Although civilians should be protected in armed conflict, they are also deliberately targeted for strategic gain. Punishment strategies are often conceptualized as calculative tools that harm civilians to coerce the adversary. This understanding reflects an inherent assumption that actors behave rationally in conflict. However, this view has limitations because rationality is seen as the opposite of emotion and cannot fully capture the dynamics of punishment strategies, as no human endeavor is devoid of emotions. By questioning the rational assumptions of strategy and investigating them from an emotion-centric perspective, this study aims to understand how emotions relate to different types of punishment. The thesis develops a Punishment Typology with four distinct types of punishment: deterrent, demoralizing, preemptive, and vengeful punishment, illustrated by case studies. The theoretical contribution also specifies how deterrent and demoralizing punishments are coercive strategies intended to manipulate the adversary’s emotions to achieve an objective, while preemptive and vengeful punishments are reactive strategies that explain how a strategist’s emotional reaction to a situation influences behavior and cognition. The study finds that emotions are indeed related to different instances of punishment, and emotions can be rooted in the strategist population at large. It also challenges the assumption that demoralization is more closely related to fear than sadness. Finally, it finds that reactive strategies are often not openly acknowledged and are frequently rationalized to shape a narrative. The emotion-centric approach is, therefore, useful in scrutinizing sentiments and interpreting underlying intentions.