Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör: En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister
Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Business Studies.
Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Business Studies.
2016 (Swedish)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [sv]

Studiens syfte: Denna studie har som syfte att undersöka hur svenska venture capital aktörer minimerar asymmetrisk information i samarbetsprocessen med entreprenören.

Metod: Studien är av fallstudiedesign med kvalitativ ansats där semistrukturerade intervjuer samt enkät med slutna frågor har använts för att samla in data.

Empiri: Det empiriska materialet visar hur tre svenska venture capital aktörer noggrant och effektivt väljer investeringsobjekt och sedan arbetar aktivt för att dessa bolag ska bli så bra som möjligt.

Slutsats: Studien visar att svenska venture capital aktörer använder sig av en kombination av olika verktyg och att bygga förtroende mellan de olika parterna för att minimera risken med asymmetrisk information. 

Abstract [en]

Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine how the Swedish venture capital operators minimize the asymmetric information that may occur during an investment process.

Method: This study has a case study design using a qualitative approach in which semi- structured interviews and a questionnaire with closed-end questions were used to collect data.

Research: The empirical data shows how Swedish Venture Capital operators accurately and efficiently selects investment targets and then actively work for the companies they invest in.

Conclusion: The main result of this investigation is that Swedish venture capital operators use a combination of different tools and trust to minimize the risk of asymmetric information. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. , p. 40
Keyword [en]
Private Equity, venture capital, asymmetric information, Moral Hazard, Agency Theory
Keyword [sv]
Private equity, venture capital, asymmetrisk information, Moral Hazard, Agency theory
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32186OAI: oai:DiVA.org:sh-32186DiVA, id: diva2:1077769
Subject / course
Business Studies
Uppsok
Social and Behavioural Science, Law
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2017-03-02 Created: 2017-03-01 Last updated: 2017-03-02Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(1450 kB)159 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 1450 kBChecksum SHA-512
df741096e74280615626ce24eb4ae8ac79dfb9dc26f653db2d5ba8a9d55448793e934b73860d5dc33f6f8d16a3131679f22cfb8e50068201f3e2d7d7fcf5b2cf
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

By organisation
Business Studies
Business Administration

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 159 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 234 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
v. 2.34-SNAPSHOT
|