Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
2010 (English)In: Philosophical Topics, ISSN 0276-2080, Vol. 38, no 2, 181-204 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

An increasingly popular strategy among critics of ethical antirealism is to stress that the traditional arguments for those theories work just as well in the case of other areas. For example, on the basis of that idea, it has recently been claimed that ethical expressivists are committed to being expressivists also about epistemic  judgments (including the judgment that it is rational to believe in ethical expressivism). This in turn is supposed to seriously undermine their position. The purpose of my paper is to examine this challenge. I argue that, in spite of the many similarities between the discourses, there are also crucial differences and that those differences justify a mixed verdict about them. According to the thesis I pursue, one can accept ethical expressivism on the basis of the traditional arguments and still, plausibly and coherently, deny a non-expressivist view about epistemic judgments.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 38, no 2, 181-204 p.
Keyword [en]
Expressivism, epistemology, ethics, argument from disagreement, argument from motivation
National Category
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-180965DOI: 10.5840/philtopics201038219OAI: diva2:552363
Available from: 2012-09-13 Created: 2012-09-13 Last updated: 2013-12-02Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

PhilTop-Tersman-new(297 kB)66 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT02.pdfFile size 297 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Tersman, Folke
By organisation
Ethics and Social Philosophy
In the same journal
Philosophical Topics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 68 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 257 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link