This paper examines how Speller’s theory of success in amphibious operations can be applied on a successful amphibious operation. The research has been encouraged by the fact that previous research concerning success in amphibious operations appears to be lacking. No previous studies of the theory have been found, which further strengthen the necessity for this study. The theory is examined by a single-case study of the recognised amphibious assault on Inchon during the Korean War. The theory is able to explain the success, otherwise the credence to the theory would be refuted.

The result of the analysis discloses that Speller’s theory successfully explains the Inchon success in every analytical aspect but deception. The study shows that the coalition forces did not manage to or intend to deceive the North Korean opponent in relation to how an amphibious landing should take place. This study supports the theory as explanatory and can serve as vital knowledge when planning and executing an amphibious operation; however, to strengthen the study’s result, further studies are necessary.