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Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7483-7060
2016 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 173, no 4, p. 1007-1030Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 173, no 4, p. 1007-1030
Keyword [en]
Perception; Intentionalism, Inferential reasons, Justification, Dogmatism; Defeasibility
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-137913DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0538-6OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-137913DiVA, id: diva2:1065011
Projects
The Nature of Belief
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2013-737
Available from: 2017-01-13 Created: 2017-01-13 Last updated: 2017-11-29Bibliographically approved

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