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Fichte i Heliopolis: En undersökning av det intersubjektiva jaget i vetenskapsläran
Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Philosophy.
2019 (Swedish)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

This essay examines the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Fichte, the ultimate ground of philosophy is the infinite self-positing activity of the I. However, this self-positing activity must have as its product a determined I, and therefore it must establish a limit to the I’s original infinity. Further, such a limit is only thinkable as a relation to that which lies beyond it: the negation of the I, or the not-I.

By this characterization of the nature of the I, Fichte establishes it as a paradoxical concept that is at once infinite and finite. To solve this paradox, he introduces the concept of a “check” (Anstoβ) that puts a halt to the outward-striving activity of the I. In experiencing this check, the I is not limited by something outside of itself, which would negate its position as the ultimate ground of its own being, but rather is given the task of positing its own limit.

In Grundlage des Naturrechts, Fichte develops this idea through another concept: that of a “summons” (Aufforderung) given to the I by another subject. Since the I is characterized by containing the ground of its own being, the intersubjective relation to the other is conditioned by the I limiting itself, so that the self-grounding character of the other can be recognized. In experiencing the summons of the other, though, the I does not only posit a limit for itself, but also becomes conscious of its own nature as a free, self-positing subject. Intersubjectivity, therefore, must be considered a fundamental element of the I as such. In Fichte’s own words: “No I, no Thou; no Thou, no I.”

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. , p. 61
Keywords [en]
Fichte, German Idealism, Intersubjectivity
Keywords [sv]
Fichte, tysk idealism, intersubjektivitet
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-39229OAI: oai:DiVA.org:sh-39229DiVA, id: diva2:1365967
Subject / course
Philosophy
Uppsok
Humanities, Theology
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2019-10-28 Created: 2019-10-27 Last updated: 2019-10-28Bibliographically approved

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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
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