DOCTORAL THESIS

Exploring Public Policy Legitimacy

A Study of Belief-System Correspondence in Swedish Environmental Policy

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EXPLORING PUBLIC POLICY LEGITIMACY

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

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ABSTRACT

As environmental problems today are understood as being problems of collective action, they also depend on the broad engagement of individual citizens for their successful solution. Policymakers are thereby faced with the challenge of designing policy and constructing policy tools, which contribute to an increase in individual environmental responsibility and voluntarily behavioural change. Here, this challenge is approached from the point of departure of policy legitimacy, concluding that the problem of legitimacy facing public policy is threefold: affecting the performance (in terms of effectiveness and efficiency) of political programs and policy tools; the boundaries of the policymaking process itself (through the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma) as well as the democratic standing and future overall performance of political government. As such, the thesis aims both at exploring the level of legitimacy for contemporary Swedish environmental public policy as well as at analysing the prospects and prerequisites for designing future environmental policy that holds a high(er) level of legitimacy. In order to fulfil these aims, a further objective is to discuss the meaning and function of policy (as opposed to political-) legitimacy as well as to suggest methods and approaches to its study.

By reviewing and synthesising key concepts and theories from legitimacy theory, public opinion research, and policy analysis, as well as from social and environmental psychology, the first part of the thesis constructs a framework for studying policy legitimacy, focusing content rather than process or actors, and systems of belief rather than opinion. The level of policy legitimacy is seen as the extent to which values and beliefs underpinning public policy content corresponds to those established among the public. This suggests that the evaluation of policy legitimacy is a three-step process, requiring an exploration of policy belief-systems; a mapping of public belief-systems and a subsequent comparison of the two.

In the second part of the thesis, the analytical framework is put to the test in an empirical exploration of the legitimacy for Swedish environmental public policy during the period 1994-2006. By examining and comparing data from a qualitative text analysis of national policy documents with the results of two mass-surveys conducted in the years of 2004 and 2006, important insights are reached in terms of how both policymakers and the public understand and frame the environmental problem in terms of causes, seriousness and possible solutions; how they assign costs and responsibilities in amending the problem; as well as their preference for overall goals in the environmental policy domain. The thesis concludes that although public policy and public values align on several instances, belief-system divergences potentially affecting policy performance might nevertheless be identified. These findings deepen our understanding of the character of those legitimacy issues facing Swedish environmental public policy, providing relevant insights into how the degree of legitimacy, and thereby policy performance, might be furthered. Lastly, it is possible to conclude that through the elaboration of an analytical framework, contributions are made to the scientific study of policy legitimacy, also beyond the environmental policy domain.

Keywords: legitimacy; public policy; beliefs; values; public opinion; environment; Sweden

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Consulting the acknowledgements in those doctoral dissertations sitting on my office bookshelves, I come to the conclusion that it is customary to describe one's work by the use of metaphors, such as solo-sailing round the world; alpine climbing in the Himalayas; or some other activity distinguished by being demanding both physically and mentally. I will refrain from doing so here. Not the least since, in my view, writing a dissertation is something that effectively hinders you from practising the above-mentioned activities, and now that I finally do have the time (that not said I will actually travel to Nepal to go climbing, in fact I most likely won't) I would prefer to think of them as recreation, not as work. But on one point these metaphors are correct; writing is something you ultimately have to do all by yourself. Most of the time it indeed feels like a lonely undertaking, and during late nights at the office or when spending warm summer days in front of the computer, this feeling quadruples in strength. Nevertheless, looking back at the past years, I also realise that although the process of writing by its nature is a one-person show, and the sole responsibility for all remaining shortcomings in this book therefore are mine, producing a thesis requires much more than that. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to thank all of you who have contributed in any way, shape or form to its completion.

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Luleå, August 14, 2009

Simon Matti

‘That’s another thing we've learned from *your* Nation’, said Mein Herr, ‘map-making. But we've carried it much further than *you*. What do you consider the *largest* map that would be really useful?’

‘About six inches to the mile.’

‘Only six *inches*!’ exclaimed Mein Herr. ‘We very soon got to six *yards* to the mile. Then we tried a *hundred* yards to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of *a mile to the mile*!’

‘Have you used it much?’ I enquired.

‘It has never been spread out, yet’, said Mein Herr: ‘the farmers objected: they said it would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well.’

Lewis Caroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded (1893)

1. LEGITIMACY AS A POLICY PROBLEM; AND THE PROBLEM OF POLICY LEGITIMACY

The task of analysis is to create problems, preferences tempered by opportunities, which are worth solving. A difficulty is not necessarily a problem; that depends on what I can do about it, including if it is worth my while to try. My inability to go to Mars, a famous gap between aspiration and actuality, is not a problem but a longing to overcome my limitations. My inability to explain the influence of the tides on the rise and fall of the stock market is not a problem unless I have a hypothesis suggesting how I might influence factors by which the two events may be linked. Only by suggesting solutions, such as programs linking governmental resources with social objectives, can we understand what might be done. Policy analysis involves creating problems that are solvable by specific organisations in a particular arena of action. A problem in policy analysis, then, cannot exist apart from a proposed solution, and its solution is a part of an organization, a structure of incentives without which there can be no will to act.

Aaron Wildavsky, *Speaking Truth To Power*

The overarching problem that I aim to address in this thesis is one concerning legitimacy, *policy* legitimacy to be more specific and *environmental* policy legitimacy in order to also explicate the empirical orientation of my study. As the chapter-title reveals, legitimacy presents a problem of a dual nature, relating both to the performance of public policy as well as to the scientific study of it. Concerning the former, the empirical focus of my thesis explores legitimacy as being a highly significant issue that requires consideration, when designing public policy. In general, legitimacy, as I here view it, is certainly a normative concept intimately linked to the democratic standing of political decision-making as it connects the normative base of policy with those publicly established values that we assume are

represented by democratically elected political government. However, legitimacy also has a more practically oriented function, as a variable affecting the long-term success or failure of political initiatives and determining what is required in terms of external incitements and structures for reaching positive outcomes. In the following sections of this chapter, I argue that without an underpinning legitimacy policy effectiveness and efficiency will suffer as people's long-term adherence to the policy's aspirations is expected to be at best partial, definitely fragile and at worse non-existent, as well as heavily dependent on various external motivations and governmental control. Although it might be expected that a certain extent of legitimacy-induced public support or acceptance is imperative for the performance and stability of public policy in general, this is presumed to be particularly relevant for policies concerning environmental issues. To its very nature, the environment presents a complex and sometimes highly contested policy domain, which abounds with conflicting interests and perspectives. At the same time, reaching the political sustainability aspirations requires a broad, long-term public participation and, ultimately, voluntarily behavioural change in day-to-day activities within the household. One central and highly significant tenet in achieving this is the level of policy legitimacy. Thus, designing legitimate policies presents a core challenge for policymakers dealing with environmental issues, and focusing legitimacy in the policymaking process might be a key to solving or at least reducing other problems related to policy efficiency and outcome.

Which, then, are the characteristics of a legitimate policy? What is captured by the concept of policy legitimacy? Moreover, how should we go about evaluating public policy from this perspective? As these questions suggest, legitimacy does not only present a problem for the practice of policy design, where the solutions ultimately are within reach for governmental officials and policymakers. Applying the concept of legitimacy as a starting-point for analysis constitutes a problem in itself. A second, perhaps even more fundamental, issue addressed in this thesis is therefore the difficulties of definition and measurement facing any scholar employing legitimacy as an analytical perspective, and consequently any policymaker attempting to avoid the pitfall of promoting illegitimate policies. Despite its here assumed significance for policy outcomes, legitimacy has to date received relatively little attention as a point of departure for policy studies. In relation to public policy[1], legitimacy is frequently used for describing pre-existing situations, but only a few of these applications are accompanied by a comprehensive exploration of the concept itself. This might be taken as a reflection of the

[1] This as opposed to the concept of *political* legitimacy, which primarily deals with the broader question of the legitimacy for political regimes and has received significantly more attention both in theory and through empirical studies (see more in chapter 2 below).

multi-dimensional and multi-faceted nature (as all too common with key concepts in social scientific research) of legitimacy. It has been connected both to the input and the output side of the political process; conceived as a trait held by a diversity of actors and entities: regimes, organisations, individuals and policies; and related to a range of various factors, for instance values, processes, behaviours and outcomes. Nonetheless, this ambiguity does not alter the fact that any empirical study concerning policy legitimacy first needs to settle on its definition, as well as determine how and by the use of which methods it should be properly measured and evaluated.

Indeed, the ambition of this thesis is not only to delineate the problems lying ahead, but also to provide suggestions for how they may be amended. As proposed by the dual nature of the problem outlined above, the remaining chapters of the thesis are distributed over two distinct parts. In the first part, I approach the problem of legitimacy as a theoretical and analytical concept. By drawing together theoretical perspectives mainly from the fields of legitimacy-theory, social psychology and policy analysis, I suggest how a policy's legitimacy can be explored in a three-stage process, focusing on belief-system correspondence between policy content and the general public. To the end of this part, I present an analytical framework designed for the task of exploring the level of legitimacy in contemporary environmental public policy. The second part of the thesis puts the analytical framework to the test. It is oriented towards studying policy legitimacy empirically, with Swedish environmental public policy as the case in point. Following the analytical framework, the empirical survey consists of two studies; a qualitative, belief-system focused idea-analysis of official Swedish environmental policy documents and a quantitative analysis of the belief-systems established among the Swedish public. By subsequently comparing and contrasting the results from these two surveys, conclusions on the current state of, as well as future prospects and prerequisites for, Swedish environmental policy legitimacy can be drawn. Almost needless to point out, remedying the environmental situation amounts to one of today's most significant challenges for policymakers on all levels of government, thus emphasising the need for efficient and positive policy outcomes as enabled by a high level of policy legitimacy.

Over the remaining pages in this chapter, I will continue to outline why legitimacy presents a challenge for policy outcomes, in particular when these are dependent on individual responsibility taking and collective action, and thus why it constitutes a relevant point of departure for studies in the field of environmental policy. I argue that the problem facing policymakers in this respect is not of a one-dimensional character, but consists of three slightly different, yet strongly interconnected, issues of legitimacy. This, I contend, further accentuates the significance of legitimacy and the absolute necessity of

considering it when in the business of either policy design or policy study. The overall aim and research questions guiding my further exploration of environmental policy legitimacy are presented to the end of the chapter. Finally, it should here be pointed out that my theoretical reasoning and empirical applications in this thesis centres on the particularities and value-conflicts in the environmental policy domain. Nevertheless, I do believe that the basic problem presented by legitimacy, as well as the suggestions I here aim at providing both for studying and for handling it in practice, are equally valid also for other political domains or contexts.

1.1 SOLVING PROBLEMS WITHOUT THE PUBLIC? THE ENVIRONMENT AS A SOCIAL DILEMMA

A guiding assumption for this thesis is that the significance of legitimacy for policy effectiveness and efficiency is particularly prominent in those instances where positive policy outcomes require a broad and long-term individual responsibility taking. This is certainly the case within contemporary environmental policy, as environmental problems today largely are understood as being, in essence, social dilemmas or problems of collective action. That is, situations in which the desirable outcome is dependent on the input from several actors, but in which everyone's rational behaviour will result in a worse outcome for all (Ostrom, 1990; see also Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). Social dilemmas are seen as arising round the provision of public goods or the sustention of common-pool resources (CPRs) as a result of individuals' propensity for cooperation being compromised by several interconnected factors. By their very nature, public goods and CPRs are characterised by non-excludability; once they are provided nobody can be excluded from enjoying their benefit (Ostrom, 2005). As public goods thereby as a rule distribute benefits over large communities, each single individual may well reason that their personal activities will not affect the overall amount of the good in a distinct or even noticeable way. Nor is it in the personal interest of any one individual to be the sole contributor to the good, thereby bearing the full cost for others non-reciprocal enjoyment of benefits. Thus, social dilemmas might arise from the temptation to free-ride by enjoying a collective good without substantially contributing to its provision; the obvious danger being that when a majority of people attempt to free-ride, the good collapses. Similar problems appear in relation to CPRs characterised by both non-excludability and subtractability. Individuals have to choose whether to voluntarily refrain from an increase in personal benefits by limiting their use of the resource, or to subtract as much as possible before the resource becomes unavailable as a

result of other actors unrestricted extraction. Many of the challenges facing society can be described in terms of social dilemmas; from the local or national provision of public services, such as schools, roads and healthcare, to the global challenges of resource depletion, climate change, and loss of biodiversity. The significant impact that sustention of these types of goods have on society in general highlights the necessity of establishing collective, rather than self-interested, patterns of action in ensuring their continuous provision.

Given the magnitude and potential severity of social dilemmas, a major issue confronting scholars of public policy is how to design institutions for negotiating problems of collective action. Paradoxically, but well in line with the famous quote by Aristotle[2], social dilemmas seem to be most frequent regarding goods which's provision are in the interest of the greatest number of individuals. The state of the environment, either broadly defined or with regards to one specific resource, can serve as an illustrative example of this. Environmental quality and the continuous access to natural resources unquestionably affect both human and non-human life in a global, intergenerational perspective. Yet, despite the collective necessity of upholding the provision of environmental goods, it may not be in the interest of any one individual to reduce her personal impact on the environment voluntarily, as this would also entail costs not necessarily shared by all those enjoying the good. Furthermore, anticipation would be that activities within the private sphere of the household, which seldom if all give rise to noticeable environmental outcomes for the individual, are particularly sensitive to this type of social dilemmas.

Mediating or solving problems with degradation of the environment, given its nature as a public or collective good, thus requires joint efforts involving a range of actors – from national and local governments, across the global community of business and industry, to single households and individuals. With particular regards to actors within the latter group, who's individual patterns of behaviour when analysed in isolation only display a marginal effect on the environment, the potential for social dilemmas to arise highlights a significant challenge facing policymakers on all levels of government; to construct new public policies for initiating and sustaining collective pro-environmental action on the individual level, in a long-term perspective. This certainly requires that technical policy aspects, such as the

[2] In *Politics*, Aristotle outlines one of what must be the earliest notions of the collective-action problematique. He writes, "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike" (Aristotle [B. Jowett and H. W. C. Davies], 2000)

selection and design of policy tools, are considered in both the decision-making and implementation stages. However, for political government to successfully combat environmental degradation, integrating environmental considerations as a social-choice mechanism determining individuals' lifestyles and selection of daily activities, public policies in this effect need to enjoy public support or, at least, acceptance. It is imperative that the public, towards whom these political aspirations are directed, views policy goals, as well as the tools used to attain these goals, as morally acceptable in the sense that they build on or can be justified by reference to core values and beliefs established in society (see, for examples Beetham, 1991; Maio and Olsen, 1995; Widegren 1998).[3] Thus, effectiveness and efficiency when implementing political programs must, in the endeavour of mediating or overcoming the collective-action problem, be complemented by a fundamental legitimacy for the substantive content of the public policy itself.

1.2 NEW OBJECTIVES, NEW POLICIES, NEW CHALLENGES: THE 'INDIVIDUALISTIC TURN' OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS

New political objectives, and indeed new policies for reaching them, usually follow causally when the nature of the problem at hand is reinterpreted. Increasingly acknowledging the contemporary environmental situation as a problem of collective action has thus indicated that the character of environmental politics has changed, addressing problems with a more global scope but simultaneously focusing increasingly on the local and even individual level of action. Taking as an important starting-point the publication of the Bruntland-commission's renowned report *Our Common Future*[4], 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' have become very influential concepts and in several ways marked a turn in the discursive constructions of national environmental policies and international environmental agreements throughout the world (Carter, 2001; Dryzek, 2005). In its contemporary connotation, sustainable development is a

[3] For more examples, see Rokeach, 1973; Lipset 1981; Connolly 1984a & 1984b; Feldman, 1988; North, 1990; Knight, 1992; Stern, Dietz, Kalof and Guagnano, 1995; Levi, 1997; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Citrin and Muste 1999; Birch, 2001; Føllesdal, 2004; Lundqvist, 2004c; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Veccione and Barbanelli, 2006; Jacoby, 2006)

[4] In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (commonly known as the Bruntland-commission after its chair, former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland) published the report Our Common Future in which it called for a development "which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". This, furthermore, is perceived to be achieved when we, so to speak, live of the interest without reducing the capital. This has since been the most widespread definition of sustainable development.

political concept for change that comprises social, economic and environmental concerns all at the same time; denoting both that socio-economic considerations must be taken when introducing new environmental standards and that economic growth and development cannot be allowed to overshadow social or environmental concerns. The comprehensive and sometimes rather radical re-structuring of society as demanded by the up-and-coming environmental movements of the 1960's and 70's has thus been replaced with a more cautious, and therefore more politically feasible, goal of gradual reformation. It takes into account also other aspects of sustainability than the ecological, and operating with a slightly different time-frame than was advocated during the 1970's 'era of the apocalypse'. By including social issues (such as equity and democratisation), the notion of sustainable development is also more wide-ranging (and therefore also more ambiguous) than the closely related, policy oriented concept of ecological modernisation, which pertains primarily to environmental protection through a (win-win) restructuring of the contemporary political-economic system (cf. Dryzek, 2005; Hajer, 1995). Today, most national governments see themselves as being both morally and politically committed to the idea of sustainability, formally expressed through the signing of numerous multilateral agreements on the topic (cf. Skr, 1992/93:13, 5). In this, Sweden is no exception. Rather, the Swedish national governments have, during the past decade and a half, repeatedly declared their ambition to make Sweden a forerunner or role-model in the global efforts to reach sustainability, among other things by combining "the revolutionary freedom of the car" with "an ecological responsibility" (Persson, 1998, *translated from Swedish*). For example, one of the key notions of the recent Swedish social democratic governments' (1994 – 2006) political sustainability aspirations was to advance the development of the existing welfare state of the 1900's into a 21st century Green People's Home (in Swedish: *Det gröna folkhemmet*, e.g. MoSD, 2005).

The inclusion of environmental issues on the national political agendas, along with the widespread acknowledgement of global environmental problems (e.g. global warming or air and water pollution), has also affected activities on the international political arena. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro during the summer of 1992 was initiated by the above mentioned Bruntland-report to further promote global efforts along the lines of the three (economic, social and environmental) interdependent dimensions of sustainability. Emanating in the signing of several multilateral agreements on the protection of the environment, the milestones of the 1992 UNCED are the twin documents Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. These comprehensive blueprints of action establish the shift from considering different developmental fields as conflicting or even isolated factors, and

towards the concept of sustainable development as defined by the Bruntland-commission, where every area in which humans affect the environment is of significance.[5] Furthermore, Agenda 21 highlights the need for broad cooperation on several levels, global; national; and local, in order to achieve sustainability.

In addition to the need for a global partnership of states and cooperation across boundaries, the documents emanating from the Rio-summit explicitly stress the necessity of involving the *individual* in the efforts towards reaching a sustainable development, most notably in those parts concerning its environmental dimension. The development of the environmental political discourse during the mid-1990's thereby displayed a considerable shift in the view on how responsibilities for the environmental situation are distributed. It marked the end of conceiving the challenges of environmental degradation as a task to be solved exclusively by the iron-triangles consisting of "governmental agencies, bureaucracy and well-organised target-group interests" (Lundqvist, 2001a:322). Instead, according to post-Rio policy documents on both national and international levels, broad public participation in environmental policymaking and -implementation has now become a cornerstone of environmental governance in many countries around the world. At the international level, Agenda 21, along with Principle 10 of the Rio-declaration on Environment and Development and the more recent Aarhus Convention, are landmark agreements that aim at strengthening public access to information, decision-making participation and justice in environmental matters (UNCED, 1992; A/CONF.151/26; Prop. 2004/05:65). Following the Rio-conference, national and local government in Sweden have acknowledged the Agenda 21's expectation that strong public participation is imperative for sustainable outcomes, from several perspectives. In line with the ever-increasing attention to deliberative practices within contemporary democratic theory[6], public participation in the policymaking processes is viewed as necessary for aiding politicians in making better (i.e. more environmentally sound) decisions by taking into account local ecological knowledge; for initiating comprehensive learning processes integrating ecological considerations in the public consciousness; as well as for strengthening the legitimacy, acceptability, and transparency of political measures and policy instruments. The recommendations lined out in Agenda 21 have therefore, on the national level, been interpreted as suggesting a

[5] The Rio-conference resulted in the multilateral signing of five major documents: the above mentioned Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; along with the Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and the Statement of Forest Principles. The latter three are however, as evident by their titles, directed towards more specific issues, whereas the two former set down the overall principles for the work towards sustainable development.

[6] In particular concerning environmental issues, see, for example, Fisher (2003); Smith (2001); Dryzek (2001, 2000, 1995 & 1987); Barry (1999); or Torgerson (1999)

bottom-up process focusing on the local levels of action and denoting the role of municipalities; non-governmental organisations; people's movements, households and single individuals (SOU, 1997:105). Consequently, an important role for the state in realising ecological sustainability is thereby to encourage and motivate its citizens to participate, and to provide local initiatives with the means necessary for involvement to be possible in practice:

> One of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making. Furthermore, in the more specific context of environment and development, the need for new forms of participation has emerged. This includes the need of individuals, groups and organizations to participate in environmental impact assessment procedures and to know about and participate in decisions, particularly those which potentially affect the communities in which they live and work. Individuals, groups and organizations should have access to information relevant to environment and development held by national authorities, including information on products and activities that have or are likely to have a significant impact on the environment, and information on environmental protection measures (UNCED, 1992:23.2).

This is echoed by the formulations found in the Rio-declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26). It's Principle 10 concludes that involving citizens in the work towards sustainability, mainly through making them a part of the decision-making processes and by providing the citizenry with relevant information, is an important task for the national government in realising ecological sustainability:

> Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceeding, including redress and remedy shall be provided.

However, in order to solve or mediate the problems with environmental degradation the contemporary environmental political discourse also picture active public participation to be imperative in another sense, focusing less on the expected merits of procedural involvement and considerably more on actual contributions to ecological sustainability in day-to-day activities. The past decades have seen a re-evaluation of the responsibility for both causes and solutions to the environmental problem, which places the activities of the individual at the centre of attention (Micheletti and McFarland, 2009; Skill,

2008; Micheletti, 2003; Maniates, 2001). To its essence, this focus on individual environmental responsibility is intimately connected to the way in which the sources of the present environmental situation have been reinterpreted. Today, environmental problems are no longer believed to be the sole result of industrial activities in a few polluting facilities; a belief which either implicitly or explicitly places the responsibility for amendment on political government as well as on business and industry, and promotes end-of-pipe regulations as the overarching solution. Rather, the contemporary conceptualisation suggests that the sources of environmental problems are to be found also in the millions of choices people make every day, in their diverse roles as citizens, consumers and household members. The amendment of these problems therefore requires that every individual take responsibility also for the global and intergenerational consequences her actions produce (cf. UNCED, 1992; Hobson, 2002 & 2004a). This, however, is not to say that amending the environmental situation is a task to be bestowed the single citizen or the household exclusively, thus allowing for governments and multinational corporations to avoid their responsibility. Within established environmental discourses, there is an expressed need for involving citizens in the day-to-day work towards sustainability *alongside* the more comprehensive efforts made and measures taken by politicians and within the global business community. This understanding of the single individual's impact on the environment, which today is found within the international political leadership and scholars of political ecology alike, is commonly illustrated by the ecological footprint[7]; an idea early adapted by environmental movements and greens directing attention also towards lifestyle issues in mainly the industrialised part of the world. According to Dobson (2007:281, italics in original):

> One way of visualizing our environmental impact is in terms of what has come to be called the *ecological footprint*. The ecological footprint is the environmental space we occupy as we go about our daily lives – and because we go about our daily lives in very different

[7] According to the definition provided by Wackernagel and Rees (1996:52, italics in original), the ecological footprint signifies "the area of ecologically productive land (and water) in various classes – cropland, pasture, forests, etc. – that would be required on a continuous basis a) to provide all the energy/material resources consumed, and b) to absorb all the wastes discharged by that population with prevailing technology, wherever on Earth that land is located". The ecological footprint thus measures human appropriation of ecosystem products and services in terms of the amount of bioproductive land and sea area needed to supply these services. It is commonly calculated as the total hectares of cropland, grazing land, fishing ground, forest land, carbon uptake land, and built-up land required to support the demand that populations and activities place on the biosphere. This also makes it possible to calculate a per capita footprint and thus to compare the size of different countries' ecological footprint to each other. By also measuring biocapacity, that is the actual area of land and sea available to meet human demand for material consumption and waste disposal, it is possible to calculate overshoot (i.e. a situation where the total demand for ecological goods and services exceeds the available supply). According to these calculations, Earth Overshoot Day (the day when resource use exceeds a year's supply) occurred for 2008 on September 23 (cf. Ewing, Reed, Rizk, Galli, Wackernagel and Kitzes, 2008).

> ways, our ecological footprints are of different sizes. The planet on which we live is of finite size; therefore, there is a limited amount of environmental space to share out. Fairness demands that we all have roughly the same amount of space, but ecological footprint analysis suggests that some of us have too much.

The ecological footprint and related concepts are prominently used as an illustrative indicator of the negative and asymmetrical effects the daily activities in each individual's lifestyle have; both directly on the ecosystem and indirectly on other individuals' possibilities to meet their basic needs. As such, the idea of an ecological footprint, and in particular acknowledgement of the fact that individuals in certain parts of the world let their activities expand way beyond what would be possible had the resources been evenly distributed, also constitutes an important foundation for one of the core notions within the green movement; the principle of social justice. A major obstacle in the way of sustainability is, thus, that the size of (almost) every individual's ecological footprint is considerably larger in the industrialised, high-consumption parts of the world, than in the less developed world.[8] This, consequently, effectively prevents both present generations living in developing countries, as well as future generations in general, to ever be able to meet their needs (cf. Carter, 2001; Dobson, 1998).

Now, since many of today's environmental problems are understood as the aggregated consequences of individuals' unsustainable ways of life, properly amending them requires that also individual citizens incorporate ecological considerations in their lifestyles and day-to-day habits. It is only on this level that the problems of environmental degradation can be properly addressed if environmental politics will avoid becoming a struggle to merely patch up a continuously inadequate system, and the long-term involvement of individuals in the work towards ecological sustainability is therefore a necessary feature of an effective environmental policy. As further denoted by Kymlicka and Norman (1994:360): "Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible personal lifestyle decisions [...]; the state cannot protect the environment if citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes". The need for both comprehensiveness when implementing changes in lifestyles and long-term planning in solving the environmental problems is, however, not an entirely novel idea. As early as 1972, the Club of Rome's report *Limits to Growth* suggested that the short-term, and one-sided, focus on merely technological, end-of-pipe solutions to cope with the exponential growth-problem certainly will postpone humanity reaching its limits, but will not adequately address the essence of the problem.

[8] For instance, calculations made by the Global Footprint Network (2008) suggest that the high income countries in the world has a total ecological footprint of 6,4 global hectares per capita, whereas the number for low income countries is 1,0. Sweden has the sixteenth largest total ecological footprint with 5,1 global hectares per capita.

Instead, the well-famous (but similarly well-critiqued) Club of Rome suggested we learn to live *within* the limits rather than fighting against them, indicating a self-imposed, as opposed to the otherwise unavoidable nature-imposed, limitation to growth (Meadows, Meadows, Randers and Behrens, 1974; see also Dobson, 1998). Furthermore, in a recent update of this highly influential report, the environmental problems owing to affluence, materialism and unrestricted consumerism in western societies are acknowledged, highlighting the need for comprehensive lifestyle-changes in order to reduce the size of the ecological footprints (Meadows, Randers and Meadows, 2005:240). Based on these lines of reasoning, green political thought abounds with theoretical notions prescribing the need for an increased individual responsibility for nature. Centre stage, adapting individual rights and responsibilities to incorporate also global and future environmental consequences of private activities have been conceptualised as an *ecological stewardship* (Barry, 1999); an *environmental-*, *sustainability-*, or *green citizenship* (for this, see Bell, 2005:180-181 & 193n2); or an *ecological citizenship* (e.g. Dobson, 2003; see also Van Steenbergen, 1994). The crucial idea behind these different forms of individual-level-solutions draws on the suggested need to adapt also individuals' daily activities and lifestyles to become more ecologically sound, as well as to ensure that these transformations of behaviour are stable on the long term. Albeit to a slightly varying degree, they all suggest a reinterpreted conception of the features of contemporary democratic citizenship and a comprehensive rethinking of the values and principles governing the balance between rights and responsibilities within both the human beings/nature, as well as the state/individual relationships respectively (cf. Bell, 2005:182; also chapter 5).

Also in political practice is environmental degradation increasingly perceived as a collective action problem, where the rational behaviour of single individuals produces collectively (and ecologically) irrational outcomes. In pursuing the objective of ecological sustainability, the attention of political government has therefore turned increasingly towards the individual's daily routines, choices and activities and their, individually minor but collectively significant, environmental consequences. Key elements of contemporary environmental policies, both in Sweden and elsewhere, directs attention towards the necessity of achieving a transformation of the current unsustainable lifestyles of citizens, which in many cases are pointed out as the single largest obstacle *en route* towards ecological sustainability (cf. SOU, 1997:105; Skr, 1996/97:50, 49). This support of transformed behavioural patterns commonly suggests altering the daily practices of single individuals and within households, usually through the introduction of new environmental obligations expressed as household-related activities. For example: implementing a sustainable household waste management;

influencing the individual's choice of more environmentally benevolent everyday transportation; and encouraging the use of consumer power to steer production in a more environmentally sound direction. The bottom line is, accordingly, that strategies for behavioural change also on the individual level is needed in order to effectively sustain the health of the planet in a long-term perspective. The overall political message thereby declares a personal environmental responsibility to be taken also within the private sphere of the household, transforming day-to-day activities in a more sustainable direction and applying new environmental considerations to guide these daily choices.

To make matters slightly more complex, individual environmental responsibility taking does not become a reality only through wishful thinking on the part of politicians. Realising this ambition also demands that efforts are made in practice, which transforms the rhetorical concept of collective environmental action into a social reality. As such, the 'individualistic turn' calling for a more comprehensive individual involvement in and responsibility for the environmental work suggest that policymakers face the ever more significant task of designing policy that effectively address the citizen's new engagements. Political government is thereby granted a central role in pursuing the objective of ecological sustainability, as de Geus (1996:188) observes: "in many discussions on the environmental issue the conclusion is reached that a growing interference of the state in society is absolutely necessary". However, at the same time as new formal institutions must be effective in addressing and mediating the environmental problem, the 'growing interference of the state', especially when concerning activities taking place within the private sphere of the individual household, calls to attention a further challenge for policymakers. Their decisions need to keep within the framework of what is considered a legitimate exercise of political authority. This institutional dilemma unquestionable highlights the possible theoretical and practical limits of the contemporary democratic state in governing the transition to ecological sustainability. Thus, the new political objectives that are brought to life through the individualisation of the environmental issue not only call for new policies for their realisation. They also, and unavoidably, give rise to new challenges that need to be overcome.

1.3 STICKS, CARROTS AND LEGITIMATE POLICIES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL DILEMMAS

What, then, is the particular role of policy legitimacy when attempting to address the environmental problematique? Why, in essence, is legitimacy a

significant factor to take into account when doing policy analysis? In this section, I will outline three main aspects of the policy legitimacy problem, presenting, that is, how the level of legitimacy for a public policy affects its present and future performance: the *ex-post* problem of policy outcomes; the *ex-ante* problem of policy decisions; and the *democratic-legitimacy* problem affecting policy performance in an indirect way, relayed through the standing of political government itself.

Taking our departure in the case of environmental policy legitimacy[9], we noted in the sections above that conceptualising environmental degradation and resource depletion as collective action problems, in need of broad societal solutions rather than end-of-pipe regulations, indicates that the state must design institutions that effectively address also the unsustainable lifestyle choices of single individuals. However, dealing with problems related to the state of the environment is, and has been for many decades, a significant challenge for democratic political government. Whether the driving forces behind political decision-making have been conservation, preservation, regulation, exploitation or, as in present day, ecological sustainability at the individual level; the complex and wide-ranging nature of environmental issues constantly give rise to fierce debates over how competing values and interests should be interpreted and negotiated throughout the process, both outside and within the democratically elected assemblies. For the contemporary democratic state, effective environmental governance has been viewed as constrained by a number of factors. One has been characterised as the overarching quest for economic development and growth and the unwillingness (or inability) of policymakers to make value choices unfavourable to these grand goals (cf. Wall 2005; de Geus 2004; Hayward 1998; Achterberg, 1993). Another as the limited time-frames and territorially bound institutions of political authority (Dobson 2003; Jagers 2002; Jelin 2000). Furthermore, effective environmental governance has been deemed constrained by processes and procedures of the contemporary state, promoting individualism and self-interest rather than 'a sense of collective purpose' (Barry, 1999:198; also Doherty and de Geus, 1996); as well as by the sensitivity to political wind and shifts in public opinion characterising policymaking and –implementation in representative democracies.

Emanating in these criticisms of the democratic state's abilities to remedy the environmental collective action problem, a range of suggestions for both less and more of state authority have been heard. Hard-line advocates of the latter solution to the collective action problem draw on Hobbes' (1683/1997:70) grim characterisation of human life as "poore, nasty,

[9] We should of course note that this argument is valid for all types of public policy, but is particularly salient in those areas where collective action is required for solving the problem addressed.

brutish and short" in the absence of a strong protective state authority, therefore arguing that people need to be forced to act in the collective interest by a coercive state. Using the reasoning in Hardin's (1968) article *Tragedy of the commons* as one example of the disastrous impact the lack of a Hobbesian Leviathan might have on the environment, proponents of eco-authoritarianism prescribe the need for, following Eckersley (1992:24) "authoritarianism from above rather than self-limitation from below". Ophuls (1977:152-154, see also Heilbroner, 1974), for example, argues that "[o]nly a government possessing great powers to regulate individual behaviour [...] can deal effectively with the tragedy of the commons". A quote providing an indication of his broader conclusion on the political organisation of the ecologically sustainable society, namely that "democracy as we know it cannot conceivably survive".

Although coercion by a hegemonic power might be an effective way of reducing uncertainties and transaction costs, thereby resolving the collective action problem (cf. North, 1990), the apparent democratic deficiencies of the eco-authoritarian approach has only attracted a minimum of support. Instead, most suggestions for how to reform the state in a more sustainability-conducive way rather promote a strengthening of local democracy by decentralising political authority and transferring decision-making power to local communities of directly affected citizens. Apart from its intellectual roots in anarchism's critique of the atomised society, there are also practical reasons underpinning the idea that "small is beautiful" (e.g. Carter, 2001:56). Political decentralisation is viewed as a precondition for implementing a functioning deliberative or communicative democracy and thus replacing the liberal representative ideal. The practice of deliberative democracy, where people communicate with each other as an integrate part of the decision-making process, is in turn expected to effectively aid in the building of collective identities and a sense of communal responsibility, and to challenge self-interest as the overarching guide for making political decisions. Given the transformative power of dialogue, face-to-face interaction will make participating individuals more aware of both the interests of others, and of the impact their own choices of lifestyle have on the environment (cf. Dryzek, 2005, 2000 & 1990; Koontz, 2005; Ryfe, 2005; Chambers, 2003; Zwart, 2003; Saward, 2000). Furthermore, this new awareness is assumed an important foundation for the emergence of a new form of environmentally sensitive (or ecological) citizenship. As summed up by Carter (2001:54, see also Dobson, 2003 & 1996; Dryzek, 2001; Barry, 1999; Eckersley, 1996): "once the shift from 'self-regarding' individual to 'other-regarding' citizen has been made, it is a much smaller step to extend that public concern to foreigners, future-generations and non-human nature". Still, the focus when prescribing a decentralised polity, as those coming from within green political theory, is

mainly on how to transform the overall organisation of the state (i.e. how sustainability better can be reached in absence of the central, representative state). As such, these suggestions for specific political arrangements do not address how the collective action problem of individual environmental responsibility can be resolved within the existing political organisation of representative government.

Nevertheless, the scaling down of decision-making authority and monitoring as well as the promotion of communication among affected actors has been applied as a means for remedying social dilemmas also without radically transforming the constitutional basis of the state (from representative to deliberative democracy – and thus from the state to local communities as principal decision-makers). For instance, it is within institutional research convincingly argued that increased personal contacts and decision-making transparency are conducive for the formation of inter-actor trust and collaboration; for the development of social norms of conduct; as well as for remedying conflicts of interest. A movement from centralised structures of government to different schemes of governance, either in the form of self-government or through private-public partnerships and co-management, might therefore be preferable when facing social or environmental tragedies (cf. Imperial, 2005; Dolšak and Ostrom, 2003; Rothstein, 2000; Levi, 1997; Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton, 1989).[10] Most of the empirical research conducted in this area, however, concerns the management of local resource-systems, where a delimited set of actors or stakeholders can be identified and targeted as partners in a system of cooperative management. The reason for this, as conveyed by the above argument for decentralisation of the state, is that the deliberative solution meets immense practical difficulties as the number of actors in need of trust- and collaboration-enhancing communication rises (cf. Parkinson, 2003; see also Sabatier, 1995). The problem with household sustainability can, however, be described as a large-*n* situation (where *n* equals the entire population) where the level of initial organisation among actors is low and the need for collective action not revolves around the sustainable use of a single, locally delimited resource, but rather concerns a wide array of everyday activities, choices and habits. As such, bridging the problem of individualised collective-action through decentralisation and deliberation seems to be ruled out for simple reasons of practicality.

[10] Although this movement from government to governance is evident across many domains, it is perhaps most developed within resource management policy. Here, it is recognised that institutional structures and management regimes must follow the spatial character of the resource system by spanning several levels of decision-making as suggested by cross-scale linkages (Young, 2002; Berkes, 2002); multi-level governance (Flinders and Bache, 2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2003); polycentrism (Imperial, 2005; Skelcher, 2005; Ostrom, 2001); or nested enterprises (Ostrom, 2005 & 1990; Lundqvist, 2004; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982).

Effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy

Given the nature both of the activities in need of sustainability-conducive transformation and the collective of actors itself, addressing individuals' patterns of behaviour within the present administrative structure of the state are for the most part still a task for a goal–oriented Weberian bureaucracy, where political goals and aspirations as well as the means to achieve these goals are outlined through public policy. Household sustainability, therefore, are predominately advanced by more traditional means of government; an arsenal of sticks and carrots in the shape of economic, informative and judicial-regulative policy tools are currently in use to make societal actors behave according to political sustainability aspirations. Regardless of whether this is perceived as requiring direct regulations of daily activities or some form of "indirect steering" (cf. Lundqvist, 2001b), a central assumption for this thesis is that any attempt to govern individual environmental responsibility-taking through public policy will only be long-term successful if citizens display a support for these policies' normative foundations and therefore are willing to implement their requirements by voluntarily engaging in recommended pro-environmental behaviours. Thus, engaging the individual in the collective work towards environmental political goals highlights the necessity of designing policies and policy instruments that keeps within the framework of what is considered *legitimate* among the citizenry.

In the first place, establishing formal rules to increase predictability of human interaction and thereby eradicate the free-rider problem is central to institutional analysis, and the rule-of-law solution is successfully applied for effectively mediating a range of collective action problems in contemporary society (cf. Hindmoor, 2006; Ostrom, 2005 & 1990; Börzel, 1997; North, 1990). For instance, the continuous provision of public services is ensured through the outtake of taxes and individuals who refuse to contribute their share run the imminent risk of punishment by the legal system. However, as a command-and-control system like this is seen as building on the predictable future behaviour of others created by the rules, successfully upholding it requires that acting according to the established rules is strictly enforced and that any violation is both discovered and sanctioned (Knight, 1992; Ostrom, 2005). To exemplify, the use of legislation is effective in the sense that it triggers a *reciprocal* or *conditional* cooperation around prescribed activities. When legislation, combined with a corresponding enforcement of the legal rules, is in place, the individual might feel motivated or even morally obliged to co-operate since she can be certain that others will also do their bit (cf. Ek and Söderholm, 2005; Ostrom, 2005).[11] On the other hand, it can be

[11] Jagers and Hammar (2009) present a similar argument in the context of public support for or acceptance of environmental taxation.

anticipated that a lack in enforcement of these rules will take away this certainty of reciprocity and therefore severely increase the risk of citizens choosing defection-strategies instead of co-operation and attempt to free-ride on the engagement of others. Without effective monitoring and a working system for sanctioning rule-violation, the citizenry's confidence in and adherence to the system run the risk of rapidly deteriorating, making the regulations both toothless and ineffective regardless of the initial public acceptance of, or commitment to, the new rule (Axelrod, 1986; Knight, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, albeit legislation constitutes formal norms of behaviour and, as Barry (1999) concludes, forces individuals to deliberate on their actions in terms of legally right or wrong, which in the long-run can be expected to induce a self-assumed sense of responsibility, they also demand a rather costly monitoring system during the period before these responsibilities are internalised as a social norm.[12] As the activities amenable for environmental regulation on the level of individuals are both broad in scope (e.g. comprehensive changes in lifestyle); strongly intertwined with individuals' day-to-day activities; and takes place within the private sphere of the household or even within the individual's mind (e.g. new environmental considerations), for the state to monitor that these changes are actually implemented is rather difficult for practical reasons alone.

That is not to say that fear of sanctions is the only rationale by which people choose to follow the requirements of formal regulation. Rather, it might well be argued that most people abide by most legislation because they perceive the rules themselves as being morally right and proper, and therefore on a voluntary basis accepts infringement of personal actions by the state.[13] That voluntariness is a significant factor for people behaving in accordance with existing rules, rather than trying to evade it, further goes to show the importance of legitimacy in applying judicial-regulative policy tools. Following March and Olsen (2004 & 1989), institutions express preferred norms of behaviour, and in this they also embody a specific set of values and beliefs. Legitimacy of the rule, where people share the values making up its

[12] A social norm is defined as a pattern of behaviour expected within a particular society in a given situation; the shared belief of what is normal and acceptable and which shapes the actions of people in a society. Although the very fact that others in society follow the norm and that the social cost for breaking it therefore is relatively high may be enough to deter norm-violation; important social norms are often, in most modern societies also enforced by law (cf. Axelrod, 1986; Bicchieri, 2005; Eisenberg, 1999; Ensminger and Knight, 1997; Gibson, Anderson, Ostrom and Shivakumar, 2005; Knight and Ensminger, 2001; North, 1990; Sunstein, 1996). If (or when) social norms have been developed as a result of formal/codified rules (i.e. legislation), a comprehensive official monitoring system is, evidently, no longer needed. The development of social norms is, however, expected to be a slow process, in particular if the rules implemented have comprehensive impact on contemporary lifestyles and day-to-day behavioural patterns. If the changes expected, in addition to being comprehensive, not are perceived to be legitimate (i.e. build on, or express, values that do not correspond with core values held by the citizenry), the successful transition of formal rules into a commonly accepted social norm is perceived to be even more uncertain.

[13] Tax on income to provide public services might be one example. For more illustrations from the perspective of Swedish law, see Michanek (2008) or Ödberg (2008).

underpinning principles reduces the cost for monitoring and enforcing compliance, as people will follow the rule as it is seen as "natural, rightful, expected and legitimate" (March and Olsen, 2004:3; see also Beetham, 1991). On the other hand, if people find that the formal rules set up for governing cooperation to be in some way or another inappropriate, unjust or disproportional, the cost for monitoring will rise rapidly, making it increasingly difficult for the state to maintain a cooperative situation (Widegren, 1998; Ostrom, 2005).

To consider also the legitimacy of new rules is therefore an imperative task when designing public policy, as it can be reasonably assumed that an implementation of new formal institutions does not automatically change neither values nor behaviour among the public. Nor do they have an immediate impact on existing societal structures. Rather, when formal rules are implemented, they unavoidably have to negotiate what is already in place. In their seminal work on public policy failure, *Implementation*, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) point towards the fact that new policy unavoidably bumps into, and needs to deal with, the effects and consequences of previously implemented political programs[14]. However, this is far from the only obstacle new public policy are faced with, neither is it the most difficult to deal with. The process of policy implementation also meet (perhaps even clash?) with informal rules already established among the members of society in the shape of routines, customs, traditions and conventions (North, 1990). In the ideal situation, informal institutions in-use constitute the foundation for the development of formal rules, thereby granting them legitimacy. But, as previous research has shown, if inadequate consideration are taken to already established informal rules during the policymaking process, traditions, diverging values and ghost-like remnants of old public policies may also contradict or undermine formal rules, rendering them inefficient (Fell, 2008; see also Nee, 2001; Knight, 1992; North, 1990). In essence, if most people are unwilling to voluntary conform to the new rules based on their inherent legitimacy, resorting to a coercive situation where "fear is larger than greed" (Rothstein, 2000:481) is the only means by which cooperation can be successfully regulated, and this in turn presents yet another dimension of legitimacy-problems. Thus, in democratic states, relying on formal legislation for resolving the dilemma of increased individual environmental responsibility also requires that the substantive elements of the public policy underpinning the rules correspond with the values established among the general public.

The limitations of the traditional command-and-control approach for governing individuals' contribution to ecological sustainability have sparked an increasing use of policy tools that do not impose direct regulation on

[14] This is akin to the "inheritance effect" as outlined by Rose (1990).

individual activities, but rather has a more voluntary image about them. Addressing behavioural change using informative policy tools allows the individual to independently select participation in the recommended activities, or not. The key notion in this approach is awareness; an increased environmental responsibility is stimulated by increasing people's knowledge about their individual contribution to the environmental problems, and what can be done to amend them (cf. Barr, 2003). Although informative tools are usually applied as a complement to other policy measures, they nevertheless serve as to convey behavioural norms preferred by the state (and sometimes regulated in formal law). Their ambition to motivate voluntary responsibility taking point towards the need to design their message in a manner that will be positively received among the public, if they are to be successful. It thus seems reasonable to assume that also informative tools, even though they do not constitute a direct exercise of political power, need to align with the dominant values and beliefs established among the public and thereby keep within the framework of legitimacy for constituting an effective complementary instrument. Perhaps even more so than other types of policy tools.

As social dilemmas are viewed as emanating from the conflict between individual and collective rationality, public choice theory suggest market-based policy instruments to be applied in order to transform the context in which actors make their behavioural choices. Following the 'logic of consequences' (e.g. Young, 2002; March and Olsen, 1989) introducing incentives and benefits for individuals acting in the collective interest, and increased costs for those choosing non-cooperation, actors are expected to change their behaviour in order to evade charges or enjoy benefits. In the context of environmental public policy, market-based instruments are thereby commonly used both to direct actors away from activities that are considered harmful for the environment as well as to encourage more environmentally beneficial activities. There is little doubt that this approach of changing incitement-structures from the top and down is effective when it comes to governing specific changes of behaviour in a short-term perspective. However, for a number of theoretical and practical reasons, this approach's ability to thoroughly and adequately reform patterns of social choice towards ecological sustainability in a long-term perspective has been questioned. Not the least since it refrains from profoundly challenging the values and attitudes underpinning individuals' established lifestyles, and thereby can be said to offer an "easy symbolic alternative to confronting the structural causes of ecological destruction" (Dryzek, 2005:132; see also Achterberg, 1993; Hayward 1998; Hobson, 2002; de Geus 2004; Wall 2005).

When applied for addressing the behaviour of individuals (rather than that of business and industry), market-based instruments have been criticised for reducing environmental problems to a question of economy as well as for

its framing of individuals as predominately guided by individualistic and materialistic concerns. This, it is argued, makes behavioural change subject to each individual's personal cost-benefit analysis and thereby encourages people to mechanically respond to the (fiscal) incentive itself rather than to the (moral) reasons underpinning it. In the words of Young (2002:41), applying incitement-structures to guide behaviour might result in the transformation of compliance into a commodity. As cooperation thereby is made dependent on the value of external incitements, it is doubted that market-based instruments will provide an enduring solution to the collective-action problem (Pardini and Katzev, 1984; Barry, 1996 & 1999; Widegren, 1998). As one example, the cost for government to provide incentives and subsidies might be expected to increase over time as people grow accustomed to them and this risk of a costly incentive-spiral, naturally, makes market-based instruments highly sensitive to the volatile workings of political will and wind. Furthermore, governing behavioural change through the application of external motivations, whether these are taking the form of market-based or command-and-control instruments, has proven both unreliable and in some cases even counter-productive due to its crowding-out effect[15] on other strands of motivation (cf. Frey, 1992 & 1999; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Thøgersen, 1996; Young, 2002).

'Vox populi, vox dei!' A higher-order legitimacy-problem

Legitimacy does not only present an issue for the performance of already implemented policy tools, but have a significant effect also on the foregoing decision-making process. The voice of the people, broadly speaking, can also be assumed to affect the outcome of policy *ex-ante*. For example, strictly following the logic of consequences rather than one of appropriateness (cf. March and Olsen, 1989), economic (dis)incentives are designed as to address the individual's self-interest, and therefore not directly associated with the simultaneous need for a moral motivation bolstering action. I nevertheless agree with Widegren (1998:77) that market-based policy tools also presuppose endorsement based on publicly held values and beliefs, but at a

[15] In recent years, research has been conducted demonstrating the importance of rethinking the interaction between different types of motivation. Among other things, it has been observed that monetary incentives can "crowd out" other sorts of motivation as it may "undermine an individual's sense of civic duty" (Frey, 1997). When an external intervention reduces individuals' intrinsic (e.g. moral) incentives to act in this manner it is referred to as "the hidden costs of reward" (see e.g. Deci and Ryan, 1985; Pittman and Heller, 1987). Similarly, external incitements can also serve as to crowd in motivation if they are perceived as supportive of the individual's already undertaken activities, but this is generally a much slower and far less reliable process. For an overview of psychological literature on this subject, see Deci (1999); for a survey of empirical evidence, see Frey and Jegen (2001); for economic experimental evidence, see for example Fehr and Gächter (2000), Frey (1997), Frey and Götte (1999) or Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). See also Berglund and Matti (2006); Hobson (2002); and Ostrom (2000).

higher level. First things first, the functions embedded in the notion of representative democracy means that as democratically elected governments are unlikely to risk unpopularity by introducing command-and-control policies that are believed to lack a fundamental support among the majority of the citizenry (Lundqvist, 2004c).[16] A public policy suggesting the introduction of market-based tools for realising its goals must, consequently, be legitimate in itself. If not, public support for a redistribution of governmental resources in the form of subsidies, or for rised taxes and levies on certain activities, should not be expected. Neither should the introduction of such tools, at least not if we agree that politicians, although sometimes driven by a desire to implement contested policies in the service of a broader public interest, also are rational, vote-maximising, reelection-seekers.

The same argument holds, of course, for other types of policy instruments. For legislation, or indeed for the public policy underpinning it, to be decided on in the first place a certain measure of public support is required. Considering the scope for change that the notion of individual environmental responsibility suggests (i.e. transformation of whole lifestyles and consciousnesses) this might, again, prove to be a significant challenge for effective environmental protection in the democratic state. Although rules and regulations can be seen as necessary for structuring cooperation among individuals, not all activities, in particular those within the private sphere of the household, might be open for strict regulation and extensive monitoring within the normative framework of the contemporary democratic state:

> Regulating every last aspect of individual consumption behaviour would mean intrusions by a 'Green Leviathan' into the privacy of individual citizens way beyond what could be legitimised in a democracy (Lundqvist, 2001b:465).

Here, a higher-order legitimacy problem is brought to the foreground by the notion of a *legitimacy/effectiveness-dilemma* constraining environmental policymaking in general, and requests for increased individual environmental responsibility in particular.[17] Thus, policy legitimacy is not only understood to

[16] For more examples on the interplay of public opinion and public policy see, for instance, Wallner (2008); Jacobs, Glynn, Herbst, O'Keefe and Shapiro (1999); Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1994); and Papadakis (1992).

[17] Certainly, the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma is not exclusive to the field of environmental policy. How problems are described and which solutions are suggested have implications for legitimacy that need to be taken into account in the public policy process also in many other policy-areas. Environmental policies, however, are assumed particularly sensitive to this type of dilemma. *First*, the environmental issue is very broad in scope as most, if not all, societal activities and decisions have an impact on its status. For individual environmental responsibility, this means that whole lifestyles rather than single activities come into focus, and for policymakers that a range of sectors and different institutional arrangements need to be addressed. *Second*, the all-encompassing nature of the environmental issue also indicates that the environmental debate is permeated by a myriad of competing interests, giving rise to multiple dimensions of conflict throughout the policymaking process (Hajer 1995; Baker, Kousis, Richardson and Stephen, 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Lundqvist 2004; Dryzek 2005).

be a significant factor for the effectiveness and efficiency of already implemented public policy and for policy tools in-use. It also seems reasonable to assume that legitimacy both constitutes the limits and provide the opportunities for the policymaking process itself, from a theoretical as well as a practical perspective. In practice, a perceived lack of public support for certain categories of political measures results in these being either avoided entirely or in attempts to rhetorically frame them in a manner which encourages broad support.[18] The main question for policymakers, however, is where these limits of legitimacy are to be drawn.

As mentioned above, the capability for the contemporary (liberal) democratic state to effectively remedy the social dilemma of environmental protection has been strongly questioned from mainly a green theoretical perspective. For a number of reasons the contemporary state has been portrayed as being too weak in its policymaking abilities, therefore having to address environmental issues with "one arm tied behind its back" (Dobson 2003:142). The string that restricts forceful environmental policymaking is in this context thought of as woven by core democratic values, most notably individual freedom, autonomy and the value-neutral state. The notion of individual environmental obligations and an adjustment to the limits of the environment, therefore, not only confronts the established routines of peoples' daily lives (by implying restrictions on what people actually are allowed to do), but in this also substantially challenges the established conception of the state/individual relationship. Most notably, mainstream liberal ideas presuppose a state that does not support, or for that matter suppress, particular values or ways of life, but merely aggregates people's preferences through a process in which they are all given equal consideration. This notion, in turn, has rather far-reaching implications as it indicates that some measures are impossible for the state to legitimately take in order to protect the environment, for the reason that the means necessary challenge (at least at first glance) the principles of individual freedom and state neutrality.[19] For instance, holding ecological sustainability as a desired end-

[18] Following Gilbert et al (1998:796), framing is here thought of as "opinion recipes, recommendations about how issues should be understood, and therefore which considerations, in what proportions, should be used to construct an opinion". This is comparable with Rein and Schön's (1993:146) definition of frames as "a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined and problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on". For more examples, see for instance Schön and Rein (1994); Baumgartner and Jones (1993); or Goffmann (1974).

[19] It is widely debated whether liberalism itself lives up to being entirely neutral or virtue-free, both in practice and in theory. In fact, certain specific virtues necessary for acting as the good, responsible citizen have been argued necessary to promote also within the liberal democratic state. Therefore, also liberal government may promote civic virtue among its citizens without violating the neutrality principle (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994:365; see also Dagger, 1997; Dobson, 2003). In these debates, however, a distinction is usually made between virtues referring to the fulfillment of a *common good*, and virtues necessary for upholding *fair procedures* (for instance the virtue of democracy) through which citizens, based on individual preference, can lead their subjective good life (Flathman, 1996).

state to which all citizens should aspire is incompatible with this notion. The contemporary democratic state has therefore to make a choice. Either to implement policies and select policy instruments that are *effective* in their long-term protection of the environment and serve as to make the transition to an ecologically sustainable society, or to implement policies which are *legitimate* in the sense that they fully respect and abide by the principles of neutrality and individual autonomy. Thus, so the argument goes, the contemporary liberal-democratic state cannot at the same time ensure effective and legitimate environmental public policies.

Also from the perspective of democratic theory, policymakers suggesting or implementing governmental programs that lack in fundamental public support might be perceived as somewhat problematic. As a general principle, public policy constitutes decisions made by public representatives on the behalf of their constituents and it therefore seems reasonable to argue that collective decisions, on at least broad social issues, should either express or be justifiable by reference to some category of basic values established in society (cf. Wallner, 2008; Merthens, 2004; Williams and Edy, 1999). However, how extensive a problem the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma constitutes for democratic theory depends to a significant extent on the manner in which the proper relationship between state and individual is conceptualised, and how the fundamental question on the duties and limits of the democratic state is answered. Different interpretations of democratic citizenship are founded in different sets of beliefs about which core values and principles that ought to be guiding for society and of the appropriate balance between individual rights, duties and entitlements.[20] As conveyed by the green critique of liberal democracy, classic liberal theory presupposes the existence of a multitude of interpretations of the good that are all granted equal consideration and respect through the state remaining neutral on all issues not directly related to the sustention of individual freedom and self-determination. But this is by far the only reading of the proper state/individual relationship. Social or developmental liberalism makes a wider interpretation of what constitutes individual liberties and therefore argues that the state legitimately can take a more active responsibility for ensuring every citizen's possibility for an autonomous life, indicating the need for both certain economic redistribution and other state-controlled measures (Heywood, 2004). Further down the road, communitarian critics of liberalism offer entirely different ontological statements about the social nature of the self. Based in these, they prescribe a state with possibilities, sometimes even obligations, to promote the establishment as well as upholding of specific, culturally bound values in

[20] This certainly affects both how major political initiatives are understood as well as the proper level of abstraction for the values promoted by the state. Rothstein (1994) has, as an example, illustrated how the welfare system and the politics of redistribution would be perceived quite differently from the viewpoint of one ideological perspective over another.

society for the reason that the majority, or collective, regards them as being more virtuous or morally correct than others (Kymlicka, 1990; Avineri and De-Shalit 1992). In line with this the primary duty of the state, Larmore (1987:92) argues "is not to uphold some kind of neutrality, but to embrace and support a specific conception of the good life". Given the magnitude of different interpretations on what are the legitimate duties and responsibilities of political government, this again goes to show that some form of basic correspondence in core values between those held by the citizenry and the political aspirations expressed by the government is of relevance also from a democracy-theory point of view. And thus for the sustained democratic legitimacy of the political authority. The question is on what level of abstraction (pertaining to, for instance, fair procedures or to a common good) this correspondence is required.

