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Preference and Choice
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9618-577X
2011 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2011. , 62 p.
Series
Theses in Risk and Safety from the Division of Philosophy at the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1654-627X
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-34690ISBN: 978-91-7415-951-6OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-34690DiVA: diva2:422406
Public defence
2011-05-18, F3, Lindstedtsvägen 26, KTH, Stockholm, 10:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Note

QC 20110613

Available from: 2011-06-13 Created: 2011-06-13 Last updated: 2015-06-15Bibliographically approved
List of papers
1. A Note in Defence of Ratificationism
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Note in Defence of Ratificationism
2011 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 75, no 1, 147-150 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theorygives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, ThePsychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Eganargues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. Thispaper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations.Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decisiontheory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-34644 (URN)10.1007/s10670-010-9267-6 (DOI)000293411600011 ()2-s2.0-79961028479 (ScopusID)
Available from: 2011-06-13 Created: 2011-06-13 Last updated: 2011-09-05Bibliographically approved
2. A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences
2010 (English)In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 64, no 2, 251-257 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The standard argument for the claim that rational preferences are transitive is the pragmatic money-pump argument. However, a money-pump only exploits agents with cyclic strict preferences. In order to pump agents who violate transitivity but without a cycle of strict preferences, one needs to somehow induce such a cycle. Methods for inducing cycles of strict preferences from non-cyclic violations of transitivity have been proposed in the literature, based either on offering the agent small monetary transaction premiums or on multi-dimensional preferences. This paper argues that previous proposals have been flawed and presents a new approach based on the dominance principle.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-27278 (URN)10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01230.x (DOI)000279021400008 ()2-s2.0-77953935910 (ScopusID)
Note
QC 20101214Available from: 2010-12-14 Created: 2010-12-09 Last updated: 2012-03-20Bibliographically approved
3. Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument
2010 (English)In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 60, no 241, 754-763 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The small-improvement argument is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, viz the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required either to prefer one of the alternatives to the other or to be indifferent between them. We argue that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. As a result, the reasons do not provide support for believing the conjunction of the premises. Without support for the conjunction of the premises, the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2010
Keyword
rational requirements, the small-improvement argument, money-pumps, incomparability
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-11055 (URN)10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.648.x (DOI)000281896500006 ()2-s2.0-77957005429 (ScopusID)
Note
QC 20101013Available from: 2009-09-13 Created: 2009-09-13 Last updated: 2011-06-13Bibliographically approved
4. An extended framework for preference relations
Open this publication in new window or tab >>An extended framework for preference relations
2011 (English)In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 27, no 2, 101-108 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-34689 (URN)10.1017/S0266267111000010 (DOI)000292793300001 ()2-s2.0-79960240828 (ScopusID)
Available from: 2011-06-13 Created: 2011-06-13 Last updated: 2011-08-02Bibliographically approved
5. Freedom of choice and expected compromise
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Freedom of choice and expected compromise
2010 (English)In: Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN 0176-1714, E-ISSN 1432-217x, Vol. 35, no 1, 65-79 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

Keyword
AXIOMATIC APPROACH, PREFERENCE, DIVERSITY, OPPORTUNITY
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-25223 (URN)10.1007/s00355-009-0430-4 (DOI)000277794300005 ()2-s2.0-77952553685 (ScopusID)
Note
QC 20101013Available from: 2010-10-13 Created: 2010-10-13 Last updated: 2011-06-13Bibliographically approved

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