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Semantic Information and Information Security: Definitional Issues
Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5830-3432
2016 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This licentiate thesis consist of two separate research papers which concern two tangential topics – that of semantic information and that of information security. Both topics are approached by similar methods, i.e. with a concern about conceptual and definitional issues. In Paper I – concerning the concept of information, and a semantic conception thereof – the conceptual, and definitional, issues focus on one property, that of truthfulness. It is argued – against the veridicality thesis – that semantic information need not be truthful. In Paper II – concerning information security – it is argued that the current leading definitions (so-called ‘CIA’ definitions, which define information as secure if, and only if, the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability are retained) suffer from both actual and possible counter-examples, and lack an appropriate conceptual sense. On the basis of this criticism a new kind of definitions is proposed and argued for.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2016. , p. 50
Series
Theses in philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1650-8831 ; 57
Keyword [en]
definitions, distinctions, philosophy of information, philosophy of risk, security, information, information security, semantics, semantic information, veridicality thesis, informativity, RIGHT, CIA
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-198630ISBN: 978-91-7729-244-9 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-198630DiVA, id: diva2:1058268
Presentation
2017-02-07, 1515, Teknikringen 74D, Stockholm, 13:00 (Swedish)
Opponent
Supervisors
Projects
SECURIT
Funder
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, H5392
Note

QC 20161220

Available from: 2017-01-17 Created: 2016-12-19 Last updated: 2017-01-25Bibliographically approved
List of papers
1. Does Semantic Information Need to be Truthful?
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Does Semantic Information Need to be Truthful?
2017 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Abstract [en]

The concept of information has well-known difficulties. Among the many issues that have been discussed is the alethic nature of a semantic conception of information. Floridi (Minds Mach 14(2):197–222, 2004; Philos Phenomenol Res 70:351–370, 2005; EUJAP 3(1):31–41, 2007; The philosophy of information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) argued that semantic information must be truthful. In this article, arguments will be presented in favor of an alethically neutral conception of semantic information and it will be shown that such a conception can withstand Floridi’s criticism. In particular, it is argued that an alethically neutral conception of semantic information can manage the so-called Bar-Hillel Carnap paradox, according to which contradictions have maximum informational content. This issue, as well as some of Floridi’s other arguments, is resolved by disentangling the property of being information from the property of being informative. The essay’s final conclusion is that although semantic information is alethically neutral, a veridical conception of semantic information can, and should, be retained as a subconcept of semantic information (i.e., as veridical semantic information), as it is essential for the analysis of informativity, which, unlike the property of being information, depends on truth.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2017
Keyword
Bar-Hillel Carnap paradox; Floridi; Information liar paradox; Informativity; Philosophy of information; Semantic information; Veridicality thesis
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-198673 (URN)10.1007/s11229-017-1587-5 (DOI)2-s2.0-85032033747 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20161220

Available from: 2017-01-17 Created: 2016-12-20 Last updated: 2018-04-25Bibliographically approved
2. Defining Information Security
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Defining Information Security
2017 (English)In: Science and Engineering Ethics, ISSN 1353-3452, E-ISSN 1471-5546Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article proposes a new definition of information security, the ‘Appropriate Access’ definition. Apart from providing the basic criteria for a definition—correct demarcation and meaning concerning the state of security—it also aims at being a definition suitable for any information security perspective. As such, it bridges the conceptual divide between so-called ‘soft issues’ of information security (those including, e.g., humans, organizations, culture, ethics, policies, and law) and more technical issues. Because of this it is also suitable for various analytical purposes, such as analysing possible security breaches, or for studying conflicting attitudes on security in an organization. The need for a new definition is demonstrated by pointing to a number of problems for the standard definition type of information security—the so-called CIA definition. Besides being too broad as well as too narrow, it cannot properly handle the soft issues of information security, nor recognize the contextual and normative nature of security.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2017
Keyword
Appropriate access; CIA definition; Defining information security; Ethical aspects on information security; Human aspects on information security; Information security
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-198672 (URN)10.1007/s11948-017-9992-1 (DOI)2-s2.0-85034044188 (Scopus ID)
Funder
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
Note

QC 20161220

Available from: 2017-01-17 Created: 2016-12-20 Last updated: 2018-04-25Bibliographically approved

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