Although the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma first and foremost is a theoretically derived concept, having implications for environmental policy in theory, its consequences for policymaking in practice can also be discerned. As we know, policy processes in general and environmental policy processes in particular, are permeated by multiple competing values, beliefs, interests and opinions, giving rise to several potential dimensions of conflict (Dryzek 2005; Nie, 2004; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Lundqvist 2004c; Baker, Kousis, Richardson and Stephen, 1997; Hajer 1995). In order to remedy these conflicts, political decision-makers therefore regularly choose to emphasise certain values; frame their messages; and make "emotive appeals" (Wallner, 2008) when presenting their policy discourses that are believed to gain broad public support and thus contribute to the perception of their decisions as legitimate (cf. Caprara et al, 2006; Rein and Schön, 1993; Feldman, 1988). As mentioned above, the mechanisms and time-frames of representative democracy makes it highly unlikely that policymakers should attempt implementing strategies that are unsupported by, or cannot be rhetorically framed so as to align with, publicly held values. A significant share of the above accounted for critique of state-weakness in general, and the inadequacy of market-based policy tools in particular, draws on the argument that the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma strongly discourages contemporary political government from effectively promoting a comprehensive pro-environmental change in individual lifestyles and social structures. The state is simply caught between the dual imperatives of protecting the environment (or, for that matter, promoting any other the value of the common good) on the one hand, and ensuring continuous economic growth and individual freedom and autonomy (e.g. the value of re-election) on the other (cf. Frickel and Davidson, 2004). Following de Geus (2004; see also Seyfang, 2005), the past decades have therefore seen a 'pacification of the environmental issue' as it has been rhetorically incorporated in the political discourse, but once there reduced to

something of an administrative problem suggesting less intrusion in the private sphere of individuals. On a national level, attempts to bridge the dilemma have resulted in symbolic acts, such as the establishment of environmental ministries and national parks (Frickel and Davisdsson, 2004); and the green-washing of policies first and foremost addressing other values, for instance national security or growth (Söderberg 2008; Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007). Turning to the individual, this dilemma is handled by addressing environmental issues through adjustments in the market; portraying them as 'technical policy issues' requiring minor behavioural amendments rather than as normative issues calling for fundamental changes in lifestyles (cf. de Geus 2004; Wissenburg 2004). An example of this is said to be the widespread use of economic policy tools and the focus on sustainable consumption as the main route towards sustainability at the individual level. By employing market-based instruments and encouraging individuals to take their environmental responsibility in their role as consumers, governments take measures to protect the environment while at the same time keeping the mechanisms of a free, yet somewhat manipulated, market in place (Lundqvist 2001b; see also Hobson, 2004; Carter and Huby, 2005; Davidson and Hatt, 2005). Thus, the politics of sustainable consumption allows political government to pursue sustainability while at the same time keeping firmly within the economic growth-paradigm (cf. Hajer, 1995; Cohen, 1998; Langhelle, 2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000; Dryzek, 2005) and, more importantly, without placing too far-ranging demands on individual lifestyle-changes (Jansen, Osland and Hanf, 1998). Hence, Hobson (2002:101) describes the ambition behind the politics of sustainable consumption as an aspiration "not to threaten consumption, but seeks to incorporate a new preference without impinging upon individual's (supposedly) sacred and deeply entrenched lifestyles". Following this critique, then, the attempt to balance calls for effective environmental policymaking with what is understood as legitimate among the public gives rise to political environmental discourses that not so much constitute an innovative road towards strong environmental protection as an attempt, due to the perceived legitimacy-problem, to keep business running as usual.

The problem of legitimacy for public policy

Over these introductory sections, I have aimed at outlining in more detail the nature of the general problem addressed in this thesis, and thus my rationales for granting it attention: the consequences that legitimacy amounts to for the design, performance and long-term stability of contemporary environmental policy. Summing up the chapter's discussion so far on the relation between public policy and legitimacy, we can identify three distinct types of legitimacy

issues or problems facing policymakers in this respect. These, along with their specific consequences and the conditions for legitimacy related to each issue, are outlined in table 1.1 below.

TABLE 1.1. *Three types of legitimacy issues*

Type of legitimacy	Consequences	Conditions for legitimacy
Legitimacy ex-post (policy outcomes)	The degree of policy legitimacy affects the performance, effectiveness, efficiency and long-term stability of political programs and policy tools in-use.	The selection of (and rhetorical communication surrounding) policy tools builds on values and beliefs shared by the public.
Legitimacy ex-ante (policy decisions)	The legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma in political practice. Legitimacy constitutes the limitations for (and exerts pressure on) the policymaking process. Certain decisions are perceived as a political impossibility, others a political necessity.	Political aspirations and goals, including value-priorities, strategies and motivations for reaching them, align with publicly established values and beliefs.
The democratic legitimacy of public policy	The level of policy legitimacy affects the democratic standing (and future performance) of political government.	Collective decisions on broad social issues made by political representatives can be justified by reference to values and beliefs held by the citizens.

Firstly, the issue of ex-post legitimacy calls to attention the effect legitimacy has on the performance of already decided on policy, in particular in those instances where the exercise of political power is in need of continuous public support or voluntary acceptance. Legitimacy affects the way in which policy goals and strategies are understood, received and responded to by the public, and is thereby expected to induce a moral foundation for compliance. Policy legitimacy, however, is not only relevant for the immediate effectiveness and efficiency of political programs and policy tools in-use with the aspiration of remedying collective action problems. Legitimacy, *secondly*, also has a higher-order impact. In the figure above, this issue is labelled ex-ante legitimacy as it constrains, or, for that matter, constitutes a driving force in the policymaking process (i.e. has an effect before policy is being decided on). In particular, what is legitimate sets the boundaries for those actors participating in the process of deciding on and designing public policy. Legitimacy is significant for the selection of discourses, symbols and motivational appeals applied to describe both policy problems and overarching political aspirations, as well as for the design of political strategies for solving policy problems and the distribution of responsibilities they imply. Just as specific institutions created to deal with single aspects of the environmental situation become embedded in structures containing already established beliefs, traditions and practices, the introduction of new public policy brings questions on its legitimacy to the

foreground and the policymaking process itself thereby becomes deeply intertwined with the values and attitudes already established among the public. To these empirical attributes, legitimacy, *thirdly*, unavoidably brings with it theoretically founded questions relating to democracy and democratic government, as the very definition of these concepts implies at least some sort of correspondence between public values and public policy. Here different understandings on the proper characteristics of the state/individual relationship also comprise different notions on which values that should be guiding the exercise of political power, and what direction as well as level of abstraction that is appropriate for political goals. A lack of legitimacy for its policies might therefore have effects also on the future overall performance (or indeed re-election) of political government.

1.4 AIM OF THE THESIS

As the basic research problem now has been presented in further detail, it is also possible to be more specific concerning the overall aim of this thesis. We remember that the dominant environmental discourses, in theory as well as in political practice, establish that citizen participation is required to reach ecological sustainability and solve the collective-action problem of environmental degradation. The major challenge for environmental public policy is thereby to make the citizens co-operate by incorporating environmental considerations in their daily lives. Following the above discussion on the conditions for positive policy performance, it seems reasonable to assume that also the *legitimacy* of new environmental public policies themselves plays a major role in this endeavour.

Public policies contain the value-laden political goals, strategies, and motivations to which the suggested application of various policy tools aspire and should therefore, at least rhetorically, align with the values and attitudes established in society for being publicly accepted and adhered to (Wallner, 2008; Schön and Rein, 1994; March and Olsen, 1989; Feldman, 1988). Taking its departure in official Swedish policy aiming to promote individual environmental responsibility, the overall aim of this thesis is therefore to *explore the degree of legitimacy for environmental public policy in Sweden and analyse the prospects and prerequisites for designing future environmental policies that holds a high(er) degree of legitimacy*. For this purpose, the thesis combines a value-oriented qualitative analysis of official political discourse with a quantitative analysis of two mass-surveys tapping

the values and beliefs established among the Swedish public.[21] By the use of these tools, it elucidates, compares and contrasts the normative foundations (and thus the moral justification) of Swedish environmental public policy with those values and beliefs held by Swedish citizens, thus significantly affecting how policy requirements are received and reacted to. In the process of fulfilling the overall aim, advancing towards a more comprehensive understanding of environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden, two main research questions will be answered:

1. *Is Swedish household-related environmental policy characterised by a legitimacy-problem, and if so, pertaining to which aspects and to what degree?*
2. *What can be done to increase the level of environmental policy legitimacy as a whole?*

Through this approach, three interconnected aspects of the legitimacy-puzzle (see table 1.1 above) are considered, which taken together are anticipated to provide relevant insights into the main features of environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden. *First*, both the effectiveness and efficiency of a public policy are dependent on the perception of policy as reasonable or acceptable in the sense that its normative foundations correspond with existing public values. Without legitimacy, voluntary adherence to policy goals is assumed to be weak, requiring the state to engage in extensive and very costly efforts of externally motivating, monitoring and enforcing compliance. Thus, when designing public policy and selecting policy tools aspiring to remedy the environmental collective-action problem in an effective and efficient way it is imperative for decision-makers to be familiar with how people reason and which values that lie beneath their attitudinal, motivational and behavioural preferences, both in general and with specific regards to environmental matters. *Second*, policymakers' perceptions of what is considered legitimate among the public are also anticipated to affect the policymaking process itself, as well as the outputs thereof. Although the introduction of illegitimate policies rarely leads to the breakdown or overthrow of state authority, at least not in consolidated democracies,

[21] This thesis is written as a part of the SHARP (Sustainable Households: Attitudes, Resources and Policy) Research Programme (www.sharpprogram.se), financed by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (*Naturvårdsverket*) and the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning (*Formas*). The SHARP program is a five-year (2003-2008) multidisciplinary research programme, comprising six subprojects from various disciplines within the social sciences and humanities. Its primary focus is on household behaviour and environmental policy in Sweden, with a particular empirical interest directed towards three partly interrelated household activities and policy areas where the need for individual households' contribution in order to improve the environmental situation is explicitly referred to: (a) recycling and recycling behaviour; (b) the active purchasing of eco-labelled products; and (c) transport choice behaviour. Jointly within the SHARP Research Programme, two mass-surveys were conducted in 2004 and 2006. The results from these are here applied for exploring publicly established values and beliefs (see more in chapter 7 below).

implementing a policy that lack in legitimacy might well compromise the long-term goals of the political authority, as public acceptance of its claims to govern is eroded (cf. Peters, 1986). Some policy measures might therefore be deemed politically impossible to implement on account of them lacking in legitimacy. By a similar account, a *perceived* legitimacy-problem can be equally limiting for policy outcomes and, if misconstrued also for the legitimacy of political authority itself. Thus, the limits of legitimacy (whether perceived or real) also constitute the very tangible limits of the policymaking process (see, for example, Skocpol [1997] for empirical examples). The existence and features of a legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma in practice, including how this is negotiated through public policy, thus provide relevant knowledge on the constraints and opportunities for future policymaking aspiring simultaneously towards increased individual environmental responsibility and strengthened legitimacy of political decisions. *Third and last*, by exploring the official environmental norm, the prospects for the democratic legitimacy of public policy can be discussed. Which interpretation of the state/individual relationship is conveyed through official policy? How do policymakers reason when it comes to the balance of individual rights, duties and entitlements? Which is presented to be the role for political authority? How do these statements align with the values held by the public in general?

In order to fulfil the above outlined aim, a theoretical model or framework is required for guiding the empirical exploration of Swedish environmental policy legitimacy. As we remember, legitimacy is not a one-dimensional concept that comes with a ready-to-use analytical framework. Rather, its many definitions and meanings indicate that the concept of legitimacy has to be clarified, allowing for the construction of an analytical framework, before commencing the study. Above, I have above suggested a number of ways in which policy legitimacy impacts performance. But we still need to further explore the way in which it should be defined (i.e. what policy legitimacy is, and what it is not), as well as the adequate tools to apply when studying it. A second purpose of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the theory formation surrounding policy legitimacy analysis in general and the analysis of environmental policy legitimacy in particular. This additional purpose is accomplished by answering a third research question:

3. *How should the concept of policy legitimacy be understood, and by the use of which tools should it be studied?*

By this account, I believe that my thesis also will provide an input that stretches beyond the study of environmental policy in Sweden. The theoretical models and discussions, as well as the analytical approach applied in this

thesis might well be utilised for the study of policy legitimacy also in other contexts, and directed towards other issues than the environment.

1.5 IDENTIFYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR POLICY LEGITIMACY: SWEDEN AS THE CASE FOR STUDY

Following the aim outlined above, the methodological approach of the thesis' empirically oriented parts takes the form of an explorative single-case study, where the degree of legitimacy for Swedish environmental public policy constitutes the case to be explored. Although the prospects of drawing generally applicable conclusions (that is, results that travel well abroad) from a single case study not should be overstated (e.g. Esaiasson, Gilliam, Oscarsson and Wängnerud, 2004; Devine, 2002; Yin, 1994; Lijphart, 1971), the empirical results of this thesis can nevertheless provide a solid foundation for future comparative studies across several cases. When conducting case studies, an important starting-point is the selection and definition of the case itself (e.g. Yin, 1994). In this thesis, Sweden provides the empirical case for the study of environmental policy legitimacy, and the *raison d'être* for this selection is founded on several observations. Swedish governments have clearly expressed political aspirations to be a forerunner in the work towards ecological sustainability, as well as to incorporate environmental considerations across policy areas and in political decisions. Following on from this, also the incorporation of the principles of Agenda 21 in national and particularly local environmental policy was swiftly executed in Sweden during the later half of the 1990's (e.g. Khakee, 2002; Brundin and Eckerberg, 1999). These political aspirations have granted Sweden a strong environmental reputation within the international community, as one of the environmental leaders of the EU, holding an "impressive" record of environmental protection (Fudge and Rowe, 2000:49; Lifferink and Skou-Andersen, 2005). As one of the main aspects of policy legitimacy pertains to the nature of official political sustainability aspirations, including how public policy deals with the many, potentially conflicting, values and beliefs surrounding the environmental issue, Sweden seems to be a suitable case for exploring how the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma is dealt with in political practice. How is, for instance, the balance struck between different understandings and interpretations of the problem at hand; of distribution of responsibility and authority; of public participation; and of available policy tools throughout the Swedish efforts to reach ecological sustainability?

Furthermore, Swedes are often placed at the top in terms of environmentally friendly attitudes (Eckersley, 2004; Witherspoon, 1996).

Earlier studies have shown that most Swedes claim that they are willing to pursue a number of household related activities for environmental purposes, such as buying products that are less harmful to the environment (von Borgstede, 2002; Widegren, 1998). These attitudes have also been reported to translate into behaviour as Swedes have responded quite well to, for instance, eco-labelling and recycling schemes (Micheletti and Stolle, 2003). As for political culture, Sweden can be described as a liberal democracy with significant communitarian features (Lundmark, 2003), meaning that the State represents ideas on the common good and has a duty to promote them. For instance, Swedish welfare politics has been described as an organised "top-down intervention of the private sphere". Through social welfare policy, consumer habits as well as lifestyle choices were to be transformed, creating a "new, more rational, educated and socially adapted and committed citizen" (Rothstein, 1994:207, my translation). These communitarian features also have environmental connotations, for instance in the Social Democratic Party's aspiration to build the "Green People's Home" (MoSD, 2005) and thereby merge the ecologically sustainable society with the welfare-state. This means Sweden should constitute the ideal testing ground for studying the interplay between environmental public policy and personal values and attitudes, but to reason the other way around is certainly also of relevance. Sweden can be viewed as a critical test of how the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma might be negotiated in practice; if environmentally protective policies that incorporate increased individual responsibilities and duties not are found to be legitimate in relation to the Swedish public, chances are they will not be found so anywhere else either.

Studying public policy in a multi-level setting

By considering legitimacy as located in the relationship between policy and public, a significant foundation for it is believed to be found within the outcome of the environmental policymaking processes, in the form of core values and beliefs embedded in official policy. However, the multi-level-structure[22] of contemporary environmental politics requires some further clarifications regarding the foundations for environmental policy legitimacy, and, thus, the objects of analysis in this thesis. *First*, the focus for this study is on the output of the policy process, not on the decision-making processes themselves. Policy legitimacy in consolidated democratic states is thus viewed as relating first and foremost to the values and beliefs expressed by political

[22] By this I mean the gradual transition of policymaking power both vertically, from the national level authorities to trans-national and local levels of government, as well as horizontally, from governmental authorities to non-governmental actors (Eckerberg and Joas, 2004:406-7; see also: Fairbrass and Jordan, 2004; Lundqvist, 2004b).

goals and strategies, not as a process-related issue. *Second*, the study is delimited to official Swedish environmental policy, e.g. policies emanating from governmental authorities in Sweden. Thereby, neither goals nor strategies expressed by non-governmental organisations (NGO's) or by the institutions of the European Union are included in the study.

It might nevertheless be relevant to note that several non-governmental actors naturally will have had a varying influence in the processes leading up to the formulations and motivations embedded in the studied official documents, for instance as bodies to which a proposed legislative measure is referred for consideration or through successful acts of lobbying. Sweden entering the EU has further expanded the multi-level-structure of environmental policymaking as the membership has meant a truly increasing influence from the Community-level over the national government's policymaking processes (Dinan, 2005; McCormick, 2001). Beginning with the 1973 Environmental Action Programme the Community competence in environmental issues has produced a range of binding policies and directives in diverse areas such as air and water quality; waste-management; chemical usage; and nature conservation. These, together with the primary rules of the EU strongly affect national environmental policymaking in the 27 Member States. For example, EU constraints on the use of policy tools (predominately economic due to the single-market) and the subordination of national laws under Community law, has allowed EU-policy to expand beyond the sum of all Member States' policies added together (Jordan, 2005:2; see also Söderholm, 2004; McCormick, 2001; Barnes and Barnes, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). As this thesis is concerned with the interplay between national policy and public values, increased Community policymaking power is viewed more as an entanglement of the environmental policymaking process, where outputs on the national level also reflect negotiations within the EU, not as another distinct set of public policy in need of analysis. For instance, according to Jordan (2005:2, italics in original) the transition of policymaking power vertically to the trans-national level has both strengthened the EU itself as a global environmental actor as well as, more importantly, merged EU- and Member State-policy into one inseparable entity.[23]

Swedish environmental policymaking is still seen as divided vertically between two levels of government; nationally, where the overall direction of Swedish environmental policy is decided on, and locally where national (and

[23] On this topic, Jordan (2005:2) writes that "the pre-existing environmental policies of the Member States are no longer politically or legally separate from EU environmental policy. In fact they have undergone a progressive change ('Europeanization') through their involvement in EU policymaking. In other words, the Member States have created an institutional entity to perform certain tasks, which has, in turn, deeply affected the way they perceive and act against environmental problems. The relationship between the two levels – international and national – of this unique system of *multi-level* environmental governance, has been and remains genuinely *two-way*, creating new opportunities and constraints for the various actors involved".

sometimes very general) policy objectives are transformed into practical policy tools with more explicit implications for households' day-to-day activities. Following the focus on local processes, inspired by the devise of 'local solutions for local problems' expressed in the Agenda 21, Swedish environmental policymaking has often been described as comprising a firm bottom-up process. The local-level itself initiates new environmental projects in addition to them translating and implementing national objectives in the local context (cf. Eckerberg and Mineur, 2003). Swedish environmental policy is, thus, not exclusively a matter for the national level of government. Rather, local level governance is of crucial importance in policymaking due both to the far-reaching autonomy for municipalities to organise local government in general (as regulated through the Municipal Act of 1991 [SFS 1991:900]), as well as to the decentralisation of environmental affairs in particular (Lundqvist, 2004c).

Nevertheless, policymaking on the national level, within the Swedish government and in particular the environmental ministry, plays a significant role in outlining and governing the environmental political field on the whole (and by both deciding on, as well as integrating Community policy on the national level). The national government decides on and outlines the preferred direction of overall environmental policy through the rhetorical formulation of policy goals and strategies, expressed through bills and written communications directed to the Parliament, and in instructions to the central environmental authority co-ordinating national and international environmental work: the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The national level of government also has a crucial influence by determining which local-level environmental projects to grant economic support[24], and which overall goals to be pursued[25]. As such, the principles, values and beliefs underpinning public policy, that is the focus for a study of legitimacy, are primarily elaborated and decided on the national level. Previous studies have also concluded that environmental policy rhetoric emanating from the national level in Sweden appears in an almost unaltered form in local policy and political practice (cf. Matti, 2006). Although Swedish environmental policy in this way can be said to have something of a dual (or even tripartite) nature, the foundations for legitimacy, and therefore also the objects relevant to include in the analysis, are perceived to be found first and foremost on the national level of policymaking. Whereas municipal governments certainly hold the competence to independently pursue environmental policy goals, to date a major (in part self-assumed) responsibility has been to implement environmental political aspirations elaborated nationally and thus to adapt

[24] For instance through the Local Investment Programmes (Eckerberg and Dahlgren, 2004; Hanberger, Eckerberg, Brännlund, Baker, Nordström and Nordenstam, 2002, see also note 41 below).
[25] Through the 16 National Environmental Quality Objectives (e.g. Lundqvist, 2004c).

local political practice in response to national environmental policy goals. In contrast, it is on the national level of policymaking where the overarching political goals are settled and specified; the main strategies and overall direction of efforts for achieving these goals are determined; and the nature of the environmental problem to which policy responds are framed. As the legitimacy-focus of this thesis suggests an analysis of the underpinning principles of Swedish environmental policy in terms of values and beliefs, and neither of its outcomes nor processes of implementation, the national level of policymaking constitutes the adequate focus.

1.6 WHERE IS THIS THESIS GOING?

Just as there are many different approaches to studying political phenomena, there are many different ways to structure a thesis exploring a single one. I have chosen to divide the remaining chapters of the thesis into two distinct parts. Following on from this introductory chapter, where I have discussed the general problem(s) addressed along with the overarching aim of my study, is the theoretically oriented part of the thesis. The ambition here is to fulfil the second objective outlined above: to elaborate on the theoretical points of departure for the thesis as well as construct an analytical framework for studying environmental policy legitimacy. This far, the admittedly complex and multi-faceted concepts round which this thesis is constructed have been used rather casually, without any further explanation of their connotation. The main task for the following theoretically oriented chapters is therefore to specify the meaning and significance of, in turn, policy legitimacy (chapter 2); publicly established values and beliefs (chapter 3); and public policy (chapter 4), as well as to outline this thesis' approach for studying them. By synthesising the main elements of these theoretical concepts, a framework for analysing policy legitimacy is developed and presented in chapter 5. The framework illustrates how policy legitimacy is conceptualised in terms of the alignment of public values and public policy, as well as which topics that are the relevant focus for such a study of correspondence. Thereby, the theoretical ambition of the thesis is reached.

The second part of the thesis amounts to the application of the framework on the case of Swedish environmental public policy. In this endeavour, two separate empirical studies exploring and analysing values and beliefs in policy as well as among the public are conducted. Commencing with the entity whose legitimacy is under review, the underpinning principles of environmental policy in Sweden are explored through a value-oriented content analysis in chapter 6. In chapter 7, then, attention is turned towards

the results of two mass-surveys with the aim of mapping value- and belief-structures established among the public. In both of these chapters, the empirical exploration of values and beliefs are combined with an analysis of their broader meaning in the context of previously applied frameworks for structuring environmental policy discourses. Each chapter is also self-contained and comprises a further elaboration on its methodological considerations and the material used, although the first part of the thesis is needed to fully understand the analytical approach. In the final chapter (8), the outcomes from the two empirical studies are brought together and compared, enabling conclusions to be drawn both on the present level of legitimacy for Swedish environmental public policy as well as on the prospect for policy legitimacy in the future. To the end of the thesis, the value of the analytical framework for analysing policy is also discussed in the light of its empirical application.



PART I

THEORY

OR,

SUGGESTING AN APPROACH
TO THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY
OF PUBLIC POLICY
LEGITIMACY

2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES I, LEGITIMACY

In this thesis, legitimacy constitutes the core tenet by which Swedish public policy for household sustainability is analysed. In brief, I argue that the degree of policy legitimacy depends on the extent to which the substantive content of policy (i.e. its goals, strategies for reaching these goals, and motivations as to why these goals should be reached) can be justified by reference to publicly established values and beliefs[26]. Citizens evaluate and react to external objects such as public policies based on how they align with their belief-system. Therefore, it is the correspondence between the beliefs and values held by those subordinate in the power relationship (that is, the citizens) and those expressed by the powerful (as determining public policy choices) which should be examined in the analytical process. Our study, then, is centred round two basic analytical entities; publicly held systems of belief and public policy, which both need to be explored and compared in order to reach conclusions on legitimacy.

However, legitimacy, belief-systems and public policy are all broad and complex concepts, frequently featured in many strands of social and political research. As such, they are surrounded by numerous theories, models and methodological approaches suggesting which their significant defining

[26] Values and beliefs are basic concepts in several disciplines within the social and behavioural sciences and have many different connotations. In this thesis, they are both thought of as components of an individual's belief-system, where values are more abstract and context-independent expressions of general goals (conceptions of the desirable) and beliefs comprises more empirically oriented or even policy-specific understandings of the way things are or should be (conceptions of the world). Both of these, in turn, are presumed to have a significant influence on a person's attitudes, opinions and behaviour. A more elaborated discussion on these concepts is found in chapter 3 below.

concepts are, how they should be studied, and how to make sense of the results. Following on from the introductory chapter, the connections here made between these concepts rests on three propositions. *First*, that policy legitimacy should be evaluated through studying the normative foundations of a policy's content. The basis of policy legitimacy is thereby located in the values and beliefs underlying those political goals, strategies and motivations constituting the outputs from the policy process, and the extent to which they correspond with publicly held systems of belief. *Second*, that this notion of policy legitimacy, in particular its proposed significance for policy outcomes, is valid to the extent that an individual's system of belief are highly significant for how she understands, reacts to and form preferences towards new social objects (for example in the shape of environmental public policy), both when acting as a citizen and in the role of a policymaker. *Third*, that systems of belief transcends the policymaking process, establishing the foundations for constructing new policies, for determining political goals and for settling on strategies. Belief-systems are as such materialised, and able to study, within the policy discourse, for example through written governmental reports and in propositions for new laws or political programmes.

These propositions will be further elaborated on in the following four chapters. The aim for this part of the thesis is to outline my theoretical starting-points and to discuss my choices of tools for exploring policy legitimacy, leading up to the construction of an analytical framework for studying policy legitimacy. An overarching task for these theoretically oriented chapters is thus to elaborate on the answer to the last of the research questions outlined in connection to the aim of the thesis: *how the concept of policy legitimacy should be understood and by the use of which tools it should be studied*. In this endeavour, chapter 3 discusses the motivational function of belief-systems, outlining both a catalogue of values and beliefs that are deemed highly significant for structuring individuals' attitudes and behaviour in relation to (environmental) policy as well as the tools for exploring them. Chapter 4 goes on to explore the role of belief-systems as a mechanism of choice within the policy process, determining desirable outcomes as well as the strategies and instruments viewed necessary for reaching them. In this initial chapter, the concept of legitimacy itself, and previous approaches to its study, will be further explored.

2.1 RESEARCHING PUBLIC POLICY LEGITIMACY

Following the argument presented in the previous chapter it seems reasonable to assume that legitimacy holds a central position for the outcomes of

environmental public policies in contemporary, representative democracy. To recapitulate; this thesis applies a general definition of policy legitimacy as a situation where a policy, based on the values expressed through its goals as well as in the strategies and motivations provided for achieving these goals, is understood as normatively acceptable and thereby morally binding for the public. In contrast, a policy which normative foundations are resented tends instead to be viewed as being illegitimate and therefore not perceived as a moral obligatory (cf. Beetham, 1991). For fulfilling the political aspiration of ecological sustainability, which to a large extent requires the active engagement of individuals in a range of lifestyle related areas, this moral based acceptance which legitimacy is believed to induce is exceedingly central. In particular in democratic states, where the reliance on authoritarian coercion as a means for citizens' compliance with policy decisions is not a viable way forward, the acceptance of collective decisions as binding even though they might conflict with immediate personal preferences or interests is imperative for reaching positive outcomes. Traditional policy instruments (e.g. laws, regulations and monetary incentives) are, for various reasons presented above, not likely to be entirely successful in achieving the necessary broad and long-term stable lifestyle-changes on their own. Rather, an important prerequisite is that those subject to the policy in question also comprehend it, including the use and design of policy instruments, as legitimate (cf. Citrin and Muste, 1999). Its significance notwithstanding, legitimacy is itself a concept given a wide range of connotations and, thus, characterized by high level of ambiguity (cf. Føllesdal, 2004; Jachtenfuchs, 1995). Therefore, in order to conduct a study of public policy legitimacy this core concept, along with the process of studying or evaluating it, first needs to be adequately defined.

From political to policy legitimacy

Despite the assumed relevance of legitimacy for the long-term success or failure of public policies, it is not a prominent point of departure for policy analysis. The majority of research in the field of policy studies has rather evaluated the functioning of policies or political programs by considering such factors as problem definition, selection of policy tools, access to resources, or the performance of the actors involved in, and the basic workings of, the policy process itself (Montpetit, 2008; Wallner, 2008; Gormley, 2007). Many policy evaluation studies have thus been preoccupied with investigating if policymakers and actors responsible for its implementation are doing things right, rather than the more fundamental question of whether they are doing the right thing in the first place. This, however, means that such studies have disregarded that also legitimacy might be a highly significant component

affecting the outcomes of public policy in several ways.[27] *First*, as legitimacy constrains policy by determining what democratic political government chooses to do (or not to do) in the first place. *Second*, as an illegitimate policy, even if successfully reaching its stated goals in the short-term, might fail when viewed in a longer perspective as such policies unavoidably must address behavioural change based solely on external motivations. *Third*, as the legitimacy of the government itself might erode as a result of introducing unsupported policies or programs, thus having a negative impact on governmental performance in other policy-domains. On the other hand, dedicated studies of legitimacy have mainly been concerned with it as a requirement for actors, e.g. states, international regimes, political institutions or governance systems, not for single policies (George, 1980; Beetham, 1991; Smoke, 1994). *Political* legitimacy, or rather a lack of it, is commonly applied as an explanation to the instability and fall of regimes, for example when considering the collapse of the Soviet empire and the break up of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. These applications reveal that the concept of legitimacy in its most basic connotation generally refers to the normative, moral grounds underpinning the rightfulness or justifiability of political power.[28] For example, a similar definition of legitimacy is captured by Lipset (1981:64) according to whom "legitimacy involves the capacity of the [political] system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society". Furthermore, Hanberger (2003:268) refers to legitimacy broadly as "citizens' support for a policy order and a regime"; and Coicaud (2002:10) defines legitimacy as "the recognition of the right to govern".[29]

In studies of the legitimacy of regimes, an important relation between the concepts of political *legitimacy* and political *authority* has also been suggested, where the former underpins the latter and, thus, creates the right for e.g. a state or a government to expect obedience from its citizens when exercising its power (Buchanan, 2002 & 2003). This turns slightly away from explicit questions on the mere existence or stability of a regime, and towards a focus on the functioning of political government. Defining legitimacy as a

[27] And we note that those (philosophical) studies that are discussing the latter question commonly defines 'the right thing' from a normative-philosophical point of view, rather than from an empirically derived one.

[28] This definition tends to disregard the more technical definition of legitimacy as equal to legality. For students and scholars in the field of law, a power relationship or a policy is most commonly considered legitimate for its compliance to established formal rules. As such, a policy or power relationship in general is legally binding and enforceable by it keeping within the framework constituted by the formal rules of the society. There are also other typologies available for definitions of legitimacy, for example, Føllesdal (2004) provides a highly informative overview of alternative definitions, as well as criteria, for evaluating legitimacy.

[29] For more definitions, see, for example, Bäckstrand (2006); Parkinson (2003); Buchanan (2002); Hague, Harrop and Breslin (2002); Karlsson (2001); Dahl (1998); Beetham and Lord (1998); Crook (1987); Peters (1986); Connolly (1984a & 1984b); Schaar (1984); Easton (1979); Poggi (1978); or Weber (1968).

measure of acquiescence indicates the instrumental importance of a regime's legitimacy for its exercise of political power, where a government enjoying a high level of legitimacy has considerably lower costs associated with monitoring and enforcing public compliance with its decisions. For instance, "[a] government that is regarded as legitimate should not have to use force over more than a very small minority of its citizens, just as army officers should not have to constantly put their men on disciplinary charges and police officers should not often have to use their batons" (Birch, 2001:57; see also Parkinson, 2003 Stoker, 1998). A range of empirical studies has also pointed towards this connection between high levels of legitimacy and correspondingly higher levels of voluntary compliance (Stern, 2008; Fell, 2006; Rova, 2004; Hønneland, 1999; Tyler, 1990). Similarly, Beetham (1991:29, italics added) acknowledges this line of reasoning by concluding that…

> …legitimacy is significant not only for the maintenance of order, but also for the *degree* of cooperation and *quality* of performance that the powerful can secure from the subordinate; it is important not only for whether they remain 'in power', but for *what their power can be used to achieve*.

Although a government's political legitimacy may stem from several different sources, many contemporary studies of regime legitimacy connect it intimately to the constitutional rule of law and the free and fair elections of modern representative democracies (e.g. Bodansky, 1999; Beetham and Lord, 1998; Beetham, 1991). Thereby, legitimacy in this respect is both an effect and a prerequisite for the contemporary democratic state. The workings of the democratic system induce and uphold the government's legitimacy, and the comprehension of the political authority as exercising a morally justifiable power makes the constant use of force and coercion under the threat of punishment unnecessary in most instances of collective decision-making. Connecting legitimacy and authority in this way also provides an explanation as to why single policies not has been a main interest of legitimacy-studies. The underpinning legitimacy for a regime, whether based on religious doctrine, tradition or the rulers' personality traits and charisma (as in non-democratic states), or on fair and open procedures (as in democracies), are believed to induce a *prima facie* legitimacy also for the political decisions made by these regimes (Smoke, 1994; Humphrey, 2006).[30] If we accept this assumption on causal relationships, then I agree that scrutinizing each and every policy from a perspective of legitimacy may seem as a slight bit overambitious.

[30] This could be defined as what Skogstad (2003a), among others, refers to as input, or procedural, legitimacy. The trust in the system's ability to generate the best outputs takes here precedence over the attitudes towards the content of the outputs themselves (see, for example, also Rawls [1999] for a philosophical discussion on "procedural justice"). Input legitimacy is further discussed below.

However, assuming that legitimacy primarily stems from the mechanisms of the political system, and public policies in a democratic state therefore always already enjoys a certain amount of legitimacy overlooks several important factors. As Hanberger (2003; see also Dryzek, 2000; Forester, 1985) points out, the legitimacy crisis and the erosion of political trust[31] facing the modern state means that policy makers no longer can rely on the legitimacy-capital of the regime itself as inducing sufficient support for every political decision made. Rather, as the level of general trust in government decreases, it simultaneously becomes more important for public policies to be able to stand on their own and to be justifiable by their content, not by the decision-making processes surrounding them or the actors presenting them. Policy makers must, in other words, make sure that the decisions made and the effects these decisions are thought to have are legitimate in themselves. Smoke (1994; see also George, 1980), for instance, invokes the example of "national interest" to illustrate a similar point. When attempting to round up public support for a policy and legitimise a chosen course of action, governments routinely frame their message and connect it to certain symbols that are believed appealing to the public (cf. Wallner, 2008; Caprara et al, 2006; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Rein and Schön, 1993; March and Olsen, 1989). Arguing that a policy serves the national interest is one example of such uses of symbolism as it connects the specific decision to a larger entity thought to be legitimate in itself (i.e. the interest of the nation represented by the national government). But rhetorically connecting a policy to a publicly recognised symbol is no longer enough to render it legitimate as such claims are constantly made by a range of competing actors apart from the democratically elected government. Rather, as Smoke (1994) argues, the connection between symbol and policy legitimacy works the other way around, and therefore these rhetorical claims will have little effect if they are not based in the initial legitimacy of the policy. Smoke (1994:103) therefore suggests that legitimacy builds on the fact that decisions and policies can be justified by reference to shared beliefs:

> consensus that some course of action is in the national interest follows from – it does not precede – the course of action's having achieved policy legitimacy [and, therefore] advocates of some policy [...] will not secure agreement unless their idea of what the national interest is, in the situation, is consistent with national values.

Connecting the legitimacy of political decisions to a general trust in government can also be assumed increasingly inadequate as political decision-making more and more moves outside the traditional hierarchical structures. Several public policy frameworks (e.g. Gormley, 2007; see also chapter 4 below) inform us that informal and situational-specific non-

[31] For examples on this, consult Inglehart (1977); Schaar (1981); and Dalton (2004).

hierarchical networks, including actors from both within and outside government, are the main source of contemporary policymaking. This however, also increases the uncertainty as to who is making the final decisions, and, consequently, where the public should place their trust. Instead, we can anticipate that this government/governance transition places the outcome of each decision-making processes, that is the resulting policy, centre stage. It further seems reasonable to assume that the causal connection between political and policy legitimacy weakens considerably as the policy-domain becomes more complex, and as an increased number of imminent value-conflicts make the Weberian notion of instrumental rationality a less adequate guide for policy design. Thus, in particular concerning broad issues such as the environment, there are good reasons for acknowledging that legitimacy can be a quality both of a regime *and* a policy, and therefore to grant attention to policy legitimacy as an issue analytically separate from the political legitimacy of whole regimes.

Moreover, as has been acknowledged by the higher-order legitimacy issue in chapter 1, it seems a logical assumption that the connection between political and policy legitimacy should work both ways and that structural flaws in the democratic system (e.g. elections, decision-making processes, accountability) not are the only factors that might reduce public support for a government. As mentioned above, also the introduction of unsupported public policies can be expected to have spill over effects on the government introducing them and compromise its pursuit of other political aspirations. This is a fact both when lack of public support are manifested as diverging public opinions, as well as when it is due to a fundamental legitimacy-deficit for the policy. For examples of the former, Williams and Edy (1999:231) argue that by routinely ignoring public opinion the government's political legitimacy is undermined, which in turn makes future decision-making and enforcing considerably more difficult. A range of models outlining the behaviour of both voters and political elites suggest that decision-making power is highly sensitive to public opinion (cf. Williams and Edy, 1999; Jacobs et al, 1999). On the one hand, research on voting behaviour has demonstrated how voters invoke past performances as a significant factor for evaluating their alternatives and support of candidates in an upcoming election.[32] On the other, decision-makers tend to follow, or at least frame decisions in a way that aligns with, what they understand to be the majority will to avoid being punished by the electorate. In models of the policy process, a supportive public opinion is also listed as a major resource for advocates of a specific line of interest, allowing them to successfully press for changes in public policy (cf. Weible, 2005). The strong rise in public opinion polls over the last decades (cf. Glynn, Herbst, O'Keefe and Shapiro, 1999) may be taken as an, at least

[32] E.g. the theory of *retrospective voting*, see for example Fiorina (1981).

indirect, acknowledgement of the causal connection between policy output and political legitimacy. Further confirmation of this direction of influence can also be presented. Not the least should we take into account the abundance of research efforts suggesting that democratic governments indeed are highly responsive to changes in public opinion, allowing it both to constrain and exert positive pressure on the policymaking process (e.g. Caprara et al., 2006; Jacobs et al, 1999; Stimson et al, 1995; Rein and Schön, 1993; Feldman, 1988; Page and Shapiro, 1983; see also chapter 3 below).

From a perspective of democratic theory, the influence of policy outputs on political legitimacy is even more firmly established. The very basics of representative democratic rule are founded on the notion that policy makers represent collective interests (e.g. Dahl, 1985). Public policy, therefore, expresses what governmental actors (wishes to) do as well as why and how they (wishes to) do it as *representatives* of their citizens. From this perspective, a minimum requirement for the legitimacy of democratic political government is that also policy content itself, not only the institutional arrangements for deciding on it, to some extent aligns with the basic values established in society. Certainly, it is true enough that not all political decisions always will be popular among a broad majority of the public. In fact, from time to time situations will certainly arise where a democratically elected government wants to make decisions that for any number of reasons do not have the widespread support of public opinion. This undisputable fact, however, highlights the need for further clarifications. There are, I believe, significant differences in both problem-solving and effects on present and future performance, between a policy to which people object based on it challenging, for examples, their immediate (material) interests, personal short-term objectives or established habits, and a policy that suffers from a fundamental legitimacy deficit.[33] Nonetheless, although dissonant policies not necessarily present any core *democratic* problems there are, so to speak, certain limits on what this dissonance should be allowed to concern. Conflicts regarding short-term objectives or personal habits are commonplace in the democratic political debate and may certainly affect the amount of initial support a policy receives.

[33] Fell (2006; see also Beetham, 1991; Glynn et al, 1999) discusses the important distinction here made between illegitimacy (based on diverging values and beliefs) and other causes to a lack in public consent to a policy (based, for example, on conflicting personal interests; misconceptions of the rules of power; or lacking political knowledge). Following on from this distinction, this thesis further disagrees with the notion that legitimacy also can be viewed in an instrumental way, as acceptance of a power-relationship for reasons of self-interest (referred to as pragmatic legitimacy, see Suchman [1995]). Rational calculations of the value a policy or a power-relationship has for a person's immediate self-interest may affect its reception, but this should not be thought of as on a par with its fundamental legitimacy. On a similar topic, note also the important difference here made between public acceptance, support or consent, and legitimacy. How people react to a power-relationship is not equal to, but may rather be a consequence of, its legitimacy. This distinction is important as other factors apart from legitimacy also can trigger expressions of both acceptance and discontent.

This, however, is not to say that all contested or unpopular policies should be dismissed as being undemocratic. In a representative system, where decisions are made through majority-rule, a complete agreement on all aspects of policy would be difficult, not to say impossible, to achieve and the democratic system therefore rather relies on acceptance despite disagreement (Dahl, 1985). This is where policy legitimacy becomes significant. In order for a policy to enjoy a fundamental acceptance from the public, thus being viewed as morally obligatory to obey even though it might conflict with immediate personal preferences, policies need to be *legitimate* in the sense that they keep within the framework of core values or beliefs established in society. The same requirement is valid from a perspective of democratic theory (e.g. Held, 1996; Dahl, 1989). In political practice, it is therefore imperative for policy makers to work as to ensure that the policies made indeed are publicly acceptable judged by the normative foundations of their content, and in this also to acknowledge the significant differences between illegitimacy (based on non-corresponding values and beliefs) and other forms of dissonance (based on shallower factors). In political and policy research, the connections between public policy content and legitimacy should therefore not be understated.

2.2 THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY

How, then, should legitimacy be evaluated, and by what criteria? Given the somewhat broad and imprecise definition of the concept, several approaches to conducting a study of legitimacy have been suggested. The description provided above draws somewhat on a sociological conceptualisation of legitimacy as on a par with public consent or acceptance. Building on the commonly used Weberian definition (e.g. Weber, 1968), an institution, a power relationship[34] or, as in the topic for this thesis, a policy is hereby deemed as legitimate when people in general believe it to be so, and openly acts so as to reinforce this notion (cf. Black, 2008; Beetham, 1991; Schaar, 1984). Consequently, this amounts to an approach to legitimacy as acquiescence; as a *social* (Karlsson, 2001) or *empirical* (Tsakatika, 2005)[35] phenomenon, stemming exclusively from the subjective and highly volatile

[34] When discussing legitimacy-theory, this thesis will henceforth apply the term 'power relationship' in order to describe all situations where questions of legitimacy might arise. In particular, power relationship here signals the relationship between the citizen and political authority, whether taking the form of a single policy or a whole regime.

[35] Another denomination for this conceptualisation of legitimacy is provided by Jachtenfuchs (1995:126), who refers to the 'functionalist approach to legitimacy'; evaluated empirically by exploring the citizens' stated loyalty to the outputs of the political system.

opinions of the citizens. Evaluating legitimacy from this point of view therefore consists of a study of the actual acceptance for a policy or a political authority, examining whether the current object of study indeed is believed to be legitimate by those subordinated to it. This type of study is explicit and as such implicating that the question of legitimacy for a power relationship is put directly to the subordinate by the means of, for example, an opinion poll or any other form of survey (cf. Glynn et al, 1999; Beetham, 1991; Jachtenfuchs, 1995). However, what is also inferred through this definition is the simultaneous dismissal of any external reference underpinning the level of legitimacy. The approach has therefore been defined as relativistic, and as such independent of any judgements made by the observer referring to the relationship's moral rights or wrongs. Any power relationship, regardless of its normative foundations, can therefore be defined as being either legitimate or illegitimate, depending solely on the subordinate's openly stated opinions on its rightfulness. For example, as stated by Jachtenfuchs (1995:127-128) the value of democracy as a political system lies, according to this view, not in democracy actually being a morally superior system of government, but rather in the system's efficiency for securing the citizens' loyalty towards the state. "As a consequence", he continues, "non-democratic systems may also enjoy legitimacy" (Jachtenfuchs, 1995:127). Evaluating the legitimacy for environmental public policy as being a purely social phenomenon would thereby consist of asking citizens directly whether they believe the policy in question to be legitimate; an affirmative answer leading to the general conclusion that it is. Following Beetham (1991:8-11), the creation of legitimacy, when conceptualised as a social or empirical occurrence, is thereby placed exclusively in the hands of the powerful, making it possible to produce merely by convincing the citizens of its own rightfulness. Not necessarily by upholding values or producing outcomes consistent with the public expectations at the same time.[36] When inferring legitimacy from expressed opinions, it should therefore be noted that opinions are considered highly susceptible to change in comparison to basic values and beliefs, and as such more sensitive to and readily influenced by external factors. This is to say that opinions on a power relationship's legitimacy might well be the result of, for example, media-reports or official information campaigns, rather than of a basic correspondence of values and beliefs creating a common ground between the powerful and the subordinate (cf. Glynn et al, 1999; see also

[36] This is the conception of legitimacy advanced by, for example, Lipset (1981:64-68). In response to this approach to the concept of legitimacy, Schaar (1984:108-110) concurs with Beetham's critique. By relating the level of legitimacy to the 'belief in legitimacy', the role of the state in manipulating it becomes far too important and an evaluation along these lines risks, therefore, to provide evidence of nothing outside the ability of the powerful to advance arguments of its own rightfulness. As Schaar (1984:109-110) puts it: "[t]he regime or the leaders provide the stimuli, first in the form of policies improving citizen welfare and later in the form of symbolic materials which function as secondary reinforcements [...] Over time, if the rulers manipulate symbols skilfully, symbolic rewards alone may suffice to maintain supportive attitudes".

Gilbert and colleagues' [1998:796] notion of framing as "opinion recipes"). As such, these opinions may also change over short time periods. Further critical voices have been rised towards this evaluation of legitimacy as acquiescence since it simply may lead to false conclusions on the matter. Most prominent, acceptance may not necessarily be a sign of legitimacy, but of public indifference or apathy (Føllesdal, 2004).

Judging from the critique towards the above approach to studying legitimacy, it is safe to say that not all would agree with Weber's empirical criteria for evaluation. For one, Beetham (1991:10-15) criticises the Weberian approach for it being merely a report on peoples beliefs, and for not providing any foundation for *explaining* acceptance and, thus, the basis for legitimacy. Accordingly, a slightly different view on the concept is put fourth by Tsakatika (2005:193, italics added) who states that "[l]egitimacy refers to the idea that the exercise of power is normatively acceptable and *for that reason* voluntarily accepted". This implies, further, that legitimacy can be evaluated also from at least one other point of departure. In contrast to the Weberian definition, most frequently applied within the social sciences, legitimacy from the perspective of political or moral philosophy is described as being *formal* or *normative*[37]. By this connotation, legitimacy is seen relating less to the subjective beliefs of the citizenry and considerably more to the nature of the object of study itself (Beetham, 1991; Føllesdal, 2004; Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Tsakatika, 2005; see also Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). Here, legitimacy is defined as objectively determined, something that is morally justifiable and therefore acceptable by it conforming to a predetermined set of normative criteria. Evaluating legitimacy by this normative approach is, therefore, a matter of determining whether this standard is met or not. Thus, the core assumptions made in defining legitimacy normatively is, *first*, that society is founded on a specific set of shared values which must be respected and upheld throughout the power relationship for its legitimacy to be at hand, but also, *second*, that the nature of the set of relevant shared values can be determined merely by considering the philosophical foundations of the said power relationship. In the context of this thesis, it is precisely this conception of normative legitimacy that is thought of as underpinning the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma of environmental politics and green political thought; in particular since the dilemma also refers to the position that contemporary environmental policies are confined by the philosophical foundations of liberal democracy for them to enjoy legitimacy. Thereby, normative legitimacy emanates from the assumption that an objectively defined set of values and beliefs (distilled from the liberal idea-tradition) is

[37] The concepts of formal and normative legitimacy are here used interchangeably, the core meaning being the same i.e. a definition of legitimacy as dependent of more than merely the empirical stated belief in (social) legitimacy. Legitimacy is, by this definition, rather evaluated in connection to some external criteria.

either more principally right and/or more widely supported among the citizenry towards which the policy in question is directed, thus determining their feelings towards the policy. Above all, any policy of this kind must, while effectively protecting the environment from destruction, at the same time respect a set of overarching values, commonly constituted by the likes of democracy, individual autonomy and/or state neutrality (cf. Jagers, 2002 & 2004; Lundqvist, 2001b & 2004c). In this, however, the question of whether or not these values indeed are shared by the citizenry (thus forming the basis for legitimacy), is taken for granted.

In *The Legitimation of Power*, David Beetham (1991) rejects the application of both the normative and the social conceptualisations as criteria for evaluating legitimacy as, when applied independently, being too one-sided. The philosophical-normative definition is deemed inadequate since it does not relate sufficiently to the actual beliefs of the citizens and thus overlooks the psychological aspects indicating that legitimacy...

> ...lies as much in the values, interests, expectations, and cognitive frames of those who are perceiving or accepting the regime as they do in the regime itself. As such, legitimacy can differ significantly across time and space, and between actors, systems, and contexts (Black, 2008:145).

Normative legitimacy exclusively focuses on drawing up guidelines for when a policy or institution *should* be considered legitimate, not when it actually is so, and it therefore, in the words of Karlsson (2001:107), "neglects a common-sense understanding of legitimacy". By building the evaluation of legitimacy exclusively on the correspondence with objectively developed moral-philosophical concepts, the value-laden positions of the public is altogether disregarded and so is the fact that people in general tend to make their judgements based not on external moral standards but on those values they actually do hold (see chapter 3 below). It is simply assumed that consensus on a universal set of values exists. Thus, evaluating the degree of normative legitimacy for a power relationship neither takes into account the legitimacy of particular situations or contexts, nor the different understandings citizens might hold regarding the normative concepts by which it is evaluated. Moreover, by doing so, the adoption of a normative approach to legitimacy limits the application of the concept, as culturally or historically bound variations in beliefs are easily overlooked.[38]

At the other end of the spectrum, the Weberian definition of social legitimacy is criticised for going too far in its ambition to take the beliefs of actual citizens in concrete situations as its starting-point. In part, Beetham

[38] See, for example, Bäckstrand's (2006:292) assertion that global multi-stakeholder partnerships not should be evaluated using nation-bound, democratic government structures as the yardstick.

agrees with the philosophical-normative critique, that the Weberian approach is amiss since it does not include any objective references for legitimacy in the form of moral standards, but his primarily objection concerns the fact that a sole focus on citizens' expressed opinions misconceives their role in legitimising a power relationship (Beetham, 1991:10-11). Instead, he continues, legitimacy must be evaluated not by the degree to which people believe it is so, but according to the extent to which it can be justified in terms of the commonly held beliefs and values:

> [W]hen we seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other power relation, one thing we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified in terms of people's beliefs, how far it satisfies the normative expectations they have of it. We are making an assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification. We are not making a report on people's 'belief in its legitimacy' (Beetham, 1991:11).

It can be deduced from this critique towards the Weberian approach that legitimacy not should be evaluated directly, by asking the subordinates about the believed legitimacy of a power relationship. Doing so risks confusing the legitimacy of a power-relationship with, for instance, more volatile opinions about its performance in a specific issue or its impact on personal habits and interests. More accurately, the study of legitimacy constitutes an indirect method, where the degree of legitimacy is inferred from the *indicators* on legitimacy elucidated through the empirical analysis. It should, however, not be expected that the empirical material in itself will provide any straight forward conclusions on legitimacy but merely serve as the foundation for a further analysis; in particular building on the amount of value-correspondence between the power-relationship under study and those subject to it.

Following this, Beetham (1991) and Tsakatika (2005), propose that an evaluation of legitimacy should take into account the prospect for a power relation to be normatively acceptable, in addition to the actual acceptance of it by the citizenry. Legitimacy is thus not to be described as one-directional, flowing from the subordinate and upwards in the system (or, by all means, vice versa). Rather it is a two-way, reciprocal connection between powerful and subordinated, where the former *upholds* or *pursues* legitimacy by conforming to a set of established rules and, more implicitly, values and beliefs. At the same time, the subordinate has a similar role by *conferring* legitimacy to the powerful through publicly displaying their consent in terms of actions that support the present power relationship. Hence, "[l]egitimate power is not owned but reasserted in a dialogue of actions between governors and governed" (Dannreuther, 1999:441). As an important contrast to the Weberian concept of social legitimacy, the acts of consent by the subordinate

are, however, believed to be dependent on the extent to which both (a) a consensus on values and beliefs, underpinning the power-relationship as a whole, is present between the powerful and the subordinate, and (b) these belief-systems are respected and adhered to by the political authority in its exercise of power. As Dannereuther (1999) goes on to assert, this notion of legitimacy in which social and normative factors reinforce each other strongly connects to March and Olsen's (e.g. 1989; see also Peters, 2005) logic of appropriateness, where the interaction between the institution itself and the individuals within it, rather than externally derived norms and values, is in focus. Following this, Beetham argues that legitimacy is to be viewed as a multi-dimensional concept, constituted by three mutually enforcing dimensions, each of which independently contributes to the legitimation (or not) of the power-relationship. Thus, legitimacy is evaluated as being a tripartite structure. *First*, by the extent to which the subordinates openly express their consent to the power relationship; *second* by the extent to which the power relationship as such conforms to the established rules of society (i.e. legality); and *third* by the extent to which these rules can be justified in terms of shared beliefs and values generally held in society. For each one of the three dimensions of legitimacy, a contrasting form of non-legitimate power is also a possible outcome, illustrating the notion that "[l]egitimacy is not an all-or-nothing affair" (Beetham, 1991:19), but comes in many different shapes as well as of varying qualities and degrees. Table 2.1 below illustrates the three dimensions of legitimacy's relation to one another, and the form of non-legitimate power following from their absence.

TABLE 2.1. *Three dimensions of legitimacy*

	Criteria of legitimacy	**Form of non-legitimate power**
1.	Expressed consent – actively given by the subordinate for the power relationship	Delegitimation (withdrawal of consent)
	dependent on	*because of*
2.	Conformity to rules (legal validity) – the acquisition and exercise of power conforms to a set of established rules,	Illegitimacy (breach of rules),
	And	*or*
3.	Justifiability of rules in terms of shared values and beliefs – the rules governing the power relationship are acceptable to the subordinate, by corresponding to general values or beliefs held in society.	Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy between rules and beliefs or absence of shared values and beliefs).

The overview of the legitimacy-dimensions shown in the table above is adapted from the one offered by Beetham (1991:20). For the purpose of this thesis, the ordering in which the three dimensions are presented has been reversed. This as to better acknowledge the fact that actively given consent here is thought of as an effect; an expression of (a lack in) legitimacy

dependent on the presence (or absence) of either the legality or the justifiability of the power relationship, or both. This also, I believe, better explicates the function of legitimacy as a variable affecting policy performance and determining what is required in terms of external incitements and structures for reaching positive outcomes. If either of the two latter criteria are missing, that is, if the established and justified rules are not followed in the exercise of power (lack in legal validity) or if the rules themselves are not established (i.e. not reflecting a set of shared values) the result will be a lack of expressed consent on the part of the subordinate and, thus, a delegitimation of the power relationship.

Before examining these three dimensions of legitimacy in more detail, a note on the territorial limitations of policy legitimacy should also be made. When exchanging the prefix of legitimacy, from *political* to *policy*, one also encounters what can be described as a *demos*-problem: a choice regarding who should be considered subordinate in the power relationship, thus able to confer legitimacy on the powerful, has to be made. Dealing exclusively with political legitimacy, identifying the roles of powerful and subordinate is relatively straight forward. Here, the latter consists of all citizens legally subject to the rulings of (the powerful) political authority. But what about when exploring policy legitimacy? In some cases, a policy might be directed towards and have consequences only for a sub-group of citizens within the state. In other, such as many environmental issues, the consequences of policy clearly have the potential to reach beyond state boundaries, and even across generations. Does this mean that also people not legally bound to the authority of the regime deciding on policy are to be considered a party in the power relationship? Should, for example, protests in other parts of the world, by citizens of other states be taken as a sign of delegitimation? These philosophically relevant questions can be debated in length, but this is neither the time nor the place to do so. In this thesis, my focus is on the legitimacy of Swedish environmental policy. Although I agree that the activities on both the individual and national level have global consequences, I nevertheless choose to delimit my interpretation of who constitutes the subordinate to the citizens of Sweden. These are the ones expected to take on a greater personal environmental responsibility. They are bound by rules, regulations and economic incentives resulting from the implementation of the policy. In addition, they hold the power to punish the powerful for introducing policies lacking in legitimacy, through the democratic election process.

Dimension 1: Legitimacy as expressed consent

The most empirically visible dimension of legitimacy is, according to Beetham, the legitimacy conferred by the citizens to the powerful through the

demonstrable expression of consent, that is, a presence of such actions providing evidence of acquiescence bestowed on the power relationship. Here, it should again be emphasised that consent (and certainly also the withdrawal of consent) for a power relationship must be expressed through actions. A verbal expression of consent is therefore, in contrast to the Weberian definition of social legitimacy, not sufficient for legitimacy to be at hand but legitimacy according to Beetham (1991) must be conferred to the powerful by consent expressed as concrete *action* on the part of the subordinate. Whether working as to legitimising or delegitimising a power-relationship, these actions must, furthermore, both take place in the public sphere be as well as be publicly known. Otherwise, their function as conferring legitimacy on (or deligitemise) the powerful will be lost (Beetham, 1991:210). In many studies, citizens' voluntary participation in election-procedures has been viewed as being a way of legitimising a political system and its distribution of power. Whether taking place in a democratic state or not, the act of voting contributes to increasing the legitimacy of the regime or the political system as a whole. In line with this, elections in contemporary representative democracies have as their prime task to legitimise political power by involving the citizens in the political process; either through creating a top-down aggregation of support for political elites (cf. Ginsberg, 1982) or by driving the bottom-up channelling of preferences from the electorate to its representatives (Harrop and Miller, 1987). By participating, the citizen openly confers legitimacy to the political authority. In similar ways are staged elections in non- or semi-democracies an important, and commonly applied, attempt to demonstrate that political authority is in fact both rightful and legitimate in the eyes of the majority of the citizenry. Perhaps more obvious, for expressed consent to be at hand requires also an absence of actions (for example demonstrations, civil disobedience or even revolutions) openly indicating non-approval.[39] If not the power-relationship is considered delegitemised, in a more or less serious way depending on the nature of the actions (Beetham, 1991:18-19 & 90-97).

