The collapse of the UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica in 1995, notably the involvement of Dutchbat, remains an important turning point in international peacekeeping. This study looks at how the Netherlands has changed its military doctrine and peacekeeping processes in response to the failures at Srebrenica, with a particular focus on operational autonomy, ethical accountability, and civilian protection. The study fills a significant gap in the current literature by examining long-term institutional learning rather than just the immediate consequences and actions after a tragedy.

To do this, a qualitative research approach was used with a major focus on document analysis of government reports, military doctrines, peacekeeping evaluations, and scholarly literature. The study uses Social Constructivism, Just peace theory and the concepts of negative and positive peace to analyze how past failures have affected later Dutch peacekeeping operations. Significant changes are highlighted in the findings, including clearer command structures, more legal and ethical accountability, and greater civilian protection standards. These changes may be seen in later peacekeeping missions, such as those in Mali and Afghanistan, where Dutch forces have used lessons learned from Srebrenica.