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Svensk väpnad styrka som säkerhetspolitiskt instrument - en doktrinanalys
Swedish National Defence College.
2004 (Swedish)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [sv]

Den här uppsatsen behandlar svensk väpnad styrka som säkerhetspolitiskt instrument.Trots ett säkerhetspolitiskt alltmer gynnsamt läge syns Sveriges vilja, förmåga och beredskap att använda de resurserFM förfogar över att öka. Vilka är de miljöer och yttre omständigheter där FM: s resurser är avsedda att utnyttjasoch hur?Syftet med uppsatsen är att finna ett mönster som gör det möjligt att formulera stöd för en tänkbar doktrin förinsats med svensk väpnad styrka i internationella insatser. Metoden för detta är att genom en kvalitativ textanalysgranska samtliga insatser som påbörjats efter det kalla krigets slut och fram till idag. Analysverktyget som användshar tagits fram för att granska utrikes- och försvarspolitiska doktriner och tjänar därför uppsatsen syfte väl.Internationella insatser är ett bra uttryck för en praktisk politik. En heltäckande och objektiv bild av en svensksäkerhetspolitisk doktrin kräver analys även av annat underlag.Undersökningen visar att det finns ett mönster i svenskt agerande. Kriser och konflikter i Europa är av strategisktintresse för Sverige medan kriser och konflikter bortom Europas gränser är av moraliskt/ideologiskt intresse förSverige. Ett grundläggande svenskt intresse är respekten för folkrätten och insatser där militärt våld krävs måstebeslutas av FN:s säkerhetsråd. Fredsframtvingande insatser skall ske i specialförband med anställda som står i högberedskap. Insatser med större förband skall ske i ett fredsbevarande syfte med frivilligt rekryterade i lägre beredskapsgradmen med längre uthållighet.En doktrin eller en policy behövs för att ta fram nödvändiga medel. Ad hoc som politisk strategi kräver outtömligaresurser för att kunna skapa många alternativa handlingsmöjligheter.

Abstract [en]

