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Estate division: equal sharing, exchange motives, and Cinderella effects
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies. Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8826-0410
2019 (English)In: Journal of Population Economics, ISSN 0933-1433, E-ISSN 1432-1475, Vol. 32, no 4, p. 1437-1480Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This study contributes to the empirical literature testing bequest motives by using a population-wide administrative dataset, covering data on inherited amounts for complete families matched with an extensive set of economic and demographic variables, to estimate the influence of child characteristics on differences in inherited amounts among siblings. Our main findings are, first, children who are more likely to have provided services to the parent receive more than their siblings, as predicted by the exchange model. Second, daughters with children receive more than sons with children. This is consistent with the prediction of the evolutionary model that larger investments should go to offspring who are certain to be genetically related. There are also Cinderella effects-that is, adopted stepchildren receive less than siblings who are biological or children who are adopted by both parents. Third, we do not find support for the prediction of the altruism model that bequests are compensatory.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
SPRINGER , 2019. Vol. 32, no 4, p. 1437-1480
Keywords [en]
Estate division, Equal sharing, Exchange motives, Adopted children
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-391275DOI: 10.1007/s00148-018-0727-7ISI: 000477028000010OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-391275DiVA, id: diva2:1345515
Funder
Swedish Research Council, VR 446-2013-8058The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, P2013:0101:1The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, P2015:0147:1Available from: 2019-08-26 Created: 2019-08-26 Last updated: 2019-08-26Bibliographically approved

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