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A Different Kind of Ignorance: Self-Deception as Flight from Self-Knowledge
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
2011 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self-deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self-deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self-deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self-knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Philosophy , 2011. , 198 p.
Keyword [en]
self-deception, self-knowledge, anxiety, rationality, intentionality, psychoanalysis, Freud, Davidson, Gardner, Lear
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-150701ISBN: 978-91-506-2206-5OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-150701DiVA: diva2:408360
Public defence
2011-05-14, Gejiersalen, Building 6, Engelska Parken, Humanistiskt Centrum, Uppsala, 13:15 (Swedish)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2011-04-20 Created: 2011-04-04 Last updated: 2011-04-20Bibliographically approved

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Hållén, Elinor
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