This essay on Swedish constitutional law aims to compare two alternative ways of regulating how the parliament and government set out norms before and during peacetime crises. Based on severity, a peacetime crisis is defined as a situation that occurs between an accident and war. Initially, the essay examines how the two norm-setting actors establish norms in the event of a peacetime crisis today. The Instrument of Government (1974:152) does not contain any possibility to declare a general state of emergency. In order to manage the crisis, the Swedish parliament and government is dependent upon the ordinary norm-setting rules. Thus, the norm-setting rules as they appear in the 8th chapter of the Instrument of Government, are applicable during both normal times and peacetime crises. 

The essay then continues to examine how the constitutional conditions in this regard is proposed to be changed by the state investigation SOU 2023:75. The committee which framed out the proposal suggests that a new 16th chapter should be introduced in the Instrument of Government. When certain preconditions are met, the 16th chapter would give both the parliament and the government power to declare a state of emergency through which it will be possible to set aside the ordinary norm-setting rules as they appear in the 8th chapter of the Instrument of Government. Ultimately, the government would have the power to give itself the right to set out norms which according to the current order are reserved only for the parliament. A central aim for the proposal is to enable a more flexible and effective peacetime crisis management. 

Though, this type of expansion of the government’s norm-setting power does not come without risk. Peacetime crises have a history of being utilized for misuse by opportunistic governments. In order to enable an effective crisis management as well as ensuring fundamental values of the rule of law, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission), has modelled out principles of states of emergency. Consequently, the main question that is analyzed in this essay is how the two constitutional alternatives relate to the Venice Commission’s principles. One conclusion is that the proposal better fulfills the principles of states of emergency than the current order. Though, during the final discussion, it is argued that several questions remain unanswered when isolating the analysis to the Venice Commission’s principles. There is no definite answer to questions concerning the actual effectiveness of a declaration of a state of emergency. Other unanswered questions are how the 16th chapter would in fact influence the protection of the human rights as well as how perilous the normalization of the state of emergency would be.