This study explores how provisions for rebel integration into government affect the durability of peace agreements. Based on models of power-sharing, peacebuilding, and spoiler dynamics, the paper investigates whether former rebel groups in governance diminish the risk of peace agreement termination. Based on a logistic regression analysis of 210 peace agreements drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset (1975–2021), the study shows that peace settlements with explicit provisions for rebel integration are linked to a lower risk of agreement termination. When rebels are integrated into government systems, the incentive to undermine agreements reduces, making it more likely that peace will hold, the findings suggest. But the analysis also identifies powerful destabilizing factors, like provisions for foreign troop withdrawals, which strongly correlate with higher termination risks. Lastly, commissions in charge of implementation, that is highly anticipated to make peace agreements more durable, also display little statistical significance in predicting durability of agreement. Such insights contribute to the post-conflict governance literature by stressing the importance of institutionalized rebel participation for sustaining peace. The study indicates that more long-term studies on the political implications of the integration of rebels are needed and that future studies should test additional control variables, use different mediation and modeling techniques, and include mixed-methods approaches to better support causal claims.