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Moral Practice after Error Theory: Negotiationism
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2019 (English)In: The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously / [ed] Richard Joyce, Richard Garner, New York: Routledge, 2019, p. 113-130Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

We first deal with a few preliminary matters and discuss what-if any-distinct  impact belief in moral error theory should have on our moral practice. Second,  we describe what is involved in giving an answer to our leading question and take  notice of some factors that are relevant to what an adequate answer might look  like. We also argue that the specific details of adequate answers to our leading  question will depend largely on context. Third, we consider three extant answers  to our leading question: fictionalism, conservationism, and abolitionism. Of these  three, conservationism seems most promising. However, conservationism leaves  pertinent questions unanswered. In order to provide answers to these questions,  and ultimately to provide an answer to our leading question, conservationism  needs to be supplemented, yielding an account we call “negotiationism.” This  final proposal is not neat and tidy, but it might work reasonably well in the moral  environment in which error theorists are likely to find themselves.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York: Routledge, 2019. p. 113-130
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-166391ISBN: 978-0-8153-5859-6 (print)ISBN: 978-1-351-12215-3 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-166391DiVA, id: diva2:1291929
Available from: 2019-02-26 Created: 2019-02-26 Last updated: 2019-02-28Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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