However, expressed consent cannot on its own carry the legitimisation of a power relationship. As evident from the critique towards the Weberian notion of social legitimacy a relationship of power, whether in the form of a political system, a regime or a single policy need not be legitimate simply because there is no evidence of discontent, or be legitimate even when we observe people expressing their consent through activities. These patterns of (non-)behaviour can be founded in other sources than in the legitimacy of a power relationship. This is the reason for Beetham to include two further,

[39] Non-approval in the context of environmental policy legitimacy would take the form of actively protesting against the policy intentions and requirements, either through demonstrations in this effect or through other public acts in contradiction to what the policy prescribes.

more fundamental, dimensions in his conceptualisation of legitimacy, both of which draw on the indirect normative-philosophical approach discussed above and serve as to make the concept of legitimacy more nuanced and enable an exploration of those factors underpinning expressed opinions.

Dimension 2: Legitimacy as rule conformity

By explicitly expressing consent through action, the subordinate confers legitimacy to the powerful. However, a high level of legitimacy also requires further criteria to be satisfied, in particular since expressed consent (or the absence of protest) also can be an effect of other circumstances than citizens' perception of political power as being legitimate. For example, coercion is not an uncommon practice for aggregating displays of public support in favour of the (powerful) regime in non-democratic states. And by the same token; abstaining from voting in democratic elections does not remove a person's general obligation to obey political authority in practice (Beetham, 1991:96). Therefore, the legitimation of power is by Beetham being characterised as a two-way flow, recognising that the powerful themselves need to take certain measures in creating or upholding the legitimacy of a power relationship. First, both the acquisition of power and the exercise of it need to conform to a set of, formal as well as informal, rules. The power relationship thus needs to enjoy *legal validity*, by respecting and abiding to the societal "rules of power" (Beetham, 1991:16 & 64-69). As a basic requirement, the exercise of power according to some set of rules is necessary in order to make the power relationship transparent for the subordinate, and in order to avoid capricious or arbitrary behaviour on the part of the powerful. Both rules that are defined as formal (i.e. laws originating from, and enforced by, the state) as well as informal (traditional and customary norms of behaviour) are therefore important, predominately for them lowering the level of uncertainty in human interaction on all levels. Without these, there will be no framework to guide the dos and don'ts of a relationship, and therefore no way of determining how, for example, a rightful acquisition of power is constituted and what may be included in the exercise of this power (cf. Beetham, 1991:65; North, 1990:3; Ostrom, 1990:50-51). Although this dimension concerns what Beetham (1991:64-69) calls the legal validity of the power relationship, the rules are, as mentioned above, not necessarily to be thought of as included in the formal legal code. Rather, they are given a broader and more general connotation, with regards both to their form as well as to their function:

> Social rules ensure predictability through their normative or prescriptive force; they impose obligations and create corresponding entitlements, which are publicly acknowledged and collectively enforced. As such, they both serve to regulate behaviour in a

> predictable fashion, and provide the reference point for entitlement claims which people can expect to have recognised by others. [...] Social rules may be customary and conventional in form, or be part of the legal order (Beetham, 1991:65).

Albeit informal rules in many aspects govern the relationships also between the powerful and the subordinate, and impose limitations on power (one example given is the strong political position of the British PM), Beetham (1991:65-66) nevertheless recognises that for legitimising a power relationship, and thereby creating obligations for the subordinate within this relationship, the establishment of formal rules are indeed preferable. Contrary to customs, codified law is both more transparent for the citizenry as well as possible for the authority to enforce, thereby creating certainty and stability in the power relationship (cf. Axelrod, 1986). In contemporary democracies, most rules of power are therefore formally regulated in law.

By this definition I choose to agree with Parkinson (2003:182; see also Beetham, 1991:17), that the legality-criterion is "fairly uncontroversially subordinate to the other two [dimensions of legitimacy], because the rules themselves may be just or unjust according to some external standard". Therefore, as Parkinson through the above quote rightly points out, the rules themselves need not only to be abided by in the process of acquiring or exercising power, but must also be acceptable to the subordinate and thereby firmly *established* in the society. Without them being agreed to by the citizenry, for the political authority merely to follow these rules of power will not in any way serve as to legitimise the exercise of power. This requirement is particularly relevant for new formal rules originating from the various levels of government. For laws and regulations already in place, an implicit acceptance is assumed since formal rules-in-use for the most part are thought of as being founded in informal rules and thereby as being already established in society. Additionally, for as long as these rules-in-use do not themselves give rise to controversies, there is no reason for anyone to question them being established in society. However, from time to time situations do occur when the explicit need for further justification of formal rules is called for. According to Beetham (1991:68), examples of these situations are (a) when conflict arises over the interpretation of existing law, for example when an authoritative decision is appealed to court by the subordinate; (b) when social changes (and with them changes in the informal rules) drive popular demands for reformation of existing law; and (c) when new formal rules are being implemented, for example through the making of environmental policy which creates new formal institutions and, to use the words of North (1990), new restrictions on the players. In instances like these, where conflict arises either over the contents of old rules or due to the implementation of new ones, it is no longer adequate (or even possible) to assume these formal rules to rest on

socially established foundations. Clearly, the powerful must also be able to justify them by referring to some core value or principle outside the rule itself, thus proving them compatible with public values. A third criterion for legitimacy is therefore introduced by Beetham, addressing the question if the normative foundations of the rules of power are shared by the citizenry; if these rules governing the power relationship can be justified by reference to common beliefs or values; if these rules in actual fact *are* established in society.

Dimension 3: Legitimacy as the justifiability of rules

Underpinning both the criteria of legal validity and, by inference, the criteria of consent, is the notion of legitimacy as evaluated by the justifiability of the rules. Following Beetham's line of reasoning, the rules of power must not only be abided by, they must also be established in society in the sense that they are justifiable with reference to beliefs and values shared between the powerful and the subordinate. Without this justifiability criteria being fulfilled, there is no basis for accepting a power relationship or its outputs as morally binding, regardless of its compliance with a set of (in this case unjust) rules or not. This, in turn, demands that the values by which the individuals evaluate the justness of the rules must be largely shared by the powerful, and vice versa. As Beetham puts it:

> Without a common framework of belief, the rules from which the powerful derive their power cannot be justifiable to the subordinate; the powerful can enjoy no moral authority for the exercise of their power, whatever its legal validity; and their requirements cannot be normatively binding, though they may by successfully enforced (Beetham, 1991:69).

Similar ideas have been put forward by, amongst others, Pennock (1979) who states that a prerequisite for an efficient functioning and endurance of public institutions is a public consensus on the values and ideals promoted.[40] Given this emphasis on justifiability, which values and beliefs are then relevant for an evaluation of legitimacy? To answer this question, it is necessary to make a careful distinction between two separate foundations for legitimacy applied in previous research: legitimacy of source and legitimacy of content. According to Skogstad (2003a:956, see also Beetham, 1991:70; Hodson and Maher, 2002; Schmidt and Thomassen, 1999; Scharpf, 1999),

[40] On a slightly different note; also the field of democratic theory displays several occasions where institutional efficiency as well as acceptance-based stability connects to value-correspondence. For example, Dahl (1989); Rousseau (1994); and Mill (1991) have all emphasized the importance of shared (democratic) values for the stable functioning and acceptance of a democratic political system. See also Knight (1992:171) who more specifically addresses the importance of basing formal rules in a set of commonly shared customs and traditions.

legitimacy (or its counter-part) can be examined both on the input- and on the output-side of the political process. That is to say that the legitimacy for either a regime or a specific policy can originate from both the rules of the game, as well as from the outcomes of governing, i.e. from the results of the political authority's power. This input/output division of legitimacy is also consistent with what Morris (2005, following Schmidtz, 1990) refers to as the teleological and the emergent approach of justification respectively; political authority can be legitimised either by the processes through which it arises, or by what it accomplishes in practice. [41]

The former case of *input* (or procedural) legitimacy concerns what Beetham (1991:70-76; see also Parkinson, 2003:182) refers to as justification originating from an authoritative source, that is, from commonly held values regarding the rightful source of authoritative decisions. Thereby, it refers first and foremost to the rules governing how political decisions are made and by whom; in essence the answer to questions regarding *who* should decide, *how*, and *why*?[42] Input legitimacy is thereby comprised by the feeling that those who make the collectively binding decisions also have a right to do so, usually as democratically elected representatives accountable to the public. Following Beetham, and drawing on a range of perspectives within political philosophy, different systems of belief can specify sources of authority that are broadly categorised as either external (i.e. religion, natural law, or science) or internal (i.e. democracy or tradition) to society; several of which have proven significant also in contemporary democracies. For example, in a survey of values regarding sources of political authority in contemporary Canada, Skogstad (2003b:956-957) uncovered no less than four competing conceptions of the basis for political power; apart from the dominating idea of the advantages of state-centred representative democracy (rule by representatives), also preferences for expert authority; market-based/private authority; and popular authority (rule by the people directly) were found.

When studying the political legitimacy of regimes, focusing on the input-side is certainly of value as this can assist in identifying the structural problems facing contemporary political institutions, for instance the well-researched democratic deficit of the European Union, focusing on public participation, decision-making accountability and control through elections (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix, 2006). However, also a significant amount of studies on policy legitimacy have focused on input, thereby placing the public policy *process* at the centre of attention when attempting to explaining policy

[41] This rough division of legitimacy in two strands relating to the input and output side respectively legitimacy respectively might seem a bit simplistic. Accordingly, there are several more intricate typologies for the analysis of legitimacy or public support. See, for example, Norris (1999) for an overview. In the context of this thesis, the dual division in input and output legitimacy is, however, entirely sufficient.

[42] Compare to the boundary problem, or demos problem, in democratic theory (e.g. Dahl, 1989).

success or failure. It is thus the justifiability of the rules governing access to participation and the procedures surrounding the decision-making process that are thought of as determining the legitimacy of a policy. In several cases policy legitimacy is therefore connected to, or viewed as emanating from, the inclusion and engagement of stakeholders throughout the problem-definition and decision-making stages. It is thus intimately linked to the suggested transition from government to governance and to the inclusion of deliberative practices in the policy process as an instrument for public policy support (Wallner, 2008; Parkinson, 2003; McLaverty and Halpin, 2008; Black, 2008; Montpetit, 2008; Smith, 2005). The key issue in these notions of policy legitimacy is that a transformation of decision-making institutions, so that "all those subject to the decision in question" (Dryzek, 2001:651) also are allowed to participate and deliberate upon it prior to any decision being made, strongly increases the legitimacy of the policy itself. However, apart from the practical problems of scale such a solution presents (e.g. Parkinson, 2003; Goodin, 2000; Rothstein, 2000; Sabatier, 1995), further objections can be made to its underpinning conceptualisation of policy legitimacy as resting solely upon process, and to the study of policy legitimacy as a study of fair, mutually agreed upon procedures. As with the legitimacy for whole regimes, it is certainly of significance that collective decisions are made by actors as well as in a way that are viewed as rightful by those subject to the decision. However, suggesting that some measure of public or stakeholder inclusion in itself can bestow legitimacy on a policy overlooks the fact that participation in deliberative processes is a display of expressed consent, and hence legitimation, for the process of decision-making alone and not necessarily for its outputs. Furthermore, as have been discussed above, it is not by any means certain that publicly acceptable processes generate a legitimacy-capital large enough to cover also policy outputs (e.g. Hanberger, 2003). In fact, following democratic procedures of any kind generally means rather little if these do not also lead to outputs that are justifiable and therefore legitimate by themselves.[43] Following Beetham (1991:82), although the source and processes of decision-making authority can be justified by reference to shared beliefs, legitimacy requires also that the powerful and the subordinate be

[43] In all fairness, it should be mentioned that this need for value-correspondence presents another rationale for suggesting the inclusion and participation of members of the public in policymaking processes. The assumption is that dialogue helps decision-makers to reach a better understanding on which values, problem descriptions or preferred solutions that are established in society and therefore can make better, i.e. more readily supported, decisions (cf. Carter, 2001). A certain measure of public participation is necessary for policymakers to become familiar with public preferences, but this is not in itself a guarantee for the outputs being legitimate. Furthermore, it is also believed that participation have a transformative function and thus might work both as to shape and to align the beliefs and preferences of those participating with political aspirations. In either case, however, changing the institutional arrangements of decision-making have an instrumental, rather than a normative, effect on policy-legitimacy as they serve as to accomplish a correspondence between public values and public policy. Again, this point towards the necessity of considering policy content when evaluating the legitimacy of a policy.

linked together by a common interest, in the absence of which "power can have no justification for the subordinate". Thus, when making an evaluation of a policy's legitimacy, it must be taken into account that legitimacy largely is a quality of the ends of the policymaking process, not merely of its procedures. As such, public policy is only considered legitimate in the case that it presents goals and strategies that align with dominant values in society, and thus demonstrates a common interest (Parkinson, 2003; Schön and Rein, 1994). The *content* of policy, not only the process through which it is developed, should therefore constitute a major part of policy legitimacy evaluations.

This connects further to the second identified source of legitimacy, where a government or any other institution of power is legitimised based on it delivering publicly desirable outputs, not for the process through which they do it. *Output* (or substantive) legitimacy is thus specifically concerned with the actual policy decisions emanating from the political authority. As argued by J. S. Mill (1862/1991:229):

> Government is to be judged by its action upon men, and by its action upon things; by what it makes of the citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of them.

Thus, for this type of legitimacy to be at hand, the outputs of the power relationship need to conform to the expectations, and work for the benefit, of the public. Following Beetham (1991:72, 76-90; see also Parkinson, 2003:183) this type of legitimacy rests on what he defines as justification based on rule-content, emphasising the need for a common ground between the subordinate and powerful; a common interest uniting the two making the actions of the powerful representative for the society as a whole. From this perspective, the degree of legitimacy builds on the existence of a consensus regarding which values should be fulfilled by an output in order for it to be regarded as being morally good, or as Beetham (1991:70) puts it, a consensus on "the moral persuasiveness of their content". For a study which focuses explicitly on policy legitimacy, this fit between public values and public policy can further be seen as pertaining to two parts of the policy's content. Policy outputs enjoy legitimacy based on the extent to which they aspire towards normatively justifiable and desirable ends and, accordingly, promotes a common interest. In particular, this is evaluated based on the (in the society in question) popular understanding of basic values, for instance freedom; equality; and justice, the meaning of which should be shared between the subordinate and the powerful (Beetham, 1991:82-90).

Although Beetham here mainly is concerned with a consensus on very basic beliefs related to the notion of good government serving the public interest in a general sense, the transition from political to policy legitimacy

requires that also less basic or goal-oriented beliefs be considered. To draw reliable conclusions on what the public interest is within a specific policy domain, also beliefs related to the understanding of the problem at hand need to align between policy and public, as these in turn affect understandings on how, by which strategies, basic values and societal goals might be reached. A more empirically oriented perspective is therefore also needed for evaluating policy legitimacy. Thus a policy is legitimate in the sense that it works as to promote the welfare of the political community through effectively addressing concrete societal issues, for example by "satisfying felt needs and solving perceived problems" (Hanberger 2003:258). This clearly addresses the need for a common understanding of the problem at hand, as well as what can be done to amend it. Making an analogy to Kingdon's (1995) widely cited multiple-streams framework, where policy change is seen as the convergence of streams, legitimacy requires not only that policymakers recognise and define a problem and settle on strategies for amending it, it also requires a public concern (for the problem identified) as well as public support (for the solutions suggested). Taken together, the justifiability criterion thereby comprises requirements for consensus on values and beliefs pertaining to both (1) the rightful source and process of authoritative decision-making, as well as to (2) a common interest expressed through the content of the authoritative decisions made.

2.3 ADAPTING THE LEGITIMACY-DIMENSIONS FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY

Returning now to more explicitly addressing the context of this thesis which, to recapitulate, has the overarching aim to *explore the degree of legitimacy for environmental public policy in Sweden and analyse the prospects and prerequisites for designing future environmental policies that holds a high(er) degree of legitimacy*. I believe that Beetham's approach to evaluating the level of legitimacy in a power relationship constitutes a well-suited starting point for reaching this aim. It bridges the two extremes of normative and social legitimacy and emphasises both the need to consider publicly held systems of belief as the basis for legitimacy, as well as the importance of separating the correspondence of values and beliefs from expressions of more volatile opinions or single-issue preferences. However, as Beetham, in line with most scholars dealing with these issues, are concerned primarily with evaluating the legitimacy of regimes or other political institutions, his definitions of a 'power relationship' or the 'powerful' need to be adapted to appropriately suit an analysis where the object of study instead consists of a

single policy-domain. In this thesis, Beetham's suggested legitimacy-dimensions will therefore be somewhat modified to match the aim outlined above.

First, following Beetham (1991), a power relationship is legitimised through the active display of support or consent on the part of the subordinated. In a public policy perspective, this criteria should therefore be evaluated by examining whether, and to what extent, citizens comply with policy requirements, by actively participating in prescribed activities. As already stated above, there are evident limitations to the application of this criterion as expressed consent provides only indications of a possible lack in public support, not of what is causing this deficiency. When scaling down the concept of legitimacy from the level of entire regimes to a single policy-domain, expressed consent becomes even less straightforward as a criterion for legitimacy. In particular when analysing a policy that aspires to initiate a broad range of private-sphere responsibilities with more or less fuzzy edges, it would be difficult to argue that consent is withdrawn from a policy simply because of a shortage in observable, active support[44]. Furthermore, day-to-day behaviour is believed to be a function of many different variables, there among access to external resources such as time or money, and failure to comply with policy requirements might therefore not necessarily be a sign of the policy itself being less legitimate but rather of hindering circumstances outside the policy's goals and strategies. In the same way might also actual compliance with a policy be founded in other factors than its legitimacy, for example in habitual behaviour. Only in those rare instances when citizens actively protest against a policy, either through demonstrations, or by, for example, consciously conducting public activities in apparent opposition to its prescriptions, can the consent for a policy reliably be defined as non-existent or withdrawn. In this thesis, the quality of Beetham's consent-criterion is therefore considered merely as defining the study's point of departure. The aim, more accurately, is to penetrate deeper into the underpinning dimensions of public policy legitimacy and by doing so contribute to the discussion on how compliance, and ultimately policy success, efficiency or failure might be explained.

Second, one of the factors thought of as affecting the amount of expressed public consent is legal validity, the ability (or even ambition) to keep within the boundaries of a contextually determined set of rules when acquiring or exercising power. For democratic states, Beetham's rule conformity criterion notably refers to abidance by the constitutionally determined procedures by which political representatives are both elected to

[44] Compare with Beetham's (1991:210) argument that actions, to have either a legitimising or a delegitimising effect, must take place in public and be publicly known. This certainly makes the consent-criterion difficult to apply on policies suggesting activities primarily located in the privacy on the own home.

office and subsequently make collective decisions. As the present object of study are official public policies in a stable representative democracy, assuming, as is done in this thesis, that a socially established and publicly legitimised set of rules indeed are followed both when policymakers are granted decision-making power and when they subsequently are deciding on policy, should be fairly uncontroversial. In this sense, the level of rule conformity might be expected to have a rather small explicit contribution to the legitimacy of a specific policy. It is perhaps more rewarding to think of public policy as in itself constituting new operational rules (or at least official aspirations towards such rules) as it aims towards the initiation of new public obligations, entitlements and behavioural patterns (cf. Beetham, 1991:65; see also Knight, 1992:145; Premfors, 1989). Doing so requires that policy not only is decided on by actors and in a way that conforms to formally established and legitimate procedures, but also that policymakers should be able to justify their decisions; that the content of these new rules resonate with public values and beliefs.

For the above reasons, the present study's evaluation of public policy legitimacy will therefore be limited to the application of Beetham's *third* criterion: the possibility to justify a policy by referring to a common framework of beliefs, appropriately enough considered being "the key site for the analysis of legitimacy" (Beetham and Lord, 1998:16). The justifiability-criterion concerns more specifically "the provision of reasons for subordinates to consent to power" (Montpetit, 2008) and as such, the focus for analysis is placed on the question how the belief-system on which policy is constructed align with publicly held values and beliefs. To what extent, then, are powerful and subordinated joined together by a common framework of beliefs? As evident from the discussion above, value-correspondence pertaining to the output-side is more of an obvious feature in a study of the legitimacy for a single policy-domain as this places focus on the content of policy expressing political goals and strategies, as well as the casual assumptions and value-priorities underpinning these. *Output-side legitimacy thereby reveals whether, and to what extent, the political aspirations expressed through policy enjoy a basic support of the public by presenting goals and strategies that resonance with the publicly held systems of beliefs, including understandings of the problem at hand.* In other words, to what extent the powerful and the subordinate are joined together by a common interest in the specific policy domain. Set in the context of an established representative democracy, output-legitimacy thus provides *the* reasons by which a public policy is viewed as normatively acceptable and morally binding, or not.

Nevertheless, although I here anticipate that the process in which public policy is being decided on indeed is legitimate in the sense that it follows established, justifiable rules, it still seems reasonable to assume that

the policies themselves will include rhetorical statements that point towards how various factors related to the input-side are considered. Beetham (1991:77-82), for example, incorporates shared "principles of differentiation" alongside a common interest as factor for rule-content justification. Being an aspect of content rather than source, these principles are not concerned with the process of actual decision-making but with the values and beliefs specifying why this distribution of authority is right and proper. Again, although political authority and the process of decision-making in general are legitimate, transferring Beetham's theories to focus on a single policy domain highlights the need for shared beliefs on the proper distribution of authority, as well as the reasons provided for this distribution, in the specific context. For instance, it seems reasonable to expect the political strategies outlined in environmental public policy to at least implicitly account for the distribution of authority between citizens and the state; for the role of citizens in deliberating both on which values that should be prioritised and how policy goals should be reached through activities on the individual level; as well as for the distribution of actual responsibility to actively participate in reaching policy goals. To incorporate these kind of normative statements found in policy is certainly relevant for an analysis of legitimacy, not the least since they might be expected to vary significantly between different policy domains. For environmental policy, this is of particular significance as it, bearing in mind previous theoretical debates, is considered straddling the effectiveness – legitimacy divide because of the implications effective environmental protection is perceived to hold for neutral, limited government and the protection of individual liberty.

At the outset of this thesis, the significance of a policy enjoying legitimacy, defined as the extent to which its normative foundations aligns with public values and beliefs, was argued to be threefold. Legitimacy affects the effectiveness, efficiency and long-term stability of a policy; it constitutes the frames for which policy decisions that are understood as politically possible; and, mainly on a theoretical level, it might have implications for democracy. In a general sense, policy legitimacy concerns the moral justification of public policy and the provision of publicly acceptable reasons for compliance. As the main point of departure in this thesis, the study of policy legitimacy is a study of belief-system correspondence. Its focus is the extent to which public policy and public values aligns and how this correspondence amounts to a possibility for moral justification. As such, however, policy legitimacy delineates a specific role for values and beliefs shared between policy and public. It is neither equal to the expressed support of, or volatile opinions on, a policy, which can be triggered by any number of factors. Nor to a policy's rightfulness according to some external standard, as proposed by normative legitimacy. Thus, when conducting an evaluation of

policy legitimacy, belief-systems rather than opinions or theoretically derived constructions should constitute the analytical focus.

In this thesis, I have therefore chosen to define policy legitimacy as the extent to which the normative foundations of political goals and strategies expressed through the content of public policy aligns with the dominant values, beliefs and attitudes in society (cf. Connolly, 1984a; Beetham, 1991). As illustrated in figure 1 below, analysing legitimacy is therefore understood as an approach comprising three steps. (1) The values and beliefs underpinning the content of public policy and (2) publicly established values and beliefs need to be elucidated, mapped and analysed before (3) a comparison of these two belief-systems can be conducted and conclusions on the level of policy legitimacy be drawn.

FIGURE 1. *Policy legitimacy as the alignment of policy content and public beliefs*



Evaluating environmental policy legitimacy, both as a current state and concerning the its prospects and prerequisites for future public policy, therefore encompass an exploration of the nature of the official environmental norm as expressed rhetorically through official policy documents as well as mapping core values and beliefs established among the public. As Beetham (1991:100) puts it, studies on legitimacy involve "reproducing the reasoning of people within [...] society, and reconstructing the logic of their own judgements". The primary task for an analysis of legitimacy is, therefore, to identify the topics on which such a comparison should focus. An analysis cannot be reliable conducted without some sort of framework or a theoretical lens guiding the inquiry and determining what is important and what can be ignored (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Utilising complex and multi-dimensional concepts such as values and beliefs, whether they are located in

policy or with the individual, as analytical concepts, further emphasises this requirement.

The remaining three chapters in this theoretical part of the thesis will be devoted to the task of outlining relevant topics for analysis and, thereafter, constructing an analytical framework for the exploration of policy legitimacy. As a starting-point, summing up the above discussions on policy legitimacy points us in the direction of a number of relevant topics on which value-alignment is believed central, including policy goals; problem understanding and strategies for problem solving. But these nevertheless need to be further elaborated and specified, and their significance for public as well as policy belief-systems, both in general and with specific consideration of the environmental domain, has to be scrutinised before the construction of an analytical framework. However, further questions also ensue. Defining policy legitimacy as belief-system correspondence also suggest that any study of it requires, using the words of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:154), public policies to be mapped on the same canvas as an individual's system of belief. How, then, can the connection between personal systems of beliefs and public policy be conceptualised, and, given the nature of this connection, how might the topics deemed relevant for policy legitimacy be operationalised for a study of these two analytical entities? Lastly, by the use of which tools might a study of public values and public policy be conducted? The following three chapters address, and will attempt to answer, these questions in more detail.

3. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES II, PUBLICLY ESTABLISHED VALUES AND BELIEFS

This chapter aims at exploring the first component in the analysis of policy legitimacy: publicly established values and beliefs. The theory of legitimacy, as outlined in chapter 2 above, suggest a key role for values and beliefs as determining ultimately how people perceive and respond to public policy. Therefore, how their function, structure and approaches to study are thought of throughout this thesis requires some further attention. Utilising values and beliefs as analytical concepts also means identifying which ones to focus the study on. The list of potentially relevant topics for a values-analysis is extensive, as previous research in the political and behavioural sciences abound with suggestions for values and beliefs functioning as motivational factors with the individual. A further significant issue to address within this chapter is therefore to determine which topics that are relevant to include in an analysis of environmental policy legitimacy, how these are manifested with the individual, and thus how they can be elucidated and mapped among the public.

The significance of an individual's values and beliefs for how she receives and responds to public policy was the topic of the second proposition outlined in the introduction to chapter 2 above. In support of this proposition, a range of previous studies has demonstrated the relevance of personally held values when exploring the formation of attitudes, behaviour, as well as policy evaluation and acceptance on the level of individuals. Demonstrating the multidisciplinary application of value-studies, results emanating

predominately from the fields of social psychology (e.g. Davidov, Schmidt and Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004; Rohan, 2000; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Schwartz, 1992; Stern et al. 1995; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Rokeach, 1968 & 1973); anthropology (Kluckhohn, 1951); as well as from political- and public opinion studies (e.g. Jacoby, 2006; Grafton and Permaloff, 2005a & 2005b; Feldman, 2003 & 1988; Glynn et al, 1999; van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991; Eckstein, 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Dawson, 1979; Inglehart, 1977; Converse, 1964) conclude that value-orientations play an important, if not the most important, role as explanatory factors for individuals' development of political preferences, behavioural predispositions, and situational-specific opinions.

3.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPTS: VALUES, BELIEFS AND PUBLIC BELIEF-SYSTEMS

As a result of the wide application of the concept of values in both behavioural and political studies, the definitions used also demonstrate a great deal of variance, or even a "definitional inconsistency" (Rohan, 2000:255-58; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987:551). Most scholars occupied with values-research nevertheless seem to agree with Allport's (1961:543) admittedly very general description of an individual's value-orientations as being a "dominating force in life", underpinning her formation of attitudes and opinions in a range of different situations. In particular, an individual's personal value-system has been acknowledged as highly significant when faced with novel situations or contexts since "they [values] do act as guiding principles in life, and as such are likely guideposts for action in unfamiliar conditions, including the condition of forming attitudes about new social objects" (Stern et al, 1995:1615; see also Thøgersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997). Similarly, van Deth (1995:5-6; see also Inglehart, 1977 & 1990) describes values as a key variable in social scientific research, as they lie at the core of an individual's formation of attitudes, behavioural intentions and by inference the actual behaviour itself, and therefore are "crucial to interpreting social and political change". Bilsky and Schwartz (1994:178) connect values to the individual's personality, by arguing that priorities among values constitute "a type of personality disposition".

The multitude of different understandings and applications of values, both as a concept as well as a function, is not an ideal starting-point for research. This rather requires a definitional consistency. Throughout this thesis, therefore, values are defined following the smallest common

denominator of these previous definitions, as being (a) *abstract and general conceptions of the desirable which people grant importance as guiding principles in life, and that underpin the understanding that one end-state of existence, goal or mode of conduct is more preferable than others.* Furthermore, unlike the more volatile attitude or opinion[45], which relate to specific objects or situations, values are anticipated to be (b) *relatively stable and enduring trans-situational guides, (i.e. applicable across different contexts).* Lastly, values can be, and are frequently by individuals, also (c) *rank-ordered in terms of their relative importance* (for examples, see: Caprara et al, 2006; Jacoby, 2006; Goren, 2005:883; Rohan, 2000; Maio and Olson, 1995:268; van Deth and Scarborough 1995:32; Schwartz, 1992, 1994 & 1996; Sniderman et al, 1991:269-70; Feldman, 1988; Rokeach, 1968 & 1973).

Consistent with several previous empirical studies on the function of personal values[46], they are also thought of as embedded in a larger hierarchical structure informing both the individual's formation of more empirically oriented beliefs, as well as of attitudes and opinions. Values, Converse (1964:211) writes, are "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs". The nature of an individual's priority among core values therefore has direct relevance for understanding her opinions on specific issues; her behavioural predispositions; and how she defends chosen courses of action (Eriksson, Garvill and Nordlund, 2006; Jacoby, 2006; Stern, 2000; Rohan, 2000:270-73; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999). That is, however, not to say that values are the sole determinant of how a person chooses to actually behave or express opinion. Rather, it must be noted that the effect of values on behaviour seems to be mediated by other factors – internal as well as external. For instance, in those situations where resource-constraints (for example a lack of time, money or adequate technology) make following one's convictions increasingly costly or where the social costs for acting upon one's values are deemed too high, personal values might have less an impact on how the individual chooses to behave (cf. Steg, Dreijerink and Abrahamse, 2005; Hobson, 2002 & 2004a; Bruvoll, Halvorsen and Nyborg, 2000; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; Witherspoon, 1996; Bennulf and Gilljam, 1990; North, 1990). Thus, if the direction of interest is individuals' behavioural choices, external factors are also important to consider. As an example relevant for the topic of this thesis, Stern (2000) lists four causal factors for pro-environmental

[45] Attitudes are here defined as affective or emotional evaluations of specific entities, expressing personal likes and dislikes as well as representing a person's behavioural predispositions. Attitudes are as such a subset of both a person's beliefs and her values. Opinions are defined as the verbal or behavioural expression of an attitude (Rohan, 2000:258; Glynn et al, 1999:105-107). In difference to the relatively stable and enduring values and beliefs, attitudes and opinions are shallower, more volatile and highly dependent on the specifics of a situation.

[46] For example the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory, where values forms the starting-point in a causal chain leading, through policy-domain specific attitudes and personal norms, to behaviour (e.g. Nordlund and Garvill, 2003; Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano and Kalof, 1999). See more below.

behaviour; values, context, capabilities and habits, all of which are interrelated with each other and serve as to shape behavioural decisions. Even so, how individuals *interpret* these external factors, for example their effect on such concepts as freedom or fairness, and how they subsequently choose to react to them, is largely determined by their personal values (cf. Garvill, Marell and Nordlund, 2001; Rohan 2000). Accordingly, Stern et al. (1995:1626) come to the expressive conclusion that "values are linked to the frame used to interpret information provided by the media and other sources". This provides an indication of the anticipation that an individual's values indeed are an important explanatory factor for how various public policy requirements are understood and evaluated on a personal level.

However, research has also showed how other cognitive components are highly important to take into account when studying the value – behaviour connection, not the least in environmental issues (Steg et al, 2005; Nordlund and Garvill, 2003). In particular is the mediating function of a person's *beliefs* of significant relevance to consider. As already mentioned, values are defined as a person's abstract, fundamental conceptions of the desirable, representing her basic ideals and fundamental goals in all aspects of life, for example freedom, security, tradition or power. Beliefs, on the other hand, are here given a more empirically oriented connotation as a person's basic conceptions of the world; the filter by which she views and make sense of reality (e.g. Glynn et al, 1999). Beliefs are therefore sometimes denoted as *worldviews*, that is understandings of both how things are and how they should be, or a "version of actual or potential realities" (Rohan, 2000:270). They thereby serve as to link general, cross-contextual values with situational specific attitudes and opinions by determining how values are interpreted, bestowed meaning and activated in relation to a specific area of the person's life. Dependent on the structure of a person's beliefs, then, different values are activated in different ways, which in turn might lead to different conclusions on how to act for achieving basic normative goals in the context of the perceived reality. According to a range of research on the connection between values and political preferences, which particular values that structure a person's political attitudes and choice depend significantly on the values perceived as predominant in the specific political context or for the specific issue (Davidov et al, 2008; see also Caprara et al, 2006; Tetlock, 1986). Thus, if the political competition is perceived as a choice between market economy or social welfare, the individual's priority among these values will determine her decision. If the choice instead is seen as ranging between family values and tolerance, these values will be activated and guide her decision-making process. This necessity of perceptions of the world for activating core values is also acknowledged in political practice. As mentioned above, politicians regularly attempt to provide the public with frames, or "recommendations

about how issues should be understood" (Gilbert, Fiske and Lindzey, 1998:796), that are anticipated to activate widely shared values, and thus public support for the issue in question (Jacoby, 2006; Goren, 2005; Brewer and Gross, 2005). The impact of issue framing has also been demonstrated in research on individuals' environmental attitudes and behaviour. These studies suggest that pro-environmental predispositions are intimately connected with certain broader discourses, determining how the individual understand the environmental problem (e.g. Flynn, Bellaby and Ricci, 2008). Lastly, as reflected by, for example, Inglehart's (1977) theory of the transition from materialist to post-materialist values, a change in beliefs about the world may also ultimately, although across long periods of time, contribute to a change in value-priorities (Rohan, 2000; also Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Rokeach, 1973).

Nevertheless, as noted by Converse (1964) above, beliefs, although highly significant for how the individual understands the empirical world, are themselves informed and constrained by the more abstract values. That is to say that the priorities a person makes among preferable end-states and important principles in life also influences the very basic way in which she views, evaluates and choose to react to the world around her. For instance, research have demonstrated that a person attributing high priority to tradition and conformity values also tends to view the world as on the brink of crumbling conventions and civilization collapse, as well as be strongly concerned about this development (Altemeyer, 1998; see also Rohan, 2000; Rohan and Zanna, 1996; Parsons, 1951). In the environmental domain, similar links have been demonstrated between altruistic values and views on the environmental situation as problematic and giving rise to negative consequences (e.g. Stern et al, 1995). Furthermore, although values have to be activated to have a direct effect on behaviour (e.g. Verplanken and Holland, 2002), the more important a specific value is to a person, the more easily accessible and thus more easily activated it is by different situations and events. As will be discussed in more detail below, values have been proved to have both a direct impact on the formation of beliefs across a range of contexts, as well as govern how these perceptions of the world subsequently result in attitudinal and behavioural decisions. Due to this perceived interdependency of values and beliefs, the connection between them is therefore understood to be a two-way road (cf. Rohan, 2000), suggesting further that they also should be analysed in concert rather than one by one. The focus for analysis in this thesis is therefore placed on the structure of which both values and beliefs are a part: the person's *belief-system*. A belief-system is here defined as incorporating both basic normative principles as well as empirical beliefs; both priorities among core values and worldviews; both conceptions of the desirable and conceptions of the world. Holsti

(1962:245; see also Converse, 1964) provides a description of the function of the belief-system that aligns rather well with this notion. According to him a belief-system is:

> a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying its salient characteristics [...] In addition to organising perceptions into a meaningful guide to behaviour, the belief system has the functioning of the establishment of goals and ordering of preferences.

This acknowledgement of the values – beliefs interplay also connects well to the definition of policy legitimacy provided above (see figure 1). For legitimacy to be at hand, it is not sufficient that policy and public aligns on fundamental normative goals, which might be interpreted differently and thus lead to diverging conclusions on adequate responses. Correspondence must also be evident concerning the basic understanding of the particular problem and preferences for (adequate) strategies, including the role of political authority in making and implementing these goals and strategies in the specifics of the problem's context.

3.2 BELIEF-SYSTEMS, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY

Being of a broad and trans-situational nature, values function as a guide to both evaluation and attitude formation in all aspects of the individual's life. In particular, however, the significance of a person's system of values for attitudes, preferences and choices pertaining to political issues and even specific public policies has been well-researched (e.g. Caprara et al, 2006; Jacoby, 2006; Altemeyer, 1998; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Rohan and Zanna, 1996; van Deth and Scarbourough, 1995; Mitchell et al, 1993; Zaller 1992; Rasinski, 1987). According to these lines of research, values expressing general desirable goals influence political preferences in several ways. As mentioned above they are causally linked to policy specific attitudes and perceptions. Most people understand political issues in terms of values and base their political choices and policy preferences on the connections they draw between the issue and their personal value-priorities (Brewer and Gross, 2005; Schwartz, 1994; Feldman, 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Thus, following Jacoby (2006:720), "citizens can 'translate' their choices among core values into stands on public policy issues". The fact that values function as the general backstop for the formation of attitudes or opinions in a range of situations also means that a relatively limited set of very basic personal values

is what ultimately lies behind individuals' attitudes towards politics in general and behind evaluations of specific public policies. Through their relative stability, values thereby make it possible for the individual to organize political evaluations and judgements in a relatively consistent manner, both over longer periods of time and in relation to a range of diverse issues (cf. Goren, 2005; Feldman, 2003 & 1988; Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; van Deth and Scarborough, 1995:32-33). For example, the research by Sniderman and colleagues (1991:269-70) leads them to the conclusion that people employ a relatively small number of values in order to give them directions on a wide range of specific issues:

> It would be hard to explain how the average person keeps a myriad of specific opinions about particular policies well organised, given how little attention he or she tends to pay to political issues: it is considerably easier to give an account of how the average person could keep track of a small number of general values, which in turn give him direction on how to respond to a large number of specific issues.

This value-centred model of political reasoning, where a set of core values form the basis for people's political evaluations, differs considerably from notions of public opinion as controlled by people adhering to, and making evaluations based on, distinct political ideologies (e.g. liberal – conservative, left – right). Even though values and beliefs here are thought of as forming coherent clusters, i.e. belief-systems or even ideologies, several studies have shown that the ideological labels commonly elaborated on within political analysis and -philosophy to be either completely unfamiliar or quite meaningless to the people outside a political elite (cf. Price, 1999; Knight, 1999; Kinder, 1998; Feldman, 1988; Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; Long, 1981; Dye and Zeigler, 1978; Converse, 1964; Almond, 1960) .[47] On the mass level, where the level of engagement in politics is low, coherent political

[47] As with the concept of values itself, the term ideology is widely used within the fields of social and behavioural sciences and has therefore been given many differing connotations. Furthermore, the literature is overwhelmed with concepts holding strong conceptual similarities to ideology: belief-systems; frames; and paradigms to name but a few. The prospect for finding a consensus on the meaning of the term ideology, as it is used in political science and psychology, is, however, not an impossible task. For political scientists, the basic concept of an ideology is a set of ideas by which a social group tries to make sense of the world. An ideology thus consists of ideas that explains, predicts as well as evaluates social conditions and gives its bearer a personal orientation regarding her relation to the rest of the world (Ball and Dagger 1999; Shively 2003). Similarly, the ideology concept referred to by Rohan (2000:270) is described as the "rhetorical association or associations between things, people, actions, or activities and the best possible living" as endorsed or promoted by a group of people. In this context, however, it is relevant to note the difference between the (internal) ideology, understood in a broad way as each individual's combination of values and beliefs into a coherent structure specifying desirable means and ends (cf. Rokeach, 1973; Milbrath, 1986; North, 1990), and the (external) political ideology which signifies a specific, elaborated combination of values pertaining exclusively to political issues. For the general public therefore, ideology is not to be thought of as the abstract concepts elaborated on in political philosophy, but as a person's personal configuration of values and beliefs akin to the concept of a belief-system.

ideologies should therefore not be expected to be found. People in general do not think explicitly in political ideological terms when deliberating on an issue, and most of the political reasoning among the public cannot therefore be reliably predicted by referring to coherent political ideologies. Instead, value-centred models of political reasoning argue that an individual's preferences for a political party, program or policy rather emanate from how they prioritise among a set of core values, and from how these value-priorities guide their evaluation of social or political issues. General values and beliefs thus constitute the foundation for the individual's formation of political attitudes and preferences across policy-domains. Thus, approaching political or policy preferences from the framework of belief-systems acknowledges that individuals indeed hold personal configurations of values and beliefs, but without consciously connecting them to abstract political-philosophical labels (even though they in reality might be similar and lead to the preference for one political ideology over an other, cf. Schwartz, 1994). This function of values as the basis for individuals evaluating and responding to political issues further echoes the notion of policy legitimacy advanced in this thesis; as the extent to which the values and beliefs expressed through public policy addresses corresponding values and beliefs established among the public.

> Political evaluations may be based, in part, on the extent to which policies and actions are consistent or inconsistent with certain important beliefs and values. Viewed this way, people do not need to be ideolouges in order to evaluate politics based on beliefs and values. To some extent, policies and actions are simply judged right or wrong because of their implications for deeply held values (Feldman, 1988:418; see also Converse, 1964; Rokeach, 1973; Feldman, 2003; Caprara et al, 2006).

Now, even though the concept of values is multi-faceted and has been given a range of slightly different connotations, there should be no doubt that personal values are intimately connected to formation of preferences, political evaluations, behavioural predispositions and, thus, policy legitimacy. Whether the focus for study concern individuals' political attitudes and choice in a broad perspective, or her formation of preferences in the process of responding to a specific public policy, values should therefore constitute a core analytical element. It also seems reasonable to conclude that a focus on basic priorities among core values, rather than on pre-defined categories derived from political philosophy, constitute an adequate point of departure for bringing to light those factors underpinning policy legitimacy. However, in order to structure an empirical analysis of public values and beliefs in the environmental domain, as is the topic for this thesis, it is first necessary to identify the key theoretical concepts and show that they, in fact, can be reliably measured. The questions guiding the reminder of this chapter, then, are as follows: (1) what is the relevant focus for an analysis of belief-systems

in the environmental domain, and (2) by the use of which tools might the included values and beliefs be uncovered?

3.3 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VALUES

As a first instance in the exploration of public belief-systems, the thesis place its focus on the basic values that, according to the theories outlined above, are thought of as the underlying principles by which the individual structures more situational specific elements: attitudes, opinions, political orientations and policy preferences. As values are seen as a significant factor for explaining political evaluations, preferences and choice, a multitude of studies addressing the impact of values have been conducted. Over the years, the scientific study of values has taken many different forms, varying with both discipline and object of interest and therefore applying different theoretical explanations, focusing on slightly different aspects of the values-construct, as well as employing a range of different tools and approaches. Within political and public opinion research, insights in the strong explanatory power of values for predicting a range of political preferences and behaviours (e.g. party choice, voting and other participatory activities, or trust in government) have spawned a significant amount of studies to be conducted.

Following the lead from de Tocqueville (e.g. 1835 & 1840/1994), a majority of this research has concerned value-structures on an aggregated level through the study of political culture, i.e. the study of those values, attitudes and norms that influence a society's political system, public participation and decision-making processes (for examples, see Devos, Spini and Schwartz, 2002; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Bean and Papadakis, 1994; McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset, 1963). Thereby, political research has in this respect mainly focused on the comparative aspect of values and value-change in societies or communities rather than on those held at the level of individuals. In major recurring studies of public opinion such as the global World Values Survey or the more regional-specific European Values Survey, the European Social Survey, the Eurobarometer, or the Swedish SOM-surveys, the notion of values are applied in different ways to structure peoples' (changing) understandings on a wide range of political, religious, cultural and social issues. Many of these studies, conducted both on the micro (individual) and on the macro (cultural) levels, also acknowledge that single values, beliefs and attitudes are not randomly held, but tend to be connected to each other in clusters, and that they therefore can be grouped together into "meaningful patterns" (van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995:42). As such, these studies have given rise to an almost

infinite list of different value-dimensions and -orientations that might serve handy for sorting survey results into coherent ideologies, mass belief-systems or political cultures, as well as to illustrate outcomes of the process of value-change. For example, Inglehart (1977, see also 1990) adapted the Maslowian needs-hierarchy to distinguish between materialist and post-materialist value orientations as an explanation for the emerging political activism and environmentalism with the post-war generations. Further classical taxonomies include Almond and Verba's (1963) identification of different participatory cultures based on citizen's attitudes towards the political system, and Douglas and Wildavsky's (1982) grid/group arrangement of five ways of life. More recently, value-structures have been arranged on the continuum ranging between left and right; between religious and secular orientations; or as a movement towards relatively novel orientations such as feminism, ecologism or postmodernism (cf. van Deth, 1995). However, the surveys conducted within some of these studies have also been subject to criticism for not discriminating adequately between stable, trans-situational core values, and the more volatile attitudes and opinions they are believed to inform. In particular, this is an evident danger when a person's value-orientation or an aggregated political culture is inferred from analysing attitudes, opinions or behaviour rather than determined by exploring basic value-priorities in a more direct way (Davidov et al, 2008; see also van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995).

Nevertheless, the importance ascribed to the concept of values, along with the lack of a comprehensive theory explaining how they should be conceptualised, categorised, compared and measured, has also directed researchers to the assignment of constructing one, universally valid theory of basic human values. An important step towards such a theory was the discovery of a set of very basic values on which these many different orientations, ideologies and political cultures rest. A set of core values that can be explored for categorizing and comparing value-priorities[48] within societies, cultures and single individuals, and if not to predict so to better explain or interpret the individual's full range of attitudinal and behavioural decisions across contexts. This quest for a universal theory of values, applicable on individuals from diverse cultures as well as of different ages and social statuses has involved a range of researchers and amounted to a massive collection of empirical data. The result has been an understanding that all personal values can be sorted in under the realm of a number of motivational value-types, each serving one particular category of interests and

[48] To clarify; a *value-type* is a label used for connecting a range of closely related *value-items* (for instance, the value-type ACHIEVEMENT connects the *value-items* SUCCESS; CAPABILITY; AMBITION; and INFLUENCE). A personal *value-system* collects all value-types, but the relative importance placed on each one differs individually; i.e. a person's *value-priority* (Rohan, 2000:262; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz, 2001:382).

encompassing all previously recognised value-orientations. In this thesis, I will approach the aim of finding, mapping and categorising personal values held by the public, and thus to assess the respondents' basic value-priorities, by the application of a well-tested framework for exploring and categorising universal values: the Schwartz (e.g. 1992) value-inventory scale.

Building on Milton Rokeach's often cited value-survey from 1973, research mainly conducted by Shalom H. Schwartz and colleagues (e.g. Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz, 1999, 1994 & 1992; Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990 & 1987) have resulted in a proposed value-systems structure, arranging a set of ten motivational value-types based on the inherent conflict and compatibility between each type's organizing values. This structure have, through numerous empirical tests, also proven to be both universally valid and reliable in categorizing individuals according to their preference for certain values over others. It is therefore widely referred to as a theoretical starting point in research on the connection between values, attitudes and behaviour on a number of socio-political issues (e.g. Davidov et al, 2008; Caprara et al, 2006; Rohan and Maiden, 2000; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Rohan and Zanna, 1998 & 1996; Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995) as well as with specific reference to various types of pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours (cf. Nordlund and Garvill 2002 & 2003; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Thørgersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997; Stern et al, 1995; Stern, Dietz and Kalof, 1993). According to Schwartz (1992:59-60), his research has shown that the identified set of ten motivationally distinct value-types "is relatively comprehensive, encompassing virtually all the types of values to which individuals attribute at least moderate importance as criteria of evaluation". This confirmation of the existence of a universal values-system thereby verifies the theoretical assumption that all individuals hold a personal value system which contains a finite number of universally important value-types, but which differ in terms of the relative importance every individual places on each of these motivational types (cf. Rohan, 2000).

In the empirical tests carried out to verify the validity of the value-systems structure suggested by Schwartz, respondents were asked to rank a number of value-items according to each item's importance as a guiding principle in life (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987:555). The respondents were also asked to grade the relative importance between each adjacent pair of values according to a nine-point scale (-1 to 7). Using multi-dimensional scaling, the researchers were able to map the correlations between values and subsequently to position them to form ten distinct motivational value-types, each type incorporating a number of representative values. Focusing on the motivational goal of each value-type, Schwartz (1992:4) anticipates that "actions taken in the pursuit of each value type have psychological, practical and social consequences that may be compatible or may conflict with the

pursuit of other value types". In other words, since all of the ten value-types express a specific motivational goal, the nature of this goal will make some value-types either logically or practically contradictory to prioritize at the same time. A high preference for one value-type will thus mean a lower preference for an opposing type. According to this, the ten motivational value-types should also be arranged in a circular, motivational continuum where adjacent values indicate them having similar or non-conflicting goals; and diametrically opposing values have the most antagonistic underlying motivations, as seen in figure 2 below.

FIGURE 2. *The Value-Dimensions*



Note: Figure after Schwartz (1992:45)

Furthermore, the continuum of values can be sorted along two dimensions displaying these consistent conflicts and compatibilities among values through four motivational value-orientations.[49] In Figure 2 above, this

[49] Alternative ways to interpret this two-dimensional structure has also been suggested where values are organised according to whether they express personal characteristics or regulate social relations; or whether they express self-expansion or self-protection. These alternative interpretations of the value-dimensions are, however, entirely compatible with the original theory (cf. Schwartz, 2006).

arrangement of motivational value-types in a bipolar, two-dimensional structure is illustrated.[50] The horizontal dimension, ranging between OPENNESS TO CHANGE and CONSERVATION, positions values consistent with the extent to which they motivate people either to act according to "their own intellectual and emotional interests" even if this might lead them in "unpredictable and uncertain directions", or to act as to "preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationships with close others, institutions and traditions" (Schwartz, 1992:43; see also Rohan, 2000). As indicated in the figure, this dimension can further be divided into a number of motivational value-types. SELF-DIRECTION suggests a preference for autonomy, independence and self-determination, and thus has "independent thought and action-choosing" as its defining goal. Individuals giving precedence to this value-type can thereby be anticipated to prove more positive towards policies enhancing individual autonomy and self-determination. Placed adjacent to self-direction in Schwartz's bipolar structure is the value-type of STIMULATION. In all probability related to the same needs underlying self-direction values, stimulation has the need for "a challenge in life" as motivational goal (Schwartz, 1992; Rohan, 2000). Empirical evidence also suggests that openness to change is to be found mainly amongst people living in countries with a strong liberal-democratic cultural influence. These are mostly contractual societies, i.e. societies characterized by "narrow primary groups and by secondary social relations in which people develop specific obligations and expectations largely through negotiation in the process of achieving and modifying statuses" (Schwartz, 1992:57). Further, it has also been suggested that people who focus on opportunity are also less unfavourably disposed in their response towards novelty as implied by, for example, the priority of values such as daring, creativity and a varied life (Rohan, 2000).

The motivational value-types at the other end of the horizontal dimension are grouped together under the motivational orientation CONSERVATION. Placed opposite to OPENNESS TO CHANGE, the values underpinning the two ends of this horizontal dimension are believed to be strongly incompatible with each other. Consequently, conservation does, as opposed to the individuality and flexibility of OPENNESS TO CHANGE, instead motivate people to "preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in the relationship with close others, institutions and traditions" (Schwartz, 1992:43). CONSERVATION is constructed by three motivational value-types that all focus on the value of stability and preservation of the community. TRADITION accentuates the importance of both preserving and respecting

[50] Both the motivational orientations of the value-types and their positioning in a circular arrangement have also been verified in later studies, and by the use of different methods (cf. Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004; see also Bilsky and Koch [2000] for an overview of the compatibility between the values-structure suggested by Schwartz and results from other approaches).

traditional religion, culture and beliefs, as well as the significance of values such as modesty, humility, acceptance and submission. CONFORMITY follows the same path by adding the need for self-restriction with regards to such actions that might upset or violate social expectations or norms. As seen in figure 2, these two values are positioned very close to each other as they both express the goal of self-subordination in favour of collective expectations. They differ, however, as this subordination might be directed either towards the potentially changing expectations of other people (parents, elders, bosses, etc.) or towards more abstract and stable objects (for example customs or religious conventions). Lastly, SECURITY denotes not only the importance of protecting nation, family and self, but also stability of society and a need for social order.

The vertical dimension, ranging between SELF-ENHANCEMENT and SELF-TRANSCENDENCE, focuses instead on the conflict between whose interests each motivational orientation serves, i.e. the conflict between individual and social context outcomes. SELF-ENHANCEMENT contains motivations for the individual to pursuit "personal interests (even at the expense of others)" (Schwartz, 1992:43). This self-regarding focus makes the value-orientation consistent with motivational domains elaborated on in other value-studies, here classified as an economic (Axelrod, 1994); egoistic (Stern et al, 1995); or egocentric (Merchant, 1992) value-orientation, all of which focus outcomes that maximise self-interest rather than the interest of a larger community. As illustrated in figure 2, SELF-ENHANCEMENT organises the motivational values POWER, status, prestige and control over people as well as resources; and ACHIEVEMENT, accentuating personal success. HEDONISM, signalling personal pleasure and gratification, shares certain characteristics with both self-enhancement and openness to change and is therefore placed between these two motivational values in the figure above.[51] The motivational values constituting SELF-TRANSCENDENCE, on the other hand, "transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and of nature" (Schwartz, 1992:44). SELF-TRANSCENDENCE is constructed by two values-types, which both express an altruistic outlook but differ somewhat in scope in the sense that they indicate slightly diverging views on the proper distribution of welfare. BENEVOLENCE is defined as the "[p]reservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact", whereas UNIVERSALISM instead captures the "understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature" (Rohan, 2000:261). In table 3.1 below, the 20 value-items measured in this thesis, along with their nine organising motivational value-types and their position within the four suggested value-orientations, are outlined. As suggested by

[51] More recent surveys (e.g. Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004) have found hedonism to be significantly closer to OPENNESS TO CHANGE than to SELF-ENHANCEMENT.

Schwartz (1992:17), the questionnaires to be used for capturing these values among the respondents in our empirical survey further specifies the meaning of each item by providing a short description or explanation, as shown in the parenthesis.

TABLE 3.1. *Value-orientations, motivational values and value-items*

Value-item	**Motivational value-type**	**Value-orientation**
BROAD-MINDED (being tolerant towards different ideas and beliefs)	Universalism	Self-Transcendence
PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT (preserving diversity in the ecological system)		
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)		
HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)	Benevolence	
LOYALTY (faithful to one's friends and group)		
WEALTH (material possessions, money)	Power	Self-Enhancement
SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)		
AUTHORITY (have the right to lead or command others)		
INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)	Achievement	
SUCCESSFUL (succeed, achieving goals)		
SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)	Conformity	Conservation
OBEDIENCE (meeting one's obligations)		
SOCIAL ORDER (a stable society)	Security	
FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)		
RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)	Tradition	
FREEDOM (freedom to think and act)	Self-Direction	Openness to Change
INDEPENDENCE (self-reliant, self-sufficient)		
CREATIVITY (being unique, imaginative)		
CURIOSITY (interested in everything, exploring)		
A VARIED LIFE (a life filled with challenge, novelty and change)	Stimulation	

Note: The table displays the items as used in the empirical surveys (see chapter 7 below). As illustrated by the table, the analysis of personal values in this thesis applies an abbreviated version of the original survey, utilising 20 value-items as markers for nine motivational value-types (Hedonism excluded as not being a strong marker for any of the four value-orientations). This use of a more limited selection of items is, however, not perceived to have a misleading effect on the overall conclusions from the survey. The number of items used in the Schwartz value-survey varies considerably across different research-projects. Originally, 45 items were used and several more recent surveys applies somewhat expanded scales of 56 or 57 items, but also shorter versions of the scale have been applied and proved reliable (cf. Lindeman and Verkasalo, 2005; Steg et al, 2005; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Stern, Dietz and Guagnano, 1998).

Following the significance of basic value-priorities outlined above, these items are measured, first, as a way of discerning which values that are deemed important in the individual's life, and thus can be expected both to constrain the formation of beliefs as well as to be easily accessible and activated by external events or political messages. Furthermore, and more importantly, as the value-items are organised into coherent -types and -orientations

according to figure 2, this will also enable reliable conclusions on their broader meaning and provide additional insights in a person's basic ideological predispositions. For example has the strength of different motivational value-types been connected to her inclination towards cooperation in social dilemmas (De Groot and Steg, 2008; Schwartz, 1996); how she makes political-ideological priorities between liberalism and conservatism or between economic egalitarianism and unrestricted market-economy (Caprara et al, 2006; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998); as well as how she places in Inglehart's (e.g. 1990) materialist/post-materialist index. Other studies have revealed how basic value-priorities are associated with a range of further specific attitudes (e.g. towards the environment, gay-rights, marriage, trust in government, religion, abortion) and behaviour (e.g. voting, political activism, pro-environmental behaviour) (Davidov et al, 2008; Schwartz, 1996). Important to note, however, is that a person's basic value-orientation (and thus her political-ideological tendencies and attitudinal predispositions) here is constructed by her priority amongst the core value-items outlined above, and not inferred from her expression of attitudes or behaviour.

