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One-sided countermeasures for side-channel attacks can backfire
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Electronics, Electronic and embedded systems.
KTH.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Electronics, Electronic and embedded systems.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Electronics, Electronic and embedded systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7382-9408
2018 (English)In: WiSec 2018 - Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc , 2018, p. 299-301Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Side-channel attacks are currently one of the most powerful attacks against implementations of cryptographic algorithms. They exploit the correlation between the physical measurements (power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, timing) taken at different points during the computation and the secret key. Some of the existing countermeasures offer a protection against one specific type of side channel only. We show that it can be a bad practice which can make exploitation of other side-channels easier. First, we perform a power analysis attack on an FPGA implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which is not protected against side-channel attacks and estimate the number of power traces required to extract its secret key. Then, we repeat the attack on AES implementations which are protected against fault injections by hardware redundancy and show that they can be broken with three times less power traces than the unprotected AES. We also demonstrate that the problem cannot be solved by complementing the duplicated module, as previously proposed. Our results show that there is a need for increasing knowledge about side-channel attacks and designing stronger countermeasures.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Association for Computing Machinery, Inc , 2018. p. 299-301
Keywords [en]
AES, Countermeasure, Duplication with comparison, Duplication with complementation, Power analysis, Side-channel attack, Data privacy, Mobile telecommunication systems, Wireless networks, Advanced Encryption Standard, Complementation, Cryptographic algorithms, Electromagnetic emissions, Physical measurement, Side channel attack
National Category
Communication Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-236305DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3226104ISI: 000456097500039Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85050937391ISBN: 9781450357319 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-236305DiVA, id: diva2:1257983
Conference
11th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, WiSec 2018, 18 June 2018 through 20 June 2018
Note

QC 20181023

Available from: 2018-10-23 Created: 2018-10-23 Last updated: 2019-02-12Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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