Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit Sector: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2011 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Results in behavioral economics suggest that material incentives can crowd out motivation, if agents are mission-oriented rather than self-interested. We test this prediction on a sample of nonprot organizations in Sweden. Swedish nonprot organizations receive tax funds annually to promote human development issues through information campaigns. Traditionally, the contract with the main principal (the Swedish foreign aid agency) has been based on trust and self-regulation. We designed an experimental policy intervention, eectively replacing the trust-based contract with an increased level of monitoring from the principal, along with a threat to cut future funds if irregularities were detected. Our findings are inconsistent with (strong) motivational crowd-out. Overall, using both self-reported and observed measures of outreach, we find that the intervention improved eciency. Graphical analysis shows that non-monitored organizations exhibit a distinct tendency to maximize expenditure; in contrast, organizations in the treatment group are more likely to return unused grants to Sida. Additionally, we find no crowding out of private contributions and no evidence of a "discouraged NGO"-syndrome.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala, 2011. , 26 p.
Series
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2011:8
Keyword [en]
Bureaucrats, NGO, Economics of psychology, Foreign aid, Randomized exper-
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-161814OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-161814DiVA: diva2:457473
Available from: 2011-11-18 Created: 2011-11-17 Last updated: 2011-11-18Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(537 kB)346 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 537 kBChecksum SHA-512
4b7c0bc6365c86600dcc9c2300087901464577b457d9dbd19bb5c5404626b48b76b4394bf77b8cac2d27b40e5a21306ba98c0ef6cbc1c41f59b2010fd5e80400
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Bengtsson, NiklasEngström, Per
By organisation
Department of Economics
Economics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 346 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 518 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf