DOCTORAL THESIS

Adverbials as Semantic and Pragmatic Operators
A Functional Approach to the Analysis of English Fiction Language

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2002:30 • ISSN: 1402 - 1544 • ISRN: LTU - DT - 02/30 - SE
Adverbials as Semantic and Pragmatic Operators. 
A Functional Approach to the Analysis of English Fiction Language

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Akademisk avhandling

som med vederbörligt tillstånd av filosofiska fakultetsnämnden vid Luleå tekniska universitet för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen, kommer att offentligt försvars i universitets sal nr D770 fredagen den 11 oktober 2002, kl 10.00.

Fakultetsopponent: Professor Roger Sell, Åbo Akademi

Doctoral Thesis 2002:30
ISSN: 1402 - 1544
ISRN: LTU-DT--- 02/30---SE
Dramatic fiction copies real life (Harris, *Philosophical Enquiries* 1780).

Abstract

Adverbials as Semantic and Pragmatic Operators. A Functional Approach to the Analysis of English Fiction Language investigates the function and use of some English adverbials as tools for creating literary meaning and effect. Adverbials function as deictic markers, operating on salient fields of our cognition, for example time, space and circumstance, the deictic expressions of which can be mapped onto other, more abstract fields such as narrative deixis and discourse deixis. The study is divided into two parts. Part I classifies adverbials into two functional categories, separated by semantic and pragmatic differences, with the concept of scalability recognised as a basic property for adverbials. The analytic tools provided in Part I are in Part II used for analysing the narrative structure of The Force of Circumstance, by Somerset Maugham. Particular attention is paid to the role of temporal and spatial adverbials and sentence adverbials in the communication between reader, text and writer.

Keywords: adverbials, semantics, pragmatics, deixis, cognition, fiction, narrative, discourse, scalability, Maugham, time, space, reader, text, writer
Maria Vedin

Adverbials as Semantic and Pragmatic Operators. A Functional Approach to the Analysis of English Fiction Language
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Cover illustration:
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Editing and computer typesetting:
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Printed in Sweden by the Printing Office of Luleå University of Technology.
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost I would like to thank Professor Gunnar Persson, Luleå University of Technology, for all the inspiration, help and support he has given me, since 1996 when I started the D-course in linguistics. The enthusiasm and dedication with which he taught linguistics encouraged me in my wish to enter the field of linguistic research. Whilst working on my D-essay his encouragement further inspired my decision to integrate the study of linguistics with literature, which at the time was not an uncontroversial choice. Since I am a writer and a poet by profession, I regarded this combination as highly meaningful and felt that my research could be rewarding for both fields.

Throughout the work on the present study, which combines a linguistic as well as a literary approach, Professor Persson’s guidance has given me the courage to believe in my own ideas. However, he has also firmly objected when he thought that these ideas were too "creative" and it has been a pleasure having such a motivated and skilled tutor.

The present study is part of a research programme, initiated and designed by Professor Persson. The research programme ELIXIR (English Lexical Research) encompasses research where word meanings are studied from a functional perspective. Among projects belonging to the programme are, language and gender, metaphor studies and studies involving the functions of various word classes in specific contexts. I would also like to thank The Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation for enabling me to spend two entire years writing my dissertation.

Furthermore I would like to express my profound gratitude to Rose Bloem, Ph.D., Skövde University, for her endless efforts concerning the stylistic and grammatical choices involving the language of this study, not all of which passed entirely without her remarks and kind advice.

I would also like to thank a number of inspiring teachers for their dedicated work and ability to make the English language seem endlessly interesting and alive. First of all my thanks go to Mimi Bergqvist, Jokkmokk, who first woke my interest in English, when I was in 7th grade. I will never forget her passion for the English language. During my university studies I was greatly inspired by Senior Lecturer Anya Easterling whose classes in English grammar contributed to my decision to
study linguistics instead of literature, at D-level. However, the insightful and analytic tutoring of Rose Bloem, Ph.D., renewed my interest in the study of English Literature, when I did the obligatory course in Renaissance Literature, on the doctoral programme. For his devoted and most patient work in unveiling the history of language to me I would like to thank Professor Bengt Odenstedt, Umeå University, from the depth of my heart.

My children, Ann and Jesper, I would like to thank for tactfully reminding me of the outside world, at times when my research became too absorbing. I hope they will not only associate working on my dissertation with a frown and a huge pile of books, but that in time they will associate it with the fascinating world of research and be inspired by it themselves.
Introduction

This study will examine the function of adverbials and adverbial clauses as semantic and pragmatic operators, in terms of their function as triggers. As such they will be regarded as primers or foregrounders of semantic, pragmatic and cognitive scales and as pragmatic markers for deixis and discourse. The aim of this study is to elucidate the way in which adverbials play a significant role in establishing contextual meaning (pragmatic meaning), due to their functional character, thus constituting highly useful tools for the writer’s purposes. The core function of adverbials is to modify, define and change the linguistic world, in a positive or negative direction, according to the perspectives and intentions of the writer or speaker. ‘Positivity’ and ‘negativity’ form a scaled operational model which is not only concerned with affirmative and negative concepts, but also with concepts such as distance/proximity, more/less, and good/bad. These are mapped on mental fields which deal with time and space, and cognitive processing of logical and evaluative character.

Adverbials represent the structure of our cognition that identifies, modifies and modalizes the mental lexicon. The main assumption of this study is that adverbials have not only a semantic deictic function but also a pragmatic deictic function. This can be realized in a general way, often dealing with discourse situations, and in a particular way, where the writer can use adverbials in pragmatic patterning and inferences which serve the purposes of the text. Initially a more general discussion about the semantic and syntactic functions of adverbials of interest for this study will be made, focusing on sentence adverbials, adverbials of manner and adverbials of time. The study then proceeds to an analysis of the function of some adverbials in fiction, examining the way chronological structure, setting, narrative voice and dramatic curve is realized syntactically, semantically and pragmatically. Some of the vital mechanisms in the construction of a text will be analysed, focusing on the way the writer uses narrative techniques, constructs settings and characters, and handles dramatic anticipation.
Methods and material

This study aims to analyse some of the linguistic tools available in creating dramatic and artistic meaning and effect in fiction. The linguistic possibilities available to a writer involve making a number of lexical choices, to which distinctions and modifications may be added. A text with only statements would be very tedious, carrying a message perhaps, but most certainly without any artistic literary value. Coste, in his study on narrative communication (1989), presents an example of a text showing ‘quantitative narration’:

A Day in the Life of Nancy
Nancy gets up very early in the morning. She wakes up with the children, gets their breakfast ready, then she drives to the mall in the blue Chevy. When she returns, she does the washing, cleans the house, and has some lunch. Early in the afternoon, she mows the lawn, studies recipes in a magazine, and tends the pets, two dogs and three pets. As soon as the kids are back from school, she prepares dinner for the whole family. At around eight o’clock, she watches TV for a while with her husband, then they rest together in their queen-size bed with a comfortable new spring mattress, tired but happy. Just before she goes to sleep she thinks that, only a few days away now, there will be the great adventure of the holiday on the beach with the loved ones. (Coste 1989:59-60).

As Coste observes, there is no feeling of a real narrative in the text. This impression is not a result of the “banality” of Nancy’s life, because in literature there is no such thing as a trivial subject, but it comes from the repetitive and “non-evential” recapturing of the day’s events. If the quantitative narration is abandoned, and a supposed purpose of narrating the text is focussed on in the narration, a re-writing of the text might read as follows:

On May 4 1985, at her home in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Nancy got up very early in the morning. She woke up the children [...] she thought that, only a few days away now, there would be the great adventure of the holiday on the beach at Biloxi with all the loved ones. (Coste 1989:60)

The iterative narrative in the first version is invariant, and does not focus on or foreground any particular instance of Nancy’s day, nor does it raise any particular expectations about any dramatic evolvement in her life. Through the foregrounding of time, place and date in the second version, and the leaving out of details insignificant to the plot, the visit to the beach at Biloxi now seems to have important dramatic meaning.
Modifications of predications and arguments must be made by the writer in order to convey the message or the purpose of the text. The definitions of setting, characters and events are not made in an objective way, as by a film camera, but rather through the eye of a biased watcher. Through the adverbial choices made by the writer the fictional world emerges, with foregrounding of the targeted elements of the setting, characters or events, and the various discourses employed. Different speech act situations are depicted, both referring to actual speech and the communication situation implied by reading.

The setting is constructed by time markers and spatial markers, the selection of which actively affects the reader's conception. Not only are the adverbials the writer chooses important, but also the full context where they are employed. Syntactic and semantic interplay creates a dynamic scene for interpretation, involving the pragmatics implicated by the context. The second part of this study will show just how crucial to the understanding of a text the linguistic surroundings are for the distribution of the particular artistic meaning intended by the writer.

The chronology of a text can be more or less tightly attached to the spatial markers, which will be specifically analysed from perspective of the fiction. The rendering of narrative voice in fiction, which is an area where adverbial usage is highlighted, will also be examined. Shifts between third person narration and omniscient narrator are signalled by adverbials, which also mark shifts in narration between the respective characters. Such shifts not only indicate alternation between mimesis and diegesis, but also between levels of discourse that are not overtly syntactically marked in the text. These can be writer addressing reader or omniscient narrator addressing reader, providing the opportunity to comment or expand on the information handed out. Both spatial and temporal adverbials, as well as sentence adverbials, have a range of pragmatic interpretations, any of which can be employed to assign wider or vaguer meanings to the text than just the semantics of it entails. The meaning of a fictional text always supersedes the semantic meaning (sentence meaning or lexical meaning), as Jon K. Adams puts it:

The meaning of a fictional text, like sentence meaning, is accounted for by the formal properties of language, such as morphology, syntax, and semantics. But the meaning of that fictional text in relation to a communicative context, like utterance meaning, is accounted for by the nature of pragmatics, by the relation of the words to the one who speaks them and to whom they are spoken. This second sense of
meaning, of the text in a communicative context, is the pragmatic foundation to the interpretation of the text. (Adams 1985:41)

In using the method of investigating a text, employed by this study does, a scan for foregrounded adverbials in fiction is involved. The general principle is that the conclusions made about the interface between the meaning of the text and its adverbial choices must, by necessity, be exclusive to the particular text. Which adverbials are felt important in creating this particular meaning is then a rational choice. Since every text is unique to its form and content generalisations regarding the selection of particular foregrounded linguistic items and their meaning fail. The method used might, however, contribute to the general understanding of writing techniques, as a result of the linguistic examples sorted out by the method. When indicated some conclusions about the semantic and syntactic functions of adverbials will have general scope. The analysis also shows that it is rewarding to make linguistic analyses on “real texts”, provided that both linguistic and literary knowledge is applied.

For the purposes of this study many of the categories of adverbials are left aside. The main attention is given to adverbials of time and manner and sentence adverbials. The semantic and pragmatic content of some of these adverbials and their interplay with syntax are discussed in detail, first in a theoretic way, then analysed in the context of a work of fiction, The Force of Circumstance, by Somerset Maugham.

The extent to which the adverbials exert their influence is analysed, and two basic functions of adverbials are identified, ‘logical’ and ‘evaluative’ adverbials. To put it shortly, the former type has the ability to rule out, confirm, negate or doubt the content of the modified slot, i.e. operate on the semantics (the proposition) of the sentence, while the latter has a more or less adjectival function, adding modifications to the phrase or to the clause, but not changing the logical status (the proposition) of what it modifies. The respective function of these categories is exposed chiefly by the implicature they produce.

It is assumed in this study that the distinction between logical and evaluative adverbials provides an opportunity for the writer to create certain effects. Whether the analysis deals with setting, plot, character construction or discourse, the logical/evaluative distinction will be referred to when relevant. The adverbials dis-
cussed will also be analysed with respect to their deictic function of binding together and communicating the information in the text. This provides a perspective of analysis which uses syntactic terms to describe the sentence use of the adverbial, combined with semantic and pragmatic analysis.

It is important to point out here that not only temporal and spatial adverbials are deictic in their function. Sentence adverbials are also deictic in the sense that when a sentence adverbial is used in context, it can refer to a previous context or discourse, or to an external context or discourse, (pragmatically defined meaning built into the adverbial), and thus evoke a particular meaning, which is unique to the use in the text. This function can be compared to the way pronouns prime the understanding of the reader. We know not only who the pronoun refers to but also all the information provided so far about the person represented by the pronoun. The writer does not have to repeat all the information about a character each time he or she is mentioned, since the information is retained by the reader who only needs a "reminder", the pronoun, to access the information about the character.

Sentence adverbials "point" back and forth in the text's lexical organisation and to separate levels of discourse. Depending on the use of the adverbial (the syntactical position and in what immediate context) the inferred meaning of the adverbial will take on a particular shape, designed and modified by the context which it refers to. In Somerset Maugham's *The Force of Circumstance*, for example, as is shown in Part II, the sentence adverbial *suddenly* is used to evoke a context where unpleasant feelings are attached to it. The adverbial is linked initially (juxtaposed) to a particular context, which has unpleasant associations, and then the following use of the adverbial refers to the previous use of it. The unpleasant associations are triggered or primed by the subsequent use of the adverbial, which then functions deictically. Maugham does not have to tell the reader explicitly that the associations to the adverbial are unpleasant, we know it already, just as we can keep the background information about a character in our heads until a pronoun signals that the information is foregrounded in the text. The full pragmatic meaning and use of a sentence adverbial is built up in much the same way as the full meaning of a pronoun is built up throughout a text; new information is added to the immediate context where the adverbial is used each time. A pattern of meaning is constructed, which advances and expands by each subsequent use of the deictic adverbial in an
on-going process. To put it in philosophical terms, this process can be described as
hermeneutic. The understanding of the text is built in progression and succession,
and the further into the text the reading proceeds the richer are the opportunities to
trigger off chosen parts of the contexts.

The border between semantic and pragmatic meaning can roughly be described
as the former dealing with meaning extracted out of context (sentence-meaning),
and the latter as meaning developing in context (speaker-meaning) (Leech 1983:6),
with the addition that pragmatic meaning can also be inferred from context-
independent use, what Grice refers to as ‘standard implicature’ (Levinson
1983:19). In reality there is, of course, a connection between semantics and prag­
matics, the one cannot do without the other, but in theory the two concepts are
separate and not interchangeable. Geis (1984:78) points out that when learning
language we also must become ‘inference drawers’. Such inferences are “war­
ranted by what words seem to mean, by felicity conditions, by rules of conversa­
tion, by background knowledge, by politeness conventions, by the multifarious
aspects of context” and by the extraordinarily varied combinations of all of these.
There is a host of possible inferences to draw from one single written expression,
all of which have to be learnt in some way. The relation between the context-
independent use of a word (the theoretical aspect) and the context-dependent (the
communicational aspect) can, theoretically, be regarded as divided into two sepa­
rate fields.

Since linguistics has established two concepts in this way, it might seem a
tempting solution to keep their definitions as far apart as possible, but it should be
kept in mind that terminology only deals with a theoretical level of language, and
should not be defended as a linguistically real entity. Concepts and terminology are
tools for description and analyses, and the terms semantics and pragmatics are re­
garded useful ones for the purposes of this study. The relation between semantics
and pragmatics can be seen as a scale, where on the one end the meaning of a word
or a linguistic item is as abstracted from speaker-meaning as possible, and on the
other the meaning is derived from speaker-meaning as much as possible. Such a
theoretical model where the semantic end of the scale represents the logical or
lexical meaning of language, and the pragmatic end represents the meaning that is
possible to infer from the use of language, illustrates the at least two-fold process
of meaning construction. Words have more or less basic meanings, to which we can add implied or inferred meaning by particular language use. The pragmatic use can cause, and does cause, semantic change too, but the diachronic process does not alter the fact that there still are two imaginable poles to meaning. The basic one being more static, and the other one dynamic, evolving from language use. Both the semantic view and the pragmatic view are processed simultaneously. Levinson (2000) building on Grice (1975:44, quoted in Levinson, 2000) refers to ‘the received view’: semantics providing the input to pragmatic interpretation, a unidirectional model, which he contends. In a communicative perspective the received view as a theoretical model only explains part of the meaning processing; Levinson goes on to say that pragmatic meanings, for example conversational implicature, also affect “what is said” (Levinson, 2000:172). In my opinion elaborations and refinements of a theory linking semantics and pragmatics, does not invalidate the concepts themselves. It is the very nature of the real relation between established meaning and inferred meaning that is complicated to explain, and puts the analyser in “a chicken-and-egg situation” (Levinson, 2000:172), about the priority of what is said versus what is implicated.

The viewpoint taken here is to keep the definitions of semantics and pragmatics theoretically apart, while at the same time discussing the relation between them. The theoretical model of placing semantics at one end on a scale of meaning and pragmatics on the other reflects this viewpoint. In this study semantic analysis and pragmatic analysis is used in combination.

The details of the semantic and pragmatic content of the adverbials used in the studied fiction are analysed in terms of their respective function as ‘narrative markers’, ‘perspective markers’, ‘discourse markers’, ‘deictic markers’ or ‘foregrounders’ of any other functional or deictic category. It is a general, basic assumption that fiction, as does language in general, functions according to the “figure versus ground” principle (Givon 1979:139), also called ‘foregrounding and ‘backgrounding’ as dealt with by Mukarovsky (1970) as a means for establishing poetic meaning.

The way new information is introduced by the discussed adverbials is important for the plot of the fiction, but also for the style of the writer, which will also be commented on, in relevant cases. In deictic terms, the adverbials discussed have
‘indexical function’, pointing and referring back and forth in the text. They thereby bind for example setting and events together. They also function as indexical markers of pragmatic value, and implicate communicative meaning. Deictic function on the semantic and pragmatic levels is a common factor for temporal and spatial adverbials, and sentence adverbials.

The restriction of this study to time and manner adverbials, and sentence adverbials, with the occasional reference to spatial adverbials, is based on the notion that these adverbials, through the skills of the writer, have the ability to convey such as choice of narrating techniques, chronology and dramatic anticipation and shifts in discourse situation. They also have the ability to show slips of the writer’s mind, as instances where the fiction becomes lucid and the author is suddenly present in discourse without intending it.

The discussed adverbials are foci or ‘triggers’ (Vedin 1996) for a range of conceptual fields: 1. meaning as a function of syntactic positioning from subject-orientation to speaker-orientation, 2. meaning as a function of sentence-meaning and their inferred meaning (implicature), 3. the concept of time as a relative entity and 4. discourse levels either overt or covert in the text. By analysing such adverbials starting from the fictional context, their unfolding functions will address all the mentioned conceptual fields and probably more, since a work of fiction is not only a text, but also a work of art, the meaning of which is always subjective.

The model of categorising adverbials suggested in this study therefore plays only a part in the work of unveiling the function of adverbials in fiction. The full understanding of an adverbial in context is not grasped that way. The dichotomy of logical/evaluative adverbials established for the purposes of this study might however provide some explanation to how literary effect is created. As for other concepts taken from semantics and pragmatics employed in this study, only general explanations will be used, since the concepts are already well-established.

**Outline**

The first part of this study aims at identifying and describing two major functions of adverbials in general, logical and evaluative function. These functional categories are defined and analysed in terms of their semantic function, pragmatic implicature, syntactic processing and scalar function. It is generally assumed that both
logical and evaluative adverbials function deictically, expressing archetypal cognitive concepts such as the *proximity/distal* relation of time and place to a centre and *figure/background* organisation, but also expressing abstract deictic reference to narrative levels and discourse. Part I mainly deals with introducing and explaining terms used for the purposes of this study, and relating them to other traditional categories. Part I further deals with adverbial functions in morphology, with the aim of showing that logical and evaluative function as well as pragmatic processes can also be observed at the morphological level.

In Part II the theoretical models and reasoning about the function of adverbials are applied to analyse the foregrounded adverbials in the chosen fiction text. Some concepts and terms not discussed in Part I, such as mood and modality and epistemic and deontic function for utterances, are introduced as tools for explaining and analysing the targeted fiction.

Since the concepts and terms are analysed in fictional context, traditional literary techniques and technicalities are in main focus throughout the analysis. Sometimes the fictional technique is easily identified, but has a more profound impact on the meaning of the text, due to the implementation of adverbials. Sometimes the choice of foregrounded adverbials opens up an inference of meaning which goes beyond the discourse applied, for example where a syntactically realized third person narration also evokes other syntactically non-marked discourses. In practical analysis this means that the broader fictional technique will sometimes be the starting point for discussion, and at other times that the linguistic tool or device used will be the starting point.
PART I
1. Pragmatic operations; Turning on and off semantic content

A basic concept of a logical character built into the function of adverbials involves an assessment of the object of concern in the sentence proposition. The ability to affirm or negate elements of the surrounding reality is basic to human thinking. All the time we must make continuous decisions about our actions to discern among friendly and hostile objects, to see if the coast is clear, to run or not, to stay or leave. The linguistic rendering of our decision-making, or lack of it, is made by adverbials, confirming, evaluating, commenting, ruling out, doubting or negating the thing or situation at hand. Adverbials realize, syntactically, a wide variety of cognitive operations.

To start with, there are two logical choices, represented by Yes and No. Yes and No can refer to Presence/Absence, True/False, Affirmative/Negative, Either/Or and other possible logically bipolar choices where one excludes the choice of the other. The philosophical concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’ are not equal to the adverbial Yes and No discussed here. The Yes and No referred to in this discussion are the actual cognitive and linguistic choices made, regardless of their truth-conditional value. As Lakoff puts it (1987:125), the cognitive models we employ do not necessarily fit the external world “correctly”. The ability to think in a particular way is relative to “experiential aspects of human psychology” (Lakoff 1987:125), idealized, as it were. The ability to confirm or negate a proposition is present, whether the assessment is correct or not.

The concept of Yes/No, as outlined above, functions as a syntactic switch, affecting the proposition of existing slots in the sentence, sometimes only one slot, on other occasions part of or all of the sentence. Starting with the basic assumption that negatives are adverbials, (sentence adverbials) labelled thus by traditional as well as functional grammar, there is a corresponding affirmative, which is zero-marked for the proposition. In terms of modality this is the declarative, which can be regarded as the unmodalized member of an epistemic system (Palmer 1986:6). The noun holds positive semantic value as long as no modifier is attached, which changes the meaning. The fact that it is positive (zero-marked) shows clearly when a sentence like
1. This is a tree.

is compared with

2. This is not a tree at all.

The meaning of *This is a tree* is affirmative, the affirmative being “given”. The affirmative status is adverbial to its nature, since there is a corresponding No-status of the proposition, which can be realized as in *This is not a tree at all.*

The meaning of example 1 is ‘Yes’-tree, which is the adverbial relational opposite of ‘No’-tree. Positive adverbial value is unmarked, but nevertheless adverbial. Negative adverbial value is marked and draws attention to itself, with some kind of doubt or conditional circumstances attached.

3. This is perhaps a tree.

In example 3 *perhaps* lies somewhere in between *Yes* and *No*. There is an imagined conceptual “axis” along which a gliding range of adverbial status is expressed, in terms of alternative presence and choice of modifying attributes. The axis model could also be expressed as conceptual “space”. (More about semantic and pragmatic scales in Ch. 2.1)

The *Yes/No* semantic/cognitive axis is present, as much in the positive case, as in the negative case. The difference is that the positive case, “a tree” itself, is zero-marked. There is no cognitive attention to be paid to the tree just standing there, observed by somebody. If someone had doubts about the tree, it suddenly becomes marked, or foregrounded as a cognitive item.

4. This is probably a tree.

There is something the matter with the thing observed, or with the observer’s perception or knowledge about it. The problem is neatly expressed by the adverbial, which in itself then holds the capability of adjusting the positive or negative attribution.

All kinds of modifications expressing small differences in confirmation or negation of the item discussed can be made, along a conceptual scale. Example 5 is perhaps a bit more positive than example 6.
5. This is perhaps a tree.
6. This slightly resembles a tree

1.1 Grammaticalization of adverbials, from lexical meaning to function

Adverbials have a status in language that is significantly different from those of nouns, adjectives and verbs, since there is very little context-independent use of adverbials that makes sense to the speaker. A child can be communicating successfully by simply naming an object, (ice-cream!), but it is unlikely that the mature speaker would elicit an adverbial without doing so in context, referring to a known or out-spoken circumstance. To elicit *No* context-independently is a meaningless statement, with respect to the linguistic situation. Since adverbials require context to develop their meaning, the status of the category is basically functional. This is not contradictory to the fact that adverbials have inherent lexical meanings. It is possible to say that *naturally* means something like *evident* or *it goes without saying that*. But without attaching the adverbial to a phrase or a sentence there is no communication performed. The meaning of the adverbial is a measure of the effect it will have on the proposition of the phrase or sentence, and not a meaning that makes sense on its own. There is some type of meaning attached to the adverbial itself, otherwise we would not know where to use it, but this meaning is only structural. Not until the adverbial is used in context does a communicative meaning develop (Wittgenstein, 1953, 1997:9:13, 54). The functional aspect of adverbials in general is seen as vital to the discussion of this study concerning the use of adverbials in fiction, where it will be shown that the basic meaning of an adverbial is at interplay with the pragmatic meaning inferred by context.

The observation that adverbials have sentence or phrase scope is also primary to a discussion about the functional role of adverbials and the progressing functionality in the category of adverbials. An attempt to grasp the meaning of an adverbial out of context serves the purpose of revealing the basically functional aspect of adverbials. A *Yes* or a *No* without a context to be modified is in fact without lexical meaning. There has to be something lexically defined in the context which the adverbial can process. Since there is no proposition in the adverbial the “meaning” produced is functional and states what the adverbial *does* for a modification. No
independent lexical meaning is present. In communication a *Yes* or a *No* hanging in the air, as it were, will call for clarification from the interlocutor.

Linguists have often attempted to explain the shifts in meaning that adverbials and adverbial particles show in various syntactic positioning and in various contexts, in terms of polysemy. The view taken in this study is that adverbials show polysemous behaviour of a pragmatic character, not as absolute categories of polysemy, where for example one word has two or more fixed or context-independent meanings. Polysemy for functional words does not operate in the same way as polysemy for lexical words. The range of possible meanings for an adverbial or an adverbial particle in use has a “seamless” or “borderless” construction, where the subtleties of the meaning of the adverbial can end up on any minute part of that range. There is a functional or cognitive scaling to the interpretation of adverbials, along which it is possible to observe more or less clear-cut meanings of the adverbial, as if we were to observe “nodes” or “foci” of pragmatic meaning. Such meaning foci reflect the frequency or saliency of the adverbial’s meaning and use, i.e., some prototypical or typical use of it. The particle *well*, for example, has a number of more easily recognized meanings in use, but new contexts could be constructed that would give the particle yet another slightly different meaning. The meaning of an adverbial or a particle can thus be “sliced up” infinitely, shades and hues of the typical meaning will occur. In my opinion there is reason enough to motivate distinguishing between a more semantic type of polysemy, and one of a pragmatic type, based on the fact that lexical and functional words do not have the same sensitivity to context. (For some functional words semantic polysemy is not available, viz. the logical operators or the logical adverbials (cf. Ch.2), since they process the proposition of the sentence. A *not* or a *never* means *No* in logical terms, regardless of its context. For the logical operators pragmatic polysemy can be at hand through language use (irony, understatement, idioms, juxtaposition) and prosodic patterns revealing speech act functions or discourse functions. Other adverbials showing evaluative function, (cf. Ch. 2) gain their polysemy from pragmatic factors alone.

The number of functional words in English is probably growing, considering the on-going process of grammaticalization that adverbials are subjected to (cf. Ch. 2. about -ly affixation.) Since words which were formerly used more as lexical
items are increasingly becoming functional items, and since this change is often fairly recent in language, residues of the original lexical meaning still cling to the interpretation of the word’s meaning and function. An adverbial such as *naturally* which in the 17th century still meant ‘according to the laws of nature’ (Swan 1988:529) has today, through a process of grammaticalization (and possibly speaker inventiveness regarding the syntactic use of the word), achieved a more functional status. The lexical meaning of *naturally* spills over to the functional use of the word to an extent that varies from context to context, and from the respective syntactic positioning. In the case of *Yes* and *No* it is impossible for these adverbials to have a context-independent meaning that communicates a message, but the same is actually true of sentence adverbials such as *naturally*. Without a context, *naturally* is equally as semantically empty as *Yes* or *No*. Without a context we can say that we know what *Yes* or *No* means, but not what it implies. Intuitively the speaker will attribute some semantic meaning to *naturally*, but this is a notion derived partly from the original lexical meaning of the word, partly from the meaning which stems from its context-dependent usage. The function of *naturally* is to modify a sentence, phrase or proposition in a way that is functionally analogous to what *Yes* or *No* does, but with pragmatically different meaning, processed in context. In other words, there is a conceptual link between the original sense of the adverbial, and its use in context, the strength of which varies according to the degree of grammaticalization of the adverbial. The further along the cline of grammaticalization the adverbial moves, lexical content will probably become more and more distant, as is the case for conjunctions, prepositions and relational time markers such as *now, then, before, after*, all of which only reveal their lexical meaning when used in context.

The wide pragmatic interpretations opened up by adverbials is thus a complex process of grammaticalization, syntactic inventiveness and the open-ended inducement of contextual meaning which the speaker, or language user, subjects language to. In this study these factors are seen as intersecting in the pragmatic marking performed by sentence adverbials, but also by other adverbials denoting time and place.
1.2 Yes and No are not perfect antonyms

In this study, Yes and No-value, positive and negative, as logical operators, are seen as basic to the adverbial function. The cognitive scale between Yes and No is mapped onto other scales, wherever there is a sense of gradability in terms of presence/absence, extent/lack of extent, increase/decrease, possibility/necessity and other concepts dealing with deictic circumstances. Negation and quantification both relate to the question how much, which is a scalar property (Werth 1995:376). Since the positive case is the unmarked one (the “normal”, the background), a fixed semantic or cognitive point where the Yes-feature or Yes-property is located, can be conceptualised. This point is the decision made by the speaker to recognize and label an item, according to his or her knowledge. There is a similar cognitive point of negation which is represented by the concept of nothing present. This concept is harder to grasp for the mind, since one can only imagine nothingness, while it is evident when something is present. In a basic, concrete sense presence can be seen, while absence cannot. Cognitive research, where persons have gone through tests directed at the identification of the processing time of affirmative and negative sentences, show that inherently negative lexical items, such as absent, are harder to process than their affirmative counterpart, present (Clark 1976:42). Negation is therefore regularly a marked concept, tended to be used only if there is an expectation that is not fulfilled (Hidalgo Downing, 2000:38). There seems to be a natural tendency that in binary opposites, such as good/bad, the expected state will be categorized as positive, and the negated form (lexicalised negation or syntactically negated) will seem as departures from the norm established by the “positive” or “normal” state (Clark & Clark 1977:539). If negation is regarded as a propositional modality in language (Halliday 1994:88, Werth 1995:376), i.e. if its logical properties are analysed, negation is placed at the end of a scale where positive assertions (yes), is at one end, and negative assertion (no) is at the other end, with modalized options in between Yes/No (Hidalgo Downing, 2000:66). In logical terms, (logically operating) there is no pragmatic value to the distinction Yes/No, but in pragmatic terms there is a considerable difference. The logical scale between Yes and No is the starting point for pragmatic interpretation, with the negative form marked.
As early as 1651, Thomas Hobbes made an observation, which was peripheral to his general doctrine, but interesting for the purpose of this study, about the nature of Yes and No:

> Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but our own inability” (Hobbes 1968:99).

The intriguing matter of positive and negative semantic value as expressed by adverbiality falls back on the fact that positivity and negativity pragmatically are not exact opposites. The negated form has an asymmetrical relation to the positive form (Werth 1995:379). Even if Yes and No are discussed as strictly structural semantic properties the difference between Presence and Absence is distinct. A sentence like

7. There is gold in the mine.

compared to

8. There is no gold at all in the mine.

has positive semantic value in the first case, and negative in the latter. The absence of gold in example 8 is definite, without need for further explanation. The presence of gold in example 7 is also definite, but can be more widely explained. The answers to adverbial questions like “How much gold?”, “How pure is it?”, “Where is it located?” will add modifying attributes to the positive item itself.

The character of these modifying attributes is adjectival, if analysed syntactically, since they do not question the Yes-status of the item, only adding modification to it. Such adverbials are also part of the verb phrase connected to the noun phrase. If the verb is be, the semantic connection between the adverbial and the noun phrase is close, however not grammatically represented in the noun phrase itself.

Givon in a discussion about logic and language, points to the fact that negated sentences have different syntactic scope and pragmatic implications other than the
affirmative ones (Givon 1979:91 pp). Negation is not just the reverse of the content of the modified clause or word, it operates on quite different cognitive ground. To say that

9. We saw a film yesterday.

only implicates that nothing but a film was watched, while

10. We didn’t see a film yesterday.

could implicate an infinite number of things, including that something else was watched, a play, for example, or that the plans for going to the cinema were cancelled for some reason. Not triggers the implicature to infer everything that lies outside what was not done. The implicature to example 9 does not foreground all the other possibilities of actions and events that could have superseded the act of seeing a film yesterday, which the negated sentence foregrounds. Example 9 does not prompt the interlocutor to ask: “What did you not do yesterday?”, while example 10 calls for asking: “What did you do then?”, thereby searching for complementary information about the implicature.

Givon talks about the unmarked state of circumstances as "any one of an infinite number of nonevents which did not occur when the universe is at rest" (Givon 1979:138), which means that “from a strictly logical point of view, one could assign the positive evaluation to any of those”. As a “retrieval strategy such an assignment is of course absurd, since the designata could never be retrieved within finite time.” This means that the answer to a question such as the one in example 11 has an infinite number of answers.

11. What did you not do yesterday?

12. What did you do yesterday at 7 o’clock?

Example 12 only requires one positive answer. Therefore Givon argues (1979:191) that the negative utterance is more marked. To single out one “non-event” when there is no practical reason behind it, seems pointless, as Givon observes (1993:191) in the following example.

13. Nobody came into my office yesterday.
A sentence like this is not used to describe “an ordinary day at the office”, since there is no communicational need to talk about an event that did not take place at all, and did not have any significance. Nobody came into my office yesterday can naturally be foregrounded in any context, implying that it is unusual with a day without visitors, but if visitors are normally rather rare, the negated utterance is not necessary. Negation and affirmation focus on different narrations of the event, which constitute highly productive adverbial choices for the writer of fiction, (cf. Ch 2.3).

One of the reasons a positive utterance is felt more concrete than a negative one is the finite number of implicatures that can be retrieved from a sentence such as example 9. Givón (1979:138) argues for the application of the finite strategy.

Humans consistently assign the positive valuation, that of possession of property or occurrence of event to the perceptually more prominent member of the pair, to the pole which constitutes a change, a break in the routine, a movement, a rarity, a surprise. In other words, they assign it to the pole for which a finite strategy can be constructed.

This means that the act of seeing the film in the above example is singled out from a background of a non-finite number of negative events, neither of which were performed yesterday.

Yes and No are opposite poles but operate on quite different cognitive spaces. By confirming something, exact information is handed out about the event. By negation, semantic space opens for implicating all other (non-finite) retrievable events. Example 14 has an infinite number of implications until the nature of the discovered substance is confirmed.

14. This is not gold.

The negation creates a non-existent “world” [...] “a potential, but not yet existing” world (Givón 1984:332). In logical terms, however, the negated utterance is finite. It corresponds with a certain context where the required answer is affirmative or negative. The pragmatic meaning of a negative utterance must therefore be analysed in context. This is not gold can be the open question which demands an answer about the item observed, or it can be the definite answer after a series of investigations about it.
In theory, or when a *not*-sentence is analysed out of context, semantic interpretation will single out one defined proposition, e.g. *not gold*, thereby hedging off all other possible propositions. *Not* functions logically in this respect, creating semantic hedging between the negative meaning and the complementary positive meaning (Hubler 1983:32). The nature of the complementary meaning, what the object discussed in fact is, is in theory of an unlimited nature, as discussed above. But as Hubler (1983:33) points out, “the broad set of complements is not quite so unlimited” when it comes to communicative linguistic reality. In context, the number of possible phrases to insert instead of the *not*-phrase is restricted by the topic of the communication. Hubler also suggests that it is hardly likely that phrases that do not match or relate to the semantic or cognitive field of the *not*-phrase should replace it. He gives the following example.

15. Paul is not a father.
The implicature to example 15 should in Hübler’s opinion contain “other classes used to describe human beings (male) – from anthropologists to zany” (1983:33). In other words, he means that the hedging between the negated proposition and the complementary positive proposition is of a nature that is determined by the semantics of the negated phrase. In the above example everything that Paul is will always entail the fact that he is male, but the “male-ness” does not necessarily (grammatically) have to be an inherent part of the complementary proposition, which the following example shows.

16. Paul is a catastrophe.

Because of the possibility to see both the theoretical interpretation (logical or semantic hedging producing infinite positive complementation) and practical or pragmatic interpretation (context limiting the number of possible phrases to exchange the *not*-phrase with) it is reasonable to regard the use of either level of analysis, or both in combination, as relevant for the purposes of this investigation. Hübler also discusses the communicative aim of a speaker’s use of negation. His purpose is the investigation of understatements in English (1983), but his thoughts apply to the analysis of this study as well. What Hübler tries to answer is why the speaker uses a negated sentence to express something, and this question is equally
valid in the analysis of literary language; why did the writer choose to express a particular statement in negative or other adverbial terms (cf ch 2.3). Hübler points out (1983:33-35) that the hedging that actually takes place by singling out one event from the rest of possible events (which is what the negation does), in practice lies within limits predictable from context. A complementary state of events to We didn’t see a film yesterday should therefore conversationally implicate for example other actions comparable with the act of watching a film on an evening, e.g. We got a beer instead, or We went to the theatre. In principle the implicature to We didn’t see a film yesterday is unlimited, but in practical language use it is not. In other words, the implicature is unlimited, as long as no additional statement or information is at hand.

Hubler says that negation not only has “a blocking function” (1983:31), but also “an initiatory function and undeniably contains positive information”. If a message can be conveyed in positive terms, why does the speaker choose a negative way of doing it? Hubler’s proposed answer to this question lies in the realm of pragmatic analysis and can be exemplified by the following understatement.

17. They did not build a hut.

Negation takes place that does not invalidate the verb, but only some qualities of the thing that was not built, viz. a hut. Suggested negated qualities can be poor, or small, indicating that what was built had neither quality. Hübner calls this ‘partial negation’. The slot of hut is fully replaceable with any other building in the positive complementary situation with items finer than a hut, but what is intended is most likely a very fine building. So by excluding some qualities from the interpretation of the message the speaker manages to implicate a particular meaning to the listener, without having to spell it out. Insults or hints can be handed out in this way.

18. I don’t say that John is a fool.

The negated form is probably a more subtle way of saying that John is a fool, but still contains the option of withdrawing the statement at any time: I didn’t say that John was a fool.
Strategic purposes of the speaker aiming at “saving face” (Hübler 1983:157) are then at work in some forms of consciously made negations. The function of these strategies is to detensify the speech act and make it less threatening to both or either of the parties involved, reducing the “face threatening acts” (Brown & Levinson. 1978:65).
2. Logical and evaluative functions of adverbials

In Chapter 1 the functional and lexical nature of adverbials was discussed, drawing the conclusion that the functional status of adverbials is the basic one, since there is no lexical meaning inferred from context-independent use of adverbials, such as can be made by nouns, adjectives and verbs. Outside the scope of this study, it should be added that adjectives have a functional status, partly resembling adverbials, since the context-independent use of an adjective can be regarded as almost as communicatively empty as the context-independent use of an adverbial. Nevertheless, adjectives are felt to be more lexical than adverbials, possibly because of their collocating function with nouns. Adjectives are “closer”, (more lexicalized), to nouns than (grammaticalized) adverbials are.) For the purposes of this study a dichotomy which separates the adverbial function is introduced, making a distinction between logical and evaluative function. The terms logical and evaluate functions can be regarded as referring to salient (archetypal, prototypical), cognitive models or entities (domains) expressed by adverbials. In much the same way as the lexicon of nouns or verbs reflect cognitive properties, experiences, abilities or processes, or concepts, as derived from bodily, sensory or mental experience (Langacker 1991:20, 2000:8ff), this study suggests that the functional lexicon of adverbials expresses the basic organisation of two mental spaces, operating on deictic grounds. Logical function is thus, primarily, a collective term, which entails a number of semantic operations such as negation, affirmation, scalability and relations (figure/ground, distance/proximity, high/low, big/small, etc), and temporal and spatial processing. Evaluative function then refers to the cognitive process of epistemic evaluation of propositions and events. The term evaluative is preferred to epistemic, because the latter regularly functions as a label which includes logical assessment of true/false character, involving truth-conditions. The cognitive term logical function in this study is not concerned with actual truth-conditions. The adverbial group Labov (1984:44ff) discusses and defines as ‘markers of intensity’, comprises adverbials that express the emotion of the speaker or his or her commitment to the proposition. The latter coincides with this study’s definition of evaluative adverbials. The view taken here is that a sentence can be analysed context-independently with regard to its logical operations. For evaluatively functioning adverbials a pragmatic, context-dependent analysis is made.
To start with, the following discussion deals with sentence adverbials, but this study also assumes that the dichotomy applies to other traditional categories of adverbials, such as adverbials denoting time, place and frequency.

The division of sentence adverbials into different subsets, based on semantic meaning, has been attempted by many linguists. Some of Swan’s work on categories of sentence adverbials is relevant to this study (Swan 1988:29-75), viz her analysis of the categories called modal adverbials and evaluative adverbials. An extensive list of examples from Swan, of the first category, contains the following:

actually, admittedly, allegedly, apparently, arguably, assertedly, assuredly, avowedly, certainly, clearly, concededly, conceivably, confessedly, decidedly, definitely, doubtlessly, evidently, hopefully, ideally, incontestably, incontrovertibly, indisputably, indubitably, inevitably, likely, manifestly, necessarily, obviously, ostensibly, patently, plainly, possibly, presumably, probably, professedly, purportedly, reputedly, seemingly, supposedly, surely, unarguably, undeniably, undoubtedly, unquestionably.

All of these “assign a degree of likelihood or evaluate the truth/probability of the adjoined sentence” (Swan 1988:42). From the superordinate category of modal adverbials Swan identifies four other categories, as exemplified below.

Logical modal adverbials; possibly, probably, undoubtedly
Evidential modal adverbials; clearly, manifestly, ostensibly
Distancing modal adverbials; supposedly, allegedly, reportedly
Performative modal adverbials; assuredly, admittedly

Before discussing Swan’s concept of modal adverbials, an explanation of her concept ‘evaluative adverbials’ is relevant, since this study will use this term in a broader sense than she does. According to Swan (1988:32) this category can be illustrated by an extensive list of adverbials belonging to it.

Absurdly, amazingly, appropriately, astonishingly, conveniently, curiously, deplorably, disgustingly, distressingly, fortunately, happily, importantly, impossibly, improbably, incredibly, interestingly, ironically, justly, luckily, mercifully, miraculously, mysteriously, naturally, oddly, paradoxically, peculiarly, predictably, regrettably, remarkably, rightly, sadly, shockingly, significantly, strangely, surprisingly, thankfully, tragically, unbelievably, understandably, unexpectedly, unfortunately, unhappily, unluckily, unpredictably.

The main function of this category is “to express the speaker’s evaluation of the fact, state of affairs, etc, denoted by the sentence” (Swan 1988:32). Swan also ob-
serves that various writers may disagree as to how to describe the evaluative adverbials, each focussing on different properties (1988:32). Greenbaum and Quirk (1990:183) calls evaluative adverbials (Swan’s term) a sub-class of attitudinal disjuncts, expressing the speaker’s attitude with regard to the content of the sentence.

For the purposes of this study the functional categories Swan calls modal adverbials and evaluative adverbials will be used as analytic instruments, but with somewhat stricter requirements. Since members of the sub-set to modal adverbials called evidential and distancing adverbials (supposedly, clearly), fit semantically just as well into the logical modal adverbial category, the usefulness of these sub-categories can be questioned.

Modal adverbials in general “assign a degree of likelihood or evaluate the truth/probability of the adjoined sentence” (Swan 1988:42), but these two operations have one important different function. To assign a degree of likelihood to something can be quite different from evaluating the truth or probability of the adjoined sentence. In the first case we are dealing with the certainty vs the uncertainty of something. In the second case evaluation means adding a statement about something that has already been affirmed or negated, i.e. evaluation includes an epistemic remark. Assigning a degree of likelihood (certainly, possibly, perhaps) to the adverbial affects the proposition of the sentence, while the evaluation of the proposition does not affect the proposition itself.

Therefore possibly and supposedly should be in the same category (not supposedly in a sub-set). Furthermore the truth-assigning function of possibly and supposedly is quite distinct from what actually and hopefully do. The latter only evaluate, and fit into Swan’s evaluative adverbial category.

Many of the adverbials that evaluate truth-conditions (reportedly, confessedly) can just as well fit into the evaluative adverbial category as a sub-set, for example called truth evaluators, while e.g ideally in my opinion fits into the main category of evaluative adverbials.

The conclusion is that I recognize the main functions of modal and evaluative adverbials in Swan’s terminology, respectively, but have a different opinion about the adverbials to be grouped in each category. Uncertainty about the grouping of actual adverbials into either logical or evaluative function does not rule out the
categories themselves. Since the categories describe functions, context use of the respective adverbials may assign them to either category at a particular instance, though it should also be pointed out that there are clear cases where the adverbial can have only one function.

The semantic difference between some members of the modal adverbial group, as defined by Swan, is too great to allow them in the same category. Consequently, I prefer to limit the content of the modal adverbial group to such adverbials that assign truth-value to the adjoined sentence, (affect the proposition of the sentence). Furthermore, I intend broadening the content of the evaluative adverbial group to include such adverbials that either evaluate any proposition or event, or evaluate an already established truth or falsity. The first group I will call logical adverbials, and the second group evaluative adverbials. In my categorising a choice of adverbials from Swan’s list of examples of modal adverbials and evaluative adverbials, and with the addition of a few of my own choice, would sort as follows (not all adverbials from Swan’s lists which I consider logical are included; note also that since the categories of logical and evaluative adverbials are functional the grouping below is not necessarily absolute or discrete):

Logical adverbials: actually, admittedly, allegedly, arguably, assuredly, avowedly, certainly, decidedly, definitely, evidently, presumably, probably, supposedly, surely, undoubtedly, never, always, sometimes, yes, no.
Evaluative adverbials: absurdly, fortunately, hopefully, ideally, manifestly, naturally, ostensibly, plainly, strangely.

In this grouping members of Swan’s modal adverbials are added to the evaluative adverbial category. Practically no members from Swan’s evaluative category can be added to the logical category here. The re-grouping done here is therefore less challenging to the evaluative adverbial group than to the modal adverbial group.

Categories like style disjuncts or attitudinal disjuncts (Greenbaum&Quirk 1990) are not profoundly challenged either by this categorising. Style disjuncts and attitudinal disjuncts are basically semantic categories, with a certain syntactic function. In my model of logical vs evaluative adverbials it is the implicature produced by the adverbials that puts them in either category, which means that all adverbials belonging to the group do not have to be listed in order to define the cate-
gory. The implications produced by the adverbial one wishes to categorize will reveal which label to attach (cf. Chs. 1.1, 2.3).

The functional category of logical adverbials assigns value to a proposition along a conceptual scale, ranging from certainty to uncertainty (affirmative/ negative, always/never, nothing/everything). Adverbials of time and place also hold logical adverbial function in the sense that the use of one such adverbial hedges off any other temporal or spatial interpretation of the sentence. The functional category of evaluative adverbials adds epistemic comment to a proposition which already has its logical status defined. This evaluation can, as Labov points out (1984:44:ff), intensify or deintensify the proposition, which is regarded as the unmarked expression. Debate as to which adverbial should go in which category can also arise, due to the user’s intuitions about the meaning of the adverbial.

Sentence adverbials have sentence scope, which can range over shorter or longer spans of the sentence. Logical adverbials operate on the truth-value of the adjoined sentence. The cognitive Yes/No axis along which logical adverbials operate, has a logical/semantic function. If the sentence is seen as slots, where lexical and grammatical items can be placed, and then linked together, semantic modifiers like the clause adverbial hardly in This is hardly gold entails the possibility for the slot where the word gold is to be exchanged with e.g. brass or rock. Thus it has logical influence over the sentence, that is the power to rule out or assign the noun to the slot in question. The logical function of hardly is shown if hardly is left out, which results in the truth-value of gold not being questioned anymore. Therefore hardly and e.g. preferably have different semantic content, hardly being within the range of the Yes/No-axis, and preferably adding adjectival content and perspective, evaluating and making an epistemic comment on the proposition.

Adverbials with adjectival function, stylistic enhancers such as regrettably, in

19. This is regrettably (enough) gold.

or frankly,

20. Frankly, this is gold.

do not change the content of the slot where the noun is placed, they only modify it. Such adverbials could therefore be assigned evaluative function.
The linguistic terminology concerning the modal categories sometimes group all adverbials operating on possibility as constituting epistemic evaluation. Coates (1995:58) groups *maybe, perhaps, possibly* and *probably* as epistemic expressions. However, these and other adverbials constitute a sub-set of epistemic modality, 'alethic modality', which Levinson identifies as 'logical operators', (2000: 86), e.g. *rarely, often, seldom*. Alethic modality for adverbials deals with the necessary or contingent truth of propositions (Hoye 1997:48-49) as outlined by von Wright (1951). Lyons (1977:791) points out the close relationship between alethic and epistemic necessity. Matthews (1991:33) also seems to regard alethic modality as being basically epistemic. Sweetser (1990:49-50) puts forward that in an historical perspective the deontic modal meanings developed before the epistemic ones, by broadening of the meaning of the modal verbs. She argues that she is in agreement with Palmer (1986) in that the alethic modality of abstract necessity and possibility has "a negligible role in natural-language semantics" (1990:58-59). From a structural viewpoint, (syntactic/semantic function), expressions carrying alethic modality (logical operators expressing necessity and possibility) operate on the proposition of the sentence. However, the deontic and epistemic modalities (in e.g. Sweetser’s definition) can often be expressed by the same modal verb, i.e. they are context-sensitive. Deontic and epistemic modality (except for the alethic modalities) do not affect the proposition of the sentence. What seems to confuse the discussion about terminology is whether the analyst’s perspective focusses on 1. the modal function of language, 2. the concept of the testifiable truth of the proposition (language philosophers and modal logic for language), or 3. has a more structural approach, like for example Carston (1998). In the late 80’s through pragmatic reasoning Carston challenged the equating of linguistic semantics and philosophy/semanstics (1988:175). She argued that “[…] while linguistic sense makes a crucial contribution to truth conditions it almost never supplies a truth evaluable propositional form” (Carston 1988:175). Pragmatic implication can, in the verifiable case, hold truth-value, (the implied meaning can be the intended meaning), and therefore the scope of analysing only the structure of the sentence for evidence of truth-conditions is too narrow (Geis,1984:79). Without pragmatic consideration (where is the sentence used, to whom is it addressed, the actual degree of disin-
fectant etc) a sentence like the following cannot be evaluated for its truth-conditions.

21. This disinfectant kills infection-causing germs.

With regard to the perspective of investigation much of the confusion seems to disappear when the syntactic properties and the scope of the adverbial are analysed as one field, and the speech-act functions and pragmatic meanings implied by them as another. The language system itself can construct logically and truth-conditionally well-formed sentences, we can tell if a sentence makes “sense” or not, regardless of our knowing the actual truth (the semantic or pragmatic reference to reality) of the sentence. In terms of analysing the logical and evaluative functions of language it does not matter, for example if there is a king of France or if he has any hair or not; the proposition could be made to pass as a good utterance anyway, and indeed a good fiction utterance. In relating truth-conditional reasoning to pragmatic understanding it is helpful to bear in mind the distinction between truth-conditional meaning and utterance meaning (pragmatic meaning). The concept of ‘possible worlds’ (the meaning of a sentence is identified with the set of worlds in which it is true) also helps contribute to the bringing together of truth-conditional semantics and meaning in a pragmatic sense (Cresswell 1985:2). If a proposition’s truth is possible or contingent, i.e. can change according to circumstances, there is no conclusion to draw about the truth-condition of the isolated sentence. We are however likely to interpret a sentence’s meaning as ‘possibly’ true if it speaks about conditions that seem likely or possible. In order to know if anything is possible we do not actually need to know if it is true (Cresswell 1984:2-3). The mental acceptance and construction of fiction worlds is a result of the mind’s ability to see the possible or probable truth of a text.

The main difference between logical and evaluative adverbials lies in whether they operate or not on the internal truth-conditions of the proposition in the sentence. As observed by Carston (1998:473) the speech act functions of sentence adverbials such as frankly, sadly, and obviously (in this study termed evaluative adverbials), do not affect the truth-conditions of the sentence. The expressions lie outside the proposition expressed by the utterance. Carston uses the leave-out test
to distinguish between sentence adverbials with truth-conditional value and those without truth-conditional value.

22. If he didn’t, sadly, get the job, he’ll have to go on the dole.
23. If he allegedly stole the handbag, we’ll have to question him.

In the first example, sadly can be left out without affecting the truth-conditions of the sentence. The subject of the sentence will go on the dole if he doesn’t get the job, which is a sad fact. In the second example the subject of the sentence will not have to be questioned if it cannot be alleged that he stole the handbag (Carston 1998:474). With the terms employed by this study sadly is an evaluative adverbial, and allegedly a logical adverbial. Carston points out that these examples show that sentence adverbials are not a single class, contrary to standard speech act assumptions that separate them uniformly from the proposition expressed by an utterance (Carston 1998:474).

Since the meaning of some adverbials such as certainly can have an inherent logical feature, which is interpreted differently in different syntactic positions, it is necessary to discuss such words in relation to context and syntactic placement. The function can be logical in one position, and more evaluative in another, without there being any contradiction. This occurs when in cases of polysemy, or cases close to polysemy, as in the widened or changed meaning of an adverbial like e.g. certainly when it is used as subjunct or disjunct. The logical content of certainly is more retained in the subjunct case, as in example 24, where the truth-value of the proposition is commented on.

24. This is certainly (for certain) gold.
25. Certainly, this is gold.

In example 25 another status for certainly is apparent. The meaning approximates that of of course, self-evidently or naturally, appealing to a wider, general understanding about the accuracy of the observation. The logical function applies more in the first example and the evaluative more one in the second.

A similar process applies for really. As Paradis observes (2001), there is a factual element in the semantics of the word, which represents the truth and is assumed to be neutral and objective in character. Other pragmatic or context-bound
meanings of *really* are evaluative, or degree reinforcing, which shows that the same word can have a logical (truth-assessing) function as well as an evaluative. Labov (1984:44) points out that *really* is a word with a ‘cognitive zero’, which has “zero representational content in context-free information processing”. The functionality of *really* is more or less complete, with the cline from lexicalisation to grammaticalisation in effect realized. We know that *really* entails *for real*, or *truly*, but the context-independent use of the adverbial is of little communicative use.

Depending on the semantics of the adverbial attribute the *Yes* and *No*-points can be evaluated.

26. This is certainly gold.

*Certainly* not only confirms the fact, but also strengthens it. The logical/semantic content of *certainly* says ‘there is no doubt about it’. The pragmatic function of *certainly* is communicatively motivated. The speaker has a communicative reason which calls for a comment on the affirmative. The communicative aspect is realized even more when *certainly* is placed as a disjunct.

27. Certainly, this is gold.

Here it is more evident that the speaker expresses his or her, or somebody else’s belief. Someone else could challenge the utterance which *certainly* defends. The semantic meaning of *certainly* can then be seen as logical and objective, while the pragmatic and speaker-oriented meaning has communicative ends, and functions evaluatively. *No* can also be modified, and certainty about the negative statement added.

28. This is absolutely not gold.

*Absolutely not* has the same logical operation of ascertaining as *certainly* in the above example. The difference is felt because of the non-completive cognitive mapping of *Yes* and *No* as discussed earlier (Ch. 1.2). *Yes* is a finite concept and *No* an infinite one. To add modification to a positive and a negative statement respectively, does not have the same pragmatic effect. While *certainly* is felt to expand on *Yes*, ‘more of *Yes***, *absolutely* modifying *not* creates the meaning ‘more
of No’ which is conceptually less meaningful in logical terms. The evaluation made by absolutely not can therefore be said to represent a hedging of the negation made. If the negation is an infinite concept, its evaluation can be regarded as an attempt at processing the negation as something finite.

2.1 Subjectivity and objectivity – facets of modality in relation to logical/evaluative function

The connection between the functional categories logical and evaluative adverbials and modality is discussed here. The match and compatibility between two terms taken from the modal framework (objective epistemic modality and subjective epistemic modality) and the terms introduced by this study, logical and evaluative adverbials will be analysed.

An utterance consists of two elements, one modal, the other non-modal. If the modal element of the utterance is abstracted away, what is left can be called the utterance’s ‘residue’ (Huddleston 1984:167). A proposition is a conceptual fact which can be seen as an underlying condition to which the speaker can then add modality, drawing a conclusion that may be true or false or adding a speech-act function. In order to be able to make an evaluation of the state of affairs, a previous stage of conceptualising must be at hand, which is represented by the proposition. Modality is a communicative function that is not always unambiguously lexicalised. The same syntactic construction may serve as representing different modalities, depending on situational context (pragmatic implications) and phonological patterning.

The concepts of objectivity and subjectivity in modality are both found within the overall epistemic category. Objective epistemic modality, OEM, (also called alethic modality (Hoye 1997:48, 102) and subjective epistemic modality, SEM, are concepts which have been examined in detail by Lyons (1977). OEM basically conveys that the uncertainty or unverifiability (or the certainty or verifiability, as this study would like to add) is due to the status of the actual truth of the statement. SEM conveys that the speaker is uncertain about a given state of affairs. In the following sentence must marks the objective epistemic or alethic mood.

29. Bill is a bachelor, so he must be unmarried.
Alethic mood deals with the modal logic of the sentence, and therefore with all of the meaning of the sentence. The logical function, as described in Chapter 2, can also operate on truth conditions, but is basically a structural term, which operates on the structural semantics of the sentence. The logical function of an adverbial can be used to make a thoroughly untrue statement.

30. Bill is not a bachelor, he is unmarried.

*Not* is a logical operator on the structure of the sentence, although the sentence obviously is untrue. The definition of alethic mood rules out *not* as a marker of the particular mood in this example, since alethic mood deals with actual truth-conditions. The logical function of adverbials processes the semantics of the sentence, but does not determine the speech act function in a definite way. In other words, the logical function, as defined in this study, is not necessarily in correspondence with ontology.

Subjective epistemic modality can be expressed by the use of an evaluative adverbial, but the category of SEM is not equivalent to the evaluative adverbial function. Objectivity and subjectivity in language, as conveyed by mood, are terms which define the speech-act function of the utterance or sentence. Logical and evaluative adverbial functions are terms which deal with particular syntax operators with semantic and pragmatic output. OEM and SEM can be expressed with many other syntactic constructions apart from the ones that are defined by logical and evaluative function. In context, a logical adverbial can function evaluatively, as shown in the case of *now* (cf. Ch. 5.3.1.3.) About evaluative adverbials and modality it can be concluded that they are either epistemic, or epistemic in the deontic mood (modality expressing an intention or will to affect the listener) or the dynamic mood (expresses the assessment of an ability belonging to the subject or object of the sentence), depending on the context. This means that epistemic/deontic items are not superordinates of the categories of logical/evaluative. The case is rather that the two dichotomies operate in different fields. The distinction between epistemic/deontic deals with modality alone, while the distinction between logical/evaluative function of adverbials deals with semantic and pragmatic operations, some of which do not involve the construction of modality. Both concepts are compatible or interrelated, since they can be triggered by the
same pragmatic markers (adverbials). The logical/evaluative distinction deals with semantic and pragmatic value and meaning, the epistemic/deontic/dynamic distinction deals with moods and speech act purposes. One adverbial can function as the deictic expression which triggers interpretation or implicature, dealing with all these distinctions, often in combination with a modal auxiliary verb (Hoye 1997:42). In fictional use the discourse deixis adds to the complexity of the adverbial function, invoking the reader's interpretation of the level of narration which is at hand. An adverbial like evidently (see Ch. 5.3.3.3.) can even invoke several levels of narration at the same time, referring to both internal and external narration. The use of logical or evaluative adverbials in fiction is one source of the multiple interpretations which the reader can make, and it contributes to the depth and meaning experienced in the literary work (Ch. 5).

In chapter 5.3.1.3. the adverbial now is identified as a pragmatic marker of subjective epistemic modality in spite of the logical function of the adverbial. In respect of the proposition/residue concepts, the logical function of now can deal with the proposition of the sentence (the residue after modality has been abstracted away). The contextual interpretation of the sentence being evaluated is then perceived as the subjective epistemic modality.

Epistemic modality is of an essentially subjective nature in natural language (Hoye 1997:45) which means that modality is always relative to the individual speaker's set of beliefs and world knowledge. From the language-philosophical perspective an individual is always making assessments of the world around him or her, resulting in utterances. From the linguistic point of view the speaker being "right" or "wrong" about his or her statements is not as important as it is to the logical philosopher. From the face (structure) of the utterance, degrees of certainty (logical assessments) and opinions about established facts (evaluated statements) can be observed. The truthfulness or the real reference of an utterance is subordinate to the linguistic analyses.

Objective epistemic modality (alethic modality) is entailed in what this study terms logical adverbial function, and subjective epistemic modality is entailed in the evaluative adverbial function. The category of logical adverbials also includes temporal and spatial adverbials, which means that the terms objective epistemic modality is inherent to, not equal to, the term logical adverbial function. The defi-
nition of the term epistemic is a broader way of saying that a statement grounded on knowledge or belief is made about the linguistically expressed truth of propositions, events or acts.

Modality added to the logically (semantically defined) and lexically defined framework can then be of many different values. For the logically functioning adverbials any possibly attached modality develops from regarding the whole context. For the evaluative adverbials, modality is an inherently defined quality. The modality stemming from evaluative adverbials can be epistemic, deontic or dynamic. In full context, further meanings can be analysed (see Ch. 5.3.4.) where the deontic modality of an utterance is not represented in the text (what the Malayan woman actually said to Guy), but yet traceable for cognition.

For both the secondary modality of logical adverbials, as well as the primary one of evaluative adverbials, their use in fiction adds further levels of understanding than that of the corresponding use in real speech. The intentions and evaluations of the grammatical subject or speaker can always be confused with, or widened to include, that of firstly the narrative voice and secondly the writer himself or herself. In spoken language the possibility of multiple or vague pragmatic interpretation of an utterance is much less, because of the communicative situation of speaker/listener where the goal and point of the conversation will be realized through communication between the interactors.

2.1.2 Scalar implicature
A description and discussion about the function of scalar implicature will follow here as a background and introduction to the use of mirrored implicature in fiction writing (Ch. 2.3). In this study it is assumed that all adverbials with logical function are scalable, with predictable or generalized semantic and pragmatic processing and hedging of meaning. Levinson shows that logical operators (processors of truth-conditions) are scalable (2000:86). The term logical adverbials as employed by this study, also includes temporal and spatial adverbials. Evaluative adverbials can be scalable also, with hedging off of other semantic or pragmatic content, such as in seriously-critically-mortally [wounded] (Horn 1976:49), or loosely speaking-strictly speaking. Loosely speaking and strictly speaking, e.g., exclude members of the category they refer to (Taylor 1995:77) Strictly speaking takes away fuzziness
of the modified category (1995:79). The difference between the hedging produced by logical and evaluative adverbials, respectively, is still observed. However, the former producing the conventionalised implicature for the proposition and the latter adding modification to the proposition of the sentence. Temporal adverbials, unsurprisingly, are also scaled (Horn 1976:48) which means that most of the adverbials discussed in this study are scalable. Temporal circumstances are typically organized in scales. Time is a concept with no exact boundaries in itself. The lexicalisation of the temporal continuum into defined stretches of time imposes "a digital, rather than an analog, encoding of experience" (Taylor 1995:75), which is another way of describing the scaled models that language provides for deictic use.

Scalability in adverbials reflects the functional nature of the category, and is a marker of functionality. A basic difference between lexical words and function words (though not the only one or an absolute one) is that the former is proto-typically organized hierarchically, or in "tree"-shape, with superordinates and hyponyms. Function words, due to their description of temporal, spatial or cognitive processes, do not fit in such a structure. Function words cannot be "divided" into subcategories with a common headword; instead they are organized along relational scales. Scalability on the pragmatic level works for lexical words in axiological scales, where values about the world place a group of objects in a relational order. Even in this case it is assumed that some degree of functionality affects the axiological scalability. In the example of the typical good/bad scale there is a progression from "less" of one quality to "more" of it, constituting an adverbial function, i.e. a cognitive scale is mapped onto the lexical one. Axiological scales involving cultural values, for example, one containing buildings ranging from shack to palace process concepts such as size, volume, space, amounts, i.e. inherent adverbial meaning for each word marks the scaled location of the lexical item.

Adverbials are markers of scalability, which operate deictically on syntactic, semantic or pragmatic ground through the foregrounding made by the use of the adverbial. This process is at work on the morphological level as well, which is discussed at the end of this chapter, and in chapter 3. The foregrounding made by an adverbial "points" to meta-linguistic levels of the text, such as semantic scalability,
as discussed here, and a number of pragmatic levels, such as subject/speaker orientation, discourse, and pragmatic implicature.

Conceptual scales such as the one ranging from Yes to No, with semantic space divided up by probably, perhaps, slightly, etc, function as efficient pragmatic markers, conveying exactly the meaning that is to be retrieved and what is to be left out. (For a detailed description of entailment scales see Levinson 2000, and for logical operators Horn 1976). The choice of one of the items on such a conceptual scale, for example the one ranging from Yes to No, is made in intrinsic relation to the other items along the scale. To pick out one point on the scale lexically, e.g. possibly, means to leave out all other members of the scale that are located “beyond” possibly up to the point of the scale where No is found. There is no need to intensify the use of e.g. possibly, by recurrent logical adverbials, since the single use of one of the items already performs the intended semantic or pragmatic operation, as shown by the awkwardness of the following sentence (possibly as logical operator is discussed in detail in ch.2.1.2.)

31. *Possibly and perhaps it is going to rain.

Philosophers like Burke, Nietzsche and Lacan argue that there seems to be a cognitive foundation or disposition to human thought that orders objects in the world along the basic scale of good/bad (Krzeszowski 1992:535) and shapes our values in a consistent way (Thomas 1993:337). Hierarchical ordering thus functions as an underlying dimension of community, which regulates and shapes the relations between the community and its members, and extends to encompass the world. Semantic or pragmatic scaling should be seen as the reflection or representation of such a capacity of ordering. We feel “intuitively” where the items on a scale are located, and we visualize the scales as having “poles”, “beginnings”, “middles”, and “ends”, thereby spatialising the concepts. The relation between the items on a scale have definite “places” according to our conception of their positive or negative value, their logical function or their behaviour and impact in the physical or mental world. Our subjective view of the world is reflected in our axiological or scalar thinking, and can be traced to our perception of bodily well-being or the lack of such well-being. Feelings of pleasure or displeasure, for example, are experienced through our senses, i.e. our interaction with the world (Sade 1995:513).
There is therefore a deep connection between our conceptions of values, based on the conditions and experiences of body and mind and language (Lakoff 1987:266). If the sensation of warmth, between cold and tepid, were to be given a name, we could say that there had been a lexicalisation of a concept. No scale has complete lexical mapping of the conceptual content it ranges between, certain “steps” on the scale are instead chosen as hubs or fixed points.

The members of a scale function as logical operators (Levinson 2000:86, Horn 1976). Logical operators can also be quantifiers, modals, connectives, cardinals, ordinals and many others (Hirschberg 1991: 47). In pragmatic terminology this hedging off of semantic content is represented by the conventionalised implicature derived from the use of the word. The speaker divides the scale in two parts, one where the “weaker” items on the scale are entailed in the word chosen, and one where all the other members on the scale are enclosed. The semantic content along the scale that is hedged off in this way and not referred to by the speaker implies the “perfected implicature” (Schwenter 1999:99). In other words, the pragmatic meaning that is understood but not necessarily expressed in the communicational situation is the perfected implicature. The utterance or the syntactic expression is then called a negated converse (Schwenter 1999:99). The negated converse is produced pragmatically, as this example of a lexical scale shows:

32. This water is cold. (Negated converse: It is not hot).

For the speaker the negated converse is of course always optional, and can remain implied or explicitly stated. Furthermore, it is possible to say that a negated converse is a conventional implicature which can be derived independent of context. In contextual use the meaning of an utterance like This water is cold is defeasible in a great number of ways, which can be exemplified:

33. This water is cold (but it will get lukewarm in a moment).
34. This water is cold (and I want it to stay that way).

In both cases the negated converse still applies on the semantic/logical level. It is a logical fact that the water is not hot and to this logical fact any number of comments or epistemic evaluations can be added, without the degrees on the scale in question being challenged. The scalability of the words on the scale is there as a
reference point, regardless of what comment or evaluation the speaker chooses to make. Scalability holds between the items on lexical scales as well as between items on logical scales, but the form of implicature produced is the same in both cases, dividing the scale in two parts. For some members on a scale of logical operators, such as possibly (Levinson 1983:137), or perhaps, some, sometimes, the implicature “balances”; perhaps it will rain, perhaps it will not rain, which seems to be a general feature of operators located in the “middle” field of a scale, producing contrastive implicature (cf. Ch. 2.2).

Conversational implicature can always cancel the conventionalised scalability and leave out or include semantic meanings other than those normally entailed by the scale. This is a fact that was pointed out by early pragmatic researchers (Horn 1976), and later followed by Levinson’s extensive contribution on scalar implicature (1983, 2001). This discharges the notion of conversational implicature and Grice’s maxims as being able to cover every instance of implicature that lies outside the semantics of the sentence. Gazdar (1979:41) analyses the implicature of some and notes that the quantifier’s function is not explained by a general theory of implicature, where implicature is simply what is meant but not explicitly stated by the utterance. He calls the behaviour of some a ‘paradigm implicature’, relating his discussion to Horn’s work (1972), on semantic scales. Gazdar observes that logical operators tend to form scales (1979:57), the implicatures of which are not explained by the conversational maxims only. The implicature is predictable, (conventionalised or generalized) and can be cancelled (defeasible). The cognitive awareness of how the scale functions, in this case a substance’s ability to be anything between extremely cold and extremely hot, is perceived as an interpretative pattern behind the particularized cancellation. Without the knowledge that there is a scale between hot and cold the conversational implicature could not arise.

35. This water is not hot (it’s scalding hot).
36. This water is not hot (it’s too cold).

By using the negated converse, a foregrounding of the fact that the substance is not hot takes place. This water is hot and This water is not hot are semantically and logically antonymous, or opposite each other on an imagined scale, but pragmatically they are not exact antonyms. The sentences can be uttered with the intention
of just stating the temperature of the water, but it is also possible to imply a number of other meanings, of speech act character.

37. This water is not hot (and I will complain to the manager if it does not get warm quick).

38. This water is hot (a fool can understand I requested cold water).

The negated converse, in addition to its semantic/logical function, takes the pragmatic function. The lexicalised negated converse, in this case *hot* as the opposite of *cold* has a more stable meaning. The negated converse using *not* is more grammaticalised and therefore more functional than the lexicalised antonyms, which leaves more space for pragmatic interpretation.

*Always-not always* show similar semantic and pragmatic behaviour as in the above example with *hot* and *cold*. Semantically speaking *not always* equals *never* (in logical terms), but the use of the negated converse also triggers other pragmatic meanings. As observed by Kratzer (1978:61-68), we rarely mean ‘always’ when we say *always*. The meaning can just as well be ‘almost always’, or ‘often’.

39. Bill is always a nice boy. (Bill is nice all the time).

40. Bill is not always a nice boy. (Bill is not nice sometimes).

In language use involving semantic scales there is therefore a need for both the negated converse and the proper lexicalised antonym to meet with different communicative purposes. The lexicalised antonym leaves less space for conventional implicature. *Unhappy*, for example, leaves no doubt about the state of the subject or object, while *not happy* conversationally, at least in principle, can implicate almost any other state.

41. I’m unhappy, (sad, down, depressed, under the weather, etc).
42. I’m not happy, I’m furious.
43. I’m not happy, I’m sad.

Schwenter (1999:186) points out that there is no need for a full lexicalisation of a negated converse like *not hot* on a semantic scale. *Not hot as the pragmatic implication (a generalized one) of cold does not need to have a word of its own, e.g. *unhot, since the meaning ‘not hot’ is already encoded in the meaning of cold. In
logical terms such a lexicalisation might not be needed, we can all infer the meaning 'not hot' from cold. I agree with Horn (1976:39) who argues that cool negates warm, "not hot", though cool does not collocate with the same expressions as warm (see example below). Contrary to Horn I find it more likely that cool is indeed a member of the scale cold-hot, though it has wider pragmatic implication than perhaps cold or hot. It can be suggested that cool is a member of a pragmatic, axiological scale, derivable from the cold/hot scale. Cool has pragmatic value implying that the substance or circumstance, like for example the weather, has a lower temperature as defined by cool than the substance or circumstance previously had or will have later. Hot, on the other hand, has no such generalized pragmatic meanings. Cool, in semantic terms, implicates not warm, which Horn, in contrast, says it does not (1976:39), but it is not the lexicalised antonym to the negated converse not warm since other words from the scale can be pragmatically implied as well from the use of not warm. Idiomatic use of cool also restricts its interchangeability with not warm.

44. This coffee is not warm, it is lukewarm.
45. This coffee is not warm, it is hot.
46. This coffee is not warm, it is *cool. (If one wanted to complain, one would say the coffee was cold).
47. This soft drink is not warm, luckily, it is cool, which I wanted.

Cool seems to have axiological value, which ranks higher or lower according to the expected or wished status of the object in question. From a semantic point of view cool is incorporated in a scale between cold and hot, but pragmatic implications and idiomatic use produce the somewhat unpredictable scalar behaviour of cool.

But in a number of other cases the negated converse is lexicalised through a process of grammaticalization by morphemes. We do not (at least not yet), say unhot about a substance that is not hot, but we do say that something is impossible which is the negated converse not possible, pragmatically produced by possible. It can even be argued that not hot is a lexicalisation, although in phrase form. For logical reasons, in principle, i.e., the lexicalisation of the negated converse is not necessary, but for communicative reasons it might well be. A prefix with negated meaning can be attached to many of the words on the right end of a gradable se-
mantic scale, e.g. unhappy, which then produces a synonym to the selected word on the scale.

48. I am sad, I am not happy.
49. I am sad, I am unhappy.

Negative affixing ranges widely over language. Since negation always implicates that there is a positive state as well, a scalar relation is established when negative affixing with e.g. un- is used. Un- and other negating or quantitative morphemes function as markers or triggers of scalability, foregrounding the scalar relation of which the adverbial is a member. A deictic process of a pragmatic nature takes place where the use of a morpheme with a positive counterpart triggers or conceptualises the range between the negative and the positive part (or the “larger” or “smaller” part). The pragmatic implication from the use of negative affixing is that there is a scale, a semantic field, at the “furthermost” end of which the positive item is found. The consequences for new word-formations is firstly one we can observe – there is a scalar relation between the lexical items, but it can also be assumed to establish new scalar relations between lexical items that were not overt in language before. The attachment of un-, e.g., to a word where it previously has not been used might condition the cognitive identification of a scalar relation where it has not been identified before. Even ungrammatical examples can be made to exemplify this. *Unboring, *unslippery, and *unugly, will all cognitively produce the affirmative counterpart, boring, slippery and ugly and also implicate that there is a semantic field between the counterparts that have lexical items related to the negative and positive poles. In principle this means that new semantic ground can be staked out where the field between the affirmative and negative words can be divided into scalar steps. Negative affixing serves to foreground a relation between a negative and a positive counterpart. Therefore the negative, No, is a prototypical pragmatic marker for scalability. It can probably be assumed that adverbial marking for scalability is a factor in the lexicalisation of negated converse forms. Scalar marking also takes place with the affirmative, evoking the opposite end of the scale, but then it is not lexicalised (there are no morphemes marking positiveness).

There are no generalisations to be made from the way some scalar words have a lexicalised negated converse (unhappy, impossible) and others have not (not hot).
It can only be observed that morphemes seem to play an important part in the process of lexicalising the negated converse. (cf. Ch. 3, Affixes and modal adverbiality).

Negated converse will be further discussed in chapter 2.2, where more detailed cases of its use as fictional device is analysed, in this study called mirrored implicature.

### 2.1.3 Scalability and possibly, probably and perhaps

*Possibly* is a sentence adverbial that is a part of a semantic scale with logical adverbials. *Possibly* entails all other affirmative possibilities, but is restricted towards the “stronger” items on the scale. Implicature here states what is not being said (Levinson 1983:135), thus referring to both what the speaker intends to say, and what he or she does not intend to say.

50. This is possibly a tree, most likely so, I should think.

The example shows the option for the speaker to move along the scale in affirmative direction, while advancement in the negative direction must be commented on explicitly in order to make sense of the speaker’s utterance.

51. This is possibly a tree, definitely not a tree, sorry, I was mistaken and now I have changed my mind.

It should be pointed out, however, that the examples are chosen for the sake of showing a conceptual mechanism in a simplified state. In magnifying and delving into the fulcrum where the scale in linguistic reality allows for utterances within (entailing) or outside (implicature) the semantic space pointed to by the adverbial, it is clear that other pragmatic processes, far more complicated than what the examples with *possibly* show, are at work. The question of where on a semantic scale a word like e.g. *possibly* actually is located can only be answered by comparing and exploring the relation of the adverbial to other members of the scale. By doing so, and inventing infinitely new utterances where *possibly* could be juxtaposed with other members of the scale, it is probable that the meaning and hedging of *possibly* should vary considerably from utterance to utterance. For the purposes of this study the complexity of pragmatic processing concerning scalar implicature
is regarded as belonging to the field of conversational implicature, i.e., meanings that are inferred from the situational context. These either follow the rules and maxims of linguistic communication or flouting them (outlined by Grice) and widely adopted by pragmaticists (Levinson 1983:101). The prototypical examples in 50 and 51 serve the purpose of showing a pragmatic function, relevant to the discussion of this study, but are not aimed at analysing the actual function of the adverbial chosen for the example. In fact, a more decontextualized analysis is available while still maintaining the pragmatic view, and attaching ‘conventional implicatures’ (Levinson 1983:127) to words, i.e., inferences that go with the word without having to be triggered by a particular context. A conventional implicature is for example the indefinite article.

52. Bill went into a house.

A *house* normally implicates that it is not Bill’s own house he is entering. Another example of conventional implicature signalled by syntax is ellipsis, the leaving out of syntactic elements that can still be inferred by the language user. Under-specification in phrasal or lexical utterances is immediately understood as conveying complete information (Carston 1988:165). The definite article can imply a verb in the following sentence, designed as a description.

53. The height 200 metres. (the height is/amounts to/goes to 200 metres).

The indefinite article produces a much less distinct implicature.

54. A height 200 metres.

The use of the indefinite article points to a possible noun phrase construction, *A height of 200 metres* or *A height that is 200 metres*, but not to *A height is 200 metres*, which is illogical to specify, at least out of context. The indefinite article here needs context to have its pragmatic meaning established (conversational implicature) while the definite article has one conventional meaning already, conveying that the information handed out is not new to the context. In context *The height 200 metres* can be intended to mean a number of things that do not include a verb between the noun and the adverbial, but out of context there is a clear inference
which the indefinite article lacks. This phenomenon can perhaps be explained by the ability or need of the linguistic processing of the mind to construct full meaning from any given information, regardless of how short it is. The definite article functions as a stronger pragmatic marker for constructing full meaning than the indefinite article.

Initially in Chapter 2, a general discussion about the nature of adverbiality was introduced, discussing the concepts of confirmation (Yes), and negation (No). In the lexicon there is a basic or prototypical scale between Yes and No, where e.g. possibly, probably and perhaps hold places, but the concepts of confirmation and negation which are at the basis of adverbial meaning are also realized in other adverbial scales containing for example adverbials of manner or time. In both cases the scales have a hierarchical disposition, in which the choice of one member of the list rules out other members that are felt to lie outside the semantic and pragmatic scope of the word. In each word on the scale there is more or less of the qualities shared by the members on the scale. Choosing one adverbial on the scale means inferring that some members are not to be included in the processing of meaning, while others are. The use of one of the items on an adverbial scale hedges off other semantic or pragmatic interpretation. The following example taken from Luukka & Markkanen (1997:169) and following Hubler (1983) shows pragmatic hedging with the use of the scalar operator perhaps:

55. The Earth is perhaps flat.

By using perhaps the speaker ‘impersonalises’ (1997:169) the utterance and hedges off the listener’s interpretation about the speaker’s commitment to the utterance. There is also semantic hedging, working on the proposition of the sentence.

As for other logical operators, scalar adverbials like possibly, probably and perhaps can have their entailment cancelled by a conversational implicature. The scale the adverbials belong to will, however, be at the cognitive base of the sentence.

56. This is perhaps true (but I believe you).
57. This is probably inevitable (it will happen).
Having identified this basic function of the adverbials on a semantic scale, the starting point for analysing such adverbials in context in Part II has been made. It is assumed here that there is a basic meaning (including semantic meaning and conventional implicature) to the adverbials discussed, which is observable when comparing related adverbials in a scale or in a field, and that this basic meaning can be expanded or changed, in specific contexts (conversational implicature).

2.1.4. Scalability and the logical function of adverbials of time denoting frequency
The logical function of adverbials is at work in scalable adverbials other than the ones assigning truth-value along an axis of probability. Usually, in its logical meaning can be said to contain a quantity aspect, as does e.g. extensively, largely, habitually and normally. Adverbials of time, denoting frequency, also have a logical function which is seen in the implications of sentences with such adverbials.

58. John sometimes sings.

Example 58 has an infinite number of retrievable implicatures, all of which should specify what John does when he is not singing, i.e. what John does on all the other occasions that are not specified by sometimes sings.

When logical adverbials are modifying verb phrases the function is still capable of ruling out, exchanging or retaining, the semantic operation of the verb.

59. John sings.
60. John always sings.
61. John sometimes sings.
62. John probably sings.
63. John never sings.
64. John does not sing.

These examples can be compared to the evaluation made by actually and really in the following examples.

65. John actually sings.
66. John really sings.

Always-sometimes-never point to designated places on a frequency scale.

67. John sings (He has the ability, or He is singing).
68. John always sings (He does nothing but sing).
69. John sometimes sings (He does it on occasion, sometimes he for example dances).
70. John never sings (He can sing but chooses not to).
71. John does not sing (He does everything (in principle) but sing).

All of these adverbials are graded along a conceptual axis of confirmation on one end and negation on the other. The respective adverbials have the power to enable the logical “slot” of the verb phrase to be filled with another verb, or ruling out this option altogether, as in the pure positive and negative examples.

Both the aspect of time (frequency) and the aspect of probability contain the logical function of establishing a point on an imagined axis between confirmation and negation. The logical function cuts through the categories established as time or truth-value, and can be applied to both.

Adverbials corresponding to the question How often does something happen? have logical function, as seen in the examples above. Members of this category are e.g. never, seldom, sometimes, occasionally, often, always. The semantics of these adverbials have a logical scope with hedges that are limited by the implications they produce, and which can be communicatively realized or not. The use of e.g. occasionally stakes out a certain frequential amount of time where the action of the sentence takes place and leaves the actions unspecified outside the time intervals of occasionally.

What happens in fictional use of such adverbials is that a host of associations can arise for the reader, spurred by the context in which the writer chooses to place the adverbial. The amount of associations can be narrowed down or widened by the context. The largest number of implications are there when the sentence is regarded in isolation.

72. John often sang.

In theory example 72 has an infinite number of conversational implications. If a writer wanted to create a personal profile for John, any opportunity is open.

73. John often sang while cutting up his victims.
Example 73 foregrounds often and its implications; what did John do when he was cutting up his victims and he was not singing? Perhaps we do not want to know, but our imagination starts working.

74. John often sang, because he was a happy man.

With this implicature expressed, all the other presumably pleasant things are implied that a happy man does when he is not singing, for example smiling.

### 2.2 Contrastive and complementary implicature

The implicature of logical adverbials has contrastive elements and can contain the negative aspect of the phrase (what we are not talking about but should be aware of: In normal circumstances, but now [...]...), also called 'perfected' implicature, (cf Chapter 2.1.2.). Evaluative adverbials have complementary implicature, and focus on the very action or item discussed, and aspects of it, not the case where the action does not take place.

Contrastive and complementary implicature appear distinctly differently. Contrastive implicature can be predicted from sentence-level and is not open-ended. Contrastive implicature functions as hedging, scaling off unintended semantic content. There is no infinitely retrievable number of meanings that are inferred from the logically modified sentence. The broader context does not have to be regarded. Since logically functioning adverbials deal with semantic content and scalability this is not surprising. There is a semantic core meaning in typical logical adverbials, e.g. probably or perhaps, which reveals their scalability and triggers the pragmatic inference. Levinson (1983) argues convincingly that scalability should be regarded as pragmatic, since the entailment of such scalar adverbials does not produce the agreement between speaker and listener in instances where a stronger case does not hold, compared to the use of a weaker one (Levinson 1983:134-135). Entailment, in its strict definition, only states what is “below” or “weaker” than the word used, not what lies “outside” the scope of the word’s semantic meaning. Another reason Levinson cites to sustain the pragmatic functional description of scalar implicature, is that there is also an epistemic modification in the implication; the speaker’s commitment to his or her knowing that the speaker
is making an inference (1983:135). This implies a commitment to his or her knowing that the speaker is leaving out the “stronger” items on the scale.

When the logically modified sentence appears in context, other pragmatic processes dealing with conversational implicature naturally take place. That does not, however, exclude the sentence from being able to have sentence-level contrastive implicature. The negated sentence has a clearly defined contrastive implicature which, in its strictest sense, theoretically speaking says: ‘I want to do everything but go’.

75. I do not want to go.

Since one event, the act of going, is excluded by the negation, all other events are theoretically possible. Until we know from the context what the person means by his or her utterance, to stay or to dance or any other action, the first implicature is valid. (Cf Chapter 1.2 for Givón’s view on pragmatic restrictions regarding negation.)

An evaluative adverbial, on the other hand, does not have the ability to be interpreted contrastively, in respect of the implicature. A sentence containing an evaluative adverbial as modifier has, at least in theory, an infinite number of implicatures that can be inferred from it. The implicature intended by the speaker or writer is only produced in full context.

A sentence like

76. Frankly, I don’t want to go.

can have a multitude of pragmatic meanings, triggered by *Frankly*, all of which would include some expression that could fit in the same syntactic slot: *sincerely, for all that I see, can’t you understand*, etc. None of these meanings are excluded until the full context is at hand, and then the interpreter can limit the number of inferred meanings. The evaluative adverbial here has discourse function. *Frankly* points to the speech act the utterer is performing in *I don’t want to go*, and not in the first place to any conversationalised implicature. It is not possible to infer one meaning that is hedged off, (the perfected implicature), by *Frankly*. An attempt to
produce a perfected implicature will not hold logically although it can be produced syntactically. A sentence like

77. *Unfrankly, I want to go.

does not hedge off the meaning that lies beyond the adverbial. If a word like *unfrankly did exist it would not mean the same thing as Frankly, I don’t want to go. It is quite possible to find word-formation with the prefix un- before an evaluative adverbial for example, but the negated meaning will be unstable according to the syntactic status of the adverbial. Unsincerely, e.g., works as adjunct or subjunct, but not as a disjunct. Unhappily means the opposite of happily in the position of adjunct or subjunct, but does not occur as a disjunct.

The reason why evaluative adverbials resist contrastive (perfected) implicature is that there is no fixed scalar relationship between adverbials such as frankly, sincerely, evidently. The grouping together of such adverbials is based on their syntactic behaviour and their communicative function, and those functions do not predict pragmatic meanings out of context, in the way logically functioning adverbials do.

Evaluatively functioning adverbials do not have a semantic content that hedges off other meanings, on sentence level. The evaluative adverbial does not operate on the logical circumstances (for instance the verbal action), it only comments on them in an epistemic way. The logically functioning adverbial, on the other hand, operates on the actions and events of the sentence as expressed by the proposition of the sentence, changing, questioning, confirming them, etc, dealing with the temporal, spatial or circumstantial (for example the Yes/No, for example) framework of the sentence.

Logical and evaluative adverbials thus behave pragmatically differently on sentence-level. The former has one distinct hedging implicature and the latter has only synonymic expressions as implications, with the implicature an open matter to conversational factors.

2.3 The mirror of implicature

Having so far identified and discussed some basic functions of adverbials, logical and evaluative function respectively, the functional use of adverbials in fiction will
be discussed in this chapter. The following discussion uses examples from fiction to introduce and explain concepts which are of relevance to the analysis such as implicature, entailment, syntactic options for adverbials and syntax and meaning.

For the reader, the implicature made possible by the use of any logical adverbial creates a set of conceptual sentences reflecting the contrastive counterpart of the written sentence. The logical message of the sentence is processed at the same time as the logical counterparts constituting the implication.

The mirrored implicature consists of two types, implicated by the ‘tolerance’ or the ‘intolerance’ of the adverbial, depending on the way the logical adverbial in question functions semantically. Following Löbner’s (1987, quoted in Levinson 2000) ‘tolerance test’ we see that adverbial quantifiers behave in two distinct ways.

**Löbner’s tolerance test**

Intolerant quantifiers
*All of the boys came but all of them didn’t.*  
*Most of the boys came but most didn’t.*  
*A majority of the boys came but a majority didn’t.*

Tolerant quantifiers
Many of the boys came, but many didn’t.  
Quite a few of the boys came, but quite a few didn’t.  
Several of the boys came, but several didn’t.  
Some of the boys came, but some didn’t.

In the first case, the intolerant quantifier does not produce an affirmative implicature, while in the second case the tolerant quantifier does. In both cases, however, a mirrored implicature is easily produced in the first case too, in the form of the negated converse (cf Ch. 2.1.2. on scalar implicature).

All of the boys came, no one did not come.  
Most of the boys came, and the others did not.  
Quite a few of the boys came, but the others did not.

The distinct difference between the implicature produced from intolerant and tolerant quantifiers is that the intolerant quantifier has an unlexicalized pragmatic inference, represented by the negated converse (All of the boys came, no one did not come) while the tolerant quantifier has a lexicalised (does not need an affixed or clausal negation to mark implicature) implicature, (half of them came, half of them did not come). It is not necessary to use a negation to produce the implicature
for tolerant quantifiers, while intolerant quantifiers seem to require a negated clause to produce the implicature.

*All of the boys came* is intuitively interpreted to be a completed utterance. Full information is already given, as it seems, and there is no need for further interpretation, as shown by the semantic grammatic awkwardness of the implicature. We are not very likely to hear anyone say *No one did not come.* The topic of the sentence, the relative importance of given facts, can therefore be foregrounded by the use of intolerant and tolerant quantifiers, and their respective implicatures.

The difference in implicature can be explained by ‘contrary’ versus ‘subcontrary’ relations. Quantifiers like *all, every, most, a majority, half, very many, quite a few, several,* and *some,* (all defining quantities in positive terms), are on a positive semantic scale. Quantifiers like *none, hardly any, very few, few, a minority,* and *not all* form a negative semantic scale. The positive and the negative scale (can be visualized as two axes parallel with each other) form relational opposites, where *all* is opposite to *none,* and *some* is opposite to *not all,* to take the bipolar examples. Somewhere in the “middle” of those semantic scales, conveniently represented by *half,* the quantifiers on the leftmost or upper side, are contrary to each other, while the quantifiers on the rightmost or lower side of *half* are subcontrary (after Horn 1989, quoted in Levinson, 2000:85). The implicature to contrary and subcontrary quantifiers differs. The first one has the contrary expression as a part of the implicature (*all came—no one did not come*), and the second one uses the initial adverbial expression as the starting point for creating the implicature (*several came, several didn’t*).

Levinson (2000:86) in his discussion about contrary and subcontrary quantifiers invites readers to try the same reasoning on e.g. frequency adverbs, *seldom, often,* and *rarely,* which is mentioned here to show that scalability is not restricted to adverbial quantifiers. The further effects of contrary and subcontrary pragmatic implication from adverbials (cf. Levinson 2000) are however not discussed in this study, since the relevance of the particular reference made here is the most substantial in the case of mirrored implicature and its impact and importance in fiction writing.

Finally, before going on to exemplifying the importance of mirrored implicature for fictional purposes, there is some reason to add that what above are termed
"positive" and "negative" scales, in practice, or in absolute terms, can just as well be seen as one scale, going from all to none, where the left-most or higher term entails the right-most or lower. The point of using the terms tolerant and intolerant quantifiers is to highlight the intrinsic pragmatic relations between the words on a semantic scale. A semantic scale that produces mirrored implicature also consists of logical adverbials, not evaluative ones, which is important to point out.

In the case of fiction a great variety of expressions, focussing on different parts of the events, arise from the use of mirrored implicature. The choice of the writer decides which part of this set of sentences are displayed in the text. A simple example using the logical adverbial sometimes shows the function of mirrored implicature.

78. John sometimes danced on Friday nights.

has the implication John did something else too on Friday nights. What this "something else" might be is the (conversational) implicature that the writer can choose to focus on. It could be e.g.

79. John sometimes drank beer on Friday nights.

The second choice (or implicature) can be just as much a starting point for the written discourse as the first one. The restrictions made for the implicature depend on the information the writer wishes to hand out, and what information the writer considers true for the fiction. In fiction terms the infinite number of implicatures to John sometimes danced on Friday nights are the possible narrations of a particular point in time, all of which, in theory, are available for the writer’s choice.

The affirmative and the negative status of a proposition are, pragmatically speaking, like the two sides of a coin. Syntactically an affirmative proposition is zero-marked for adverbiality. No affirmative adverbial is needed to confirm the meaning which is already “built into” the expression or generally understood to be a positive proposition. The negative status of a proposition must be syntactically marked (cf. Chapter 1.2), but both the affirmative and the negative proposition
speak about the same circumstance, with different foci. The affirmative proposition with a logical, temporal adverbial *yesterday*, as in

80. We saw a film yesterday.

has an optional, mirrored counterpart in e.g.

81. We did not see a TV-program yesterday.

Examples 80 and 81 talk about the same event, the same time, but focus on different narrations of the event. In fact, in the second example, everything that the subject of the sentence did not do can be made the focus of the sentence. In fiction this mirrored implicature is highly useful for stylistic purposes and also for the way meaning is inferred by the reader.

A little experiment showing the way implicature can be “mirrored” involves exchanging the adverbial choices made in a text and replacing them with their contrastive implications. The result will differ in style, but not in logic, although other facets of the fiction “reality” are foregrounded. First the original text from *The Force of Circumstance* is quoted, then a couple of “mirrored” versions are tried, describing the same event.

(a) Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bathhouse. He was a noisy fellow and even with bare feet he could not be quiet.

(b) Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bathhouse. He was a noisy fellow who made himself heard even without shoes.” (Implicature mirror)

(c) Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bathhouse. He was a noisy fellow and even with bare feet he could be heard.” (Implicature mirror)

The variations, or possible narrations, are probably endless, describing the same event from a number of perspectives. The “real” event is the ‘matrix’ for the subsequent narration (Hoey 2000:17, after Pike 1981), the objective facts about the situation at hand, and can be deduced from the narration. From one matrix an infinite number of narrations can take place, focusing on and high-lighting various sections or sequences, or adding personal perspective to the matrix’ events. The narration consists of foregrounded parts of the matrix. In a fiction text it is more often the narration and not the matrix in itself that is of interest. The narration tells
the reader which facets of the event to focus on, and which to leave out, and shows whose perspective is at hand. In many cases epistemic value is distributed in the choice of narration.

Without shoes can just as well, logically speaking, be replaced with bare feet, and the other way around. What changes is the foregrounding, and hence the stylistic effect. If the writer wants to distance the reader from the bare feet of Guy the choice of e.g. without shoes is functional. If the writer wants to background the fact that Guy was a noisy fellow that could not be quiet, the choice of could be heard distances that fact. The choice of adverbial rendering of an event is therefore active and of vital importance to the foregrounding. In this example it is one of the characters who is targeted in bare feet, and not quiet, thus creating a certain image of Guy. In other cases the target could be any other event of the plot or element of the setting.

2.4 Syntactic and semantic differences between logical and evaluative adverbials

Semantic/syntactic multi-functions for logical and evaluative adverbials are highly important in creating different narrative perspectives, ranging from mimesis to deixis. It makes a great difference for the interpretation of the text if the adverbial’s scope is the subject, part of the whole phrase or the whole phrase.

Before looking in detail at the adverbial’s syntactic scope and its importance for creating different meanings, it is useful to recount Bakhtin’s view of the relation between lexical meaning and the social and communicative interaction involved in producing it (Bakhtin 1999:129). According to him words can be interpreted from three aspects: 1. as a neutral word of a language, belonging to nobody, 2. as another’s word, which belongs to another person and is related to all the other persons’ use of it, 3. the individual’s word, i.e. the particular use the subject makes of it.

This three-part description captures the range of possible interpretations that can be made from an utterance, from semantic meaning only, over to subject-orientation and to speaker-orientation (Bakhtin puts speaker-orientation in the second position). Swan says that adverbials with essentially vague scope are open to “creative interpretation” (1998:536), a term which covers the multiple choices the
language user has in respect of adverbials. Pragmatic functions are also optional with the use of evaluative adverbials. Using vague adverbials (vague hedges) has the pragmatic communicative function of saving face, and it is the semantic vagueness of such adverbials that opens up this pragmatic possibility.

As a rule, the speaker/writer will make vague statements if exact data is missing or if precise information is irrelevant in preliminary result, or with no need for categorical assertions, or when the speaker/writer is not absolutely certain. Hedging protects him from making possible false statements, provides him with a graceful way out and increases the credibility of his utterance ("It's about a hundred...".). Predications that cannot be evaluated exactly demand vagueness of expression, and hedging is typically found in such communicative situations. (Clemen 1997:240-241).

The "vagueness" that is experienced when interpreting the meaning of evaluative adverbials, in particular, comes from the wide choice provided by adverbials in assigning them to any of Bakhtin's above mentioned categories. The adequate meaning of the adverbial for the situation is therefore always context-dependent. The difference in meaning between the various uses of an evaluative adverbial, e.g. naturally or hopefully, is not substantial enough to qualify for polysemous interpretation. In terms of grammaticalisation the process of in-creasing functionality of the evaluative adverbials probably counteracts their lexicalisation which, in my opinion, should be a pre-requisite for at least semantic polysemy. The more grammaticalised (or functionalised) an adverbial becomes the less probable it is that the basically unidirectional process of grammaticalisation (Hopper and Traugott 1993:7) should "reverse" and move towards lexicalisation (cf. Ch. 1.1).

When it comes to the use of adverbials in fiction the interpretation of meaning ranges not only from subject-orientation to speaker-orientation, but also from "inside" the characters to "outside" them, where the author himself or herself might be audible or not. If the author "hides" behind a narrative voice, i.e., takes on the role of a narrator, this role is hidden to a varying extent by the adverbial deixis involved.

The semantic and pragmatic effect of the syntactic choices made, regarding the positioning of logical and evaluative adverbials, will be discussed in the following. Apart from the general difference between logical and evaluative adverbials where the former affirm, question or negate the content of the proposition, and the latter
add evaluative or commentary value to the proposition, other observable syntactic differences will also be discussed.
The first difference to be discussed deals with recurrence of adverbials, the second with semantic diversity as a result of syntactic versatility.

2.4.1 Recurrence
The evaluative adverbial expression is optional for recurrence. An unlimited number of modifiers saying practically the same thing can be added for stylistic effect.

82. This is fortunately, luckily, pleasingly gold.
83. This is fortunately and indeed luckily, gold.

To repeat a logical adverbial does not make the same sense.

84. This is hardly, practically not, most unlikely gold.

seems repetitive, and so does

85. This is certainly, truly, definitely gold.

which seems to contain a great deal of superfluous information. The establishment of a logical fact made by e.g. certainly, does not need enhancing, since the communicative effect is already carried out by the use of one scaled adverbial item. The typical scaled organisation of logical adverbials determines the relevance of the items on the scale, pointing to the particular use of some of them and leaving out others. The selection of one scaled item therefore makes the use of the others redundant. A sentence such as 85 is possible in theory, due to pragmatic reasons, but also adds fuzziness to its meaning, instead of enhancing it. The indexical reference to the cognitive scale between confirmation and negation, made by the logical adverbial, is complete with the use of one adverbial, and repetition is unlikely to be motivated for communicative reasons. The repetition of an evaluative adverbial, on the other hand, adds more facets of pragmatic meaning to the proposition, highlighting possible different aspects of speaker-intention. Different facets of confirmation or negation, as expressed by logical operators, in effect mutually exclude each other since the purpose of the speaker to establish truth-value to the proposi-
tion is efficiently performed by the use of one single logical adverbial. Greenbaum (1970:20) observes that there are groups into which adverbials naturally divide, a division that shows when one constructs juxtapositioned sentences to contrast the adverbial examined.

86. Did he reply to them politely or did he reply to them rudely?

This sentence can be coordinated into

87. Did he reply to them politely or rudely?

A sentence like

88. Did he reply to them politely or did he reply to them probably?

immediately exposes the divided semantic categories of politely and probably. Coordination of the juxtaposed sentences produces a clear case of zeugma. Politely and probably are not hyponyms, although they both may have the same syntactic function.

89. Did he reply to them politely or probably?

Probably, in the distinction made in this study, is a logical adverbial, on a scale placed somewhere between never and always. A juxtaposition of probably and never can be tried as follows.

90. He will probably come, and he will never come.

This is syntactically possible, however logically dismissable. The logical contradiction of He will probably and never come shows the semantic function of logical adverbials. The use of one logical operator on a scale (cf. 2.1.2-4) rules out the use of any other item on the same scale. It is not necessary, indeed it is even nonsensical from a semantic-logical point of view, to have recurrent adverbials from the same logical category in the same context. This can further be explained by the pragmatic point of view that the inference of a scalar adverbial produces the agreement that the “stronger” items on the implied scale are hedged off (Levinson...
It can probably be concluded that evaluative adverbials (adverbials with phrase modifying function) can be grouped more easily into hyponymic categories, containing more alternative choices to be used in language, than the logical adverbials do. The difficulty to paraphrase logical operators (Leech 1981:165) semantically is apparent in the scarcer appearance of hyponyms for logical adverbials. This has given rise to much linguistic creativity among speakers, resulting in idiomatic expressions often with metaphoric or metonymic content. How often is once in a blue moon, for example? It must be very close to never. The stylistic choice between once in a blue moon (or when the hills turns to sand, until you’re blue in the face, when apes start to talk, etc.) and never yields very different effects. The first would hardly appear in a financial report, while it would fit in many journalistic or fictional texts, not to mention ordinary speech, while never is stylistically unmarked and can appear anywhere.

Something like a synonym (hyponyms with very close meaning) for never is hard to find, without making a linguistic trope. Something like a synonym for politely produces some fifteen interchangeable words, while never is suggested to be replaced with 1. at no time, not ever, 2. certainly not, by no means, 3. surely not (Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus 1987), all of which are variations on the same theme, not other words meaning more or less the same thing, as is the case with the mentioned evaluative adverbial politely.

2.4.2 The interrelation between syntax, morphology and semantics in logical and evaluative adverbials

In fiction, as a result of literary techniques, a syntactically subject-oriented adverbial can expand its scope to speaker-orientation (cf Ch. 5.4.). Both logical and evaluative adverbials can change their scope, meaning and subject/speaker orientation according to their position and function as adjunct, subjunct or disjunct, in the sentence. Some evaluative adverbials can have all three positions, e.g. frankly
or naturally. Other evaluative adverbials function only as adjuncts or subjuncts, but not as disjuncts. Some evaluative adverbials functioning as subjunct or disjunct are excluded from adjunct position, such as certainly. The syntactic status of adjunct, subjunct and disjunct, respectively, can partly be tested by re-phrasing the adverbial (Bäcklund 1973:277, examples from Bäcklund), showing that adverbials with wider syntactic scope (sentence scope) and more salient degree function resist nominalization.

92. An excessively difficult task → excessive difficulty
93. Absolutely covered with gentians → *absolute cover

There is an on-going process of grammaticalisation for evaluative adverbials which involves increasing syntactic versatility. Wider options for syntactic positioning is also the starting point for wider semantic interpretation, although it should be added that the original semantic meaning of the evaluative adverbial is likely to have conceptual elements that allow for use in syntactic surroundings other than those it was originally used in. Some semantic potential for expansion must be inherent in the evaluative adverbial or else a speaker’s language use would not find it favourable to employ the word in new syntactic positions.

Ramsay (1987) who examines when-clauses in a piece of fiction observes that the information conveyed by final when-clauses does not advance the main line of the narrative (1987:404), while initial when-clauses by Silva (1981:284-294) are regarded to have an introductory function to new topics. If the differential functions between initial and final when-clauses are generalized to include other adverbial clauses it is highly probable that similar introduction and completion of information is made by evaluative adverbials. To put an evaluative adverbial in subjunct position means foregrounding its function and meaning. The syntactic position of the adverbial operates on the information of the sentence. When the evaluative adverbial is placed initially its scope will range over more of the sentence just because it precedes the proposition of the sentence. Logical adverbials (for example negations,) on the other hand, can operate on the entire sentence regardless of positioning. In a study of adverbial clauses in conversation Ford finds that a final adverbial clause is not involved in discourse-organising work, but has local scope instead, which provides semantic limitation, qualification or grounding.
for the main clause to which it is related, whereas the initial adverbial clause has a
text-organising function which may include more than one of the subsequent
clauses within its scope of limitation, qualification or grounding (Ford 1993:18). It
can be assumed that the more initial position the adverbial has, the more its func-
tion will be increasingly discourse-related, which is evident in adverbials such as
frankly or naturally.

One factor which seems to be operating in favour of semantic change is the ad-
verbial suffix —ly. Swan (1988:536) in a large diachronic study of adverbial se-
mantic change, draws the conclusion that “the extra-ordinary ability —ly adverbs
have to function multi-directionally, with an essentially vague scope” opens for
“creative interpretation”. Swan provides a detailed analysis of the grammaticaliza-
tion processes involving sentence adverbials, and shows that the category has
changed much, and is still changing. The process, in short, begins with an —ly ad-
verbial which is subject-oriented to start with. Depending on the semantic possi-
bilities and limitations of the adverbial it can then gradually move to occupy other
syntactic positions, thus changing more to speaker-orientation, due to pragmatic
processing, and also its meaning. Consequently, the fully grammaticalised adver-
bial functions as a true disjunct which in some cases may have required polyse-
mous or close to polysemous properties. Swan says that the evaluative adverbials
(i.e. Swan’s definition of evaluative adverbials, cf. Ch. 2.) are such a productive
class that one needs to accept a great many innovations (Swan 1988:529). Adver-
bial originally denied status as sentence adverbials might acquire such syntactic
status, over a period of time, as is the case with e.g. hopefully.

Truth-commenting sentence adverbials (in Swan’s sense, cf Ch 2, which in-
cludes sentence adverbial operating on the logic of the sentence and sentence ad-
verbials adding truth-evaluation) are the most common adverbials in all periods
(OE, ME, EmE, LmE, PresE) (Swan 1988:471). In OE, however, such sentence
adverbials exclusively emphasize the truth, while in PresE the modal adverbials
are immensely diversified semantically speaking. When it comes to evaluative ad-
verbials (Swan’s term), OE and PresE differ even more, both in quantity (7 times
higher rate of evaluative adverbials in PresE than in OE) and in the scope of the
adverbials. The evaluatives, as well as other adverbs of earlier English, have de-
veloped and become abstract speaker comments, which are detached from the
sentence as true disjuncts. Naturally, e.g., widened its scope and became more abstract in the course of the ModE period and in Chaucer’s day it meant ‘by nature’ only. By the 18th century its meaning was more or less widened (grammaticalised) and in the 19th century fully so.

94. a. Forwhy the covetize of verray good is naturely iplauntyd in the hertes of men, but the myswandrynge errorr mysledeth hem into. (Chaucer)
   b. The grief we naturally feel at the death of [...] (18th century)
   c. Gerard Douw began to fear, naturally enough, that [...] (19th century)

The original meaning of naturally is still retrievable and so is, presumably, practically every other original meaning of an –ly adverbial. The syntactic distribution in each respective modern case opens up a wider interpretation of subject/speaker orientation.

Evaluative adverbials can occupy different positions in a sentence with accordingly different semantic interpretations. The evaluative adverbial can modify the verb phrase itself or influence a whole sentence. (Example from Quirk, Greenbaum 1970, quoted in Swan 1988).

95. Truly, this is wine.
96. This is truly wine.

In the first case truly appears polysemous due to its syntactic distribution and speaker-orientation is achieved. Truly, in the first example has wider scope and wider meaning than truly in the second one. There is a logical function in truly, as in certainly or surely.

Not all –ly adverbials are semantically and syntactically productive. Adverbials that have logical function are semantically less versatile than evaluative ones. All logical adverbials can change their syntactic positions, but not with the same extension of scope and meaning achieved by the evaluative ones. Adverbials like hardly, possibly, probably, likely, perhaps, sometimes, never, always, occasionally and others do not fit as true disjuncts which are followed by a comma, indicating sentence shortening and speaker orientation. The mentioned adverbials can have initial position, but are then semantically equalled to a position elsewhere in the sentence.

97. Probably this is gold.
98. This is probably gold.

Examples 97 and 98 are semantically unambiguous, but with a slight stylistic foregrounding on probably in the first example.

Logical adverbials have some, but not all, the syntactic options of evaluative adverbials. Furthermore, some logical adverbials mentioned (hardly, possibly, probably, likely, perhaps, sometimes, never, always, occasionally) do not change their meaning and subject/speaker orientation at all when placed in different syntactic positions.

If logical adverbials lack the ability to have disjunct position followed by a comma it might be expected that only evaluative adverbials (or polysemous adverbials functioning in an evaluative way) can have that position. Not all evaluative adverbials, however, can hold initial position as disjunct. The semantic content of the adverbial and its current stage of grammaticalisation set the syntactic options.

99. Desperately, he answered the question. (subject-oriented disjunct)
100. He answered the question desperately. (adjunct)
101. He desperately answered the question. (subjunct)

Other evaluative adverbials that modify verb phrases function differently.

102. Strangely, he answered the question. (speaker-oriented disjunct)
103. He answered the question strangely.
104. *He strangely answered the question.

The perspective of the meaning of strangely allows for it to function as speaker-oriented disjunct. Someone else (speaker-orientation) thinks that it is strange that he answered the question. In example 105 it is difficult to assign the meaning of desperately to anyone else besides the subject in the sentence

105. Desperately, he answered the question.

Desperately cannot include anyone else besides the subject, at least not at the present stage of grammaticalization of the adverbial, which might be safe to add. (Not so long ago thankfully and hopefully would not have been accepted as sentence adverbials, but now they are.) Without the comma the sentence is of course perfectly acceptable and means the same as

106. He desperately answered the question.
The left-right ordering of the words in a sentence also plays an important part in establishing the meaning of evaluative adverbials. Pragmatically speaking, an initial word or phrase is, in most cases, also foregrounded and it is placed there for communicative reasons. From the syntactic/semantic perspective, expressions standing to the left in a sentence have wide scope over the expressions standing to the right, which goes for both for example quantifiers and for sentence adverbials (Koktova 1986:20). The position of the evaluative adverbial is highly significant for its interpretation.

To place the adverbial initially, focuses on the adverbial modification, and produces both stylistic effect and widened scope for the adverbial. Koktova suggests that the movement of Complementation of Attitude-expressions, into which category Koktova places adverbials such as frankly, shortly, surprisingly, certainly, presumably, probably, alternatively, especially and others, to sentence-initial position, can be accounted for in terms of promoting the highlight of the attention of the hearers; “whereby it is specified, even before the topic of a sentence is mentioned, how the information conveyed by the focus holds.” (Koktova 1986:43-44).

From a deictic point of view the interpretation of an adverbial in initial position is far more detached from the context that follows after the expression. That is when a disjunct like frankly is used the interpretation is more ambiguous than when the word appears as subjunct or adjunct. One reason for this is the combination of the lexical and syntactic function of adverbials. The lack of real reference for a word like frankly necessitates for a context to modify before the meaning of the adverbial is fully processed. The full meaning of the sentence is processed, but the initial use of the adverbial triggers a deictic reference that is wider and more subject-oriented than the sentence-mediate or sentence-final position.

The semantics and pragmatics of the evaluative adverbial is therefore crucial to its syntactic functions which also applies in the other direction: the syntactic position of the evaluative adverbial is crucial to its semantic and pragmatic function. The semantic and pragmatic meaning of the logical adverbial on the other hand, is less dependent on the syntactic distribution for its meaning and has fewer alternatives for syntactic function than the evaluative adverbials. Evaluative adverbials can have predicate scope or sentence scope, while logical adverbials always have
sentence scope. The difference between the semantic output of a sentence scope evaluative adverbial and a sentence scope logical one is that the latter affects the proposition of the sentence, while the former does not, which is shown by the implicature produced (cf. Ch. 2.).
3. Affixes and adverbial function

Adverbial functions can be observed on the morphological level as well as on the word or sentence level. The purpose of the following discussion is to look into the way two functional categories previously identified in this study, logical and evaluative function, operate on suffixes.

Affixes have a number of functions in word-formation on the structural level. They can, for example, change words into other word classes or express change of number, tense or case. In this chapter some suffixes’ (-free, -less, -ful) pragmatic functions will be discussed, as logical operators, as pragmatic markers, as well as their collocational interplay with base morphemes such as sugar and fear.

3.1. Distinction between logical and evaluative function for affixes

For the purposes of the following discussion two levels of analysing language are identified. The first level is the syntactic one where suffixes can turn, for example, nouns into adjectives, that is, create derivations of words. (Other word-formations such as compounding will not be discussed here.) Since syntactic choices very much affect the semantic and pragmatic status of modal adverbials, analyses involving syntax reference will be used when necessary.

The other level is of a pragmatic character, and involves the entailments, implications and implicatures triggered off by the meaning of the suffixes when the whole word is interpreted. Pragmatic meaning can be interpreted both from a text-independent and a cohesive view. In the former case, the context is more or less virtually invoked by the analyser, as in sugar-free which bears the pragmatic notion of needed lack, which can be called standard implicature (Levinson 1983:104). In the latter case the pragmatic implicature inferred by context can be called conversational implicature (Levinson 1983:102) when interpreted from the particular context in which the utterance is used. In this discussion the perspective is mainly text-independent, due to the focus on morphology, although some basic assumptions about the general associations around particular words, such as sugar-free, will also be made.

The assumption of this discussion is that the functions expressed by entire sentence adverbials also apply on the morphological level. Sentence adverbials express modality, commenting on the truth-value of what is being said and ex-
presses the belief of the speaker (Quirk et al 1972). The speaker’s assessments are basically of two kinds and are both of a pragmatic character. In Part I, chapter 2., these two assessments are assigned functional value and termed logical and evaluative functions.

3.2 Logical and evaluative adverbial functions in morphemes

It is the basic assumption of this study that some morphemes with certain semantics perform pragmatic operations on the morphological level analogous to those made by logical and evaluative adverbials. The similarity in adverbial function is sustained by the process of grammaticalisation which has gradually given syntactic status to what were formerly words of their own, like -ful (cf. Ch. 3.4.1). If the semantics of a word, once used non-instrumentally in syntax, allows for objective logical assessment or subjective evaluation then it should follow that the grammaticalised item will retain that function, but on a morphological level.

3.2.1 Without or free

The pragmatic foregrounding made by -free is shown when compared to a semantically equal expression, without. -free, as in sugarfree, focuses on the fact that there is no sugar in the soda, which is to be considered positive, as in

107. There is no sugar in the soda, thank God.

Without sugar, on the other hand, can have both positive and negative implicature according to the context:

108. I want my coffee without sugar, please.
109. I am without sugar, there won’t be any cakes baked today.

Other contexts can be constructed such as:

110. Oh, sugar-free soda, I hate it.

I hate it is then an implicature that stretches the agreement between speakers, performing what Grice calls flouting of maxims (Levinson 1983:104). The lexical meaning of without, however, equals the one of both -free and -less (Gorska 1995:36, quoting LDCE). This is the logical function of the suffixes. Their inher-
3.3 Sugar-free

-free is a base morpheme as well as a prefix and suffix with flexible functions in new word-formation. The pragmatic meaning of the morpheme is mainly positive. Attempts to form words with negative meaning, such as freedom-free or money-free, are culled from the rational grammar (confer Sw. barnfri and barnlös). The logical adverbiality of -free, however, has different effects on the whole word it is attached to, depending on the values attached to the base morpheme.

The suffix -free is productive in English and attaches readily to many nouns (a corpus count from various TIME-magazines indicates that -free is gaining productivity (Gorska 1995:35) and has the function of negating the proposition of the noun. Starting with the noun a proposition is made and then a second level of conceptualising is added, when the suffix on the morphological level negates the proposition. It should be pointed out that the original meaning of the base morpheme is retained, the suffix adding modification is founded on the base morpheme. The two-level conceptualising is processed in the following example.

111. Is there any sugar-free soda?

Example 112 is a possible conversational implicature (though not necessarily uttered) of example 111.

112. Is there any sugar-free soda, I’m on a diet.

The soda we are talking about has one property that interests the customer; it is not supposed to contain any sugar. Sugar is the background for attaching the foregrounded meaning, the absence of sugar. Other properties like food additives, colours, preservatives, or for that matter, the taste, are not foregrounded here. The foregrounded meaning, the absence of sugar is expressed by the suffix -free. The implicature (what is inferred by the speaker) of the sentence will be Is there any-
thing but sugared soda, I’m on a diet thus hedging off all other options for the soda being anything but without sugar.

This way –free operates with logical adverbial function. The entailment of example 111 as expressed by example 112, shows the top-required element of the proposition, namely lack of sugar:

112. Is there a soda, one without sugar?

If one asks Is there any sugar-free soda? the statement I don’t want sugar in my soda is pragmatically entailed. This is a presupposition that can be overt if a sugared soda is offered, and the person refuses to have it, No sugar, please! might follow.

Embedded adverbial functions thus affect the semantic and pragmatic content of the sentence. In fact, the choice to use –free is distinctly meaningful to the message of the utterance. To indicate what you do not want is as important as to request what you want.

3.3.1 -free and -less as pragmatic complementaries

It was shown above that without could produce either positive or negative implicature. On the morphological level the operations the suffix –less performs seem to be the pragmatic opposite or counterpart of what –free does.

First there is reason to ask if sugar-free and sugar-less mean the same thing. Semantically speaking they do, both words indicate the lack of sugar, but pragmatically they do not (cf. Ch. 1.2 about pragmatic differences between affirmative and negative sentences.)

As Gorska puts it, “It appears that a night without the moon can be moonless but not moonfree […], a city without smoke can be smoke-free, but not smokeless, and although a tea without sugar can be both sugarless and sugar-free, […] the expressions are likely to be used in quite different contexts.” (Gorska 1995:36).

Sugar-less soda implicates that something which should not be missing in the drink is lacking. sugar-free implicates that the lack is intentional and even desired. A sentence meaning a car without tyres would not be expressed as a tyre-free car. Consequently, a car without tyres is a tyre-less car. Properties that are normally expected of the thing or concept are not foregrounded, linguistically. It is not nec-
ecessary to say a tyred car. Whereas if you say that the soda is sugared, you suggest that there are alternatives to choose from. Any of which can be given attention by foregrounding the particular property. The soda is salted, really alerts the receiver of the message, while The soda is sugared is slightly less provoking, although perhaps of crucial importance to the over-weighted. If there were only one kind of soda, with or without sugar, foregrounding would not be necessary. Neither is it necessary for the car salesman to ask if you want a tyred or a tyre-less car.

In the case of -free social aspects of the word’s meanings and associations also contribute to the way word-formation with the morpheme is made. Free is a highly loaded word which carries social and ideological signals (Hughes 1994:205) and which has been “verbally impacted into social formulas in the course of time” (1994:205). Hughes points out that in a historic perspective the word freedom has undergone a semantic shift, reflecting the slow break up of feudalism. Freedom was once something that only chivalry had. Freedom is now is a democratic right and is not limited to nobility. To be free and have freedom is so unquestionably desirable that the use of the word in word-formation will, in my opinion, prove highly persuasive. A diet coke can taste like bilge water, but still be bought because of the pleasant ring of sugar-free. The combination of -free and sugar makes the sugar seem unattractive. It probably makes sense to say that words that can be used in marketing like sugar-free, alcohol-free, caffeine-free, fat-free, cholesterol-free, the suffix -free functions as a guarantee for quality and an argument for buying things.

3.3.2 Scaling between -free and -less

Normally antonyms are defined by their semantic properties only, but pragmatically speaking it makes sense to say that -free and -less are antonyms; at least one could say that there is a field relation between them (cf. Ch. 1.2). Seen this way (Bolinger&Sears 1981:117) the conceptual elements of each suffix are not “contained” in it, the meaning of the suffix develops in contrast and comparison with other related members of the same field.

