Ambiguity attitudes, framing, and consistency
2016 (English)In: Theory and Decision, ISSN 0040-5833, E-ISSN 1573-7187, Vol. 81, no 3, 313-337 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg's single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects' consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 81, no 3, 313-337 p.
Ambiguity attitudes, Framing, Consistency of choice, Ellsberg paradox
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-306765DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9544-1ISI: 000384581700002OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-306765DiVA: diva2:1044483
FunderEU, FP7, Seventh Framework Programme, 295449