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DISH: DIstributed SHuffling against selective jamming attack in IEEE 802.15.4e TSCH networks
RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, ICT, SICS. (Security Lab)ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8842-9810
University of Pisa, Italy.
University of Pisa, Italy.
University of Pisa, Italy.
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2018 (English)In: ACM transactions on sensor networks, ISSN 1550-4867, E-ISSN 1550-4859Article in journal (Refereed) Accepted
Abstract [en]

The MAC standard amendment IEEE 802.15.4e is designed to meet the requirements of industrial and critical applications. In particular, the Time Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode divides time into periodic, equally-sized, slotframes composed of transmission timeslots. Then, it combines timeslotted access with multi-channel and channel hopping capabilities, providing large network capacity, high reliability and predictable latency, while ensuring energy efficiency. Since every network node considers the same timeslots at each sloframe and selects physical channels according to a periodic function, TSCH produces a steady channel utilization pattern. This can be exploited by a selective jammer to entirely thwart communications of a victim node, in a way that is stealthy, effective and extremely energy efficient. This paper shows how a selective jamming attack can be successfully performed even though TSCH uses the IEEE 802.15.4e security services. Furthermore, we propose DISH, a countermeasure which randomly permutes the timeslot and channel utilization patterns at every slotframe in a consistent and completely distributed way, without requiring any additional message exchange. We have implemented DISH for the Contiki OS and tested its effectiveness onTelosB sensor nodes. Quantitative analysis for different network configurations shows that DISH effectively contrasts selective jamming with negligible performance penalty.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018.
Keywords [en]
IEEE 802.15.4e, TSCH, Security, Selective Jamming, Denial of Service, Secure Schedule Permutation
National Category
Communication Systems Embedded Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-33956OAI: oai:DiVA.org:ri-33956DiVA, id: diva2:1229818
Available from: 2018-07-02 Created: 2018-07-02 Last updated: 2018-07-02Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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