There is an axis between -free and -less which, hypothetically, could be designated in other places besides at the “poles” of it. At least in theory morphemes that denoted “a fair amount of sugar” or “just enough to make the drink taste of sugar”
could exist. There is a designated value which the use of the respective morphemes signal and this is related to axiological concepts (more about morphemes and axiology in Ch. 3.3.5, cf. also Ch. 2.1.2 on scalar implicature).

Hübler points out (1983:44) that the suffix \(-less\) is used mostly to signify the opposite meaning to adjectives with the suffix \(-ful\), which is worth taking into consideration in this discussion. Unfortunately, Hübler does not provide examples. If \(-less\) is analysed purely from a semantic perspective its meaning approximates negation of the word base and \(-ful\) consequently approximates affirmation. In a semantic sense \(-less\) means *without* and \(-ful\) means *with*. But as this study has shown, it is not the same thing to attach an objective adverbial morpheme such as \(-less\), (or \(-free\)), and attach a subjective adverbial morpheme such as \(-ful\). The objective adverbial morpheme produces a perfected implicature, *(sugar-free implies “everything that has no sugar”)*, while the subjective adverbial morpheme, e.g. \(-ful\), foregrounds and qualifies the meaning of the word base but makes no semantic operation like \(-free\) does. \(-ful\) processes meaning on the pragmatic level mainly, making an epistemic comment, while leaving the pure semantic level untouched. \(-less\) both operates on the semantic level and pragmatic level, which gives us the opportunity to distinguish between semantic antonyms (e.g. \(-less\) and \(-ful\)) and pragmatic antonyms (e.g. \(-free\) and \(-less\)) without having to choose between terminologies in a final way.

### 3.3.3 Positive pragmatic meaning with \(-less\)

Although the pragmatic meaning of \(-less\) indicates a lack which is not desired, there are numerous examples where \(-less\) produces positive pragmatic meaning. Culturally designed notions about concepts such as *sugar* and *fear* operate in construing the full interpreted meaning of words such as *sugarless* or *fearless*. The function of \(-less\) as a modifier is to foreground a lack of the element the noun denotes. This is the objective logical function. Operating on the values associated with the noun, the modification (or the adding of objective modal adverbiality) will negate these values and associations.

In the case of *fearless*, where \(-less\) does not indicate unwantedness with the base morpheme, one might assume that the negative factor of \(-less\) has different
semantic outputs when the base morpheme in itself is positive or when it is felt to be negative.

Something that is supposed to have sugar in it, like a soda, is suffixed with 
−less (which is basically negative in its evaluation) and a negative compound sug−
arless, is formed, from one positive morpheme and one negative suffix. If fear is 
considered as something negative in itself, the affixing of a negative −less fore−
grounds the logical meaning of −less, viz. without. One negatively interpreted base 
morpheme (a noun or a verb with a nominal base) and one negative suffix can pro−
duce a positive word. Other examples supporting this can be fearless, stressless, 
spotless, and tireless. Positively interpreted base morphemes combined with −less 
can produce negatively interpreted words: thoughtless, helpless, useless, and 
childless. In all of these cases the semantic/logical negative status of −less is re−
tained. −less performs the same privative operation on the base morpheme, the 
axiological value of which will determine whether the resulting word will be 
negative or positive.

A suffix like −free which marks positively felt absence, as in sugar-free, has a 
sense which is closer to the de- of de-caffeinated coffee than to anything negative. 
It is positive to remove something we do not want, but the removal in itself has a 
privative character, logically speaking and semantically speaking; the modification 
entails negation. Thus a word like stress-free or war-free makes a privative se−
semantic operation on stress and war. Both stress and war have negative pragmatic 
associations and the result of combining a privative suffix with a pragmatically 
negative word produces a pragmatically positive word. So both the “negative” 
component of −less as well as that of −free has a logical semantic effect, regardless 
of the pragmatic interpretations the suffixes have. In other words, in a logi−
cal/semantic sense −free only “removes” properties and in a pragmatic sense the 
suffix signals that the removal is perceived positively. I think that word-formation 
with −free and -less is liable to semantic change because of such a “double per−
spective” of semantic and pragmatic interpretation. A word like carefree can, in 
certain contexts, attain negative as well as positive associations. The more polyse−
rous the base morpheme is, the likelier it probably is for the resultant word to 
have many alternatives for interpretation. The opinions about the positivity and 
negativity of the base morpheme might vary according to the personal or cultural
context, as in the case of sugar or fear. It could also be suggested (Persson 2001, in communication) that -less is used for denoting more permanent conditions, as in stainless, where the assumption is that the stains are gone forever. If something is stainfree the association is that the stains are removed, but there is no promise that they would stay away forever. As with the other examples with -less and -free, generalisations seem to fail about the meaning of the suffixes. The full meaning of the word is affected by the associations attached to the base morpheme, (sugar, mother, alcohol, war, fear, etc.), which also spill over to the interpretation of the suffix.

3.3.4 The cognitive approach to -free and -less
A cognitive view of looking at the semantic field where adjectives are formed with -less and -free is offered by Gorska (1995), who in referring to Langacker (1987 1991) suggests that the conceptual frame of -less and -free be set ‘in the cognitive domain of possession’ (Gorska 1995:37). Briefly this involves the conceptualisation of some entity requiring reference to a state in which a given entity such as e.g. legless, motherless or alcohol-free, has the properties the nominal stem designates, legs/mother/alcohol, etc. Gorska further provides a net-work model which illustrates the semantic poles of privative adjectives (Gorska 1995:37ff), drawing on prototype theory, and trying to identify possible linguistic archetypes (ICM:s in Lakoff sense). The ICM (how we see the structure of the world) behind -less should then indicate that ‘the course of events is beyond human control’. Gorska’s discussion deals with nouns of bodily character, the discrete metaphor involved for legless, motherless would be BODY PARTS ARE POSSESSIONS. The problem in respect of networking semantic poles of specific adjectives (sugar-free, sugarless, motherless,) as I see it, is that generalisations are hard to find. The analysis of e.g. legless or motherless does not really focus on the suffixes either, but on the conceptual values we attach to the nominal stem, (cf. discussion on axiological value, Ch. 3.3.5). The discussion about the function of -free and -less is thereby somewhat neglected. Seeing the suffix mentioned as the starting point of the discussion, there is reason to pose questions which concern abstract word-formation with -free and -less, or word-formation where something felt to be negative (fearless, stainless), is removed from the conceptual original, the nominal stem.
What complicates Gorska’s theory is the contextual influence. It is one thing to try and observe e.g. *legless*, looking at the word in isolation, and quite another to analyse it in context. A legless bed is definitely perceived as less mutilated than a leg-less soldier, although it is probable that prototype processing must be at work, thus affecting the interpretation of the morpheme and the resulting word.

3.3.5 Axiological interpretation of **-free** and **-less**

Fundamental values about items and concepts in human reality are organized along ‘good-bad scales’ (Krzeszowski 1992:535), reflecting the axiological hierarchy humans tend to apply (Krzeszowski 1992:532), where concepts and states such as pleasure, happiness, displeasure, and unhappiness are applicable along the scale. Axiological values are subjective, based on the individual’s perceptions and conceptions (Hatzimoysis 1997:293), but there seems to be substantial consensus about these values among groups who share compatible cultural and social circumstances. Therefore we accept that there are “lower” and “higher” values, the lower ones stemming from our motor-sensoric perception of the objects in the world. We want to “grab” the good things, and disregard or reject the bad things (Krzeszowski 1992:531). This is a conditioning of behaviour that starts in early childhood and goes on into maturity. With this very brief outline of the axiological hierarchy as a background, the possible scaling between **-free** and **-less** can be regarded as ranging between something basically good; **-free**, and something basically bad; **-less**. In their lexicalised forms, i.e., when they function as words, the scale between them exists on a semantic basis derived from etymological evidence (see Ch.3.4, about the history of **-less**). Both **-free** and **-less** in their basic meaning indicate that something is missing, but in the first case the lack is wanted, and in the second it is not wanted. The grammaticalisation of the words has implemented their pragmatic function, thereby opening up for different interpretations in various word-formations and contexts.

3.4 The history of **-less**

As Gorska points out (1995:35) the productivity of word formation with **-less**, is much greater than the word formation with **-free** has yielded so far. The difference “quite naturally follows from the historical development of the two word forma-
tion types: the \(-less\) type has been well established in English since the 15\textsuperscript{th} c., while the derivatives in \(-free\) are all recent formations" (Gorska 1995:35).

Etymologically the suffix \(-less\) goes back to *leasing, loose and lose*, from OE *leas* meaning ‘devoid of’, ‘free from’. OE *leas* could occur as genitive attribute as in *firena leas*, but also in compounds, e.g. *wifleas*. The morpheme was freer than it is today. The process of grammaticalisation at hand has resulted in \(-less\) being restricted to affixing. Historically speaking \(-less\) has widened its initial ability to affix to nouns into verb affixation as well (The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology marks this generalisation from the late 17\textsuperscript{th} century). The homonym of \(-less\), the *less* being the comparison of *little* is another word, the etymologies of which derive from OE *leas*, which also had the function of comparing the adjective *little*. Since today’s comparative *less* is not related to the suffix \(-less\), speculations about any process of grammaticalization between them can be left out, at least in a reasonable historical perspective.

### 3.4.1 The clines of \(-less\) and \(-ful\)

The grammaticalization of \(-less\) from OE *leas* to ME \(-less\) is an example of a cline of lexicality (Hopper and Traugott 1993:6), where the lexical meaning of the morpheme is retained throughout the syntactic processing. Hopper and Traugott argue that the chain involving \(-ful\) as exemplified below shows decreasing lexical meaning and increasing syntactic function.

113. a basket full of eggs, a cupful of water, hopeful

Another way of putting it can be that the syntactic function of *full* changes (widens in this case) and its meaning stays. The new word that can result from the suffixing is, in its turn, wholly lexicalised. The meaning of the suffixed word is not the same as the compounded one, which is at the start of the cline. A basket full of eggs implies that it is eggs, and nothing else that the basket is full of. A basketful of something, on the other hand, implies that it is the level of content in the basket that is foregrounded, not the content in itself. The meaning of the morpheme *full* is still the same, however. The unidirectionality (Hopper and Traugott 1993:7) of the process seems, however, indisputable. In the case of \(-less\) and \(-ful\) there is reason
to believe that it is the adverbial function with spatial reference that leads the process of grammaticalisation on. The cognitive aspects of spatial reference are “central to human thinking, as they form the basis of standard metaphors in numerous areas of experience” (Vershueren 1999:98), which is also the localist claim (involving directional, spatial and temporal interpretations) as defended by Anderson (1997:138-139). Vershueren exemplifies verbs such as come/go, and adverbs such as here/there. The spatially oriented deictic component of come/go represents adverbial processes such as directionality and location. Here and there represent the typical, or central, deictic construction of pointing out (Lakoff 1987:505). Since there is a context-bound meaning to be inferred from verbs with adverbial components such as -ful, or adverbials themselves, the possibility for multi-lexical use is there whenever adverbial function is involved. The adverbial component realized as a morpheme can be attached to form new words, with the function component being stable within a new context, which opens up for semantic change. The adverbiality of -less (logical adverbiality) and -ful (evaluative adverbiality) foregrounds an element of the modified noun, according to the speaker’s intention. In the case of -ful the speaker is making an epistemic remark. A touch of subjectivity is added to the proposition of the event. The speaker highlights the fact that the basket can contain something, and that it is more or less ful to the brim. There is also the assumption that the basket is without holes and has the ability to be filled to the brim; the basket has the ability to contain something fully, which in reality is distinct from baskets that cannot. Linguistically non-functional items of baskets are then hedged off by saying a basketful.

The lexical meaning of the grammaticalised morphemes, discussed above, should be regarded as fully retained. It is when the grammaticalised morphemes attain a dynamic function in word formation (fit onto many nominal stems) that pragmatics start working, and the respective choice of e.g. -free or -ful serves the purpose of providing the speaker with an instrument for displaying both the cognitive background (sodas can be sugared, but if you are on a diet you might not want a sugared one) and the speaker’s belief or attitude about the item in question.
3.5 Conclusions about -free, -less, and -ful

The basic, functional dichotomy between logical adverbial function and evaluative adverbial function applies to the morphological level as well as to word level (adverbials). The morpheme -free has the conventional implicature meaning 'a desired lack of something', and -less the conventional implicature 'unwanted lack of something'. When the respective morphemes are used in word-formation other conversational implicatures (the inferences that speakers can draw from a speech situation) can appear. The -less of stainless certainly indicates a wanted lack, for example.

The concept of foregrounding is also relevant to the pragmatic analysis. -free has the pragmatic marking function of foregrounding a desired lack of something, while -less has a basic pragmatic notion of expressing an undesired lack of something. Both suffixes operate with logical adverbial function, which is shown by the way entailment and implicature produced by them logically hedge off other pragmatic interpretations than the one indicated by the word composed.

Depending on the pragmatics of the base morpheme (sugar, child, war) the resultant word will yield different pragmatic interpretations. Why the use of a suffix which adds "unwantedness" can result in either positive or negative words might to some extent be explained by the semantic and pragmatic operation of combining positive and negative elements. Seen from the logical point of view, -less and -free have a logical adverbial function, modifying the base morpheme accordingly. -ful on the other hand, has an evaluative adverbial function, commenting epistemically on the word composed; it states "I observe and foreground the performance or existence of the base morpheme", but it only adds adjectival properties (the syntactic aspect) to the base morpheme, and is therefore evaluative in the pragmatic aspect.

From a syntactic point of analysis all of the discussed suffixes, -free, -less, and -ful, are derivational. The ability to form an adjective is morpho-syntactic, but the associations and evaluations that stem from people’s beliefs and attitudes about the state of the world, are an effect of the syntactic choices. This effect might be called 'morpho-pragmatic', and divides into logical and evaluative adverbial function for the suffixes discussed. The effect of negation, which is what -free and -less produce on a logical level, is also a result of what Givon calls "the discourse-pragmatics" of negation (Givón 1979:139), i.e. what the nature of the negated do-
main is. The affirmative is pre-supposed, and the negative refers back to it. In order to have a non-referential object (sugar-free) the positive reference must be implied (sugared).
PART II

4. Pragmatic markers in fiction

The following part of the study will focus on the function of some pragmatic markers in fiction. Temporal and spatial markers and logical and evaluative adverbials are salient building blocks in fiction creating setting, plot, and characterisation. The way these pragmatic markers are used as literary tools will be discussed in terms of authorial techniques for creating narrative voice, discourse in fiction and plot-relational strategies for creating dramatic tension. Some attention will also be given to instances of pragmatic marking where the presence of the writer's own voice co-relates with the text-internal narration and discourse. (For an extensive survey of pragmatic markers, see Brinton 1996:29ff.) The use of adverbials creates meta-levels or meta-linguistic levels in the text, which bring to the reader's attention for example temporal or spatial framework and discourse and discourse changes (including modality and speech act representations). It is assumed in this study that all functional words operate on linguistic grounds that are in contrast with the lexical words. The patterning or particularization of these meta-linguistic levels constitutes a salient part of the literary understanding and interpretation inducing a sense of literariness or artfulness to the text, which relates the facts of the text with the artistic reasons for those facts being a part of the text.

The concept of pragmatic marking is closely connected with deixis in language. Deixis can even be regarded as a pragmatic category of its own (Marmoudou, 2000:97). Semantic scales, semantic fields, logical and cognitive processes and mental spaces, and world knowledge (social and cultural experience), link the linguistic expression with a set of referential information, which can be retrieved by the pragmatic markers used. From a cognitive perspective language can be seen as a direct manifestation of the structure and organisation of the mind's (i.e., the “functional organization and functional activity of the brain” (Jackendoff, 2002:21) mental spaces, i.e. as we think and talk mental spaces are set up, structured, and linked, “under pressure” from grammar, context and culture. As discourse evolves and moves on, a network of spaces is created, constituting a dynamic and subjective means of constructing meaning (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996:12). Mental spaces such as for example beliefs as expressed by cognitive
metaphor or metonymy, time conceptualising, hypotheticals, counterfactuals \((if\-phrasing)\), and quantification are the targets of the deictic expressions (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996:18). The pragmatic markers then function as triggers or primers of a particular frame of reference (mental space). Linguistic expressions functioning as space-builders include prepositional phrases (adverbials), adverbs such as \textit{really} and \textit{probably}, connectives \((if, then, either)\) or clauses of propositional attitude \((Mary\ hopes\ldots\ believes\ldots\ claims)\) (Marmaridou, 2000:51). Clauses with propositional attitude can easily be re-phrased into adverbial use: \textit{Hopefully}...\textit{likely}...\textit{definitely}, which shows the important role of adverbial functions as triggers of cognitive access to mental spaces. Pragmatic marking takes place on the concrete as well as on the abstract level of communication, which should not lead to assuming that the more tangible cases of pragmatic marking are more salient, (as in time-scaling), and the less tangible ones, (such as discourse markers) are less salient. It is the degree of accessibility to analyses (syntactic marking or not) that might vary in both the concrete and the abstract pragmatic marking.

Syntactic and pragmatic analyses interact in the discussion. It is assumed that syntactic multi-functions in adverbials contribute to the versatility of the discussed adverbials as literary tools, although it should be pointed out that formal distinctions between syntax, semantics and pragmatics are maintained in the analysis. In context the full pragmatic meaning of the patterned syntax regarding adverbials develops, following the purposes of the writer concerning the desired impressions on the reader. Syntax and pragmatics are however regarded as two distinct areas, the former always text-internal – not as a real object of language, but as a description of the linguistic structure, the latter including the effects of a number of syntactic choices. To analyse syntax is to classify and identify, to say what syntax does in terms of creating meaning beyond semantics means stepping into pragmatics.

Syntactically and semantically speaking two functional categories, logical and evaluative adverbials appear, both of which are explained in detail in Ch. 2. The pragmatic behaviour of the respective adverbials which belong to the categories varies concerning entailment and implicature, and therefore produces different literary effects, some of which will be discussed.
The analysis is contextually oriented, assuming that the full meaning of a pattern of adverbials used in fiction develops as the text progresses, building up both the formal structure of the text concerning time and place and the dramatic tension and purpose of the plot. Nowhere though, is it assumed that it is only the adverbials discussed that make fiction work. Into the level of language called fiction there is a multitude of artistic options for the writer, a few of which will be dealt with in this study.

In *The Force of Circumstance* by Somerset Maugham time events play a major part in the plot. The chronology is intertwined with the spatial markers. The first part of the analysis serves to lay out the structure of time and place in the short story, and to give a general idea of the text. Then other areas of deixis are discussed, such as spatial, discourse and social deixis, marked by adverbials. The specific use of some foregrounded evaluative adverbials is also analysed.
5. Deixis in fiction

In order to analyse a literary work in full context the concept of deixis is highly adequate to identify and explain the meaning of a fiction text. Deixis is enabled by the foregrounding of context-relevant parts of the linguistic system, interpreted by the reader's or language encoder's subjectivity (Green 1995:11), and deals with the logical and contextual elements of a text or narration. Deictic expressions and indexical markers relate time, place, persons, events, and speech acts in a context (Sell, 2000:164-165), making the information of the text accessible to processing for the reader (speaker, encoder) (Levinson 1983:54, Marmaridou, 2000:65). Without the deictic expressions holding the text together, the meaning of it would not be retrievable to a meaningful extent. If there is no coherent use of personal and demonstrative pronouns, adverbs, tense and modality, referring expressions and anaphora, the message or meaning of the text will be lost or confused. Deixis is a communicative concept, per definition assuming that meaning can only arise out of interacting linguistic activity (Green 1995:14). Werth points to the fact that deixis is even a part of the modality function in language (1995:65), showing 'viewpoint', (relations in space) 'probability', (epistemic function), and 'interaction' (relationships between participants), thereby stressing the communicative function of deixis. Deictic interpretation relies on the property of human cognition to contextualise, i.e., to access information differently in different contexts (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996:19). A deictic expression is therefore a functional one, the meaning of which will emerge from the context. Marmaridou (2000) points out that the encoding of aspects of context in deictic expressions and markers is so systematic in human language that it could be taken as a part of semantics proper, but since the meaning of a deictic marker is context-dependent and truth-conditional semantics cannot make reference to contextual parameters, the field of deixis lies within pragmatics. If a deictic marker is analysed out of context, as a single word or expression, we know what the word can do in a functional respect, but there is no real meaning to it until a context is present. The meaning of a functional word needs on-going contextual exemplifying to develop, while a lexical word has a more or less set meaning which can be learned (if we do not understand it at first) and then stays context-insensitive for its semantics.
Time and place are the basic elements in the fiction construction. Without them characters would not have a physical location or the ability to move, and plots could not move forward. If the plot is seen as the narrative structure of a message, i.e. the text (Coste 1989:215), its operations on temporal and spatial circumstance can be described as "the logic or perhaps the syntax of a certain kind of discourse, one that develops its propositions only through temporal sequence and progression" (Brooks 1985:xii). The particular choices regarding time and space the writer makes create a framework that functions as the vehicle for the events the writer wishes to narrate. The plot, regarded as "the syntax of a certain kind of discourse" is therefore a meta-linguistic level of the text, to which deictic attention is drawn by the temporal and spatial markers. This meta-linguistic level does not have to be lexicalised in the text, i.e., the writer does not necessarily have to point out the actual stage of the plot, but the opportunity to do so in an overt manner is there. One way of keeping plot-comments "outside" the text, but still giving the reader a hint of what is going on in the plot is to give a name, a headline, to the respective chapters or divisions of a text. Such labels will carry some of the plot's "discourse" pattern and cue the reader's response to the narrated events. The scene can receive a title that will also be a narrateme, a 'sequence' (Coste 1989:223), defined by Barthes as "a logical succession of nuclei (elementary narratemes), bound together by a relation of solidarity" (Barthes 1979:101). Examples of such titles or labels can be "a meeting", "a gift", "a departure" (Coste 1989:223).

Deixis in fiction involve essentially four dimensions; time, space, society (especially the interlocutors), and discourse (the ongoing linguistic activity) (Verschuere,1999:18, Levinson 1983:62). Deixis functions somewhat differently in the respective categories. Structural deixis concerning time and place has a more prototypical function, setting the basic parameters for the text or narration (Buhler quoted in Green 1995:12). Deixis is a complicated web of linguistic design, both stemming from and interacting with the world knowledge shared by humans. The distinction of the categories in deixis reflect this complexity. It is easy to define or locate the basic instances of deixis, the ones that are the most grammaticalized like pronouns and temporal and spatial adverbs, but for many other deictic linguistic items, such as for example sentence adverbials, the functions are much more complex or multi-faceted. The view taken in this study is that words with any func-
tional degree (and therefore especially adverbials) have deictic function, due to the fact that the full meaning of function words does not emerge until located in a context. The scope or the range of the deictic function will vary from adverbial to adverbial. The more pragmatically marked the adverbial is the more the deictic function is stressed. In other words, the more the meaning of an adverbial changes from contextual use, the more deictically and pragmatically it is assumed to function. Furthermore, a logically functioning adverbial like now can in its evaluative function trigger a pragmatic meaning that is not syntactically overt (cf ch5.3.1.2-3). One deictic expression may also have the ability to have a more easily defined function in one context, for example in building up time, place or character, and yet another function of for example changing discourse. In cognitive terms (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996:19) this transfer can be described as the mapping of one mental space or domain of a temporal or spatial character (physical character) onto a mental space or domain of an abstract character, (a social or cultural domain), through means of cognitive metaphor or metonymy.

These four dimensions of deixis have sets of indexical expressions (Vershueren 1999:18) each member of which has a basic lexical meaning. The lexical meaning of an indexical expression can be interpreted context-independently, while the indexical meaning is context-dependent (Nunberg, 1998:145). Since deictic expressions have some lexical/semantic meaning and deictic function, they can be said to form a link between truth-conditional semantics and context-dependent pragmatics (Green 1995:12). It is a basic assumption of this study that the polysemous behaviour of indexical expression can be explained by their combination of lexical and pragmatic function. Different contexts and different syntactic renderings can use the same word for producing different meanings.

When analysed in fictional context the four dimensions sometimes interact, as is the case in The Force of Circumstance to be investigated here. Special attention will be paid to the function of logical and evaluative adverbials as indexical expressions.

5.1. Temporal deixis – time and place as interrelated narrative markers

Time and place in interrelation play a major role in creating the plot in the short story The Force of Circumstance by Somerset Maugham. The temporal expres-
sions are identified and discussed in their deictic context. The meaning and function of these expressions in creating literary effect is discussed, in terms of foregrounding and backgrounding, but also in terms of artistic meaning.

Temporal and spatial markers are extential markers for the respective departure from the ‘description’ of a scene, thus functioning as narrational markers showing where the ‘deictic centre’ (Marmariodou, 2000:70) of the text is located temporally and spatially, which will be discussed here in relation to Maugham’s short story. Deictic centre, or ‘vantage point’ (Langacker, 2000:5), takes its starting point in a person or a subject, from which specific parameters of the communicative event is foregrounded, such as temporal, spatial, social or discourse factors (Levinson 1983:64, Marmaridou, 2000:70). Deixis can be said to be conceptualised in terms of an ‘idealized cognitive model’, in Lakoff’s (1987:490) sense, of “pointing out”, which structures a mental space exhibiting prototype effects (Marmaridou, 2000:96-97). Some deictic expressions are felt more salient than others, among which are found the spatial and temporal markers used in their literal sense. Other deictic markers operating on discourse are felt more “distant” from the core sense of deixis to organize and “point” in different directions on a physical level. The general organizational function of deixis has the schema of ‘centre’ vs ‘periphery’ (Marmaridou, 2000:97), and the deictic expressions mark the relative distance from the perceived centre. Other bodily experienced relations and orientations such as up-down, front-back and part-whole (Lakoff 1987:267) are also domains that are referred to by deictic expressions. Our ability to spatialise not only what we see but also our concepts and our thinking (Lakoff 1987:23), structures all categories of deixis, where the abstract concept of time is metaphorically understood as physical space, and discourse deixis as the metaphorical understanding of discourse as time and time as space. (Marmaridou, 2000:97). The narration of an event or a scene in fiction takes a certain time to read, and also depicts a certain narrated time, both of which are perceived as having spatial extension, to which narrative markers (deictic markers) can point to separate areas or locations of.

A text can generate narrative as well as non-narrative discourse (Coste 1989:223), the former a proximal or distal deictic extension from the time and place at the centre, the latter constituting a description (a statement for a scene that does not digress from the immediateness, the “here and now” (Coste 1989:224) of
it). The extension and dislocation in time and space of such temporal and spatial marking can be described in terms of ‘narrative programs’ (Coste 1989:224), where the narrative program is the complete set of narratemes (the scenes) that can be produced from the “here and now”. If the statement $X$ is bald is considered as an example, a digression from the time and space factors together with a possible negation of the proposition constitutes four narrative programs for the statement. From the narrative programs in brackets it is evident that adverbials have the function of expressing the logical ordering of the narratemes. (Examples from Coste 1989:224)

114. $X$ was not bald. $X$ is bald. $X$ will not be bold. ($X$ has become temporarily bald.)
115. $X$ was bald. $X$ is bald. $X$ will not be bald. ($X$ will finally cease to be bald.)
116. $X$ was bald. $X$ is bald. $X$ will be bald. ($X$ will never cease to be bald.)
117. $X$ was not bald. $X$ is bald. $X$ will be bald. ($X$ will become definitely bald.)

Each of these programs can of course be enriched or expanded on by adding particularized information, but the basic narrative programs remain. The adverbials captures the temporal, spatial and circumstantial deictics of the program; the narrative (pragmatic) marker temporarily, e.g., evokes the circumstances before, during and after the focussed event of $X$ is bald.

Scenes (persons in a temporal and spatial setting) provide a basic model for our experience of transactions with the outside world, and is therefore a source of our tendency to naturalize narrative (Coste 1989:223). Taking part in a scene and narrating it by talking or thinking about it are very closely related in our minds, the scene is easily projected into a linguistic expression.

The closest narrative expression for “here and now” of a scene is the mimetic dialogue (always felt as a narration because of the fiction discourse agreement) or the iterative descriptions of a series of on-going events (I walk to the door, I grab the handle, I open the door, etc), which leaves the choice of interpretation open to the reader whether the text is a narration/fiction or not. Any distancing from “the here and now” to the “there and then” involves the use of temporal and spatial deictics, as well as discourse deixis markers, all of which are realized by adverbials or adverbial phrases. Together with pronouns and tense marking the deictic marking will point to specific scenes, persons at a particular time and place, and a whole
range of temporal or spatial dislocations can be narrated, "not here, but now", "not now, but here", "neither here, nor there" (Coste 1989:224) Departures from the "here and now" can require marking for flashbacks or spatial dislocation from the deictic centre as defined in the text, as well as marking for which narrative voice is present (third person, omniscient narrator, I-narration), and marking for meta-fictional levels (comments from the narrator on any discourse or plot item). The consistent use of deictic markers for time and place "moves" time, persons and objects back and forth in space; and it might be suggested that a text’s varying ability to "move" the thoughts and feelings of the reader and create the illusion of fiction, is a product of the degree of the deictic marking’s efficiency and impact.

5.1.1 Temporal markers in The Force of Circumstance

The general story is about an Englishman, Guy, who is placed in an out-station in Malaysia. On a visit to England he meets a girl, Doris, and they marry. Doris comes to live with him in the isolated out-station. After four peaceful months things fall apart for them. Guy has had a Malayan family before Doris came there, a woman and two children of his own. Guy tells her the truth about this, and she decides to leave him and go back to England, upon which Guy takes up living with his Malayan family again.

Time spans and moments of time sometimes have symbolic meaning in the short story (Ch. 5.1.1). The major temporal framework in the short story has three deictic frames of reference, ‘calendar time’, ‘clock time’ (divided into ‘private’ and ‘official’ time), which forms the relational point from where flashbacks and outlooks to the future are made, and ‘jungle time’, rendering primordial time in the place, merging with the setting.

Spatial location also plays a dramatic part in the short story, where the veranda and rooms of the house Guy and Doris live in, and the surrounding grounds interact with the events of the plot.

There follows a briefing of the foregrounded temporal and spatial phrases, which together have the larger function of co-relating with the plot. It is the very circumstances in the out-station that trigger the tragedy in Guy’s and Doris’ lives, and the surroundings are felt to interact with the plot advancing.
The story starts at *luncheon*, where Doris sits and waits for Guy. A brief outline of the setting in place is made, Malaysia, the river, the sun, the cicadas. Maugham adds a marker of Doris’ origin by letting her remember “the English blackbird” in the beginning of the text. *luncheon* refers to clock-time, supposed to go on perpetually in the short story, each day in the same tempo and with the same intervals. *luncheon* is an indexical expression that combines time and space, in a way that reflects the tendency in language to use spatial dimensions figuratively (Quirk et al 1990:167). The importance of spatial organization to human cognition is pervasive (Lyons 1977:648, 'localism': Anderson 1992 1997, Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976), and the concept of space is often systematically mapped onto temporal domains (Marmaridou, 2000:86). A phrase like *luncheon* functions as a ‘space builder’ (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996:10), which the reader can use to set up a new mental space (*lunch time*). The concept of place is spatialised to cover a temporal expression. It can be argued that *luncheon* in itself is a temporal marker, since it denotes the connection to a certain point in time, but the concrete conceptualisation of *luncheon* rather suggests the food involved or the social circumstances around it, the abstract temporal mapping optional for extraction from the expression. *luncheon* is a visualized concept, which adds to the saliency of the spatialisation. Sweetser and Fauconnier points out that space builders in themselves provide very little explicit information about the new domain or what it purports to refer to (1996:10), which is hardly surprising to see regarding the fact that the functional character of indexical expressions is exactly what makes their meaning appear in context only. When the indexical expression *luncheon* appears a new mental space opens up which is prototypical or unspecified until further details about it are handed out in the text. Then the mental space opened up by the expression becomes particularized, or elaborated locally, as Sweetser and Fauconnier puts it (1996:11). Access to the mental space’s knowledge is triggered by the indexical expression (*luncheon*) but which specific parts of that knowledge to be included in the interpretation is not decided on (apart from the general understanding of what *luncheon* is or includes) until the text contributes these details. The text world’s temporal and spatial framework, (for example what the text means with *luncheon*), builds up as the result of the interplay between the triggering the indexical expression makes and the mental spaces the indexical expres-
sions gain access to. In the short story the spatial world that emerges is defined by the hot sun, *the breathless sun of midday*. The jungle scene emerges, with the blazing sun, the river and the vegetation reflecting the white light, and in this setting the event of *luncheon* takes place. The general spatio-temporal event of *luncheon* is particularized to denote lunch in the jungle, and only a few, salient markers are needed in the text for the particularization to emerge.

A flashback ('*analepsis*') to the morning is made, in order to create contrast between the freshness of the morning time and the “breathless sun of midday”. This flashback is a comment on the time that has passed before Doris sat on the veranda, waiting for her husband, clock time is already set at work by the time marker. The flashback is within Doris’ universe, as if we are given her memory of the past morning. As soon as movements along the chronology of a text is made, the temporal digressions require deictic marking of some kind. If the text is narrated as “here and now”, in a mimetic way (Coste 1989:224), there is no need to bring to the reader’s attention any other moment in time than the mere present, or on-going present, but if the writer wants to post-pone the narrating of some events to a later moment of the text’s present, deictic marking is needed. The marking that Maugham uses for the first flashback is a temporal phrase, *when the morning*, which points back to a moment in time distant to the time when the story begins with Doris sitting on the veranda.

She was sitting on the veranda waiting for her husband to come in for luncheon. The Malay boy had drawn the blinds when the morning lost its freshness, but she had partly raised one of them so that she could look at the river. Under the breathless sun of midday it had the white pallor of death.

*When*-clauses are “not only used to set up the initial time frames for event sequences or to move from one time frame to a wholly different one, they are also used within event sequences to create shifts in time and situation as part of the reporting of one continuous sequence” (Ford 1993:31), a form of temporal deictic marking which here shifts the narration temporarily back to a while earlier in the chronology. The flashback of the *when*-clause moves on in time with Doris’ raising of one of the blinds, and returns to the initial narrative moment, (She was sitting on the veranda), by *under the breathless sun of midday*. 
By mentioning *luncheon* the time span before it is immediately conceptualised for the reader. The flashback is therefore not needed for establishing clock or calendar time, but is here a way of foregrounding a topic; the climate. *luncheon* is therefore a deictic centre of time at the beginning of the short story. The flashback ends with Guy entering the yard, then she heard her husband’s step on the gravel path. From the time flow in which Doris sits on the veranda, one moment is singled out by *then*. *Then*, as well as other temporal adverbials such as *first, last,* and *between* can be used for relative comparison within a framework of time, the limits of the framework being specified by the text. The pragmatic and deictic function of such adverbials is dependent on the context.

If the adverbial *then* had not been there, the impression would have been that there was no exact sequential ordering between Doris sitting on the veranda and her hearing Guy’s footsteps. By the insertion of *then* two events are singled out more clearly from each other, Doris on the veranda, and Guy coming towards the house. A sentence without the adverb *then*: “She was sitting on the veranda. She heard her husband’s step on the gravel path”, does order the events chronologically, but with a different effect. The logical or consequential relation between the two events is not as strong as if *then* is inserted. With the adverbial a new topic is introduced and foregrounded. Guy, her husband, enters. A dialogue between them serves the purpose of establishing the relation between them, which is warm and loving. Clock time passes with a description of Guy’s preparations for lunch, during which a second flashback is narrated through Doris’ character. Both Doris’ and Guy’s personalities are elaborated on in the flashback. Here calendar time is foregrounded by Doris’ thoughts about the past, a flashback introduced by *nine months ago*, which is the time that has passed since she met him in England. The evaluative adverbial phrase *It was hard to realize* also serves the purpose of marking the second flashback deictically and relate it to the present lunch time. While Doris is “thinking” about the events of the flashback, she is still sitting on the veranda (my italics).

*It was hard to realize* that nine months ago she had never even heard of him. She had met him at a small place by the seaside where she was spending a month’s holiday with her mother.
The flashback retells a mutual experience to them, and shows that they have shared the past nine months with each other. Since there are other flashbacks to come in the short story, revealing Guy’s experiences only, the flashback to the past nine months constitutes a background to the more dramatic flashbacks later on in the text, where Guy’s secret is revealed. Since what Doris recalls in this flashback, sitting on the veranda, is so harmonious and uncontroversial the reader is led to believe that all of their respective past is of the same qualities.

With this information the event on the veranda, Doris waiting for her husband, becomes more elaborated than we are told initially. During four months Doris has acquired the habit of sitting on the veranda at lunch-time, and her sitting there in the beginning of the story marks the perfectly undisturbed situation of the married couple.

The end of the flashback is marked by Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bath-house, thus interrupting Doris’ thoughts about the past nine months. She overhears someone talking to him in the native language, and supposes it is someone who has a complaint to make. Clock time passes while Maugham describes how Doris listens to the sound of water being splashed around by Guy.

How much time passes after the sound of the water has ceased and Guy enters the dining-room is specified by in a couple of minutes, during which Doris’ thoughts are not revealed to the reader, a technique constituting ‘summary’ (Toolan 1988:57). This is the first instance where Maugham “skips” Doris’ narrative attachment to clock time, by not telling us what she does or thinks while time passes. All of the beginning of the text up to in a couple of minutes is so far given to us as experienced by Doris. The social deictic centre is Doris, and the temporal adverbials sustain this centre. It is Doris keeping track of the time recorded by the narrative voice.

At lunch they talk about the woman that had disturbed Guy, and Doris unwraps an event of the morning; the woman had been there in the morning too. Doris thus makes another flashback, a discourse-internal one, since she is retelling the morning’s events to the other character in the text. This discourse-internal flashback covers the same amount of time as in the first flashback which is marked by when the morning lost its freshness, but it does not disrupt the chronological events of
the plot. Since the flashback is related by Doris sitting at the table, scene time and text time are equal. Technically, this internal flashback might as well have been interrupting text time, but by embedding the flashback in the third person narration we are here given the perspective of the character through an invisible writer. The information we are given is highly relevant to the plot and provides the first hint that things are not what they appear to be, letting Doris be the “messenger” and making the reader experience a foregrounding of the information. It is new information to the reader, as well as to Guy, that Doris has seen the Malayan woman in the morning. By having Doris provide it now, instead of through her thoughts in the first flashback, the events are made to seem increasingly important. The time span Doris refers to, the morning, has been narrated once already, but then without any foregrounded information. The first flashback then constitutes the temporal background and Doris’ text-internal flashback the foregrounded events.

They also talk about the woman’s children, “half-castes”, as Doris puts it, but she has no idea that they could be Guy’s, i.e. Maugham is still keeping the informational world of Guy and Doris, respectively, apart.

During their lunch a third, long flashback is made where Doris’ first time at the out-station is described through her thoughts. Gradually, Maugham provides the full information about Doris’ and Guy’s nine months together. This flashback is marked by an evaluative adverbial, of course, and a temporal adverbial, when.

Of course she had read novels about the Malay Archipelago and she had formed an impression of a sombre land with great ominous rivers and a silent, impenetrable jungle. When the little coasting steamer set them down at the mouth of the river, where a large boat, manned by a dozen Dyaks, was waiting to take them to the station, her breath was taken away by the beauty, friendly rather than awe-inspiring, of the scene.

First the story starts in medias res, as mentioned, with Doris on the veranda, then we are told that nine months have passed, in the flashback taking place while Doris is sitting on the veranda, waiting for Guy to prepare himself for luncheon, but we are told not what has happened during this time. The leaving out of information in the first flashback is followed up by the introduction of more detailed information in the second and third flashbacks.
Then the flashback made by Doris’ thoughts during lunch-time is highly informative, about the flashbacked calendar time, but also a clear example of the deceptions of narrative techniques. On one and a half page their life so far is depicted and the narrative consensus between the writer and the reader instructs us to interpret this flashback as the actual thoughts of Doris, sitting at the lunch table. The illusion of ticking clock-time is lost, however, because of the length of the passage. Between the changing of plates until they finished luncheon, there is no believing that Doris could have had the time to ponder all of the events mentioned. The ‘isochronicity’ (Coste 1989:22), i.e., the equalling of time of narration and narrated time, is disrupted. Maugham is simply filling us in on the preliminaries, and he has to do it by using one of the characters, since all of the short story is to be understood as narrated in the third person, with an omniscient narrator occasionally slipping in. In my opinion this is the first instance where the fiction discourse becomes evident, in using the ‘descriptive pause’, text without story-duration (Toolan 1988:56). Time is felt to expand, but it expands in the universe of the reader, and not in the text. The time that in reality must have been spent in making the lengthy flashback is extended beyond the text-internal period of time, the clock-time that goes on in Guy and Doris’ dining-room. The communication between the writer and the reader is more observable here than before in the text, and there is reason to say that the indexical expressions concerning time, signalling the flashback, are also of importance to discourse deixis, pointing to the evolution of the plot. The respective flashbacks concentrate on separate narratemes (narrations of the scenes of the plot), and the initial flashbacks function as conveyors of sufficient information to grasp the developments of the plot i.e., as providers of background information.

In the flashback we get information about not only the character through which the story is being told, but also about another one, Guy. This makes the narration ‘heterodiegetic’ (Toolan 1988:51), including the information of a more all-present narrator.

So far two temporal markers have had narrative and pragmatic functions beyond just marking time. First the temporal marker in a couple of minutes marked the social deixis in the text, with the deictic centre with Doris. It is Doris who is waiting for Guy to come back from his shower. Then the temporal marker nine
months ago starts with the flashback which has a descriptive pause, disturbing the illusion of fiction and calling attention to the communication between writer and reader, thus foregrounding discourse deixis (cf. Ch. 5.3).

Clock time is marked after lunch. They are having their siesta. “Don’t let me see you for at least two hours”, Guy says to Doris. The narrative attention, the deictic centre, is still on Doris, and it is through her perception we are told about the events directly after her nap; the boy is bringing the tea things in.

Another example of time markers functioning in dimensions of deixis other than just pointing out clock time is the moment where Doris enters the sitting-room. This event is foregrounded by When she came into the sitting-room Guy was taking the rackets out of the press, thereby shifting from Doris’ own person to her relation with Guy. A temporal expression, When, marks the point in time after which the social deixis, at least during their game of tennis, is shared by both characters. One time marker here signals a co-relation and co-ordination of the characters’ personal time scales.

Their habit of playing tennis in the afternoon, in the short cool of the evening, adds to the normality of the story so far. The dramatic curve of the plot has been hinted at by Maugham, when he introduces the native woman as a topic for lunch discussion. The reader might be suspicious, but it is clear that Doris is not. Dramatic material that serves the purpose of hinting at the reader is thus inserted, providing a slight foregrounding, but the information is not intended to let Doris in on Guy’s secret.

On the tennis court, Guy plays badly, and they return to the house when it is dark. Another important time marker of clock time character in Guy’s and Doris’ lives is entered, This was the hour at which they had the first drink of the day, and by now the reader is told about all their daily routines by following their activities during a whole day.

The story started at lunch-time, but brief flashbacks go back to the morning as well. There is an ‘ellipsis’, no text space spent on story duration (Toolan 1988:56), covering the clock time in the story between their last drink of the evening and the next day.

Next day introduces us to another familiar event at the out-station, the arrival of the mail. Next day marks the first reference to calendar time in the text. Calendar
time is introduced as a complement to the chronological axis of clock time. By now we have a complete picture of their activities and their schedule, the background is fully outlined. The mail arrives twice a month and this is the first mentioning of calendar time so far. The staging of calendar time involves a drastic change in the chronology of the narration. So far the narration has been approximating clock time at the out-station. When the mail arrives a long ellipsis is made, rendered by *Then, perhaps a week later.* The impression is that clock-time, the normal time, is suspended for a while by the arrival of the mail. This is sustained by information from the text telling how Guy and Doris absorb themselves in the newly arrived newspapers.

*Then, perhaps a week later, one morning when she was sitting in the shaded room studying a Malay grammar [...]*

A new stage in the so far very quiet married life of the couple has arrived. This adverbial phrase marks a transition in the story. This is where Doris becomes aware that something is wrong about the Malay woman who hangs about their home. Their old life waned away in the ellipsis between next day and *Then, perhaps a week later.* The last days of peace are not told to the reader, a stretch of time that relates to the unbroken chain of peaceful days that they have had before. Up to the point where the mail arrives all the adverbial phrases mentioned, only indicate the pleasant normal things Guy and Doris do. Starting with *Then, perhaps a week later,* all time markers afterwards indicate yet another crack in their carefully built life. The steady, slow flow of life and time, like the water in the dull river, is broken. The previously undisturbed flow of life of the characters has a correspondence to the outline of the setting. The dull river, the sun eternally setting and rising therefore, though constituting the facts and frame of the text, contribute to the evolvement of the plot. The jungle as background is famous in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness,* where the setting is threatening. In *The Force of Circumstance* the jungle and the river represent stability and safety, which are broken by Guy’s old secrets being revealed.

At lunch Doris inquires from Guy about the Malay woman, but Guy’s tone of voice disturbs her. *For a little while Doris did not speak,* shows another new element in their relation, the inability to communicate freely and which they had al-
ways done so far. The interval of time denoted by *For a little while* marks where Doris lapses into her own world where time is not shared with anyone else.

Another of their familiar routines, the tennis game in the afternoon, is cancelled due to bad weather, *The rain was falling when she woke up.* The time when Doris usually wakes up, a couple of hours after lunch, is the backgrounded moment in time. This particular day the rain interrupts their routines. A spatial event, the rain, is connected to the temporal event of Doris waking up, with the effect that rain is perceived unpleasant. Teatime, usually a pleasant and backgrounded event, is now foregrounded; *During tea Guy was silent and abstracted.* The change in atmosphere is clearly felt. All of the pleasant time markers in their lives are now a source of anxiety: *lunch, tea, siesta.* At this point of the story not only the reader, but also Doris, are fully aware that something bad is going to happen. The fulcrum of the story where the plot finally tips over to the tragic, is marked by *It was not till after dinner that he spoke.* suddenly is now used as a marker of unpleasantness, (cf. Ch. 5.1.5.1). Guy *suddenly* says that he has "something to say" to her.

Now the whole story about Guy’s life at the out-station before Doris came there is revealed. He tells her the full story of his life, starting from the age of eighteen when he first came to Malaysia, the loneliness, the climate, the dark nights, and the cure for this; the Malayan woman with whom he has three children. The text space time spent on this flashback is felt to reflect the time it took for Guy to tell Doris the whole story. Descriptive pause is not the appropriate term here since the flashback is supposed to be rendered in mimesis, a monologue from Guy. The text space spent on the events preceding Guy’s marrying Doris is supposed to match the time it should take for Guy to tell Doris about the past. The verisimilitude between real speech and Guy’s flashback (the isochronicity), is revealed as the most important information ever in the story, at the same time it is the background, since all of it has been known, but not to Doris or the reader. The end of the flashback is marked by the final *Now she had heard everything.* The impact of Guy’s information on Doris is pragmatically implicated by *Now she had heard everything.* He waited for her to speak, but she said nothing.

The narrative pattern of the flashbacks so far, creates a contrastive effect between the different sides Guy’s real life. What Doris retells in her initial flashbacks are versions, narrations, of their life together, describing a happy marriage and a
good relationship. Guy’s flashback corrects Doris’ narration of what their life is like, by telling her what should have remained a secret. Doris’ flashbacks represent “things that can be told” and Guy’s the opposite “what cannot be spoken about”. There is an iconic resemblance between this contrast in the text and the general filtering that any text (narration) is a result of. The production of a text is a series of choices depending on the knowledge (the material) of the writer, and his/her ability to mobilize parts of this knowledge, in other words; what the writer actually places in the text. But as Coste observes (1989:245-246), there are at least two “blind spots” on the plane of available materials. Firstly, the ‘unutterable’, language material that for legal, social or practical reasons is not available as a choice for the writer, secondly the ‘field of ignorance’, the forgotten, the uninvented, the unimaginable, etc. Both the former and the latter factors constrain the material available to the writer, and function as broad filters that can have various degrees of impact on the writer, depending on his or her sensibility to them. If the “unutterable” and the “field of ignorance” is unchallenged or disregarded, the material available to the writer constitutes “what can be talked or spoken about”, for legal, social, practical and conceptual reasons, a sort of mainstream abidance to canon and decorum in terms of literary practices and expressions. Narration is a personal as well as a social process:

The choice of materials by the actual producer of a narrative is already a labor of transformation in relation to the total narrative and discursive program of a language, but the relative possibility and probability of these choices, the capacity of elements of language and culture to be recognized as potential narrative materials, are already the beginning of the collective production of a vast general narrative; a society and culture start to tell their own stories, through the materials they make available to their narrators (Coste 1992:45).

When the “unutterable” or the “field of ignorance” is used or hinted at in discourse, (in the same text or in texts in dialogue) a contrastive effect will be perceived, which challenges the undisturbed “mainstream” narration. Maugham’s narratemes (in the form of flashbacks) containing “what can be spoken about” and “the unspeakable”, are held distinctly apart by placing the former in Doris’ account and the latter in Guy’s. The micro-universe of the text’s filtered narration thus mirrors the macro-universe of a writer’s own options for narrations, (if and where to talk about material that is “unutterable” or in the “field of ignorance”). If a writer
wishes to reveal “unutterable”, (appalling, immoral, unlawful, unethical, etc) information in a text, he or she conforms to the “blind spot” norm if the unutterable is placed in a discourse situation where its stigmatisation is apparent, i.e. its status as information that is outside some established norm. In a “normal” world things are supposed to be “normal” too, and normal things are supposed to be overtly displayed. Digressions from the norm are marked, or even shameful, as in the way Guy tells his story as if he were a criminal. The sense of what is “right” and “wrong” thus becomes strongly apparent, without the text explicitly taking any stand of its own. The narration itself (Maugham’s voice) does not tell the reader to side for either Doris or Guy, it is the norms that the respective flashbacks evoke that may want the reader to have an opinion about Guy’s behaviour. A text’s narrative structure (which narratemes carry which information) can be employed to “protect” the writer from being attributed the opinions or values displayed or embedded in the text. If Maugham had retold Guy’s former life in third-person or with an omniscient narrator, it would have been much easier to confuse Maugham’s voice with the voice of Guy. Now it is Guy speaking for himself and Maugham’s own opinion (if he had one) is left aside. Maugham cannot be called “an immoral writer”, even if any reader should decide that Guy was doing the right thing. The author’s narrative technique of placing “immoral” textual content where it can only be attributed to one of the characters himself or herself can be called a strategy of “politeness”, as described by Sell (2000:220-222), and constructed in accordance with any standards of politeness that the writer chooses to be in contrast with. Due to the restriction of information about Guy’s behaviour to his own narration it also becomes foregrounded for the reader, and increased dramatic tension is created.

After Guy has told Doris everything the tension between the “speakable” and the “unspeakable” is released, and the result is a collapse of their relationship. Now in Now she had heard everything is more than a marker of clock time or calendar time. It is a relational time marker, indicating a stretch of time ended, time where time itself really is not foregrounded. Now marks the full delivery of a message, Guy telling Doris, and how long the message took to be told is subordinate. For the reader, though, it seems as if the message took as long to deliver as it took to read the pages containing the flashback. Now foregrounds the completing of the mes-
sage, conveyed by Guy. The choice of an adverbial of time as pragmatic marker adds to the contrastive feelings of time conveyed through the story. Previously time was calm, protective, safe, assuring, now the moments in time are hurtful, as if something sharp has cut their paradise-like time apart. *Now* changes the text-internal discourse situation from marital happiness to apparent relational conflict.

*Now* also becomes a new centre of temporal deixis, because of the important events attached to it. Everything that happens from now on, happens after the completed moment. The temporal marker *Now* therefore not only marks a point on a time scale, separating before from after, but also functions as a text-internal discourse marker. It is also a social marker, since more of Guy's narrative perspective enters the text from now on.

There is also a change in their attitude towards calendar time, distinctly marked by the next adverbial, *She was pale next day*. The arrival of a new day is unpleasantly felt. The emotional separation between them is a fact and time is moving on again, but with a gnawing sensation to it. *Next morning he asked her if she had slept better* is a marker of their attempt and failure to normalize things.

Doris asks Guy to allow her six months to try and get over what has happened, and he agrees. These six months are registered adverbially to resemble the turning over of the pages of a calendar; *A month passed, a second month passed, then a third, and suddenly the six months which had seen so interminable were over.*

In terms of literary techniques these adverbial expressions constitute iconicity. Iconicity involves the principle of imitation, the text device mimicking the meaning that it expresses (Leech&Short 1981:233). A well-known example of iconicity is onomatopoeia, where the sound of the syllables in the word is supposed to evoke its meaning.

The iconic force in language produces an ENACTMENT of the fictional reality through the form of the text. This brings realistic illusion to life in a new dimension; as readers we do not merely receive a report of the fictional world, we enter into it iconically, as a dramatic performance, through the experience of reading. (Leech&Short 1981:236).

Above Leech&Short refer to time sequencing in narration, event A is followed by event B, which is logical compared to the ordering of events in example 119.
118. The lone ranger saddled his horse, mounted, and rode off into the sunset.
119. The lone ranger rode off into the sunset, mounted, and saddled his horse.

In the first example reality is mimicked by the ordering of the clauses. The principle of iconicity is at work when Maugham repeats the temporal expressions referring to calendar time, and the reader can almost see the pages of a calendar being turned, month by month.

Time is set to work on a visible, spatialised level, giving the impression that an effort has been made to make time turn again, time which earlier flowed without their thinking of it. Now it is will power that makes time move. The six months are ended with suddenly, an adverbial which earlier has been attached to breaks in the usual routine, the boy hurrying to Doris' call, the boy eager to tell Guy about the visit of the Malayan woman before Doris does, and Guy's decision to start talking about what has happened. All of this came suddenly, and the impression is that everything that happens suddenly in the tropics is unwanted or signals forthcoming misery. A glance Doris passes at Guy has the same unpleasant tinge: She looked at him suddenly and her eyes were cold and hostile. Once this impression is established, the use of suddenly in the context where the six months Doris asked for are over, does not raise any positive expectations.

Calendar time is segmented down to days, in the final passage of the short story. The mail boat has arrived, and two or three days passed by. It was a Tuesday and the prahu was to start at dawn on Thursday to await the steamer. Even the arrival of the mail, which used to be such a pleasant occasion is poisoned for them, and especially for Guy since he does not yet know of his wife's decision to leave. The time between Tuesday, when Doris tells Guy that she is leaving him, and Thursday is marked by calendar time, as well as clock time. On Tuesday evening the hands of the clock are vividly present for Guy and Doris, For two minutes perhaps they sat there without a word, in a way they have not experienced before. Time has most often been measured in larger and more indefinite chunks, like morning, night, lunch, tea, tennis, time, mail time, but now every second that passes is felt. For two minutes... also marks social deixis together with the pronoun they. Wednesday, which is not mentioned by name, is called Next morning, in Next morning, up earlier than usual, he went to her door and knocked. The clock time is foregrounded again, it is before the time he usually rises. Guy leaves the house and
does not come in until ten o’clock at night, which is another marker of an unprece-
dently foregrounded moment. Before, there was no need to look at the watch, the
evenings just trailed on. Now Guy misses dinner, one of the standard events of
their day. The time is also a signal that their time is separated. They used to do
everything together after Guy had finished work, but now each has their own time.
They both count the hours before Doris is leaving, but they do not do it together.

The “jungle time” is reinstated on the day she leaves. It was dark when the boy
awakened them, and there is no mentioning of clock time. When Doris steps into
the prahu, the little boat to take her to the steamer, The dawn now was creeping
along the river mistily, but the night lurked still in the dark trees of the jungle.
Maugham personifies time here, which is a classic literary device involving spati­
alisation. Dawn and night are felt as physical entities, bodies moving in the sur­
rroundings. A blend of space and time is thereby made with extraordinary vivacity.
The consequence is that the original time flow of the out-station is re-established
when Doris leaves. “Jungle time” (see Ch. 5.1.2) falls back on Guy again and to
the state he was in before Doris arrived. It is therefore most significant that clock
time markers are not used when Doris is removed from the story. Jungle time
merges with Guy’s personality to a point where the adverbial expressions have
social deictic importance. Guy is alone from now on and the rest of the story must
be told through him. The text-internal narrative discourse also changes, since
Guy’s personal situation is much changed from this moment on.

When she has left, Guy sits down on the veranda, and watched the day ad­
vance gradually. The movement of the sun is the time measure, and not the clock.
Again a spatial event is connected to a temporal event. The day is the time meas­
ure, personified by its metaphoric advance. Gradually mimics the painful and
slow tempo at which time is now perceived to progress, which is another case of
iconicity. The iconicity is dependent on the full context to develop. Gradually in
its lexical meaning has no negative associations, but in this context where the
reader knows that Guy is unhappy, to say the least, and his feeling sitting on the
veranda is experienced as depression. The juxtaposition of gradually with the
reader’s understanding of Guy’s unhappiness colours the pragmatic interpretation
of the adverbial.
At last he looked at his watch, is this time a sign of habit, he has to go to the office. Guy’s watch here measures “official time”, the time to go to work. There is no foregrounding of clock time here, what is happening is rather we are told that Guy is holding on to his routines.

In the afternoon he could not sleep, is a return to “private time”, like the one he and Doris shared, but now he is alone. Towards sunset he came back and had two or three drinks, and then it was time to dress for dinner. Guy’s experience of time the first day he is alone snaps back to what it has always been, divisions between light and dark, sleep and wake, work and leisure. That night Guy is lying awake without being able to fall asleep. Presently he heard a discreet cough, marks the end of Guy’s solitude. One day of loneliness bears the outline for the rest of Guy’s days, a thought which he cannot bear. He cannot fall asleep because waking up means going through just one more of those empty days.

The short story ends with Guy accepting the offer from his former Malayan family to return to the house. On the question of when they should return Guy gives in and says Tonight. The sooner he can put an end to the terrible time that would plague him for the rest of his life, the better.

The meaning of Tonight is ‘immediately’, since it is already night. The deictic context of Tonight is the time Guy experiences lying awake, pondering the day that has passed and fearing all the days to come. Guy’s wish is that this frightful perception of time should cease as soon as possible, to put an end to his misery. In this context Tonight cannot mean in a few hours, or two o’clock at night, only at once. The story ends there, and the perception is that time ends too. The message seems to be that when time is not felt, one is either happy or dead.

The interplay between semantic and pragmatic interpretation for temporal markers creates the opportunity for artistic effects. When temporal markers are mapped on other dimensions of deixis, or are connected to other facts in the text, the logical function contributes to evoke pragmatic meaning through means of the literary technique of juxtaposition. This involves placing linguistic items whose meaning the writer wants to be associated, close to each other in the text, as in the following example.

120. The colours of the day were ashy and wan.
The day is the logical centre of understanding in the sentence. The day is the topic of the sentence, and juxtaposed with the spatial or visual markers, the whole noun phrase The colours of the day becomes credible. The logical function of the day spills over to include The colours and we are ready to accept the truth of the sentence.

From the adverbial markers in the text one can extract both the facts of the text and how they are told. Time and place can be regarded as factual entities, modifying the “firmness” and tactility of a fictional universe. One could check in the text to see at what time of day Guy and Doris had their first drink, or what the jungle looked like, but it is also evident that these facts play a larger part in the plot. The actual points in time and place chosen by the writer serve the purpose of explaining to the reader why the characters’ lives are first happy, then most unhappy. Both the good and bad things that happen to the protagonists are all because of the jungle and the climate. Time and place is therefore also a discourse factor.

5.1.2 Jungle time and human time
There are separate aspects of time experience in the short story, as rendered by the temporal expressions discussed in 5.1.1. First there is the sense of time based on the tropical location and the jungle, then there is human time, which divides into private and official time. This analysis aims at estimating the artistic impression created for the reader and how this is formed by the extensive foregrounding of time in the short story, as well as identifying some of the literary techniques used. Coste (1989:226) suggests that the plane of narration (the temporal scenes chosen and the linguistic form for expressing them) interplays with the narration (the text) in an iconic relation. In The Force of Circumstance temporal events are indeed narrated in a way that renders iconic value to them; time is felt to be moving and behaving in three distinctly different ways: jungle time plus private and official time.

The basic time concept in The Force of Circumstance is time which is perceived as an integrated part of the setting of the story, the jungle and the river. In this sense time is both seen, felt and heard, but not clocked. The sun goes up and down and by its movement one can see time advancing. Time is thus spatialised. The day is divided according to the presence or absence of light, to a floating de-
gree, from morning to midday, afternoon, evening and night. Guy sits on the veranda and watched the day advance gradually, like a bitter, an unmerited, and an over-whelming sorrow.

The day is also perceived to have different colours; The colours of the day were ashy and wan. They were but the various tones of the heat. Here two senses begin to mix, sight and hearing, to a form of synaesthesia (one perception of the body and mind felt as interpreted through another sense).

The colours of the day were ashy and wan. They were but the various tones of the heat. (It was like an Eastern melody, in the minor key, which exacerbates the nerves by its ambiguous monotony.

The sounds and noises from the surroundings are also time markers. The birds sing only at daytime, while the cicadas never stop chirping, a constant marker of time flow. At night the frogs start to croak. Even the absence of sounds is a time marker. During nights the silence is enough to drive Guy out of his wits, when he is alone.

There wasn't a sound in the bungalow except now and then the croak of the chik-chak. It used to come out of the silence, suddenly, so that it made me jump.

Time is also felt, since the temperature varies from the freshness of the morning, till the breathless sun of midday, and the short cool of the evening. Time is tangible. Time can be seen, heard and felt, and is therefore also spatial, which is a basic concept in the human perception of time. In many ways, spatial concepts are central to human thinking, since they form “the basis of standard metaphors in numerous areas of experience” (Lakoff 1987, Vershueren 1999:98). I would like to add to this that not only markers as e.g. before and after, but also metonymies such as luncheon or time to play tennis involve a spatial element (cf. Ch. 5.1.1.). One event is made to represent a certain time of day.

This means that when an adverbial like morning is used a whole set of associations that are linked to the place in the jungle emerges for the reader. After the writer has established the setting properly, the spatial and temporal markers in the text are “loaded” in the desired way. Morning, e.g., will have a particularized de-
ictic function, pointing not only to a time of the day, but also to the circumstances around this time.

The spatial reference in the short story is the jungle and its climate. This is what makes time turn, it seems, and not the ordinary laws of physics, such as gravity and the earth’s revolving. The personification of the jungle and of time itself, the night lurked still in the dark trees of the jungle, establishes the spatial relation between experienced time for the characters and the environment. The jungle, including the climate, thus forms the ‘ground’ and the events around it the ‘figure’ (Vershueren 1999:99, Givon 1979:139). Consequently, nature’s time is the background on which human time is projected.

All adverbials of time have a logical function which involves the inclusion of a certain point of time, or time span, and exclusion of all others. The implications produced by a sentence with an adverbial of time will contrast with all other time events or time spans, except the one pinned down by the adverbial itself.

121. The chik-chaks sang at night.

The temporal adverbial limits the scope of interpretation down to the factive level. It was at night that the chik-chaks sang, and not at any other time. According to the truth that would apply in the fiction (the quote in ex 121 is from The Force of Circumstance) some implications could be:

122. The chik-chaks did nothing but sing at night.
123. The chik-chaks ate ants at night.

or any other thing that chik-chaks are known to do at night. The point in time is the logical focus of the sentence. It was at night the chik-chaks sang, and not at any other time. Temporal adverbials are therefore perceived as creating something stable in a text, a sense of structure to build events on (cf. Ch. 5.1). The scalability of temporal adverbials involves chronological time as well as relational time, durational time and frequency, all of which are in some way related to spatial concepts.

Temporal concepts are mapped onto other adverbials as well. Evaluative adverbials, such as e.g. currently, finally, eventually, originally and shortly, are related to “pure” adverbials of time, and have a reference to time “built” into the meaning of the word. All of those adverbials have an aspect denoting an event in time, but
other aspects of meaning regarding the evaluation of an event or proposition are also involved (cf. Ch 5.1.6).

5.1.2.1 Official time and private time

In the short story, human time divides into official time and private time. The official time structure is maintained by the colonial organisation, and is clocked daily. Guy does his clock hours every day, in a regular manner. If he had not have his work to attend to, clocks would have been unnecessary. No exact hours of time are mentioned, except for two foregrounded moments. The first is when Guy comes home late the night before Doris leaves, ten o’clock, which marks a situation where the hands of the clock are watched and observed intensely, every advancement of time is paid attention. The second is Doris’ request to the boy to wake me at five, which is singled out as quite unusual for her. The normal situation would not require her to rise early, which her departure the following day does. Normally they would not rise until the sun was up.

Towards the end of the story Guy checks his watch: At last he looked at his watch. It was time for him to go to the office. We are not told exactly what time it is, only that the proper time has come. The impression is that official time is as much a background in the story as jungle time is, something normal that just flows on, and the occasional look at his watch signals whether Guy should go to his work. Night time is definitely not the normal time for exact measure. Guy did not come in till ten o’clock at night foregrounds both the event, Guy does not usually stay out this late, and the observation of clock time is not ordinarily a habit of the household.

Official time, measured at exact points, is therefore not a part of private time, which is the third kind of time experienced in the story. Guy and Doris have established a household routine, which is the same from day to day and is only interrupted by the arrival of the mail boat which is a recurring event. They mainly adjust their actions to the demands of jungle time. They work in the morning and early day, sleep during the heat of the afternoon, play tennis in the short cool before dark, and sit on the veranda before going to bed having drinks in the dark. When it rains they cannot play tennis, for instance, but are forced to stay inside during the afternoon. This way time it seems that if had not been for the fact that
private time included a past, which they have not always shared, time would go on forever. It is the time which they have not spent in the jungle together that threatens their relationship. Guy explains to Doris why living at the out-station was such a pain to him initially; *I had never been alone before.* Once past time is a reality to them both, the paradise feeling is lost. *Now she had heard everything,* marks completed knowledge about time past, a knowledge which also puts an end to their relationship at that very moment. From this moment on Guy and Doris have separate accounts or flows of time; of private time. The separation from Guy’s time is finally marked by *I told the boy to wake me at five.* It is in the flow of separate private time that *Guy did not come in till ten o’clock that night* appears. Both of them are watching the time, but they do not share it, their formerly common deictic point of reference regarding time is now split.

Private time is generally measured in months; *nine months ago she had never even heard of him.* — *A month passed, A second month passed, then a third, and suddenly the six months [...] were over.* The important event of the mail arriving is also a monthly related event, the coasting steamer passed the mouth of the river twice a month. For a jungle world governed by the sun, it is something like a paradox that private time should be measured by the moon. Their daily life, surely, is formed by the sun’s position, but their private “clock” seems to be the calendar. No names of months are mentioned, they are only time intervals in a static jungle universe. The absence of a seasonal character of monthly progression is therefore foregrounded, and the implication is that there are no seasons as we know them in the jungle. Time is a perpetual movement from day to night and back to day again. To keep track of the number of days the time span of a month is selected, with no relation to jungle time itself.

Jungle time, official time and private time are maintained throughout the story, and are represented by matching adverbial phrases. The jungle does not have a watch, since there it is the sun that marks the time. The office where Guy works clocks time, is backgrounded in the text, and is only foregrounded on one instance. Private time is more or less jungle time, but functional in the sense that different actions are related to the adverbials of time used; *This was the hour at which they had their first drink, they played tennis in the short cool of the evening, they had risen at dawn, the blinds on the veranda were raised now.*
The main difference between jungle time and private time is there is an awareness of the progression of private time is aware, while with jungle time there is not. Private time has a sinister past, and an Eden-like present, and it separates the future destinies of the couple. The happy time Guy and Doris share for nine months is perceived as a continuous present, as a trail of pleasant days without interruptions. The characteristics of this present is much like that of jungle time, since it merely appears to be going on forever. The jungle is equalled to tranquil love and undisturbed life, where private time is in accord as long as past time is not recognized or admitted. Guy’s past makes Doris leave him, when she is gone Guy returns to a time flow which is close to the jungle again, but with a different perception about it. The joy of living is gone, when Doris is gone. Guy cannot bear the solitude and admits the Malayan woman in his house again. This way solitude and the awful feeling of being lonely in the silence of the night is conquered.

Maugham seems to suggest that any company would do as a remedy for Guy’s loneliness and perhaps even Doris was no more than an up-grade from a Malayan woman, a white English-speaking company. This interpretation seeps back into the story, and what first seems as a true love story, looses much of its glamour when the story reaches its conclusion.

5.1.3 The setting as a function of time and place
Time structure, presented in the short story, is intrinsically bound with place descriptions. The setting therefore forms a strong background which, in effect, becomes one of the characters of the text. When the sun moves, or the jungle and the climate make themselves noticeable, it has to be respected by the people who live at the out-station. The setting is relevant to the whole plot, since Guy and Doris-lives are formed by the environment. Guy has lived there for many years, and has had to adapt to it; Doris adapts to Guy’s way of life. The same story could hardly have happened anywhere else but in such out-station like conditions.

The three respective trails of time which are maintained in the story, jungle time, official time and private time, have one common factor; humans have to be present to experience it. Jungle time, though, has a more independent role. It is perceived by humans, but nature is also felt to have an archaic character, a life of its own, which is indifferent towards humans. The lazy, drawling feeling of jungle
time is the effect of the climate on the characters, not a feature of nature itself.

Human time, divided into official and private time, is an essential time scale for the development of the characters and the plot. Time and place are related in human time too, and are represented by the house and the tennis court. Each time has a matching place for Guy and Doris, and they move around following roughly the turn of the sun. The private setting is therefore the figure, and the universal setting, the jungle, is the ground.

5.1.4 Temporal deixis and dramatic curve
The climax of the plot is marked by one adverbial, and is actually not delivered until the very end of the story. When Guy admits his Malayan family back into the house by answering Tonight to his son’s request, time and events coincide dramatically. The building up of the plot has been slow and steady throughout the story, with lengthy flashbacks, and a long delay involving Doris’ insight about her husband’s previous life. The reader, however, gains insight about Guy’s secret earlier than Doris. The bits and pieces of information provided by Maugham we can soon put together, while the main character remains unknowing. When will she find out is therefore something the reader is expected to know. What the reader cannot tell while reading is the outcome of the story. The final Tonight reverberates in the story, and makes one reconsider much of the previous reading. Guy’s readiness to accept his former life back raises the question of whether he had kept his other family as an option all the time. A dawning sense of surprise and a change of perspective enters at the end. The story has been so much about Doris, but now we are told a great deal more about Guy, just by the simple word Tonight. This is a knowledge which seeps back into the plot, shifting all previous understanding of the text. Guy is depicted as the decent English chap who did what everybody else did to cope with life in the out-stations; he took a Malayan wife. Somehow it seems not the decent thing to do when he so quickly reverts back to the old life after experiencing life with a “real” wife.

A good short story should of course work on different levels and provide some kind of surprise at the end, something that alters the world-view previously established. To find that this role can be rendered by one single adverbial, once the plot has been presented, adds to the supposition that adverbials are highly important
markers of narrative structure. The end could have been: Guy opened the door and let the woman in, but such an alternative is far less dramatic than using the time marker to conclude the story with.

As mentioned above the final adverbial would not have been so foregrounded if it had not been for the basic time structure of the story. The passing of time, and the fixed points of time forming Guy’s and Doris’ daily routine is the background on which the adverbial tonight is made to appear foregrounded. All the other “tonights”, except maybe the last one before Doris leaves, were uneventful just as they should be. A tonight where something extraordinary happens must arouse attention. After this one and only tonight all the following evenings are supposed to pass unnoticed and the story comes to a natural conclusion.

5.1.5 Narrative functions of logical and evaluative adverbials of time
Clock or calendar times rendered by adverbials are nominal in their character. Some action is always coupled with such adverbials, and the influence on them on the verb action is logical. The adverbial rules out every other action at the same moment, as in

124. The chik-chaks sang at night.

At night the chik-chaks sang, we are not told that they danced or ate at that moment. Some adverbials of time, the relational ones, have evaluative value. Some tell us how something happened as in Suddenly, avoiding her wrathful glance, he came towards the bungalow, where suddenly modifies the manner in which the house boy moves. The fact that he came can remain without modification: Avoiding her wrathful glance, he came towards the bungalow. Suddenly is a modifier of came, and does not challenge the action of the verb or imply that something else took place. The evaluative adverbials of time used in The Force of Circumstance are important as markers of private time. Suddenly is discussed above to some extent and in Ch. 5.1.6.1. as being a signal of something unpleasant appearing in Guy’s and Doris’ calm lives. The time aspect of suddenly is relational to a background of events, which might be static or not. Suddenly foregrounds events which are assumed to have narrative importance. Immediately is another relational time adverbial in the analysed text.
Immediately after dinner she said: I'm not feeling very well tonight. I think I shall go straight to bed.

The adverbial phrase *after dinner* is used to establish the large chunk of time after dinner as something durationally unspecified, as in *Then, one evening, after dinner*, where the span between after dinner and bedtime is unknown. The impression created is that the stretch of time is an undisturbed one. When *immediately* is introduced the action is foregrounded. Doris only eats her meal and then refuses to be in Guy’s company. *Immediately* has the same unpleasantness to it as *suddenly*. Any interruptions of their slow, steady life seem unpleasant.

*Presently* is a relative of *immediately*, semantically speaking, covering a shorter stretch of time between two fixed points. The deixis of *presently* has its reference point in the scene right before the adverbial. Guy is “the deictic centre of the world” (Short 1996:270), which can be equaled to the deictic centre of the text as a whole now, since there is no one else present. When Doris lived in the house, she was very much the reference point of narration. On the night after Doris has left Guy is lying in his bed, unable to sleep. Then he hears a noise; *presently he heard a discreet cough*. The adverbial makes it appear as if Guy had been waiting for something to happen. If *immediately* had been used Guy’s anticipation would not have been as clear. If *suddenly* had been used, the negative expectations experienced around the word, as established in the previous context, the arrival of Guy’s Malayan family would have been perceived as unpleasant. It should be noted that *presently* can mean either ‘at present’ or ‘soon’. Here it is used in its pre-supposed meaning of ‘soon’, or ‘in a while’ (Harkness 1985:112), but it still functions as a marker of *in medias res*. The short story began with one particular instance of the present foregrounded; Doris sitting on the veranda, and is rounded off with another foregrounded instance of the present; Guy hearing the knock on the door. *Presently* highlights the very moment where Guy’s old life returns to him again. The double meanings of *presently* holds both the time references of a moment at the present and a moment that came soon, or after a while. The two meanings probably interact here to construct the temporal frame meaning (the logical function) of saying that the knock came a little while after Guy had sat down, as well as retaining the more pragmatic meaning of giving the impression that the narration is focused on the very moment of the knock. It is the importance of the knock that
contributes to the construction of pragmatic meaning for presently.

The use of logical adverbials of time in the story creates a firm structure, an almost objectively described background that holds the story together. The paragraphs often start with an adverbial of time, which then stays foregrounded in the reading. One is never allowed to forget time while reading. Time is felt to be autonomous and is beyond human control. The repeated glancing at watches in the story only strengthens this impression. To be out at night, at ten o'clock, is quite unnatural compared to the characters’ ordinary smooth adaptation to light and darkness. Guy’s work, though guided by hours, is still shaped according to jungle time. When it is too hot they do not work at the out-station.

The way the narration proceeds along an axis of time, starting at one point of reference and using flashbacks to elaborate on characters and then building up the plot is traditional and creates the effect of realism and identification. The appeal to basic elements of life such as light and darkness, time advancing or physical sensations like hot and cool is inescapable. We must perceive these things since our bodies and minds are tuned and conditioned to them. Once this association is established we are the likelier to accept the rest of the fiction as “something that could have happened”.

5.1.6 The cognitive scale in temporal adverbials

In *The Force of Circumstance* the use of suddenly indicates dramatic tension, and marks unpleasant events. Since everything in Guy’s and Doris’ lives is supposed to be calm, just as the flow of the river, the attribution of unpleasant events to the use of suddenly foregrounds the adverbial. The reader is taught to be wary of anything occurring suddenly. Before taking a closer look at the pragmatic marking done by suddenly in terms of alerting the reader’s awareness to the use of the adverbial, a short discussion about the cognitive processes at interplay within the semantics of the word follows.

In this adverbial the concepts of time and place meet, both in Maugham’s short story, but also generally. It is a known fact that our thinking can isolate the time feature and associate it with spatial elements (Lakoff&Johnson 1980). Mostly the discussion deals with transferring time expressions to spatial domains, (or the other way around) as in before, after, between, etc, a process which can involve meta-
phoric or metonymic mapping. In the case of suddenly another kind of processing takes place becoming less a transfer than a merging. The following discussion aims at analysing the temporal/spatial cognitive scale which is inherent in suddenly, and discussing the possible prototypical spatial event represented by the cognitive scale represents.

The time feature in suddenly is closely linked to the spatial or physical event modified. It is possible to construct an imagined axis which denotes the speed with which an event takes place with a number of designated positions in between, thus grading the time element. The scale thus denotes and segments the amount of time needed for an object to be transferred from one place to another, i.e. on a stretch of space.

Such an axis is a conceptual reality which should be regarded as an independent category of its own, as a model of the way time works on events, which orders the lexical expressions on the scale. Such a scale also has pragmatic inference. A linguistic scale contains contrastive expressions of the same grammatical category which can be arranged in a linear order, according to the semantic scope, strength or width of the words (Levinson 1983:133) (cf Chapter 2.1.2. about scalar implicature) There is a pragmatic perspective to the meaning of the scalar words since there is an implicature to each of them. If a speaker chooses one word on a point on such a scale, this choice functions like a pragmatic hedge, stating that all other words on the “weaker” side of the chosen point are entailed by it, and all other words on the “stronger” side of the chosen point are not entailed by it. In other words; the logical (conventionalised) implicature indicates the semantic content that lies within and outside the meaning of the chosen word on the scale. The semantic meaning of each word can be understood independently, but without the relational meaning between the adverbials, on the scale, each single word would fail to have communicative meaning. The pragmatic relation between the “lower” and the “higher” items on the scale defines the meaningful distinction through which the meaning of the single word is processed. A hot without its scalar opposite cold, or a yes without a no would have a floating meaning. The cognitive scale which is involved in the case of hot/cold, represents change in the temperature of physical objects. The relations between the words on the same scale, and the fact that the choice of one word forms a semantic and pragmatic hedge on the scale, are
just as important for meaning construction as what might be perceived as the pure semantics of the words. The meaning of the words on a linguistic scale depends on the relational context (the scale's divisions), the pragmatic aspect of which therefore is an important one, and not just the time factor seen as one isolated semantic element.

There is a context within the scale itself, with scalar implicature provided by each choice on the scale. The words on the scale have a semantic/lexical meaning, (as far as we can accept structure as a theoretical concept), but also a pragmatic function of hedging off the semantics of the words which are not entailed by the chosen word. When a word like *suddenly* is chosen, it is also assumed that the other temporal/spatial functions “higher” on the scale are hedged off, e.g. *like lightning*. The temporal/spatial processing is similar for a semantic scale ranging from e.g. *slowly* to *quickly*. There is, therefore, a cognitive scale, (a logical scaling) inherent in differentiated semantic scales, which denotes the relative speed with which an object covers a distance or performs an event.

In full linguistic context other pragmatic phenomena might appear, such as cancelling of the implicature, which is always possible by adding clauses modifying or evaluating the proposition (Levinson 1983:134), or pragmatic meanings inferred by juxtaposing the scalar adverbial with other lexical items. Chapter 5.1.6. will illustrate that there is a recurrent use of *suddenly* in *The Force of Circumstance* which foregrounds the adverbial in a negative way in this particular context. A certain “stable” or “independent” meaning is required in a word like *suddenly* or the opportunity to build context-dependent meaning, in contrast with the semantic meaning, would not exist. The norm, which is based on language use, functions as a background for the context-dependent meaning. Although it is reasonable to assume that even the semantic meaning of a word is created from a larger source of experience, background knowledge and actual language use of the word, it is also probable that this “core meaning” is kept as a frame of reference when contextual interpretation is made. We compare the “basic” meaning of the word with the new surroundings where it is used and base part of our interpretation on that comparison. The process of building meaning on an interplay between semantics and pragmatics can be used as a tool for creating fictional and stylistic effect. The skilled writer will direct and design interplay in the desired way by placing lexical
items in surroundings where their meaning becomes foregrounded. In The Force of Circumstance the adverbial suddenly alerts the reader, because nothing is supposed to happen suddenly at the out-station where the short story is set. The spatial circumstances rule out events that happen suddenly, and the reader’s comparison between the meaning of the word, and the context it is placed in, thus creates a foregrounded impression.

The mapping of a spatial event over a period of time in human experience involves the knowledge that when a longer distance is covered more time is required (Cresswell 1984:46-47, Marmaridou, 2000:87). This means that time is linearised and the event is located within the duration of a state or process. Along semantic scales where e.g. suddenly/abruptly, quickly/slowly/sluggishly are found, (where the cognitive temporal/spatial scale is a part of them), the concept of time stretches from denoting an event of less and less speed and longer duration (slowly, sluggishly) to more and more speed and less and less duration (suddenly, abruptly). When speed is hastened, duration is consequently supposed to shorten. This means that along the temporal/spatial scale, there is not only a glide between what is done slowly and what is done quickly, but also a pragmatic, spatialised glide between the speed and duration of the events, starting at something with high speed and short duration and ending with low speed and long duration. According to Cresswell the semantic operation performed by quickly is a spatio-temporal index (1984:47) which maps out the amounts and limits of the time and space involved in modifying the event of the verb. Events that occur along a suggested temporal/spatial scale are mapped on one prototypical event, for example moving from one physical place to another, or transferring a physical object from one place to another. These events can be carried out at various speeds which affect the duration of the action. The event in itself therefore has one designated starting-point and one finishing point, between which varying stretches of time are needed, according to the speed with which the event or action is carried out. The spatio-temporal scale which is observable in adverbials such as quickly/slowly/rapidly is a cognitive one, and is mapped on other lexical scales as well, which process the inherent temporal/spatial elements.

It can be assumed that the cognitive temporal/spatial scale builds on prototypical events to form the matrix for defining the concept of speed and subsequently
also the concept of time in the words on the particular scale. These prototypical events can be performed at all speeds varying from standing still (or next to it) to infinite speed (at least in theory). It might be suggested that such events could be the appearance or entrance of a new object on a scene which was previously empty, the ‘figure/ground’ event (Talmy 1978). Hanks (1992:61) observes that deictic reference “organizes the field of interaction into a foreground upon a background, as figure and ground organize the visual field”. Since the physical objects familiar to us are known to move and behave in particular ways, collocations with adverbials on the scale and subject/predicate constructions are likely to be expected to be limited. Not all members on the scale will collocate with all subject/predicate constructions. Snails will generally not appear suddenly, but stones that are thrown most likely will. Oaks will not grow rapidly, while cobras are likely to strike in that fashion, and so on. Judging from our background knowledge of a known number of objects with known qualities, adverbial modification will be made for each particular case, depending on our prediction of the particular object’s or event’s behaviour. Collocative use (Leech 1981:16-17) will be determined from our pre-suppositions or background knowledge. Suddenly therefore has its own deictic anchoring in time and place, where objects that behave suddenly has temporal and spatial extension and reference, with the deictic centre placed at the very moment of catching sight of the object.

This means that we expect the world to perform in a way that experience has taught us it should. Some things are supposed to appear or behave suddenly, while others are known to appear or behave more slowly or quickly. The use of the adverbial suddenly opens a semantic field of objects and events that are likely to behave or perform in this way. When suddenly is collocated with an object or event that normally does not behave in that way, or when we can conclude from the context that the object or event normally does not behave in that way, foregrounding takes place. The reader is alerted to the fact that something deviates from the norm. This is what happens when Maugham attributes suddenly to the houseboy’s behaviour in The Force of Circumstance, to be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Around the house everyone’s movements were supposed to be even, on the verge of slow, because of the heat and the lack of any reason hurry. When the
houseboy moves suddenly, he deviates from normal behaviour, a fact the reader registers automatically.

The pragmatic meaning produced by each chosen adverbial on a lexical scale with temporally and spatially related items will contain a functionally processed meaning where semantic reference to time (how fast something is performed) also invokes the performance of a prototypical spatial event and the speed with which this event is performed. Along this gliding, functional scale the choice of any scalar point will outrule (create implicature) other members of "higher" value on the scale, or simply situated to the right of the word on the constructed scale. “Higher”, “right” and “left” are of course theoretical constructs, the former based on prototypical cognitive notions, possibly metaphors (Lakoff’s ICM:s) which states that the word denoting the universe at rest is the left-most word. Cold is therefore a “better” word to start a scale with than hot, low before high, and so on, provided that physical reference can be made where the laws of gravity apply.

The evaluative function of suddenly, quickly, slowly, etc, distinguishes them from the logically functioning temporal adverbials. For the evaluative temporal adverbials the cognitive temporal/spatial scale is an inherent quality of the event they modify, while the logically functioning temporal adverbials lexicalise the temporal element in a transparent way. This difference can also be expressed as the evaluative adverbials expressing possibility (possible, non-restrictive modification of the proposition) and the logical adverbials expressing necessity, dealing with the proposition itself.

The fact that time is involved in the meaning process is not enough to label suddenly a temporal adverbial only. The convenience of doing so is due to the abstraction of the time concept, which we can perceive without context. Language use itself places suddenly in the category of adverbs of manner. There has also been a process of semantic change (a cline of grammaticalisation) for suddenly, where the meanings ‘without premeditation, after a short time’ and ‘not long after the time of speaking’ were all obsolete by the end of the 19th century (OED), i.e. the lexicalised temporal aspect of suddenly has disappeared from language use. The adverbial can be re-phrased as meaning in a sudden way, answering the question: How did the snake appear? The same goes for the temporal/spatial processing of immediately, where the adverbial in context can be interpreted as an adverbial of
manner, as well, (cf. Ch. 5.1.7.1). Thus *immediately*, through its syntactic position, becomes more related to the subject, in this case Guy and his movements which are perceived as being in an immediate way.

If *suddenly* and other adverbials processing temporal/spatial events are regarded as function words then a linguistic environment can be imagined where its function (the items on the cognitive scale) is completely grammaticalised, perhaps as a morpheme denoting grade of speed or action, i.e. the linguistic equivalent of an equation with the factors time, speed and distance. The temporal/spatial function of e.g. *suddenly* cannot be wholly integrated (lexicalized) in one verb. An infinite number of verbs would then have to be used, one for each particular, physically possible event in the world. The linguistic solution is therefore to evoke the cognitive scale through those collocations made for the word. If someone walks quickly into a room there are concrete physical limitations to the speed with which the event takes place, such as the distance covered by it, and the time it takes to complete. One item from the cognitive scale processing time/speed is singled out in one particular linguistic surrounding and we receive a general picture of the part of the scale that is relevant or not.

5.1.6.1 Pragmatic use of *suddenly* in *The Force of Circumstance*
Analysed in fictional context the meaning of *suddenly* is a result of the interplay between its scalar meaning (semantic and pragmatic) including the temporal, spatial and speed elements, and the actual verb phrase or event it will modify in the text. The reader is able to infer information about the meaning of *suddenly* in a way that is not part of the reader’s pre-suppositions. Pre-suppositions, i.e. the reader’s world knowledge, play a great part in creating conversational implicature derived from the context (Aristar-Dry 1992:281). The pre-supposition is not likely to be challenged by the occasional introduction of “new” information (Aristar-Dry 1992:281), as is the case in the systematic pragmatic use of *suddenly*, but there will be a “request for more information”(Aristar-Dry 1992:281). The foregrounding of the pre-supposed meaning of *suddenly* that takes place in Maugham’s use of the adverbial, raises the question of what *suddenly* does imply in this particular case. The pre-supposed semantic and pragmatic meaning is retained while at the same time a new interpretation starts forming, which includes foregrounding the
negative associations of *suddenly*. The juxtaposition of the adverbial with other lexical items that are negatively felt combine to evoke a negative meaning. There is also collocational evidence that *suddenly* has a substantial tendency to denote unexpected, in many cases negative events (Collins Cobuild, subcorpora Today and UK Books, 2002).

In this passage from *The Force of Circumstance* the time and speed component becomes associated with a spatial event. A full context-dependent meaning of the adverbial is produced.

At the sound of her voice the water-carrier let go suddenly and the woman, still pushed from behind, fell to the ground.

The houseboy lets go of the Malayan woman who is intruding on them, and he does it in a particular manner. He lets go suddenly, which causes the woman to fall. The speed of a spatial event is affected by the manner in which the houseboy behaves. The speed with which things are done gives rise to the use of a number of adverbials, grading the speed or haste with which the event takes place. Seen in context such adverbials always have a spatial reference, without which the time element would be nonsensical. We have background knowledge about the associations and consequences of the act of performing something suddenly, based on the way physical objects are known to perform, behave or appear. This means that the spatial element and the way it its known to behave designates the linguistic out-put which consists of the time feature captured in one adverbial. Time and place become merged. The designated adverbials resulting from this process have physical reference, i.e. a host of real actions or experiences is the mental frame for denoting the speed with which they appear or disappear, start or end, etc. The cognitive ground is physical as well as mental, with the physical and concrete field perceived as central; we can see things happen, and we can analyse and estimate how they happened. Mentally speaking thoughts and images can appear or disappear, doing so fast or slowly.

Maugham makes a regular pattern of using *suddenly* as a signal for not only something unexpected (the houseboy’s sudden movements), thereby raising the reader’s expectations on forthcoming events of the plot, but also something unpleasant. While Doris quietly studies her Malayan grammar, the upsetting incident
with the Malay woman where the house boy who carries water to the house tries to shove her off the premises, takes place outside the house, *At the sound of her voice the water-carrier let go suddenly and the woman, still pushed from behind, fell to the ground.* Doris interferes, defending the woman who leaves the compound, whereupon Doris calls the boy for an explanation. Here another unusual incident for the tempo of the household occurs. The boy suddenly comes towards Doris, after she calls for him. The foregrounding of the adverbial is important, since it tells us that this is not the usual way this boy moves. Nowhere else in the story, so far, has he moved anything but very quietly and calmly. *Suddenly* indicates that something is wrong here, there is an agitation in the boy. It is lunchtime, and when the boy hears Guy’s steps he once again moves suddenly, on a sudden he leaps to inform Guy about the morning’s incident. *Suddenly* and *sudden* foreground events essential to the plot, and to the imminent discovery of Guy’s secret. In fact, all the instances where *suddenly* appear in the short story are associated with unpleasant events. The most unpleasant event of them all, the revelation of Guy’s secret, starts with Guy speaking suddenly. He has three children with the Malayan woman.

‘Doris, I’ve got something to say to you’, he said suddenly.

When Guy has almost finished his story, Doris interrupts him:

‘She has three children, then?’
‘Yes’
‘It’s quite a family you’ve got’
She felt the sudden gesture which her remark forced from him, but he did not speak.
‘Didn’t she know that you were married till you suddenly turned up here with a wife?’ asked Doris.

Guy’s sudden gesture appears to be “forced from him”, and the reader becomes used to *suddenly* as something unpleasant. When Doris uses *suddenly* Guy’s surprise revelation is also unpleasant, but to the Malayan woman.

Even Guy’s own experience of sudden events is recorded as unpleasant. He tells Doris about his lonely days at the out-station before the Malayan woman came to live with him, when the silence used to scare him out of his wits. *suddenly* is once again attached to negative experiences.
There wasn’t a sound in the bungalow except now and then the croak of the chik­chak. It used to come out of the silence, suddenly, so that it made me jump.

After Guy’s confession Doris refuses to share a bedroom with him. Two nights later Guy wants to make amends, but Doris will not forgive him.

She looked at him suddenly and her eyes were cold and hostile. ‘That bed I slept on, is that the bed in which she had her children?’

Suddenly is here made to signal the termination of their relationship, which is very painful to them both. Doris asks Guy to allow her six months to think their marriage over, and he consents. Guy hopes that she will forgive him after those six months:

A second month passed, then a third, and suddenly the six months which had seemed so interminable were over.

By now suddenly gives rise to the suspicion that Doris’ has news for Guy which is not pleasant. Two days later Doris announces her decision:

‘Guy, I have something I want to say to you’, she murmured. His heart gave a sudden thud against his ribs and he felt himself change colour. ‘Oh, my dear, don’t look like that, it’s not so very terrible’, she laughed. But he thought her voice trembled a little.

Guy’s heart does not suddenly leap joyfully but fearfully and with anxiety, as he expects the worst. Doris tells him she wants to go home, and that she will take the mail-boat when it leaves shortly.

Maugham’s foregrounding of suddenly appears to start inoffensively with the houseboy behaving in a manner he usually does not, and which does not comply with the general pace at which life in the out-station was conducted. There, life was supposed to be calm and undisturbed, following the rhythm of the climate, both for work and private affairs. Disturbances of the scene are introduced and signalled by the pragmatic marker suddenly, and when the use of suddenly is attributed to Guy and Doris an escalation of the plot takes place. By using suddenly in connection with the most unpleasant and disturbing events in the plot, as for instance where Guy’s secret is revealed to Doris, the adverbial acquires a negative pragmatic marking altogether. Having established this negative marking Maugham is able to use suddenly to mark one more turning point in the plot: the very end of
Guy’s and Doris’ relationship when she is about to tell him that she is leaving.

Further evidence that suddenly is used as an important pragmatic marker of unpleasantness is provided by a passage towards the end of the short story. Guy has seen Doris off at the boat, it is night and he is very miserable, sitting on the veranda.

Presently he heard a discreet cough. ‘Who’s there?’ he cried. There was a pause. He looked at the door. The chik-chak laughed harshly. A small boy sidled in and stood on the threshold. It was a little half-caste boy in a tattered singlet and a sarong. It was the elder of his two sons.

The passage starts with Presently, which for the sake of content could just as well have been suddenly. A sudden knock at the door would not have been unexpected here, but Maugham does not use suddenly. When Guy’s Malayan family comes back to him it is not the most pleasant thing to happen to him, but it is more pleasant than being on his own, something he hates. The use of presently instead of suddenly is therefore an appropriate one.

In The Force of Circumstance the foregrounded use of suddenly contributes to the reader’s perception of the presence of the jungle. The concrete background in the setting is the jungle and the climate to which all living things adapt, including Guy’s married life. From this background unpleasant events “jump” up disturbingly. This effect is created by a combination of the foregrounding use of suddenly and its contextual association, and the semantics of suddenly, both denoting temporal and spatial elements.

5.1.7 Telic and atelic time versus evaluated time in temporal adverbials
Temporal adverbs foregrounding the time component only, and not the manner of the action in question, (as e.g. quickly or slowly), have a logical function, as in

125. I saw Bill for two seconds.

All other time spans, besides for two seconds, are hedged off. The time span which the action occupies can be termed ‘atelic time extent’ (Hasselmath 1997:126ff), meaning that the action took place all through the affirmed time. There is a beginning and an end to the action, marked by for.
Sequential adverbs like *immediately, shortly, momentaneously, instantaneously*, relate events with other events along an imagined time axis.

126. I saw Bill immediately after the show.

which could be interpreted as meaning ‘I saw Bill in a very short moment after the show’. The preposition *in* marks the off-most temporal boundary built into the noun phrase that is a part of the adverbial and is a telic-extent marker, (Haspelmath 1997:130 ff). One could also say that ‘not more than a very short moment had passed after the show’, also referring to the off-most point of time referred to. What the telic marker does not say is *when* during the time phrase the event of the sentence occurred. The fact that Bill was seen takes place sometime immediately after the show, but we do not know the exact time.

Atelic time markers, therefore, contribute with more accuracy to the proposition of the sentence than telic time markers. Atelic time is regularly marked by *for*, indicating that the whole time span denoted is covered by the event attached. Telic time is regularly marked by *in*, which denotes that the event took place sometime before the end of the spatial marker, but not specifying exactly which instant. In context it is evident that telic and atelic time markers are functional categories, and not exclusively bound to the prepositions *for* and *in*. The following quote from *The Force of Circumstance* serves as an example of this.

‘Get out and don’t let me see you again for at least two hours.’

This is Guy’s remark to his wife before they withdraw to take their siesta. The meaning of the utterance is at least two-folded. The first interpretation is the semantic one, meaning: ‘During the whole time span of two hours I don’t want to see you.’ In this interpretation the atelic sense is fully realized by *for*. But it is also possible to interpret the sentence as: ‘Not until two hours have passed will I want to see you again’. This interpretation refers to telic time, and the utterance can be re-phrased as

127. Get out and I’ll see you again in two hours.
The respective meanings emerge when they are analysed in their contextual background which is the setting of the house and the event constituted by their leaving each other temporarily. Doris leaves the room and will not come back until two hours have passed. The time span for two hours both refers to the time during which they will not be seeing each other and the point in time in which they will meet again. The background information provides the double interpretation of telic/atelic time. This is the pragmatic interpretation. Looking only at syntax and semantics (the structure of the utterance and the temporal phrase alone), the basic meaning of for will prevail, thus causing a restriction in analysis which does not cover the full literary meaning. The telic or atelic meaning of a temporal phrase beginning with for or in develops when analysed in context, but is not triggered by the prepositions only. Suddenly, abruptly, slowly and quickly, to mention some, are evaluative modifiers with a semantic component for time processing (cf. Ch. 5.1.6.). It is possible to construct telic or atelic time extent (in and for) with logical temporal adverbials but it is not possible to form prepositional phrases with evaluative temporal adverbial, which shows that there is no objectively measurable time span involved in them. The time factor is always relative to the verb proposition. Time is a factor in them, but through a process where spatial action is evaluated in relation to other spatial actions, (cf. Ch 5.1.6).

5.1.7.1 Immediately as telic marker and pragmatic adverbial of manner
An evaluative temporal adverbial such as immediately can function in context both as telic (in) marker and as a pragmatic adverbial of manner. In the following example from The Force of Circumstance, immediately has telic extent.
'I tried going to bed immediately after dinner, but I couldn’t sleep."

Immediately means ‘in immediate succession to dinner’ or ‘nothing happened after dinner until going to bed’. Both implications refer to the time in between dinner and bedtime, during which the subject did nothing else. A spatial reference is thus made (Haspelmath 1997:130 ff) for a time span, which results in a telic time concept. Inside the span of the beginning and the end of the short moment after dinner another action takes place, they go to bed. The length of this moment is not specified by the adverbial itself, it is defined by the context. It matters if something comes immediately after dinner or immediately after the Jurassic era. We can be
sure of the fact that *immediately* touches directly on the time phrase it modifies. It is also certain that something comes after *immediately*, which is the subject of the conversation, but it is not certain for how long the stretch of time is between the relational point (after dinner) and the event related (going to bed).

*Immediately* can also approximate an adverbial of manner, which the following example shows.

Guy did not come up the steps immediately; he paused, and Doris at once surmised that the boy had gone down to meet him in order to tell him of the morning’s incident.

Here *immediately* is widened to mean the way in which Guy normally comes into the house; he usually moves in an immediate way. The pragmatic scope of *immediately* is extended to include the verb phrase also. The telic meaning (logical meaning) is retained on one level of understanding, such as connecting the act of opening the door of the house and coming up the steps. Normally there is a very small amount of time during which Guy does nothing else but take the steps. The event of Guy coming up the steps is seen by an observer, lending the narration speaker-orientation. *Immediately* is an evaluation made from “outside”, which opens up the possibility for subject as well as verb attribution of the adverbial, not in syntactic, but in pragmatic terms. When Guy’s normal behaviour is retold by a distant observer, the modification done by *immediately* spills over to the subject as well. *Which way did he come up the steps?* could be answered with “Immediately, as usual”, maintaining the conceptual link between Guy and what he does. In cognitive terms the pragmatic process which is described probably involves the spatialisation of the temporal component of *immediately*. The adverbial is not only an abstract measure of a certain time relation, it also evokes the background knowledge that something which is taking place immediately is also happening fast. *Immediately* evokes the cognitive temporal scale (cf. Ch. 5.1.6), which is linked to spatial events and the time span they occupy when carried out. The object, in this case Guy, is a part of the spatial scene where the action of the verb takes place, since it is he who performs it. *Immediately* can therefore function as a logical temporal adverbial and also as approximating an adverbial of manner, which is interesting to note in comparison with *suddenly*. Suddenly has a time component, but
cannot be used as a logical temporal adverbial. Since it has no duration of time it can only be used as adverbial of manner.

5.2 Social and spatial deixis
In fiction narration the concepts of spatial deixis and social deixis merge. In fiction social deixis (the point of reference in an individual or a group of people) becomes a more abstract concept since it is part of an abstract “object”, the narrative discourse. The characters in a plot can be seen as abstract foci, places of narrative attention, and therefore the concepts of spatial and social deixis are evoked mutually when the narrative focus changes between characters. In real communication social distance is internalised as physical distance (Marmaridou, 2000:116). This provides the cognitive reasons for mapping spatial expressions on social interactions, between individuals and between groups of individuals. The indexical expressions which typically are pronouns, can however also be realized in adverbials.

The socio-spatial deixis in *The Force of Circumstance* gradually shifts from referring mostly to Doris at the beginning, and entirely to Guy at the end, thus symbolising the advancing split between them.

5.2.1 Social deixis in *The Force of Circumstance*
Social deixis is frequently marked by pronouns and shifts in pronoun use (Vershueren 1999:20). “Face-to-face communication involves a number of social actors whose roles underlie the basic three-fold distinction between first person, the deictic centre along the social dimension, second person or addressee, and third person or ‘others’ (Vershueren 1999:20). It is possible to change the scope of a single subject, a first person, to cover a “we” by using particular adverbials in disjunct position. Their semantics allows for widened meaning and widened syntactic use. An adverbial in disjunct position, therefore, has the deictic function of pointing “away” from the grammatical subject of the sentence “towards” an imagined societal group. The adverbial thus retains the deictic centre syntactically and expands on it pragmatically, thus creating a sentence with multiple interpretations. The range between subject-orientation and speaker-orientation alters the scope and the semantics of the adverbials (cf. Ch. 2.4). This goes for real speech as well as fiction texts, with the difference that fiction texts constitute a communicative situa-
tion other that provided by reality. Social deixis is, therefore, a wider, more multi-levelled concept in fiction than in speech. It is to be remembered, though, that the real speech social deixis is the model to which the fiction social deixis refers.

In fictional communication, subject/speaker orientation can be found internal, as well as external to the plot and its narrative techniques. In fiction, the adverbial refers to present or non-present subjects. In the case of *evidently* and *of course* (cf. Ch. 5.3.3.3-4) the personal reference can be seen to alternate between the third person subject, the internal speaker-orientation and the external communication between writer-reader (cf. Ch. 5.3.2.1 about narrative voice). This alternation can be described as a shift in social deixis from one perspective to another in the text, with corresponding shifts in person deixis. Social deixis can be explained “to anchor language into its immediate interactional context of use (Vershueren 1999:20). Since real social deixis is rendered in fictional texts this is applicable to this study but is, however, widened to include the reading situation in itself.

With *evidently* and *of course* the shift in person deixis deals with the whole range from internal narration to external communication between writer and reader, and therefore it also includes the discourse situation. Vershueren defines discourse deixis as being “involved whenever a form of expression points at earlier, simultaneous, or following discourse” (1999:21), thus applying the wide definition of discourse meaning, “ongoing linguistic activity”. The scope of *evidently* and *of course* is a marker of person deixis; the grammatical subject of the character includes other persons in his or her opinions. Moreover, as a marker of discourse deixis; the ambiguity or vagueness of both adverbials opens up for the voice of the real writer to emerge. Thus the adverbials “point at” simultaneous discourse. The simultaneity contains the internal narration as well as the external communication between the narration and the reader. Text-internal social deixis operates when the writer switches from telling the story through one person’s mind, to another. It can be rendered both in logical adverbials (spatial, temporal, truth-conditional) as well as evaluative adverbials. Text-externally the evaluative adverbials have the function of pointing at separate discourses, as shown with *evidently* and *of course*. 
5.2.2. Socio/spatial deixis in *The Force of Circumstance*

The introduction of the short story pins down the deictic centre of place, Doris is sitting on the veranda. The veranda seems like the centre of the whole world, and indeed it is to Guy and Doris because it is their home. All spatial excursions are made from this centre to start with, and essentially through Doris’ perception, exemplified by e.g. *She leaned towards him* or *She left him quickly*. An established spatial location of a literary character creates an understanding that the text represents the mind or consciousness of the person (Chafe 1994:255), since the reader empathizes with this consciousness. Sell (2000:165) stresses the communicative importance such an initial deictic centre has for establishing an “interpersonal orientation” for the reader. *The Force of Circumstance* would have been a totally different story if the initial, foregrounded deictic centre had been Guy instead of Doris. As she sits on the veranda she looks out over the river and sees a native in a canoe at a very far distance, and this stresses the veranda as the fixed point. She sits on the veranda and *After a while she heard her husband’s step on the gravel path behind the bungalow*. The house has a back and a front, and this is perceived by Doris. *He came into the room which served them as a dining-room and parlour and his eyes lit up with pleasure as he saw her* tells us that Doris is already there and that she sees him coming into the room. The attachment of a deictic point of reference to Doris is made not only through these place adverbials, but they are salient examples. Final evidence of whose viewpoint is at work is evident in *He disappeared into his dressing-room and she heard him whistling cheerily*, when Guy moves out of Doris’s sight. The first sign of narration through Guy comes in this passage:

> She always found that smile irresistible. It was his best argument. Her eyes grew once more soft and tender.

In the last sentence of the quote it is certain that we are watching the events through Guy’s eyes, because he sees Doris’ eyes change, and he comments once more on the event. The narration through Guy goes on for some paragraphs before it returns to Doris and the long flashback to the months preceding the narrative present. Then Guy is not the focus of narration until he has told her about his secret.
She did not move her hand. He felt it cold beneath his.

The final narrative shift towards Guy is marked by a temporal adverbial, *now* (cf. Ch. 5.3.1.1-2):

*Now she had heard everything. He waited for her to speak, but she said nothing.*

After the particular moment marked by *now* it is essentially Guy's mind the reader follows. The split in narration is also symbolic of the split in their relationship. Doris withdraws into herself, and the rest of the story is about Guy's sufferings.

*She was gone. He heard her lock the door of her bedroom. She was pale next day and he could see that she had not slept.*

Here Guy's narrative voice is sustained throughout the rest of the story with minor intrusions from Doris' perspective:

*He did not even touch her hand. He went into his room. In a few minutes she heard him throw himself on his bed.*

The adverbial deixis is not entirely responsible for creating shifts in narrative voice, pronouns are of course of major importance too. But if *He went into his room* had been *He went away*, a shift in pronouns (she heard him) had not been necessary. The paragraph might have been rendered like this.

128. *He did not even touch her hand. He went away. In a few minutes the bed creaked in his room.*

*Away* would, in this version, be the point of reference. Guy is going away, and the reader knows that Doris is alone. Therefore the pronoun can be left out in the last sentence. In the first sentence though, *He did not even touch her hand*, the narration can be through either of Guy or Doris. Just before Doris steps on the boat and it pushes off, one evaluative adverbial, *desperately*, shows that the narrative perspective is definitely inside her.

*She turned and looked at Guy. She wanted desperately to say one last word of comfort.*
Desperately is felt as coming from “inside” Doris and cannot be a comment from Guy. The feeling of desperation is therefore the last impression the reader has of Doris. She leaves the story there and the narrative perspective of the rest of the story is that of Guy.

5.3. Discourse deixis. The connection between text and discourse

The concepts and terms used in this study to separate between what is said in the fiction, and how it is said, are ‘text’ and ‘discourse’. Since the aim of this study is to analyse certain linguistic means, in particular the use of adverbials, by means of which the impression of fiction is created, the terms text and discourse will have linguistic implications, although they are also used by literary and analysis and theory.

This study focuses on the relation between real language and fiction language. Without real speech acts and the discourse produced by them, there would not be any references for the reader to recognize cognitively the fiction discourse. Therefore the field of pragmatics is highly relevant to this study. van Dijk defines the pragmatics of discourse as the systematic relation between structures of text and context (van Dijk 1998:345), i.e. between sequences of sentences and sequences of speech acts. Aspects such as coherence, topic, focus, perspective and similar notions have a pragmatic base (van Dijk 1998:345), but must naturally be rendered in some kind of sentence structure. A writer makes conscious choices about the sentence structure in order to convey full meaning, using the semantic framework of the sentence as the vehicle for implied meaning (van Dijk 1998:390). It is important to note that the pragmatics of a particular discourse does not have one particularized sentence structure (van Dijk 1998:370-71). Therefore it is necessary to study structure and context in relation. van Dijk in the following quote refers to texts in general, but his argument for a broad interpretative approach is also well-suited for dealing with literary texts.

With the pragmatic approach, a [discourse] analysis is carried out in socio-linguistic terms in which the identity, location and relative social statuses of the participants in the communication act are taken into account, together with a description of the social or institutional occasion within which the discourse was observed or within which it could be produced. Of particular interest, of course, is the correlation of these items with formal linguistic phenomena. (van Dijk 1998:389)
Discourse can also be defined as how the events in the fiction, (the narration), are told. This how also includes through whom it is being told (O’Neill 1996:34). The narrative voice, when it holds illusionary force, can be seen as co-existing with what O’Neill calls the ‘subversive’ narrative voice (O’Neill 1996:34). The way in which something is being told can be potentially undermining to the facts that are being told. A story can be told as if it were possible for Achilles never to reach the finish and the tortoise for ever catching up on him, but the text, in fact, tells another story: Zeno’s discourse over-powering the sense of logic with the audience (O’Neill 1996:6). In The Force of Circumstance the multi-functional narration’s subversiveness coincides in certain adverbials, thus exposing the interaction between the narrative levels. If we choose to, we can listen to one of the characters’ voices, the narrator’s voice and the author’s voice at the same time. This will be focused on in chapter 5.3.2. As a consequence of the writer’s subtle intrusion we can also choose to exclude taking in the compound discourse, or thinking about it overtly. The fact remains, though, that the presence of compound discourse creates a certain impression for the reader, whether he or she identifies it consciously or not. What happens when something is retold is that the factuality of events is challenged in some way, and narrated from a particular perspective. In the most extreme case, subversiveness is apparent and discourse contradicts the reality we know. Achilles must reach the goal before the tortoise does, while the point of the story is that the goal is never reached and that time is infinitely chopped up in smaller pieces, allowing the tortoise to cut the distance to Achilles in half for ever. In less extreme cases the opinions and purposes of the writer are just hints to the reader.

The means by which discourse is conveyed is through the text, which might perhaps seem superfluous to say. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the real events and retelling them, especially when discussing fiction. Paul Werth calls the text’s world the ‘situation’ depicted by the discourse (Werth 1995:53). In a fiction text there is a chain or field of ‘fictional events’ behind the sentence representation. The links, the deixis between the fiction text and the fiction events, mimic the deictic relations exposed in real language behaviour. Therefore the fiction text refers not only to the fictional events, but also addresses the readers’ world knowledge about real events. This constant interplay between the reader’s
knowledge base and the fiction text's depicted events is the source of the multi-levelled understanding of a piece of fiction that emerges when reading. With each discourse marker the narrative voice, the setting, the plot, the fictional level and the real level co-exist. While we read we know that we are reading fiction, and are still busy with interpreting it as reality. The "text in preparation" (Wodak 1992:508) is the comprehension or processing of the text at any precise moment. This interpretation is an heuristic process, described by Bakhtin (1999:124). Bakhtin talks about real speech as follows but assigns written language the same process of communication. "Listener" and "speaker" in the following are therefore exchangeable with "reader" and "writer", or "reader" and "text"

[...]

For reasons of convenience this study will examine the text as if it were possible to distinguish between a text's inside and the outside. The inside of a text consists of the 'epi-reading' level, where the consensus of fiction is not challenged and we read the text as if we were listening to someone telling us a story (Barry 1987:12). We accept the text as mimetic or representational, and more or less see the text as a window which presents us with the human world behind it.

The outside of the text is the writer's advertent or inadvertent intrusion in the text, together with the reader's responses. So text-internally we can have an anonymous narrative voice providing us third-person narration, which the reader accepts as representational. Text-externally, we can find traces of the narrative voice not being anonymous at all, displaying the writer's efforts to attribute meaning and values to the narration or displaying flaws in the writer's attempt to create a text, amenable for epi-reading. This means that it is possible to talk about a text-internal discourse, upheld by the characters and the narrative voice, and a text-external discourse which we can observe, one that sometimes is intended to
involve the reader, and sometimes not. The text-external level and the text-internal level are not separate physical entities. It is always the same text being discussed, but the levels are theoretical entities that can be observed. The text-internal level's speech acts can be seen as 'micro-speech acts' (van Dijk 1981:195-209) in which the conventions of fiction alert or cue the reader's knowledge about fiction (Mao 1992:260). The micro-speech acts are organized according to “normal” or ‘global’ pragmatic rules for speech acts and conversation that can be seen as the 'macro-speech acts' (van Dijk 1981:195-209). The relation between a macro-speech act and a micro-speech act is of a formalized nature, and leaves the operational power of the micro-speech act intact. The micro-speech act can e.g. be an assertive or a directive speech act but its pragmatic interpretation depends on the context of the text, not on the definition of the macro-speech act itself (Mao 1992:261). We mentally produce certain macro-speech acts which are relative to the text’s discourse, but not necessarily derivable from each micro-speech act (Mao 1992:262). In practical terms, this means that any conversational implicature can be made without the micro-speech act losing its speech act function. In modernist and postmodernist literature the fact that the agreement of epi-reading between writer and reader is brought to awareness is often a large part of the reading experience. The full discourse situation is often highlighted (Beckett, Kafka, Joyce), and the writer reminds the reader that the discourse is fictional, thus stepping out of the epi-reading frame by commenting on the existence of the narration. The reader is urged to resist the “normal” fiction-mode of reading. Reading a text while actively staying conscious about the fact that it is a narration, is in post-modernist terms referred to as 'graphi-reading'.

The concern of this study is the linguistic markers that reveal narrative techniques employed in fiction. Most of these markers are not consciously brought to the reader’s attention, at least not in epi-reading mode. But even in traditional epi-readable fiction readers are reminded that a narrative is actually going on. In some cases these reminders are so formulaic or grammaticalised that we can accept them as inherent parts of the fiction, without having the graphi-reading mode (Fabb 1997:166ff). Phrases like Once upon a time, or They lived happily ever after, point to the narration itself and encode it by linguistic means. The function of the adverbial phrase can be described as ‘a frame adverbial’ (Harkness 1985:135) which
signals that the events are located outside history and reality. After the initial use of the frame adverbial other temporal structures take over (Harkness 1985:135). *Once upon a time* functions as a meta-linguistic comment (cf. Ch. 5.1 on the temporal deictic organisation of narrative structure.). So even in traditional narration we are used to receiving comments concerning the nature of narration and discourse. The most obvious types of narrative comments are phrases like *Once upon a time*, but the overall sensitivity of the reader to linguistic markers for narration or discourse provides for interpretation of un-formulaic linguistic markers in analogy with such set phrases. The function of adverbial phrases which signal narrative techniques or particular discourses, as investigated in this study, are therefore an extension of the general familiarity readers have with narrative comments. This is seen in traditional story-telling or in the oral narrative tradition where the narrator is always present to the audience and is able to comment on the events of the story and to retell and comment on the original source of the story. This process is deictic, referring to previous or forth-coming discourse or other discourse levels in the text.

So if discourse is **how** things are being told and text is **what** being told, these two concepts will always be produced in interplay between the text and the reader. Discourse will, therefore, not just be an evaluation of how the text is told, but will also be the reader's response to the text; how the reader perceives the text to be told and how the reader responds to the events told by the text. Without being able to separate between the functional concepts of text and discourse it would not be possible to analyse their collapse or intertwining. Text is what produces discourse, but both categories can be observed. The distinction between text and discourse is felt essential to the discussion thoughout, given the fact that the study will try to show that even the **what** of the text assists in producing the **how**, such as the temporal and spatial events in *The Force of Circumstance* display an independent narrative role of creating its own discourse (cf. Ch 5.1.2). The interplay between **what** and **how**, i.e. between text and discourse, is not new to observation. The discourse functions of spatial and temporal expression have been analysed (O’Neill 1996:47-55), showing that the setting produced by the lexical choices made can contribute largely to the particular meaning of the fiction.
It is also useful for the purposes of this study to distinguish between story line and non-story-line text. Starting with the basic assumption that the story-line is the sequence of events which are the core of the story, like beads on a string, it is common practice in written texts for the order of clauses to reflect the order of the events in an iconic way (Leech&Short 1981:233). The fundamental principle of language trying to reflect connected events which happen in a temporal sequence is also a fundamental principle in the reading and interpretation of a text. The following example illustrates this mechanism. (example from Fabb 1997:170)

129. He hit me. I hit him.

Simply by sequencing these two clauses we are likely to infer that the “I” hit the “He” after “He” hit “I”. To prevent this “natural” interpretation we must insert a conjunction or an adverbial phrase to correct or direct the interpretation to a state which reflects the speaker’s intention.

130. He hit me, but I hit him first.
131. He hit me, when I hit him
132. He hit me, because I hit him
133. He hit me, totally aware that I would hit him afterwards.

By saying one thing after another we imply that in the events described, the first one took place before the second. In literary language we also expect this sequential ordering to be at work. In 1972 Labov and Waletzky (quoted in Fabb 1997) observed this connection between events and their representations in language. A story-line clause, in their definition, which is adopted here, is a clause whose position relative to other clauses, encodes the temporal location of the events which are described by it. This means that when story-line clauses are re-ordered the consequence is that the text will represent the events taking place in the other order (Fabb 1997:170), for example as in

134. I hit him. He hit me.

Consequently when analysing the story-line in *The Force of Circumstance*, the relative order in which events are presented will be identified and commented on, thus interpreting the depiction of events and the use of flashbacks as markers of the separate worlds of the characters, as well as markers of dramatic anticipation.
5.3.1. Discourse deictic marking

Discourse is the whole of the linguistic situation, it is the category of communication. Once it is produced, discourse itself provides a dimension for anchoring utterances (Vershueren 1999:20). Discourse markers can mark which discourse is at hand and also refer to “earlier, simultaneous, or following discourse”. Fraser’s definition of the function of a discourse marker (1998:302) assigns the adverbial the function of providing information on how to interpret the message conveyed by the proposition the marker is tagged to, and how to interpret the message that follows after the marker. Fraser deals with contrastive discourse markers, adverbials such as *but, however, nevertheless, conversely, instead, rather*, etc, but his definition is assumed relevant for the wider definition of a discourse marker as used in this study. Fraser, as well as other linguists studying pragmatic markers (Blake-more 1987, Hovy 1994, Lakoff 1973, Redeker 1991, Stubbs 1983, and others), analyse context-independent sets of sentences in a structural perspective while this study will deal with larger parts of a fictional text for analysing shifts in discourses and discourse marking. Analyses within larger discourse frameworks are also given attention by linguists, but are not as frequent (Labov and Fanshel 1997, Owen 1983, Brinton 1996). By foregrounding a sentence adverbial, or an adverbial of time, place or manner the fiction writer can assign discourse marking function to an adverbial that does not fit the semantic category of discourse marking exemplified by *but, however, nevertheless*, etc. The function of discourse marking is assumed in this study to be operating because of the linear arrangement of the text, its syntactic choices, the coherence and schemes of the text, and the deictic aspect of the adverbial chosen as discourse marker. The English language, at least in comparison with Swedish, seems to favour the initial positioning of modal adverbials, as sentence openers (Svensson 2000:117) This could indicate that the foregrounding of modal adverbials in English has a salient communicative function which is inherent to language use.

When discussing discourse, and discourse marking, it is important to bear in mind that discourse marking by adverbials is optional, and does not have to be grammatically overt (syntactically marked) or grammaticalised. A discourse is a discourse, regardless of the presence of overt marking in syntax. By subtle or less
subtle distinctions in the text, as interpreted by the reader, he or she will identify speech situation which is referred to and hold it in mind while reading. It is the fact that we are reading a book that makes it possible to see “the narrator”, “the third-person narrator, “the writer behind the text”, and also witness the various representations of speech-acts to be identified text-internally. We spatialise the participant roles of the reading process, and even the reading process itself, to appear as objects to which the narration or discourse can point. Discourse is also perceived to be a temporal entity, since the reading is a spatial excursion, which in its prototypical sense involves time to cover (Marmaridou, 2000:104).

Discourse markers function deictically by foregrounding a previously primed communicative situation in the text, or by referring to the reader’s general knowledge about speech acts and communication situations. The discourse markers, in this study assumed mainly to be sentence adverbials, function in this respect analogously to pronouns. One adverbial with a certain speaker or subject orientation, combined with its particular semantic and pragmatic meaning, is enough to signal for example the shift between third person narration and omniscient narrator (cf. Ch. 6.4.1) or conveying the modality in which a character is speaking (epistemic, deontic).

The use of discourse markers further highlights the discourse intended to be displayed in the text. This might be done for safety reasons - less probability for misunderstandings of the text - or in order to give special text-internal attention to a particular discourse thus creating more dramatic effect. Incidentally, when there are too few discourse markers in a text it appears lame and without life (cf. Ch. Methods and material, on iterative narration). The reader needs to know which speech situation is at hand and the intentions of the rendered speech acts in order to create his or her own mental image of the discourse and its meaning.

Referential discourse markers appear in The Force of Circumstance, some of which are realized as adverbials. In chapter 5.3.1.1-3 I will show that Now, in context, functions as a discourse marker in at least two ways. The first function is to separate Doris’ restricted knowledge (and also of the reader, because we do not really know more than she does ) from the full knowledge Guy has and to mark that Doris is now fully aware of all that Guy had previously kept to himself.
Now she had heard everything.

refers back to the entire discourse situation enclosed by Guy’s confession.

The second discourse function deals with the discourse situation involving the writer and the reader, where Now tells the reader that we now know just as much as both characters. I will also show that the attachment of the adjunct quickly to one of Guy’s movements marks a shift in discourse, from a situation where Guy thinks that he will get away with his secret, to one where he starts to realize direction things are taking. The logical function of now and quickly will be analysed as an introduction to the analysis of now and quickly as discourse markers.

5.3.1.1 The logical influence of now and quickly

Adverbials sustaining chronological structure have logical function, ruling out all other instances of time points or time spans than the one mentioned. Now has the same logical function, but is more foregrounded than other points of time in the story. Time adverbials are logical in the sense that they define a point in time and nothing else, thus marking out the border between the predication and its implication, i.e. all the other possible events that are not referred to by now. The implication of Now she had heard everything could be ‘Before this point she did not know everything, and afterwards she did.’ There is a definiteness to this that is quite distinct from the lexical choice of quickly. Quickly is also foregrounded, as shown above, but speaking in terms of logical/evaluative function quickly works evaluatively, modifying the verb. The modification could have been another one instead, saying more or less the same thing, e.g. suddenly, rapidly or instantly. Implications of Guy turned quickly are complementary, and might be rendered as follows, all elaborating the same event.

135. Guy’s turning was quick.
136. Guy turned rapidly.

An attempt to form a contrastive implication (the negated converse, cf. Ch. 2.2, 2.3) will retrieve meanings that do not tell us about the way he actually moved, a fact the writer wants us to know.

137. Guy’s turning was not slow.
138. Guy did not turn slowly.

A sentence like *Guy’s turning was not slow* could in fact mean or implicate almost everything, ‘He turned even slower’. The attempt to produce a contrastive implicature from an evaluative adverbial will not automatically counter-produce the meaning of the original sentence, as the logical adverbial does, (cf. 2.2). The implication of *Now she had heard everything* points to the original sentence in an unambiguous way, and excludes all other points in time: ‘Before this point in time she did not know everything, and after she did.’ The implication of *Guy turned quickly* must be elaborative and must include the meaning of *quickly*, otherwise the meaning of the original sentence is lost. For the point of time that Maugham wishes to refer to, where Doris is fully aware of Guy’s secret, there is no other option than *now*. *Quickly* works on the stylistic level, and *now* operates on spatial and temporal logic.

5.3.1.2. *Now* and *quickly* as discourse markers

The secret in Guy’s life is like a ticking time-bomb beneath the surface of their well-ordered life in the Malayan outpost. Knowledge about the imminent destruction is distributed at two levels. The fictional counterpart, Doris, is not fully aware of Guy’s secret until he actually tells her all about it, which *Now* marks. This is the text-internal level, where the writer decides how much information the characters are supposed to have and to understand. Doris is given hints about the situation, but draws no conclusions. The second function of *Now*, the text-external level of communication between the text and the reader, is much more open. From the beginning of the story events take place that arouse the reader’s suspicion. The chronological events in the story start on one particular day, when at lunchtime a Malayan woman turns up at the gate. The full dramatic issue is provided there at lunch; Guy covers up about the Malayan woman with a lie. Doris chats about the two boys she saw at the kampong, who were much whiter than the others, without having the slightest idea that they could be Guy’s. The reader is almost immediately let in on the embarrassing and threatening secret. We know more about the story than Doris does, and the double discourse of the reader’s knowledge and the
character’s knowledge trails on in the story, until Doris knows as much as the reader. That intersection is marked by a moment in time.

Now she had heard everything.

The temporal adverbial marks an important shift in the narrative discourse. Temporal markers often express discourse deixis as well (Marmaridou, 2000:115). The information available to Doris and the reader has so far been more extensive for the reader. *Now she had heard everything,* marks the point where the reader shares all the information about Guy’s secret with Doris. Didier Coste (1989) in his study on narratology, observes that pointing out one single and precise date and place in a text will make the reader deal with a before and an after (1989:60), thus creating more effect than if there were no such foregrounding. The reader infers that there should be a reason why one particular date or time is introduced, and that reason involves change of some or the other kind. The adverbial compares “two states of affairs” (Coste 1989:61), one of which is presented in the text (what we know from the text so far), and what the reader presumes will lie ahead in the narration. In *The Force of Circumstance* the reader knows “everything” when the moment of *Now* is there; from now on a host of expectations arise for the rest of the plot of the short story. Temporal adverbials like *now* and *today* are markers of immediacy, i.e., closeness between the narrative voice and the fiction character (Chafe 1994:251). The pragmatic interpretation of *Now* in *The Force of Circumstance* implies that the adverbial marks a shift to Doris’ narration in the text.

From Guy’s perspective, he is of course the one who knows all the information from the beginning. Slowly, the reader gains access to what Guy knows, but in an indirect way through the series of steps that Guy takes in order to get rid of the Malayan woman.

Starting from the point where Guy tells Doris and the reader everything, the reader is on equal terms with the characters, regarding the access to information. What happens in the plot from now on cannot be supervised by the reader; it is to be experienced, just as it is for Guy and Doris. Therefore *Now* is also precedent to the discourse which follows, the reader is informed that there is a new discourse from then on. A discourse marking function of this type can be labelled projective discourse deixis (Vershueren 1999:21). At the same time as *Now* points forwards
(cataphoric) to a discourse to come, it also points backwards to what has been the normal discourse between Guy and Doris. Thus Now is also anaphoric, since it refers to a previously existing discourse (Vershueren 1999:21). To say that anaphoric reference is made is, in the strict sense, to make an observation that is technical, or syntactic. Vershueren’s broader concept of what anaphoric function is (referring to discourse also), and the structurally limited definition of anaphoric function, calls for some interrelational discussion. In the following discussion a distinction is made between structural anaphoric function and discourse anaphoric function. The latter case also relates to the concept of ‘priming’ (Emmott 1995) as a tool for understanding literary interpretation of a text.

On the structural level the anaphoric function of now is closely linked to the logical function of now (cf. Ch. 5.3.1.1.) both belonging to the syntactic/semantic level of observation. We can say that Now refers back to something previously mentioned, or written, but a closer look at what this something is reveals that now operates on separate grounds of understanding and interpretation. First there is the logical time scale that now marks a particular point on. There is an implicit antecedent here, consisting of all the time that has passed up to the moment where now signals one particular foregrounded moment in time. Without this previously existing time there is no now to refer to. It is worth mentioning that this previously existing time can be either overt or covert in the text, the mental ground for interpreting now still remains the same. There has to be a before, to have a now. In this respect now is anaphoric in a logical/semantic way, operating on the chronological scale of the narration. But secondly there is the more complex process of interpretation involved where now functions as a trigger in a formerly primed context. Priming as a concept is discussed by Emmott (1995) as a more dynamic alternative or complementary model than the linear one, where a pronoun or a time marker “refers back” to an “antecedent”. The linear model’s validity is discussed above, and the conclusion is that is an important tool for separating and distinguishing between logical/semantic content. It also creates a logical structure that is part of the interpretation made by the reader. While reading a text a more complex understanding is constantly processed, a fictional world is built or primed in the reader’s mind.
Readers need to imagine a fictional context by amalgamating information from different parts of the text in order to build a mental representation of the context. When names of characters are mentioned, readers must not only register the use of these particular linguistic items, but also actively think of the characters denoted by the names and place these characters within the fictional context. This approach to narrative texts puts the emphasis on the active role of the reader who maintains certain information in consciousness even when it is not being explicitly mentioned by the text (Emmott 1995:84).

Emmott’s work on priming deals with pronouns, but she draws analogous conclusions for place and time adverbs (Emmott 1995:91). Priming in regard to pronouns is then the inference that enables the reader to assume that a character remains in a context over a certain period of time. The reader is continually conscious, is being primed to, the existence of the characters. The pronouns used, serve to foreground any one of the characters the writer intends. The priming with regard to place and time adverbials, such as triggered by now and when, (which are the ones Emmott compares to the priming of pronouns), is conceptually broader than the use of pronouns indicates. Now foregrounds one point on a linear scale of time and is thus anaphoric. But the wider context the reader is primed to, enabling him or her to grasp the immediate situation (time, place, narrative events, characters) marked by now, is not only anaphoric. There is no single linguistic item that now or when can refer back to, as is the case with pronouns and personal names. The reference made by now and when is not to a linear one, but refers to a context, i.e., a pragmatic reference. If the total of each communicative situation in a literary text is called a discourse, the pragmatic marker now or when foregrounds the particular discourse at hand. In the case of The Force of Circumstance the adverbial now signals a total change in discourse. In general the pragmatic marker now requires the reader to assemble whatever knowledge he or she has up to that very point of the text, and to keep that knowledge stored while the information pertaining to the adverbial phrase is provided. The assembling of information made by reading is a hermeneutic process, each step builds on the other, and a continuous representation of the fictional world is created in the reader’s mind, at each point of the reading.

Discourse deixis and text cohesion are interrelated, as shown by certain uses of now and then (Levinson 1983:66).

139. Now, what is it that you want?
140. What do you want, then?
The temporal adverbials here obviously do not directly encode time deixis, but rather related aspects of the unfolding discourse (Marmaridou, 2000:95). The linear, temporal reference that now makes in *The Force of Circumstance* is only part of the full interpretation of the adverbial. Now is a discourse marker, marking a narrative fulcrum, and is also a full stop in the communication between the characters. All of their previously happy life is in the past and all of the future ahead of them is disconnected from happiness. The fact that the reader knows more than Doris, up to a certain point of the story, does not challenge the third person model of narration. We are told what Doris does, and what Guy does, through a supposed third-person narration. The reader is only allowed to be cleverer than Doris, figuring things out that Doris could also have guessed. Maugham makes the story far more dramatic this way, in fact the story relies on the reader’s expectation for Doris to become aware of the truth. Dramatic tension therefore reaches one height, marked by now. The climax is not revealed until the very last words of the short story, though. First the reader is waiting for the secret to be revealed. When it is, one starts to wait for what will happen. It is a certain thing that details of Guy’s former life will become apparent, but the real tension starts after Doris is told all about it. Then no one knows what will happen, neither the reader nor the characters.

If we go back a bit in the chronology of the text to the first day, after tea, when they walk to the tennis court, there are instances where the writer reminds us about the heavy secret Guy is carrying, and what will happen when it is released.

‘Oh, look,” said Doris, ‘there’s that girl that I saw this morning’. Guy turned quickly. His eyes rested for a moment on a native woman, but he did not speak.

*Quickly* is foregrounded, because it is the first time that Guy moves that way in the story so far, and without natural reasons. *Quickly* is the first signal that will, at intervals, be followed by *suddenly* (cf.5.1.5.1), indicating reactions caused by the secret that Guy tries to hide. Nothing is supposed to happen quickly at the outstation; even their games of tennis have a smooth and even pace. When the reader sees *quickly* he or she perhaps does not work the full secret out, but information is added to the foregrounding which was previously made, when Guy and Doris sit at
the lunch-table, talking about the Malayan woman and about "half-castes". Doris, on the other hand, does not seem suspicious at all. *Now* and *quickly* are dramatic markers, the former with the function of collapsing the previous double discourse in the fiction, the latter with that of marking the presence of a barely hidden secret which is about to surface. It is important to point out that this interpretation is contextual, above all. The full meaning of the adverbials does not develop on its own, a host of other lexical and syntactic choices help to produce a certain impact for *now* and *quickly*. Therefore the full interplay between the whole text and its adverbials must be considered in order to interpret the function of the adverbials.

5.3.1.3. Epistemic modality in *now*

*Now* is analysed above with regard to its logical function as narrative marker. In this chapter *now* will be used to exemplify an instance of language where from a semantic point of view, a seemingly "pure" logical adverbial, can in fact be interpreted to have epistemic function. The example is the same as used in Ch 5.3.1.1, where *now* marked a discourse shift and a fulcrum of the dramatic narration.

Now she had heard everything.

This is the instance of the plot where the female character, Doris, has been told all about her husband’s previous life. In a semantic sense *now*, in the chronology of the plot, can be regarded as one highlighted indexical expression denoting time and time only. This function of *now* can be regarded as having logical influence on the text, creating the conceptual framework for an understanding of temporal deixis in the plot. *Now*, analysed this way, is “inside” the syntax, occupying a selected place which, in turn, adds further meaning to it. These meanings cannot be deduced from the syntactic analysis alone. *Now* seems loaded with dramatic tension, as interpreted from the context. This can be seen as text-internal pragmatic interpretation. We can observe the temporal framework and its construction, which consists of syntax and semantics, and we can draw conclusions about what the framework means to us in a broader literary sense, thereby analysing its pragmatic functions. The pragmatic meaning includes changes in social deixis, from more of Doris’ perspective to less of it, changes in the internal discourse between the characters, and changes in the external discourse, all of these indexed by the adverbial
now. Syntax does not have to have overt markers for all kinds of deixis, but when it does, the impact is stronger and foregrounding takes place. We are urged to interpret now in the strongest sense, as where sometimes with other indexical expressions we are requested by the organisation of the text to background the information in the markers.

The discourse marking of now has the same syntactic representation, but leads to another dimension, the text-external discourse between the narration of the text and the reader. This is the pragmatic field where the possibility to interpret now arises epistemically. The logical function of now in Now she had heard everything is excluded from the functional representational/instrumental dichotomy (Hoye 1997, Palmer 1986), i.e. from the epistemic/deontic dichotomy. The logical function of now does not express the speaker’s (the narrator’s) beliefs and different degrees of conviction concerning the state of affairs (epistemic function). Neither does it try to implement a requested action (deontic). But on the discourse level something else happens. Now indicates a change in the relationship between the characters, and indicates therefore the start of a new internal discourse between them. Doris’ opinion about what she has heard may not be expressed in that particular sentence, but the reader easily picks up her evaluation in the next few paragraphs. Doris’ thought behind Now she had heard everything is: I know it all now, and I hate it. She certainly knows how to pass judgment about the state of affairs, only the text does not make explicit mention of it. There is an epistemic dimension here, which can only be seen when the whole context is regarded. The reader knows what Doris thinks, and the marker now triggers an epistemic interpretation.

Having seen this, it makes sense that the logical function does not reveal epistemic meaning. The logical function works syntax-internally, with the specific goal of denoting one particular instance of time, and leaving out the rest. The semantic meaning of now subsequently serves to relate the events in the text to where there is a before and an after, and in between which now is located. The pragmatic function, optionally retrievable from the same syntactic construction with now, reveals Doris’ opinions about the situation, thus making an epistemic remark.

Not only in this example can the adverbial now be seen to have pragmatic meaning beyond its semantic/temporal meaning. Sentences such as example 141
and 142 show that the adverbial in a particular use can be made to express pragmatic value.

141. Now what is this all about, can someone tell me?
142. Now my dear, don’t cry over spilt milk.

In the first example *now* functions as an introductory pragmatic marker for discourse, signalling disbelief. In the other example the pragmatic marking involves the introduction of the speaker’s modification of another speaker’s assessment of a situation. Other examples can easily be constructed, showing the dramatization of now. Utterances using “Now, now…..” may express for example soothing, reproach, threat, etc, depending on the context (Persson 1974:109).

There is, evidently, the pragmatic option of inferring an epistemic meaning from the use of *now* in the quote from *The Force of Circumstance*. It is not deontic, however. There is no evidence in the text that Doris is trying to enforce any kind of action when her husband has told her about his secret. Even for a logical adverbial with well-defined semantic meaning it is possible to have a pragmatic meaning, in this case an epistemic one, pertaining to Doris’ evaluation of the situation. On the syntactic level *now* is a temporal adverbial only, on the pragmatic level it holds implied meaning. Therefore it is possible to say that the adverbial *now* interrelates syntax, semantics and pragmatics. The example shows that adverbials have both lexical and grammatical functions, both of which are at work at the same time.

5.3.2. Syntax and discourse coincide in the evaluative adverbial

In Ch 2.4. it was shown that the semantic scope as well as the subject/speaker orientation changed for the adverbial in different syntactic positions. When the speaker orientation became more apparent, the narrative voice also changed, from being perceived through the mind of one of the characters to also expressing the voice of the writer. An evaluative adverbial in foregrounded position can pragmatically mark not only third-person narration but also the presence of the writer. The syntactic analysis can be considered largely text-internal. The operations that syntax perform can be analysed within a closed linguistic universe, in the sense that all text types can be analysed equally regardless of their style, message or ori-
gin. Syntactic analysis can be made on a text of law as well as on a poem. Therefore, third person narration or any other type of narration can, for example, appear in any category of text besides fiction. The syntactic construction does not alter, it is made to reflect language in its function of carrying and sending a message. It is the pragmatic implications of the discourse situation (reader/writer, fiction reading, holding a book in one's hands, etc) that enables the decoding of the linguistic construction to represent a fiction situation. When the particular linguistic situation where the message appears is analysed, separate discourses can be identified, all of which pertaining to certain goals and purposes of the speaker. This variety of discourses has its reflection in fiction, too. The characters in a novel can appear in just as many discourse situations as there are in reality. To render a real discourse situation in a fiction text is common matter for the writer, whose task is, in effect, to provide the reader with something that resembles reality as much as possible. The discourse markers, or pragmatic markers, ordinarily used to signal the intention of the speaker are often adverbials. In the previous chapter two of these markers, now and quickly, were discussed. It is important to point out, however, that in other contexts these adverbials might have other pragmatic or discourse functions. As long as the fiction is interpreted as real speech or thought, regardless of the narrative perspective (other meta-narrative levels, such as for example the writer's voice and the writer/reader communication) these pragmatic markers have text-internal scope. They can signal subject-orientation, speaker-orientation, interest, disinterest and hesitation, as if these appeared in real conversation. But when fiction discourse is regarded there is also the purpose of the writer to include in the analysis. The purpose is not primarily to mimic ordinary speech situations, but to present and arrange such situations in a way that conveys the intentions of the writer.

When pragmatic markers regularly used in real speech are found in fiction, levels of discourse particular to fiction appear. In Ch 5.3.2.1 three such categories are identified: 1. text-internal, 2. between narration and reader, and 3. between the real writer and reader. In all three categories the adverbials play an important part in establishing and co-relating the communication between the fiction and the reader.

Syntactic choices for the writer then work differently on all levels. Text-externally a subject-oriented adverbial can be seen as independent of the text-
external communication, rendering the real speech situation which the reader willingly recognizes. However, in all its complexity, the syntactic role of the adverbial used as pragmatic marker, is always the same. It is the modifier of a word, clause or sentence, and it functions accordingly, regardless of the discourse situations or narrative levels experienced by the reader. The narrative perspectives the reader identifies are triggered by the same adverbials that mark the corresponding real discourse (from mimesis to diegesis) but it is only the fact that we know that we are reading a book that makes it possible for us to see “the narrator”, “the third-person narration”, “the writer behind the text”, and so on. Reading is itself a discourse, with its own terms and roles. It is not syntax in itself that tells us we are reading a fiction text, it is the actual situation of having the text in front of us. The discourse situation of reading a fiction text is not therefore necessarily syntactically marked.

When an evaluative adverbial appears in the fiction text knowledge about the reading situation is added to the linguistic knowledge about discourse marking. The syntactic function of evaluative adverbials and their discourse functions intersect for the reader in the actual adverbial used. The evaluative adverbial thus works like a key or a trigger, unlocking both a syntactic response creating meaning, as well as a psychological response dealing with the communicative situation of reading fiction.

In terms of discourse analysis, the writer is seen as the real source of information and the narrative voice the virtual source. Real source is evident in analysis, although it does not have to be syntactically realized. Even if the text does not explicitly show it we know that there is a real source, a writer, behind the fiction. In the example of but of course discussed in Ch. 5.3.3.1, the adverbial both signals the semantic change and the discourse change. But of course expands to include not only the speakers internal to the fiction (Doris’ friends) but also the external speaker, the writer.

When we have the constant back-ground knowledge that the discourse has a real source and a virtual source, this knowledge is suddenly made linguistically overt by the presence of but of course. From the point of view of analysis the discourse perspective can be seen as dealing more with the text-external level than with the syntactic analysis. The adverbial thus works as a marker on the syntac-
tic/semantic level as well as on the discourse level. In syntax, the adverbial must be present in the sentence to produce a certain narration, in discourse the adverbial is optional, we know that someone wrote a text for us, even if the writer is not displayed in the syntax. However, when it actually is present the foregrounding of the literary discourse’s nature is powerful.

5.3.2.1. Narrative utterer and source

The levels of discourse, as described above, can be regarded in terms of the access to information the participants in the communicative process in fiction have. The writer has full-handed information, which he or she provides appropriately in the text, to the characters and to the reader. In third person narration it is the information that equals one or more of the characters that forms one level of discourse. When the information is withheld from the characters and handed only to the reader, another level of discourse arises. Information about the events behind the actual text can also be hidden from the reader and known by any of the characters, constituting yet another level of discourse. The main distinction between these separate discourses goes between internal and external discourse. Internal discourse is always syntactically rendered, while external discourse marking is syntactically optional; we know that we are reading a book as recounted by Somerset Maugham, even though it is not overt in the text. As shown above, this writer prefers to show himself occasionally at least. The compound discourse (O’Neill 1996:59) emerging from all these separable layers of discourse is assumed in this study to be marked by particular foregrounded adverbials. Compounded discourse is therefore taken to mean discourse where more than one narrative voice is operating at the same time, or in the same context.

Without the real communication between people as a conceptual background, fiction would not work. The same patterns and roles for communication adopted by people in general are by analogy transferred to written texts, subjecting the fictional discourse to the rules of real communication. Some part of the discourse analysis of fiction will appear just like the same analysis made of real speech, and this is the part where the reader agrees that a text should have face-value. But when the analysis looks behind the curtain of the mere content of the fiction and
observes the technical means used by the writer to create a certain narrative discourse, a more complex picture of communication emerges in the reading process.

The fiction communication divides into two main fields, text-internal and text-external. The internal fiction communication in *The Force of Circumstance* is between Guy and Doris and the people they know and meet in the story. Externally the communication is between the fictional level and the reader, the agreement of the third-person narration that the writer and reader have. The external communication also involves, as shown above, a message between the actual writer and the reader, where the writer "unveils" himself or herself and speaks more or less directly to the reader. Messages in these communications can always be seen as addressing the same level of narration (O'Neill 1996:72). Internally characters speak to each other, externally the narration speaks to the reader, or the writer to the reader, all of which discourse takes place on the same diegetic level.

The narrative discourse and its information processing can be described in terms of utterer and source (Vershueren 1999:81). An utterer is the voice expressing an informational message, the source is the person or piece of information origin of the utterer's utterance. When a person retells something that someone else has said the roles for the person actually delivering the utterance is the utterer and the absent person is the source, as in

143. B: Is that what Ann said?
   J: Right. She does not think very highly of the Brussels bureaucracy.

In this dialogue (from Vershueren 1999:80) J is the utterer and Ann is the source. Any elaborate pattern can form in the interplay between utterer and source. Vershueren makes no distinction between a fictional utterer and source and a real one (1999:81-82), fiction being a mirror of spoken discourse or speech which is basically the view taken in this study.

Text-internally, utterer and source in direct dialogue (mimesis), are no harder to identify than they would have been if the fictional dialogue took place in reality. This is the narrative level of discourse where fiction resembles real speech the most, in terms of discourse analysis. It is also the level where the reader is most likely to overlook the real source of information, that is the writer in person. O'Neill calls the discourse where the writer speaks through direct speech 'ven-
It tells what happened, or how it happened, by using tags such as *John said* or *John said desperately*. But as soon as the narrative perspective shifts to third-person or omniscient narration the communicative aspect becomes increasingly complex. Above three separate levels of narrative discourse stemming from third-person narration were identified: 1. text-internal between the characters, 2. text-external between the third-person narration and the reader, and 3. text-external between the actual writer and the reader. The levels have pragmatic markers (adverbials) signalling the communicative scope at hand. The complexity of the discourse in third-person narration is closely associated with the reader’s perception of the relative absence or presence of an external source.

Before examining the relation between real source and utterer and their corresponsences in fiction, it is important to point out that all varieties of narration, from pure mimesis (rendered speech) to diegesis (omniscient narrator) invoke a real speech situation. The modes and turns of daily speech constitute the model that is set to work by the techniques of fiction. No matter how simple or complicated the text is perceived to be, the normal speech pattern will be the measure of our reading, and the level of difficulty or deviance will be felt according to the communicative standards which are an inherent part of our linguistic behaviour. The terms ‘virtual source’ and ‘virtual utterer’ will be implemented as tools for distinguishing between the real source and utterer and those in the fiction, progressing to varieties between mimesis and diegesis.

‘Virtuality’ is also an inherent part of the reading process. Wolfgang Iser speaks about the virtuality of a text:

> The fact that completely different readers can be differently affected by the ‘reality’ of a particular text is ample evidence of the degree to which literary texts transform reading into a creative process that is far above mere perception of what is written. The literary text activates our own faculties, enabling us to recreate the world it presents. The product of this creative activity is what we might call the virtual dimension of the text, which endows it with its reality. This virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it the imagination of the reader: it is the coming together of text and imagination. (in Barry 1987:106ff)

The reader brings life to the text through his or her imagination and endows it with a reality that is not present until the text is interpreted. Iser’s observation is concerned with the epi-reading status of a text, where the reader agrees with the consensus of the fiction. But if the concept of virtuality is applied to the narrative...
technique employed, another level of virtuality appears; the correspondence between actual speech and represented speech, between real persons and thoughts and between representational ones becomes apparent. A fictional source of utterance is in the process of epi-reading, unambiguously equal to the mimetic character. If graphi-reading (considering the construction of the text) is undertaken a real source of utterance must lie behind the fictional source. In such a reading the fictional source of utterance can be looked upon as virtual, being the channel or medium for the writer (the ventriloquism metaphor mentioned previously).

5.3.2.2. Third-person narration

Third-person narration has its correspondence in real conversation in that it deals with retelling what other persons have done. When a person is saying something about someone else, a very common and natural conversational situation, the utterer (the person) is present in the situation, and the source, the topicalised person, is absent. In fiction these communicative roles can also be referred to as the 'representing self' (a narrative voice speaking for someone else or retelling) and 'the self', the actual speaker (Chafe 1994:225) or informant. In fiction there is a two-fold correspondence to the real person, the utterer. First the narrative voice through which the story is told and secondly the real writer behind the words. The situation is that the agreement of the normal speech situation is maintained automatically and we perceive the narrative voice as a real person talking to us. A few effective linguistic markers are enough to make us go along with the discourse; the use of pronouns and the use of evaluative adverbials, which trigger off a response in the reader to interpret the text as coming from a person who is identical with the narrative voice. How aware the reader might be that the real source and the virtual source are separated is an open question. The option to distinguish between them and to identify various levels of discourse is, however, present all through the reading of a text. A further explanation of this process of identification is sustained by separating the real source of information from the fictional source.

In third-person narration the virtual source is different from the one in I-narration. When a story is told from the respective perspective of one of the characters, as in The Force of Circumstance, the concepts of source and utterer become even more complex. Deixis is also involved, since the prototypical deictic centre is
the individual’s perspective. Narrative departures from this centre are also departures in person deixis. The further from the I-centre the narration moves, the more it becomes obvious that the narrative voice, the self (Chafe 1994:206), is distant from the represented self (the he/she of the narration) or the reader. When reading a third-person narration (or free indirect discourse) the reader has a double focus on the aspect of displacement of the narrative voice (someone is telling us about someone in the text), and on the aspect of identification with the character being narrated. This double focus does not take a conscious effort to maintain as part of the reading.

Text-internally, the discourse can be analysed in just the same terms as if the events in the text takes place in real life. Who says what and from what source can be readily analysed, though, without any results that contribute to the understanding of how narrative voice is constructed. The adverbials evidently and but of course co-relate or interrelate the various levels of fictional discourse in Maugham’s short story (cf Ch 5.3.3.) When Maugham says

She was puzzled by the look of his face. It was deathly white, and the pimples which not a little distressed her were more than commonly red.

Another source of information emerges, one that is seemingly narrating the story and recording what “she” does. This can be called the narrative source, since it is still text-internal due to the agreement between the writer and reader that writers should be overlooked. The narrative source tells the story, but is not visible itself. There has to be a someone telling us a story about “Guy” and “Doris”, and this someone is supposed to be hidden, just as the I-character’s source is hidden. But another impression arrives when one interprets third-person narration. The “someone” that tells the story and watching the persons is not entirely as invisible as the one behind the I-character. We can see and hear the things the characters do, just as the narrative observer does, and therefore the narrative observer becomes a cognitive object for us. It is as if we heard a voice telling us a story, a voice which must belong to someone, our common sense tells us, although we do not need that knowledge to understand the text. What happens is that the fiction level is called to action at the same time as the story is being told. The text-internal discourse is being co-related externally with the communication between the text-internal dis-
course, the writer and the reader. The narrative voice is therefore a text-internal source, a personal entity who knows and tells about the events. The text-internal source is at the same time the utterer, the "voice" we are listening to. Therefore the narrative voice is the linguistic link between the text-internal level and the text-external one. Without the voice telling us about Guy and Doris there would not be any story. Telling a story in third-person narration also gives the writer the opportunity to impersonalise him or herself, thus making it less evident who the real source is, in analogy with the strategy for avoiding explicit personal reference to the source of a text, which is used as a face-saving strategy involving hedging (Luukka & Markkanen 1997:171-172). The narrative use of third-person pronouns points in a different deictic direction than the real circumstances' deictics should (the writer as a source), and leads the reader to interpret the text as coming from the subject of the text. Attaching evaluative adverbials to such third-person virtual sources further enforces the deictic detachment from the real source.

Finally, the text-external level that deals with the real source, has to be regarded. It was shown above that the scope of *but of course* far extended beyond the internals of the text, and was in fact part of a comment from the writer himself. At this point in the text the real source, the writer, surfaces. *but of course* is partly uttered from the real source. The text-internal narrative voice, Doris and the real source become co-related or are merged. Doris, on the other hand, can never be interpreted as the utterer, only as the text-internal source from which the narrative voice is seemingly taking its information. In relation to both source and utterer the term virtual can be applied here too. The virtual source is the narrative voice that observes the events, but has its real source in the writer. There is also a virtual utterer, the narrative voice that fills in for the real utterer, equivalent to the real source.

In the linguistic item of *but of course* real source and real utterer coincide with virtual source and virtual utterer. The result is maximum narrative scope where all the interactors in the fiction communication process are engaged. The adverbial's foregrounding in terms of narrative address is maximized. In the early days of romance writing it was fashionable to show the writer's voice which the following quote from *Tom Jones* shows. Henry Fielding addresses the reader directly.
Here, reader, it may be necessary to acquaint thee with some matters, which, if thou
dost know already, thou art wiser than I take thee to be. And this information thou
shalt receive in the next chapter. (p 490)

The compliance to fictional agreement depends largely on the markers that trigger
the impression of natural discourse. A full comprehension of the communicative
situation in fiction must, however, extend beyond this agreement, since the fiction
discourse is only a rendering of natural discourse. In this rendering the real source
and the virtual source of information hold different roles. The virtual source is the
illusory voice we “listen” to in the text, and the real source functions as a meta-
level, providing information and sometimes communicating with the fiction level.
For artistic reasons Somerset Maugham in *The Force of Circumstance* provides the
most dramatic information in the text: Guy’s confession about his former life, in I-
narration. The reader “listens” to Guy “talking”, which adds immediacy to the text,
much more so than if third-person narration had been used. Immediacy equals be­
ing close to the prototypical deictic centre of narration, which gives the reader the
impression of being close to the character, in a real situation. Guy’s voice in the
text is then felt as the real source of information, because of the narrative merging
of the real internal source and the virtual internal source (the observer). It also be­
longs to the convention of I-narration that the access to the information handed out
through it, is restricted to the mind of the I (Chafe 1994:225). In the case of Guy’s
secret it is very appropriate to let the reader know about it from the character’s
own narration. This way the reader gets the impression that not even the omnisci­
cent narrator knowing anything about the secret. It belongs to Guy only.

5.3.3. Adverbials of evaluation as discourse markers
The voice of the omniscient narrator in *The Force of Circumstance* is fore­
grounded by the use of sentence adverbials. Here, three of these will be analysed
more closely, *but of course, really,* and *evidently.* The syntactic positioning and the
semantic and pragmatic meaning of these adverbials will be discussed in relation
to their role as discourse markers and as pragmatic markers other than those infer­
ing pragmatic meaning beyond what the text states.
5.3.3.1. But of course

Evaluative adverbials play an important role in creating a level of understanding of the fiction which adds extra weight to the voice of the omniscient narrator. *But of course she knew perfectly well* is Doris’ supposed thoughts about the reason she liked Guy. The phrase *but of course* works in at least two ways. Firstly the phrase can be attributed unequivocally to Doris, following the consensus between the writer and the reader. This way the phrase functions as a subjunct, attributed to the subject of the phrase. But as is the case with many other adverbial phrases, it also has the ability to function as disjunct. What happens then is that the scope of the phrase’s meaning expands into covering the evaluation of a distant observer other than the subject. Someone “outside” the text makes a comment. This someone can be the writer’s comment, telling the reader that it is obvious that Doris should feel this way. The distant observer can also be anyone who agrees with the general appeal that Doris should, indeed, feel this way. *But of course* suggests that there is a majority of opinions supporting Doris’ feelings. She could well act according to common sense, custom, tradition or norms. Her adherence to such customs is implied in *but of course*.

An adverbial such as *but of course* has the ability to hold these three perspectives simultaneously, enabled by its syntactic position, represented by 1. what Doris thinks, 2. the writer’s supposed comment, or 3. the distant observer’s assessment of a situation. When an evaluative adverbial appears in the fiction text the reader’s knowledge about the reading situation is added to the linguistic knowledge about discourse marking. The syntactic function of evaluative adverbials and their discourse functions intersect for the reader in the actual adverbial used. The adverbial works like a trigger, unlocking both a syntactic response creating meaning, and a psychological response dealing with the communicative situation of reading fiction. Hence the adverbial functions deictically, and evokes differentiated mental spaces with its use. As Sweetser and Fauconnier point out (1996:20), the same linguistic material can serve as an access point to evoke more than one cognitive entity (cf Ch 4), which is also the case with *but of course*. The phrase interpreted in full context appeals to the personal level, as well as to a social or general level.
But of course she knew perfectly well. He was a gay, jolly little man, who took nothing very solemnly, and he was constantly laughing. He made her laugh too. He found life an amusing rather than a serious business, and he had a charming smile. When she was with him she felt happy and good-tempered. And the deep affection which she saw in those merry blue eyes of his touched her.

All of Guy's character is enough to make people like him. The opinion about him is not only held by Doris, but it is also a general one. But of course Guy must be liked. The writer's comment is also there, guiding the reader, and telling us what conclusions to draw about Doris' feelings. Evaluative adverbials work narration-externally as well as narration-internally. Narration-internal adverbials are often made to stand out less than the narration-external adverbials. An example of a narration-internal adverbial is found in the above quote, "But of course she knew perfectly well." Perfectly is closely linked to the subject syntactically and is not foregrounded. The question of how well she knows her feelings is a matter of degree only, while it is not as self-evident why she should interpret her feelings as self-spoken, indicated by but of course... Therefore but of course is foregrounded, while perfectly is not. The logical/evaluative distinction labels both adverbials evaluative, adding extra features or evaluation to the proposition of the sentence. What gives these evaluative adverbials their important role here is their syntactic range of function. But of course has the ability to function as either a subjunct or a disjunct, while perfectly stays as approximating a subjunct.

5.3.3.2. Really

The extent to which an adverbial like but of course or perfectly is felt to have different discourse functions, depends not only on the semantics and pragmatics of the adverbial itself, but also on the context. Fine distinctions or shifts in associations can be acquired by placing the adverbial in the surrounding text in such a way that the cognitive or associative links between the adverbial and the matter discussed seem tighter or looser. This is actually a phenomenon known from rhetoric. The flavour of the surrounding text may be transferred to the item the writer or speaker wants to highlight, in a positive or negative direction. It may also just establish the connection between the two things discussed, by conscious use of juxtaposition.

The following example from The Force of Circumstance embeds really in sur-
roundings where it is attributed to Doris and there is no other level of interpretation like the ones discussed for but of course.

Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bath-house. He was a noisy fellow and even with bare feet he could not be quiet. But he uttered an exclamation. He said two or three words in the local dialect and she could not understand. Then she hears someone speaking to him, not aloud, but in a sibilant whisper. Really it was too bad of people to waylay him when he was going to have his bath. He spoke again and though his voice was low she could hear that he was vexed.

The situation is observed by Doris, listening to the sounds from the bath-house. In this situation which is firmly established as taking place at the present moment, it is Doris’ perceptions we follow. Attention to time moving is achieved by the markers now, then, and again, which pin down the situation to one character through whom the events are told. When really appears the reader is already inside Doris’ mind, and the adverbial passes as her reflection only. Chafe calls this narrative technique where there is a syntactically realized third-person narration ‘represented consciousness’ (1994:250), but with lexical items inserted in the narration pointing to experiences or perceptions of the character, exclusive to himself or herself (1994:251). That is the omniscient narrator’s possibility to comment on the behaviour or appearance of a character is barred in instances. If really had been placed initially in the paragraph, in a sentence fitting the context, it would have been different. Then the uncertainty about whose mind we are observing would be greater, just because the conditions of the situations are not yet established. The front-positioning of really assigns modal function to the adverbial (Jacobson 1964:323,355, Poutsma 1926:693), in contrast with its adjunct position, which is perceived as less emphatic (Bocklund 1973:236).

A contextual interpretation of really can yield a number of different conversationally implied meanings. The adverbial can function as a truth attester, an emphasiser or a degree reinforcer (modifier) (Paradis 2001). Prosodic features play an important role in producing pragmatic meaning for really. In the case of fiction the context will be assumed to provide the phonological reading of the word. Really is also a pragmatic marker (Paradis, 2001, Brinton 1996:280) with functions surpassing its semantics. Really is an appeal to negativise the action commented on. It is a kind of exclamatory protest which can be used as a substitute for much stronger phrases in less polite language. The aggression and agitation contained in
really on Doris’ behalf imply: ‘The actions of the Malay woman are bad, and it is about time that something is done about it.’ Really appears to be a pragmatic marker expressing Doris’ growing distress as events are unfolded to her. The same day as Guy is about to tell her his secret about the Malayan woman, they argue over the Malayan woman and the way she has been treated by the house boys. Doris thinks that the Malayan woman is being treated far too harshly and Guy objects, claiming that she has no right to intrude the way she does. Doris tries to defend the Malayan woman, not yet knowing who she is.

‘The boys were treating her brutally. I had to stop them. You must really speak to them about it.’

The combination of the modal verb and the adverbial in must really is pragmatically speaking a set construction, which uses the strategy of impersonalising, that is phrasing the utterance in such a way that the agent (Doris) is not directly identified as the speaker or the speaker alone (Hoye 1997:134). Since the term ‘speaker’ can be used ambiguously, there is reason to clarify Hoye’s use of speaker. Referring to the previous discussion about subject and speaker orientation (cf Ch. 5.3.2.1.) it is necessary to point out that “speaker” in Hoye’s reasoning as referred to here, means the subject. The difference between acting subject-orientedly and speaker-orientedly is that the former is openly the source of the utterance, while the latter widens the scope of the utterance to include other sources besides himself or herself, without necessarily specifying which other sources are referred to. In this way a generalized comment which the subject is a part of, can be made, but not in respect of the whole source. The extent to which really is subject-oriented or speaker-oriented depends on the context. In the above example really is attributed to Doris only, by means of embedding the adverbial in linguistic surroundings where it is clear that Doris states how negatively she experiences the disturbance made by the Malayan woman. By juxtaposing the adverbial with the character’s opinion the adverbial is interpreted as subject-oriented.

