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A median voter model of health insurance with ex post moral hazard
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2001 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly (1968); people face incentives for excess utilization of medical care since they do not pay the full marginal cost for provision. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, a coinsurance can be included in the insurance contract. We analyze under what conditions there is a conflict between individuals on what coinsurance rate should be set with public health insurance, and we establish conditions for a median-voter equilibrium. Then we allow the public insurance to be supplemented with private insurance, and we establish conditions under which public provision will lead to larger aggregate spending than private provision does.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Nationalekonomiska institutionen , 2001. , p. 34
Series
Working paper, ISSN 0284-2904
Keywords [en]
Economics
Keywords [sv]
Nationalekonomi
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2515ISBN: 99-3442461-4 OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-2515DiVA, id: diva2:128776
Available from: 2001-01-01 Created: 2001-01-01

Open Access in DiVA

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