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Agency Costs in the Process of Development
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
1996 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We analyze an economy where production is subject to moral hazard. The degree of the incentive (agency) costs introduced by the presence of moral hazard naturally depends on the information structure in the economy; it is cheaper to induce correct incentives in a society which posesses better ex post information. The degree of ex post information depends on the number of projects and entrepreneurs in the economy; the more projects, the better the information. This implies that at the early stages of development, the range of projects and the amount of information are limited and agency costs are high. Since the information created by a project is an externality on others, the decentralized economy is constrained inefficient; in particular, it does not 'experiment' enough. The analysis of the role of information also opens the way to an investigation of the development of financial institutions. We contrast the information aggregation role of stock markets and information production role of banks. Because the amount of available information increases with development, our model predicts the pattern of financial development observed in practice; banks first and stock markets later.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University , 1996. , 40 p.
Series
Seminar Paper / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, ISSN 0347-8769 ; 607
Keyword [en]
Agency Costs, Development, Information, Financial Institutions, Social Experimentation
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41011OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-41011DiVA: diva2:327734
Available from: 2013-01-25 Created: 2010-06-30 Last updated: 2013-01-25Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
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  • Other style
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Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
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  • asciidoc
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