Scholars within the research field of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) have argued that the European Union is mainly a normative power that renounces all sorts of realpolitik (or pragmatic politics), which instead acts by its moral principles (normative justifications). However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led the European Commission (EC) to put forward new defence industrial strategies that would strengthen the European defence industry. This thesis examines how the EC, since the invasion, has discursively represented the EU (the ‘self’) and Russia (the ‘other’) in such a manner as to normatively and non-normatively justify the new defence industrial strategies. The previous literature and the results from the analysis show that the EC’s new ‘principled pragmatist’ identity demonstrates two discourses: one exhibiting a geopolitical mindscape and geostrategic interests, and one expressing normative justifications. My findings suggest that although these two discourses could be compatible within the NPE theoretical framework, the general lack of normative justifications in the former discourse challenges the EC’s normative claims and ultimately its representation of itself as a Normative Power Europe. As the EC’s self-perception has changed through its representations, external states might perceive the EU differently in the future, which in turn could significantly alter the geopolitical landscape.