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Calculus of Cryptographic Communication
EECS, Technical University of Berlin, Germany. (LAMP)
EPFL. (LAMP)
EECS, Technical University of Berlin, Germany. (LAMP)
2006 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We define C3, a model-based formalism that is one half of a framework for the modelling, specification and verification of cryptographic protocols. C3 consists of a design language of distributed processes and an associated (SOS) notion of concurrent execution. The other half of our framework is a property-based formalism, i.e., a logic for the specification and verification of cryptographic protocols, called CPL. The two primary features of the co-design of C3 and CPL are that reduction constraints of C3-processes are checkable via CPL-satisfaction, and that C3’s notion of observational equivalence and CPL’s notion of propositional knowledge have a common definitional basis, namely structurally indistinguishable protocol histories. Moreover, this co-design permits separation of the concerns of protocol and property description, within the same framework. Other important features of C3 are explicit notions of secure (out- of-band) communication and history-based key lookup, which together give a concrete foundation on which to base authentication and key establishment protocols. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. , 17 p.
National Category
Computer Science
Research subject
Computer Science with specialization in Computer Communication
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-162625OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-162625DiVA: diva2:461135
Conference
Joint Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security and Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis, Seattle, August 15 - 16, 2006
Note
Unpublished note accompanying a presentation at the Joint Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security and Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis, Seattle, August 15 - 16, 2006Available from: 2011-12-05 Created: 2011-12-02 Last updated: 2011-12-07Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
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Output format
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