This thesis deals with using armed forces as an instrument for Swedish security policy. Participationin Peace Support Operations (PSO) under the framework of The United Nations(UN) has been a part of Swedish Foreign Affairs and Security policy since 1948. In 1993, inthe beginning of the post cold-war period, Sweden sent armed forces to a somehow differentPSO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was in many ways a new kind of PSO acting under chapterVII of the UN Charter using all necessary means to enforce compliance with The UN SecurityCouncil Resolution. Swedish participation in a European crisis was possible due to the newpost cold-war security policy environment. Since 1993, Sweden has participated in PSO underthe command of THE UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union(EU).Post cold war security environment with no foreseeable military threat towards Sweden, hascaused a transformation of the Swedish armed forces. Today, new tasks put an emphasis onparticipation in PSO in close cooperation with other countries and organisations. Sweden hasarmed units on seven days alert to join a multinational PSO within 30 days. This means thatthe preparedness and willingness to use armed forces as an instrument for security policy hasincreased since the cold war ended. Under what conditions should this instrument be used andhow? Is it possible to track a Swedish doctrine for international operations? This inquiryanalyses the use of Swedish armed units in PSO between 1993 and 2004 on a politicalstrategiclevel.The Swedish constitution requires a decision from the parliament when Swedish armed unitsare sent abroad for more then Peace Keeping operations. Due to this fact, the use of armedforces as an instrument is subject to a parliamentary process that gives a lot of paper to analyse.The use of armed units in PSO is a good expression for practical security policy. Eventhough it is not possible to formulate a doctrine only by this inquiry it can be a building blocktogether with other inquiries. It is also worth mentioning that a doctrine like all other analysingtools is a simplification of the reality. The real use of armed forces is influenced by a lotof reasons. It is however useful to know the conditions for using armed forces in order to developthe right means to a certain policy.The tool for this inquiry has been developed by analysing foreign affairs policies and securitypolicies. A doctrine, in short, consists of three parts.The first thing is a description of what values or interests the doctrine is supposed to protect.The willingness of using armed forces needs certain interests to be at stake. What are theSwedish interests and do they have a national or an international dimension?Secondly there needs to be a description of the threats against those values and interests. Thedefinition of security and the threats to this security is in many ways contested. What is theSwedish point of view for using armed forces?Lastly a doctrine should deal with strategies for how to encounter those threats. How shouldthe use of armed units in multinational PSO be used to fulfil political and military objectiveswill therefore be the question in this inquiry?Analysing the use of armed units in PSO gives some guidelines to support the formulation ofa doctrine. The description of threats is the weakest link. This is possibly because of the difficultiesto define security and the threats to this security within the widened security agenda oftoday. This inquiry shows in a way that security and the use of armed forces to support thatsecurity is more than lack of military threats. The prevention of conflicts and crises on the European mainland is of strategic interest forSweden. Even the international law and the respect for The UN are strategic interests. Conflictsand crises in Africa and other places are to be looked upon as of moral/ideological interest.The use of armed forces implies certain risks. If the interests at stake are weak or are not sufficientto take the risk, some decision are strengthened with more or less practical interestssuch as experience for The Armed Forces or the need to show political will. Even an argumenton the need for The UN and The EU to cooperate in PSO is used as a reason for participatingin multinational operations. If Strategic interests are at stake Sweden is willing to usearmed forces for a long duration.Even if all operations have been working under the auspices of chapter VII of the UN charter,not all of them have included Peace Enforcement (PE). This is typical for what is called SecondGeneration Peace Keeping (SGPK). Although PE has been a part of the operation thetasks for Swedish units have been mostly SGPK. There are two major deviations from thispicture. In ISAF in Afghanistan, Swedish units were tasked to strengthen the security aroundKabul. This was more PE than something else. In Operation Artemis in Democratic Republicof Congo (DR Congo) Swedish units were tasked to facilitate the establishment of a UN missionin the eastern part of DR Congo. Also this operation was more PE than something else.The last one was also a EU-led operation. This could be a watershed that points out a newdirection for the use of armed forces in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP).The use of armed forces could also be divided in Deterrence, Compellence and Brute Force.Brute Force aims at taking total control of a defined enemy and is not very common in PSO.Deterrence is supposed to prevent crises to arise or arise anew. This could be used as a meanSof prevention or in a peacekeeping situation. PE situation might need strategies for use of violence.Compellence aims to initiate target action or stop target action. The opposing actor canstop the violence by full compliance with the condition that gives the operation legitimacy.For Sweden, this condition must be a UN Security Council Resolution. Even if Swedish unitsonly in Operation Artemis and ISAF have used PE means, this tool is not abandoned. It ishowever significant that those operations were carried out by professional officers withinunits highly specialised.There is in many ways a need for clear policy lines and corresponding necessary means includingmilitary means. This is, if nothing else, the lessons learned of the Balkan crises. TheSwedish participation in PSO since the cold war could very well be the reason for EU expectingSweden to put up a Battle Group. Such a policy needs to be followed by some kind ofdoctrine. Ad hoc as policy strategy is only possible if the means to fulfil that policy allowsalmost endless amount of courses of action. This Inquiry could be a building block for such adoctrine.To conclude, this inquiry shows that small units specialised with high readiness should bedeveloped for use on the European mainland and has PE capabilities. Larger units could beput together for use in SGPK operation globally.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2004. , 61 p.
Keyword [sv]
Fredsbevarande styrkor, Säkerhetspolitik, Sverige, Militära operationer, Uppsatser, Chefsprogrammet, Chefsprogrammet 2002-2004, Internationella aspekter
National Category
Social Sciences
URN: urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-1740OAI: diva2:428491
Educational program
Chefsprogrammet. (ChP)
Social and Behavioural Science, Law
Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 02-04Available from: 2011-06-30 Created: 2011-06-30 Last updated: 2011-06-30Bibliographically approved

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