The concept of good governance, as the manifestation of a larger ideology of shareholder value maximization, is designed for and promoted by large, manager-controlled listed corporations. The increasing adoption and growing legitimacy of good governance have led to the formation of a dominant institutional logic, which family firms experience pressure to adopt. Particularly strong is the pressure to increase the independence of the board of directors. While the process of change towards more independent boards may not necessarily contribute to increased economic efficiency or be fully able to fulfill the governance needs of family firms, these firms continue to adopt such practices. Drawing on institutional theory, we propose that institutional pressure is the dominant reason for family firms to adopt board independence. We then deduce potential consequences of this change, including positive consequences in terms of creation of both social and economic value, as well as negative consequences in terms of dilution of board meetings, demotivation of managers and decreased collaboration in the boardroom. Our study suggests that the benefits associated with the adoption of good governance can become offset by a decrease in the strategic adaptability of a firm.

The board of directors at the family firm is often dominated by family members. While research has acknowledged the presence of the family, it has neglected the actual family composition of the board and the effects it has on the board's activities. We study the family composition of the board through using insights from evolutionary psychology, stressing genetic kinship. We present a model where the contingency of genetic relationships of the family directors influences the functional emphasis of the family firm's board. Testing the hypotheses on a convenience sample of 68 small and medium-sized Swedish family firms, we find indications of genetic kinship influencing the functions of the board. We suggest the development of the family conception along these lines, where the importance of kinship ties and characteristics of nepotism are explored. The practical implication is a recommendation for families to have a conscious strategy to manage nepotism.

Certain functions are ascribed to a board of directors, and are usually assumedto be performed within board meetings. However, research has observed boardfunctions to be performed in other domains, such as informal meetings. This isespecially prevalent in family firms, where directors usually have other roleswithin the firm in addition to being directors. This paper introduces bordertheory to family firm board research and analyzes four case studies of firms inorder to investigate board functions in other domains than the board meeting. Iidentify four different domains for board functions: board meetings, topmanagement team (TMT) meetings, spontaneous conversations, and familygatherings. Furthermore, I identify antecedents to board functions beingperformed in other domains. These are that the directors possess several roleswithin the firm, that they have the capacity for border-crossing, as well as thewillingness to cross borders. We also identify consequences of using otherdomains, which are that it can create tensions during certain circumstances, butunder other circumstances it can lead to the handling of family-specificquestions in other domains than the board meeting, and to convenient boardwork. Lastly, I discuss the management of the border of the board, meaning theefforts to align the directors’ views on where to conduct the board functions.

Succession in family firms is a crucial event, since it concerns the continuity ofthe firm as a family firm. The succession process starts with the introduction ofthe successor and ends with the withdrawal of the predecessor. The literatureindicates that the board of directors can have a role in both the introduction andwithdrawal phases, but this role has scarcely been researched. As the board isan intermediary between the family and the firm, and often consists of familymembers, it can be a means of managing family generations through thesuccession process. This paper aims to investigate the role of the board in thesuccession process, assuming that the board can be used as an arena in thisprocess. In addition to having governance functions over the firm, the board canhave a function directed at the family instead of the firm, related to thesuccession of family generations. More specifically, the board can providesupport in the process of introducing the next generation of family members tothe firm, and can engage the previous generation that is about to leave directoperations. This article contributes to the field by identifying the board as a toolin the succession process that can be used by the family for several purposes,depending on the family’s intentions.