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Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort
Dalarna University, School of Humanities and Media Studies, Philosophy.
2011 (English)In: Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, ISSN 2084-1043, Vol. 1, no 1, 69-85 p.Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued that this does not imply that person should be understood as a phased sortal concept. It will be argued that Animalism rests upon a prior conception of person, and that this implies that person must be understood as a basic substance sortal concept through which we have to individuate ourselves and others. It is further argued that this, together with the insights of Animalism, implies that persons, by necessity, are beings of a biological nature.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Krakow: IFiS , 2011. Vol. 1, no 1, 69-85 p.
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-5809OAI: diva2:520422
Available from: 2011-09-02 Created: 2011-09-02 Last updated: 2014-10-02Bibliographically approved

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Melin, Roger
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