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The role of identification for the motivational force of moral judgments
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
2019 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

What is the relationship between judging something as good and being motivated to acton this judgment? Motivational internalism is the thesis that there is a necessaryconnection between moral judgments and motivation. Externalists typically believe that ajudgment-independent desire is needed for the moral judgment to be motivating. Tobridge the gap between internalism and externalism, a few philosophers have appealed totheories of identification-based moral judgments. This implies that although moraljudgments may not be necessarily motivating in general, it could be possible to define acertain kind of identification-based moral judgment that is necessarily motivating. HereinI will examine the role identification plays for moral motivation. I will first analyse anargument that uses an identification-incompatible moral judgment to show thatinternalism is false. I will argue that this argument is unconvincing and that identificationdoes not preclude identification-incompatible moral judgments from being motivating.The identification-based argument hence does not support that internalism is false.Second, I will argue that identification can provide the motivational force needed to makecertain identity-based moral judgments necessarily motivating. This identification-basedaccount does however, I will argue, not support internalism. Despite presenting a kind ofmoral judgment that is necessarily motivating, it is an externalist account of theconnection between moral judgments and motivation since a judgment-independentdesire is a necessary source of its motivational force.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. , p. 25
Keywords [en]
judgment internalism, motivational internalism, externalism, identification, motivation, volitional necessity, self-consistency
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-162365OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-162365DiVA, id: diva2:1343332
Subject / course
Philosophy
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2019-08-16 Created: 2019-08-16 Last updated: 2019-08-16Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
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Language
  • de-DE
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  • en-US
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  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
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Output format
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