3.4 VALUES, BELIEFS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

As the legitimacy for *environmental* public policy constitutes the point of departure for this thesis, it seems reasonable to ask also how these general, cross-situational values relate to environmental issues in specific. In other words, what does a survey of personal value-priorities reveal about how people react and form preferences to policies and policy measures more explicitly addressing the environmental context? Furthermore, we remember from above that the connection between values and patterns of behaviour are seen as mediated by empirically oriented beliefs, leading to the suggestion for studying coherent belief-systems rather than focusing solely on basic values. Therefore, a further question to ask is which particular beliefs that might be relevant for study within the environmental policy domain.

In line with the assumption that both attitudes and behaviour derive from a set of core values, consistent support has been found for the conclusion that an individual's value-priorities have both direct and indirect "explanatory power for individuals' beliefs about environmental conditions and their willingness to take action in response to them" (Stern et al, 1995:1630). As already mentioned above, a significant amount of these environmentally related value-behaviour studies take their point of departure in Schwartz's universal value system elaborated on above. Building on the notion of environmental problems as social dilemmas emanating from self-interested

behaviour, these lines of research have argued that an individual's main target for concern reveals a great deal about her willingness to act in a pro-environmental way (Steg et al, 2005; Nordlund and Garvill, 2002; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Stern et al, 1995; Stern and Dietz, 1994). This places pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour in the context of the conflict between self-regarding (i.e. SELF-ENHANCEMENT) and other-regarding (i.e. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE) outcomes captured in Schwartz's vertical value-dimension.[52] As such, these orientations could therefore be applied as an indication of the respondent's motivation to pursuit, or at least accept, (pro-environmental) activities with a particular set of consequences (cf. Stern et al, 1995:1624).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a range of previous research has established that voluntary pro-environmental behaviour resides firmly in the moral sphere of SELF-TRANSCENDENCE, as the motivations expressed here guide individuals to restrain their personal interests for acting in the benefit of a common good (e.g. Nordlund and Garvill, 2003; Thøgersen, 1996).[53] Within this orientation, it is primarily the other-regarding value-type UNIVERSALISM, expressing a broad-scope altruism extending beyond personal relations or contacts, that displays the strongest connections to pronounced pro-environmental attitudes (cf. Barr, 2003; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Stern et al, 1995; Merchant, 1992). Although the motivations inherent in the value-orientation SELF-ENHANCEMENT may well form the basis for an individual (indirectly) pursuing a better environment, the theoretical expectation is that persons attributing significant importance to individual welfare in this are motivated primarily by the benefits environmental protection might have for their own personal good. Consequently, in those instances where the pursuit of environmental and personal ends conflict, which they more often than not do, they are more likely to prioritise the latter (Axelrod, 1994).

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[52] Instead of these two dimensions, several studies have drawn inspiration from the literature on environmental ethic to suggest a triarchal classification of motivational domains, capturing the priority of concern for (a) the self; (b) all people; and (c) all living things. These suggestions thereby add a motivational orientation signalling the intrinsic value of nature to the egoism-altruism dichotomy. For example, Merchant (1992) makes the distinction between egocentric, homocentric, and ecocentric values; Axelrod (1994) between economic, social and universal values; and Stern et al (1995) between egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value. Such a division of values makes explicit that the scope of the altruism captured within the SELF-TRANSCENDENCE value-orientation in Schwartz's value-structure ranges from the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (BENEVOLENCE) to the welfare of all people and for nature (UNIVERSALISM). However, in difference to these tripartite classifications of values, SELF-TRANSCENDENCE does not discriminate between an explicit ecocentric or anthropocentric ethic. Although it seems reasonable to assume that ecocentrism should provide a distinct motivational base for pro-environmental behaviour, most empirical studies nevertheless fail to distinguish between altruism and separate ecocentric orientation as the basis for PEB.

[53] Similar conclusions are drawn when applying the labels Cooperators (prosocials) and Noncooperators (proselves) within social dilemma research, where the former has been identified as having more pronounced environmental attitudes and express a stronger willingness to engage in pro-environmental activities. This distinction is comparable to the one made between SELF-TRANSCENDENCE and SELF-ENHANCEMENT (De Groot and Steg, 2008; Gärling, Fujii, Gärling and Jacobsson, 2003; Stern and Dietz, 1994).

Given the well-researched connection between Schwartz's basic value-orientations, environmental attitudes, behavioural readiness, and willingness to accept public policy measures, it seems reasonable to assume that the empirical survey of values conducted in this thesis will provide results with a direct relevance also for the environmental policy-domain. Among others, it will explore how people position themselves in relation to the environment and how they form more situational-specific attitudes, develop norms of behaviour and respond to public policy requirements. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that a priority of the values underpinning the SELF-ENHANCEMENT value-orientation guide the formation of beliefs in a way that makes the individual less inclined to respond positively to policies that are understood as entailing some form of individual cost, and similarly more inclined to accept policies promising personal benefits. On the contrary, other-regarding values within the SELF-TRANSCENDENCE orientation direct attention to a willingness to accept policies in those instances where they are understood as addressing a situation with adverse consequences for others, both humans and non-humans. Lastly, research has also found a connection between values in the SELF-TRANSCENDENCE orientation and the inclination to view the environmental situation as leading to negative consequences in the first place (Slimak and Dietz, 2006; Stern et al, 1995).

Connecting environmental values and beliefs

In line with the above suggested connection between values and beliefs, the prioritised welfare of different objects (e.g. the self, other people, nature) captured within Schwartz's universal structure of values has in recent research on environmental attitudes and behaviour been combined with the theoretical approaches of other studies focusing different parts of an individual's belief-system. This juxtaposition of perspectives has led to a proposed connection between various cognitive components and pro-environmental behaviour within the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory of environmental support (Stern et al, 1999; Stern, 2000). Illustrated in figure 3 below, the VBN-theory assumes that a range of behavioural activities, there among policy support or acceptance and environmental activism, are the result of a causal chain starting with personal value-priorities and leading across beliefs (general environmental beliefs; awareness of environmental consequences; ascription of personal responsibility for these consequences); and the formation of personal norms of behaviour. The hierarchical structure of the VBN-theory thus clearly illustrates a previous suggested point. General, abstract and cross-situational values elaborated on by Schwartz might have an indirect, rather than a direct, effect on both behaviours and evaluations in the environmental (and, by all means, also other) policy-domain. In this, the

effect of basic value-priorities is mediated by beliefs or worldviews providing the individual with an understanding of the empirical nature of the domain, including her own place in it. Throughout the literature, a range of evidence is found in support of the VBN-theory's validity as it has been shown to account for variance in many forms of environmentally related behaviours (e.g. Hansla, Gamble, Juliusson and Gärling, 2008; Eriksson, Garvill and Nordlund, 2008; Dietz, Fitzgerald and Shwom, 2005; Steg et al, 2005; Nordlund and Garvill 2003 & 2002; Stern, 2000).

FIGURE 3. *Schematic model of the variables in the VBN-theory*



Note: Adapted after Stern et al (1999:84). The figure shows causal relationships between variables at adjacent levels. However, variables might also have effect on variables more than one level downstream, and might be affected by external elements not part of the VBN-theory. The main ambition of the VBN-theory is to measure causal relationships between different factors in the chain, flowing from left to right. However, according to the here adapted notion of a value-belief interdependence (f. Rohan, 2000), the arrow connecting basic value-priorities and beliefs should be thought of as pointing in both directions.

Now, bearing in mind that the overarching aim of this thesis is to evaluate the level of environmental policy legitimacy, not the causal relationship between values and behaviour per se, the three separately developed and independently tested lines of research combined within the VBN-theory nevertheless provides a framework, as well as tools, for elucidating and mapping beliefs relevant in the environmental policy context. Furthermore, the hierarchical ordering of basic value-priorities and empirically oriented beliefs in the VBN-theory also adds a suggestion for how the relationship between different elements in the person's (environmental) belief-system can be conceptualised. This, in turn, is believed to facilitate the empirical analysis of public belief-systems within this thesis and the model illustrated in figure 3 below will therefore be applied for structuring the exploration of publicly established values and beliefs conducted in chapter 7. Note, however, that the two shadowed boxes to the right in the figure are

factors not included in what this thesis defines as the personal belief-system, but rather constitute the outcome of these.

A significant component in the VBN-theory is a line of research that focuses explicitly on the human beings/nature relationship as expressed through people's general environmental beliefs. The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale (e.g. Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig and Jones, 2000) collects a range of perceptions and understandings on matters related both to the current environmental situation and to the principal relationship between human beings and nature into forming coherent worldviews or paradigms. It has been extensively used during the past three decades as a measure of a person's pro-environmental orientation and is widely acknowledged as one of the most reliable scales for capturing people's beliefs on environmental matters. Previous studies suggest that the scale holds a high validity for making predictions on both behavioural intentions as well as actual behaviour (Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Widegren, 1998; Schultz and Oskamp, 1996; Stern and Dietz, 1994; Stern et al, 1995). How a person scores on the NEP-scale should therefore be taken as a further reflection of her inclination to form pro-environmental attitudes on a wide range of issues, and, by inference, of her probable response towards specific policies in these matters (cf. Dunlap et al, 2000:428).

Originally designed as a measure of environmental concern, the main task for the NEP-scale is to capture people's views on how the basic relationship between human beings and nature is disposed, from both a descriptive and a normative perspective. In this aspect, it aims at exploring beliefs on the dimension ranging between an anthropocentric and an ecocentric ethic[54], deemed critical for structuring individuals' pro-environmental preferences and behaviour. It reveals the extent to which nature is granted an intrinsic or purely instrumental value, as well as the extent to which humans are separated from nature (rather than being a part of it) and able to adapt their problem solving capacity and technical inventiveness to deal also with current environmental problems. According to Dunlap and Van Liere (1978; see also Milbrath, 1986; Catton and Dunlap, 1980), this place the New Ecological Paradigm (or worldview) in stark opposition to the worldview thought of as prevalent among people in the industrialised west at the time of the scale's construction during the late 1970's: the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP). In contrast to the high valuation

[54] The NEP-scale's ability to capture the full breadth of this dimension has been subject to some critique. It has been proposed that the items in the scale only extend to a shallow ecological ethic and that an ecocentric view, where the moral community is extended to incorporate also non-human entities and ecosystems is not explicitly captured by the scale (cf. Lundmark, 2007). Nevertheless, when analysing value-correspondence for legitimacy these views on the human beings/nature relationship are deemed adequate for describing established value-systems among the public.

of nature expressed by the NEP, the DSP instead indicates a promethean (e.g. Dryzek, 2005) worldview where nature is granted an instrumental value and economic growth constitutes the overarching goal. Furthermore, DSP also indicates a belief in the privileged status of human beings (pronounced anthropocentrism) and a strong trust in human's ability to solve problems of environmental degradation and resource depletion through developments in science and technology.

TABLE 3.2. *The NEP-scale as used in this thesis*

Central facets	**Items**	**Paradigm**
POSSIBILITY OF AN ECO-CRISIS	Humans are severely abusing the environment.	NEP
	If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.	NEP
	The so-called "ecological crisis" facing human kind has been greatly exaggerated.	DSP
REJECTION OF EXEMPTIONALISM	Humans' ingenuity will insure that we do *not* make the earth unliveable.	DSP
	Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.	NEP
	Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.	DSP
REALITY OF LIMITS TO GROWTH	We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.	NEP
	The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them.	DSP
	The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.	NEP
ANTI-ANTHROPOCENTRISM	Humans have right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.	DSP
	Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.	NEP
	Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.	DSP
FRAGILITY OF NATURE'S BALANCE	When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.	NEP
	The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.	DSP
	The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.	NEP

Note: After Dunlap et al (2000). In this table, the items are arranged by the central facet they are supposed to capture, not by how they appear in the questionnaire.

As seen in table 3.2 above, the NEP-scale aims at capturing a person's view on five central facets believed to form the core of environmental concern: the possibility of an ecological crisis; rejection of exemptionalism; the reality of limits to growth; anti-anthropocentrism; as well as the fragility of nature's balance. The five facets included in the NEP-scale are each marked by a number of items or statements. Whereas agreement with a statement indicates a worldview in line with NEP for eight of the items, the remaining

seven statements are worded so that agreement instead follows the worldview expressed by the Dominant Social Paradigm. [55]

When considering these facets and their items, it is evident that the NEP-scale also can be applied to highlight further relevant environmental beliefs, apart from the basic normative views on the proper relationship between human beings and nature. *First*, we remember from the above discussion on legitimacy that a shared understanding on questions pertaining to the nature of the problem addressed by policy is highly relevant for its legitimacy. Several of the items included in the NEP-scale also serve as to tap the individual's understanding of the environmental problem: its overall causes (stemming from human activities); its seriousness (in terms of a crisis or a catastrophe); as well as the prospect for society to solve it (trust in human ingenuity). This follows the assertion by Stern and colleagues (1999 & 1995; but see Hansla et al, 2008) that the NEP-scale includes items from which people's beliefs about the adverse consequences of environmental change can be deduced. *Second*, the worldviews highlighted by the NEP-scale also relate to more general political-ideological principles and can thereby be applied as a complement to the Schwartz value-dimensions discussed above. Following Milbrath (1986; see also Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978), the two opposing paradigms captured by the beliefs in the NEP-scale describe the tension between new and old politics and can thus be expressed as a third, diagonal axis running from the post-materialistic value-cluster at the top left, to the materialistic value-cluster at the bottom right of the Schwartz' value continuum (see figure 2).[56] Apart from altruism with apparent universal and non- (or at least weak) anthropocentric signatures, the New Ecological Paradigm expresses an acknowledgement of the necessity of social change as well as openness towards new and radical political solutions (e.g. participatory democratic processes and direct action to bring about change [Milbrath, 1986:99-103]), to deal with the environmental problematique. The opposing Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP), on the other hand, hold similarities with both the self-centred materialism of SELF-ENHANCEMENT and the resistance towards structural societal change expressed by the value-orientation CONSERVATION. In this, the DSP also expresses a strong trust in expert-driven politics as well as in the mechanisms of the current, market driven socioeconomic system.

[55] Although the scale has undergone several revisions since its construction, some critics argue that these have not been thorough enough and that the scale therefore is somewhat dated, not adequately measuring contemporary environmental attitudes, and too strongly influenced by the development of environmental debate in the 1960's and -70's (cf. Lundmark, 2007). However, as a scale for capturing people's attitudes towards the environment and their general pro-environmental stance, the NEP-scale is nevertheless widely applied in environmental research.

[56] For instance, remembering that the value-orientation Openness to Change was interpreted as expressing more of a liberal-individualistic political orientation, it is relevant to note that Dunlap et al (2000:436) found a significant positive correlation between endorsement of the NEP and political liberalism.

Apart from the general environmental beliefs captured by the NEP-scale, the explanatory model of the VBN-theory suggest that also more specific beliefs mediate the effect of personal value-priorities *en route* towards pro-environmental behaviour (see figure 3). Taking its departure in the norm-activation model (e.g. Schwartz, 1977), the VBN-theory proposes that altruistic (including pro-environmental) behaviour is undertaken as a response to a feeling of moral obligation or a personal norm[57] favourable to these efforts. According to Schwartz (1977), personal norms are in turn activated by (a) the individual believing that a situation poses a threat to others of great value (an awareness of consequences, or AC-beliefs) and (b) that they can adverse those consequences by taking personal action (an ascription of personal responsibility, or AR-beliefs). How these believes are formed is, in turn, determined by the personal value-priorities of each individual, as these guide the individual to prioritising the welfare of different groups or entities. The norm-activation model has been applied to research on several environmental activities (e.g. Hopper and McCarl-Nielsen 1991; Guagnano, Dietz and Stern 1994; Widegren 1998; Nordlund and Garvill 2002), where the norm activation resulting in pro-environmental behaviour has been shown to be intimately connected to SELF-TRANSCENDENCE values, that is, an orientation towards the good of the community as a value in itself. This is also consistent with further research on household's environmental activities. Barr (2003:230), for example, lists a range of psychological variables deemed important for pro-environmental behaviour; altruism; intrinsic motivation, where the activity itself provides the agent with a sense of self-worth and satisfaction; and environmental citizenship, e.g. a feeling of collectivism and personally ascribed responsibility for taking action. As these more specific beliefs suggested by the VBN-model relate strongly to both problem-description and problem-solving strategies, it seems reasonable to grant them attention in the present exploration of public belief-systems.

In previous research, the empirical study of AC- and AR-beliefs have been conducted in slightly different ways, deriving conclusions from either general beliefs on environmental conditions or from questions related to more specific behaviours (cf. Steg et al, 2005). In this thesis, publicly established AC-and AR-beliefs will be explored both by considering general environmental beliefs derived from the NEP-scale, as well as by analysing how respondents answer to questions directly addressing the severity of the environmental problem stemming from specific activities, as well as the

[57] The distinction between personal and social norms here follows Schwartz (1977:231). Accordingly, a personal norm is distinguished from a social norm in "that the sanctions attached to personal norms are tied to the self-concept", that is, conformity to a personal norm gives rise to positive feelings of the self, whereas violation of a personal norm results in negative evaluations. A social norm is instead defined as the behavioural-pattern expected within a society for a given situation; the shared belief of what is normal and acceptable.

responsibility for and ability of the single individual to amend this problem. As a last instance in the survey of publicly held values and beliefs, the strength of a personal norm resulting from these belief-systems is considered in terms of a moral obligation to take environmental considerations in day-to-day activities (cf. Steg et al, 2005).

3.5 SUMMING UP: THE MEANING AND STUDY OF PUBLIC BELIEF-SYSTEMS

This chapter set out with three interconnected ambitions. *First*, to provide a definition of one of the two main analytical entities in a study of policy legitimacy: publicly held values and beliefs. *Second*, to discuss the significance of values and beliefs for how the individual understands, reacts to and form preferences towards political issues and public policy. *Third*, to determine how publicly held values and beliefs should be explored, as well as what should be the focus for such a study when dealing with questions related to the environmental policy-domain. From the discussion above we can conclude that the centrality of values for studying both preference-formation and behaviour, with single individuals and among societies, cause the literature to abound with different definitions, approaches and suggestions for causal mechanisms (the same can certainly be said for related concepts such as beliefs, attitudes and opinions). Settling for a definition that satisfies all these claims is, of course, an impossible task. However, although differing in some aspects, most of the previous value-studies seem to agree that values are individually held, abstract, stable and cross-situational conceptions of general goals, which have a significant impact on the further formation of beliefs, attitudes and behaviour across different areas. This is also the definition I apply in this thesis. Furthermore, although the causal impact of values on attitudes and behaviour have been clearly demonstrated in previous research, I also argue that preferences for general goals must be connected to conceptions of reality in order to take effect and guide further responses in a specific context or policy-domain. Thus, when exploring the public-side of legitimacy (see figure 1 above), focus will be directed towards *public belief-systems*, capturing both the individual's fundamental normative goals (values) as well as her empirically oriented conceptions of reality (beliefs).

The many different definitions of values and beliefs applied in previous research also means that the approaches to and tools used for studying them varies considerably, not the least between different disciplines. Depending on the main interest of study, different values, beliefs and orientations are also suggested as being of significant relevance. As my aim directs attention to

central aspects of public-belief systems relevant in the environmental policy domain, I suggest that an analytical framework should draw on the elements outlined in the VBN-theory of environmental support. This seems a suitable choice as the VBN-theory incorporates both basic value-priorities as well as general environmental and behavioural specific beliefs, thus comprising the main elements thought to underpin policy legitimacy. Being a combination of different theoretical perspectives, the VBN-theory also links (1) a well-researched approach for studying and structuring basic values (i.e. the Schwartz Value-Survey) with (2) the extensively applied NEP-scale for mapping environmental worldviews as well as (3) a more specific focus on beliefs regarding environmental awareness and personal environmental responsibility. By structuring the empirical analysis round these three elements, a comprehensive image of public belief-systems, highly relevant as a point of departure also in the study of environmental policy legitimacy, is assumed to be the result.

In chapter 2, the study of policy legitimacy was described as an analysis of the level of correspondence between publicly held beliefs and values and public policy. This present chapter has outlined how the first element in such a study will be approached. However, for an analysis of correspondence to be meaningful, it requires that the two main objects of study hold some common characteristics that make them possible to compare in a reliable manner. Therefore, the next chapter will approach the second element in a study of policy legitimacy, and thus examine how values and beliefs are manifested through public policy content, as well as the relevant focus for exploring them.

4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES III, PUBLIC POLICY

The final proposition outlined as a theoretical point of departure for this thesis addresses the need for comparability between the two main components of a legitimacy study; publicly held belief-systems and the content of public policy. Conceiving policy legitimacy as the level of correspondence between these two components implies further that values and beliefs constitute an important foundation also for the construction of policy; are materialised in policy discourse; and therefore can be reliably mapped and subsequently compared with the belief-systems of individuals. However, since there probably are as many definitions of policy as there are policy analysts (cf. Birkland, 2005), how this central concept is thought of and, consequently, analysed throughout the thesis requires some further clarification. First, we note that the key characteristics ascribed to the concept of policy might well be applicable within many different organizations, such as private companies or NGOs. This in particular when considering the contemporary transferation of decision-making from government to systems of governance (e.g. Gormley, 2007). This thesis, however, is concerned with official environmental policy and its relations to the public in terms of legitimacy. The focus for empirical analysis, therefore, is delimited to what is commonly denoted as *public* policy, that is policies emanating from state institutions and forming the foundation of public legislation (cf. Hill, 2005). The concepts of policy and public policy are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. Now, as evident from the discussion in chapter 2, an evaluation of policy legitimacy requires a primary exploration of the belief systems expressed through public policy. The primary question for this chapter,

therefore, is how, and by which concepts, public policy should be analysed with this requirement in mind.

4.1 PROCESSES AND OUTPUTS – PUBLIC POLICY DEFINED

Popular definitions of policy ranges from the narrow (policy as the product of a political process) to the broad (where policy is seen as encompassing also decision-making and implementation processes). As an example of the latter, Dye (1992: 2) provides a definition which incorporates everything; public policy is, he writes, "[W]hatever governments choose to do or not". Similar broad interpretations are also made by Peters (1999) who defines public policy as "the sum of government activities"; by Hall and Jenkins (1995) who see it as comprising both government action and inaction as well as decisions and non-decisions; and by Stimson, Mackuen and Eriksson (1995:543) who view policy as "a diverse set of acts of elected and unelected officials". The rationale for adapting such broad interpretations of policy is the understanding that governing rarely can be described as a linear progression through a set of separated and functionally sequenced stages, where problem formation; selection of policy; implementation; and evaluation follow causally on each other (Simon, 1997; Lasswell, 1971; deLeon 1999). Instead, policymaking has been described as either a process characterised by incrementalism (cf. Lindblom, 1959) or a dynamic process incorporating a range of competing ideas, actors and actions, where policy production is the result of spatially and temporally interconnected processes of negotiation and resource mobilization (Hall and McGinty 1997; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Political goals and strategies are continuously changing as a response to external factors: shifts in (political) power relationships; sways of public opinion; domestic and international changes in real-world conditions, as well as through feedback on previous outputs of the political system (cf. Easton, 1953; Kingdon, 1995; Stimson et. al, 1995). From these perspectives, a public policy, therefore, is never a finished product but caught in a constant process of development, which makes it increasingly difficult to isolate output from process, and decision-making from implementation:

> Public policy, to put it flatly, is a continuous process, the formulation of which is inseparable from it execution. Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being executed as it is being formed (Friedrich, 1940:6).

Applying such broad interpretations of policy unavoidably places process, rather than outcome or content, centre-stage in the policy analytical

approach. However, for a study of public policy legitimacy, where the degree of correspondence between the belief-systems of policy and public is in focus, it seem more productive to adapt a narrower view of what constitutes policy, confined to denoting policy content, or "the product emerging from the political factory" (Hague and Harrop, 2007:377) rather than the process within it. There are also a range of such *output*-oriented definitions, describing public policy in slightly varying ways as guidelines (Dror, 1973:14); programmes (Premfors, 1989:9); decisions (Cochran and Malone, 1995:1; Easton, 1953:130; Jenkins, 1978:15); or sets of ideas (Hjern, 1987:3) emanating from governmental authorities. Although these definitions do not include the decision-making process as an integral part of policy, several of them nevertheless stretches out the concept by incorporating also the implementation-phase in their definition, that is, the actions taken to realise the outlined goals. Due to the approach of this thesis, focusing rules-in-form rather than rules-in-use[58], including implementation in the definition is not entirely relevant, as the basis for a policy's legitimacy is believed to be found in those belief-systems shaping its basic goals and strategies. Public policy is therefore, *first* given an output- rather than process-oriented definition and, *second* follows the distinction between policies and (implementation) programs made by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and Dolwitz and Marsh (2000). The former is seen as broad statements of intention comprising goals, motivations as well as preferences for policy tools, and the latter as the attempts to realise these intentions in practice. Thus, following Dolwitz and March (2000:12), "it should be clear that each policy can have multiple programs, while a program is a complete course of action in and of itself". In the specific area of Swedish environmental policy such a distinction can, as an example, be made between the national government's officially stated *goal* to promote environmental responsible efforts on the municipal level as well as the outlined *strategy* of strengthening local government's efforts in developing and implementing environmental action-plans through economic support, and the subsequent *implementation* of the Local Investment Program (LIP, see more in chapter 6 below).

From the above discussion, a definition of public policy as used in this thesis can be outlined. Public policy is taken to denote those decisions on goals and strategies expressed in official governmental documents, i.e. the product of those processes in which actors "based on their values and resources" (Wihlborg, 2000:18, my translation) decide upon the desirable

[58] Rules-in-form refers to the written, formal and officially established norms. In this thesis, public policy is thought of as the bearer of these formal rules. Rules-in-use, on the other hand, refers to the norms that are actually applied by the actors in a situation. These might be the same as rules-in-form, but may also be different and draw on informal practices and traditions (e.g. Andersson, 2006; Gibson et al, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). In fact, following the anticipation in this thesis, a divergence between rules-in-form and rules-in-use may be a sign of the former lacking in legitimacy (see also the discussion in Fell, 2008).

goals for a specific issue as well as on the strategies for realising these goals. So conceptualised, policy guides future actions through outlining strategy, instructions and purpose (e.g. Colebatch, 2002), but does not encompass neither the decision-making, nor the implementation, activities themselves (cf. Rönnbäck, 2008). By applying this definition, the scope of the study is also delimited to encompass policy content: the belief-systems materialised in official policy discourse and expressed as political goals and strategies. Which, then, are the roles for values and beliefs within the policy process, and what does their place in the process reveal about the method for studying them?

4.2 THE VALUE-BASE OF PUBLIC POLICY

That values constitute the underlying principles for the individual's formation of political preferences was asserted in chapter 3. It is therefore not surprising that values (or rather belief-systems) have a central place also in most theories about the political and policy processes, and therefore figure prominently in many well-known explanatory models of these.[59] This is for example true for basic conceptions of politics, such as Easton's (1953) "authoritative allocation of values", or Lasswell's (1936) struggle over "who gets what, when and how"; as well as in the theories of Vickers (1968), and in Dror's (1973) normative-optimum model for decision-making. Much like the above presented notion of policy legitimacy, modern institutional theory views established value-systems as constituting the frameworks within which policymaking takes place (cf. March and Olsen, 1984). Consistent with the function of values suggested above, these theories primarily conceptualise values as influencing goal formation by guiding the actors' perception of what is important or desirable. In a general sense therefore, values are seen as the ultimate end of public policy. They permeates both policy goals and theories about how to reach them, either explicitly where the goals themselves express a set of prioritised values or implicitly where policy goals function as instruments for reaching more fundamental values (cf. Thatcher and Rein, 2004; Amara, 1972). According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993; and see notes therein for examples of empirical studies), the connection between the values and beliefs held by policy actors and how they subsequently position themselves in political decisions have been verified in a range of studies. For example, consider the proposition posed by Tetlock, Peterson and Lerner (1996:27; see also Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, 1994):

[59] Although seldom applied as central analytical concepts in their own right but rather as a way of structuring actor interests, which somewhat misconceives their (hierarchically superior) key function in the individual's formation of preferences (cf. Stewart, 2009)

> Underlying all political belief systems are core or terminal values [...] that specify what the ultimate goal of public policy should be (e.g., economic efficiency, social equality, individual freedom, crime control, national security, racial purity and so on). Values are the backstops of belief systems. When we press people to justify their political preferences, all inquiry ultimately terminates in values that people find it ridiculous to justify any further.

Certainly, most policy domains are more often than not characterised by incorporating a range of incompatible values and interests. Indeed, according to Weible (2006), there is a growing recognition that the major conflicts surrounding contemporary public policy processes can be attributed to actors entering the policy process holding diverging values and, thus, political goals. As different policies typically generate different outcomes, an important aspect of the policymaking process is concerned with the selection and priority of those basic values towards which the outlined political strategies should aim.[60] Pertaining to the settlement on goals this calls for the need to negotiate, make trade-offs or in other ways deal with value-conflict throughout the processes.[61] In political research, these value-conflicts are sometimes conceptualised as conflicts among diverging ideologies. Similar to other broad concepts, such as belief-systems (e.g. Tetlock et al, 1996; Sabatier, 1988) or policy frames (e.g. Rein and Schön, 1993), every distinct ideology is made up by a coherent structure of basic value priorities and empirically oriented beliefs. This indicates that it, at least implicitly, also contain prescriptions for those goals public policy ultimately should aim at obtaining, as well as the political strategies available to do so (cf. Grafton and Permaloff, 2005a & 2005b; Caprara et. al, 2006; Feldman, 1998 & 2003; Goren, 2005; North, 1990; Milbrath, 1986). This is why Kingdon (1995), for instance, argues that ideology serves very handy for structuring the analysis of public policy.

As an example of a fundamental, goal-oriented value-conflict that must be handled within a public policy domain, Birkland (2005:162-168; see also Rokeach, 1973) points towards the inherent incompatibility between the basic values of liberty and security. As many political thinkers have recognised, any increase in the latter (through, for example, the very creation of a state, granted a monopoly on coercive power) unavoidably brings with it a trade-off of the former. This incompatibility has spawned many fundamental ideological debates on the size, role and authority of political government. Within environmental policymaking, these types of basic value-conflicts are

[60] As Nilsson (2005) rightly acknowledges, also rational approaches to decision-making focusing "pure" economic considerations have a strong value-base as the way in which costs and benefits are assessed ultimately depends on the core value-priorities of the involved actors. See also Wildavsky's (1984) description of the budgetary process as being essentially one of value-choice.

[61] For an exploration of different strategies applied for managing value-conflicts in public policy, see, for example, Stewart (2009) or Thatcher and Rein (2004).

particularly salient, which leads Rydin (1999 & 2005) to conclude that environmental policy analysis has much to gain by incorporating an exploration of the values, beliefs, arguments and motivations that underpin governmental programs and constitute the environmental discourse. The environmental domain covers multiple dimensions of individual and societal life and therefore give rise to a myriad of potential conflicts, ultimately dependent on how priorities among basic competing values are struck. For example between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism; between welfare-priorities across the in-group/out-group divide; between continued economic growth and a steady-state economy; between exploitation or resource conservation; or between increased civic environmental duties and individual freedom and autonomy (Dryzek, 2005; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Weston, 2000; Baker et al, 1997; Hajer, 1995). As such, it seems reasonable to assume that a complete representation of what public policy amounts to, and how it subsequently will affect interpretation and structure implementation, requires a thorough exploration of the normative principles underpinning political decisions.[62]

Furthermore, even in those instances where there is an agreement on desirable ends, how best to reach these ends might still be disputed and amount to a conflict over means or strategies (Birkland, 2005; Hall and McGinty, 1997). Within the environmental policy domain, the many different political strategies suggested and implemented with the common aim of preventing ecological destruction clearly signifies these differences in preference of means to an end. For instance, as illustrated in Dryzek's (2005; see also Rydin, 2003) four-square classification of environmental discourses[63], the today dominant perspectives on environmental politics and policy, *Environmental problem solving*; *Sustainability*; *Survivalism*; and

[62] The same goes of course for studies aiming at other aspects of public policy, for example, focusing the decision-making process and the relations between actors included in it.

[63] According to Dryzek (2005), the two prosaic discourses *Environmental problem solving* and *Survivalism* share the view on the current political and economic systems as given, and on the environmental problem as an external threat to these systems. They thereby also attempt to limit or prevent environmental problems by the use of tools internal to these already existing structures and do, thereby, not include any suggestions for an altogether rethinking of the structures on which contemporary society rests. The do, however, differ in the type of action they see necessary. When *Survivalism* see the environmental situation as highly problematic (drawing on the apocalyptic message in the limits-to-growth discourse) requiring radical action, *Environmental problem solving* primarily suggest a pragmatic reformation of current practices where experts, markets and public policy administrators are given a lead role. The imaginative discourses of *Sustainability* and *Green radicalism* on the other hand, acknowledge that the environmental situation calls for (or rather constitutes an opportunity for) a rethinking of current social, political and economic systems, as these lie at the root of the problems currently experienced. As with the two prosaic discourses, these also differ in terms of the extent of restructuring suggested. *Sustainability* seeks to dissolve the conflicts between environment and growth, for instance through the notion of ecological modernisation where infrastructural and industrial reform both reduce the strain on the environment and provide new employment and export opportunities. *Green radicalism* instead seeks a radical political-economic reform, emphasising the need to change consciousness, ethical guidelines, lifestyles and, ultimately, society.

Green radicalism, all position themselves in relation to contemporary industrialism and share a general ambition to remedy the environmental situation. As Dryzek goes on to show, despite their common overarching aim these discourses nevertheless differ considerably in terms of the strategies they find necessary for attaining a proper level of environmental protection. In particular, these lines of demarcation run between suggesting (prosaic) changes within the contemporary political-economic structures or an (imaginative) redefinition of these structures altogether, as well as between advocating the necessity for these changes to take either radical or reformist expressions. Major factors determining how the four discourses are positioned along the reformist/radical and prosaic/imaginative divides are the underpinning understanding of both the origins and the seriousness of the environmental problem. By classifying environmental discourses in this way, Dryzek highlights the necessity of complementing an exploration of the basic goals and values on which a policy rests with a focus on how the nature of the problem addressed is conceptualised. The basic assumption is thus that although basic goals might be shared, different understandings of what the problem is, including the causal relationships underpinning it, lead to quite different suggestions for policy strategies. Applying Dryzek's (e.g. 2005) environmental discourses as examples[64], perceiving the policy issue as a highly serious problem drives the demand of radical strategies, and identifying its sources as internal to current socio-political structures suggest that these in turn need to be reformed in order to remedy the problem.[65] This further echoes a previously made point. Empirically oriented beliefs or worldviews are important to take into account when studying belief-systems, as they affect the meaning bestowed on basic value-priorities, as well as their subsequent translation into attitudes or behaviour (see chapter 3 above).

A range of researchers concerned with the analysis of public policy has also noted that the framing of a particular situation, or the way in which reality is perceived and constructed is central to the subsequent process of selecting strategies and assigning responsibilities (e.g. Kingdon, 1995; Fischer, 2003; Bacchi, 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Majone, 1989; Rein and Schön, 1993). For example, Anderson (1978:20) argues that "[p]olicy problems are not just 'out there' waiting to be dealt with. Policymaking is not simply problem-solving. It is also a matter of setting up and defining problems in the first place"; and Fischer (2003:60) that "policymaking is a constant discursive struggle over the definitions of problems". According to these notions, conceptions of reality thus constitute an important part of the policy's underlying belief-system. Primarily, it

[64] See also Sabatier and Hunter (1989:255) for more examples outside the environmental domain.
[65] And vice versa, i.e. a less serious problem-description suggest less radical (or reformist) strategies, and conceiving the problem as external to the current political-economic structures implies that these structures also should be adapted as to cope with the problem.

triggers the notion of the present situation as being a policy problem. How the particular nature of the problem then is understood further determines the particular strategy adequate to apply for solving the problem and thus attaining or defending values that are more basic. Consequently, following Bacchi (1999; see also Spector and Kituse, 1987 Masuda and Varghese, 2005; Powells, 2006), as the representation of the problem changes, so do also the suggested responses to it. What has been said here clearly points away from the rational models of policymaking, where the best means to reach a goal are perceived as open for objective empirical study, and towards the understanding that context (or the subjective construction of reality) matters when settling on strategies.

In a broader perspective, Parsons (1995; see also Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Hall and McGinty 1997; Rein and Schön, 1993; Heclo, 1978) note that the policy process therefore might be viewed as a constant competition for power between coalitions of actors holding not only different sets of basic values and political goals, but also different empirical beliefs about the world and thus different definitions of the problem to be solved. It is from this perspective that Hall (1993:278-9) introduces the concept of the policy paradigm as being a "framework of ideas and standards". According to Hall, most policymaking takes place within such a framework, which sums up the shared core beliefs of the policy community and includes ideas on both the nature of the problem, possible solutions and the appropriate role of government and other actors in the process. A range of other policy analytical approaches have also emphasised the significance of considering shared definitions of the problem when analysing the collective behaviour of policy actors and for understanding the mechanisms behind actors' formation of networks or coalitions aiming to influence policy development (cf. Carlsson, 2000). An agreement on problem definitions serves as the common denominator in, for instance, Etzioni's (1968) community-of-assumptions; Heclo's (1978) issue networks; Young's (1977) assumptive world; Haas's (1992) epistemic communities; and Fischer's (2003; see also Yanow, 2000) interpretive communities. On the same note, Hendricks (1994:51-52 & 1999:68; see also Thompson et al, 1990) asserts that the values, norms and convictions that policy actors hold in a specific issue are important for explaining the existence of different policy cultures, as well as their respective definition of the policy problem and its solutions. Policy output is consequently as much, or even more, the result of processes of negotiation (or the creation of shared meaning) between these competing belief-systems, as it is a result of the rational pairing of goals with strategies.

We can thus conclude that the policymaking process does not start from a blank piece of paper (a *tabula rasa* if you will), as every single issue both itself contains and is placed in the context of a range of competing values and

beliefs that need to be dealt with.[66] This, it should be noted, most certainly affects also the outputs from the policy process itself. Similar to when policymakers seek broad public support for a specific decision (cf. Wallner, 2008; Caprara et al, 2006; Rein and Schön, 1993; Feldman, 1988), the result of an inter-process compromise between policy actors might be highly ambiguous and vague public policies, attempting to deemphasise opposing value claims in the final product.[67] According to Wildavsky (2007:30) "objectives of public policy, arrived at by negotiation, are both multiple, conflicting and vague". A policy might therefore amount to nothing more than "elaborate window-dressing" (Parsons, 1995:15) as political aspirations are rhetorically expressed without any ambition to enact them in practice, or even be contradictory as policy makers grant a simultaneous support to conflicting goals through parallel programs (Thatcher and Rein, 2004). As discussed above, this is one line of critique directed towards those environmental discourses emphasising modernisation, rather than a radical restructuring of the political economy, as a problem-solving strategy. Nevertheless, these seemingly unavoidable value-conflicts further suggest that how policymakers in the end settle on, as well as communicate, desirable goals, problem-perceptions, and preferred solutions are highly significant. Regardless of their vagueness, the objectives settled on throughout the public policy process lay the ground for subsequent policy outcomes. Public policy constitutes the basis for making or amending laws and for the process of implementing political goals within governmental agencies and lower level authorities. More importantly, the values and beliefs forming the outputs of the policy process determines, either directly or indirectly, how public policy is received by those outside the process of decision-making. Apart from structuring implementation, it is the final product of the policymaking process that is presented to the public and subsequently debated in media and/or by the political opposition. Values and beliefs, therefore, are not only core factors shaping the policymaking process, but should be so also in a study of policy content and legitimacy.

Moreover, depicting political goals and strategies as the product of complex and non-linear processes of negotiation and bargaining among actors also suggests the appropriateness of this thesis' approach of treating policy *output* as an analytical entity separated from input or process (cf. Nilsson, 2005; Falkemark, 1999). Given the complexity of policy processes, incorporating any number of actors potentially holding a wide range of conflicting values and beliefs, policy output might in reality show little resemblance with any one of those belief-systems held by actors when

[66] Including the effects and lingering norms of previously implemented public policies, e.g. Rose (1990); Pressman and Wildavsky (1973).
[67] According to Wilson (1995), ambiguous and weak policies also result from situations where both the costs and the benefits from a policy are diffuse and dispersed among large numbers of people.

entering the process. According to Sabatier (1988:142), as "pressures for compromise generally result in governmental programs incorporating elements advocated by different coalitions". Drawing a parallel to Easton's (e.g. 1953) famous model of the political system, the values constituting input into the black box are rarely identical to those resulting from the process, particularly not in highly complex issues with many dimensions of conflict.[68]

As evident from above, the processes of policy construction and change can be viewed in many different ways. Policymaking has been described as conducted by actors forming either iron-triangles or non-hierarchical networks. It has further been conceptualised as a series of separated, hierarchically ordered, and rational stages (Lasswell, 1971; Brewer and deLeon, 1983); the incrementalism of "muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959); or the unforeseen leaps of an organised anarchy (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). Either which way, the output of these processes collects the final decisions reached by the actors involved in the policy process. It outlines the official view on desirable political goals and aspirations as well as on strategies for fulfilling them, or "a path to the best situation you can reach at a cost you think it worthwhile to pay" (Dahl, 1991:136). In this, policy output expresses those values and beliefs agreed upon by the actors, and, when materialised in official documents or through their impact on the making and implementation of public law, those objects towards which the public form their reactions. Therefore, only by treating output as a distinct object for analysis can those values and beliefs relevant for a study of legitimacy be adequately elucidated. For these reasons are also methodological techniques such as elite surveys or panels (cf. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993), that might be relevant when the aim is to map the diverging beliefs of different actors involved in the process, not entirely adequate for capturing a policy's system of beliefs. Instead, public policy will, in this thesis, be explored by analysing the content of official policy documents.

4.3 EXPLORING POLICY BELIEF-SYSTEMS: THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK APPROACH

As have been seen above, perspectives in policy analysis abound. Which specific approach is chosen then depend principally on what aspect of policy that is under study. In order to structure the analysis of public policy within this thesis, those theoretical approaches focusing values and beliefs as the

[68] For an illustrative example on how actors' preferences and values going into the black box can be completely different from what finally comes out from it (in this case leading not to a weaker, but to a stronger policy), see Wildavsky's (2007:184-203) discussion of the policy processes surrounding the Delaware river basin clean-up.

principles underpinning, as well as expressed through, official political goals and strategies constitute the main point of departure. Although their central role is acknowledged in several theoretical conceptions of the policy process, any number of values and beliefs might have an impact on the resulting political decisions. Therefore, policy analytical studies applying this focus require a more detailed explanatory framework to distinguish what is important and what is not, and where the elements deemed relevant to include are operationalised for the empirical study of public policy belief-systems.

The conception of values as informing the preferences of actors and thereby constituting the normative base for public policy is perhaps most clearly expressed within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF, e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999 & 1993; Sabatier, 1998 & 1988). A highly influential and well-tested framework, applied in a large range of case studies on varying topics (cf. Weible, Sabatier and McQueen, 2009) and subject to a lively debate (see Hysing and Olsson [2008] for an overview), the ACF was originally created as a corrective to the staged and incremetalist models of policy change. It expands the number of relevant actors involved in the policy process by incorporating also the activities of interest groups and media, and it argues that learning-processes and exogenous chocks are the primary sources for policy change. Although conflicts and processes of policy change are the main topics for studies applying the ACF, also analyses focusing more specifically on the normative components or belief-systems underpinning policy might benefit from how the framework conceptualises the drivers behind political decision-making. Following the assumptions within ACF, the most useful unit of analysis for understanding policy change is the policy subsystem and the interaction between competing coalitions operating within it. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) describe a subsystem as the collection of actors actively concerned with a problem and regularly seeking to influence the decision-making and implementation processes in line with their preferences. As such, a central assumption within the ACF is that actors primarily aim to convert their personally held values and beliefs into public policy and political programs. In order to reach this aim, actors within the policy subsystem form advocacy coalitions which, similar to other understandings of networks within the policy process (see above), are characterised by their members sharing a "set of casual and normative beliefs" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133) [69]. Shared belief-systems are thus the

[69] To be regarded as an advocacy coalition, one additional criterion is also needed to be fulfilled (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:138). Apart from the actors in advocacy coalitions displaying consensus on a specific set of policy-core beliefs, they need also to display "a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time". As Szarka (2004:319; see also Rydin, 1999:472) acknowledges, this makes advocacy coalitions a subset of Hajer's (1995) "discourse coalitions", which are defined on the basis of actors subscribing to the same discourse, without them necessarily even being aware of each others' existence. For more on advocacy vs. discourse coalitions, see Fisher (2003).

glue that keeps alliances or coalitions together as these guide actors to preferring the attainment of similar goals, by the use of similar strategies, and in response to similar problems. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that beliefs held in common by policy actors within a coalition in the end determine the design and content of a policy over which it has had decision-making influence.[70] This, for example, leads Sabatier (1988:148; compare with Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:124) to hypothesise that "[t]he core (basic attributes) of a governmental program are unlikely to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition which instituted the program remains in power". Exploring the structure and content of coalitions' belief-systems is therefore an important component when applying the framework. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:119), the fact that systems of belief in this way constitute the framework for the policy process and significantly determine its outputs means that public policy itself can "be conceptualised in much the same way as belief systems".[71] The outputs of the policy process contain either explicit or implicit expressions of the beliefs held in common by the members of the deciding policy coalitions. These, in turn, determine the way in which the basic policy problem is considered as well as how decisions on overarching goals for the policy-domain and strategies to achieve these are formed in response to the perceived problem. As the policy outputs further materialises in text, through public policy documents, these systems of belief should therefore also be open for study and analysis (cf. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993).

Table 4.1 below summarises the beliefs-systems structure as envisioned by the ACF. As seen here, the structure and content of coalition belief-systems suggested within the ACF clearly diverges from previously applied rational goal-selection models of elite and mass beliefs, where actors' positions regarding specific policy options are inferred directly from their very fundamental normative or ideological orientations valid across policy-domains (cf. Sabatier and Hunter, 1989). Instead, similar to the concept of personal values and beliefs in social psychology (cf. Rohan, 2000); and departing from previous research on public opinion and political behaviour (e.g. Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985; Putnam, 1976; Converse, 1964), beliefs in the ACF are nested in a three-tiered hierarchical structure. This structure certainly contains both basic ontological beliefs on the relative priority of core values as well as a set of rather shallow and volatile attitudinal positions regarding the implementation of strategies in specific situations. However, to this the ACF also add a set of beliefs that are both empirically oriented as well as related to all aspects of the entire policy-domain. These beliefs address the

[70] Although we remember from above that policy outputs more often than not are the result of a negotiation or merging of several systems of belief.
[71] For additional perspectives, see also Hanberger (2001); Majone (1980); Pressman and Wildavsky (1973).

nature of the problem, contain causal assumptions about how to realize normative goals in relation to it, and thus constitute the crucial link between normative principles and policy-specific opinions.

TABLE 4.1. *The beliefs-systems structure for studying policy content*

Deep Core Beliefs	Policy Core Beliefs	Secondary Aspects
1. Human nature: a. Inherently evil vs. socially redeemable b. Part of nature vs. dominion over nature c. Narrow egoists vs. contractarians 2. Relative priority of basic values: freedom, security, power, beauty, etc. 3. Basic criteria of distributive justice: Whose welfare counts? Relative weights of self, primary groups, all people, future generations, nonhuman beings, etc. 4. Sociocultural identity: ethnicity, gender, religion, profession	1. Basic value priorities 2. Identification of groups or other entities whose welfare is of greatest concern 3. Overall seriousness of the problem 4. Basic causes of the problem 5. Proper distribution of authority between government and market 6. Proper distribution of authority among levels of government 7. Priority accorded various policy instruments 8. Ability of society to solve the problem 9. Participation of the public, elected officials, and experts 10. Policy core policy preferences	1. Seriousness of specific aspects of the problem in specific locales 2. Importance of various causal linkages in different locales and over time 3. Most decisions concerning administrative rules, budgetary allocations, disposition of cases, statutory interpretation, and even statutory revision 4. Information regarding performance of specific programs or institutions

Note: Table after Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:133).

At the highest level of abstraction are the beliefs that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:133) term the *Deep Core*. These are "fundamental normative and ontological axioms", which consist of basic views on human nature; the priority of ultimate values (such as freedom, security and power); the basic criteria of distributive justice and the person's socio-cultural identity. The Deep Core is therefore anticipated to be the basic source for how people react to the world around them, and form preferences as a response. According to Sabatier (1988:144), the beliefs within the Deep Core thereby define a person's underlying philosophy and are closely tied to her general political-ideological position. This is consistent with the function of basic value-orientations as outlined within social psychology (se chapter 3 above). As evident from its label, beliefs in the deep core are deep-seated, highly resistant to change, and applicable on all types of issues or questions. Being generally relevant across multiple policy domains the beliefs in the deep core are, however, not what essentially brings advocacy-coalitions together. As these rather are formed in response to more specific policy issues, the beliefs serving as their glue therefore also have a more explicit empirical orientation.

As I have argued above, problem representation is probably as significant for a person's preference for, and perception of, policy outputs as

are basic value-orientations. When forming preferences in specific issues, core values or normative principles have to be connected to beliefs focusing the issue in question in order to make sense.[72] Following the schematic diagram of the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:149), empirically oriented beliefs help the actor to interpret both stable and dynamic exogenous variables, such as the basic attributes of the problem and changes in socioeconomic conditions or public opinion, and decide what to do in response to them. In particular, beliefs connected to the specific issue help the person to link her ultimate goals with strategies for how to realise them within the policy domain in question. For instance, Sabatier and Hunter (1989:232; see also Kingdon, 1995) argue that problem understanding has significant bearings on resulting policy outputs as a policy alternative only will be advocated in those cases when it is seen as causally linked to the problem which is to be solved. The ACF thereby assumes that more empirically oriented beliefs work as a person's cognitive constraints in the sense that they "constitute a lens through which actors perceive the world" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:131). People who differ on their beliefs will therefore also hold different worldviews, interpret the same information in different ways and form diverging opinions towards the issue at hand.[73] Therefore, focusing only on those basic value-orientations that work as a person's fundamental normative goals across multiple policy domains misconceives the mechanisms by which her position in specific policy issues are formed (Sabatier and Hunter, 1989).

Within each specific policy domain, the ACF therefore assumes that beliefs in the deep core are complemented by *Policy Core* beliefs, described as "fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133). Although slightly more akin to change than values in the deep core, these are nevertheless relatively stable over time and may therefore be applied for tracing coalitions over longer periods of time (cf. Weible, 2006; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). As seen in table 4.1 above, beliefs in the policy core consists both of basic value-priorities and criteria for distributive justice transferred from the deep core (i.e. "fundamental normative precepts"), and of "precepts

[72] This might explain the difficulty of drawing a straight line from ideological to operational attitudes, thus inferring specific policy positions from general normative orientations (e.g. Mehrtens, 2004; also Coughlin, 1980; Free and Cantril, 1968). People might hold basic values that, when considered in isolation, point towards preferences for a certain type of policies (e.g. free market-solutions and limited government). However, in the context of a specific policy-area, the same people might be advocating quite the opposite strategies (e.g. strong governmental planning and control). This, it is here assumed, depends on their understanding of the problem and of the causal relationships valid for the policy area in question.

[73] The belief-systems of the ACF are thereby conceptually similar to, but not the same as, other notions applied within policy studies, such as paradigms (Hall, 1993); discourses (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2005) or policy frames, that is, "ways of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality" (Schön and Rein, 1994:146).

with a substantial empirical component". These empirical beliefs are directly oriented towards a specific policy-domain and collect therefore views on the basic causes of the problem in question; its seriousness (particularly as a threat to basic values); and the appropriate means for amending it. The latter includes both beliefs on the proper role of government, the balance of market and governmental activity, preferences for different types of policy instruments (e.g. sticks, carrots or information); as well as the preferred participation by public, experts and elected officials in amending the problem (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

Given the function of beliefs as cognitive constraints as well as their concern with issues related to policymaking within a specific domain, the ACF postulates that consensus on the beliefs in the policy core is the primary force that brings actors together in the process of forming advocacy coalitions. In an analysis of environmental policy, then, coalitions might be distinguished by considering their position on a range of policy core beliefs. For example, coalitions might differ on beliefs regarding the basic sources to the environmental problem (as caused by contemporary economic structures or as an external problem facing them, [cf. Dryzek, 2005]). They might hold diverging beliefs pertaining to the proper balance between (and possibility for mutually accommodating) environmental protection and economic growth. Or, coalitions might disagree on the role for government *vis-à-vis* market in solving the problem (e.g. Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Hunter, 1989). As such, their common policy core beliefs, rather than beliefs in the deep core, are also what advocacy coalitions aspire to convert into public policy (e.g. Sabatier, 1998:105). These are thereby possible to locate not only as held by actors in the policymaking process, but also, and more importantly given the approach of this thesis, in the outputs or rules-in-form resulting from this process itself. Policy core beliefs are thus materialised in official governmental programs and public policy statements, and therefore also possible to explore by analysing such texts (for examples on such recently conducted studies, see Hysing and Olsson, 2008; Weible, 2006; Larsen, Vrangbæk and Traulsen, 2006; Wolsink, 2004; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993). The beliefs constituting the policy core are therefore anticipated to be the most appropriate to focus on also in a study of policy legitimacy, where the analysis of beliefs forming the normative content of Swedish environmental public policy is in focus.

In the ACF's hierarchical structure, the stable beliefs in the deep and policy cores are further complemented by a larger set of *Secondary Aspects*. These relates only to a narrow part of the policy domain, in particular describing the instrumental aspects of actually implementing the policy core beliefs, for example budgetary allocations; perceptions of necessary administrative decisions; the design of specific institutions; and evaluations of

various actors' performance (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133). Although secondary aspects thereby indeed are materialised in policy documents and governmental programs, their instrumental orientation and narrow scope make them less adequate for an analysis of legitimacy. Secondary aspects are believed to be moderately easy for the actors to reconsider when faced with new information (cf. Sabatier, 1998:104) and as such, they are not a reliable source for capturing the core values and beliefs underpinning the overall formation of policy goals and strategies. Rather, and similar to the demarcation made above (see chapters 2) between stable values and volatile opinions, secondary aspects capture the actors' opinions and personal objectives concerning specific aspects of the problem, which are hypothesised to be sacrificed before the actor acknowledges weaknesses in her policy core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

4.4 SUMMING UP: THE STUDY OF BELIEF-SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC POLICY

The ambition of this chapter has been to clarify how the rather elusive concept of public policy is thought of and analysed throughout this thesis. More specifically, the general aim has been to elaborate on one of the initial assumptions in the thesis, which stated that values and beliefs constitute the basis for political choice, and, as such, are therefore important foundations in the construction of public policy, which can be elucidated through analysing policy content. To recapitulate the above discussion, the definitions applied in this thesis point towards policy as being *public*, in the sense that official governmental decisions are in focus for the legitimacy-analysis, as well as an *output*. Policy is thereby considered the product of political processes; as the rules-in-form resulting from the interaction between actors that, either through conflict or through negotiation, amounts to decisions expressing the official view on desirable goals within a policy domain as well as the strategies that should be applied for realising these goals. This definition leaves the more inclusive characterizations of policy, incorporating also decision-making and implementation processes, aside and facilitates an analysis of policy belief-systems centred on document studies and text analysis. In line with this, public policy is also seen as being, in essence, *systems of beliefs*. Core values inform the ultimate goals of policy by guiding decision-makers' aspiration towards desirable outcomes, and each policy thereby embodies the priority among values reached through the policy process. However, the connection between preferable goals and selected strategies is also mediated by more empirically oriented beliefs, in particular related to how the

addressed policy problem is understood. A comprehensive analysis of policy belief-systems therefore requires that also questions regarding how policy represents the problem, including its basic causes and available solutions, be posed. It seems, following these definitions, reasonable to assume that beliefs or values relevant for policy legitimacy indeed can be elucidated through the study of policy content, and serve as a starting point for evaluating the degree to which public policy match public values.

Dependent on which aspect of policy that is being studied, the policy analytical approach can take many different forms. In this thesis, the checklist of relevant beliefs provided by Advocacy Coalition Framework will be applied to structure the analysis of policy belief-systems. In line with what has been suggested above, the ACF describes policy as constructed on a system of beliefs, the structure and content of which can be explored by analysing official documents. The ACF presents a three-tiered, hierarchical classification of values and beliefs, where beliefs in the *policy core* represent what actors aspire to translate into public policy and thus constitute the relevant focus for a study of policy content. By comprising both fundamental principles expressing the underpinning normative goals for the policy domain, as well as empirically oriented problem descriptions and suggestions for strategies, policy core beliefs also serve as to bridge the divide between core values and issue-specific opinions in a way similar to the individual's belief-system outlined in chapter 3. Applying this checklist for studying policy belief-systems is therefore believed to be an adequate point of departure also when the overarching aim is to explore policy legitimacy.

In the next chapter, the theoretical perspectives explored over the past three chapters will be brought together into a coherent framework for analysis, applicable on both the study of public- and policy belief-systems.

5. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING POLICY LEGITIMACY

In the previous chapters, the theoretical points of departure for this thesis have been outlined. A guide for my discussion throughout these chapters has been the three propositions posed in the introduction to chapter 2; and a principle aim thus to outline how the main concepts in this thesis (including the internal relationships), legitimacy, public systems of belief and public policy respectively, are thought of and should be explored. This aim answers to the theoretically oriented purpose of my thesis, which, to recapitulate, is to contribute to the theory formation surrounding policy legitimacy analysis by suggesting how the concept of policy legitimacy itself should be understood and how it should be studied (see the research questions in chapter 1 above). In this chapter, I draw together my conclusions so far and apply them for the construction of an analytical framework, to be used for the empirical study of environmental policy legitimacy. Three basic lessons can be drawn from the theoretical part of the thesis. *First*, policy legitimacy should be evaluated by examining how and to what extent the values and beliefs underpinning public policy content corresponds to publicly established values and beliefs. *Second*, values and beliefs have a strong motivational function. An individual's personal system of beliefs, incorporating both her conceptions of the desirable and her conceptions of the world, is highly significant for how she understands, reacts to and form preferences towards a range of political issues, there among public policy. *Third*, values and beliefs also function as the basis for policy choice. Policy is the result of competition, coordination and compromise among actors attempting to translate their values and beliefs into political programs. Public policy can therefore itself be conceptualised as

a system of belief, incorporating fundamental goals for the policy domain determined by core value-priorities, representations of the problem addressed, as well as preferred strategies for amending problems and reaching goals.

