The rapid adoption of networks that are based on "cloudification" and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) comes from the anticipated high cost savings of up to 70% in their build and operation. The high savings are founded in the use of general standard servers, instead of single-purpose hardware, and by efficiency resource sharing through virtualisation concepts. In this paper, we discuss the capabilities of resource description of "on-board" tools, i.e. using standard Linux commands, to enable OPEX savings. We put a focus on monitoring resources on small time-scales and on the variation observed on such scales. We introduce a QoE-based comparative concept that relates guest and host views on "utilisation" and "load" for the analysis of the variations. We describe the order of variations in "utilisation" and "load" by measurement and by graphical analysis of the measurements. We do these evaluations for different host operating systems and monitoring tools.

Cloudified architectures facilitate resource ac-cess and sharing which is independent from physical lo-cations. They permit high availability of resources at lowoperational costs. These advantages, however, do not comefor free. End users might fear that they lose control overthe location of their data and, thus, of their autonomy indeciding to whom the data is communicate to. Thus, strongprivacy and trust concerns arise for end users.In this work we will review and investigate privacy andtrust requirements for Cloud systems in general and for acloud-based marketplace (CMP) for AI in particular. We willinvestigate whether and how the current privacy and trustdimensions can be applied to Clouds and for the design ofa CMP. We also propose the concept of a "virtual premise"for enabling "Privacy-by-Design" [1] in Clouds. The ideaof a "virtual premise" might probably not be a universalsolution for any privacy requirement. However, we expectthat it provides flexibility in designing privacy in Cloudsand thus leading to higher trust.

The use of data is essential for the capabilities of Data-driven Artificial intelligence (AI), Deep Learning and Big Data analysis techniques. This data usage, however, raises intrinsically the concerns on data privacy. In addition, supporting collaborative development of AI applications across organisations has become a major need in AI system design. Digital Rights Management (DRM) is required to protect intellectual property in such collaboration. As a consequence of DRM, privacy threats and privacy-enforcing mechanisms will interact with each other.

This paper describes the privacy and DRM requirements in collaborative AI system design using AI pipelines. It describes the relationships between DRM and privacy and outlines the threats against these non-functional features. Finally, the paper provides first security architecture to protect against the threats on DRM and privacy in collaborative AI design using AI pipelines. 

IoT systems are increasingly composed out of flexible, programmable, virtualised, and arbitrarily chained IoT elements and services using portable code. Moreover, they might be sliced, i.e. allowing multiple logical IoT systems (network + application) to run on top of a shared physical network and compute infrastructure. However, implementing and designing particularly security mechanisms for such IoT systems is challenging since a) promising technologies are still maturing, and b) the relationships among the many requirements, technologies and components are difficult to model a-priori.

The aim of the paper is to define design cues for the security architecture and mechanisms of future, virtualised, arbitrarily chained, and eventually sliced IoT systems. Hereby, our focus is laid on the authorisation and authentication of user, host, and code integrity in these virtualised systems. The design cues are derived from the design and implementation of a secure virtual environment for distributed and collaborative AI system engineering using so called AI pipelines. The pipelines apply chained virtual elements and services and facilitate the slicing of the system. The virtual environment is denoted for short as the virtual premise (VP). The use-case of the VP for AI design provides insight into the complex interactions in the architecture, leading us to believe that the VP concept can be generalised to the IoT systems mentioned above. In addition, the use-case permits to derive, implement, and test solutions. This paper describes the flexible architecture of the VP and the design and implementation of access and execution control in virtual and containerised environments.