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Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
1999 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. We show existence of equilibrium under mild assumptions for an arbitrary number of parties. The main result is that if the parties are more extreme, then they spend less resources on campaigning (on average), compared with moderate parties. The reason is the following. Consider voters that are informed by one party only, say party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform moves closer to the indifferent voters peak. By concavity of preferences, the increase in payoff of voting for the party that informed is bigger than the increase in payoff of voting for the other party. Thus, the previously indifferent voter now strictly prefers party 1. The effect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are moderate. Since spending increases, voters are (on average) more informed when parties are moderates.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Nationalekonomiska institutionen , 1999. , p. 46
Series
Working paper, ISSN 0284-2904
Keyword [en]
Economics
Keyword [sv]
Nationalekonomi
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2448ISBN: 99-2978639-2 OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-2448DiVA, id: diva2:128709
Available from: 1999-01-01 Created: 1999-01-01

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf