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Frankfurt-type Examples: Moral Responsibility in Which Sense?
2012 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

This paper is about Frankfurt-type examples. These examples aim to provide a case where an agent is choosing between two actions, and where it is ensured that the agent can only choose one of the actions, but where what ensure this does not play any role in the agent making the choice that he does. It is argued by proponents of these examples that the agent would be morally responsible in such a case even though he could not have done otherwise, and that therefore moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise.In this paper it is argued that the examples beg the question of determinism, and that they therefore could not provide a clear case of an agent being morally responsible if the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is in question. Moreover, it is argued that the agent in the examples would not be prevented from having a conditional type of an ability to do otherwise if determinism is true, and that a reflection on the examples does not show that this type of an ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. , 50 p.
Keyword [en]
Humanities Theology
Keyword [sv]
Humaniora, Teologi, Fri vilja, Etik, Moraliskt ansvar
URN: urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-55149Local ID: c0b17a1f-66de-4a33-9682-b1259a7c281dOAI: diva2:1028530
Subject / course
Student thesis, at least 15 credits
Educational program
Philosophy, bachelor's level
Validerat; 20120524 (anonymous)Available from: 2016-10-04 Created: 2016-10-04Bibliographically approved

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