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On Using Inconsistent Expressions
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2012 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 77, no 1, 133-148 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The paper discusses the Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT), the view that true is inconsistent in the sense that its meaning-constitutive principles include all instances of the truth-schema (T). It argues that (IT) entails that anyone using true in its ordinary sense is committed to all the (T)-instances and that any theory in which true is used in that sense entails the (T)-instances (which, given classical logic, entail contradictions). More specifically, I argue that theorists are committed to the meaning-constitutive principles of logical constants, relative to the interpretation they intend thereof (e.g., classical), and that theories containing logical constants entail those principles. Further, I argue, since there is no relevant difference from the case of true, inconsistency theorists' uses of true commit them to the (T)-instances. Adherents of (IT) are recommended, as a consequence, to eschew the truth-predicate. I also criticise Matti Eklund's account of how the semantic value of true is determined, which can be taken as an attempt to show how true can be consistently used, despite being inconsistent.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 77, no 1, 133-148 p.
Keyword [en]
Semantic paradoxes
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-80031DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9310-2ISI: 000304697300008OAI: diva2:552007


Available from: 2012-09-12 Created: 2012-09-12 Last updated: 2013-05-13Bibliographically approved

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