Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
The State as Investment Market: An Analytical Framework for Interpreting Politics and Bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
2011 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

What type of state has emerged in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, and what kind of theoretical framework must we develop to understand its behavior and performance? This study argues that the logic of political and bureaucratic organization follows that of an investment market in which public offices are purchased with the expectation of yielding a favorable return. This theory represents a novel perspective on the post-communist state which has hitherto either been premised on modernization theory or emphasized a robustly personalistic logic of political organization.

There is a serial of linkages to this argument. First, the decisive factor for public employment is unofficial financial payments rather than merits or personal ties. The sums involved in the exchange are far greater than conventional “bribery.” The market for public offices, intimately connected from top to bottom in the state hierarchy, pertains to a much more unified system than the one found in the literature which treats political and administrative, high and low level corruption as distinct and unrelated forms. Second, individuals invest in public offices in order to convert the rights, assets and powers connected to officialdom into private capital. In this political economy, alternative markets for enrichment are subordinated to the state and poorly functioning. Third, the abundance of pecuniary corruption in Kyrgyzstan is standardized, entrenched and predictable norms of behavior in this type of state. The key to success on this market is the ability to control the supply of “public” goods and services in exchange for unofficial payments.

Finally, the risk for systemic instability increases when more reasonably inclusive personal connections and money is no longer sufficient and access to the state for earning and investing is manipulated by narrow personalistic ties. This creates pressure for returning to a more competitive market as opposed to a monopolistic order.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Government, Uppsala University , 2011. , 271 p.
Keyword [en]
Kyrgyzstan, state, investment market, sale of public offices, corruption, politics, bureaucracy
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Political Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-159378ISBN: 978-91-506-2238-6OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-159378DiVA: diva2:445254
Public defence
2011-12-19, Brusewitzsalen, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Gamla Torget 6, Uppsala, 13:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2011-11-23 Created: 2011-09-29 Last updated: 2012-10-10Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(3360 kB)882 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 3360 kBChecksum SHA-512
d526773560171a8a814f4e3ed6c981ec4a5f32119703a80e411af9fd57b10a8099e5f1eb0bc790112fdd4a1ea748501142fb5ce11395a181605592dbf9345726
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Engvall, Johan
By organisation
Department of Government
Social Sciences

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 882 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 3598 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link