In the above discussion the use of really refers to the set combination of the modal verb and the adverb that makes the orientation move away from subject-orientation to speaker-orientation. Really here functions deictically, “pointing” to different discourse levels at the same time. Doris is not only talking for herself
when she says that Guy must really speak to the house boys. She is also expressing what Guy should interpret as a more general opinion of how one should behave in a similar situation. Thereby impersonalising her own utterance, she weakens the deontic purpose of the utterance. The function of the utterance is made less direct and therefore also less face-threatening (Hoye 1997:134). At this point in their relationship Doris is still resorting to well-known strategies in order to cope with arising problems. She just says what any other person would have said to Guy.

The first use of really, discussed above, shows Doris’ sympathy for Guy. She defends his right not to be disturbed when he takes his shower. The second use of the adverbial is made just before Doris realizes that it is Guy who has ordered the house boys to be as rough as they are. Therefore the utterance You must really speak to them about it, loses its deontic purpose. Really as a marker of Doris’ attitude towards Guy is changed from the first discussed use to the second one, from empathy to mild questioning. In a third use of really, the adverbial functions as a pragmatic marker of the distance between Doris and Guy. After the six months of postponing the final discussion about their relation, Doris tells Guy that she wants to go home.

‘Oh, Guy, don’t blame me. It really is not my fault. I can’t help myself.’

Here really functions as a disjunct. The utterance could have been rendered ‘Really, this is not my fault’. The meaning of really is thus widened even further than in the second example discussed above, You must really speak to them about it where Doris was still a part of the source of the utterance. In It really is not my fault the adverbial really communicates that the adverbial comment could just as well have been made by any other person. It is as if Doris retells what the rest of the world would have to say about her leaving her husband. The advance from pure subject-orientation in the first example, over to pure speaker-orientation in the third, is made gradually through the use made in the second example, where Doris’ opinion about Guy still wavers between loyalty and detachment. First Doris has a positive opinion about her husband, then she requests of him that he should take action (the deontic use of really). When he does not comply with her request, she stops trying to affect him. From the long confession Guy makes it is clear that he knows how much he has hurt Doris, but it is also clear that he is now willing to
repent. He did what he did because he had to, more or less, and he thinks Doris should take the same standpoint, something she is incapable of. Doris knows that she cannot affect the way Guy thinks about his life before they were married, and she does not try either. After listening to his story she abandons her loyalty towards Guy, comprehending his inability to understand how wrongly he has behaved towards her. The detached use of *really* in the third example, mirrors the way Doris separates herself from Guy. She has lost her confidence in him, and she appeals to the supposed opinion of the world about Guy’s behaviour; *It really is not my fault.* Her utterance might infer the conversational implicature ‘[...]and everyone will agree with me.’ or, ‘It is so obvious that it is not my fault that I don’t even have to say it’

The repetitive use of *really*, applied in different pragmatic contexts, assigns the adverbial to Doris’ and her way of expressing herself. The impression is that she is trying to be decent and polite, as far as she can go. When she realizes that she cannot change the past or the way Guy thinks about the past, she abandons her former attitude and replaces it with the politeness of any stranger in her communication with Guy. The reader is thereby given insight into the character, and the way she develops throughout the short story. She is perceived as a sensible, intelligent person who knows when she is defeated, and she does not waste more energy than necessary once she realises it. To the reader her personality might seem a bit cold and rigid in that she depends too much on principle and standards of morality. However, there is no shadow of a doubt that we know why she acts as she does.

Foregrounded adverbial use in the narrative plays an important role in creating the character’s personality in a three-dimensional way. What makes the adverbial so versatile is its syntactic ability to fit in various positions and accordingly its semantic vagueness (widening scope from subject-orientation to speaker-orientation), which in combination serves to produce pragmatic meaning in context. The basic lexical properties of the adverbial interact with its functional ability to add pragmatic value, and this process cannot be triggered by a noun or a verb. A tree would be a tree, regardless of the context it is placed in, while *really* implies distinctly different meanings in different contexts, which is a sign of its functionality.
5.3.3.3. Evidently as an internal discourse marker

The link between the subject and the evaluative adverbial is of a sophisticated nature. It does not take much to create a linguistic situation where a double discourse involving the character’s thoughts and an observer’s thought appears.

The other voice was raised now; it was a woman’s. Doris supposed it was someone who had a complaint to make. It was like a Malay woman to come in that surreptitious way. But she was evidently getting very little from Guy for she heard him say; Get out. That at all events she understood, and then she heard him bolt the door.

In the above passage there is a slight shift in narrative perspective from the person-internal narration to a more visible omniscient narrator. This shift is important for the interpretation of the adverbial evidently. The marker of the shift is, Doris supposed it was someone who had a complaint to make. The consensus of the reading interprets the statement as coming from Doris’ mind, but it is the use of her first name that breaks the illusion and the implied author enters (Short 1996:259). Once again, we are told the story through “someone’s” narration. When Maugham uses the pronoun she it is easier to imagine being inside Doris’ mind, after the shift to “Doris” we are watching from the outside. In the first quoted passage Doris is referred to as she, in the second as Doris. Persons do not think of themselves in terms of their first names, excepting for perhaps small children, but in fiction it works as an agreement that “Doris” equals an “I” to whom we are listening. Using the name of the character also serves the purpose of identifying and introducing the person (Chafe 1994:253) and can be seen as an instance of foregrounding. Chafe observes that the use of the proper name for a character signals the distinction between the preceding subject and the third-person narrative subject (1994:253). In the above quote the use of Doris foregrounds the fact that she is now the subject, not The other voice. The mere mention of Doris supposed[...] also distances the discourse from inside the character to an overall perspective. The sentence could have been rendered as follows: ‘It might have been someone who had a complaint to make.’ Then the illusion of still being in the same narrative situation as in the first passage, would have been retained.

By introducing this shift in narration evidently is made to mean more than it would have if it were embedded in the same way as really. Now evidently is not only an evaluation from Doris, but also a more general one. One could even go so
far as to suggest that evidently is shared by the Malayan woman, too. It is evident to the Malayan woman that her appeal to Guy is fruitless, and it is also evident to Doris. It cannot be Guy’s evaluation, since he is the one that knows that he will not give in to the woman.

Another technical feature of the text further adds to this impression.

But she was evidently getting very little from Guy, for she heard him say: ‘Get out’

The two instances of the pronoun she do not refer to the same person. In the first case it is the Malayan woman and in the second it is Doris. It is as if Doris is telling us about the Malayan woman; She got very little out of it, which Doris evaluates by adding evidently. The closeness of the first she and evidently forms the link between the Malayan woman’s thoughts and Doris’ own. If evidently was assigned initial position in the sentence, yet another perspective would appear. Then the general opinion about what the Malayan woman gets or does not get would be a part of evidently. The omniscient narrator would then be more visible. When evidently is more closely attached to the subject, the third person narration is more at hand.

The syntactic positioning of evaluative adverbials is of great importance to the understanding of the text, and comprises a versatile tool for creating narrative discourses. The evaluative function of evidently comes from its contextual use in this case. Evidently can function as a logical adverbial in other contexts where there is less speaker-orientation in the utterance. The use of evidently in the following examples shows the possibility of evidently having either function.

144. Evidently, this is gold. (If there were not evidence that this is gold, it wouldn’t be gold, therefore logical function.)

145. Evidently, the Malayan woman got very little out of Guy. (To the evaluation and knowledge of more persons than the subject speaking the Malayan woman got very little out of Guy.)

5.3.3.4 Evidently and of course as external discourse markers

Evidently is not only a marker of changes and scope of the internal discourse, but it is also a marker of the discourse involved in the reading process. From the fol-
lowing passage a complicated pattern of discourse level with consequences for the adverbial scope can be discerned.

He (the house boy) went out to take Guy’s hat from him. His quick ears had caught the footsteps before they were audible to her. Guy did not as usual come up the steps immediately; he paused, and Doris at once surmised that the boy had gone down to meet him in order to tell him of the morning’s incident. She shrugged her shoulders. The boy evidently wanted to get his story in first. But she was astonished when Guy came in. His face was ashy.

The normal writer/reader consensus requires that the reader interprets the quoted passage as being Doris’ thoughts, as if the reader were inside her head. This interpretation is sustained by the deictic references made in the text. The house boy goes out, from where Doris is situated. We are then told that Doris listens to her husband’s steps. The use of her first name again points to the deictic focus and when Guy comes into the room, to her, she can see that his face looks ashy. But what makes it certain beyond any doubt that we are following Doris and not Guy here, is the adverbial evidently. It cannot be anyone else but Doris who thinks evidently, thus evaluating the fact that the houseboy was in such a hurry to meet Guy. *The boy evidently wanted to get his story in first* is embedded between two sentences where Doris is the subject. The third-person narration sustains the reader’s identification with her, and the sentence containing evidently is attributed to her thoughts as well. Doris is listening to what is happening outside the room, and makes an evaluative comment about it: *The boy evidently wanted to get his story in first*. This is the internal discourse setting of the text so far; Doris’s thoughts which we can follow. Inside this internal discourse the communicative scope of evidently is speaker-oriented, Doris is commenting on something happening. But since this is the world of fiction there is also another level of discourse at work, the external discourse. The external discourse is, in fact, the communication between the internal discourse and the reader. External discourse can be rendered in a wide variety of ways, ranging from pure mimesis to diegesis. In the passage quoted above there is a third person narration where Doris does not know that she is being watched and we are looking at the internal effects of the text where she sits in a room listening to Guy. The communication between the internal discourse and the reader is two-fold. One level of discourse is the narrative voice, the third person narrative, “talking” to the reader, the other is the writer himself addressing the reader.
To subsume these two levels at all times and to equal the utterances of the narrative voice with that of the writer is obviously unreliable or even false (O’Neill 1996:69). In a text like the short story by Somerset Maugham it is, however, tempting to do so. There seems to be a close correspondence between the purpose of the narrative voice (tell the story of Guy and Doris) and the purpose of the writer (tell the same story). The subtle difference between the narrative voice and that of the writer in this case, lies perhaps in the fact that the narrative voice is restricted to the text, while our conception of the actual writer is unrestricted to the text. Maugham should know more about the story than the narrative voice actually reveals, the former being less restricted by the text than the latter. From this fact the sometimes zero-marked discourse between the writer and the reader emerges. We are able to induce things about the writer’s purposes and the choices he or she makes, picking up hints from the text constituting the restricted discourse. In The Force of Circumstance such hints are distributed in some adverbials, as discussed above, with possible widened interpretation from subject to speaker orientation, enabling us to include the real writer in the pragmatic context. When the narrative voice addresses the reader a shift of the scope of evidently takes place from internally speaker-oriented (Doris commenting “inside” the text), to externally subject-oriented (the writer modifying the subject’s thoughts with the sentence-adverbial evidently. Thus evidently is both something Doris thinks to herself, and something the observer can tell is attached to her. It is actually the use of evidently that creates the option to discern the various levels of discourse in the text. Without evidently the narrative voice would sway over to the house boy’s perspective:

146. She shrugged her shoulders. The boy wanted to get his story in first.

We would have an omniscient narrator here, one that can follow the minds of all the characters in the text. The double discourse perspective reflected in speaker/subject orientation at the same time, allows for a wider interpretation of the adverbial. As in the case of immediately discussed above, a vagueness of scope appears for evidently. The vagueness in its turn opens up for semantic change. For immediately, the meaning shifted from temporal orientation as a sentence adverbial, to spatial orientation (how did he walk the steps), as a subjunct. The least fictional level of discourse is then the one of the writer, in this case Somerset
Maugham who addresses the reader, you and me. In my opinion this level is actually the one where the purpose of the text is communicated. There is a reason why Maugham writes this and while we are reading we ponder this reason. This is a level of discourse which does not have to be overt in the text (in syntax), but in the case of The Force of Circumstance the above examples of widening scope of interpretation, syntactically realizes this level in the text.

In terms of understanding the text, the level where the narrative voice addresses the reader is not that important for the reader. We settle for the mutual agreement in fiction, and leave out the paradoxical fact that we are watching someone who does not know that he or she is being watched, like we look at Doris as if she was sitting in an aquarium. The external discourse level, finally, between the actual writer and the actual reader, is the level where the content of the book can be discussed in terms of a level of reflection regarding what the writer meant, and our interpretation of it. The writer addressing us with evidently as if it were coming from inside Doris’ mind might want to inform us that we should know that Doris is attentively listening and drawing conclusions about events she cannot see. This level is the one most open to personal interpretations. All of these discourses are present all the time, resulting in a compound discourse (O’Neill 1996:58) (cf. Ch. 5.3.2.2.), but the reader can choose to ignore everything but the internal discourse and follow the events. One of the reasons why the internal discourse is so easily followed here is the use of evidently. We are told something that originates exclusively in Doris’ mind.

Other normally speaker-oriented adverbials also create this rather puzzling extra level of discourse as evidently is shown to do above. An interesting example where the internal speaker-orientation is even stronger than in evidently is found in the following quote from The Force of Circumstance. The adverbial of course is the starting point for Doris’ rather lengthy flashback.

Of course she had read novels about the Malay Archipelago and she had formed an impression of a sombre land with great ominous rivers and a silent, impenetrable jungle.

What level of discourse should of course be regarded as a marker of? The internal discourse, Doris “thinking” for herself, uses of course to signal that Doris finds it self-evident that she should have read books about the country, and that she is
commenting not only for herself, but also on behalf of other people; she is using a speaker-oriented adverbial inside the third-person narrative. But there is also a tinge of something breaking up the third-person narrative illusion here. *Of course* can be interpreted as an occasional narrative slip of the writer’s pen, the writer’s voice is heard for a moment, *telling* the reader that it is self-evident that Doris should have read such books. By the use of *course* the speaker-orientation widens to include even the reader. The initial position of the adverbial helps to foreground the meaning of it, too. So what happens here is that an internally speaker-oriented adverbial widens to include external speaker-orientation, the writer addressing the reader. If the writer wanted to tone down this split discourse the adverbial could have been embedded somewhere in the sentence;

Doris knew of course a great deal about the Malayan Archipelago from the novels she had read about it.

This way *of course* is more exclusively tied to the subject and her internal speaker-orientation.

### 5.3.4. Epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality in the evaluative adverbial *evidently*

Hoye identifies a basic dichotomy in language use. Either we comment on or assert our interpretation of the world, a static use, or else we want to effect some change in it, which is a dynamic use (Hoye 1997:122). These two fundamental uses of language, according to Hoye, correspond to Searle’s (derived from J.L. Austin 1962) speech act categories of assertives on the one hand, and directives and commissives on the other, and it is assumed that modal verbs reflect this dichotomy, and so do a range of other syntactic categories. The assumed validity of these observations for the adverbials of interest for this study will be discussed here. Palmer’s work (1986) focuses more on the modal auxiliaries than Hoye’s, which is more concerned with adverbs and modality. Therefore, I will refer more to Hoye’s discussion of epistemic and deontic function, although Palmer has the same view, both of them building on work by Jespersen (1924), von Wright (1951) and Lyons (1977), among others. In speech act theory it is the utterance that is the analysed unit, the actual spoken or written performance, whereas in syntactic analysis it is
the sentence that is analysed. The concepts are excluded from interchange by definition, the sentence being an abstract concept and the utterance real speech observed. Syntax can and will change the uttered meaning as discussed in chapters 5.2.1-5.3 on social and discourse deixis, but the full pragmatic meaning and purpose of an utterance will only develop in context.

Pragmatic meaning is not always predicted by the syntax in use, although this is sometimes the case (Hoye 1997:54). The formal-syntactic classification of sentence types divides into declarative, interrogative, imperative and exclamative, independently of the context in which they occur. The functional analysis of speech-acts takes as its starting point the discourse functions with which these major types of sentences can be associated at a semantic level: statements (to present information) questions, directives (to issue commands and requests), and exclamations (expressions of the speaker’s emotions) (Hoye 1997:54). There is therefore a general correspondence between the syntactic and semantic class of an utterance, but this is not always the case as these examples from Hoye show.

147. You can’t possibly do it? (syntactically declarative, pragmatically a question)

148. Why the bloody hell should I pay the fine? (syntactically an interrogative, pragmatically a statement)

149. Perhaps you would come to my office for a moment. (syntactically a declarative, semantically a directive.

The pragmatic meaning of these utterances does not correspond with the syntactic representation. In reality this means that a person is able to say something that is interrogative, but should be interpreted as a directive or a statement, which gives credit to both the power of syntax and of speech acts. Let’s assume that the person addressed with

150. Perhaps you would come to my office for a moment?

said “No”, then his or her behaviour would be considered insubordinate. A “question” likes this only holds rhetorical value, it is understood to be a directive and nothing else. From the discrepancy between the sentence form and the function of
the utterance it can be gathered that the linguistic form of an utterance does not necessarily reflect the speaker's communicative intention (Hoye 1997:5). Assertions, predictions, promises, etc, represent language as action and as such constitute pragmatic categories (Hoye 1997:5). They are thus functional by nature, and cannot be identified by their syntactic structure only. We speak with a purpose or a motivation. The goal is frequently to influence the beliefs, attitudes or behaviour of our interlocutors (Hoye 1997:55). Two fundamental functions of language divide the speech act goals into the representational and the instrumental (Perkins 1983:14, quoted in Hoye 1997:56). The first function deals with 'epistemic modality', the other with 'deontic modality', terms which will subsequently be used. Two examples taken from Hoye serve to exemplify the difference.

151. You may have a car.
152. You must be very patient.

Both examples may mean at least two things. To begin with they can be paraphrased as 'Perhaps you have a car' and 'I confidently infer that you are very patient'. This paraphrasing, or pragmatic meaning, expresses the speaker's beliefs and degree of conviction concerning the state of affairs, an interpretation which is epistemic in its function. The examples can also be paraphrased as 'You are permitted to have a car', and 'You are required to be very patient'. With this pragmatic interpretation the deontic function means trying to affect a change involving a performance or obligation for the interlocutor. Without considering the context the epistemic/deontic distinction is random, an either/or, which shows that the categories epistemic/deontic are functional, not semantic. We cannot say that certain words or grammatical constructions are entirely epistemic or deontic, context and pragmatic inference must also be regarded.

Another form of modality, 'dynamic modality', is found in the following utterance.

153. Sebastian can sing in Romanian

The utterance has no real degree of subjectivity (a condition for epistemic and deontic use), although a modal is used. No attitude from the speaker is expressed,
although the utterance is in fact epistemic, since it talks about a state of affairs. A third kind of functional modality called dynamic modality is at hand (Palmer 1997 1990). In dynamic modality it is the subject’s ability or willingness which is at issue, not the speaker’s attitudes or opinions (Hoey 1997:44). Hoey prefers to use the terms epistemic and non-epistemic to cover the basic distinction between epistemic and deontic/dynamic (when there is no call for distinguishing between deontic and dynamic) and use dynamic and deontic where appropriate, an approach this study also will adopt. Having so far defined these two basic pragmatic functions of language the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction will be applied to evidently and really. Reference will also be made to the logical/evaluative dichotomy.

The “pure” logical function as described in this study (Part I), by definition serves to hedge off other interpretations and implicatures concerning time, place and truth assessments. The “pure” evaluative function adds subjective interpretation to a proposition. Epistemics, in the sense and explanation given by Hoey, Palmer and others (Hoey 1997, Palmer 1986), covers both truth assessments (scaled adverbials ranging from semantic Yes to semantic No) and subjective interpretation. What the epistemic function does not relate to is the logical function of temporal and spatial adverbials. In other words, the epistemic function is subsumed by both logical and evaluative function, with the exception of temporally and spatially functioning adverbials which are not being epistemic. It is important to bear in mind that this distinction is not semantically bound. It is also worth considering that although a semantically unbound concept, i.e., a functional category derived from semantic meaning. The functional category itself does not necessarily have to be tied to the specific semantic category it was once derived from. From the prototypical examples of temporal adverbials or sentence adverbials like Yes and No, a functional conclusion is made. From there the functional category can be applied to other semantic categories as well. On the one hand functional categories are theoretical concepts not bound to certain categories of words, in spite of their methodological affinity to the semantic meaning of those categories. On the other hand the semantic meaning of a word might coincide perfectly with its functional meaning. (For example if the adverbial now is used only as temporal marker, then semantics and function coincide.) In both the former and latter case it is the context that decides how close the semantic and functional meanings are. Evaluative ad-
verbials have much more obvious epistemic/deontic functions, obvious in the sense that the functions are lexically overt. It is built into the meaning of e.g. *evidently* that a comment is being made, while it is not semantically overt that *Now* also can function epistemically.

It was shown in chapter 5.3.1-3 that evaluative adverbials (*but of course, really, evidently*) play an important role in creating a level of understanding of fiction which adds extra weight to the voice of the omniscient narrator. Subject/speaker orientation in the adverbials was felt to alter, thereby opening up for widened interpretation of the narrative voice’s origin. Three levels of narrative communication were identified 1. text-internal, 2. narrative level (third person, *I*-narration, omniscient narrator) towards reader, and 3. real writer to reader. Syntactic positioning of the adverbials mentioned is a major factor in the understanding of narrative voice. Again it should be pointed out that syntax is one way of describing the state of affairs, the technical one, while pragmatics deals with the associations inferred from the respective syntactic patterns.

But she was evidently getting very little from Guy, for she heard him say: ‘Get out.’ An epistemic/deontic analysis will say that *evidently* is epistemic. Doris is making an evaluation or comment on an event. This is the text-internal analysis, read as if we were the interlocutors of the speech-act Doris is expressing in her thoughts. What complicates the analysis is the way fiction retells stories to us. Here we have a narrative voice, which tells us the story in a third person, and makes statements about subjects other than itself.

Modality and subjectivity are interrelated. Modality as expressed in epistemic and deontic functions is by definition supposed to include subjectivity on the speaker’s behalf. Cases where the subjectivity or commenting come with another subject besides the speaker therefore needed another term, dynamic modality. Hoye (1997) shows that there are cases when deontic utterances do involve the speaker, but it is not the speaker who is the agent causing something to happen, since the source of permission is external.

154. Can I just try some more cake?
Dynamic modality is subject-oriented rather than speaker-oriented. The subject’s willingness or ability is at issue, not the speaker’s attitudes or opinions (Hoye 1997:44). Both deontic and dynamic modality is non-epistemic, which perhaps is the safest way of defining the dichotomy. The epistemic function is easier to define, therefore pragmatic functions outside it, but still related, can be called non-epistemic (Hoye 1997:44). Having thus placed the concept of subjectivity in relation to epistemic/deontic and dynamic modality, a look at the modality of *evidently* will firstly show epistemic modality, as already mentioned, at a text-internal level. But since there is someone, the narrative voice, telling us that Doris thinks that the woman evidently gets very little from Guy, the utterance is subject-related on the level of communication between the narrative voice and the reader. Doris is the grammatical subject of the narrative voice, and *evidently* then belongs to her, as if she were saying it herself, as a speaker uttering something. Furthermore Doris is the target of the narrative voice retelling the reader, which means she is the subject being talked about, which corresponds rather directly to Hoye’s example.

155. She’ll fetch the car, if you ask her.

where the willingness of the subject, She’ll, is at issue. In the following quote from *The Force of Circumstance* the narrative voice comments on Guy’s willingness to accept what the Malayan woman says to him, through Doris’ interpretation.

But she (the Malayan woman) was evidently getting very little from Guy, for she heard him say; ‘Get out.’

The Malayan woman is performing a deontic utterance and Guy responds to it. This deontic modality is first perceived through Doris, then through the narrator, and finally by the reader. And since the narrative voice is only retelling this deontic event, it is not the narrative voice (the third-person narration) that is deontic. The narrative voice is referring to a deontic event, not acting it out. Therefore the modality expressed by the narrative voice can be called dynamic. It expresses the subject’s ability or willingness of some sort, not the speaker’s (the narrative voice’s) attitudes or opinions. What Doris thinks about the event overheard is ex-
pressed by *evidently*, and must be regarded as epistemic, seen as coming from “inside” the third person narration.

One sentence has managed to produce at least three utterances with different speech-acts: 1. The Malayan woman’s deontic utterance, and Guy’s response to it, 2. Doris’ epistemic evaluation of what she heard, and 3. the narrative voice retelling Doris’ thoughts, thus inferring a dynamic modality (a speaker talking about the state of affairs of something else’s evaluation).

### 5.4. Discourse and modality in fiction

Fiction creates a layer of understanding utterances other than that normal speech consists of since the text-internal representation can be deontic, and the text-external discourse showing epistemic or dynamic modality, all in one text. Modality, as expressed by adverbials, has the ability to cross over borders established by speech-act theory, concerning the nature of utterances (cf Ch 5.3.4). The actual effect of a special richness of understanding is produced through the reader’s perception of the speech-act purposes of the characters and the speech-act performed by the narrative voice which addresses us. Transferred to the domain of fiction, modality then works according to the beliefs or pre-suppositions of the readers. A common world-view or knowledge about the way speech-acts and utterances function is the background which makes it possible for the writer to hint at speech acts. When reading *The Force of Circumstance* and finding the foregrounded adverbial *now*, as a pragmatic marker for social deixis as well as discourse deixis, the reader unequivocally grasps the consequences for the plot.

The technical literary framework is the vehicle for this understanding. Chronology, place, characters, exits, exeunts, are all part of the background, and yet at the same time providers of the literary understanding. Although we are absorbed in the dramatic tension in any text, we notice the logical framework which makes us able to answer questions such as when did Doris leave Guy, for how long had he been at the out-station before he married, what does the jungle look like, etc. All of these answers are propositional in their character.

Modality added to this framework can then be of many different values. For the logically functioning adverbials possibly attached modality develops from regarding the whole context. For the evaluative adverbials modality is an inherently
defined quality. The modality stemming from evaluative adverbials can be epistemic, deontic or dynamic, from the very meaning of them alone. In full context, as shown above, even further meanings can be analysed where the deontic modality of an utterance is not even represented in the text (what the Malayan woman actually said to Guy), but yet traceable for cognition. For both the secondary modality, so to speak, of logical adverbials, and the primary one of evaluative adverbials, it goes for both categories that their use in fiction adds further levels of understanding other than the corresponding use in real speech. The intentions and evaluations of the grammatical subject or speaker can always be confused with, or widened to include, firstly the narrative voice and secondly the writer him or herself.
6. Summary and conclusion

In this study the functions of adverbials and adverbial clauses as operators on semantic and pragmatic meaning are analysed, with the main purpose of investigating these functions in a literary context.

All adverbials operate on deictic grounds, binding together and relating lexical items or fields to each other and expressing the cognitive operations made on, or with, the lexical structures. Adverbials linguistically represent the structure of our cognition that identifies, modifies and modalises the mental lexicon, and enables us to linguistically point to the spatial and temporal framework of our cognition and to differentiated cognitive operations of language. Semantically, adverbials lexicalise generalized deictically organized concepts of a temporal, spatial and circumstantial (e.g. negations) character, commonly of a scaled organization. Pragmatically, adverbials lexicalise meta-linguistic levels of language, referring to cognitive operations dealing with evaluation, comparison and commenting, with deictic functions of discourse and speech-act character commonly involved.

According to this study, adverbials are not divided into discrete semantic categories. The semantic and the pragmatic aspect respectively, can be observed in one and the same adverbial. Building on previous adverbial categorisation by linguists based on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic analyses, this study identifies two basic functional adverbial categories, logical and evaluative adverbials. Logical adverbials lexicalise and point to cognitive processes which deal with scaled operational models for temporal, spatial, truth-assessing and relational and conditional processes. The logical/evaluative distinction applies on the morphological level too, such as the suffixes -free, -less and -ful analysed in this study. Evaluative adverbials lexicalise and point to mainly discourse-related deixis, which involves the epistemic evaluation of a proposition, made by a speaker who is pragmatically experienced to be more or less distant from the grammatical subject of the utterance. Basically, the evaluative category is therefore more pragmatically oriented than the logical one. In contextual interpretation, however, logical adverbials can have pragmatic function, and evaluative adverbials can have an inherent logical function. Clines of grammaticalisation have affected and still affect both categories, particularly so in the case of evaluative adverbials. The optional glide between semantic and pragmatic interpretation for evaluative adverbials is probably enabled
by residues of more literal meanings in the adverbials. Logical adverbials operate on the conditions of the proposition of the sentence, while evaluative adverbials add comments and evaluations to the proposition, as shown by the following examples.

1. This is a tree.
2. This is not a tree.
3. This is hopefully a tree.

_Not_ indicates that there is a need to substitute the lexical item in the noun slot with another one, not as yet specified by the sentence, thus performing a logical/semantic operation on the proposition. _Hopefully_, on the other hand, only adds speaker comment and does not challenge the proposition. In example 1 affirmation is zero-marked syntactically, and constitutes the positive location on the adverbial scale between affirmation and negation (_Yes/No_). This study also identifies a prototypical cognitive scale between the semantic concepts of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ which is mapped onto other lexical scales, wherever there is a sense of gradability in terms of _presence/absence, extent/lack of extent, proximity/distance, increase/decrease, possibility/necessity_ and all other concepts dealing with deictic circumstances. It is assumed here that the cognitive scale between affirmation and negation is a core element of adverbial function at large. The cognitive scale between ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ is lexicalised in the scale represented by three of its members, _yes-perhaps-no_, and is almost transparently lexicalised in temporal scales such as _always-sometimes-never_. The prototypical adverbial scale functions as a mapped-on concept in other lexical scales of both semantic and pragmatic character.

4. Cold-tepid-hot (semantic scaling: how much warmth)
5. Slightly-critically- seriously [wounded] (semantic scaling: how much wounded)
6. Hut-cottage-villa (pragmatic, axiological scaling: how much of positive or negative value)

Cognitive temporal scales can be either fully lexicalised such as _now-before_, or inherent in other lexical scales such as _slowly-quickly-rapidly_. The prototypical adverbial scale between ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ can probably be traced in most lexical scales where there is a spatial or spatialized range between size, length or width of a concrete or abstract manner, with variations of the degree or saliency of the prototypical scale.
Logical and evaluative adverbials differ regarding the implicature they produce. Logical adverbials hedge off all other propositions except the one uttered, and foreground the proposition itself.

7. This is not gold (This is any substance except gold).

Not until the implicature is developed on (conversationalised) will the information of the sentence be completed, ‘This is not gold, it is lead’. The implicature made possible by the use of any logical adverbial, creates a set of conceptual sentences reflecting the contrastive counterpart to the actual written sentence, which provides a tool for narrating different perspectives. The following sentence (ex 8) from The Force of Circumstance can be re-phrased, retaining the logical meaning, but with another narration of the event. It is the implicature of “bare feet” that produces the optional sentences of 9 and 10.

8. “Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bath-house. He was a noisy fellow and even with bare feet he could not be quiet.”
9. Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bath-house. He was a noisy fellow who made himself heard even without shoes. (mirror implicature)
10. Now she heard Guy clatter down the steps to the bath-house. He was a noisy fellow and even with bare feet he could be heard. (mirror implicature)

The respective choice of implicature allows for variations in stylistic and artistic meaning.

Semantic/syntactic multi-functions of logical and evaluative adverbials can be employed to create different narrative perspectives, operating mainly on the narrative range from mimesis to diegesis. Adverbials with essentially vague scope regarding speaker/subject orientation open up for pragmatic interpretation. Depending on the position and foregrounding of the evaluative adverbial it can be assigned to the source of the narrated character, the omniscient narrator or the actual writer of the text. Initial syntactic position foregrounds the meaning and function of the evaluative adverbial the most, firstly because the processing scope of it will range over more of the sentence, and secondly because the discourse-related deixis will be increasingly foregrounded the more initial the position of the adverbial is. The evaluative adverbial thus points to text-internal and text-external discourse levels. The actual meaning constructed by the reader from the particular text is context-dependent and particularized.
Discourse functions in fiction texts are therefore to a large extent marked by adverbials. In *The Force of Circumstance* logical and evaluative adverbials are markers of deixis which involves temporal, spatial, social, discourse and narrative deixis. The general organizational function of deixis has the schema of ‘centre’ vs ‘periphery’, and the deictic expressions mark the relative distance from the perceived centre. Other bodily experienced relations and orientations such as *up/down, front/back* and *part/whole* are also domains that are referred to by deictic expressions. Our cognitive ability to spatialise not only what we see but also our concepts and our thinking structures all categories of deixis. Even the narration of an event or a scene in fiction involves spatialisation, since the actual time required for reading the text and its narrated time are perceived to have spatial extension, areas and locations to which narrative markers can point. Narrative deixis also involves the particular departure in the text from the prototypical I-narration. This study shows that deictic domains are often interrelated, and the same deictic marker can operate on more than one deictic domain.

Time and place in interrelation play a major role in creating not only the setting, but also the plot in the analysed short story. By means of spatialisation, often made by juxtaposing temporal expressions with phrases describing the climate or the jungle, time in itself becomes an agent of the story, interacting with the characters and the events. The chronological structure, therefore, has both a semantic/logical aspect and a pragmatic one. In Maugham’s text, three different cognitive aspects of time can be observed, each with representational meaning indicating the state of the relation between the two characters, Doris and Guy, in the short story. Their life in the Malayan out-station is connected to a pattern of temporal expressions in this study called ‘jungle time’, ‘official time’ and ‘private time’. Jungle time is time as an integrated part of the setting of the story, the jungle and the river. Time is seen, felt and heard, but not clocked. The sun goes up and down and by its movement one can see time progressing. Visual perception paired with aural sensations in the form of the frogs croaking or not, and bodily experiences of heat and coolness, spatialise the concept of time in a way that makes the fiction text tangible and vividly alive. Doris and Guy follow the rhythm of the jungle time, adjusting themselves to the presence or absence of daylight or heat. Jungle time is the backgrounded temporal framework with which the other two cognitive concepts of time
in the short story, private and official time, are contrasted. Private time is equalled to jungle time and associated with marital harmony, until the moment when their relation falls apart by the revelation to Doris of Guy’s former life in the out-station. When Doris learns all about Guy’s secret, his former Malayan live-in and his three children with her, the temporal deictic references in the text change to the separate perspectives of Doris and Guy, thus allowing for the temporal marking to narrate their split in an iconic way. Official time is also a part of the temporal background, since it is perceived as something that just flows on, related to the requirements of jungle time to adjust to the sun and the heat. Time measured by clocks is foregrounded, since the climate and the location provide enough time markers for their daily life to function. When clock time is mentioned it is therefore foregrounded. The mentioning of clock time in the short story is associated with pragmatic reference to unpleasantness. Doris and Guy used to do everything together. After their separation during the six months that pass until Doris leaves, each has their own time to follow. After Doris leaves jungle time is reinstated for Guy, marked by the absence of any more clock time expressions in the text. The original flow of time in the out-station comes back when she is no longer there, and conversely Guy goes back to the state he was in before his wife came to live with him. Temporal and spatial markers, therefore, not only construct the fiction framework of time and place in the text, but also have discourse functions, showing changes in narrative voice and perspective, thus operating on person and social deixis as well. To begin with, the story was told through Doris, with narrative markers of time and place associated with her. After the clash between them most of the narration is made through Guy. The crucial point of their relationship is marked by the adverbial now in the phrase Now she had heard everything. Now which is a logical temporal adverbial is shown to have pragmatic meaning also, indicating the change in Doris and Guy’s relationship, with anaphoric reference to their previously happy life and cataphoric deictic reference to the following discourse of the text. The interplay between the logical function and the evaluative function of the adverbial creates artistic effect. The particular positioning of the adverbial now foregrounds both the semantic and the pragmatic levels of interpretation, which is here assumed to be a consciously applied fiction technique. Another foregrounded use of an adverbial in evaluative function, suddenly, contributes to adding dramatic tension to
the plot. Maugham juxtaposes *suddenly* with unpleasant events, hinting that Guy’s secret will surface.

11. ‘Doris, I’ve got something to say to you’, he said suddenly.

At a later stage the adverbial shows Doris’ attitude to Guy.

12. She looked at him suddenly and her eyes were cold and hostile. ‘That bed I slept on, is that the bed in which she had her children?’

Evaluative adverbials have a mostly pragmatic function, pointing to levels of deixis that are not necessarily syntactically marked. Since evaluative adverbials lack a stable semantic function and develop their meaning more context-independently than the logical ones, their functions are perceived less concrete and tangible than temporally and spatially operating adverbials. Evaluative adverbials however play a distinct role in discourse marking, pointing to differentiated communicational situations. Discourse markers mark which discourse is at hand and also refer to earlier, simultaneous or following discourse. The adverbial thus provides cue information on how to interpret the message conveyed by the proposition the marker is tagged on to. The function of discourse marking is in this study assumed to be operating because of the arrangement of the text, its syntactic choices, the coherence and schemes of the text, and the deictic aspect of the adverbial chosen as discourse marker. *In the Force of Circumstance* three evaluative adverbials are analysed in particular, regarding their discourse function, *but of course*, *really* and *evidently*. The initial positioning of *but of course* expands the scope of interpretation to include not only Doris’ evaluation of an event, but also the voice of a distant observer. Doris’ opinion of Guy is optionally shared by another, socially defined group.

13. But of course she knew perfectly well [why she liked him]. He was a gay, jolly little man, who took nothing very solemnly, and he was constantly laughing. He made her laugh too. He found life an amusing rather than a serious business, and he had a charming smile.

It is the disjunct position of *but of course* which opens up for wide interpretation, operating on both the text-internal and the text-external level. Text-internally *but of*
course refers to Doris herself and her social references. Text-externally the narrative voice is foregrounded, and also the communication between the text and the reader. The reader is urged to interpret the adverbial according to his or her own set of social beliefs and conditioning. The evaluative adverbial evidently in the text also creates a double or multi-layered discourse.

14. The other voice was raised now; it was a woman's. Doris supposed it was someone who had a complaint to make. It was like a Malay woman to come in that surreptitious way. But she was evidently getting very little from Guy for she heard him say; Get out. That at all events she understood, and then she heard him bolt the door.

The third-person narration contributes to opening up an even wider pragmatic interpretation of evidently than is the case in but of course. The event can be interpreted as retold by Doris, or by an omniscient narrator. The first use of she in the quote refers to the Malayan woman, whom Doris might refer to as she when she retells the event. The second use of she cannot be Doris’ own voice, since I-reference would have been required then. The whole sentence is therefore a mixture of third-person narration and omniscient narrator, which lends a broad focus to the interpretation of evidently. It is evident to Doris that the Malayan woman gets very little from Guy, which is also evident to the distant observer. Finally it is also evident to the Malayan woman. Evidently thus marks a text-internal twofold person deixis, and a text-external twofold discourse between the real source of the text (the writer) and the text and the reader. Maugham, disguised as the omniscient narrator records the event. We can observe his narration (a meta-narrative level is foregrounded) and at the same time process the information he provides.

Since adverbials and adverbial phrases in language represent cognitive structures and processes, they address not only our perception and sensory responses, but also our evaluation of those mental and physical experiences. The conscious, patterned use of adverbials in fiction language therefore provides a powerful tool for artistic expression and impression. Through adverbial use the writer can “move” and displace the reader’s mental response from any perceived concrete or abstract deictic centre, in a way that reflects and operates on the organisation of the deictic field triggered by the adverbial marker. In The Force of Circumstance the world built by the infinite possibilities that adverbials provide, emerges to the reader in
extraordinary clarity and vivacity, in a manner typical of Maugham. He uses razor-sharp language to cut and paste, mould and define not only the anatomy of the visible world, but also the inner workings of the human mind, to a point where reading *The Force of Circumstance* becomes an exploration of the universal human landscapes we see before us and carry within us.

Besides providing some linguistic implements for sensitising the reading experience to the use of adverbials, some fields of investigation focused upon in this study suggest a potential for further exploration and analyses. The semantic and pragmatic construction and behaviour of idealized cognitive scales and their relation to lexical items is one such field. My rational belief is that the scaled concepts lexicalised by adverbials also permeate the lexicon, to a varying degree of transparency and saliency.

Since cognitive scales are involved in organising deictic fields, a study of scaled processing and lexical expressions for deixis might also provide a possibility to apply cognitive analyses in a context-dependent frame. To the preference of the present writer, literature should here be the target of analysis, so motivated not only by voice of Maugham, as interpreted here, but also by the multitude and richness of the literary sources available to us today.
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Adverbials as Semantic and Pragmatic Operators. A Functional Approach to the Analysis of English Fiction Language

Adverbials function as deictic markers, operating on salient fields of our cognition, for example time, space and circumstance, the deictic expressions of which can be mapped onto other, more abstract fields such as narrative deixis and discourse deixis. The study is divided into two parts. Part I classifies adverbials into two functional categories, separated by semantic and pragmatic differences, with the concept of scalability recognised as a basic property for adverbials. The analytic tools provided in Part I are in Part II used for analysing the narrative structure of The Force of Circumstance, by Somerset Maugham. Particular attention is paid to the role of temporal and spatial adverbials and sentence adverbials in the communication between reader, text and writer.

Keywords: