The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology
2010 (English)In: Philosophical Topics, ISSN 0276-2080, Vol. 38, no 2, 181-204 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
An increasingly popular strategy among critics of ethical antirealism is to stress that the traditional arguments for those theories work just as well in the case of other areas. For example, on the basis of that idea, it has recently been claimed that ethical expressivists are committed to being expressivists also about epistemic judgments (including the judgment that it is rational to believe in ethical expressivism). This in turn is supposed to seriously undermine their position. The purpose of my paper is to examine this challenge. I argue that, in spite of the many similarities between the discourses, there are also crucial differences and that those differences justify a mixed verdict about them. According to the thesis I pursue, one can accept ethical expressivism on the basis of the traditional arguments and still, plausibly and coherently, deny a non-expressivist view about epistemic judgments.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 38, no 2, 181-204 p.
Expressivism, epistemology, ethics, argument from disagreement, argument from motivation
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-180965DOI: 10.5840/philtopics201038219OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-180965DiVA: diva2:552363