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Relationen mellan ägarstruktur, agentkostnad och risk i EU-länders banker
Kristianstad University, School of Health and Society.
Kristianstad University, School of Health and Society.
2016 (Swedish)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesisAlternative title
The relationship between ownership structure, agency cost and risk in EU countries' banks (English)
Abstract [sv]

Tidigare finanskriser har resulterat i ett större fokus på bankers risktagande. Kriserna har påvisat hur bankers kris kan få förödande effekt på den globala marknaden vilket har föranlett olika konsekvenser (bland annat i form av nya regelverk) för att hantera bankers tendens mot ett för högt risktagande. Bankers inställning till risktagande kan förklaras utifrån dess ägarstruktur där ägarna kan ha olika riskpreferenser.

 

Forskningsstudier har påvisat att ett samband existerar mellan ägarkoncentration och bankers risk, dock utan någon konsensus om sambandets utseende. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur ägarstruktur påverkar bankers konkursrisk, där banker inom EU-länder har undersökts. Vidare har karaktären på bankernas största aktieägare tagits i beaktning för att se om sambandet mellan ägarkoncentration och risk skiljer sig beroende på vilka ägare bankerna utgörs av. Därtill har sex hypoteser formulerats som syftar till att undersöka relationen mellan ägarstruktur, agentkostnader och konkursrisk utifrån agentteorin och teorier om bolagsstyrning. För studiens undersökning har  en kvantitativ metod använts tillsammans med en deduktiv ansats.

 

Undersökningen visar, likt andra studier, att det existerar ett samband mellan ägarstruktur och bankers risk. Mer specifikt visar vår studie att sambandet ser olika ut för olika ägartyper. För vissa ägartyper har vi identifierat ett positivt samband mellan ägarkoncentrationen och bankers konkursrisk medan för andra ägartyper har vi istället identifierat ett negativt samband. Avslutningsvis visar studien att agentkostnader föreligger i större grad när aktieägarna har mindre kontroll över ledningen.

Abstract [en]

Previous financial crises have resulted in a greater focus on bank’s risk taking. The crises have shown how the bank’s instability may create a devastating effect on the global market, which has given rise to several studies focus on bank’s risk. Bank’s attitude towards risk taking can be explained by its ownership structure where the owners may have different risk preferences.

 

Research studies have found a relationship between the concentration of ownership and bank risk, but without any consensus on the sign of the relationship. The purpose of this study is to investigate how ownership concentration affects bank’s default risk. The study has been performed on banks within the EU countries. Furthermore, the nature of the bank’s largest shareholders has been taken into consideration to distinguish whether they have an impact on the relationship between ownership concentration and risk. In addition, six hypotheses were formulated which aim to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration, agency costs and the default risk, based on the agency theory and theories on corporate governance. For this study’s survey a quantitative method has been used in conjunction with a deductive approach.

 

Our findings show that there exists a relationship between ownership concentration and bank risk. More specifically, our study shows that the relationship is different depending on the nature of the owner. For some types of owners, we have identified a positive relationship between ownership concentration and bank’s default risk, while for other types of owners we have instead identified a negative relationship. Finally, this study shows that agency costs are greater when shareholders perform a lower degree of monitoring of the management. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. , 59 p.
Keyword [en]
Ownership concentration, agency cost, bank risk, agency theory, ownership structure, owner identity
Keyword [sv]
Ägarkoncentrationer, agentkostnader, bankrisk, agentteori, ägarstruktur, ägaridentitet
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-16173OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hkr-16173DiVA: diva2:1037709
Subject / course
Banking and financing
Educational program
Degree of Bachelor of Science in Business and Economics
Uppsok
Social and Behavioural Science, Law
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2016-11-03 Created: 2016-10-17 Last updated: 2016-11-03Bibliographically approved

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