A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision problem into another by altering the structure of the initial problem, either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability or value assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging this class are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi's condition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, and the precautionary principle. In the papers some foundational issues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated, and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules are proved.

The main result of this paper is a formal argument for the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the law of large numbers. Unlike the well-known arguments by Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern, this argument does not presuppose the sure-thing principle or the independence axiom. The principal idea is to use the concept of transformative decision rules for decomposing the principle of maximizing expected utility into a sequence of normatively reasonable subrules. It is shown that this procedure provides a resolution of Allais's paradox that cannot be obtained by Savage-style or von Neumann & Morgenstern-style arguments.