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What can debunking do for us (sceptics and nihilists)?
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2019 (English)In: Ratio (Oxford. Print), ISSN 0034-0006, E-ISSN 1467-9329, Vol. 32, no 4, p. 290-299Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Debunking arguments in metaethics are often presented as particularly challenging for non‐naturalistic versions of moral realism. The first aim of this paper is to explore and defend a response on behalf of non‐naturalism. The second aim of the paper is to argue that although non‐naturalism’s response is satisfactory, this does not mean that debunking arguments are metaethically uninteresting. They have a limited and indirect role to play in the exchange between non‐naturalists and moral error theorists. In the end, debunking arguments can do less for sceptics and nihilists than what is commonly thought, but not nothing.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. Vol. 32, no 4, p. 290-299
Keywords [en]
debunking, error theory, Moorean arguments, moral realism, non‐naturalism, scepticism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-175966DOI: 10.1111/rati.12229ISI: 000495576000006OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-175966DiVA, id: diva2:1369478
Available from: 2019-11-12 Created: 2019-11-12 Last updated: 2019-12-09Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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  • apa
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