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Distance Bounding with IEEE 802.15.4a: Attacks and Countermeasures
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Communication Networks.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3267-5374
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2011 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, ISSN 1536-1276, Vol. 10, 1334-1344 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband, in particular the recent standard IEEE 802.15.4a, is a primary candidate for implementing distance bounding protocols, thanks to its ability to perform accurate indoor ranging. Distance bounding protocols allow two wireless devices to securely estimate the distance between themselves, with the guarantee that the estimate is an upper-bound on the actual distance. These protocols serve as building blocks in security-sensitive applications such as tracking, physical access control, or localization.We investigate the resilience of IEEE 802.15.4a to physical-communication-layer attacks that decrease the distance measured by distance bounding protocols, thus violating their security. We consider two attack types: malicious prover (internal) and distance-decreasing relay (external). We show that if the honest devices use energy-detection receivers (popular due to their low cost and complexity), then an adversary can perform highly effective internal and external attacks, decreasing the distance by hundreds of meters. However, by using more sophisticated rake receivers, or by implementing small modifications to IEEE 802.15.4a and employing energy-detection receivers with a simple countermeasure, honest devices can reduce the effectiveness of external distance-decreasing relay attacks to the order of 10m. The same is true for malicious prover attacks, provided that an additional modification to IEEE 802.15.4a is implemented.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 10, 1334-1344 p.
Keyword [en]
Security; ranging; distance bounding; impulse radio; ultra-wideband
National Category
Communication Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-35573DOI: 10.1109/TWC.2011.020111.101219ISI: 000289841200036Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-79955480673OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-35573DiVA: diva2:429015
Funder
ICT - The Next Generation
Note
© 2011 IEEE. Personal use of the attached pdf is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. Qc 20120220Available from: 2011-07-08 Created: 2011-07-01 Last updated: 2012-06-13Bibliographically approved

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