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Dworkin's Paradox
Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Physics. (Icelab)
2012 (English)In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 7, no 6, e38529- p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the coordination among them. Based on a simple assumption that an individual's welfare is proportional to how her preference is fulfilled by the actual distribution, we show that an egalitarian preference is a strict Nash equilibrium and can be favorable even in certain inhomogeneous situations. These suggest how communication can encourage and secure a notion of fairness.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 7, no 6, e38529- p.
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-57437DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0038529ISI: 000305808700004OAI: diva2:541746
Available from: 2012-07-23 Created: 2012-07-23 Last updated: 2012-07-23Bibliographically approved

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Baek, Seung Ki
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