Natural selection and multiple realisation: A closer look
2013 (English)In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, I, Vol. 27, no 1, 73-83 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The target of this paper is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered doesn’t provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the “indifference” of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts it isn’t a causal factor at all in non-intentional nature. The upshot is that once the necessary initial assumption about heterogeneity is accepted there is no further explanation to do.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 27, no 1, 73-83 p.
Philosophy History of Ideas
Research subject Theoretical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-63298DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2013.783972ISI: 000325092600005OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-63298DiVA: diva2:448276
AuthorCount: 1;2011-10-142011-10-142015-08-20Bibliographically approved