Derived from the discussion on different approaches to legitimacy in chapter 2, a tentative framework for studying policy legitimacy was presented (see figure 1 above). According to the here adapted conceptualisation of legitimacy, analysing it requires a belief-system oriented comparison between policy (i.e. *the policy belief-system*) and public (i.e. *the public belief-system*) to be conducted. From the subsequent exploration of theoretical concepts in chapters 3 and 4, it is evident that public belief-systems and public policy hold a number of basic characteristics in common, and therefore indeed can be mapped "on the same canvas" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:154). This conceptual convergence enables the study of policy legitimacy to reliably compare and contrast the central components in these two main analytical entities, and to draw conclusions on the extent to which, and on what parts, the two belief-systems align and diverge. By further synthesising the three theoretical points of departure, the previously suggested framework for studying policy legitimacy can now be developed (figure 4 below), and the main topics on which public and policy need to align for legitimacy to be at hand be specified.

FIGURE 4. *A general framework for studying policy legitimacy*



In this thesis, the empirical study and analysis of *public* belief-systems takes its departure in the hierarchical structure of values and beliefs suggested by the VBN-theory (e.g. Stern et al, 1999; Stern, 2000) and presented in detail in chapter 3 above. As the VBN-theory captures those values and cognitive elements that are deemed of significant importance for the formation of a

range of attitudes, opinions and behaviours in the specifics of the environmental context, this seems a reasonable point of departure also for a study of environmental policy legitimacy. Thus, public systems of beliefs will be elucidated through mass-surveys including questions on basic value-priorities (derived from the Schwartz [1992] Value-Survey); general environmental beliefs (as outlined in the NEP-scale [e.g. Dunlap et al, 2000]; as well as more specific beliefs on environmental consequences, distribution of authority and responsibility, and personal norms towards pro-environmental action taking.

TABLE 5.1. *An outline of topics for studying belief-systems*

	Main topics	**Defining questions**
FUNDAMENTAL NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES	Basic value priorities	*Which basic values are emphasised as important guiding principles, in individuals' lives and as determining policy goals?*
		How do these values relate to each other, i.e. when making trade-offs which basic values are prioritised?
	Welfare of greatest concern	*Which group's or entity's welfare is the most important?*
POLICY-DOMAIN SPECIFIC BELIEFS	Basic views of the problem	*Which are the basic causes of the problem?*
		What types of solutions are necessary for moving development in the opposite direction?
	Seriousness of the problem	*How serious is the policy problem?*
		For whom does the identified problem present a threat?
	Distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation	*Who is responsible for amending the policy problem (e.g. citizens, municipal or state authorities)?*
		How, and by whom, should decisions on the distribution of responsibility be taken?
		What is the individual's ability to make a personal impact in remedying the policy problem?

We remember from chapter 4 above that the checklist of policy core beliefs suggested by the Advocacy Coalition Framework will form the basis for

the empirical study of *policy* belief-systems. Following the ACF, this set of beliefs represents the policy preferences of, and therefore also conflicts between, coalitions of actors competing for influence in the policy process and will as such form a core foundation for the resulting policy discourse. Thus, they are also possible to elucidate and map by applying a content-oriented text analysis of relevant public documentation (for instance proposals for new bills and communications from the government). As the concept of beliefs applied within the ACF draws significantly on models of the individual developed within social psychology, incorporating both basic normative precepts and empirically oriented beliefs, this further facilitates the construction of one coherent set of analytical topics by which the two empirical surveys will be conducted. The three theoretical concepts applied in this thesis share a number of fundamental premises and denote similar significant aspects for evaluating policy legitimacy, exploring public systems of belief, and analysing public policy. Taken together, these significant aspects amounts to five main topics that will be applied to guide the empirical analyses conducted in chapters 6 and 7: basic value priorities; welfare of greatest concern; basic views of the problem; seriousness of the problem; and distribution of authority, responsibility and participation. As illustrated in table 5.1 above, a number of defining questions are also connected to each one of the main topics. These questions outline the direction of interest within each topic and thus constitute the checklist of specific issues that will be scrutinised in the empirical material.

A basic premise for constructing the framework round these topics is the acknowledgement of the need to focus both fundamental normative principles (values) as well as policy-domain specific beliefs in order to reach a comprehensive and complete representation of policy and public belief-systems. As values are conceptualised as general, abstract and trans-situational underlying orientations (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995) or universal motivational concerns (Schwartz, 1990), studying basic values on their own provides only limited information about how the person holding them will form her preferences and beliefs in a given situation or in the context of a specific policy-domain. Basic values, such as "freedom" or "conformity" hold multiple meanings and can thus be assumed to underpin several, sometimes conflicting, courses of action. Therefore, following Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995:31), to fully understand how the individual makes the connection between fundamental normative principles and the empirical world, i.e. how she interprets and bestows meaning to her basic values, these need to be connected to an array of more context oriented beliefs; a person's "understanding of the field of action", or her perceptions of the what the policy problem is (e.g. Bacchi, 1999). For policy studies, this need is conveyed by the logic of the ACF-model where empirically oriented beliefs in the Policy

Core constitute the understanding of how the goals derived from basic values are to be achieved within the context of a specific subsystem (cf. Sabatier, 1988; see also Kingdon, 1995; Fischer, 2003 & 1995; Majone, 1989; Anderson, 1978). In addition, the mediating function of beliefs on human/nature relationships within the VBN-theory, where a person's values-structure obliges action dependent on her perception of threats to these values (cf. Stern and Dietz, 1994; Stern et al, 1999), explicates the significance of connecting basic values to more empirically oriented beliefs when analysing public systems of belief.

As such, the connection between values and beliefs is not to be considered as a one-way connection. Rather, the causality flows both ways. Basic values constitute the very foundation of a belief-system, and a range of previous research have demonstrated the influence of a person's value-orientations on her formation of beliefs on a range of specific socio-political issues. They, it can be said, determine both the intensity and the salience of a person's empirical beliefs on a specific issue by serving as a general guide to what is deemed of supreme importance in life (cf. Dunlap, 1989; Mitchell, 1990). For example, two people may both believe that the current environmental situation constitutes a serious threat to other people, but how this understanding is translated into further beliefs on policy strategies, responsibilities and decision-making authority may nevertheless differ due to variations in basic value-priorities. Nevertheless, before individuals activate their values on a specific issue they need some definition of the situation brought to them by their empirical beliefs. Consequently, as much as the hierarchical belief-system structure implies that conclusions on fundamental normative principles are relevant also for conclusions regarding the direction of empirically oriented beliefs, an analysis of these empirical precepts is also necessary for interpreting the significance of basic values in the context of a specific policy-domain. And vice versa, a survey limited to empirical beliefs certainly also falls short as it does not provide a comprehensive image of how salient these issues are for the individual.

On a similar note, constructing the framework round five main topics for analysis calls for an emphasis of the point that, borrowing from Beetham (1991:19), policy legitimacy is not a question of all or nothing, but comes in many different shapes. Evaluating policy legitimacy is therefore rather an analysis of a policy's *degree* of legitimacy, as it is perfectly reasonable that the two analytical entities might align on some topics but nevertheless diverge on others. By applying a number of specific topics and questions when conducting the analysis therefore enables detailed conclusions on the sources of (ill)legitimacy to be drawn. From a policy design perspective, this is of course highly significant as it makes it possible to isolate those factors that are

believed significant for explaining policy outcomes, success or failure in a long-term perspective.

Exploring the topics for analysis

Table 5.1 summarises the five main topics by which the exploration of belief-systems in policy as well as among the public is constructed. As mentioned above, these are the result of the theoretical discussions in chapters 2 through 4, and they capture the issues deemed of significant relevance for the study of policy legitimacy, for the exploration of public policy content as well as for analysing the individual's system of belief. Starting at the highest level of abstraction, the first topic outlined in the analytical framework concerns *basic value priorities*, as expressed both among the public and in policy. As seen in chapter 3 above, most studies concerned with public belief-systems take their point of departure in the analysis of very basic, cross-situational values; for example the relative importance assigned to freedom, to equality or to security. Following theory, the importance ascribed to basic values draws on their centrality for understanding a number of more situational-specific beliefs, attitudes, opinions and actions. How priorities among core values are made determine which issues that are granted explicit concern, express the basic motivation to take action and underpin the construction of overarching (personal or political) goals. Value-priorities have therefore been applied as a point of departure for predicting a range of political preferences and choices as well as more specific environmental attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Davidov et al, 2008; Steg et al, 2005). Also within frameworks for analysing policy, basic value-priorities constitute the critical foundation of policy beliefs, expressing the basic policy goals and guiding more empirically oriented understandings and preferences related to their achievement (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:132). As values are conceived as generally applicable across policy domains, and not specifically related to environmental issues, the exploration of value-priorities is believed to capture basic political-ideological preferences (or broad ideological attitudes, cf. Free and Cantril, 1968; Coughlin, 1980). In particular, and following the horizontal value-dimension outlined by Schwartz (e.g. figure 2 above), the basic values explored within this topic relate to different conceptions of the proper state/individual relationship by focusing the balance between individual rights and responsibilities; between individualism and collectivism as guiding social principles; and between liberalism and conservatism as the basic ideological guide. As such, and in line with the hierarchical structure of belief-systems, they are also believed to constitute the foundation for more empirically oriented beliefs regarding the distribution of decision-making

authority and public participation in the specific environmental context explored in this thesis.

Following the outline of policy core beliefs in the ACF, the list of fundamental normative principles also include basic values pertaining to *welfare of greatest concern*. In other words, which groups or entities that are singled out for their welfare being of significant priority, basically ranging between a self- and an other-regarding orientation. To its essence, values addressing welfare-priorities have a strong political-ideological bearing as they underpin understandings of economic egalitarianism, and guide the individual to different political preferences on this issue (cf. Caprara et al, 2006; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998). Within the environmental policy domain, how the importance between personal and social context outcomes is rated is of course of significant relevance. One reason is that the attainment of positive environmental outcomes might entail both economic and social costs for the individual (hence the framing of them as collective-action dilemmas), another that environmental problems may be conceptualised as threats to a number of different groups (self, in-group, out-group) the significance of which is determined by these values. The egoism/altruism demarcation that this value-dimension elucidates has therefore been widely applied to characterise both the sources of the environmental problem as well as the necessary change of individuals' consciousness in the process of amending it (cf. Dobson, 2003). In this endeavour, Sagoff (1988:8; see also Berglund and Matti, 2006; and Matti and Jagers, 2009), for example, highlights the egoism/altruism divide by distinguishing between the motivational differences behind the two roles of citizen and consumer: "As a *citizen*, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own interest; with the good of the community, rather than simply the well-being of my own family. [...] In my role as a *consumer*, [...] I concern myself with personal or self-regarding wants and interests; I pursue the goals I have as an individual". Values expressing welfare-priorities thus lay at the core of how the relationships both between human beings and nature (e.g. a moral sphere expanded also to other species or entities), and between state and individual (e.g. non-territorial or global duties for the citizen) are understood.

Following on from the analysis of fundamental normative principles, the exploration of policy-domain specific beliefs initially addresses how the (environmental) policy problem is understood and expressed. This approach draws inspiration from the constructivist notion of problem representation as the key for public policy formulation. It has causal effects for subsequent political strategies, and, following the understanding that an event or process is only understood as a problem if it challenges the dominating discourse, serves as to highlight basic value-priorities. As seen in table 5.1, the focus for the first topic addressing policy-domain specific beliefs is placed on the *basic*

views of the problem, i.e. how the basic causes as well as necessary solutions to the problem is expressed. Focusing on how the causes to the problem is presented is an approach granted significant attention within different policy analytical approaches and in analyses of environmental policy discourses (see chapter 4 above) as understandings of causation lay at the core of a range of further beliefs. For instance, problem causes affect perceptions of alternative solutions (balancing technological optimism and pessimism, or the roles of government and market); the proper distribution of costs and benefits for amending the problem (e.g. zero-sum competition or mutual accommodation of environment and growth); as well as the responsibility for different actors to participate in solving the problem (Dryzek, 2005; Sabatier and Hunter, 1989; Bacchi, 1999; Sabatier, 1988). As demonstrated by, among others Hobson (2003) and Macnaghten and Urry (1998), also how people in general understand the basics of an environmental problem strongly affect their further views on necessary solutions as well as responsibilities for implementing these. To its essence, therefore, exploring basic views of the problem relates to how the relationship between human beings and nature are understood; if the environmental problem is perceived either as internal or as external to the basic social structure, and therefore requiring either fundamental social restructuring or increased technological inventiveness.

Strongly related both to the above-discussed perceptions of causes to the problem as well as to values capturing basic welfare-priorities are beliefs on the *seriousness of the problem* and, not the least, its direction. How the magnitude of the problem is perceived certainly affects the necessity to properly amend it and to utilise societal (or personal) resources for this endeavour. It seems reasonable to assume that a problem believed to be highly serious also will be seen as requiring radical and immediate solutions, whereas minor amendments might suffice for a problem considered less severe. Furthermore, beliefs on the direction of the problem, that is the identification of those groups or entities primarily affected by it, certainly have an affect of how basic values on welfare-priorities are transformed into empirically oriented beliefs on the necessity for problem solving. In policy analysis, for instance, exploring the distribution of costs and benefits resulting from a particular policy is an essential component as this provides an initial indication on how different interests might react to it (Birkland, 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Wilson, 1995). It is therefore necessary to elucidate not only how the basic problem is described, but also the policy's rhetorical construction of those interests benefiting from the policy (or those explicitly threatened by the problem addressed).

As a final topic, beliefs related to the *distribution of authority, responsibility and participation* are explored. Regardless of whether the object of study concerns a single specific case of policy development (e.g.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) or the politics of sustainability in a broad perspective (e.g. Dryzek, 2005; Lundqvist, 2004c; Rydin, 2003 & 1999; Baker et al, 1997; Thompson et al, 1990) questions on the extent and reach of political authority's decision-making power and the individual's responsibilities have been deemed critical to include in any comprehensive analysis of environmental policy beliefs. Although the existence of a basic public consensus on, and legitimacy for, the representative democratic system and the legislative function of parliament here are assumed (see chapter 2 above), the question of what political authority should be allowed to decide upon is still very much an open question. From a general political-theoretical perspective, views on the proper societal distribution of participation, responsibility and authority constitute basic factors when discriminating between different interpretations of the state/individual relationship. We recall that these issues are, for instance, fundamentals in traditional theories of citizenship, ranging between the classic liberal notion of a passively rights-claiming, autonomous individual enabled by a fundamentally neutral state, and the duty-bound, socially conditioned civic-republican citizen (e.g. Holden, 1993; Avineri and De-Shalit, 1992; Kymlicka, 1990; Uddhammar, 1993; Delanty, 2000; Held, 1996). As such, beliefs on the role of the individual *vis-à-vis* the state have a considerable relevance also for the specifics of environmental politics. As mentioned on several occasions above, diverging trade-offs made between the values of (state mandated) pro-environmental obligations and individual autonomy constitutes one primary source of potential legitimacy-deficits within environmental public policy. Put most simply, governments prescribing reformed institutions and an increased civic day-to-day responsibility for the environment must consider the possibility that "not all people wishes to become involved in such political action" (Rydin, 1999:477). However, for an evaluation of legitimacy it is not sufficient to merely consider how public opinion responds to the question *if* individual participation should be mandated to or not. In line with the critique directed towards the concept of social legitimacy, dichotomous pro and con statements are certainly valuable for elucidating the direction of public opinion, but they provide little guidance to the complex, sometimes highly context dependent, processes underpinning a person's expressed preferences and thus only convey a limited image of publicly established values and beliefs (e.g. Glynn et al, 1999; Beetham, 1991). It therefore seems reasonable to take an analysis of legitimacy further, by considering also beliefs pertaining to *why* public participation (if at all) is necessary; *what* form it should take, and *how* this participation should be decided on.

In the following empirical chapters, the five topics outlined here will be applied for exploring policy- and public belief-systems through the use of both quantitative (e.g. mass-data analysis) and qualitative (e.g. content oriented

text-analysis) approaches. In the final chapter, where the results from the two empirical surveys are brought together, the five main topics will form the basis for evaluating the level of legitimacy for Swedish environmental public policy.

Setting the scene for analysis: belief-system structures in the environmental domain

As conveyed by the application of open-ended topics/questions for guiding the empirical explorations of belief-systems, this thesis does not aspire to classify neither political discourses nor public values by the use of preconceived, coherent ideal-types, which is a common analytical tool for studying ideas in, for example, political texts (e.g. Bergström and Boréus, 2005). We remember from chapters 3 and 4 above that predetermined ideological labels are assumed to be inadequate for providing a veracious representation of both mass belief-systems (as the public are not expected to hold coherent political ideologies) and policy beliefs (as they more often than not are the result of reconciling competing belief-systems). Owing to this "problem of fit" (Ragin, 1998:20), where the empirical issues studied are not easily placed into an ideal-type structure, the ambition here is rather to explore how the two analytical entities are positioned relative to the theoretically grounded central topics outlined above, as well as if, and in that case how and to what extent, they differ. This approach will enable the identification of coherent policy- and public belief-systems based on the results from the empirical surveys, thus avoiding the allure to fit reality into pre-defined boxes known as the *nirvana fallacy* (Cram, 2002:323), the *nirvana approach* (Carlsson, 1996:530) or the *scarecrow-mistake* (Vedung, 1991:164). As the topics and defining questions in the framework are generally held, this also caters for the possibility that the framework can be applied for elucidating public and policy belief-systems as well as exploring public policy legitimacy relative to other domains than the environmental one.

Nevertheless, to structure the analysis of belief-systems and assist the interpretation of different answers to the defining questions, it is still relevant to connect the results from the empirical surveys to those concepts and value-systems round which the main debates within the policy area in question revolve, and to consider how the two belief-systems position on the different ideational dimensions suggested by these systems. Following Lindahl (2008:134), previously elaborated theoretical conceptualisations of the environmental policy debate can act as "searchlights" in the endeavour to sort, interpret and make sense of the empirical material, and serve as to bring

perspectives together into coherent systems of beliefs or, as defined by Hajer (1995), story lines.[74]

In previous environmental-political research, many such value-systems and concepts have been discussed. However, a review of the literature points towards two strongly interconnected value-systems being of central importance for distinguishing different ideological orientations in the environmental domain; values regarding what constitutes *first* the relationship between human beings and the natural environment, and *second* the proper relationship between the individual and the state are in focus for any analysis of environmental discourses. As has already been noted on several occasions above, a key focus in the environmental debate is the re-conceptualisation of the proper human beings/nature relationship. Suggestions for a rethinking of the values guiding this relationship highlights the environmental issue as something which cannot be confined within the conventional ideological dimension ranging from left to right, and thus serves as to single out Ecologism as a distinct and novel political ideology (cf. Carter, 2001). How the basic relationship between human beings and nature is thought of forms the core of all environmental discourses as it has implications for how the sources, seriousness, and solutions to the environmental problem are understood, as well as for how the moral and ethical issues arising from this relationship are conceived. As Dryzek (2005:11) notes, there has been many attempts to classify environmental discourses, politics and theories along these lines.[75] For instance, Hajer (1995), Brulle (2000), Dryzek (2005) and Hannigan (2005) all applies analytical frameworks drawing on the 'state of nature in environmental discourse', thus focusing predominately on people's views of the environment. On the same note have Hedrén (1994), Algotsson (1996) and Lundmark (1998) approached the Swedish environmental discourse by investigating how core values and systems of beliefs concerning the human beings/nature relationships are expressed in political party programmes and parliamentary debates. According to Dobson (1995; see also Eckersley, 1992), most of the various definitions on the human beings/nature relationship used in the literature, theoretical as well as empirical, are grounded in the basic distinction between an *ecocentric* and an *anthropocentric* ethic. In short, ecocentrism argues that the various parts or entities in nature hold an intrinsic value, regardless of their usefulness for human beings. This ethic thereby moves away from values placing humans at the top of nature's moral

[74] According to Hajer (1995:62), story lines "provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding". Thus, they play an important role in bringing actors together into discourse coalitions.

[75] See, for examples, the difference made between ecologists and environmentalists (e.g. Dobson, 1995); between Shallow and Deep ecology (e.g. Naess, 1983); between Fundis and the Realos (e.g. Doherty, 1992); between a Techno-centric and an Eco-centric approach to environmental problems (Carter, 2001; O'Riordan, 1981).

hierarchy, viewing them rather as being an interdependent part of nature (Carter, 2001; Dobson, 1995; Eckersley, 1992; Devall and Sessions, 1985; Naess, 1981). Anthropocentrism, on the other hand, entails a belief in human superiority and thus regards human beings as separated from the natural environment. Humans are the only entity holding an intrinsic value and nature is instead viewed in an instrumental manner, as providing resources to be utilised for human purposes (Eckersley, 1992). Apart from the apparent normative-philosophical differences between these two orientations, the diverging perspectives on the human beings/nature relationship also have implications for how political practice is conceived. The anthropocentric belief in human superiority also includes a strong faith in technological and scientific development as means for dealing with the environmental problem. The unique human capacity for problem solving will thereby allow human expansion and growth to continue undisturbed without being restricted by nature's limits. Ecocentrism instead perceives the environmental problem as being caused by humans attempting to expand beyond the natural limits to growth. Adapting a significantly more cautious position towards the use of technology, ecocentrism argues that learning to live within these limits, and thus radically adapting the structures in society to them, is the only viable long-term solution to the environmental problem.

This perceived need to rethink contemporary social, political and economic structures, not the least the individual's place within them, also highlights another value-system where the environmental challenge instead is discussed in terms of democratic theory. The new institutional structures suggested being necessary within several environmental discourses comprise both new processes for political decision-making, new economic arrangements as well as a different conception of rights, responsibilities, duties and entitlements for both the individual citizen as well as for political authority (Dobson, 2003; Carter, 2001; Eckersley, 1996 & 2006). For one, we remember from above that perceived conflicts between core democratic values are what underpin the notion of environmental policymaking's legitimacy – effectiveness dilemma, and that the fundamental correspondence between contemporary liberal democracy and a politics of environmental protection therefore has been granted attention through a wide range of research, mainly with a strong theoretical focus (e.g. Dobson and Eckersley, 2006; Hailwood 2004; Lundmark 2003; Barry and Wissenburg 2001; Doherty and De Geus 1996; Eckersley 1996, 1995 & 1992; Dobson, 1995; Achterberg 1993; Saward 1993; Goodin, 1992; Sagoff 1988). In particular, the fundamental relationship between the individual and the state has been granted significant attention as the individualisation of the environmental issue has suggested new interpretations of what lies (or, rather, should lie) in the concept of democratic citizenship (cf. Dobson and Valencia Saiz, 2007;

Bell 2005 & 2001; Dobson, 2003; Barry, 1999; van Steenbergen, 1994). The notion of an *ecological citizenship* captures this rethinking of the values guiding the state/individual relationship by moving beyond traditional (e.g. liberal and civic-republican) conceptions of what denotes 'the political' and 'the state'.

In particular, three aspects relating to environmental rights and obligations set ecological citizenship apart from its traditional counterparts. *First*, inspired by feminist political thought (e.g. Prokhovnik, 1998), ecological citizenship argues that also private activities and non-contractual relations between citizens have an impact on the public arena and thus should be considered as of a citizenly character alongside participation in "politics proper" (Curry, 2000:1062), is a cornerstone in the theory of ecological citizenship. According to Dobson (2003), as each person's occupation of ecological space neither intellectually nor practically can be confined to traditional public life of society, the traditional private/public divide constituting the foundation for contemporary notions of civic rights and duties should be re-conceptualised. Instead, all those activities and private relations that affect others, within as well as across generations, should be thought of as forming the basis for assigning individual environmental responsibilities. As a direct consequence of rethinking the boundaries for citizenship, a new set of values are also recognised as core civic virtues. As an example, whereas civic-republican citizenship draws predominately on Machiavellian values supporting civil service and protection of the community (courage, strength and obedience), ecological citizenship also recognises motivational values that draws on personal relationships (social justice, responsibility, care and compassion) (Dobson, 2003).

The *second* feature that distinguishes ecological citizenship from its traditional counterparts is the expansion of the scope of citizen duties; from being confined within a traditional nation-state, citizenship is now thought of as being global or universal in character. On this topic, Jelin (2000:53) writes: "although the ideas about citizenship and rights have been grounded in the notion of the modern nation-state, there is no intrinsic necessity that this be so: the public sphere might be 'smaller' or 'larger' than the state, or may even be different". Remembering that ecological citizenship is not exclusively defined in terms of the relations between the individual and the state, but rather expanded to also include private-sphere relations between citizens themselves, this indicates that ecological citizenship not needs to be identified with any contingent political space or a political authority towards which citizens owe duties or can claim rights. Instead the space of ecological citizenship is synonymous with the spread of negative effects actions have for others and, since most environmental problems have the capacity to spread both geographically and over time, the scope of citizen duties can be extended

both from one generation to another and across territorial borders. Therefore, it can in this context be concluded, as Christoff (1996:152) does, that the "relationship between citizen and nation-state is now one of considerable tension".

Third, based on the above expansion of the citizenship sphere, also the motivations for engaging in environmentally protective acts discern ecological citizenship from its two traditional counterparts. The fact that citizenship is thought of as comprising also the non-contractual relationship between citizens themselves has, for the obligations proposed by ecological citizenship, for effect that also the reciprocity of the relationship is missing from traditional citizenship theory. In other words, individuals are not asked to take on new duties with the motivation that they personally will gain from them and be able to claim some right or benefit in return (even if they will, especially in the long run, this is not the motivation). Rather, the duties of ecological citizenship are described as responsibilities for all personal actions that "always already" affect others (cf. Dobson, 2003:49 & 115). Since all acts, in the case of environmentalism especially those in the private sphere, have an impact on other individuals, the civic duties therefore lies in making these impacts as sustainable as possible and not to use an unequal amount of environmental services, capital or space compared to others. The main (or only) motivation for taking on environmental obligations is, thereby, within an ecological citizenship founded in a sense of social justice; an acknowledgement that it is not right to compromise others ability to lead a full life by upholding an unequal distribution of resources (Connelly and Smith, 2003).

Although the aim of the thesis not is to categorise either policy or public belief-systems as belonging firmly to either end of the human beings/nature and state/individual dimensions, structuring the analysis round the five main topics presented in table 5.1 nevertheless have the additional benefit of highlighting a number of core beliefs within the different ideological structures outlined above. By capturing, among other things, values and beliefs relating to the balance between individualism and collectivism; what entities that are given value; views on human ability to remedy the environmental problem; as well as environmental risk perception, it is possible also to draw parallels between the belief-systems uncovered in the empirical analyses and previous suggestions for coherent environmental discourses. This, I believe, will add to the understanding of the results by placing the analytical topics in a broader ideational context related specifically to the environmental policy-domain here studied.

PART II

EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS

OR,

UTILISING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLORING LEGITIMACY IN THE CASE OF SWEDISH ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY

6. BELIEF-SYSTEMS IN SWEDISH ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY

The following two chapters hold a dual purpose. *First*, having suggested an approach for the study of policy legitimacy, the analytical framework outlined above is now put to the test and applied to the case of Swedish environmental policy. This will demonstrate the value of the framework when attempting to study policy legitimacy empirically. *Second*, the conclusions reached through the here conducted survey of belief-systems established in policy, as well as among the public, deepen our understanding of the character of those legitimacy issues facing Swedish environmental public policy. It thereby provides us with insights into how the degree of legitimacy, and thereby policy performance, might be furthered.

Following the analytical framework, studying policy legitimacy requires a trilateral approach, where the values and beliefs established among the general public are explored, compared and contrasted with those on which public policy relies. As the Swedish environmental policy legitimacy is the primary objective for study, it seems reasonable to set off the empirical survey be exploring the *policy* belief-systems. Accordingly, the task advanced in the present chapter is to map the values and beliefs underpinning environmental public policy in Sweden and thus to reach an understanding of the structure and content of the belief-system on which it relies. The aim for this chapter can thereby be stated as answering the following question: *which values and beliefs constitute the underpinning principles of, and are expressed through, Swedish environmental policy?* Before embarking on the empirical exploration of policy values and beliefs, however, a few notes on the methodological considerations guiding this part of the thesis as well as the

approaches applied for studying policy content will be presented. As will the material studied in the endeavour of capturing central values and beliefs in Swedish environmental public policy.

6.1 EXPLORING POLICY BELIEF-SYSTEMS: METHODS AND MATERIAL

From the discussion in chapter 4, we remember that public policy can be conceptualised in much the same way as a system of beliefs. The political aspirations, goals and strategies manifested in public policy either explicitly or in a more implicit way contain both fundamental normative principles (priorities among basic values and welfare-priorities) as well as policy-domain specific beliefs (regarding the nature of the problem and its preferred solutions). This acknowledgement of policy as being in essence a belief-system, where value-laden arguments and claims are crucial for setting priorities and shaping policy outcomes, have spurred an 'argumentative' or 'discursive' turn (e.g. Fisher, 2003; Fisher and Forester, 1993) within the policy analysis field. A range of methodological approaches, focusing the tracing of shared ideas, values or problem-perceptions in policy content as a highly significant tool for analysing both the process- and output-side of public policy, have been suggested. As we have seen in chapter 4 above, these approaches conceptualise the coherent structures of values and beliefs found in policy as, for example, discourses (Dryzek, 2005; Rydin, 2003; Hajer, 1995); paradigms (Hall, 1993); or frames (Rein and Schön, 1993). The common denominator for these discursively oriented approaches is that they all see the construction of shared meaning, pertaining to how the overarching policy problem is understood and represented, as a critical factor bringing actors together into coalitions attempting to influence policy output and outcome.

Much of the research on values and beliefs in the policy process takes its ontological and epistemological point of departure within the social constructionist and discourse theoretical paradigm. As with most analytical approaches or theories, the term social constructionism covers a range of slightly different approaches to the study of politics. A common theme, however, is the premise that social phenomena (or 'reality', cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1966) are not universal, but rather agreed-upon social conventions. They are thus seen as constructed, by being labelled (given a name) and at the same time bestowed with a range of other characteristics (for instance meaning, quality and value) through acts of language, of convention and of practice (Peterson, 1999). As an example connecting to the

topic of this thesis, the concepts of Nature or the Environment do not signify the same for all people, at all times or on all places in the world. Rather, as expressed by Peterson (1999:341; see also Thompson et al, 1990) "different individuals, times, and societies construct particular versions of nature insofar as they interpret it in different ways in and through cultural categories and values". From this perspective, policies are never neutral or objective but a product of a struggle between different, competing ways of framing reality.[76] As argued above, social constructionist approaches to policy analysis differ in this sense from the rationalist view of the policy process. Following Masuda and Varghese (2005), instead of focusing on statements which merely describe the environmental situation (e.g. the air is polluted) social constructionism focuses on the claims that are made about this situation, its origin and effects (e.g. who or what is being polluted, who is doing the polluting, why, and who holds the responsibility for amending the situation?). Thus, a social constructionist approach provides ways of exploring the social and cultural factors that underlie decisions made about, for instance, a perceived environmental situation or problem and argues that what is considered as a problem in a one society depends on a particular construction of social reality, not necessarily on actual physical conditions (Spector and Kituse, 1987). This also indicates the understanding that an event or (natural) process is only an environmental problem if it causes problems for the dominating discourse. In this way, social constructionism has been applied to show both how actors – individuals, organisations or political authorities – develop alternative meanings of real phenomena, as well as how behavioural choices are steered or limited by dominating social interpretations of reality and how power-relationships are manifested through discourses (cf. Powells, 2006; Torfing, 1999).

By applying a constructionist approach to policy analysis, several results can be reached. *First*, different discourses relating to the same problem can be traced and classified (for examples on this, see Dryzek's [2005] identification of nine macro-level environmental discourses; or Rydin's [2003] three-part environmental discourse typology). *Second*, an analysis of this kind can also be used for studying the actors behind the discourses and the way in which they interact with each other. By examining who uses particular arguments and for what purposes, it is possible to arrange the array of single actors into,

[76] One often analysed social phenomena is the concept of place, where different groups of people, although related to the same physical space, hold conflicting understandings of place (e.g. the characteristics; value and proper use of the physical space). These divergences are common drivers in conflicts over land-use, as it deals with a multiple-users/multiple-uses resource – land can, for example, be conceptualised as a place for grazing reindeer and other cattle, a place for agricultural production, a place for extracting virgin materials, as well as a place for several non-extractive benefits such as tourism, recreational use or nature conservation, but also as a functional place for building wind-parks, roads, housing, or depository plants (cf. Edwards and Steins, 1999; Ostrom, 1990; for social constructionist research on the understanding of place see, for example, Lindahl, 2008; Keskitalo, 2004; Parkins, Varghese and Stedman, 2001; William and Stewart, 1998).

for instance, discourse- (e.g. Hajer, 1995) or advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) bound together by a shared understanding of the policy issue at hand. *Third*, a social constructionist approach to policy analysis allows for the examination and understanding of the 'conditions of possibility' for the appearance of a certain phenomenon, such as a new ideological mode of reasoning or new policy instruments (cf. Torfing, 1999; Bacchi, 1999). By focusing on three major questions which are posed to the empirical material, the provided image of the problem; its solution; and the actors responsible for solving it, this approach can be useful when examining, for instance, the way in which environmental politics has evolved over time as well as for analysing the different means for amendment deemed politically viable during different times.

Applying a social constructionist approach to the study of Swedish environmental policy – with any one of the three above suggested aims (to elucidate and classify discourses; to discover and group actors into coalitions; or to examine the conditions of possibility for political solutions) – thus has several advantages. In particular, social constructionism and discursively-oriented analyses of policy allows for a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural conditions, power relationships and interpretations of reality which underpins policy formation and the selection of policy instruments. As argued across the theoretical chapters above, a constructionist analysis of how the policy problem and its plausible solutions is framed by the powerful (i.e. the government) and communicated to the citizenry is of crucial importance for a study that aims at exploring the legitimacy of household-oriented environmental policy. As are an elucidation of how problem representation further affects views on the distribution of responsibilities, authority and costs in amending the problem. Concerning these points of analysis, the approach applied in this thesis is indeed inspired by the constructionist focus on problem representation and the notion of policy design as a process of creating discourse. It thus views the outputs of the policy process as something more than the result of a rational pairing of goals or interests and 'best practices' and acknowledges that policy content is always, and by somebody, framed in one way or another, and thus can be analysed by exploring the values and beliefs that these framings reflect. Nevertheless, this is as far as the relation to social constructionism can be extended given the purpose of my thesis. It is therefore important to further stress that this thesis not should be viewed as an attempt to conduct a Foucauldian analysis of power, where policy content is analysed as a reflection of the power-relationships (or social conditions) underlying the construction of contemporary Swedish environmental policy. A definitional distinction should therefore be made between the occupation with analysing or studying discourses (in the broad meaning of exploring the belief-systems or the shared

way of understanding the world expressed through, for example, the content of governmental programs) and discourse theory as one (out of many) specific theoretical and analytical approach to doing this (cf. Bergström and Boréus, 2005; see also Hannigan, 2005:36-52, for a discussion of different interpretations of 'discourse' in environmental studies). This thesis clearly belongs to the former category, as it explores policy content in an attempt to elucidate its underpinning values and beliefs in themselves (constituting factors in the evaluation of policy legitimacy), not to infer from them any expressions of power.

A qualitative analysis of policy

As the beliefs and values underpinning political sustainability aspirations here are assumed to materialise in official policy documents and governmental programs (see more on material below), text analysis will be applied to elucidate them. Text analysis encompass a range of different methodological approaches employed for studying discourses expressed in texts; from quantitative content analysis to the, within political science, relatively novel method of discourse analysis (cf. Esaiasson et al, 2004). Although inspired by certain discourse analytical techniques, for example Bacchi's (1999) 'what's the problem' approach, the specific purpose guiding this chapter rather suggest the use of qualitative idea- (sometimes referred to as ideology-) analysis as the most appropriate tool. Idea-analysis is predominantly used when mapping or comparing different ideological turns in texts, which, in essence, is what this study is all about. Further, idea-analysis has been previously used by scholars in order to trace ideas in political debates and to analyse ideological development among groups of actors (Bergström and Boréus, 2005; Esaiasson et al, 2004). Compared to those analyses of text that follow a strict discursive approach, the characteristic of idea-analysis indicates that the subject for scrutiny are the actual ideas or normative statements found in texts, which in turn are viewed as reflecting a relatively stable sets of values and beliefs. Discourse analysis, in contrast, is not designed to explore those values and beliefs constituting the foundation of policy or with an actor's reasoning, but focuses rather on the context; the 'conditions of possibility' for the appearance of a certain phenomenon such as a new ideological mode of reasoning. Discourse analysis thus studies the creation of identity and social relations in a broad sense; and is not concerned with the ideas or values found in texts as such (cf. Torfing, 1999). Idea-analysis focuses more specifically on the ideas expressed through written discourses (texts) and is thus advantageously used for identifying values, ideologies and belief-systems with an actor, in a policy area or in a debate (Bergström and Boréus,

2005). In this study, which aims at mapping belief-systems[77] expressed through the official policy discourse, the latter thus presents a suitable methodological approach.

Idea-analysis is also qualitative in character since it aims at exploring the ideas, values or beliefs in, for instance, written texts, and not to quantify the use of language itself. The choice of idea-analysis in preference to different types of quantitative approaches such as content analysis can, thus, be justified by the subtle character of what here is being studied. Values are not easily quantified and when they are reflected in texts, it is critical to also evaluate the context within which they are presented. Furthermore, there are clearly no guarantees that the importance of a value is reflected in how often it, in the form of a specific word or phrase, appears in the text, which is the point of departure for quantitative approaches to text analysis (implying the counting of selected words deemed relevant for the research). Rather, when studying ideas, ideologies or values, it might be of similar importance to analyse what is not said, than merely focusing on the frequency of which categories or words are included in the texts (Hedrén, 1994:11; see also Esaiasson et al, 2004). Although a quantitative approach undoubtedly will produce more easily measured and illustrated results, this thesis nevertheless agrees with Devine's (2002:207) conclusion that the qualitative methods' advantages "are clear where the goal of a piece of research is to explore people's experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to establish their meaning for those concerned".

There are a range of different tools and techniques available for performing an idea-analysis and, as with most research considerations, which one is chosen depends significantly on the study's direction of interest. As a prerequisite, an analytical framework is essential in order to determine what to look for and where, and as a guide for exposing the relevant parts of the texts studied (cf. Esaiasson et al, 2004; Bergström and Boréus, 2005). Nevertheless, how this framework for analysis is designed also depends on the nature of the study. For example, policy can be studied either as a means to discover broad (and sometimes competing) discourses expressed through texts and held by different groups of actors, or the study of policy might be driven by the desire to relate the texts studied to a pre-determined set of coherent ideas or beliefs and thereby to determine the studied policy discourse's resemblance to an already developed ideal-type. Given this, the framework employed in idea-analysis for directing the examination and systematising the findings can take a number of different shapes (cf. Bergström and Boréus, 2005). Theoretically derived *ideal-types* can be used

[77] We remember from previous chapters that belief-systems contain both conceptions of the desirable and conceptions of the world, and are therefore conceptually similar to the notion of ideology as incorporating basic value-premises, perceptions of reality, as well as recommendations for acting (cf. Bergström and Boréus, 2005:151).

in order to analyse what kind of idea or ideology is represented in a certain document and subsequently to sort the text according to specific, predetermined categories. The application of ideal-types is useful for examining whether, and to what extent, the object of study resembles a certain system of ideas, but, as pointed out in chapter 5 above, this also makes them less adequate for the purpose of this thesis. In those instances where the ideal-types are not known beforehand, another possible tool is the application of *dimensions*, often dichotomies, which can be used to compare the studied texts. The use of dimensions as analytical tools implies instead the identification of important themes on which the texts are supposed to differ. In difference to the use of ideal-types, the texts are analysed by arranging them according to a set of parameters (e.g. collectivism versus individualism in the understanding of society, or optimism versus pessimism in the view of human nature). This provides the researcher with broad tools that, consequently, admit the material studied to be arranged on an open scale instead of being interpreted in connection with strictly structured (and sometimes not entirely adequate) ideal-types. By the same token, however, using dimensions as an analytical tool might also be difficult since it tends to allow much room for interpretation, perhaps not providing the researcher with enough support throughout the analysis. Although dimensions are prominently used in those cases where or when the range of possible interpretations is wished to be left open, for example if the aspiration is to discover (previously unknown) discourses in text, they nevertheless also require that the extremes between which the scale ranges are determined beforehand. Whereas some issues relevant for environmental policy legitimacy certainly can be described in terms of dimensions (for instance government regulation versus open market; or ecology versus growth) others are not easily fitted into such a structure. A third approach, and the one applied in this chapter, is to analyse policy discourse by the use of *open-ended topics and questions*. This approach opens up for a range of alternative responses and interpretations, as only the topics themselves, and not the range of possible answers, are grounded in theory. As the ambition of this thesis is to explore how two empirically uncovered belief-systems align, and not to conduct an analysis based on the correspondence with a theoretical ideal-type, this approach seems the most adequate for the task ahead. Derived from the discussions on this thesis' theoretical points of departure, chapter 5 outlined the main themes and defining questions guiding the empirical analyses. As illustrated in table 5.1 above, the topics selected for analysis acknowledge the structure of belief-systems, containing conceptions of the desirable as well as conceptions of the world, as suggested throughout the theoretical chapters. Thereby, they incorporate both *fundamental normative principles* (basic value priorities; welfare of greatest concern) and *policy-*

domain specific beliefs (basic views of the problem; seriousness of the problem; distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation). As these topics will be applied also for guiding the exploration of publicly held belief-systems, a strong basis for comparison and, subsequently, evaluation of the level of policy legitimacy for Swedish household-oriented environmental public policy is believed to result.

Some difficulties when conducting analyses of policy content should also be mentioned. As we have noted on several occasions above, it seems reasonable to assume that official policy documents will display some measure of ambiguity (or fuzziness, see for example Ragin, 1998 & 2000). For one, we expect that policy makers attempt to frame problems and construct reality in a way that will grant their decisions broad public support. Policy content might therefore be shaped by the aspiration to capture as many perspectives as possible on the issue in question, thereby neither ruling out any future options nor offending anyone. Furthermore, if we agree that negotiation is commonplace in the policymaking process, we should also expect that public policy might display objectives and strategies that are both vaguely defined and sometimes even contradictory. These difficulties should certainly be accounted for throughout the analysis, acknowledging that policy content might prove to incorporate an array of broad statements on differing political goals and strategies. Nevertheless, as the exploration here conducted spans a relatively long period of time and thus incorporates a range of official policy documents, I also believe that it will be possible to isolate one set of values and beliefs that comprises the very foundation of the official Swedish environmental norm.

Material used

Three core prerequisites, discussed at length over the previous chapters, guide the selection of material for the empirical study. *First*, the analysis here aspires to elucidate the belief-system structure of *official* Swedish environmental policy. This sets the boundaries of the selection of empirical material in the sense that the following study is exclusively concerned with the values and beliefs expressed through official governmental policy documents. *Second*, as discussed in chapter 4, public policy is here viewed as an output. The focus of interest is thus the values and beliefs conveyed by those settled on political goals and strategies resulting from policymaking processes, leaving aside broader interpretations of policy as incorporating also the preceding process itself as well as the following implementation of policy decisions. The documents selected for study, therefore, are primarily those expressing the decided on direction of Swedish environmental policy. Thus, documents produced during earlier stages of the decision-making process, e.g.

government commission reports, protocols from parliamentary debates or reports produced within the sector authorities, are not subject to analysis. On the same note are the primary sources utilised for exploring policy belief-systems limited to official documentation. Although interviews with decision-makers can be considered an adequate method for reaching additional knowledge of the beliefs and values guiding or influencing the policymaking processes, the focus for this study is neither on actors or coalitions, nor on processes, but on the content of the resulting policy itself. *Third*, as this thesis is explicitly concerned with household related policy, the study focuses primarily on those policy documents and statements explicitly addressing the individual's involvement and responsibility in the environmental work.

A further consideration that needs to be made when selecting documents for analysis concerns the time-frame under study. The documents selected for analysis capture the goals and strategies of Swedish environmental policy during the years 1994 to 2006. In this respect, the choice of documents represent a distinct period in the development of contemporary Swedish environmental policy and aims at providing a chronological context to the analysis, ranging from the initial implementation of UNCED's Agenda 21, which initiated a new direction for national environmental policy, to present-day. Although more relevant when explicitly concerned with tracing policy change or –learning (e.g. Sabatier, 1988), the fact that the exploration of policy belief-systems covers a period of twelve years means that this part of the analysis allows for comparison and contrasting over time.[78] This, in turn, is anticipated to provide for a thorough exploration and analysis of the belief-system underpinning the reasoning and argumentation within the policy discourse.

During the years that have passed since incorporating the ideas of Agenda 21 into Swedish environmental policymaking, the Swedish government has presented a range of bills and communications (shown in table 6.1 below) to parliament, outlining the goals and direction of Swedish environmental policy. Apart from a range of documents focusing on specific measures in clearly defined policy areas (e.g. energy, transport and housing), the government has presented yearly communications outlining how the general environmental work is progressing as well as, and perhaps even more relevant considering the focus for this study, the perceived and desired direction of the continuous work. These documents do not themselves

[78] It should here be noted that, during all of the years included in the study, Sweden had a social democratic minority government (supported in parliament by the Left Party and the Environmental Party the Greens). Thereby, the impact of altered political majorities and shifts in power-relations cannot explain possible changes in the political discourse over time. Instead, the long time-frames of the study allows for conclusions on the stability or change in the governing coalition's beliefs over time, and thus on the ACF hypothesis that "The core (basic attributes) of a governmental program are unlikely to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition which instituted the program remains in power" (Sabatier, 1988:148).

constitute a part of the legislative process and do therefore not, unlike a bill, include a proposition for a decision on new public law by the parliament. Instead, communications consist of information from the government to the Swedish parliament with the purpose of reporting the government's official view on a certain policy area or issue; how it plans to approach it in political practice, and why. Communications thereby present the government's overarching goals and strategies, as well as the reasoning underpinning them, for an issue. In order to analyse the values and beliefs underpinning Swedish household-oriented environmental policy, communications from the government are therefore a highly relevant source of information, as they provide an elaborate understanding of the ideational context within which public policy decisions are being made. Furthermore, both bills and communications sum up the conclusions from earlier steps in the policymaking process, thereby providing the final synopsis of opinions and normative statements given by, for example, external committees or in previous legislative work.

As shown by table 6.1, a large number of such texts are available from the policymaking process during the period of study (from the year 1994 to the year 2006), thereby providing an elaborate understanding of the political contexts within which the texts have originated. [79] Now, although Swedish political sustainability aspirations clearly reach into policy areas well outside of what may be strictly regarded as environmental politics, the here conducted analysis is delimited to generic environmental policy presenting the overarching policy goals and strategies decided on. Sectoral policies, for instance focusing on sustainability-related issues in energy-, infrastructural-, trade-, or foreign policy are therefore, as evident from the table below, not included in the study. Although these can be useful when presenting detailed aspects of the environmental political strategy, they also take their point of departure in the general national strategy. Nevertheless, the list of relevant documents can still be slightly expanded. In case that an aspect of one of the official policy decisions displayed above needs to be closer examined, the reports setting out the conclusions and suggestions of external committees are also considered. These are for the most part published in the Swedish Government Official Reports series (SOU) or as part of the Ministry Publications Series (Ds). It should, however, again be emphasised that these types of documents, along with reports from governmental authorities (e.g. the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency), political speeches or statements, and texts connected specifically to the *implementation* of policy decisions, not constitute the main empirical material.

[79] The original version of the policy documents is written in Swedish, with only a few of them accompanied by official translations to, or summaries in, English. All of the quotes included in the following empirical survey have therefore been translated for the purpose of this thesis.

TABLE 6.1. *Major environmental policy documents 1994-2006*

	Overall environmental policy goals and strategies		Specific aspects/areas of environmental policy	
Year	Bills (Prop)	Communications (Skr)	Bills (Prop)	Communications (Skr)
1994	*Aiming towards sustainable development* (Prop, 1993/94:111)			
1995		*The environment – our common responsibility* (Skr, 1994/95:120)		
1996				
1997		*On the road towards a sustainable ecological society* (Skr, 1996/97:50)	*Management of worn out goods in an ecologically sustainable society* (Prop,1996/97:172)	
1998	*Environmental Code* (Prop, 1997/98:45) *Swedish environmental objectives. Environmental politics for a sustainable Sweden* (Prop, 1997/98:145)	*Ecological sustainability* (Skr, 1997/98:13)		
1999		*Sustainable Sweden – evaluation and further measures to support an ecologically sustainable development* (Skr, 1998/99:5)		*A national strategy for waste-management* (Skr, 1998/99:63)
2000		*Sustainable Sweden – evaluation of measures to support an ecologically sustainable development* (Skr, 1999/00:13)		*An environmentally oriented product policy* (Skr, 1999/00:114)
2001	*Swedish environmental objectives – interim targets and action strategies* (Prop, 2000/01:130)	*Sustainable Sweden – evaluation of measures to support an ecologically sustainable development* (Skr, 2000/01:38)		
2002	*Sweden's climate strategy* (Prop, 2001/02:55)	*Sustainable Sweden – evaluation of measures to support an ecologically sustainable development* (Skr, 2001/02:50) *A national strategy for sustainable development* (Skr, 2001/02:172)		*The consumers and the environment* (Skr, 2001/02:68)
2003		*Johannesburg – The UN Global Summit on Sustainable Development* (Skr, 2002/03:29)	*An eco-efficient society: non-toxic, resource-saving environmental life cycles* (Prop, 2002/03:117)	*Evaluation of the environmental goal in consumer policy* (Skr, 2002/03:31)
2004		*A Swedish strategy for sustainable development* (Skr, 2003/04:129)		*EU-priorities for reaching the environmental goals* (Skr, 2003/04:9)
2005	*Swedish environmental objectives – a joint task* (Prop, 2004/05:150)		*The Aarhus convention* (Prop, 2004/05:65)	
2006		*Strategic Challenges - A Further Elaboration of the Swedish Strategy for Sustainable Development* (Skr, 2005/06:126)	*National Climate Policy in Global Cooperation* (Prop, 2005/06:172)	*Think Twice! – An action plan for sustainable household consumption* (Skr, 2005/06:107)

In addition to these primary sources, a range of secondary sources is also consulted. It must be acknowledged that Sweden's reputation as a forerunner in the environmental work has attracted a range of scholarly interest. Several research efforts delineating the discourses of Swedish environmental politics and policy have been conducted during the past years and, despite departing from different theoretical lines of thought than what is applied here, have been very helpful for my attempts to analyse the underpinning values and beliefs of environmental policy in Sweden. Even though straightforward comparisons to other studies are difficult, particularly when dealing with analyses based on interpretation, these secondary sources nevertheless serve as to place the rhetorical statements in Swedish policy in a broader political context, thus facilitating the understanding and analysis of their ideational base. To mention but a few, Hedrén (1994); Algotsson (1996); Lundmark (1998), and Duit (2002) have all made distinguished contributions to the study of Swedish environmental policy and the actors (political parties as well as governmental authorities and NGOs) involved in developing and executing it during the past half-century. Furthermore, Eckerberg (e.g. 2001; Eckerberg and Edström, 2002; Eckerberg and Dahlgren, 2004; Eckerberg and Baker, 2007 & 2008), Mineur (2007), and Forsberg (2002) all highlight the political context of sub-national level environmental policy and implementation in Sweden. In particular, however, Lennart J. Lundqvist's (2004c) comprehensive work on *Sweden and Ecological Governance* deserves particular attention for providing an admirably detailed account of the development of Swedish environmental- and resource management policy, on both national and municipal levels.

In the following empirical exploration of fundamental normative principles (i.e. basic values) and policy-domain specific beliefs in Swedish household-oriented environmental public policy, the topics and questions outlined in the analytical framework (table 5.1) will guide the analysis. However, to further make sense of the values and beliefs elucidated through the analysis, and to place them in a broader context of previously studied environmental discourses, how policy belief-systems reflect different interpretations of the proper human beings/nature and state/individual relationships respectively will form the outer boundaries for the analysis in this chapter. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that how the latter relationship is described has a strong indirect relevance also for policy legitimacy. This reveals the official image of the 'environmental citizen', that is, on the individual's willingness and ability to take on an increased environmental responsibility as well as on the resources and governmental support needed to do so. We remember from above that public opinion is anticipated to be an important resource for advocacy coalitions. Policymakers are therefore expected to be rather sensitive to its direction, attempting to

rhetorically frame issues in a way that is believed to capture the interest of and round up support from the public. This, however, requires that policymakers' image of the citizen herself is correct, as there is a strong probability that a misconstruction in this respect will lead to policies and framings that do not correspond to the values and beliefs actually established among the citizenry. In other words, attempts by policy makers to deal with perceived legitimacy problems ex-ante might in fact *give rise* to legitimacy problems ex-post (cf. table 1.1 above). Thus, policymakers have, in this respect, to handle not one but two distinct problems throughout the process of designing policy. *First*, the policy problem itself (e.g. the problem with environmental degradation) has to be properly understood in order for it to be addressed and remedied in an adequate manner. *Second*, the image of the individual forming the basis for the policy design, the rhetorical framings of the policy message, and the selection of policy tools need to correspond to the values, beliefs and motives actually established among the public.

As established in the analytical framework, cross-contextual values exist on a higher level of abstraction compared to the empirically oriented beliefs. Their significance and meaning with regards to a specific policy area, such as the environment, might therefore be difficult to reliably interpret in isolation. This might be particularly true when analysing text in the shape of policy documents, which by their very nature can be assumed to deal with specific issues and empirical conditions rather than emphasising basic normative principles. It therefore seems reasonable to begin the analysis with an exploration of empirically oriented beliefs addressing conceptions of the policy area in question and first thereafter, based on these results, consider how priorities among basic values are made and reflected in policy. As a first instance, then, what is the nature of the basic problem addressed in Swedish environmental public policy?

6.2 THE ENVIRONMENT AS A POLICY PROBLEM: CAUSES, SERIOUSNESS AND PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES

We remember from chapter 4 above that even though there might be agreement on what, in broad terms at least, constitutes the general goals for a policy area, there still might exist many different interpretations of the particularities of the policy problem that need to be addressed in order for these goals to be reached. Thus, as Dryzek's (2005; see also, for example, Sabatier and Hunter [1989]; or Fischer [2003] for the significance of problem definition in policymaking) review of environmental discourses demonstrates,

even though a general agreement on the necessity of (some measure of) environmental protection or sustainability can be assumed, what is needed in terms of strategies for realising this might differ considerably. These differences depend ultimately on how the basic nature of, the causes to, as well as magnitude and direction of the environmental policy problem is understood. Basic problem definitions can thus be thought of as the core round which a policy discourse is constructed; when the framing of the problem shifts, so does also the policy addressing it. In this section, therefore, the main purpose is to explore how official Swedish environmental public policy frames the environmental problem in terms of its basic characteristics: causes, seriousness as well as the general problem-solving strategies necessary for its amendment.

Problems or opportunities? The Swedish modernisation discourse

In line with the significance of problem understanding, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:132, for an explicit environmental policy perspective see Langhelle [2000]), argues that one "really critical" aspect of policy beliefs is how the basic causes of the problem are understood. In particular since this "obviously affect the set of plausible solutions and, in turn, who is likely to bear the costs of those solutions". So, then, the first question addressed in this empirical survey of policy belief-systems is how the environmental problem is represented in Swedish policy. Following the analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter, two more specific questions define this topic: (1) which are the basic causes of the problem, and (2) what types of solutions are necessary for moving development in the opposite direction?

When conducting the initial exploration on how the overall policy problem is framed in Swedish environmental policy, Dryzek's (2005) typology of environmental discourses can be applied as a point of departure for structuring my findings. Alternative views on the basic environmental problem facing contemporary society essentially range between seeing changes in the environment as a problem that needs to, and can, be addressed by applying the instruments available within the political economy of contemporary industrial society (prosaic), or as an opportunity for redefining society altogether (imaginative). From this point of view, I conclude that Swedish environmental policy during the period studied is firmly anchored in an imaginative discourse drawing strongly on the strategy of ecological modernisation. The main storyline applied in policy certainly recognises the structural character of the environmental challenge, calling for the need to reform all parts of society in an ecologically sustainable direction. However, nowhere in policy are suggestions for radical social change, proposing a wholly new or a very different society (e.g. in line with the transformations of

people and politics suggested by the green radicalism discourse), to be found. Rather, the changes suggested primarily take the form of modernised institutions, increased sectoral responsibility and strong governmental investments in technological, scientific and industrial development (see also discussions in Anshelm, 2002; Duit, 2002; Lundqvist, 2001a; Eckerberg, 2001; Jamison and Baark, 1999; Algotsson, 1996). [80] These strategies are further accompanied by two central arguments, clearly evident through my analysis of official policy statements. *First*, the reciprocity-argument stating that the work towards sustainability essentially is a positive-sum game, as it will reinforce (and indeed be reinforced by) a simultaneously strong growth in national economy and welfare. *Second*, the argument that the societal reformation suggested to its essence promotes traditional, well-established Swedish values and thereby constitutes a natural, as well as positive, development rather than a completely new direction of politics.

