Revealing Stealthy Attacks in Control Systems
2012 (English)In: 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference On Communication, Control, And Computing (Allerton), IEEE conference proceedings, 2012, 1806-1813 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
In this paper the problem of revealing stealthy data-injection attacks on control systems is addressed. In particular we consider the scenario where the attacker performs zero-dynamics attacks on the system. First, we characterize and analyze the stealthiness properties of these attacks for linear time-invariant systems. Then we tackle the problem of detecting such attacks by modifying the system's structure. Our results provide necessary and sufficient conditions that the modifications should satisfy in order to detect the zero-dynamics attacks. The results and proposed detection methods are illustrated through numerical examples.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE conference proceedings, 2012. 1806-1813 p.
Detection methods, In-control, Linear time invariant systems, Numerical example, Sufficient conditions, Zero dynamics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-103329DOI: 10.1109/Allerton.2012.6483441ISI: 000320654000250ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84875701366ISBN: 978-1-4673-4539-2OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-103329DiVA: diva2:559754
50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton, IL, USA, October 01-05, 2012
FunderSwedish Research Council, 2007- 6350Swedish Research Council, 2009-4565Knut and Alice Wallenberg FoundationICT - The Next Generation
QC 201211142012-11-142012-10-102013-07-31Bibliographically approved