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Safeguarding NMA Enhanced Galileo OS Signals from Distance-Decreasing Attacks
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering. KTH Royal Institute of Technology.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering. RISE SICS.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3267-5374
2019 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Increased use of global satellite navigation systems (GNSS), for applications such as autonomous vehicles, intelligent transportationsystems and drones, heightens security concerns. Civil GNSS signals are vulnerable to notably spoofing and replayattacks. To counter such attacks, cryptographic methods are developed: Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) is onesuch scheme, about to be deployed for Galileo E1 Open Service (OS); it allows receivers to verify the signal origin andprotects navigation message integrity. However, NMA signals cannot fully thwart replay attacks, which do not require forgingnavigation messages. Classic replay attacks, e.g, meaconing, retransmit previously recorded signals without any modification,thus highly limiting the capacity of the adversary. Distance-decreasing (DD) attacks are a strong type of replay attack,allowing fine-grained individual pseudorange manipulation in real time. Moreover, DD attacks counterbalance processing andtransmission delays induced by adversary, by virtue of shifting earlier in time the perceived (relayed) signal arrival; thusshortening the pseudorange measurements. In this paper, we first analyze how DD attacks can harm the Galileo E1 OSNMAservice assuming the adversary has no prior information on the navigation message. Moreover,we propose a DD attackdetection method based on a Goodness of Fit test on the prompt correlator outputs of the victim. The results show that themethod can detect the DD attacks even when the receiver has locked to the DD signals.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Miami, Florida, 2019. p. 4041-4052
National Category
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-265517OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-265517DiVA, id: diva2:1377572
Conference
Proceedings of the 32nd International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2019)
Note

QC  20191212

Available from: 2019-12-12 Created: 2019-12-12 Last updated: 2019-12-12Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(1952 kB)19 downloads
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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
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