Underpinning an ecologically modernised discourse is a more encompassing construction of the policy problem in need of attention than what is the case within traditional environmentally protective policy. Its basic rationale is not principally the amendment or prevention of environmental degradation. Rather, it is to demonstrate how the tension between environmental and economic goals can be overcome in political practice. In

[80] A major focus of environmental policy-analysis during the past decades has been placed on how governmental rhetoric and policy implementation aligns with the two discourses of Ecological Modernisation (EM) and Sustainable Development (SD). However, as with most concepts within the social sciences, a consensus on what beliefs these discourses actually comprise, including the intricate question of how their internal relationship should be characterised, is not easily found. Many attempts has been made to summarise, categorise and classify the concepts, giving rise to a range of typologies and taxonomies, usually distinguishing between 'weak' and 'strong' forms (see, for examples, Langhelle, 2000). According to some scholars, EM and SD reflect the same belief-system, viewing the notion of SD presented by the Bruntland-commission merely as an expression of a hegemonic modernisation-discourse (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Weale, 1992). Others argue that the concepts certainly do incorporate many overlapping beliefs (Carter [2001:195], for example, describes them as being "half-sisters"), but withhold that they are not identical and do indeed differ in a number of important respects (e.g. Dryzek, 2005; Jänicke, 1997). In this thesis, I view SD as a broad, overarching *principle* to which many governments, there among Sweden's (e.g. Skr, 1992/93:13, 5) feel morally and politically committed following the developments on the international political arena during the early 1990's. However, as a principle primarily designed with the purpose of being politically acceptable in a global setting, and thereby not to offend any one, SD attempts to reconcile a range of (sometimes seemingly contradictory) environmental, economic, developmental and democratic goals, all with an explicit global or North/South perspective. This multi-faceted character also makes SD a rather diffuse and imprecise concept, leaving plenty of room for national governments to interpret it, to rank-order its included goals as well as to devise political strategies for reaching them. Hence Dryzek's (2005:147) assertion that "[s]ustainable development, like democracy, is a discourse rather than a concept which can or should be defined with any precision". EM, on the other hand, is here viewed as a more precise and policy-oriented concept, which offers practical suggestions for how (parts of) the goals of SD can be reached. EM can thus be characterised as a political *strategy* rather than an ambiguous principle. Due to this difference in abstraction between SD and EM, it is not entirely adequate to categorise environmental policy through a dichotomous either/or statement. A central task when exploring environmental policy is instead to consider how, and by which strategy, the government has chosen to address the principle of SD, and which aspects and goals included in this discourse that are highlighted throughout official policy.

this endeavour, problem formulations and strategies take a more holistic approach, primarily targeting the interconnectedness between environmental degradation and economic loss and, more importantly, emphasising that environmental protection actually pays off in economic terms (on several levels; for the individual, for business and industry, and for the nation in general). Thus, the environmental problematique is here placed within a broader context, where its amendment is seen as a necessary tool for reaching other positive outcomes in society. This broadening of the environmental issue is also evident when considering Swedish environmental policy post-Rio, which rhetorically adheres to the definition of sustainable development presented by the Bruntland commission and thereby complements environmental strategies with both economic and social ambitions.

As several scholars (e.g. Lundqvist, 2000, 2004b & 2004c; Anshelm, 2000; Duit, 2002) previously have noted, a major shift in official Swedish environmental policy became visible almost immediately following the Rio-conference and the Social Democratic Party's return to power in the general election of 1994.[81] Sweden had played a significant part in both the preparations of and in the actual conference itself, carrying on the legacy from the first UN summit on global development held in Stockholm 20 years prior. The message from the new government was clear: in consecutive governmental statements, the ambitions to develop an ecologically sustainable Sweden as well as to make Sweden a forerunner in the environmental work was articulated (e.g. Regeringsförklaring, 1995). In particular, however, the election of Göran Persson as party leader and, thus, prime minister in 1996 marked a definitive turn in the political rhetoric and placed the environmental issue centre stage on the political agenda. In the reformed discourse, the environment was conceived as being a broad societal-, welfare- or lifestyle-issue, requiring a similarly broad political strategy. In several speeches and policy statements during the years following his election, Persson outlined his view on the need for social restructuring along ecologically sustainable lines; on the aspiration to make Sweden a forerunner in the global environmental work; as well as on the positive connection between growth and ecology. According to Persson (quoted in Lundqvist, 2001a:323), this novel idea of restructuring society along ecologically sustainable lines was not to be perceived as counter to the traditional social democratic politics of welfare development. Rather, it was envisioned as an "engine for growth and jobs", as the development of new environmentally

[81] It needs to be pointed out that the Swedish parliament as early as 1993, and with a conservative/liberal majority, decided to carry through the guidelines of the Agenda 21 (e.g. Skr, 1992/93:13; also Prop, 1993/94:111). However, since the Social Democratic party took office in the 1994 election, almost immediately after the Agenda 21 was incorporated into Swedish environmental policymaking, and has since been in power for 12 consecutive years, the story on new environmental rhetoric post-Rio is predominately concerned with a period of Social Democratic governing.

friendly and resource-efficient technologies would provide competitive advantages, new export-market opportunities and actually "create new, green jobs". In line with the principle idea of ecological modernisation (cf. Hajer, 1995; Cohen, 1998; Langhelle, 2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000; Dryzek, 2005), this discursive framing of environmental and economic goals as mutually reinforcing indicated further that no sector will be stuck with unilateral costs for implementing the political sustainability aspirations. Rather, taking this chance to restructure both society and the direction of industrial production would prevent the need to make sacrifices in the future, as the economy would have the prerequisites for a strong continued development and growth.

Following the Rio-conference, the Swedish government initiated a comprehensive environmental policy program. Under the slogan "Sustainable Sweden", not only the Environmental Ministry and its areas of responsibility, but most sectors in society became involved. The character of the main problems envisioned by the new Social Democratic government's environmental policy, including a detailed strategy for how to address them, was outlined a few years later in the Government Bill *Swedish environmental objectives. Environmental politics for a sustainable Sweden* (Prop, 1997/98:145). Presented to parliament in May 1998, this bill further develops and outlines in detail the strategy for building the ecologically sustainable society that was initiated following the Rio-summit and the Social Democratic Party's return to political power in 1994. Emanating from the overarching ambition of environmental policymaking in Sweden, the *Generation Goal*[82], the Swedish government here outlines its view on the major *environmental* problems that need to be addressed and remedied in order for ecological sustainability to be reached. In the Bill, these overarching environmental problems can be inferred from the proposition for fifteen National Environmental Quality Objectives (NEQO's)[83] to guide the environmental work, ranging from a reduction of the negative impact on the climate to open landscapes and a safe living environment. Although very generally held, the ambition with the NEQO's is both to define what quality and state of the environment that is sustainable in the long term, as well as to outline what

[82] The Generation Goal is described as the overall objective of the Swedish politics for environmental politics and is defined as the aspiration to "to the next generation hand over a society in which the major environmental problems in Sweden has been solved" (Prop, 1997/98:145, 1).
[83] The fifteen NEQOs subsequently decided on by parliament in 1999 are: Reduced Climate Impact; Clean Air; Natural Acidification Only; A Non-Toxic Environment; A Protective Ozone Layer; A Safe Radiation Environment; Zero Eutrophication; Flourishing Lakes and Streams; Good-Quality Groundwater; A Balanced Marine Environment, Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipelagos; Thriving Wetlands; Sustainable Forests; A Varied Agricultural Landscape; A Magnificent Mountain Landscape; A Good Built Environment. In 2005, Parliament decided on a sixteenth NEQO: A Rich Diversity of Plant and Animal Life (Prop, 2004/05:150; Rskr, 2005/06:49). Each objective is further specified by interims targets as well as by specific targets for different sectors and policy areas (cf. SOU, 2000:52; Eckerberg and Mineur, 2003).

needs to be done in a range of sectors in order to reach ecological sustainability within the time-frame of one generation. The introduction of NEQO's for governing the environmental work represented a major change in how environmental issues were managed in Sweden, well in line with what has been identified as core components of an ecologically modernised strategy (e.g. Carter, 2001). The use of openly defined directives meant that the national Swedish environmental policy process took the form of a "management by objectives" (e.g. Lundqvist, 2004c), rather than by detailed regulation. This suggest that the Swedish government aimed at granting local and sectoral authorities more flexibility in the day-to-day implementation of national environmental policy, but also that the enforcement of strict regulatory measures that might risk holding back economic development and growth, is avoided.[84]

The establishment of the NEQO's suggests a classic problem description, centred on the necessity of comprehensive environmental protection. However, when considering the broader policy discourse it is evident that environmental problems not are the sole, or even the major, political focus. Rather, the 1997/98 bill marks a definitive breakpoint for how the general topic of Swedish environmental policy was to be defined, and thus for the framing of the overall problem addressed.[85] First of all, it is essential to note that the NEQO's not only are valid for the traditional environmental sector. The goal of ecological sustainability instead requires that changes are made to many areas of society, and subsequently are the NEQO's also meant to be "guiding for social development as a whole, and to be integrated in goals for other policy areas" (SEPA, 1999:5007, 17-18). Furthermore, according to Mineur's (2007:95-97; see also Anshelm, 2002) analysis of four major Swedish environmental bills presented between the late 1980's and the early 2000's, the very focus for political attention shifted in the late 1990's. From

[84] See also Wildavsky's (2007:29-30) discussion of the management by objectives-approach where he, amongst others, argue that "[t]he more numerous the objectives, the more likely it is that an organisation's activity will somehow contribute to one of them and the less will be the need to give up one thing for another". From this perspective, the comprehensive list of broadly held (sometimes leading to conflicting measures, e.g. protection of biodiversity and counteracting climate change) NEQO's in Swedish environmental policy might signal an attempt to avoid the making of value trade-offs, as well as to lessen the need for changing traditional political-economic structures.

[85] Although environmental policy during this period (e.g. 1994-2006) is strongly intertwined with social democratic ideology and ideals, several previous studies point towards the discourse of ecological modernisation and its basic notions of the positive connection between environment, growth and new technological development as reaching the status of discursive hegemony (e.g. Lundqvist, 2004b; Hajer, 1995) in the Swedish political debate. Certainly, slightly different interpretations of what ecological modernisation requires in terms of implementation, governmental control and policy tools have been presented (for example by the Moderate Party and the Green Party). However, no strong opposition has been presented towards the basic beliefs underpinning this strategy of combining environmental and economic objectives, neither within nor outside of the Social Democratic Party (cf. Anshelm, 2002; Duit, 2002; Lundmark, 1998; Algotsson, 1996). This, it might be assumed, constitutes an important prerequisite for the continuation and strengthening of this line of rhetoric over the studied period.

constructing measures for preventing the emergence of (potentially devastating) environmental problems, which had been the primary concern of environmental policy during the previous decade, political rhetoric instead focused increasingly on actively promoting the broader goal of *ecologically sustainable development*. Accompanying this shift in rhetoric was a significant change in the official description of the overarching problem addressed in policy. Indeed, some signs of a widened problem frame, where benefits outside the immediate environmental focus are presented as motivations in policy, are certainly found also in earlier policy. For example was "new employment opportunities that increases welfare" (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3) emphasised as one important goal of overall Swedish environmental politics a few years earlier. In the year 1996, the spring Budget Bill further demonstrated how the environmental issue was firmly caught in a process of transformation, increasingly becoming rhetorically connected to a broader range of social problems:

> The environmental politics play a central part in a strategy for increased employment [...] It is in the interaction between an increasingly ambitious environmental politics and a business world ready for change that Sweden can renew already established industries and find new successful branches, which leads to new employment opportunities (Prop, 1995/96:150, 26)

However, the new environmental discourse presented with the 1997/98 bill increased the frequency of such references. Environmental policy was thus granted a dual role; as a tool for combating *environmental* problems (which had been the sole focus ten years earlier, cf. Mineur, 2007) as well as simultaneously considering, and working as to promote, *economy and growth*. This development, where the main policy problem and consequently also the benefits from a politics for environmental protection, are framed explicitly in socioeconomic terms, continued across the period studied in this thesis. In fact, it is possible to conclude that the economic, rather than the environmental, dimension of sustainability dominates the policy discourse. For example, improved public health, economic benefits, increased competitive strength for businesses as well as positive effects on national growth and employment are all connected to the environmental storyline and introduced as motivations for a pro-environmental social change. The Swedish government highlights the expectance of reciprocity in the environmental work by emphasising the values of competitiveness, employment and growth, as well as stressing that environmental degradation implies not (only) damages to nature, but also induce...

> Substantial costs due to loss of production, destruction of materials, impaired health, destruction of the physical cultural heritage and

> depletion of both renewable and non-renewable natural resources (Skr, 2003/04:129, 37).

This rhetorical turn, from the narrow scope of environmental protection towards the broader goal of building an ecologically sustainable society, certainly indicates that the official construction of the environment has transformed. From being a discrete or even marginalised issue, handled exclusively within the environmental ministry (e.g. Frickel and Davidson, 2004; Carter, 2001), contemporary policy represents the environment as a broad concern involving a range of sectors (see more on policy strategies below), and environmental protective policies as giving rise to a multitude of positive benefits for society at large. Although this certainly places the environmental issue squarely at the centre of political attention, making ecological sustainability an "overarching goal for the government's politics" (e.g. Skr, 2005/06:126, 1), environmental protection itself has also increasingly lost its normative appeal. To a certain extent, then, it could well be argued that the development of Swedish environmental policy over the past decade has seen a watering down of the environmental problem understanding. A politics of environmental protection is predominately framed as a practical tool for solving a range of other, more pressing (and perhaps, as Lundqvist [2000] suggests, more politically rewarding) social problems.[86]

During the latter half of the 1990's, it became clear what the government viewed as the major problems ahead and thus what the new environmental policy primarily aimed at addressing. Foregoing the 1997/98 bill was the communication entitled *Ecological Sustainability* (Skr, 1997/98:13), in which the basic values and beliefs underpinning the political strategy in the environmental policy domain are clearly outlined. In this communication, the government strongly emphasises the role of environmental policy as the political strategy necessary for attaining other, more traditional, goals. For example:

> Achieving ecological sustainability in Sweden will require long-term efforts in all policy areas. Great importance is attached to measures that have positive effects on industry and employment (Skr, 1997/98:13, 1).
>
> The international competitiveness is the foundation for economy, employment and welfare. Swedish trade and industry sector can

[86] See, for instance, Anshelm's (2002) reading of the Green People's Home as nothing more than a modernised, green-washed version of the traditional Social Democratic vision of the good society, born from the need to rebuild the Swedish economy during the mid 1990's. On the same note, Duit (2002:169) argues that the fundamental motive behind the idea of social transformation along ecological lines was the poor economic climate. Lundqvist (2000), furthermore, states that the Social Democratic Party was hard-pressed to find ways for keeping up previous levels of welfare in a downward-sloping economy.

> strengthen its competitiveness with a 'green business idea'. An adjustment to ecological sustainability of the Swedish society as a whole gives increased credibility to such a profile and the adjustment provides at the same time the stable domestic market needed to develop new industrial ideas to commercial maturity. In such a way, the ecological adjustment can become a carrier of long-term growth and stability in the employment sector. A broad adjustment can also contribute to creating employment within several branches and thereby contribute to increase prospects for growth also in highly exposed regions (Skr, 1997/98:13, 7).
>
> The work for ecological sustainability creates new possibilities for the trade and industry sector. The environmental policy is already a part of the pressure for change being put on Swedish industry, and which forms the driving force behind new production processes, new products and new markets. [...] The Swedish export of environmentally adapted technology ought to increase (Skr, 1997/98:13, 8).
>
> The main theme is to strengthen Sweden's international competitiveness on the future markets where the demand will be guided by demand for ecological sustainability (Skr, 1997/98:13, 10).

This framing of the positive effects of environmental protection predominately in economic terms is evident also in more recent documents, signalling that the government's view on fundamental societal goals and policy problems has remained relatively stable across the period studied. A few years on, when further developing the Swedish strategy for sustainable development, the government states that:

> Sweden should start the 21st century by taking steps to lay the foundation for sustained and high economic growth in a world characterized by rapid change and increasingly keen competition. Our prosperity must be maintained and developed and – where the economic situation permits – be increased. The opportunities offered by the necessary adjustment to ecological sustainability will be utilized to promote growth, increased employment and prosperity. Economic development and social welfare can be promoted by the adjustment to ecological sustainability. For Swedish industry, the adjustment process is an incentive to develop greener products and services, which in turn can help to increase market share and thus create new jobs (Skr, 1999/00:13, 4-5).

Moreover, in the last communication presented during the studied period, this discursive connection between environmental adaptation and economic progress is, as it becomes a Ministry of Sustainable Development, recycled:

> Sweden as a country has everything to gain from pioneering sustainable development. [...] So can a politics for sustainable development also be made an important driving force for reinvigoration, growth and employment in our own country. Just as social reforms continuously contribute to economic progress, will a

> transition in an environmental direction require new solutions, new ways of producing energy, modern and environmentally adapted technology and future innovations that create work and development (Skr. 2005/06:126, 8).

By allowing the overarching political goal outlined in the documents to expand, focusing primarily on positive national development clad in economic terms, also means that Swedish environmental policy must negotiate the basic built-in tension between environmental protection and other societal goals. If a politics for ecological sustainability is to become the metafix needed to boost economic growth, care must simultaneously be taken so that efforts for protecting the environment do not hamper development in other areas.[87] This view is also clearly acknowledged:

> It is essential to combine the environmental politics with other important goals for, e.g. free trade, competitiveness, employment, and growth. It is therefore of concern to be aware of the consequences eventual regulations might result in so that the positive effects not are overshadowed by unwanted effects (Skr, 1997/98:13, 71-72).

It thereby stands clear that Swedish environmental policy during the period studied displays a dual objective and includes a combination of political goals. Although the environmental issue has left its marginalised existence within the Ministry of the Environment and has become a central political topic also for sectoral ministries, it is by no means placed above other, more traditional, societal concerns. Rather, the new politics for ecological sustainability unmistakably signal that the transformed framing of the environment follows from a belief in political programs for sustainability as drivers of economic development. Summing up this shift in (or broadening of) overall problem framing, it seems fair to conclude that how the rationale for environmental public policy is presented displays several core characteristics of an ecologically modernised discourse. The nature of the overarching problem that is addressed through Swedish environmental policy is far more encompassing than merely limiting or preventing environmental degradation. Based in the vision of the ecologically sustainable society, the Social Democratic government instead perceives the implementation of

[87] Furthermore, it might be argued that framing environmental protection predominately as a driver for other societal benefits (for instance growth, employment or international reputation) makes political environmentally protective efforts rather volatile and highly dependent on the rhetorical connection to other values. Environmental protection is essential as long as the positive environment – growth relationship convincingly can be argued for, but what happens on the implementation-side of the process when or if the environment looses its status as a metafix for these problems; if "environment-as-growth" is replaced by another discourse? On this topic, we note that research on problem-framing in other policy areas in Sweden, for instance concerning the energy and agricultural sectors, convincingly has demonstrated how policy goals and the implementation of political programs seen considerable changes following changes in the dominant framing of the problem itself (cf. Söderberg, 2008; Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007; Nilsson, 2005).

environmental public policy as an opportunity to move towards increased welfare and economic prosperity as well as an opportunity for state-initiated (and steered) development of, for instance, new technology, new infrastructure and new export-markets.

This widened problem formulation, suggesting that environmental policy not only is directed towards environmental protection, is further accentuated when considering the main metaphor applied within the storyline of ecological sustainability in Sweden. As an overarching approach to gain support for the new vision of broad societal change, Prime Minister Persson early framed the transformation towards the ecologically sustainable society as building the *Green People's Home* (e.g. Lundqvist, 2004b; Anshelm, 2002; Duit, 2002). In one of his many environmentally related speeches during the late 1990's, Persson clearly outlined his vision of the Green People's Home as a modernised, sustainable and technologically advanced version of the traditional welfare state, and as a project with clear parallels to previous large-scale projects of positive social restructuring for the common good:

> Now we stand in front of a similar task. As large, as challenging. Now we shall do it again. With the same conviction, the same pride, the same engagement. Now we shall rebuild the country of Sweden so that it becomes ecological and thereby economically and socially more sustainable facing the 21st century! To its essence, this whole project is about modernisation. About our traditional optimism before science and technology (Persson [1997], quoted in Duit, 2002:169).

The discourse of ecological sustainability was, in this fashion, intimately linked with the mid-1900's large-scale social project of constructing the Swedish welfare state. Thereby, the environmental agenda was firmly placed in a larger societal context, where the role of environmental policy as a core prerequisite for retaining the welfare-system in Sweden was strongly emphasised. As is outlined in the government's first action plan for ecological sustainability:

> There are similarities to another major societal change. Building the People's Home was a major and long-term political project, born out of unemployment, social deprivation and demands for justice, started with local power of action and turned into national policy with the support of new economic theories and experience. The result can be measured by life expectancy, housing standards, education, elderly care and other welfare measures (Skr, 1997/98:13, 6).

This also provides yet another example of the optimistic tone within the new Swedish modernisation discourse, emphasising opportunities for further development rather than the problems and difficulties needed to be overcome. According to Lundqvist (2000; 2001a & 2004b), connecting traditional social

democratic values to the sustainability discourse was an attempt from the government to attract support for the vision of an ecologically sustainable society from the public and, more importantly, within the party ranks. This further accompanied the arguments for reciprocity in environmental policy directed towards the trade unions (e.g. increased employment opportunities) and towards business and industry (e.g. the positive connection between environment and growth). This interpretation might be true enough. As explained by the government when reporting on the progress of the environmental work at the turn of the century:

> A successful strategy for ecologically sustainable development must promote social and economic development. Only by combining these objectives will it be possible to engage citizens and industry in the process of adjusting to sustainable development (Skr, 1999/00:13, 5).

The frequent invocation of the welfare-state metaphor means that the government, also when turning explicitly towards the public (as opposed to organised interests or the national business community), allow the environmental discourse to incorporate goals and objectives that clearly stretches outside the boundaries of environmental protection. Applying strong references to Sweden's position as a forerunner in welfare development, the storyline of ecological sustainability presents an updated version of the vision of a prosperous future, this time enabled by assuming global leadership in the environmental field. In line with this attempt to connect previously established values to the new discourse, the politics for ecological sustainability was, and still is, framed as a broad social interest. It is a common good for all referring back to the "historical experiences" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 14), where social welfare and stability were the main goals in focus for the political reformations of society. By mobilising the already familiar rhetoric of 'the Swedish model', the development of the ecologically sustainable society, although at least hypothetically implying significant changes in many areas, is not to be considered a novel idea. It is rather a natural next step in building, developing and upholding the Swedish welfare state, as well as defending Sweden's place and reputation as a forerunner or "pioneer" (e.g. Skr, 2001/02:172, 6; 2000/01:38, 5) in the international development processes.

> A good living environment is a part of welfare. An active environmental policy can contribute to an ecologically sustainable development and to creating new employment opportunities that increases welfare and guarantees employment (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3).

> When we make a total judgement of the welfare, we cannot forget the environment (Skr, 1996/97:50, 4 & 9-10).

Apart from the propositions for Swedish economic progress mentioned above, several examples on how the connection between collective traditions and the politics of ecological sustainability is envisioned can also be identified throughout the policy documents, most commonly relating sustainable development to democratic values. This further increases the emphasis on the value of preserving tradition and of forwarding 'the Swedish model', officially motivated by the aspiration to "safeguarding and deepening Swedish democracy" (Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005:234). For example:

> An important prerequisite for reaching a sustainable society is [...] a society built on basic democratic values (Skr, 2001/02:50, 41).
>
> Vision and goals also affect the cross-cutting aspects that is a connective glue and important conditions in a sustainable society, such as fundamental values in both an individual and a societal perspective, knowledge and cultural heritage, democracy and participation as well as education and knowledge (Skr, 2001/02:172, 13).
>
> [The vision of the sustainable society is characterized by it being] a society permeated by democratic values (Skr, 2003/04:129, 7).

From what above has been said about the overall direction of, and rhetoric surrounding, the vision of the ecologically sustainable society, as outlined in official Swedish environmental policy, we can conclude that the values and beliefs underpinning it are as much, perhaps even more, founded in socioeconomic considerations than in environmental ones. Although these documents form the core of the national *environmental* policy, the basics of the discourse applied are of an economist rather than environmentalist nature (see, for example, the distinction made by Wildavsky, 2007). Economic development and growth is granted significant space in the policy documents, as the major societal problem in need of solutions. Those environmental protective measures suggested are on many occasions framed as innovative ways of reversing poor economic development; increasing the domestic rate of employment as well as ensuring a positive development in terms of welfare and democracy, rather than as having a normative value as tools for protecting environmental quality. The policy's vision of the ecologically transformed society thus incorporates a strong reciprocal character, where a transition towards pro-environmental structures is motivated by social, corporate and personal benefits in other areas. Turning to the public for support for this vision, the metaphor of the Green People's Home invokes the values of tradition and stability as well as national welfare and –pride (i.e. being a forerunner among nations and the value of the Swedish way) as motivations for building the ecologically sustainable society. Its thus argues that environmental issues can be adequately addressed without this implying a change in societal values or redirection of the present course of

development, alternatively that the present pace and direction of development only can be retained through the governments sustainability aspirations. How, then, are the route towards these goals envisioned, and which are the basic strategies outlined for building the Green People's Home?

How to get there? Strategies for reaching the Green People's Home

In general, the solutions and policy alternatives suggested to address a problem can be expected causally linked to both preferred overarching goals as well as beliefs pertaining to how the basic causes to the problem is understood. This connection is evident also throughout the documents studied here. As we have already seen in the section above, the overarching political goal guiding Swedish environmental policy consists of a juxtaposition of environment and economy, framed in the documents both as an issue of sustainability, of modernisation, and of welfare. This leads us to the conclusion that Swedish policy in many ways frames the environmental situation not as a unique problem in itself, but as an opportunity to address a more fundamental problematique. Although the traditional Swedish welfare-politics of the mid-1900's has come to the end of the road, so the government seems to reason, by embarking on a slightly different route and readjusting society in ecologically sustainable terms might the journey nevertheless continue. Acknowledging the basic principles of ecological modernisation, the attainment of environmental goals is seen both as a prerequisite and as a driver for growth. Initially, the process of societal restructuring itself implies comprehensive, nationwide industrial, scientific and infrastructural investments that will lift Sweden from economic decline. Furthermore, the resulting status as an environmental pioneer will open the global markets for export of clean, eco-friendly knowledge, technology and products, thus creating employment opportunities and welfare at home. In line with considering the transition towards ecological sustainability as a positive-sum game, this ambition is thereby strongly intertwined with the traditional Social Democratic goal of socioeconomic welfare and democracy, framed as the Green People's Home.

Framing the strategies needed to realise the political goals and combating the perceived problems as a building of the Green People's Home and a restructuring of society *as a whole* along ecologically sustainable lines suggests that this is a more comprehensive social project than one that can be accomplished merely through expert-driven, top-down adjustments of public policy. It requires, borrowing the description from Dryzek (2005:14) an "imaginative redefinition of the chessboard", where all parts of society take responsibility for change. In the words of Prime Minister Persson (1997):

> Nationally, we shall rebuild Sweden into an ecologically sustainable nation. This is an enormous political and individual challenge. It is a task that goes way beyond what we normally refer to as environmental politics.

Well in line with an ecologically modernised discourse (cf. Dryzek, 2005; Carter, 2001), a main political strategy outlined in policy is the development of partnerships[88], where political government cooperates closely with organised interests (that is, with the business- and science communities as well as with labour organisations and people's movements) in the restructuring of society. We remember from above that the policy's notion of reciprocity in the environmental work might be understood as explicitly directed towards gaining or retaining the support of different partners within this strategy. Thus, both producers and consumers are encouraged to take responsibility and actively participate in the adjustment for ecological sustainability.[89]

It is thereby clear that the basic solutions necessary for moving development in the desired direction revolves round a broad participation from all sectors of society. As early as the parliamentary year of 1994/95, only three months after the 1994 general election which brought the Social Democratic party to power, this all-inclusive participation is given a lead role in a communication from the Swedish government, setting out a new national strategy for accomplishing ecological sustainability. In this document, appropriately enough entitled *The Environment – Our Common Responsibility* (Skr, 1994/95:120) the strategy from Rio, with both a strong local and wide-ranging focus, is clearly visible throughout. Local government, business and industry, people's movements and individual citizens are all encouraged to contribute *en mass* to the fulfilment of the new environmental policy goals.

> Also the local and regional environmental work is important. The reality is transformed through concrete work in residential areas and workplaces. Individuals, people's movements, municipalities, county

[88] In this respect Lundqvist (2004c; see also Eckerberg, 2001) refers to the "path-dependency" of Swedish environmental politics. The corporatist structure from building the welfare state is retained, causing the strong focus on reaching voluntary agreements and partnerships with Swedish industry and thereby advancing, for example, the investment in "green" technology or the introduction of environmental management-systems (cf. Skr, 2003/04:129; Skr, 2001/02:172; Skr, 2001/02:50). For example, as early as 1995, a national Agenda 21 Committee was set up by government, comprising representatives from the political-, science- and business communities, as well as from NGO's. The main tasks of the committee were to stimulate, follow up and report on the work with Agenda 21 in Sweden (SOU, 1997:105; Eckerberg and Forsberg, 1998). Welfare-state corporatism might also be one explanation for the comparatively prominent place granted non-governmental organisations and people's movements as advancing the work towards sustainability through, for example, civic adult education (see below).

[89] The former, for instance, by using new, clean technology and applying a life-cycle perspective on products (cf. Skr, 1999/2000:114 & 1998/99:63), and the latter through identifying and requesting eco-friendly products (cf. Skr, 2001/02:68 & 2005/06:107; Prop, 2005/06:105)

> councils and county administrative boards have important roles (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3).
>
> The local work constitutes the foundation for a sustainable development [...]. Municipal residents, interest organisations, companies and other local actors need to be engaged in the work and contribute with their knowledge (Skr, 1994/95:120, 8).

In government communications reporting on and specifying the desirable direction of Swedish environmental policy from later dates, this apparent need for extensive participation on the local level, within organisations and even by individuals is further emphasized. Here, it also becomes obvious that broad participation not only is necessary in order to reach the politically specified goals, but also thought of as a responsibility or even a duty symmetrically distributed among all actors in the Swedish society. This, furthermore, seems to align perfectly with the previously discussed notion of ecological sustainability as a broad, societal undertaking related to the time-honoured traditions of the good society, rather than to environmental adjustments through end-of-pipe regulations (or indeed a novel project of social change). An all-inclusive participation is a core strategy in documents outlining the general direction of environmental policy, as for examples:

> The success of the adjustment process depends on the broad participation of all sectors of society: the public sector, industry and business, organisations and individual citizens (Skr, 2000/01:38, 30).
>
> To create an environmentally sustainable society, there is a need for all individuals and social institutions to feel co-responsible for the society's development (Skr, 2001/02:50, 29).
>
> All people must take part in the adjustment [towards a sustainable society] and contribute with different experiences (Skr, 2003/04:129, 29).
>
> The potential for achieving this [e.g. the Generation Goal] requires that all forces in society strive in the same direction and that the engagement and environmental work within businesses, municipalities, and households et al increases (Prop, 2004/05:150, 15).

The same framing is also seen in various policy documents directed towards household-related behaviour (primarily household consumption-patterns) in particular:

> Everyone in society has a responsibility for the work towards an ecologically sustainable development and for the efforts to reach the national environmental quality objectives (Skr, 2001/02:68, 7).

> All of us – within the public sector and the private sector as well as in our role as consumers – must contribute if we are to achieve sustainable development, both in Sweden and globally (Skr, 2005/06:107, 5).

The need for broad participation in environmental issues is further highlighted when considering how policy rhetoric is translated into political practice and program implementation, as for example in the guidelines for following up the national sustainability strategy. In 2001, the government commissioned the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency to, in cooperation with Statistics Sweden, develop a set of sustainable development indicators for describing and evaluating progress in the work towards a sustainable development (cf. Mineur, 2007; SOU, 2000:52; Prop, 2000/01:130). Following the acknowledgement throughout policy that "the participation and involvement of all are crucial to a sustainable Sweden", one of the four themes by which the environmental indicators are classified therefore focuses on "everyone's contribution, participation, equality and distribution" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 113 & 109). As the indicators collect the progress in all three dimensions of sustainability, the greater part of the indicators in this section draws on economic and social issues, for example demographic and income-based variables. Nevertheless, also public participation, both in the political sphere through elections and more directly in the environmental work through the purchase of eco-labelled products and services are included (Statistics Sweden, 2001:21). This indicates, again, that a broad, all-encompassing participation is the key strategy for realising environmental policy goals, both in rhetoric and in practice.

Although broad public participation as well as organised interests partnerships are emphasised throughout policy, the role of the state itself has not been scaled back. Surely, both the introduction of NEQO's and the focus on cooperation with organised interests signals a somewhat changed approach of central government, from governing-by-regulation towards a (at least in theory more flexible) governing-by-objectives. Nevertheless, when focusing on the solutions presented as necessary for amending the outlined policy problem, it is unmistakable so that strategies for building the ecologically sustainable society largely holds the state as a central actor. Framed in general terms as a forerunner; as leading the transition and setting a good example in the restructuring of society, the inspirational the role of the state is emphasised on several occasions (e.g. Skr, 1997/98:13, 12; Skr, 1998/99:5, 12). In particular, however, the vision framed as the Green People's Home is to be realised through a range of state-controlled initiatives, where a changed (more sustainable) direction of development are achieved through government-set objectives; publicly funded investments; and an incorporation of environmental considerations into all kinds of state policy.

Although the link between policy adjustments and positive outcomes runs via a broad societal participation, the policy problem is in this manner frequently presented in policy-technical terms, with positive benefits that can be reached largely through the means of top-down administration and planning.[90]

The first task for the administrative state in this endeavour was to amend the separation of the environmental issue from the policy processes within sectoral ministries and agencies, by internalising environmental considerations into all kinds of governmental decisions and activities. As suggested by the problem understanding – solutions causality, the evident broadened understanding of the policy problem (that is, the movement from environmental adjustment to ecological sustainability) also requires a broad approach to amending it. A necessary shift in strategy is therefore seen in the movement away from end-of-pipe regulations within the realm of the environment ministry, towards active involvement from all sectors:

> Sweden's national strategy for sustainable development shall bring together social, including cultural, economic and environmental priorities. The themes or core areas of the strategy thus denote the significance of integration rather than sectoral dispersion (Skr, 2001/02:172, 12).
>
> Environmental concerns and resource management must be integrated into decision-making in all sectors (Skr, 2000/01:38, 5).

This integrative aspect of the national policy strategy, pointing towards the environmental issues' incorporation in "all politics, in daily life, in governmental- and community work (SOU, 2000:52, 25) stem from the international processes of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI, cf. Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007).[91] Due to the early initiation of the process for building the ecologically sustainable society, EPI in Sweden has followed and in some respects even preceded international developments (cf. Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007; Lundqvist, 2004c; Persson, 2004). For instance, the Government Communication *On the road towards a sustainable ecological society* (Skr, 1996/97:50) focuses on the sector responsibility for the

[90] See, for example, Eckerberg's (2000:244) review of the developments in Swedish environmental policy, where she asserts that "it is probably safe to conclude that it [the Swedish environmental work] has also been focused on the most easy-to-grasp and easy-to-change issues of a technical and simple organisational nature, rather than on problematizing the more fundamental issues of economic growth and individual life-styles".

[91] Environmental Policy Integration (or sector integration) have throughout the literature been given a variety of slightly differing connotations (for examples, see Hertin and Berkhout, 2001 & 2003; Lafferty, 2004; Lenschow 2002; Liberatore, 1997). The core meaning of the concept is, nevertheless, the same; *to coordinate environmental and key sector policy objectives by integrating the environment as a value of consideration in habitual activities of all policy-areas* (cf. Söderberg, 2008). For an enlightening overview of EPI, both historically and as a research phenomena see Persson (2004), and for empirical examples of the process of EPI in Sweden (primarily concerning the energy and agriculture sectors), Nilsson and Eckerberg (2007) provide an ample discussion.

environment and comes to the conclusion that the goal of ecological sustainability shall be included as a goal in several sector policies; for example economy, communications, agriculture, fisheries, consumer issues, defence- and foreign policy. All activities in these sectors shall emanate, the Swedish government asserts, "from what nature and the environment can carry" (cf. Skr, 1996/97:50, 34). Following on from this, Persson (2004:7; see also Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007) lists several efforts on the national level of policymaking related to EPI in Sweden, all of which denote ecological sustainability as a broad issue of societal transformation and sets out a central role for the state in this endeavour. For instance, the establishment of a new Environmental Code taking effect in 1999 (Prop, 1997/98:45; SFS, 1998:808); the introduction of Environmental Management Systems in governmental agencies and ministries (e.g. Skr, 1996/97:50; Prop, 2000/01:130); and the requirement for green public procurement, where "all public contracts will be subject to environmental requirements" (cf. Skr, 2000/01:38, 15). The most explicit connection to the EPI-processes is, however, seen in the formalisation of the sector responsibility for Swedish governmental authorities. This was further explicated in the process of developing the NEQO's, aspiring to be "guiding for the development of society as a whole and to be integrated in goals for other [than environmental] policy-areas" (SEPA, 1999:17-18). As suggested in the 1997/98:145 bill, the government also directed a specific responsibility for working with ecological sustainability to 24 agencies to…

> …integrate environmental considerations and resource management into their activities and seek to promote efforts to achieve ecological sustainability throughout the sector for which they are responsible (Skr, 1998/99:5, 13; see further Skr, 1999/2000:13 & 2000/01:38; Prop, 1997/98:145).

The integrative strategy expressed in Swedish environmental policy leads us to several conclusions. *First*, if we agree that environmental issues by its very nature cut across a range of traditional policy domains, energy, transportation, agriculture, housing and infrastructure to name but a few, this can certainly be interpreted as an adequate response to the challenges lying ahead, demonstrating the Swedish government's commitment to amending the environmental situation. *Second*, given how the overarching problems and goals of the government's sustainability aspirations are framed, the process of integrating ecological sustainability in the activities and decisions also in sectors dealing with social and economic issues explicates the strategy of building a new society based on the positive connections between pro-environmental investments and economic growth. This, *third*, demonstrates the above-mentioned transformation of the environmental issue from a single-sector problem, concerned with combating environmental degradation, and towards a significantly broader take on the problem to be solved; on the

desirable end-states for policy; as well as on the strategies suggested for reaching them.

At the same time as the responsibilities for the sustainability-work are distributed among sectoral authorities, the political strategy also seems to suggest an increasing centralisation of the leadership over agenda setting and implementation processes. This top-down approach to ecological sustainability is evident both when it comes the distribution of authority between different levels of government as well as concerning the balance between the cabinet itself and national agencies and departments. Several scholars have noted the authoritative role of central government in Swedish environmental policy. This despite the legally prescribed municipal autonomy and the decentralised structure of policymaking in Sweden, indicating that decisions on as well as implementation of environmental policy is strongly reliant on local government activities and decisions.[92] Mineur (2007:95) argues that although the environmental work in Sweden has been characterised as a bottom-up process, the application of NEQO's in actual fact served as to bind local government work to the problem representations, goals and strategies articulated nationally. As many of the responsibilities for environmental program implementation are transferred down to local government (e.g. Skr, 1996/97:50, 74-75 & 2003/04:129, 26-28), Swedish municipalities are also charged with carrying through and following up the work on nationally elaborated objectives (e.g. Prop. 1997/98:145, 155). The flexibility suggested by the management-by-objectives approach is thus circumscribed as national government sets the frames for the environmental work by both deciding on desirable goals and connecting financial incentives for adhering to national policy-aspirations. On a similar note, Duit (2002:165) claims that the Social Democratic environmental policy in fact recycles core elements of state-centred strategies that have been applied to solve previous societal problems. In particular as also environmental strategies emphasises the application of a national redistributive politics and increase in government spending in order to stimulate growth and welfare. Lastly, Lundqvist (e.g. 2004c & 2001a; see also Eckerberg, 2001) highlights several factors pointing towards the centrality of national government, both in the policymaking and program implementation phases. In his view, the intra-

[92] Swedish municipalities were required to integrate environmental concerns in their decisions and activities as early as the year 1991 (Prop, 1990/91:90). In particular, however, local environmental work was initiated on a broad scale through the Local Agenda 21 processes (cf. Eckerberg, 2001; Fudge and Rowe, 2000; Brundin and Eckerberg, 1999; Forsberg, 2002). Soon after Rio, the Swedish municipalities were bestowed the responsibility to develop local Agenda 21-plans as a guide for the continued environmental work, and in 1998 a majority of the Swedish municipalities stated that they, accordingly, had started an Agenda 21-process, a number which had further increased in 2002 (cf. Eckerberg and Edström, 2002). In order to carry out their responsibilities, the municipalities were made eligible to apply for funding by the national government. During the years 1994-1996, SEK 25 millions were distributed to various municipal projects within the framework of LA21 (SOU, 2003:31; also Forsberg, 2002; Brundin and Eckerberg).

cabinet formation of a Delegation for Ecologically Sustainable Development (DESD) in 1997 marked the desire of the Swedish government to establish a centralised political structure, where not only decision-making on but also administration and implementation of the national strategy for ecological sustainability was placed directly with the cabined rather than with sectoral agencies or local authorities.[93]

One central part of the sustainability strategy where the authoritative role of national government is evident is the mobilisation of publicly funded investments as a tool for initiating and steering development processes in the preferred direction. In general, Swedish environmental policy draws strongly on the perceived effectiveness of economic incentives and holds, as an example, that "economic policy-instruments are the most important tools for [reaching] a sustainable development" as well as that the increased use of economic instruments should be designed so that their "steering effects are strengthened" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 141 & 40; see also Skr, 1999/00:13; 2000/01:38 & 2005/06:126). A major share of the taxes, fees and subsidies presented in policy are obviously directed towards increasing the cost of polluting activities for business and industry (or, seen the other way, realising ecological modernisation's central devise that pollution prevention pays). Nevertheless, market instruments or fiscal incentives[94] are also the preferred tools for addressing the behaviour of individuals on both the national (e.g. SEPA, 1996:4601; SOU, 1997:105; Skr, 2001/02:68 & 1996/97:50) and local (cf. Matti, 2006; Lundmark, 2003) levels of government. Conversely, judicial-legal tools are not granted any major attention in the general strategies for individual behavioural change, suggesting that that the above mentioned responsibility for the individual to contribute to the positive development is thought of as a moral duty rather than one enforced by law.[95]

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[93] The DESD was formed in the beginning of 1997 by the ministers of Environment and ministerial colleagues (agriculture, taxation, education and labour). The main tasks for the delegation were to develop a platform for the government's cross-sectoral environmental policy as well as to prepare cabinet decisions on sustainability-inducing investments (Skr, 1996/97:50).

[94] A number of tools are suggested for both directly and indirectly influencing activities within the household. These tools are designed either with the purpose to present a new, sustainable alternative as more advantageous to the household ("pull strategies"), or to exacerbate the negative impact of practicing unsustainable activities and thus reduce their prevalence ("push strategies"). In general, the former tends to be perceived as more acceptable due to its explicit connection to voluntariness, even if its effects are not necessarily as distinct, and for the same reason.

[95] That is to say, laws and regulations not are proposed in the context of participation on the individual level. However, with regards to business and industry, as well as the Swedish municipalities, formal environmental regulations are in place, not the least through the new, coordinated and strengthened Swedish Environmental Code of 1999 (Prop, 1997/98:45; SFS, 1998:808). Additionally, due to the fact that waste-management is one area of the environmental politics heavily regulated in both national and international law, the individual have not the same opportunity to choose non-participation as is the case in other areas (cf. SFS, 1997:185, §5), for example consumption. As household waste also stands for a large percentage of the waste total, the individual's action in this area is of course important, but controlled not as much by the state as by the municipalities which are responsible for all household waste not covered by the Swedish *producer responsibility* (cf. Skr, 1998/99:63).

In particular, realising the vision of the Green People's Home requires a strategy based round large-scale investments. This is in line with the basic components of ecological modernisation as well as with the above accounted for view of the policy problem as requiring top-down green leadership consisting of experts and politicians. For instance, in his review of social democratic environmental strategies, Anshelm (2002:48) argues that the aims of increasing the rate of employment, strengthening the position for Swedish export-industry and, thus, lifting Sweden from the economic recession, were primarily approached through the direction of financial resources to various projects with the purpose of infrastructural and industrial modernisation. Following the shift from environmental protection to ecological sustainability, an ambitious plan for state-controlled investments was early introduced as a cornerstone in the government's strategy, and a central task for the Delegation for Ecologically Sustainable Development (see above) was described as to elaborate on and suggest areas of investment for ecological sustainability (Skr, 1996/97:50). The direction of governmental investments outlined in policy as necessary for reaching the political goals are of two distinct kinds. *First*, in line with an ecologically modernised emphasis on technological solutions to the environmental problematique (and of the positive connection between technological development and economic growth), the necessity for the state to promote the development of new science and technology is seen as imperative. Directed towards business and industry, the role of the state is seen as to provide "information, counselling, capacity building and financing" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 103) to assist the innovation processes, in the marketing of new technology on the global markets, and in making the transition towards new modes of production. As for the role of science within Swedish universities and institutes, policy clearly outlines the ambition that research related to environmental issues should increase in both quality and quantity and thereby constitute a driving force in the attainment of positive future developments (see, for examples, Skr, 1996/97:50; 1998/99:5 & 1997/98:13 or Prop, 1997/98;145 & 2004/05:150). Although research contributing to the advancement of new technology is underlined also the humanities and social sciences is perceived as making noteworthy contributions to the transition towards ecological sustainability, thereby highlighting its character as a societal goal requiring broad participation also from households and individuals. As for example:

> New technology is one of the prerequisites for the development towards increased ecological sustainability, for example regarding energy- and other forms of resource efficiency as well as cleaning- and recycling technology. But also knowledge on organisation, lifestyle issues and norms play a significant role (Skr, 1998/99:5, 19).

Second, although the development of science and technology is a key mechanism within ecological modernisation, the major share of suggested investments for ecological sustainability is directed towards the transformation of societal structures in a broader sense. For instance, in the 1997/98 bill (e.g. Prop, 1997/98:145, 305-307; see also Skr, 1997/98:13; and Mineur, 2007) two new programs for funding social restructuring at the local level were launched: the Local Investment Program (LIP)[96] and the Eco-Cycle Billion (in Swedish: Kretsloppsmiljarden). These added to the previous governmental funding of the local work with Agenda 21 and were further combined with large-scale investments for increasing energy efficiency; for transforming Swedish agricultural production in a more sustainable direction; as well as for modernising and expand the infrastructure for track-bound transportation. In total, the government suggested setting aside funds in the excess of SEK 27 billions for sustainability investments (Skr, 1998/99:5, 14).

Supporting my previous conclusions on the broadening of overarching goals for the policy, the value of large-scale investments in science, technology and infrastructure outside the immediate environmental domain is highlighted also when presenting these aspects of the government's sustainability-strategy.

> Investments that lead to early structured skills and advanced product development should provide advantages on the growing world markets for environmental- and energy technologies as well as on other markets for goods and services in which ecologically sustainable products are requested. Thereby will this also benefit employment (Skr, 1998/99:5, 15).
>
> Research shall contribute to economic development and the societal shift to sustainable development and thereby promote employment and prosperity (Skr, 1997/98:13, 55)

The shared environment-employment ambition is particularly evident in the presentation of the government's aims with the LIP, as its positive effects on the local economy and labour market are highlighted (e.g. Prop, 1997/98:1; 1997/98:145 & 1997/98:150; Skr, 1998/99:5 & 2001/02:50). In this aspect, the administration of the LIP has also received a fair amount of critique, not the least from the parliamentary auditors (e.g. Riksdagens revisorer,

[96] The Local Investment Program (LIP) was constructed as a part of the Swedish government's investment in the transition to an (ecologically) sustainable society. Through the program, Swedish municipalities was given the possibility to apply for financial grants from national authorities in order to initiate and continuing local environmental work, predominately structural and technological developments (e.g. Forsberg, 2002). The program followed chronologically on previous programs for funding local environmental projects, e.g. the Swedish Agenda 21-grants, and was in place during the years 1998-2002. During this time, it distributed in total SEK 6.2 billion to 161 of Sweden's 290 municipalities (Eckerberg, Baker, Marell, Dahlgren, Morley and Wahlström, 2005; see, for more examples, also Berglund and Hanberger, 2003; Eckerberg and Edström, 2002; Sköllerhorn and Hanberger, 2004).

1998/99:8), due to the fact that process of setting criteria for and distributing grants was controlled directly by the government itself rather than, as is the common procedure, by governmental agencies. The critique towards the centralised structure of the LIP-grants process clearly points in the direction of dual imperatives in the design of Swedish environmental policy. In particular, it highlights that environmental policy tools are used for targeting other goals that, again, might be understood as more politically rewarding on the short-term. The inter-cabinet control of the grants process along with the unclear principles for how and to whom they should be distributed meant that the government had the power to use the LIP as a tool for attracting votes in the upcoming national elections. As an example, economists Dahlberg and Johansson (2002:37; see also Forslund, Samakovlis and Vredin Johansson, 2006; Berglund and Hanberger, 2003; Kågesson and Lidmark, 1998) claim, in an article on vote-purchasing behaviour in the *American Political Science Review*, that they "find support for the hypothesis that the temporary 'ecological' grants that we study [i.e. the LIP] are used tactically by the incumbent (socialist) government. In particular [...] that the incumbent government purchases votes by investing in those municipalities where there are a lot of swing voters".

Whether these critics are correct or not in their assessment of the real motives behind the investment programmes, this still goes to show that the Swedish environmental policy can be characterised as a top-down affair. Although, the strategies outlined for building the Green People's Home recognises the need for partnerships and broad participation in the implementation phase, it clearly holds a central role for the government itself even in decisions on the particulars of policy implementation. Furthermore, as we now have seen, the strategies presented places a strong faith in economic policy tools for driving the development. It places particular emphasis on the positive outcomes that can be reached through the application of various fiscal pull-measures for directing social actors to taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the new global situation. Lastly, this aligns with what we have previously concluded on prominence of beliefs both in the possibility to successfully combine environmental and economic goals, as well as in the possibility to achieve them largely through governmental administration and management.

Radical change or gradual reformation? The policy problem's seriousness and direction

Intimately connected to the representation of what the problem actually amounts to is the understanding of the perceived problem's seriousness and its direction. As already discussed, how serious the problem is perceived to be

is a strong determinant for which kind of action, and the comprehensiveness of the same, that is required to properly amend it. In terms of Dryzek's (2005) environmental discourses, perceiving the problem as on a large-scale, and amounting to an imminent and significant threat, also suggests that the solutions presented will take a radical form. This regardless if they draw on an overall prosaic strategy (e.g. a strong, centralised and expert-driven control) or suggest imaginative solutions (e.g. a rethinking of social values and structures). Similarly, if the situation is seen to be less challenging and acute the solutions will rather outline a strategy that suggests gradual and long-term reformation to address the problem. As outlined in table 5.1 above, the second question addressed within this topic concerns the framing of the direction of the problem, in other words who that are affected by the identified policy problem, and consequently who that will benefit from its eradication. In policy-analysis, exploring the distribution of costs and benefits resulting from a particular policy is an essential component as this provides an initial indication on how different interests might react to it (Birkland, 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). For instance, Wilson's (1995) typology of policy-types suggests that a policy providing benefits for a concentrated interest group, but to a cost shared by many, is the easiest to implement successfully. We should, however, remember that the actual outcome of the policy in terms of cost/benefit distribution not is the adequate focus for an analysis of policy legitimacy. Instead, it is the policy's description of the interests thought to benefit from the policy or those explicitly threatened by the problem addressed (and subsequently how these correspond to public beliefs in this effect) that is of relevance.

As the perception of problem seriousness and the presentation of necessary solutions are strongly intertwined, an initial image of how the magnitude of the problem is thought of within the Swedish environmental policy discourse can also be inferred from what we have learned in the sections above. Overall, it is evident that Swedish policy do not present radical (in the sense indicated by Dryzek [2005]) strategies for dealing with the environmental problem, but is firmly settled in a reformist discourse, suggesting gradual adjustments and long-term changes to society rather than immediate, full-scale measures. We have seen how the political ambition to implement lasting changes "in order to secure welfare and a good standard of living for future generations" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 5), primarily frames an ecologically sustainable development as a natural continuation of the traditional social democratic welfare politics rather than a challenge requiring an entirely new social organisation. A similar conclusion can be inferred from the political rhetoric applied when discussing the nature of the problem itself. The government continuously points towards the issue of sustainability as an overarching goal for Swedish politics, in need of a broad participation, and

requiring integration in all policy sectors. As such, the policy problem addressed here is certainly both perceived as important and of central character. It is, however, entirely possible, and even probable, that the central position of the sustainability issue on the political agenda primarily is due to the broad understanding of what a sustainable development signifies, rather than to the explicit seriousness of the environmental threat. We remember that as the focus for Swedish policy transformed from environment to ecologically sustainable development, it also widened the political aspiration towards a goal much broader than of merely amending the environmental problematique. At the same time as the environment-as-growth objective became more outspoken in the policy documents, so did also descriptions of the environmental threat become less frequent. This point towards the conclusion drawn by Mineur (2007:96) following her analysis of four Swedish environmental bills; the environmental-threat rhetoric evident in the official environmental discourse during the 1980's has now been replaced with a staggeringly more optimistic tone.

A certain amount of ambiguity is nevertheless found in the policy documents. They do contain some instances where the environmental situation is described in more pessimistic terms, as "a large challenge for both the society and the business world" and as requiring "forceful action" (e.g. Prop, 1997/98:145, 19-20). The strongest (and one of the very few) explicit expressions of an environmental threat describes the environmental impact from contemporary patterns of consumption and production as "a disastrous threat to the climate, the ecosystems and human health" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 30). However, and given the overall concern with sustainability rather than environment, only a minimum of statements presenting the problem in term of an imminent catastrophe or crisis are found in the documents. For the most part, the environmental situation is not framed as something that necessities immediate action. As early as the year 2000 (Skr, 1999/2000:13, 5), the government asserted that the most significant environmental problems in Sweden were on their way towards being amended, and that political attention therefore should turn towards broader issues of societal planning. Instead, the increased attention granted environmental issues on the international arena, primarily the calls for sustainability heard from Rio, is seen with positive eyes as an opportunity for modernisation and development; for lifting Sweden from the economic recession (cf. Anshelm, 2002; Duit, 2002); and thus to cater for citizens' welfare and security in a longer perspective. For example, the major "strategic challenges" outlined in policy documents from the end of the studied period contains very few explicit references to remedying a pressing environmental situation. In the year 2004, the challenges lying ahead are said to consist of "Environment-driven growth and welfare"; "Good health - the future's most important resource"; "An

integrated policy of sustainable community building"; and "Child and youth policy for an aging society" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 1). In the follow up strategic document from 2006, the challenges are expressed as "Sustainable community building"; "Stimulate a good health on equal conditions"; "Meet the demographic challenge"; and "Promote a sustainable growth" (Skr, 2005/06:126, 2). On this account, it seems reasonable to conclude that what we understand as being the classic problem of environmental degradation clearly is overshadowed by the aspiration to address other problems, and that the notion of a serious environmental threat therefore is reduced to a minimum in the policy documents.

Neither when considering how policy is positioned relative to the notion of ecological limits does the understanding of the environmental problem seems to be of a kind requiring forceful and immediate action. Unlike the more radical discourses on the environment, where 'limits to growth'[97] is a core principle, Swedish environmental policy takes a significantly more sceptical stance towards this discourse. Following the same limits-ambiguity that is found in *Our Common Future* (e.g. Baker, 2007; Langhelle, 2000), we can see that Swedish policy simultaneously both recognises and rejects the idea of ecological limits. First of all, the very existence of a political aspiration towards ecological sustainability should indicate that some form of limits of nature's carrying capacity must have been identified. If not, and if present patterns of action are not thought to infringe on the life and prosperity of future generations, why even suggest a different route for development? Many of the opening paragraphs in the policy documents can also be read as suggesting that we indeed are facing ecological limits, in particular when expressing the need to change present conditions in order to ensure the living standard (perhaps even life itself) of coming generations of humans. For examples: to "protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations" (Prop, 2004/05:65, 140); to "ensure future generations' prospect of a good living environment and adequate welfare" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 22); or to "secure welfare and a good standard of living for future generations" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 5). It is perhaps even more explicit in those statements discussing the development of the environmental situation in a global perspective, which point towards the facts that:

> This [the environmental] threat will probably be reinforced over the coming decades, when economic growth escalates in previously poor countries (Skr, 2003/04:129, 30).
>
> In a world whose population is constantly growing, sustainable development is only possible if we increase our ecological efficiency (Skr, 1997/98:13, 8).

[97] That is, the understanding that a continuation of present human development inevitably will reach the maximum of what nature has the capacity to carry (cf. Dryzek, 2005; Carter, 2001).

However, this is not to say that the ecological limits place constraints on all forms of growth, or, so it seems, that the limits are understood to be absolute. As necessary for convincingly making a positive environment-economy connection, the policy discourse also expresses the belief that a economic growth and development is possible despite the fact nature's carrying capacity currently seems to be under pressure. One important limit for the goals to become reality is instead seen in the current knowledge of how to best (read most effective) use the earth's resources.

> Most environmental problems are due to man not yet having learned how to manage her resources (Skr, 1996/97:50, 4).

Once again, therefore, we can return to my previous conclusions on the major political strategies outlined for reaching the political sustainability aspirations. It seems reasonable to assume that the optimistic or reassuring (cf. Dryzek, 2005:172) message that the government attempts to get across in policy draws strongly on the potential in utilising human ingenuity. By developing new technology and, thereby, increasing the effectiveness in our use of resources it is possible to stretch the natural limits. This, in combination with a centrally planned and administered strategy for social reorganisation, will make continuous growth possible even though each resource by itself might be finite.

> Guidelines and a strategy for sustainable development will show how lasting changes can be made in society in order to secure welfare and a good standard of living for future generations (Skr, 2001/02:172, 5)

Finally, when considering the strategies laid down in Swedish policy, I do agree with Anshelm's (2002:46-47) assertion that Swedish environmental policy from the late 1990's and onwards reveals a strongly utopian and techno-optimistic vision of the future, for several reasons. *First*, the central message throughout policy is that pressure for pro-environmental social change creates opportunities for growth and prosperity in Sweden, rather than restricting its future possibilities. *Second*, the strategies outlined place great faith in human ingenuity: through technological progress, governmental administration, and the ability of science to control or at least foresee the strength and resilience of nature will building the good society be guaranteed. *Third*, the optimistic outlook on the ability to amend the problem can also be seen in the timeframe denoted by the Generation Goal (see note 62 above). The expressed belief is that, by applying the strategies outlined in policy all major environmental challenges can be successfully solved within 25 years (starting in 1999 when the NEQO's were first established, e.g. Prop, 1997/98:145). The optimistic tone in policy thus concerns not only the framing of environmental problems as opportunities for change, but also the

possibilities to actually realise the stated goals; to develop science and technology in a way that will eradicate the inherent conflict between economic growth and environmental protection, expand the limits of nature, and reach ecological sustainability within the span of one generation.

Having established that policy draws on a conception of the problem as an opportunity for change rather than as a significant and imminent environmental threat, the question remaining within this topic concerns how the benefits from addressing the problem are distributed. Who (if anyone) is threatened by the environmental problem, and who will thereby gain from following the outlined strategies? What is more, exploring beliefs on the direction of the problem also touches upon more fundamental, motivational values. In particular, it can be assumed that those entities highlighted as beneficiaries in the policy rhetoric also express the official view on whose welfare that is of the greatest concern. The broad, and as have been shown above, multi-faceted field of environmental discourses, contains many different interpretations and suggestions for the proper direction of welfare, rights or any other positive outcome from pro-environmental activities. One basic raft runs between the various forms of ethical positions that take either a human-centred or an eco-centred stance. Within the radical deep-ecology movement, for example, human special interests are rejected and a basic criterion for distributive justice is instead a more equal moral status and value between human beings and the non-human world (e.g. Devall and Sessions, 1985). This ecocentric perspective thus sees the intrinsic worth of nature as a major motivation for radical social (and personal) change in a pro-environmental direction.

The wide range of, more or less strongly pronounced, human-centred ethical positions also expresses quite different interpretations on whose welfare to prioritise. We remember from the discussion in chapter 3 that one important divergence runs between values-orientations expressing the welfare of the own person; the in-group; or incorporating people also with whom one has no (nor ever will have) personal contact. In theorising the state/individual relationship, a significant difference setting traditional conceptualisations of what the status of citizenship amounts to apart from the relatively novel idea of *ecological* citizenship is the sphere of civic duties (e.g. Dobson, 2003; see more in chapter 5 above). Traditional understandings commonly are thought of as expressing a territorial view on duties, confining the sphere of civic relations to people sharing membership in a territorially defined community or contingent political space (that is, a state). Ecological citizenship, on the other hand, instead departs from a non-territorial, post-cosmopolitan view of civic relations and defines one's duties by the negative spread of one's actions. Social justice, or the fair distribution of essential resources and ecological

space between all people now living in the world, as well as extended to future generations, is therefore a core value within the idea of ecological citizenship.

As with the previous question on the magnitude of the problem, several conclusions can here be drawn based on what already have been touched upon above. We can therefore initially conclude that, perhaps to no greater surprise, ecocentric arguments only play a peripheral role in the Swedish policy discourse, and that anthropocentric orientations consequently dominate the perspective on the human beings/nature relationship. This is also consistent with the conclusions of previously conducted studies on this matter (e.g. Lundmark, 1998; Hedrén, 1994). It should nevertheless be mentioned that a few streaks of green certainly are found alongside the explicit anthropocentric motivations in the policy rhetoric, in particular in documents from the early stages of the period studied. Here, the notions of natural limits to human activity, as well as of the inherent value of nature are presented as motivations for environmental protection, thereby leaning towards a slightly more ecocentric, or at least weakly anthropocentric[98], outlook on the human beings/nature relationship. As an example of this:

> Care of man is also care of nature. Nature sets the frames for human activity, but at the same time is the state of nature affected by human political, economical and social conditions (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3).

> Humans have a responsibility to manage the earth's resources. This must be done not only from our own interests and needs, but also with regard to the needs of other living creatures as well as the need to conserve and rebuild the earth's resources for the future (Skr, 1997/98:13, 26).

The frequency of these arguments is, however clearly overshadowed by the many anthropocentric motivations pervading the policy discourse. The policy's perspective on nature draws for the most part on its instrumental value, and prescribes environmental protection as being necessary for sustaining the resources and goods nature provides, for example food, medicine or raw materials, as in this quote addressing the necessity for the Swedish regions to adapt a strategy for suitability:

[98] Weak anthropocentrism, sometimes referred to as shallow ecology, holds that humans are superior to nature, yet dependent on its resources. Thereby, nature is thought of in instrumental or inherent (materialistic and aesthetic values respectively) terms and subordinate to human interests. Even though the needs of humans take precedence, weak anthropocentrism also acknowledges that ecological concerns are required to ensure them (cf. Carter 2001; Stenmark 2000). Expressing the value of unity with nature, thus, might prove relevant also for these motivational interpretations. A closer scrutiny of the documents reveals several statements where human dependence on the environment for future economic development, health and welfare are denoted, implying on one hand the pure instrumental value of nature as provider of *human* goods, on the other that more care need to be taken for this function to remain stable in a long-term perspective.

> To protect the environment [...] is important for a sustainable regional development and a vital countryside. An attractive natural, cultural and living environment is important for attracting entrepreneurship as well as businesses and residents, and does also contribute to an increased growth and development e.g. environmentally friendly local production and tourist industry. Local environmentally friendly production can have great significance for employment and livelihood in rural- and sparsely populated areas. An environmentally motivated trade and industry generates increased competitive strength and contributes therefore also directly to increased development and growth (Skr, 2001/02:172, 45).

Adding to this, also nature's aesthetic value (as beautiful, for recreational use or to inspire culture) is occasionally presented as motivations for its protection. As an example:

> Nature's abundance of variation also gives spiritual and aesthetic stimulation as well as invaluable experiences of beauty and serves as a source of inspiration for arts, literature and other forms of human creativity (Skr, 2003/04:129, 42).

For the most part, then, environmental protection is framed as necessary from an anthropocentric point of view. The expectance of reciprocity, where an ecologically sustainable society (or merely the process of working towards it) gives rise to positive benefits in terms of human wants and needs is a core motivation for action. Although policy rhetoric at some occasions go beyond the instrumental claims on nature, acknowledging also "the needs of other living creatures" (Skr, 1997/98:13, 26), these claims are neither strong enough nor presented with any frequency to suggest that the rights-discourse is extended also to non-human entities. The general tone in policy signals the belief that nature indeed is subordinate to humans and that humans not only have the moral right to utilise nature's resources, but also the ability to control and to shape it according to the present needs.

Overall, therefore, we conclude that humans are at the centre of attention as the entity whose welfare is of greatest concern. But a further demarcation is still possible to make, between entities *within* this group. Towards the welfare of which humans does the political goals of sustainability aspire? Are the motivations presented for pro-environmental action framed as the possibility for personal gains, for the good of the in-group (e.g. the family, the community, or even the nation), or for all humans irrespectively of both personal relationships and current residence? How wide a group the concern for welfare is extended to, have been suggested as a defining feature of different environmental discourses. Following Langhelle (2000; see also Dryzek, 2005; Lundqvist, 2004b) territoriality is one of the core features that sets Ecological Modernisation (as a strategy for the developed world) apart from Sustainable Development (as a global principle). As suggested by it

name, the principle of sustainable development is built around a strong normative focus on developmental issues, with a clear inter- as well as intra-generational perspective. This also makes it appealing as a principle for governments in developing countries. The modernisation discourse, on the other hand, is chiefly aimed towards governments and citizens in the already industrialised world, aiming at demonstrating not only that an environment-as-growth strategy is possible, but that environmental and economic sustainability indeed are mutually reinforcing goals. The third pillar of Sustainable Development, the goal of global social justice, is thereby omitted from this strategy in preference for a more territorially bound focus on developing green growth, technology and market opportunities. Dobson (2003) makes a similar distinction between the traditional citizenship-concept, where rights, responsibilities and duties are based in membership in a territorially bounded community, and ecological citizenship, whose relations between citizens instead are defined by the (global) effects of one's actions.

Considering what we so far have seen in terms of goals and strategies, the Swedish government's policy rhetoric clearly states its commitment to the principle of sustainable development as defined by the Bruntland Commission. That is to say that, in almost all policy documents, the introductory statements outlining the rationale for increased efforts to address the environmental situation acknowledges the global development perspective. Swedish policy here points towards the (both positive and negative) effects of increased globalisation, a concern with the situation in developing countries, and even invoking the metaphor of the ecological footprint to highlight the particular responsibility for developed countries to amend the situation.

> Pollution knows no national boundaries (Skr, 1997/98:13, 1).
>
> Sustainable development in Sweden is closely linked to sustainable development in the rest of the world. Our lifestyle and politics influences others (Skr, 2002/03:31, 11).
>
> In the vision of the sustainable society, the political goal is solidarity and justice in all countries, between countries and between generations (Skr, 2005/06:126, 7).
>
> The rich world has a special responsibility. Scarcely one-fifth of the world's population accounts for most of the pressure on the environment and consumption of the earth's natural resources (Skr, 1997/98:13, 1; for further statements, see Skr, 1996/97:50, 1 & 4; 2002/03:31, 5-6; 2003/04:129, 11 & 147).

These statements suggest that also the third, developmental pillar of Sustainable Development is a focus within Swedish environmental policy. In prolongation, they can indeed be interpreted as expressing a broad-scope

altruism extending both in time (to future generations) and in space (addressing the north-south problematique). However, the global concern that these statements express seem at odds with the explicit focus on welfare and prosperity in Sweden as we have seen expressed in abundance when describing the problem, outlining policy goals and providing motivations for a transition to pro-environmental patterns of behaviour. Indeed, apart from the introductory paragraphs in each policy document, further statements drawing on global social justice as the overarching motivation for implementing policy strategies in Sweden are hard pressed to find. When instead considering more closely how the storyline of the ecologically sustainable society is constructed, the good of the territorially delimited Swedish community is clearly the overarching argument applied. For example, pioneering the work for sustainability and sharing knowledge with other countries is presented as important primarily as this reduces cross-border pollution of the *Swedish* environment and thus contributes to a better living environment for *Swedish* citizens (alongside the benefits arising from the establishments of new markets). The attention to global development might, thus, not be driven primarily by the primacy of social justice, as suggested when considering how the first of the four quotes above continues:

> Pollution knows no national boundaries. We are particularly affected by emissions in Northern Europe. The EU's eastern enlargement is therefore important for the Swedish environment. All of this constitutes reasons for Sweden to pioneer the international shift to ecological sustainable development (Skr, 1997/98:13, 1).

> In the bilateral cooperation on knowledge building, the countries in Sweden's proximity should be prioritised, that is, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, North-West Russia and Poland primarily. In these countries, both the environmental effects and the establishment of the cooperation in itself are judged to best being able to profit beneficiary countries' as well as Swedish interests (Skr, 1994/95:120, 7).

Does this mean that the expressed commitment to broad-scope altruism framed as global development is just empty rhetoric; a form of, speaking with Parsons (1995:15) "elaborate window-dressing" neither supported in the strategies lined out, nor in program implementation? Well, this is certainly one possible interpretation, and one made in previous research exploring the cases of environmental policy in the EU (Baker, 2007) as well as in Sweden (Lundqvist, 2004b). Here it is argued that although policies generally include broad rhetorical statements emphasising the principle of global sustainability, it is evident that this third pillar regularly is omitted from more explicit descriptions of strategies, from motivational statements, as well as from political practice. Consistent with what we have seen in the analysis, these focuses instead on environmental protection as a potential source of future

growth and welfare in a strictly territorial perspective, leading Lundqvist (2004b:1298, italics in original) to assert that: "[t]he government did not seek sustainable development in general, but *ecologically sustainable socioeconomic welfare through ecological modernisation*".[99] Despite this, to reason the other way around is also a possibility. We remember that the basis for policy is politics, and that decision-makers, being rational re-election seekers, might well attempt to frame their message in ways that supposedly attract widespread support among the public. From this perspective, cannot the abundance of statements drawing on reciprocity rather than justice instead be interpreted as a reflection of how the motivational construct of the citizen-voter is perceived? Perhaps developmental goals in fact are at the centre of political sustainability aspirations, but their reciprocal effects emphasised for political reasons? On this matter, my exploration provides no certain answers as the documents on many instances present several arguments side-by-side, making their order of priority impossible to discern. As an example:

> The goal has been to strengthen economic growth, a good environment and social justice (Skr, 2003/04:129, 34).

What is clear, however, is that developmental goals with an explicit non-territorial focus are much rarer in Swedish policy than are those presenting territorial goals for policy. When arguing the necessity of instituting pro-environmental patterns of behaviour, whether directed towards governmental agencies, businesses or individual citizens, very few statements draws explicitly on a global justice perspective. Nevertheless, despite the strong economic motives and goals stated in policy, we should not conclude that pure self-interest is the main motivational focus and that it is the good of the own person which is thought of as driving environmental responsibility-taking. Although the motivations in policy rarely extend beyond the Swedish borders in space, the time-perspective is nevertheless clearly longer than the present generation. As conveyed not the least by the overarching *Generation Goal* (see note 64 above), future generations (of Swedish) citizens are those who primarily will benefit from a carrying through of policy. The responsibility for all to participate in the work towards the ecologically sustainable society, and to ensure a continuation of the Swedish welfare state is therefore held in relation to "our children's or future generation's possibilities to lead a good life" (Skr, 2005/06:126, 1). It is therefore possible to conclude that Swedish policy, at least when considering the frequency of the different motivational

[99] Although Lundqvist (2004c) at a later stage somewhat revises his analysis, placing more weight to the development rhetoric in Swedish policy, he still acknowledges that these are predominately found in generally held, introductory statements and that the territorially bound modernisation-discourse takes precedence, in particular considering more explicit statements and acts of implementation.

statements, presents a human-centred altruism with a narrow scope, extending primarily to the collective of present and future Swedish citizens.

6.3 THE IMAGINED ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN: TRACING BELIEF-SYSTEMS CLOSER TO THE INDIVIDUAL

Before drawing this analysis to a close, we remember that a basic premise for this thesis is the perceived necessity of involving also individual citizens in the pro-environmental work. In the introductory chapter, I outlined how environmental policy making over the past decades has turned towards considering environmental degradation as a social dilemma, where the aggregated effect of many, although independently negligible, unsustainable activities on the level of individuals constitutes a significant cause behind the contemporary environmental situation. This 'individualistic turn' further accentuates the connection between legitimacy and effectiveness, as a policy relying on the support and engagement of individual citizens for its success also need to enjoy a certain amount of legitimacy. As the primary concern of my study is with policy directed towards the involvement of individuals in the pro-environmental work, it seems reasonable to consider in more detail how the role of the individual is thought of.

This far, my exploration of belief-systems in Swedish environmental policy, represented by the major environmental policy documents from the period 1994-2006, has covered most of the topics outlined in the analytical framework. We have seen how the nature of the problem is thought of; how the overall goals are formulated; and which strategies are considered necessary to implement. These explorations of empirically oriented beliefs also enable conclusions on the more basic values underpinning policy; the priorities made between different basic values; as well as those principles applied when discussing the issue of distributive justice to be drawn. Prior to doing so, I conclude my analysis of belief-systems in Swedish environmental public policy by looking more closely at those statements directed specifically towards the role of the individual, with the aim of outlining the official image of the 'environmental citizen'. Following the analytical framework, several questions relating to the distribution of authority, of responsibility, and of participation can be highlighted as guiding for this section. What is the role of the single individual, both in terms of creating and amending the problem? Is the individual viewed as having the willingness to take on a greater environmental responsibility? Does she have the ability to do so? Lastly, what is seen as being the role of the state in this endeavour?

The individual and the policy problem

We remember that the basic problem addressed in Swedish environmental policy is of a dual character, where the narrow issues of environmental problem solving in a majority of occasions is described as a tool for addressing a range of broader social issues: economic growth, employment welfare (tradition), security and stability. We also note that building the green welfare state is seen as requiring the participation not only of governmental agencies, local authorities and the business community, but also of individual citizens. This need for all-inclusive participation suggests that the individual is thought of as having the ability, and indeed also the duty, to make a positive impact on reaching the political sustainability aspiration. A range of policy documents further specifies the perceived relationship between Swedish households and the environmental situation, and outlines answers to the basic questions of why individual participation is perceived as a necessity, and what form this participation should take. Here it is evident that the notion of an 'individualistic turn' within environmental policymaking certainly holds true also when considering the development of environmental policy in Sweden during the past decade. Following the Rio-summit and the subsequent multilateral signing of Agenda 21 as a strategy for sustainability in the 21st century, Swedish environmental policy adapted the individual-level focus set down by the aforementioned agreements. Characterising for this new environmental discourse was the movement away from problem-descriptions focusing on industry as the sole environmental villain and towards conceptualising environmental degradation as a lifestyle-problem, thereby turning the spotlight of attention towards single individuals or households as principal actors in the work towards environmental sustainability. Thus, on the input-side of the environmental policy process, a range of statements suggests that a significant source of the contemporary environmental problems is found in the unsustainable activities of single individuals and that the current unsustainable lifestyles of citizens constitute the single largest obstacle *en route* towards ecological sustainability (cf. SOU, 1997:105). For instance, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (e.g. SEPA, 1999:5007 & 1996: 4601) identifies the present environmental problems as ultimately caused by people's ecologically unsustainable habits and practices, suggesting that "if we change patterns of consumption, travel habits and other behaviour – in short, our lifestyle – we can improve the environment".

This description of the individual's role in the problem is echoed also in official policy documents. In the first communication outlining the aspiration to build the ecologically sustainable society it is, for example, stated that "[t]he environmental problems are, to a higher degree than before, caused by the day-to-day life of single individuals", which is followed by the insight that it is "clear that the individual's actions often are crucial" (Skr, 1996/97:50,

49). In a range of areas, the individual's choices and activities are mentioned as a potential obstacle to reaching the political sustainability aspirations. Consequently, policy emphasises the need for broad participation among the general public, both in general terms (as we have noted above) as well as with regards to specific policy areas, for example waste-management (cf. Skr, 2001/02:68, 27); climate policy (Skr, 2001/02:172, 29) and in the choice of means of personal transportation (Skr, 2001/02:172, 86). However, and similar to the results of previously conducted studies of how the individual-environment relationship is framed[100], the main problem relates to *unsustainable patterns of consumption* on the level of individuals, which, by inference, leads to equally unsustainable patterns of production, waste and resource-use (cf. Skr, 1996/97:50, 49 & 2001/02:172, 71). Individuals' consumption behaviour is described as a major problem, and is by far the most commonly included example of an area of society where individuals can and should take on an increased individual responsibility. In turn, this indicates a central role for the individual, or rather the single consumer, also in amending the problem outlined in policy. At several occasions, the Swedish government acknowledges that "consumption and production in predominately the industrialised parts of the world is the single largest cause for continuous negative effects on the global environment. It is necessary to amend these negative effects and to reach sustainable patterns of consumption" (Skr, 2002/03:31, 4; see also Skr, 2001/02:172, 69; Skr, 2001/02:68, 5 & 13). Furthermore:

> It has also been established that private consumption is one of the two single largest causes of a continuous negative impact on the global environment. It is therefore imperative to reach sustainable patterns of consumption (Skr, 2003/04:129, 65).

By emphasising the impact of activities conducted within the household, this responsibility clearly stretches beyond a passive rights-claiming and public role for the citizen.[101] Instead, the role for the citizen is framed in terms of active contributions, and points towards the need to take responsibility for building the good society, also in activities within the private sphere.[102] For example, policy documents refer to citizens' responsibilities as making *achievements* or *efforts*, and to *fulfil roles* (see, for example, Skr, 2001/02:172), and an active responsibility taking is expected to be significant

[100] For example, Hobson (2002 & 2004); Cohen (2005); Martens and Spaargaren (2005); Sanches (2005); Cohen, Comrov and Hoffner (2005); Seyfang (2005); Carter and Huby (2005); Conca, Princen and Maniates (2001); Micheletti (2003).
[101] For different perspectives of the spheres and characters of citizenship, in particular the distinction between private and public, and between passive and active participation, see Turner (1990); Arendt (1998); Prokhovnik (1998); Dobson (2003); or Kymlicka and Norman (1994).
[102] That the active citizen-ideal is prevailing in Swedish environmental politics is a conclusion also reached by Lundmark (1998:105-116) in her analysis of Swedish political parties' standpoint in the matter, and by Algotsson (1996:41) in a similar analysis of party-programmes and political debates.

for driving a broader societal change. Not the least is this evident in relation to the citizen's role as an "active environmental-consumer" utilising her consumer power and, for instance, demanding organic produce in the local supermarket. This, in turn, is believed to affect a change in current patterns of production, both in Sweden and globally (Skr, 2001/02:50, 24; also Skr, 2005/06:107; 2005/06:126 & 2003/04:129). But is this requested change in consumption-patterns seen as a straight forward pro-environmental activity? We note, for instance, that the key to ecological sustainability never is framed as an overall reduction in private consumption, but rather as changing its negative impact by incorporating ethical and environmental concerns when making decisions on the market. A strong, continuous consumption is indeed emphasised as being imperative for reaching the goal of economic development (e.g. Skr, 2005/06:107).[103] Given the environment-economy connection discussed above, it seems a reasonable assumption that the change in national market demands here promoted by the government also is seen as necessary for Swedish business and industry to be able to invest in new technology and new products and, thus, gain shares on the global export markets.

Describing the problem mainly in terms of unsustainable consumption gives rise to a rather strong consumer-bias within household-oriented environmental policy, where goals, strategies as well as individual responsibilities predominately are framed in terms of consumption and market-behaviour (for another perspective on this, see Lundqvist [2004c]). Nevertheless, although patterns of consumption are explicitly mentioned as being the problem, it is evident throughout the studied policy documents that the individual's activities in the market are seen as an integral part, or as an expression of, current unsustainable lifestyles in a broader perspective. Changing pattern of consumption, therefore, requires a rethink of values, attitudes and behaviour in a broader perspective.

> Patterns of consumption and individuals' behaviour can be viewed as a function of values and attitudes (Skr, 1994/95:120, 18).
>
> The vision of sustainable development is essentially a question of values and outlook on life. Continuous investments in information and education to demonstrate the connection between individuals' values and practical lifestyles, and between local and global sustainability problems, will be needed (Skr, 2003/04:129, 29).

By focusing the necessity of changes in individuals' lifestyles and consciousness, the policy discourse also makes a clear connection between activities within the private sphere of the household (and even the individual's

[103] This line of argument follows the conclusions of the Agenda 21 and can therefore be found also outside Sweden. For example, Hobson has located the same patterns in both the United Kingdom (Hobson, 2002, 2004b) as well as in the Asia-Pacific region (Hobson, 2004a).

mind-set) and their global, or at least national, consequences. It is not citizen's participation in public decision-making processes that are the prime target for the policy strategy, but rather are the prospects for reaching the ecologically sustainable society recognized as being dependent on more profound and far-reaching civic responsibility; a comprehensive rethinking and "adaptation of lifestyles" (Skr, 1996/97:50, 4) as a whole. The notion of individual participation, then, comprises all-encompassing changes in both the way we live and think about the world. For instance are citizens encouraged to both "live and act environmentally adapted" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 10), and to internalise the new environmental norms (cf. Skr, 2002/03:31, 23 & 1997/98:13, 23). In sum, then, private acts are clearly framed as having global consequences. The aggregated activities of individuals, conducted within the privacy of their own home, amounts to a major problem that needs to be addressed, and changing lifestyles is therefore a key stone when building the ecologically sustainable society. Thereby, the individual herself is believed to have the ability to make a difference, by amending her lifestyle-patterns in a more sustainable direction and by actively pressing for change through her daily actions and choices.

Strategies for change at the individual level

As individuals are believed to have an important role to play in the transition to the ecologically sustainable society, the policy documents also outlines strategies for promoting an increased responsibility taking on the individual level. Exploring these strategies elucidates how the individual citizen's ability, in terms of recourses needed, as well as her willingness and motivations to implement changes in her daily activities are thought of. All of these factors are at the core of how the government imagines the 'environmental citizen'.

We have seen above how a majority of motivational statements in policy, outlining the rationale for transforming society in a more ecologically sustainable direction, are put in economic terms expressing an expectance of reciprocity. Motives portraying a change in behaviour as beneficial for the individual herself (or for the common good of the community), particularly in the shape of improved welfare, are substantially more frequent than motivations from citizen-orientated rights – or social justice – aspects.[104] In line with this framing of the policy problem as balancing costs and benefits, we also remember how the application of market-based policy tools, that is, taxes, fees, subsidies and public investments, dominates the environmental policy strategies both when turning towards major actors such as business

[104] See more above. See also Lundmark (2003) for an overview of those motivations for individual environmental responsibility provided by Swedish local government.

and industry as well as towards the collective of citizens. Placing the unsustainable activities of the individual, indeed the whole expression of her chosen lifestyle, on the market, further underlines the belief that a logic of consequences (e.g. March and Olsen, 1989) in terms of "distinct incentives and effective tools" (Skr, 2002/03:31, 5) is needed to amend behavioural patterns. Economic policy tools are therefore introduced as an important (in fact the most important or the most effective) means for driving the development towards sustainability (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 69 & 2003/04:129, 141). In this, citizens are portrayed as consumers, identified by and through their market-choices, and rationally responding to the boosting of costs or the enticements of economic benefits when changing behaviour.[105] An illustrative example on the thought motivations held by the individual is found in the major consumer-policy communication presented to parliament in 2006, entitled *Think Twice! An action plan for sustainable household consumption* (Skr, 2005/06:107). Under the heading "Motivating sustainable consumption", the government discusses the use of policy tools for successfully promoting behavioural change among the Swedish citizenry. Here, as on many other instances, are moral or justice-based motivations connected to what is thought of as the citizen-role (e.g. Berglund and Matti, 2006), difficult to find. The government, instead, explains that "economic control instruments and sometimes information may be used to strengthen consumers' motivation to make a change", and further specifies the possible tools to apply as motivators for change:

> The motivation may be strengthened by increasing consumer costs for unsustainable behaviour, for example by adding an environmental tax on air travel [...] or by reducing the costs for sustainable behaviour, for example a tax reduction on environmental improvements in single-family dwellings [...]. An incentive can also be created through the introduction of a financial grant, such as investment support for conversion from direct electric heating (Skr, 2005/06:107, 11-12)

Now, although "transformed patterns of behaviour with consumers and households" (Skr, 1997/98:13, 36) is a clearly stated goal, the notion of consumption as an expression of a larger (unsustainable) lifestyle pattern leads the government to suggest that also the individual's consciousness needs to be targeted. To realise the ecologically sustainable society, the individual needs to be transformed from a preference-maximising consumer to a citizen taking responsibility for the common good of the community.

[105] See, for example, Sagoff's (1988) depiction of the individual's role as a consumer and a citizen respectively. See also Berglund and Matti (2006). I have previously discussed the critique directed towards the framing environmental responsibility as a commodity, please consult chapter 1 for an overview.

> Consumption is a part of individuals' social and individual identification. [...] To reach sustainable patterns of consumption, it is therefore necessary that the consumers have an understanding of the fact that there is a connection between their own action and the environmental, social and economical development of the society (Skr, 2003/04:129, 113-114).

In this endeavour, the government turns towards other types of policy tools, particularly those building on the means of information and education. Although the individual, particularly in the earlier dated policy documents, is portrayed as holding both a rather large environmental interest and a willingness to undertake voluntary change[106], the government still see it necessary to provide her with additional "guidelines", "knowledge", "support", "stimuli", and "easily accessible information" (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 5; 2001/02:68, 5 & 2002/03:31, 28), in order to facilitate changed behaviours. The need for the state to take an active role in directing the citizens towards more sustainable patterns of day-to-day behaviour is further accentuated in documents dated from the beginning of the 21st century and onwards. Here, the positive outlook on the prospects for voluntary change during the mid-1990's are substituted for the acknowledgment that previous strategies to some extent have failed. Despite having been provided with a range of information on the necessity for a pro-environmental behavioural change, people still do not act accordingly, as the unsustainable consumption continues to increase and a majority continues to drive their cars to work on a daily basis:

> For instance, many new surveys show that despite a positive attitude towards sustainable consumption amongst most consumers, an unsustainable behaviour is still largely in place (Skr, 2003/04:129, 115; see also Skr, 2002/03:31, 5).

This, the government concludes, is primarily an information problem. Perhaps people do not possesses the information necessary for making "well thought through" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 7) or "responsible" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 21) choices. As for example:

> It is uncertain how much knowledge the consumer possesses on the connection between the choice of foodstuffs and sustainable development. It is probably relatively limited (Skr, 2003/04:129, 65).

[106] In the earlier dated documents (e.g. 1994-2000), the government states, for example, that "knowledge, awareness and engagement are present with many individuals today" (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3) and that "the consumers' awareness of the connection between consumption and environment has steadily increased, and people are today willing to take on a large responsibility for the environment" (Skr, 1996/97:50, 50). This already present environmental commitment among the public is, for instance, argued to be an important factor driving the relatively swift anchoring of the Agenda 21-programme at the local level (Skr, 2001/02:172, 90). Furthermore, it leads the government to conclude that "[t]he work with facilitating for consumers to play a more active role in counteracting environmental problems should give good results" (Skr, 1996/97:50, 50).

> It is not certain that the consumer today has the possibility to put his/her choice of foodstuffs in relation to the effect this choice has on sustainable development. Sufficiently clear information on the consequences of different choices is often lacking. [...] A conclusion is therefore that it today is difficult for a consumer to make conscious choices which benefits a sustainable development (Skr, 2003/04:129, 66).

Therefore, policymakers conclude, additional and more easily accessible information is called for (and, as demonstrated above, also needs to be complemented by more effectively working instruments for steering behavioural change). It thus seems reasonable to make the interpretation that the state's role in Swedish environmental policy not solely is to facilitate an informed and independent choice by citizens ready to take matters into their own hands, but rather to enlighten and steer the citizenry towards a certain perception of what constitutes good life-projects. Following this line of reasoning; as long as the particular preferred perception is not observed in the minds and daily practices of all individuals, the information has not been sufficient or adequately interpretable and the state's efforts to demonstrate the 'good life' for its citizens must be continued.

> A first step on the way [towards an environmentally sustainable society] is to create such possibilities that all citizens can have access to the existing information (Skr, 2001/02:50, 29).

> There shall be enough information on how foodstuffs are produced and on the effects of different methods of production on sustainable development, to enable the consumer to make a choice that benefits sustainable development (Skr, 2003/04:129, 66).

A significant part of the policy's outlined strategies directed towards the individual-level of action amounts therefore to an increase in the use of informative and educational policy tools, with the aspiration to "provide people with knowledge and insights that will enable them to, as citizens, making responsible choices" (Skr, 2001/02:50, 30; see also Skr, 2001/02:172, 111). Whereas informative tools, taking the shape of eco-labelling and merchandise information (e.g. Skr, 1994/95:120, 15), predominately are applied to signal 'better choices' to the individual in her consumer-role, educational tools aim at addressing and influencing a broader range of activities and lifestyle issues. Following his, major efforts have been made to integrate environmental and sustainability issues in the curriculum of Swedish educational institutions. For instance can schools, since 1999 apply for, and by the Swedish National Authority for School Improvement be granted, the honour of *Environmental School*[107], recognising the work with

[107] In 2005, this was renamed *School for Sustainable Development*, recognising all three dimensions of sustainability. Amongst other reasons, the expectation is that this broadening of the focus will increase the number of schools receiving the honour (cf. SKOLFS, 2005:2; MfS, 2005).

ecological sustainability within the education (SKOLFS, 1998:25). Amongst the criteria for receiving the honour is that the education "shall contribute to the pupils developing a lifestyle and a pattern of consumption which promotes an ecologically sustainable development (Skr, 2001/02:68, 21). In policy documents from later date, the above mentioned need for informational policy instruments and education of the public becomes even more articulated, with an increasing focus predominately on angling the education system in total, from pre-school to adult education, towards promoting the sustainable society. In 2003, the Swedish government appointed a special committee to review the education for sustainable development in Sweden, and to make suggestions to further develop this work (Dir, 2003:68). The committee's work was presented in the official report *To learn for sustainable development* and recommended amending the acts governing the Swedish education system[108] so to explicitly express that all educational activities shall promote a sustainable development and that ""the pedagogical work shall be characterized by an ecological approach" (SOU, 2004:104, 24 & 123; also Skr, 1999/00:13 & 2001/02:50; Prop, 2000/01:130). For the past years, then, ecological sustainability has been granted a place alongside democracy, equality and human rights as a core value that is to be promoted and upheld throughout the Swedish educational system. The strategy suggests further that education for sustainability should be an integral part on all levels of the Swedish educational system, from pre-schools to adult-/civic-[109] and higher education:

> The school can shape and influence children's and youths' lifestyles and attitudes towards the environment, both locally and globally [...] The environmental issues should be given large attention in the education. This concerns all levels; primary school, upper secondary school, adult education as well as universities and colleges (Skr, 1994/95:120, 26).
>
> Contemporary research shows that the lifestyle established in an early age usually is retained throughout life. Education for sustainable development should therefore start as early as in pre-school and thereafter increase throughout the educational system (Skr, 2001/02:13, 31).
>
> Higher education shall not only offer a qualified training, conduct research and development work, but also promote an ecologically sustainable development (Skr, 1997/98:13, 23).

[108] The Education Act (SFS, 1985:1100); the Higher Education Act (SFS, 1992:1434); and the Decree on Government Subsidy for Liberal Adult Education (SFS, 1991:977).
[109] In the Budget Bill for the fiscal year of 2000, the government presented a Green Adult Education Initiative (in Swedish: *grönt kunskapslyft*), with the aim to "rise public awareness of the need of conversion to sustainable development and to show how individuals can contribute to this process in their everyday lives" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 30; Prop, 1999/00:100).

From the many statements where the necessity of education and information is emphasised, we are also able to draw further conclusions on how the government perceives each individual's personal ability to convert her feelings of responsibility in practice, as well as how the government perceives its own role in this process. As briefly noted above, the expressed ambition with education for sustainability initiative is to provide individuals with the resources[110] needed to be able to make choices that benefit the governmental policy goals. The image of the citizen thus predominately draws on her being unable (but not necessarily unwilling) either to discover or by her self reach her real interests, in terms of the common good towards which policy aspires. Political government, then, assumes the roles of *first* enlightening the citizens on what constitutes the common good, and, *second*, actively directing them towards making good behavioural choices in this respect. This follows well in line with my assertion above, that building the ecologically sustainable society is a task that certainly necessitates an all-inclusive participation, but which is largely (and in detail) governed through centralised structures of top-down administration and governmental planning.[111]

On the same note, Lundqvist (2004c & 2001a) suggests the individual thereby indeed is thought of as a consumer, but in a slightly different capacity than the one mentioned above. Through his analyses[112], he reaches the conclusion that individuals in general are portrayed as passively reacting to market incentives and on already determined values presented to them through top-down policy-instruments, for example governmental information and education. This rather than being "politically competent subjects" ready to take an active part in deliberating on the moral foundations of the policy itself. Therefore, as he puts it, her role in policy is reduced "to one of 'changing behaviour' in response to future policy". Lundqvist's conclusions are further supported by Feichtinger and Pregering's (2005) exploration of the Swedish participatory processes within the framework of Local Agenda 21, where they conclude that citizens' participation almost exclusively is framed

[110] Framed as, for example, "competence, values and skills" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 91); a "readiness-to-act" (Skr, 2001/02:13, 31); or "increased knowledge" (Skr, 2001/02:50, 32 & 1997/98:13, 8).

[111] What the sustainable lifestyle actually encompasses in terms of household-related activities is not entirely clear judging from policy-rhetoric. Through the general formulations in these policy documents from the national level, the outer boundaries for the 'environmental citizen's' lifestyle is certainly drawn up through indicating the need for, for example, a transformed transport behaviour or altered patterns of consumption. Nevertheless, any detailed specifics for what a sustainable lifestyle would include is not provided, though it is clear that also the construction of such details are both desirable and even in progress, as suggested: "A government committee of inquiry has been set up with the task of establishing a closer definition of sustainable consumption for the households and propose a plan of action" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 113).

[112] Following a content analysis of official reports outlining contemporary Swedish environmental policy, Lundqvist (2004c:166-167) notes that references to individuals as citizens are only made a total of 16 times. By contrast, the epithets customer, consumer or individual are used about 470 times across, in total, 900 pages of text. See also the discussion in Berglund and Matti (2006).

as them being fed information, both on what their real interests are, and on how to realise them. Conceiving citizens in this manner as "instructible", unaware of which their true interests are and how to reach them, also brings with it a paternalistic role for the state. The task, Feichtinger and Pregering (2005:236) assert, is to "prevent citizens acting against their own ('objective') interests" by enlighten them via a "one-sided transfer of information or schoolmasterly instructions". I thereby end this exploration of the imagined environmental citizen in Swedish public policy. And I do so by affirming that the individual, although believed to be positively disposed to the environment in general, is seen as requiring both external incitements (the economic-reciprocity strategy) and strong guidance by the state (the administration-from-above-strategy) to be able to take her active and much needed responsibility as a citizen.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS: BELIEF-SYSTEMS IN SWEDISH ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY

In this chapter, I have attempted to draw out the belief-system underpinning Swedish environmental public policy. As stated in the introduction, this exploration constitutes the first step in analysing the legitimacy of said policy. For structuring my analysis, and deciding what is relevant to include, I have applied the topics and questions outlined in the analytical framework (e.g. Chapter 5). Following this, focus is placed on how Swedish environmental policy expresses beliefs related to the basic nature of the problem; its possible solutions; it seriousness and direction; as well as the distribution of responsibility and authority when deciding on and implementing strategies for combating the policy problem. Although basic value-priorities rarely are given explicit mentioning in the policy documents, primarily dealing with political practice, a number of fundamental normative principles are still possible to deduce from the policy rhetoric. This, as we have seen, is particularly true for those values relating to distributive justice, as policy includes a range of statements on how the costs (of the current situation) and benefits (of amending the problem) are dispersed in society. A major impression from the exploration of policy belief-systems is that public policy documents, primarily containing broad political statements, at parts seem to aspire to capture as many perspectives as possible on the issue in question, in turn making them rather ambiguous. This accounted for, a closer scrutiny of the established policy discourse nonetheless reveals a coherent set of both fundamental normative principles and policy-domain oriented beliefs, which together form a coherent image of the politically established Swedish

environmental norm. The result of the analysis in this chapter, the dominating Swedish environmental policy belief-system, is outlined in table 6.2 below.

TABLE 6.2. *Dominant policy belief-system*

Main topics	**Dominant Policy Belief-System**
Basic value priorities	Welfare, Security, Stability and Tradition.
Welfare of greatest concern	An anthropocentric ethic, incorporating some streaks of green. Nature subordinate to human needs. Ability of human ingenuity to expand or negotiate natural limits. Narrow-scope altruism, extending welfare *first* to the present generation (growth and economy) and *second* to future generations (a long-term stable welfare and prosperity – the Generation Goal) of Swedes.
Basic views of the problem	Building the ecologically sustainable society. The economic dimension of sustainability dominates. Main problems address the furthering of welfare and Swedish economy. Environment-as-growth, where environmental adaptation is the tool for furthering a broad range of societal goals. Unsustainable patterns of consumption (and thereby production) presented as a main cause of the problem on the individual level – the individual has the ability to impact positive development through active responsibility, primarily on the market. Strategies: sector integration (an all-inclusive responsibility); top-dow administration; public investments; partnerships; and market based policy tools. Social restructuring as modernisation rather than as radical change.
Seriousness of the problem	Environmental degradation not the main focus for policy. The environmental situation needs amendment, also on the individual level, but not in terms of an imminent crisis requiring radical and immediate measures. Rather a natural, gradual reformation of current structures. Policy primarily depicts possibilities (for further development) rather than (environmental) problems. A highly optimistic view of the future where a modernised society leads to future prosperity, and natural limits to growth can be overcome through government-led initiatives and human ingenuity.
Distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation	Partnerships: an all-inclusive participation in all sectors of society required for achieving the ecologically sustainable society. The individual has a responsibility, even duty, to further the common good by amending unsustainable lifestyles and take an active part in the work. Citizens are environmentally aware, but lack in knowledge and ability. The citizen as a consumer: motivated by economic rationality and reciprocity, as well as passively reacting to governmental instructions. The state governs changes (societal as well as individual) through top-down administration and dissemination of information/education.

To sum up the conclusions on the established Swedish policy belief-system, the first step in the analysis explored how the nature of the policy problem is framed in the policy documents. We remember from above that the policy discourse, during the period studied, transformed to one of ecological sustainability rather than of environmental protection. Through this change in problem description, the policy area also became a key issue in society, involving all types of actors and spanning a broad range of sectors. The overall goal suggested a wide-ranging reformation of society, aiming at building a new welfare state for the 21st century: the ecologically sustainable society. This, however, also means that a more traditional environmental policy-focus on preventing and amending environmental degradation through, for instance, regulatory politics, was substituted for a sustainability aspiration with a considerably broader scope. The major problem emphasised

in policy discourse is not of an environmentalist, but rather economist nature, as the economic sustainability dimension dominates the policy's description of problems, goals as well as strategies. In line with this turn I rhetoric, the overarching political aspiration to build the ecologically sustainable society primarily frames environmental adaptation as an engine for growth, and as a tool for addressing more pressing societal (or more politically marketable) problems: increased welfare and prosperity; better employment opportunities; as well as strong industrial development and widened export opportunities. Environmental degradation is certainly believed to be a problem, in particular as it implies increased costs, but the environmental situation is first and foremost framed as an opportunity for new development, and for a gradual reformation of those socioeconomic structures needed to ensure the continuation of the Swedish welfare state. In this sense, the nature of the problem within Swedish policy aligns with an ecologically modernised discourse. Focus is placed on demonstrating the positive sum-game of ecological sustainability, where environment and economy act as mutually reinforcing objectives and where the attainment of environmental goals is thought of as a new road towards prosperity.

The solutions outlined for reaching the political goal of an ecologically sustainable society also follow in line with what previously has been described as the corner stones of an ecologically modernised strategy: sectoral integration; top-down administration; partnerships, market instruments and technological development. An all-inclusive participation in the transitory work is described as imperative, where all sectors and all societal actors should take responsibility for, and be partners in, the common good of building a modernised Swedish welfare state. At the individual level, major emphasis is placed on targeting changed patterns of consumption, thereby creating (together with new demands on public procurement) a domestic market for new green knowledge and technology, enabling Swedish industry to reinvent themselves and their products. Making Sweden an environmental pioneer further means that global export markets will open, thereby ensuring a continuous growth, better employment opportunities and a growing tax-base to finance welfare development at home. As such, the rather pronounced economist nature of Swedish policy for ecological sustainability is also seen in the motivations provided for engaging in the work of societal reformation. An expectance of reciprocity underpins the framing of both the basic nature of the problem (e.g. the win-win notion of ecological modernisation), as well as in the motivational statements directed towards the partners – individuals (the Green People's Home), labour unions (increased employment opportunities), and industry (new export markets) – in the transition work. Voluntary responsibility taking, primarily as a reaction to external (market-

based) incitements and a commitment to a common good, thereby dominates the outlined strategy.

A further topic of policy-domain specific beliefs concerns the seriousness and direction of the problem. Here, we noted that Swedish policy indeed does frame the problem as on a major scale, affecting all of society and in need of broad solutions. Hence the suggestion for an imaginative restructuring of current socio-economic patters. Nevertheless, as the problem description is focused more on the opportunities presented by ecological sustainability (read: welfare) than on the necessity of strong environmental protection, the "environmental threat rhetoric" is also strikingly downplayed in the policy documents. On very few occasions throughout the 12 year period studied are the environmental situation presented in terms of an imminent ecological crisis, requiring immediate and radical action. Toning down the magnitude of the environmental problem is also seen in policy's view on natural limits. Although the Swedish government recognises that there are natural limits, these concern specific recourses and are by no means believed to be absolute. Instead, the modernised Swedish discourse contains a large element of reassurance, demonstrating that the limits of nature can be expanded through progress in science and technology, through human inventiveness and through a top-down administration of societal reform. As environment and economy goes hand in hand, we do not have to choose one over the other. What this far has been said about the general problem understanding and the basic rationale for building the ecologically sustainable society clearly points towards the understanding that the problem addressed primarily is one affecting the territorially bound community of Sweden. An overwhelming majority of the motivations provided for engaging in the transition draws, as we have seen, on the positive benefits resulting. Continuing on the present route implies costs and slow development, whereas the vision of the ecologically sustainable society promises increased growth and prosperity, not the least in the form of a modernised welfare state.

Our last topic addressed in the exploration placed focus on the provided image of the environmental citizen, the key actor in a policy drawing on the necessity of collective action. Here, we noted that policy expresses a belief in the connection between private activities and consequences on a larger scale. By amending individual lifestyles (particularly market behaviours), a major input is made towards reaching the political sustainability aspirations. The individual therefore indeed holds a responsibility (even a duty, although not enforced in law) to amend her activities and contribute to the common good. The economist focus and the emphasis on opportunities over problems are also evident when turning towards the individual level of action. As the main impact of individuals' behavioural patterns is expected to be located on the market, the individual's consumer-role is also targeted when designing

strategies for change. This is reflected both in the preference for market-based policy-instruments as well as in the fact that motivations for change emphasises reciprocity rather than acknowledging the moral good of taking on a larger responsibility for the situation. In the same way as the individual is expected to react rationally to monetary incentives, she is also expected to passively adhere to governmental instructions for change. Information and education, where the state enlightens the individual on the change required are therefore presented as an important compliment to market-based policy tools. This, finally, also affects our interpretation of the last aspect within this topic: the question of authority in deciding on responsibilities and pointing out the direction of change. It is evident from the policy documents that the state itself holds a significant role as initiating, planning and deciding on the overall work. On the national level, the vision of the ecologically sustainable society is seen as attainable through a range of state-controlled initiatives, primarily adjustments of future policy and large-scale public funded investments driving a modernised development. On the individual level, the state, similarly, must provide the individual citizens with both external incitements and detailed instructions on preferred behaviours.

From this exploration of policy domain specific beliefs, it is also possible to draw some further conclusions regarding those fundamental normative principles being at the core of the Swedish policy for ecological sustainability. *First*, we conclude that the basic values and value-priorities emphasised as important guiding principles when determining policy goals are those of welfare, security, stability and tradition. These are frequently emphasised as important goals and motivational factors, indeed very few other value-statements are found in the documents. In short, a continuous welfare, catering for the stability of 'the Swedish model' and the subsequent security this brings to the citizens, is, as we have seen, the overarching goal of policy. In describing the changes necessary to implement, policy also takes care to denote that building the ecologically sustainable society not implies radical transformations to the current system. Rather, the necessary developments are, in the spirit of reassurance, presented as a natural next step; as a modernised version of the welfare state; and as a way of protecting and preserving traditional Swedish (or at least social democratic) values. *Second*, those values relating to distributive justice, or the entity whose welfare is of greatest concern, get a more explicit mentioning in the policy documents. Based on the descriptions of benefits resulting from carrying through the political sustainability aspirations, we initially conclude that a human centred, anthropocentric, perspective dominates. Nature is primarily seen as a provider of goods and services, subordinate to human needs. The faith in science and technology for expanding natural limits suggests, further, that humans are believed to be, if not exempt from, so at least able to strongly

influence the laws of nature. Within the dominating anthropocentric ethic, policy further expresses a narrow-scope altruism as the care for others primarily concern the territorially bound community of present and future generations of Swedish citizens. We have seen how the common good towards which the political sustainability goals aspire is framed in terms of a modernised Swedish welfare state; how the positive benefits on Swedish employment and industrial development is placed centre stage in the motivational statements provided; as well as how values drawing on a non-territorial altruism, for example social justice and global development, only is granted minor attention in the policy discourse.

These results from the exploration of the belief-system underpinning Swedish environmental public policy complete the first empirical step in our analysis of Swedish environmental policy legitimacy. They provide the legitimacy-analysis with its basic entity: an outline of those fundamental values and beliefs making up the content of policy. Before the final step of our legitimacy analysis can be taken, however, the nature of the belief-system established among the public needs to be explored and mapped in a corresponding manner. This will be the task for the next chapter.

7. BELIEF-SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED AMONG THE SWEDISH PUBLIC

In the previous chapter (6), I laid the foundation for our empirical study of policy legitimacy by mapping the basic values and beliefs expressed by the policy in question itself. However, to fulfil the overall aim of this thesis, exploring both the degree of legitimacy for contemporary environmental policy and outlining some conclusions on the prospects and prerequisites for the legitimacy of future policy, another belief-system need also to be considered. In this chapter, consequently, the second step of the legitimacy-evaluation is taken. Following my definition of policy legitimacy as the extent to which policy and public belief-systems align, the primary aim of the present chapter is to determine the structure and content of those systems of beliefs established among those subordinate to the policy: the Swedish public.

To facilitate a reliable comparison, it is necessary that the public belief-system be explored and mapped in a way comparable to the one applied for the previously conducted analysis of policy belief-systems. The analysis thereby follows the framework presented in chapter 5 above (see table 5.1). To recapitulate, this framework outlines five distinct topics incorporating both very fundamental normative principles (basic value-priorities; criteria for distributive justice) as well as beliefs more specifically related to the nature of the policy-issue in focus for the study (problem causes; problem seriousness; distribution of authority and participation). In general terms, the framework thereby follows the requirements derived from legitimacy-theory, that public policy and public values should align on critical questions regarding the rightful authoritative power; the nature of the problem addressed by policy; the goals aimed at; and the strategies outlined for reaching these goals (cf.

Beetham, 1991). By structuring this chapter's exploration of public values and beliefs round the five themes outlined in the framework, the analysis will also enable a discussion relating explicitly to previous explorations of beliefs in the environmental domain. Primarily, and following the discussion outlined in chapter 5 above, the approach will enable scrutinizing how publicly held values and beliefs relate to the two overarching ideological dimensions collecting a significant amount of the value-based conflicts surrounding contemporary environmental politics and policy: a) perceptions of the proper relationship between the individual and the state; and b) understandings of how the relationship between human beings and the natural environment is, or at least should be, constituted. In addition to it being a vital part of the exploration of policy legitimacy in the Swedish case, this study also amounts to testing the value of my framework for analysing mass belief-systems.

As the focus for this chapter is to explore how a number of critical topics resonances among the public, the reasoning within the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory (e.g. Stern et al, 1999) is applied for highlighting the thought connections between different elements of a person's beliefs-structure as well as how these can be elucidated through empirical studies. Consistent with the outline of themes within the analytical framework, the VBN-model arranges both fundamental value-priorities as well as the more empirically oriented, policy-domain specific beliefs, but adds a further explanation to how the relationship between these different elements is constituted. This, in turn, is believed to facilitate the overall interpretation of the respondents' system of beliefs. However, as previous applications of the VBN-model primarily have aimed towards conceptualising the causal chain of factors leading up to an individual's pro-environmental behaviours, it should here be noted that legitimacy, not behaviour, is the topic for this thesis. As such, this chapter does neither aim at testing the causal relationship between the different elements of the VBN-theory, nor their impact on the respondents' actual behaviour. In fact, the structure of the single respondent's values, beliefs and behaviour is of minor, if not to say no, interest here. Rather, publicly held basic values and policy-domain specific beliefs among the collective of respondents are explored and mapped solely in order to facilitate the analysis of policy legitimacy, and to draw conclusions on the prospects and prerequisites for future policy design ensuring its positive performance.

7.1 THE SURVEYS

With the aim of exploring public values along the topics outlined in the analytical framework, this thesis will refer to data from two mass-surveys

collected within the SHARP Research Program in the years 2004 and 2006 respectively. The fact that the two surveys are separated in time by two years offers information on the stability of the publicly established systems of beliefs under study. Following values-theory, basic values are believed to be very stable concepts that are highly resistant to change, and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:132) similarly describe a change in fundamental normative precepts as "akin to religious conversion". This also means that any major differences in basic value-priorities and basic criteria for distributive justice not should be expected between the two samples. Rather, retesting the same variables a second time provides for a certain examination of the reliability of the results. Although the policy-domain specific beliefs also are assumed to be relatively stable over time, their empirical nature makes them slightly more susceptible to change based on external events ("if experience reveals serious anomalies" [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133]). As this thesis is concerned with beliefs specifically regarding the environment, this might be of relevance. The fact that environmental issues, not the least climate change, has enjoyed increasing attention from both the political community and media during the past years might have had an impact, not the least on people's beliefs regarding the seriousness of the environmental problem. Therefore, eventual changes in environmental beliefs between the two samples are considered as reflective of the actual situation.

Both surveys were conducted among a randomly selected sample of respondents from four Swedish municipalities: Piteå; Huddinge; Växjö; and Göteborg. The municipalities were selected jointly within the SHARP Research Program based on them providing a cross-section of contextual factors (i.e. social and physical structures) which are believed to impact possibilities for environmental responsibility-taking within the household, for example size and geographical distances, climate, and access to/amount of communal services offered. As these factors are expected to vary a great deal between the Swedish municipalities, the aspiration was to select sub-cases so as to acknowledge some of these differences.[113] The municipalities therefore represent differences in geographic location and, consequently, climate (north – south; costal – inland) as well as different population sizes (from the small-town of Piteå, to Sweden's second largest municipality Göteborg, with the municipality Huddinge located in close proximity to the Swedish capital, and

[113] This were particularly relevant for those SHARP sub-projects focusing explicitly on the actual environmental work within the household and the constraints household members experience in attempting to pursue more sustainable lifestyles. Small municipalities were not considered when making the selection. The research program required that the municipalities included were large enough to be able to provide public transportation for its citizens, so that a viable alternative to the car is present all year round despite weather-conditions. At September 30, 2005, the four municipalities selected had a population size of 40 862 (Piteå); 88 427 (Huddinge); 484 106 (Göteborg); and 77 285 (Växjö). The 290 Swedish municipalities display populations in the range between 758 311 (Stockholm) and 2 652 (Bjurholm) (Statistics Sweden, 2005).

by population the largest city, Stockholm). For the time-period during which the surveys were conducted, political party support in the selected municipalities mirrored that of Sweden as a whole. In all four municipalities, the Social Democratic party supported by the Left Party and the Greens formed the political majority[114], and the votes cast for the national parliament in the 2002 general election showed a similar distribution of votes.[115] This is of significance as the respondents drawn from these four municipalities are used for exploring public values and beliefs in a comparison with national policy. Strong divergences in basic political orientations between the selected municipalities and the conditions on the national arena would therefore make this illustration far less reliable. Furthermore, previously conducted studies (e.g. Matti, 2006) have established that environmental policy rhetoric emanating from the national level in Sweden appears in an almost unaltered form in the local policies of these four municipalities. The management-by-objectives approach to environmental governance expressed through the Swedish application of National Environmental Quality Objectives (NEQO's) also suggest that local environmental policy follows in line with the national rhetoric. As suggested by Mineur (2007:95), local environmental policy is in many ways confined to the implementation of NEQO's. Problem definitions as well as goal formulations at the local level are therefore also determined by how these issues are interpreted and represented nationally. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the respondents are faced with a similar set of values and beliefs in documents explicitly addressing local environmental political practice, as those underpinning documents where national environmental goals and strategies are outlined.

In spring 2004, 4000 respondents received a questionnaire asking them about their general value-priorities and environmental beliefs, as well as a range of questions on environmental responsibilities; risk awareness; perceptions of different pro-environmental behaviours that can be undertaken to improve the environment (sorting waste at source, mode of transportation choice etc.); and opinions on policy instruments implemented to encourage these activities. After two reminders the overall response rate for the 2004-survey was 32%, varying from 26% to 35% in the different municipalities. The socioeconomic characteristics (gender, age, education, and income) of the respondents were compared with an average resident in

[114] In Piteå the Social Democrats held own majority (51,3 % of total votes cast). The votes for The Green Party amounted to 3 % and for the Left Party to 11,5 % (The Swedish Election Authority, 2005 and municipalities' official websites).

[115] Votes from each municipality in the 2002 election for national parliament was distributed as follows: Piteå (Social Democrats, 55,5 %, Left Party, 11,8 %, Green Party, 3,9 %); Huddinge (S, 37,2 %, LP, 8,2 %, GP, 4,7 %); Göteborg (S, 33,1 %, LP, 11,8 %, GP, 6,4 %); Växjö (S, 38,7 %, LP, 8,2 %, GP, 4,9 %). During the period 2002-2006, the national government in Sweden was made up by the Social Democratic Party (39,8 % of total votes nationwide), supported in parliament by the Left Party (8,3 %) and The Greens (4,6 %) (The Swedish Election Authority, 2005).

each of the four municipalities. Correspondence was found to be reasonable on most of these factors, although the sample contained somewhat more women and, for two of the municipalities (Piteå and Huddinge), were slightly older compared to the population. The second survey, conducted in the same four municipalities in 2006 replicated most of these questions on values, beliefs and attitudes, enabling the stability of beliefs and values to be assessed. Following a reminder sent after one week, the overall response rate for this second survey was 30 %. In relation to gender and civil status, the respondents compared favourably to the population of the municipalities at large. Again, however, the sample was slightly older than the population. Compared to other previously conducted studies on environmental attitudes and behaviour in Sweden, these response-rates are rather low. One significant reason for this large attrition is believed to be that the questionnaires comprised a wide range of questions on several areas of household behaviour, in addition to a comprehensive survey of values, beliefs and personal norms *vis-à-vis* the environment. This comprehensiveness made the surveys quite demanding for the respondents to complete. Nevertheless, incorporating basic values and beliefs is also what makes this study unique and enables a careful, all-inclusive, and for legitimacy crucial, exploration of public belief-systems. Surveys limited to exploring environmental attitudes or opinions do not allow for this.

An analysis of how and to what extent the respondents' socioeconomic status affects their values and beliefs is conducted to the end of this chapter. A difficulty when interpreting environmentally related questionnaires is the possible self-selection bias occurring if people with a stronger than average pro-environmental orientation to a larger extent choose to take part in the survey. However, comparing the results from both surveys to those of other studies with higher response rates, either utilising partly the same analytical tools (e.g. the NEP-scale in Widegren, 1998 and Gooch, 1995) or asking a range of similar environmentally-related questions (e.g. Lundmark, 1998; Jeffner and Uddenberg, 1994; Bråkenhielm, 1994), indicates that self-selection bias due to pro-environmental attitudes not appears to be a significant problem. Also when comparing the results from the yearly recurring SOM-surveys[116], consistently displaying a response-rate above 60 %, the results from the surveys are confirmed. Provided this, although these surveys formally should be considered an illustration of public beliefs providing limited prospect for further generalisations, there is nothing to indicate that the results reached should diverge considerably from the Swedish population as a whole.

[116] Since 1986, the SOM (Society, Opinion and Media) Institute at Gothenburg University, Sweden, has conducted a yearly, nationwide survey addressing a range of politics and social issues. The SOM-surveys are sent out to 6000 (from the year 2007, 9000) randomly selected individuals between the ages of 15 and 85, with an average response rate of around 65 % (SOM, 2009).

7.2 FUNDAMENTAL NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES

The approach applied in this thesis acknowledges that a person's system of beliefs constitutes a hierarchically ordered structure in which a priority amongst very stable and general basic values inform, constrain and guide the formation of more salient, but also more volatile, beliefs on specific matters. Following the three-tiered structure of beliefs outlined in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF, e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999), the normative precepts of the Deep Core have a scope that ranges across policy areas, and underpin therefore any number of more empirically oriented beliefs related specifically to a policy domain or a political issue. This is also consistent with the definition of universal values as abstract and general conceptions of the desirable, serving as the individual's stable and enduring trans-situational guides (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), as with the notion of basic values forming the starting point for the causal chain of beliefs proposed within the VBN-theory (Stern, 2000). In the ACF-model, two sets of fundamental normative precepts from the Deep Core are highlighted as forming the critical normative base of the Policy Core beliefs; basic value priorities and basic criteria of distributive justice. As these two are assumed to constitute the basic point of departure for a person's structure of more empirically oriented beliefs, making up "the most important defining characteristic of an advocacy coalition" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:132), they constitute the first two topics of the analytical framework applied in this thesis. However, before commencing the below analysis of fundamental normative principles it should be noted that the suggested two-way connection between values and beliefs (see chapter 5 above) implies that the meaning of the results deriving from this first section can be fully explored only when an analysis of publicly established policy-domain specific beliefs also have been conducted.

Basic value-priorities

As a first step in the analysis, a shortened version of Schwartz's (e.g. 1992) value-inventory scale is applied for assessing the importance the respondents assign to basic values, as well as how they make priorities among them. As demonstrated in chapter 3 above, Schwartz's value-inventory scale arranges a set of 10 motivational value-types based on the inherent conflict and compatibility between each type's organizing value-items and have undergone numerous empirical tests confirming its validity for categorizing those values that individuals employ as guiding principles in life. The results from this inventory are therefore believed to provide a reliable first indication of how

the respondents rate the importance and significance of fundamental normative principles, such as loyalty, power, security, and freedom. Furthermore, following the hierarchical structure of the values-construct, basic value priorities have been shown as lying at the core of the individuals' formation of beliefs on a wide range of more specific topics, for instance political orientations and environmentalist predispositions (cf. van Deth and Scarbourough, 1995; Schwartz, 1996; Stern et al, 1995; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999). Thereby, how the respondents' prioritise among basic values is believed to be of additional significance as it provides relevant first-hand information also on which type of issues that are the most salient for the individual, which assists her interpretation of the outside world, and will guide her formation of empirically oriented beliefs and policy-preferences. Following the analytical framework, two interconnected questions capture the focus of interest and are to be answered in this section:

1. *Which basic values are emphasised as important guiding principles in individuals' lives?*
2. *How do these values relate to each other, i.e. when making trade-offs, which basic values are prioritised?*

In completing the value-inventory scale, the respondents in the two samples were asked to indicate the degree to which 20 indicator-values functioned as, following Rokeach (1973), guiding principles in their life. A 9-point scale, ranging from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (of supreme importance), was provided for marking their answers. The mean score for all value-items from these samples are illustrated in table 7.1 below, along with any significant changes in the importance attributed a value-item between the two samples.

This initial inventory of basic value-priorities conveys that the respondents in both samples attribute the highest importance to the two value-items FAMILY (or, as framed in the 2006 survey, CITIZEN) SECURITY and FREEDOM. At the very bottom of the list are the value-items SOCIAL POWER and AUTHORITY, both of which enjoys a markedly low support. This is perhaps an expected result, as the two top-rated values, taken at face-value, have a more positive air about them compared to the two with the lowest rating (at least in the cultural context of this thesis). A further six items, distributed over all positions in Schwartz' motivational continuum (see figure 3 above) also receive a mean score over 5,0 which point towards their overall importance for the respondents. Among these is the value-item of specific relevance for the policy-domain studied in this thesis: PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT. This goes

to show that, although not the most important, environmental protection can nevertheless be assumed a salient issue with the respondents.

TABLE 7.1. *Value-items (mean score)*

Value-item	Sample 2004 (N = 1189-1207)	Sample 2006 (N = 836)
BROAD-MINDED (being tolerant towards different ideas and beliefs) (U)	4,68	4,68
PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT (preserving diversity in the ecological system) (U)	5,11	5,10
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak) (U)	5,21	5,21
HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) (B)	4,52	4,40***
LOYALTY (faithful to one's friends and group) (B)	5,54	5,54
WEALTH (material possessions, money) (P)	3,31	3,36
SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance) (P)	,54	,68***
AUTHORITY (have the right to lead or command others) (P)	1,04	1,68***
INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events) (A)	3,31	3,92***
SUCCESSFUL (succeed, achieving goals) (A)	4,13	4,31***
SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation) (C)	3,90	3,79**
OBEDIENCE (meeting one's obligations) (C)	5,20	5,23
SOCIAL ORDER (a stable society) (SEC)	5,31	5,29
FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones) (SEC)	6,36	5,94 ***
RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs) (T)	3,48	3,22***
FREEDOM (freedom to think and act) (SD)	6,17	6,15
INDEPENDENCE (self-reliant, self-sufficient) (SD)	5,20	5,14
CREATIVITY (being unique, imaginative) (SD)	4,15	4,22
CURIOSITY (interested in everything, exploring) (SD)	4,18	4,17
A VARIED LIFE (a life filled with challenge, novelty and change) (STI)	3,87	3,63 ***

Note: Significant changes between the two samples are indicated as ***p<0.01; **p<0.05 (two-tailed). Two items were worded slightly different in the 2006 survey: FAMILY SECURITY as CITIZEN SECURITY (*Safety for all in society*), and A VARIED LIFE as CHANGE (*Seeking challenges and novelty*). The value-items are labelled according to their belonging to a motivational value-type (UNIVERSALISM; BENEVOLENCE; POWER; ACHIEVEMENT; CONFORMITY; SECURITY; TRADITION; SELF-DIRECTION; STIMULATION) and grouped together based on them informing one of the four basic value-orientations: SELF-TRANCENDENCE; SELF-ENHANCEMENT; CONSERVATION; and OPENNESS TO CHANGE respectively (see further table 3.1).

As the table above further illustrates, the differences between the two samples are relatively minor, but in some instances are the variance in mean-score for these universal values nevertheless significant. In particular, values expressing motivations for the individual to pursuit personal interests (e.g. belonging to the value-types POWER and ACHIEVEMENT) are rated as slightly more important for respondents in the 2006 sample. Consistent with theory, the 2006 sample also display a significant decrease for the opposing value-item HELPFUL as a guiding principle in life.

However, as discussed above, analysing how people rate single value-items provide only limited information about their overall value-orientation. This is due to several causes (cf. Schwartz, 1996), not the least since the generality of the value-items opens up for a range of subjective interpretations on their meaning. In this sense, a value-item might be described as a 'floating signifier' (Torfing, 1999) since it is ascribed different meanings by different individuals in different contexts, and can thus be fully understood only when connected to a chain of other items. For instance, different understandings of the value-item FREEDOM might be expected to have significant implications for how the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma is experienced. In a classical liberal connotation it is first and foremost interpreted negatively, signifying freedom from constraints; freedom to act according to one's wishes; and, by inference, the absence of coercion from an all too extensive state (e.g. Berlin, 1969). On the other hand, many individuals subscribe to quite different interpretations of freedom. Social liberals interpret freedom positively, as signifying freedom to self-realisation. This interpretation rather suggests a state which, albeit being neutral with regards to interpretations of the good life, actively empowers individuals and provides opportunities for autonomy. The communitarian critique of liberalism provides yet another interpretation of this value-item; as something which can only be realised through community.[117]

As these quite different, but all well-established, interpretations imply, only very general conclusions can be drawn from analysing value-items independently. The description or explanation provided for each value-item included in the survey (see table 3.1 above) neither provides any indication as to how they should be interpreted. The first step towards providing a more comprehensive analysis of people's basic priority of values is therefore to consider how single value-items form coherent value-orientations, and take into account the compatibility and conflict between different single values that these orientations convey. In line with this, four indices were calculated following Schwartz's (1992) suggested value-dimensions. The indices were created by summing up the responses to each included value item and dividing by the total number of items within the value-orientation. Each of the four indices was composed of five items (see table 7.1 above) and the reliability (Cronbach's α) [118] was also generated for each value orientation. In both samples, the reliabilities for the value-orientations range between 0.71

[117] Hence the communitarian argument for a reconsideration of the liberal claim of the self as being 'atomised' (Taylor, 1992) or 'unencumbered' (Sandel, 1984), as well as an emphasis of 'the Good' rather than of individual (liberal) rights (cf. Theobald and Dinkelman, 1995).
[118] Cronbach's alpha, or internal consistency reliability, measures the correlations between the items making up each index, and thus if the items included measure the same general construct. The coefficient varies between 0 and 1, and increases as the correlation between items increases. A scale-reliability score above 0.6 is commonly agreed to indicate acceptable reliability.

and 0.76, which are considered reasonably high enough to generate indices for each.

The four value-orientations are placed in a two-dimensional structure, ranging between OPENNESS TO CHANGE and CONSERVATION, and between SELF-TRANSCENDENCE to SELF-ENHANCEMENT respectively (see figure 2 in chapter 3 above). Due to the value-items included, the importance an individual ascribes to either end of the former dimension has been suggested as closely associated with her general political-ideological reasoning. Primarily, this dimension captures the fundamental normative conflicts involving different conceptualisations of the proper relationship between the state and the individual, ranging between classical liberalism on the one hand, and authoritarianism on the other. It thereby provides an indication of how the respondents assign relative importance to individual rights, freedom and self-determination, as well as their readiness for social change. Previous research has also suggested that how a person prioritises among these values can predict her formation of support for political parties and programs emphasising either side of the dimension (cf. Schwartz, 1992, 1996 & 1998; Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Caprara et al, 2006). By exploring how public beliefs align with either side of the OPENNESS TO CHANGE – CONSERVATION dichotomy, the basics of a fundamental value-conflict within environmental policymaking is also captured. Due to it emphasising either side of the divide between an individualistic and a collectivistic political culture (cf. Schwartz, 1990), the *prima facie* challenge that collective environmental obligations aspiring towards a common good presents for individuals' freedom to independently choose and pursue their life projects is materialised along this dimension (for different perspectives on this issue, see Doherty and De Geus, 1996; Barry, 1999; Barry and Wissenburg, 2001; Dobson, 1998 & 2003; Eckersley, 1992 & 2004; Hailwood, 2004; Wissenburg, 1998).

The conflict between openness- and conservation-values has also been applied in order to discriminate between respondents with a materialistic or post-materialistic worldview, as the theory of post-materialism argues that the desire for self-expressive values takes precedence first when more fundamental needs, e.g. for security, has been fulfilled. To give one example, Inglehart's (e.g. 1990:74-75) widely applied index of post-materialism requires that the respondents rate the desirability of items such as "Maintaining order in the nation" (indicating a materialistic value-orientation) or "Protecting freedom of speech" (indicating post-materialism). Thereby, considering how the respondents position themselves along the OPENNESS TO CHANGE - CONSERVATION dimension reveals not only their general priority of core values, it also provides indications on how they form more salient beliefs concerning, for example, the proper distribution of decision-

making authority or the duty for individuals to participate in state-mandated activities (e.g. environmental responsibility-taking within the household).

The latter, i.e. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE/SELF-ENHANCEMENT, dimension also has a bearing on the individual's general political ideology, as it expresses support for different interpretations of socioeconomic issues or the respondents' stance towards "economic egalitarianism" (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998:22). Whereas SELF-TRANSCENDENCE motivates the individual to altruistic behaviour, including a strong emphasis on social and economic equality, SELF-ENHANCEMENT instead draws on values accentuating the maximisation of personal interests, i.e. a self-centred (egoistic [Stern et al., 1995] or egocentric [Merchant, 1992]) value-orientation. People who value these two ends on the dimension differently also tend to lend their support to political parties expressing different approaches to socioeconomic issues (Caprara et al, 2006). For the present study, this dimension's elucidation of values on opposite sides of the conflict between individual and social context outcomes means that it primarily serves as to capture the second relevant component of fundamental normative principles: the weight given to the welfare of different groups or entities. This issue will be explored in more depth in the next section.

So, how do these four value-orientations resonance among the respondents? The mean-scores, standard deviations and scale-reliability for the four index variables in both samples are illustrated in table 7.2 below. Again, the scale ranges from -1 to 7.

TABLE 7.2. *Support for value-orientations*

	Mean		Standard deviation		Scale reliability (Cronbach's α)	
	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006
OPENNESS TO CHANGE	4,72	4,66	1,11	1,14	0,71	0,73
CONSERVATION	4,85	4,69***	1,11	1,09	0,70	0,70
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE	5,02	4,99	1,07	1,06	0,70	0,71
SELF-ENHANCEMENT	2,47	2,79***	1,20	1,15	0,76	0,72

Note: Significant changes between the two samples are indicated as ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). The four value-orientations each comprise five items. OPENNESS TO CHANGE incorporates FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE, CREATIVITY, CURIOSITY and A VARIED LIFE; CONSERVATION incorporates SELF-DISCIPLINE, OBEDIENCE, SOCIAL ORDER, FAMILY SECURITY and RESPECT FOR TRADITION; SELF-TRANSCENDENCE consists of BROAD-MINDED, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL JUSTICE, HELPFUL and LOYALTY; and SELF-ENHANCEMENT of WEALTH, SOCIAL POWER, AUTHORITY, INFLUENTIAL and SUCCESSFUL.

As it stands, the overall score for the two value-orientations located on the horizontal dimension, OPENNESS TO CHANGE and CONSERVATION respectively, are about the same in both samples. This is a rather expected result for several reasons. Due to the strong political-ideological connotations

of these value-orientations, it might come as no surprise that they are both established in a stable representative democracy with a broad political spectrum. It also follows the strong emphasis of the value-items SECURITY and FREEDOM as guiding principles in life. These results suggest, *first*, that the respondents are almost evenly divided in their support of the two ends of this dimension; between individualism and collectivism (or between individualist and collectivist values [cf. Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz, 1990]).[119] On the one hand, respondents from both samples attribute importance to OPENNESS TO CHANGE. This, it is reasonable to assume, makes them to a larger extent susceptible to policies emphasising individual freedoms and social change as motivational factors, as well as expressing a positive stance towards human nature and the ability of people to make good choices in life (cf. Schwartz and Bilsky, 1994). Similarly, they are expected to place great value on each individual's self-determination and therefore reject policies that are understood as limiting individual autonomy. On the other hand, the value-orientation CONSERVATION, expressing more of collectivist values, receives a marginally larger overall support. As evident from the value-items included, respondents displaying a high score for this value-orientation are instead assumed to be more positively disposed towards a policy that frames its goals in terms of collectiveness, conformity and tradition and demonstrates the connection between these values and the political aspirations towards which the policy in question aims.

Before drawing any further conclusions on these value-orientations, it should be noted that it obviously is perfectly reasonable to argue that people have multiple preference orderings, and apply different preference maps in different contexts (Arrow 1951; Hausman and McPhearson 1996). Furthermore, in those situations where a policy is perceived as resulting in positive outcomes for values from both sides of the dimension, or where consequences are clearly decoupled from either one, little significance would be attributed to the existing preferences for a specific value-orientation. For instance, a policy addressing an issue containing no explicit significance for the values in the above dimension will instead be evaluated based on its bearing on other types of values entirely. Due to the overall high scores for the above value-orientations, it seems a valid conclusion that the respondents to some extent indeed are motivated by values within both of these two opposing

[119] Consistent with theory, the two opposing value-orientations are, although weakly, negatively correlated (In the 2004 sample r = -0,54 significant at the 0,01 level). When removing the value-item with the highest overall score from both orientations (FREEDOM and SECURITY respectively) the strength of the negative correlation increased somewhat (r = -0,57). Consistent with these results the two value-items display a weak, but nevertheless, positive correlation (r = 0,32, significant at the 0,01 level). As recommended by Schwartz (1992:56), mean values were controlled for before performing the correlation analysis in order to remove the variance shared between the mean ratings of all of the values in the survey and the variables of interest in the correlation analysis.

orientations. However, from time to time individuals are unavoidably faced with situations where two values come into direct conflict and where the making of value trade-offs therefore become necessary (cf. Hadari, 1988; Tetlock, Peterson and Lerner, 1996). This is, for example, evident in the classic conflict between freedom and security referred to in chapter 2 above, and in the conflict between (individual) rights and (environmental) duties underpinning the perceived legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma of environmental politics. It is in conflict-situations like these that a person's hierarchical ordering of values is believed to be of significant importance, as it will serve as a guide to how trade-offs are made (Rokeach, 1968; Schwartz, 1996; Rossteucher, 2004). Thus, as this thesis deals with the value-correspondence based policy legitimacy in a context ridden with potential conflicts between different outcomes, it seems adequate to also take into account how people rate the motivational value-orientations relative to each other and, by inference how they can be expected to prioritise among different ultimate values. This is provided for by exploring if one end of the value-dimension is dominant for the respondent. To what extent, then, do the respondents embrace one value-orientation over another?

Two criteria, inspired by the approach outlined by Axelrod (1994), were applied in order to determine if the respondents should be assigned one value-orientation as being dominant (and by inference the extent to which the respondents hold 'mixed or uncertain' value-orientations). *First*, each respondent's mean-score for her dominant value-orientation should be higher than her mean-scores for (any one of) the opposing value-orientation(s). *Second*, to be considered dominant, the respondent's own mean-score for this value-orientation also should be above the mean-score for the same value-orientation calculated among the total population. In this way, the strength of the respondents' preference for a value-orientation is considered to be clearly displayed. The distribution of dominant value-orientations among the respondents is illustrated in table 7.3 below. This calculation of *strong* dominant value-orientation is further complemented by an illustration of how the respondents are distributed if only the 'highest mean-score' criterion was applied, as shown in the two columns marked *weak* dominant value-orientation. In both samples, a dominant value-orientation is possible to assign to about 70 % of the respondents, whereas the remaining 30% hold a value-orientation that is not strong enough to be considered dominant according to the applied criteria, and thus not possible to assign to either one of the two orientations. These are marked as uncertain/mixed in the table above. It should, however, be noted that when only the 'highest mean-score' criterion was applied, the amount of respondents in the uncertain/mixed category decreased significantly (as only containing those with an equal mean score for the two orientations).

TABLE 7.3. *Distribution of dominant value-orientations (% of respondents)*

Value-orientation	Strong		Weak	
	2004 (N=1209)	2006 (N=747)	2004 (N=1209)	2006 (N=744)
OPENNESS TO CHANGE	31,2	32,1	39,7	41,4
CONSERVATION	38,4	37,3	53,3	51,6
UNCERTAIN/MIXED	30,4	30,6	7,0	7,0

As evident from these results, the respondents are quite evenly distributed among the two value-orientations, but nevertheless with a clear overweight towards CONSERVATION. Confirming the relative stability of basic values over time, this is true both for the 2004 and the 2006 sample and consistent with the overall mean-scores for the value-orientations illustrated in table 7.2 above. As such, the analysis of basic value-priorities so far reveals that values underpinning both a preference for individual freedom and social change, as well as entirely opposite preferences for tradition, security and stability, indeed are found established among the respondents. The share of respondents holding strong preferences for one over the other is of such equal distribution that it is difficult to single out one value-orientation as being more established than the other applying this criterion. However, it must be remembered that over half of the respondents, from both samples, display their highest mean-score for the value-orientation CONSERVATION. This shows that, when push comes to shove, a small but nevertheless majority of the respondents rank the importance of collectivist values higher than they do individualist ones. These indications places the perceived tension between personal rights and collective (environmental) duties implied by the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma, as well as the political rhetoric applied to mediate it in practice, in a slightly different light.

However, as the respondents nevertheless are quite evenly divided between the two strong dominant value-orientations, and as a third of the respondents in both samples are unable to assign a strong value-orientation, the conflicts among this dimension might not be as significant in practice as they are in theory. Instead, it might be assumed that a significant amount of respondents simultaneously value the items included in both of the above dimensions fairly high. In fact, Schwartz (1990:153-154) also suggests that SECURITY is a value-item that might be expected to display high importance across social types, as people are likely to interpret its meaning based on their aggregative value-orientation. When it comes to the bearing these basic value-priorities have on questions regarding authority and participation in the specific environmental context, the beliefs directly related to how the respondents perceive the environmental situation must first be considered.

Welfare of greatest concern

Before approaching the respondents' empirically oriented beliefs relating explicitly to the environmental policy-domain, the values arranged on the vertical dimension in Schwartz' motivational value-continuum should be granted some further attention. These value-orientations represent opposite sides of the conflict between individual and social context outcomes. Therefore, the importance that the respondents assign to SELF-TRANSCENDENCE and SELF-ENHANCEMENT respectively, along with their relative priority of these two orientations, is suitable for elucidating the second topic concerning fundamental normative principles: the identification of groups whose welfare is pivotal. The overall question approached here is to what extent the individual prioritise, and thus are motivated by, positive benefits for the own person or by the welfare of others.

1. Which group's or entity's welfare is the most important?

As illustrated in table 7.2 above, SELF-TRANSCENDENCE enjoys a significantly higher support (2004 mean = 5,02) than its opposing value-orientation (2004 mean = 2,44). Although this gap decreased somewhat in the 2006 sample, in line with the higher importance attributed the value-items included in SELF-ENHANCEMENT (see table 7.1 above), it should nevertheless stand clear that an altruistic perspective, rather than egoism, serves as the guiding principle when the respondents' identifies groups whose welfare is of greatest concern. Similar results supporting these data have also been reported by other surveys of peoples' values and beliefs in Sweden. For example, the yearly conducted SOM-surveys[120] repeatedly find that value-items pointing towards a self-centred position received weak support from the respondents. In 2006, the items Power and Wealth were indicated as being very important by a mere 5 and 7 % respectively of the respondents in the SOM-survey. On the other hand, items signalling altruism, such as Justice and Equality, were marked as very important by over half of the respondents (Holmberg and Weibull, 2008:11). A primary conclusion is thus that also perceptions of negative consequences for other people are highly salient for the respondents, and that a legitimate policy well can motivate a settlement on goals and strategies also with positive effects for a larger community. Furthermore, considering that SELF-TRANSCENDENCE captures those values frequently suggested to underpin environmentalism, as well as the connection

[120] To explore basic value-priorities, the SOM-surveys apply a Swedish version of Rokeach's (e.g.1973) value-scale which holds certain similarities to, and indeed strongly inspired, the one developed by Schwartz and colleagues (e.g. 1992; see also Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).

between self-interested behaviour and environmental problems suggested by theories of collective-action, these results can be expected to have positive impacts also on the presence of more specific pro-environmental beliefs.

However, merely making the distinction between egoism and altruism do not adequately capture the full complexity of an individual's value-system. Although egoism or SELF-ENHANCEMENT presents a rather straight-forward orientation towards personal benefits, altruistic motivations might be both narrow and broad in scope. Altruism might thus incorporate a preference for welfare on a global (perhaps even non-human or intergenerational) scale, as well as the priority of primary group's welfare. By not discriminating between theses two interpretations of altruism, the value-orientation SELF-TRANSCENDENCE becomes a rather blunt instrument for reliably establishing whose welfare the respondents assign priority to (e.g. Hansla et al, 2008; Schwartz, 1990). This highlights the need for making a further demarcation of value-orientations expressing a prominent universal and narrow social scope respectively. In order to nuance the concept of altruism, a triarchal classification of motivational domains is constructed as suggested by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987); Merchant (1992); Axelrod (1994); Stern and Dietz (1994) and Stern et al. (1995). Here, the motivational split between BENEVOLENCE and UNIVERSALISM, both located within the SELF-TRANSCENDENCE value-orientation constitutes the foundation for two new orientations.

Whereas SELF-ENHANCEMENT remains unaltered, a SOCIAL and a UNIVERSAL value-orientation[121] are computed using value-items which accentuate the preference either for "welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact" or for "welfare of all people and for nature" (Rohan, 2000:261). As such, these three orientations could also be applied as providing an indication of the respondent's motivation to pursuit, or at least accept, activities with a particular set of consequences directed towards particular groups or entities (cf. Stern et al., 1995:1624). A SOCIAL value-orientation indicates prioritising a sense of belongingness and acceptance from others as well as a pursuit of goals which enhances the welfare of close others as a means to this end. This value-orientation therefore incorporates items which emphasises the welfare of the in-group and motivates the individual to restrain actions that are likely to upset others and violate social

[121] The self-regarding focus of SELF-ENHANCEMENT makes it consistent with what other studies have classified as an economic (Axelrod, 1994); egoistic (Stern et al., 1995); or egocentric (Merchant, 1992) value-orientation, all of which have a focus on outcomes that maximise self-interest rather than the interest of a larger community. The Universal and Social value-orientations are similar, but not entirely correspondent, to those value-orientations termed either Biospheric and Social-Altruistic (Stern et al., 1995), or Ecocentric and Homocentric (Merchant, 1992). An important difference from Stern's and Merchant's categorisations is the less pronounced demarcation between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism in these value-orientations. Also universalism has an anthropocentric orientation evident by, for instance, the inclusion of social justice and broad-mindedness as two of its motivating values.

norms (Schwartz, 1996:4 & 1992:9; Axelrod, 1994:88). In order to capture a focus on in-group welfare, and relative indifference towards the out-group, the value-type BENEVOLENCE is combined with items from CONFORMITY and TRADITION. This also highlights the connections between a narrow scope of altruism and more collectivist cultures as suggested by Schwartz (1992:12). The care for close others expressed by this value-orientation reflects a notion of territoriality when rank-ordering the welfare of different groups, where priority is granted those individuals who share membership in a community either taking the shape of the family or of some other form of in-group. In this way, a SOCIAL value-orientation thereby expresses a significant principle on which traditional ideas of citizenship (or state/individual relations) are constructed: the moral relationship among people within the same politically defined society. Thus, from a perspective of environmentalism, individuals holding a strong social value-orientation are expected not to support environmental protective policies in those instances where these are understood as having short-term negative consequences for close others, and actively support environmental claims if they are perceived as beneficial for the own in-group and/or for their own social status (Axelrod, 1994).

In contrast, people holding a UNIVERSAL value-orientation are believed not to make any sharp distinctions between members of the in- and out-groups when developing criteria for welfare distribution. The UNIVERSAL orientation is also the one most closely associated with the morality and motivational content suggested as imperative for implementing various individual-level-solutions to the environmental problem. For instance, recall that one suggested means for reaching sustainability, reinterpreting contemporary democratic citizenship's rights and duties in line with an ecological citizenship, uses the metaphor of the ecological footprint and the inter-personal relationships this generate as a starting-point (van Steenbergen, 1994; Dobson, 2003). By acknowledging the connection between private actions and global consequences, in particular that individuals in certain parts of the world let their activities expand way beyond what would be possible had the resources been evenly distributed, the notion of ecological citizenship forwards the significance of non-territorial relationships and non-reciprocal duties. It also holds social justice as its core virtue. All of these defining characteristics correspond rather well with the value-items included in the UNIVERSAL value-orientation, and the strong connections between it and pronounced environmental attitudes should therefore come as no surprise. Consistent with the orientation elaborated by Schwartz (1992; see figure 2 above), the UNIVERSAL value-orientation is constructed by the value-items BROAD-MINDED, SOCIAL JUSTICE and PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT. People holding it as their dominating value-orientation are therefore expected to be motivated by the perceived benefit or cost to the

world at large, including the non-human environment, not based on the short-term costs facing either the own person or close others (cf. Schwartz, 1992; Axelrod, 1994).[122]

TABLE 7.4. *Welfare of greatest concern*

	Mean		Standard deviation		Scale reliability (Cronbach's α)	
	2004	2006	2004	2006	2004	2006
SELF-ENHANCEMENT	2,47	2,79***	1,20	1,15	0,76	0,72
SOCIAL	4,54	4,43***	1,09	1,03	0,67	0,62
UNIVERSAL	5,00	5,00	1,23	1,22	0,62	0,61

Note: Significant changes between the two samples are indicated as ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). Self-Enhancement is comprised by five items: Wealth, Social Power, Authority, Influential and Successful. The Social value-orientation organises the items Tradition, Self-discipline, Obedience, Helpful and Loyalty. The items making up the Universal value-orientation are three: Broad-minded, Social Justice and Protected environment.

In table 7.4 above, the means, standard deviations and scale-reliabilities for the three value-orientations are outlined. Consistent with the importance assigned to SELF-TRANSCENDENCE, the survey data shows that the respondents from both samples give strong priority to the two interpretations of altruism as guiding principles. A noteworthy difference between the samples is that the 2006 sample displays a slight increase in the mean-score for SELF-ENHANCEMENT, whereas the score for a SOCIAL value-orientation is slightly down. The mean-score for a UNIVERSAL value-orientation remains unchanged between the two samples. According to the survey results, when discriminating between altruism with a narrow and a broad scope, respondents attribute higher importance to the latter. This is a clear demonstration of the fact that also non-territorial relationships are granted significant weight when developing personal criteria for distributive justice. Considering that this thesis deals specifically with the environmental domain, incorporating a range of different entities (e.g. humans, animals, ecosystems) to which altruism potentially could be extended, a further question to ask is which groups or entities this non-territorial altruism encompass. As noted by Stern and colleagues (1995), the original value-orientations elaborated by Schwartz do not include any distinct ecocentric (deep green) or biospheric orientation as SELF-TRANSCENDENCE collects values which express altruism both towards other people and towards nature. The same can be said for the

[122] Although these three items do not specifically address global or non-territorial relationships, they are clearly distinguished from the altruistic value-items within BENEVOLENCE as they are relevant also for distant or anonymous relationships without any form of in-group contacts. According to Schwartz, an acknowledgment of UNIVERSAL values stems from the recognition of global interdependency, and these values will therefore be absent in small, isolated homogenous cultures (cf. Schwartz, 1990 & 1992).

three value-orientations outlined above. The UNIVERSAL orientation is the only one which contains explicit references to environmental protection, and also the one orientation which is presumed to be strongly correlated with various forms of pro-environmental behaviour. This, however, is not to say that the relatively high mean-score for a UNIVERSAL orientation should be interpreted as expressing any kind of ecocentric ethic present among the respondents. Expressing the importance for environmental protection may well be motivated also by anthropocentric or human-centred concerns, and the failure to separate the egalitarian and explicit environmental values within the Universal value-type (cf. Stern et al, 1995) provides no further conclusions on the matter. So far therefore, although it can be concluded that altruism with a broad scope is of significant importance, answers pertaining to the respondents' basic views on the human beings/nature relationship must instead be drawn from those empirically oriented topics which more explicitly addresses these issues. However, as with the analysis of the previous, horizontal dimension, the high mean-scores of two altruistic orientations suggest that respondents, to some extent, attribute importance to both a broad as well as a narrow interpretation of altruism. This makes it desirable to explore the extent to which one value-orientation can be deemed dominant among the respondents, following the same criteria as have been discussed above. So, to what extent can the respondents be assumed ready to make trade-offs in favour of one of the above orientations? How the dominant value-orientations concerning the priority of welfare are distributed among the respondents is displayed in table 7.5 below.

TABLE 7.5. *Dominant value-orientations concerning welfare (% of respondents)*

Value-orientation	Strong		Weak	
	2004 sample	2006 sample	2004 sample	2006 sample
SELF-ENHANCEMENT	1,5	2,5	1,5	2,5
SOCIAL	22,7	18,1	32,9	28,4
UNIVERSAL	40,9	42,9	61,3	65,6
UNCERTAIN/MIXED	34,9	36,5	4,3	3,5

As the table above shows, it is possible to assign a strong dominant value-orientation to about 65 % of the respondents. Similar to the results displayed in table 7.3 above, this percentage increases significantly when trying for a weak dominant value-orientation. Some minor differences between the two samples can also be noted, following shift in mean-scores for the value-orientations. The 2006 sample consequently shows a decrease in the percentage holding a SOCIAL orientation as strong dominant, as well as a

simultaneous increase for both SELF-ENHANCEMENT and UNIVERSAL orientations. An identical pattern of development is true also for weak dominant value-orientations and consistent with the slight decrease in importance for some included value-items (see table 7,2 above). Furthermore, it should also be noted that when only the 'highest mean-score criterion' was applied, the following decrease in respondents in the uncertain/mixed category were distributed exclusively among the two altruistic value-orientations whereas no increase in the SELF-ENHANCEMENT orientation could be discerned.

Overall, these results suggest that altruism with a broad scope, focusing on the "welfare of all people and for nature", is firmly established among the respondents with over 60 % holding it as a weak dominant value-orientation. This, again, suggests that the distinction between the welfare for members of the own in-group and for others, is not as sharp among the respondents. The groups whose welfare is of greatest concern are thereby identified based on other criteria than a predetermined, territorially bound membership and the moral community therefore stretched out as to encompass also people and entities with whom no personal contacts exists. As the values included in the UNIVERSAL value-orientation to a higher extent signal an awareness of the needs and problems facing people in other parts of the world, policies aiming at the promotion of environmental protection in general enjoy a higher legitimacy in this group even if doing so entails short-term costs (economic or other) both for the own person and for other people within the in-group. From the perspective of the perceived legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma, the manner in which this trade-off is being made is of highest significance. The notion of a dilemma concerns, to its very essence, the political difficulties of trading personal outcomes (in the shape of individual liberties, personal autonomy etc.) for environmental protection. As the results above show, such a trade-off would be considered rightful among a large share of the respondents.

Although a UNIVERSAL orientation certainly is dominant among the respondents, it should nevertheless be noted that a SOCIAL value-orientation was possible to assign as weakly dominant among one-third of the respondents. Following theory, these respondents are assumed to lend their active support to environmental protection primarily in those situations where they also perceive some social benefit from this, either in the form of acceptance for themselves by a community or in the form of positive effects for close others. Together with the above displayed preference for CONSERVATION-values, this could be further interpreted as the traditional (as opposed to post-cosmopolitan) sense of civic duty being generally strong among the respondents, in particular when considering the total amount of respondents holding an overall high mean-score for the SOCIAL value-

orientation. On a slightly different note, it could also be argued that although a social-altruistic care for others as here defined not explicitly implies a care also for nature, it could indeed be interpreted as a movement in this direction. Following the deliberative-turn within political ecology, social-altruism is considered a first way-station on the road towards a transformed ecological consciousness, as: "once the shift from 'self-regarding' individual to 'other-regarding' citizen has been made, it is a much smaller step to extend that public concern to foreigners, future-generations and non-human nature" (Carter, 2001:54; see also Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 2000).

Lastly, what should be clearly evident from this analysis of welfare-priorities is the divide between the extent to which personal and social-context outcomes are valued. When considering the minimal share of respondents holding SELF-ENHANCEMENT as their dominant value-orientation, whether strong or weak, it is here possible to conclude that self-regarding values serve only a minor function when assigning relative weights of importance to different groups. Instead, respondents are considerably more likely to extend the sphere of welfare also to other people or entities, and thus to be motivated by a concern for a larger community; something which can be expected to have a positive effect on the prospects for negotiating the economic – environmental conflicts underpinning the framing of environmental problems as collective-action dilemmas. When considering the weights granted single value-items, illustrated by the initial exploration of basic values in table 7.1 above, the difference in importance between self- and other-regarding motivations become even more pronounced. For one, none of the eight value-items displaying a mean-score above 5,0 belongs to the SELF-ENHANCEMENT orientation.

Summing up: fundamental normative principles

Two broad points can be made from this initial survey. *First*, considering how the respondents are distributed among the dimension capturing basic understandings of the state/individual relationship (i.e. between OPENNESS TO CHANGE and CONSERVATION), it is difficult to single out one value-dimension as being strongly dominant among the collective of respondents. Rather, the respondents are almost evenly divided between strongly emphasising one over the other. This, it seems reasonable to assume, follows mainly from the strong importance granted both of the two opposing values FREEDOM and SECURITY as guiding principles. Nevertheless, before drawing any further conclusions of the bearing this has for the legitimacy of different policy strategies, it must be noted that these value-orientations only capture a part of the person's system of beliefs. To understand how these two values are interpreted by the respondents, and how priorities are made in explicit

situations of conflict, it is necessary also to examine how the specific policy-issue is understood. In particular, it could be hypothesised that the experience of the environmental situation as an imminent threat, with causes rooted in individuals' behaviours, the valuation of security will take precedence and serve as to legitimise a stronger interference of the state even at the cost of less personal autonomy.

Second, following theory, how salient the notion of an environmental threat is for the person depends also on how it is believed to target entities of great value. Which entities' welfare the respondents prioritise is explored by the dimension structuring the divergence between personal and social context outcomes. Here it is evident that altruistic values, suggesting the welfare of others, are strongly favoured by the respondents. As a first instance, this suggests that environmental threats will be perceived as of significance to counteract and take responsibility for even when not believed to be affecting the own person in a noticeable way. When considering the results more closely it is also evident that a significant share of the respondents holds a strong broad-scope altruism, suggesting that welfare of others is interpreted non-territorially and thereby not confined to the own in-group. This, in turn, indicates that also beliefs on the environmental situation as a threat to individuals in a global perspective are highly salient for the respondent.

7.3 POLICY-DOMAIN SPECIFIC BELIEFS

Although basic values constitute the fundamental normative base of an individual's system of beliefs (or of her personal philosophy, e.g. Sabatier, 1988), their high level of abstraction makes interpreting their significance for a specific policy-domain rather difficult without simultaneously scrutinizing also beliefs related specifically to the particular domain. In particular as basic values are believed moderated or activated by more issue-oriented beliefs in the context of specific situations (Glynn et al, 1999; van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995). Therefore, the second set of critical topics outlined in the analytical framework explores beliefs more readily connected to the empirical nature of the policy domain in question. In difference to basic value priorities which are very general and thus applicable on most situations across policy domains, these empirical precepts instead relate to a range of issues within one specific domain and are therefore also believed to be more salient for actors' formation of attitudes, opinions and behavioural patterns (cf. Steg et al, 2005; Stern, 2000). Thus, by exploring also policy-domain specific beliefs the above survey of basic values will be complemented with topics that address beliefs on the environmental issue in a more explicit way.

As outlined in the analytical framework (see chapter 5 above), the policy-domain specific beliefs relevant for study are thought of as those revolving round Bacchi's (1999) overarching question: "What is the problem?". They thus incorporate the respondents' views on the basic causes to the overall problem addressed by policy (and by inference also the ability, for society or self, to solve the problem as well as the solutions necessary to implement in this endeavour); on the problem's seriousness; as well as on the distribution of authority, responsibility and participation in addressing the problem. Remembering the above discussion on the relationship between basic values and policy-domain specific beliefs, the analysis of the latter can be seen as divided into two parts. *First*, the respondents' general understanding on the human beings/nature relationship, as well as on the environmental problem's causes, seriousness and the direction of environmental threat will be explored. *Second*, the respondents' beliefs on the basic strategies for dealing with the perceived overall problem are analysed. Consistent with theory, how the respondent forms her beliefs on necessary policy responses are assumed to be influenced both by her assessment of the situation, as well as by the fundamental goals expressed through her basic values. Therefore, by analysing the respondents' perceptions of the policy problem and its solutions, also the normative presuppositions which underlie this representation will be further clarified. The exploration of policy-domain specific beliefs will thereby further assist the analysis of how the broad questions regarding the proper state/individual and human/beings nature relationships are answered.

Basic views of the problem

How the basic problem is understood is critical for the development of policy as it sets the frames for a range of further beliefs on causal relationships. Due to this significance, the first question on policy-domain specific beliefs addresses the respondents' basic understandings of the environmental problem in general. Two defining questions summarises this direction of interest:

1. *Which are the basic causes of the problem?*
2. *What types of solutions are necessary for moving development in the opposite direction?*

As a first instance, the NEP-scale (New Ecological Paradigm Scale, Dunlap and van Liere, 1978; Dunlap et al, 2000) is used to explore the

respondents' general beliefs relating to the environmental policy domain. We remember from chapter 3 that although the NEP-scale primarily aims at exploring beliefs related to the basic relationship between human beings and nature, it also reveals more general political-ideological beliefs and can thereby be applied as a complement to the value-dimensions above. In the two SHARP surveys, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 15 statements about the environment following the revised NEP-scale presented by Dunlap et al (2000). The results from these surveys are presented in table 7.6 below, including significant changes in mean scores between the two samples.

TABLE 7.6. *General environmental beliefs (mean scores)*

	2004	2006
NEP-total	3,67 (α = 0,78)	3,69 (α = 0,76)
POSSIBILITY OF AN ECO-CRISIS		
Humans are severely abusing the environment.	4,17	4,19
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.	3,70	3,75*
The so-called "ecological crisis" facing human kind has been greatly exaggerated. (-)	2,55	2,59
REJECTION OF EXEMPTIONALISM		
Humans' ingenuity will insure that we do *not* make the earth unliveable. (-)	2,87	2,84
Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.	4,20	4,12***
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it. (-)	2,79	2,75
REALITY OF LIMITS TO GROWTH		
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.	3,49	3,52
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. (-)	3,82	3,86
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.	3,70	3,75*
ANTIANTHROPOCENTRISM		
Humans have right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. (-)	1,99	2,00
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.	4,15	4,09**
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. (-)	2,14	2,05***
FRAGILITY OF NATURE'S BALANCE		
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.	3,89	3,97***
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations. (-)	2,10	2,11
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.	4,14	4,15

Note: Significant changes between the two samples are indicated as ***p<0.01 (two-tailed); **p<0.05 (two-tailed); and *p<0.1 (two-tailed) respectively. The response categories in the two questionnaires ranged between 1 and 5 and were marked as 1 (completely disagree); 2 (partly disagree); 3 (unsure); 4 (partly agree) and 5 (completely agree). Whereas agreement indicates a worldview in line with NEP for eight of the items, seven of the statements were worded so that disagreement, i.e. a low score, instead follows the NEP-worldview. These are marked with (-) in the table above. Calculating the mean-score for NEP in total, the ordering for these items have been reversed so that high scores correspond to a stronger pro-environmental orientation than low scores.

First of all, we note that both samples demonstrate a fairly high internal consistency (α = 0,78 and α = 0,76 respectively) for the 15-item NEP-scale used in the SHARP-surveys. This, I believe, validates the creation of a NEP-index incorporating all of these items. When doing so, it is furthermore possible to conclude that the respondents overall lend a strong support for the NEP-scale as a whole, with mean NEP-scores of 3,67 in the 2004 sample and 3,69 in the sample from 2006. This, in turn, suggests that the respondents hold a rather pronounced pro-environmental orientation, as consistent with the above reported support for the UNIVERSAL value-orientation[123] as well as for the single value-item PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT. As further shown in table 7.6, the strength of this pro-environmental orientation has not changed markedly during the two years passed in between the surveys. This, we remember, is also consistent with the theoretical expectation on the relative stability of core beliefs (see chapter 4 above). In further validation of the results of the NEP-survey, the relatively strong pro-environmentalism among the respondents also corresponds rather well to previous studies of support for the NEP-worldview. Studies conducted by Widegren (1998) and Gooch (1995) have both reported an even stronger support for a pro-environmental stance in Sweden.[124]

As mentioned above, the beliefs inferred through the items included in the NEP-scale concern both the human beings/nature relationship in specific as well as more general political beliefs. The items most clearly distinguishing between a worldview with a clear anthropocentric ethic and one that draw on at least a shallow ecological ethic, are those concerned with the standing of humans *vis-à-vis* non-human entities in questions of rights and, by inference, intrinsic value. The data suggests that a shallow ecological ethic is firmly established also in the years 2004 and 2006. As displayed in table 7.7 below, almost half (48,5 and 47,8 % respectively)[125] of the respondents from both samples completely agree with the statement that plants and animals hold the same existential rights as humans, amounting to a mean-score for this item of just above 4. That this statement not only includes the rights of animals, which in many ways can be viewed as the logical first step in an expansion of the moral sphere (cf. Singer, 1977; Regan, 1983), but also of plants conveys a clear separation from a pronounced anthropocentric ethical position among the respondents.

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[123] A strong dominant UNIVERSAL value-orientation and NEP-score are positively correlated in both samples (r = 0,254 and r = 0,325 respectively, significant at the 1 % level). Significant negative correlations is displayed for both of the two other (i.e. SOCIAL and SELF-ENHANCEMENT) value-orientations.

[124] However, we should note that these results are not entirely comparable. Both the study conducted by Gooch (1995) and the one by Widegren (1998) applied a shorter NEP-scale, comprising only six items.

[125] Similar results for this item are reported by Dunlap et al (2000) in a survey conducted among residents of Washington State.

TABLE 7.7. *Anti-anthropocentrism (% of respondents)*

	Year	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
Humans have right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs	2004	1,5	11,2	9,9	39,8	37,6	1231
	2006	0,6	12,6	10,2	39,6	37,0	801
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.	2004	48,5	32,7	7,0	9,1	2,7	1240
	2006	47,8	31,7	6,7	9,6	4,2	802
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature	2004	3,8	11,4	18,2	28,7	38,0	1225
	2006	1,8	12,5	16,4	27,1	42,2	797

Previous surveys exploring public attitudes towards more encompassing interpretations of rights have found that an acknowledgement of a wider moral sphere than what is suggested through a pronounced anthropocentric worldview is fairly well established. For example, Lundmark (1998:149) found that 90 % of the respondents in a representative sample of the Swedish public agreed completely with the statement that "Also animals and plants have rights, e.g. to life and development". Similar results, indicating strong support for a position where human beings not are the only ones with value in their own right, have also been reported by Jeffner and Uddenberg (1994), and Bråkenhielm (1994). Although not entirely compatible, the yearly surveys from the Swedish SOM-institute further report that over 50 % of Swedes believe that a strengthening of animal rights is either a very good or a rather good suggestion (Holmberg and Weibull, 2008:22). This, of course, does not convey anything definitive on how human and animal rights should be balanced relative to each other, but nevertheless point towards the fact that respecting the rights also of other species indeed is deemed important.

The answers on the two other items designed as to explicitly capture the divide between a human-centred and a more eco-centred ethic further confirm these results. When asked about the position of human beings in nature's hierarchy, as being a part of or as dominant over nature, very few of the respondents agreed with the two statements placing humans at the top.[126] The low mean scores for the two additional items contained within the label ANTI-ANTHROPOCENTRISM are instead the result of a large majority of the respondents either completely or partly disagreeing with the statements (≈ 77

[126] This is almost identical to the results reported by Widegren (1998:87), where 67,8 % of the public completely or partly disagreed with the statement that "Humans were created to rule over the rest of nature". For the respondents labelled either as environmental activists or as members of the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, this percentage was even higher.

% and 67 % respectively). We can thereby conclude that the respondents, at least when framed in general terms, support the expansion of rights as well as the granting of intrinsic value to encompass also non-human entities. This is an important result, not the least since it assists in clarifying the extension of non-territorial altruism within the UNIVERSAL value-orientation above. Evidently, the respondents' assigned importance of protecting the environment draws not only on nature's instrumental value for humans, but is also founded in a widespread acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of non-human entities themselves.

A second set of items addressing beliefs directly associated with the relationship between human beings and nature are those dealing with the question of human exemptionalism; if humans hold some set of unique capabilities that might justify placing them at the top of nature's moral hierarchy. Due to how they are framed, these items cannot be straightforwardly applied to discriminate between an anthropocentric and an ecocentric ethic. In particular as a rejection of human exemptionalism and ingenuity can be motivated also within a human centred perspective (for more examples, see Lundmark, 2007). Nevertheless, these items still do capture highly relevant beliefs regarding the place of humans in relation to nature, not the least concerning whether humans have the ability to develop technological solutions for expanding the present limits of nature. A strong trust in this regard, in turn, suggests a highly optimistic view on the capacity of science and technology, well in line with a pronounced anthropocentric worldview.

Turning to the questions for analysis outlined above, these beliefs are thereby relevant to consider when exploring which overall solutions that are perceived necessary for addressing the environmental problems: development of end-of-pipe technology or comprehensive societal change? This rough division of beliefs on necessary solutions into two categories, proposing either an adaptation (e.g. DSP) or a transformation (e.g. NEP) of the current political and economic systems, is also applied as the main point of departure in Dryzek's (2005:15) classification of environmental discourses. Dependent on whether the mechanisms of the current system are viewed as at the core of the problematic environmental situation, or if environmental problems are viewed mainly in terms of their effects on the current systems ability to function properly, different solutions are suggested. The former view leads to discourses proposing a transformation of society with the aim of incorporating environmental concerns as fully valid factors in the political and economic decision-making processes, thus eradicating what is considered the basic causes of the problem. The latter view instead forms the basis for solutions where the central functions of the current political-economic system are kept intact, but adjusted to be able to cope with the new conditions of a changed environment. Table 7.8 illustrates the distribution for these items.

TABLE 7.8. *Rejection of exemptionalism (% of respondents)*

	Year	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
Humans' ingenuity will insure that we do not make the earth unliveable	2004	4,2	19,6	46,2	19,0	11,0	1234
	2006	5,8	19,0	41,7	20,8	12,8	799
Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature	2004	43,7	38,9	12,0	3,7	1,5	1230
	2006	43,3	34,6	14,6	5,8	1,7	804
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it	2004	3,2	18,5	45,7	19,2	13,4	1232
	2006	2,6	20,9	39,3	23,5	13,6	799

As with the strong acceptance of rights covering also non-human entities, a large majority of the respondents rejects the notion of human exemptionalism. In both samples, around 80 % of the respondents agree either completely or partly that humans are subject to the laws of nature. This number decreases to just below a quarter of the respondents for the other two items included in the table expressing a worldview in line with the Dominant Social Paradigm, with a large number of respondents (40 %) answering that they are unsure. These results show that the established beliefs do not express a particularly strong trust in the ability of humans to combat the limits of nature through technological development. Rather, a large majority of respondents are either opposed to or at least cautious towards statements that separate humans from the constraints of nature. A discursive framing of problems with resource depletion and environmental degradation as being "technical policy issues" (cf. de Geus 2004; Wissenburg 2004), at most requiring a market-driven rationalisation of established social practices and individual behaviour for their amendment, might therefore not be entirely adequate. Instead, rejecting the potential of human ingenuity rather suggests that solutions to the environmental problem require careful planning and an acknowledgement of the need to learn to live *within* the limits of nature rather than fighting against them (e.g. Meadows et al., 1974; see also Dobson, 1998).[127]

As conveyed by, amongst others, Dryzek's (2005) environmental discourses, the manner in which the respondents view available solutions is of course intimately related also to their views on the causes of the problem

[127] In a previous study of environmental values and beliefs among the Swedish public conducted by Lundmark (1998:176), only 13-16 % of the respondents agreed that the current political system works well for dealing with environmental problems.

itself. A range of items in the NEP-scale approaches the question of what causes the environmental problem, or rather on the responsibility of human behaviour for the present environmental situation. An overall high score on the NEP-scale demonstrates an awareness of the problematic relationship between contemporary human society and the surrounding environment, and further suggest that human activities lie at the root of present changes in the environment.

TABLE 7.9. *Human activities causing environmental problems (% of respondents)*

	Year	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
Humans are severely abusing the environment	2004	40,1	44,0	10,5	4,1	1,3	1232
	2006	41,3	43,6	9,1	4,4	1,6	800
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences	2004	27,8	45,5	16,1	8,8	1,8	1234
	2006	30,5	46,0	14,6	7,3	1,6	800
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations	2004	2,1	7,0	24,5	32,1	34,4	1231
	2006	2,9	7,5	23,3	30,0	36,3	799

As evident from the results presented in table 7.9 above, it is apparent that the respondents either consider human activities to be a significant cause to the present environmental problems, or that human interference with nature is a potential source of more pressing problems in the future. For instance, about 85 % of the respondents in both samples agree that "Humans are severely abusing the environment"; over 70 % that "When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences"; and as few as 10 % that "The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations". This clearly demonstrates an acknowledgement among the respondents that current human activities constitute a significant strain on the environment, as well as a deep concern with the effects of human interference with nature.[128] In prolongation, therefore, what is required to move the development in an opposite, more sustainable, direction is a rethinking of humans' relationship with nature, a cautious rather than

[128] In Widegren's (1998:86) survey, as many as 93,9 % of the sample of Swedish public agreed completely or largely that "The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset by human activities". This can be compared with about 80 % of the respondents agreeing with a similar item addressing the delicacy of nature's balance in the presently used NEP-scale, although not explicitly connecting it to human activities (see table 7.5 above).

unlimited technological development, as well as a restructuring of society so as not to continue upsetting the balance of nature.

Taken together, the results from the NEP-survey so far demonstrate that the respondents overall hold rather strong pro-environmental beliefs and acknowledge that a significant cause to the environmental problem is located in human activities. Consistent with the previous analysis of basic value-priorities, a majority of the respondents hold worldviews in line with the New Ecological Paradigm, where post-materialistic values and openness towards societal transformation in the endeavour of environmental protection dominate. The fact that the respondents' basic environmental ethic seems to expresses also a valuation of nature in itself (and not in an instrumental way) along with the view on environmental problems as being to their essence man-made, also affect their views on overall strategies needed in order to amend the environmental situation. That the aggregated consequences of unsustainable human activities constitute the cause to the environmental problems seems to be an established view, which in turn suggests that society in its present form is working less well and therefore needs some form of restructuring. This interpretation is also supported by the respondents' lacking confidence in human ability to manage the environment through short-term solutions based on human ingenuity and technological development, as suggested by the prosaic discourse of environmental problem solving (cf. Dryzek, 2005), not being overwhelming. Finally, the small differences displayed between the two samples demonstrate that also basic environmental beliefs, consistent with theory, are relatively resistant to change and thus stable over time.

Seriousness of the problem

Identifying perceptions of the basic causes of the problem is considered a critical element in the analysis of public policy legitimacy. Views on the problem's causes are important determinants both for the way in which available solutions are expressed and responsibilities assigned within a policy discourse, as well as for the extent to which its goals and strategies subsequently are legitimised among the public. However, which solutions that are deemed necessary for amending a problem also depend on how serious the current environmental situation is perceived to be. By classifying environmental discourses as either reformist or radical, Dryzek (2005:14-15) highlights the necessity of considering also beliefs on problem seriousness when aiming towards a comprehensive analysis of political strategies and goals. Although diverging views on the basic causes to the environmental problem might be applied to tell discourses apart, giving rise to solutions that are either technical or structural to their nature (see above), these solutions

can, in turn, incorporate changes of a smaller or larger degree. The apparent difference in degree between the technical changes suggested within the discourses of Environmental problem solving and Survivalism exemplify this (e.g Dryzek, 2005). Although advocates of both discourses see the current political and economic systems as given and aim at presenting solutions for enabling this system to cope with environmental challenges, their solutions also differ considerably in terms of their comprehensiveness. Whereas Environmental problem solving argues that minor changes in public policy and adjustments of the market constitute adequate solutions, this stands in stark contrast to Survivalism's gloomy prognosis of a future where nature's limits have been reached through exponential human growth and resource consumption, and an ecological crisis is imminent (e.g. Meadows et al., 1974; Hardin, 1968). Due to the perception of the problem as of a very serious nature, Survivalism strongly advocates far more radical solutions than the reformist problem-solving discourses, including governmental control with authoritarian features and strong central planning.

Since beliefs concerning the overall seriousness of the environmental problem are believed to have a significant bearing on how a person view overall solutions and responsibilities, as well as on how these are translated into more specific policy preferences, these constitute a further topic deemed highly relevant to include in the present analysis. Two more specific questions define this topic.

1. How serious is the policy problem?

2. For whom does the identified problem present a threat?

According to the yearly surveys of Swedish public opinion conducted by the SOM-institute (Holmberg and Weibull, 2008:24), the share of Swedes perceiving the environment as one of the three most important societal issues has decreased significantly since the end of the 1980's. In 1988, 62 % of the Swedes listed the environment as a top-three issue making it the single most important problem for society to address. Ten years later, this share had dropped to 9 %. Since 2004, however, possibly due to the growing media-attention to environmental and particularly climate-related issues (cf. Jagers and Martinsson, 2008:4), this trend has instead been increasing and in 2007 the environment was rated as a top-three issue by 21 % of the Swedes, surpassed only by employment and health care. This upward trend is further confirmed when considering the issues which are perceived as worrying for Swedes. The SOM-survey from the year 2007 report that as many as 60 % of the respondents state that they are very worried both by environmental

deterioration as well as by changes to the global climate, which is a strong (about 20 percentage points) increase since the beginning of the 2000's (Holmberg and Weibull, 2008:12). These trends show that environmental risk awareness is fairly strong among the Swedish public, and it might therefore be hypothesised that those NEP-items which address the issue of problem seriousness also would receive a rather strong support in the present analysis.

In the NEP-scale, beliefs concerning the seriousness of the environmental problem are captured under the headings POSSIBILITY OF AN ECO-CRISIS and REALITY OF LIMITS TO GROWTH. *First*, as shown in table 7.5 above, the mean scores for the two items expressing a view on the REALITY OF LIMITS TO GROWTH in line with the New Ecological Paradigm are fairly high. This, of course, echoes the amount of respondents agreeing with the statements, illustrated in table 7.10 below.

TABLE 7.10. *Limits to Growth (% of respondents)*

	Year	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources	2004	26,3	36,5	23,6	7,8	5,8	1226
	2006	26,9	37,6	23,1	8,0	4,4	797
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support	2004	19,0	27,6	40,1	9,9	3,4	1233
	2006	21,0	28,7	36,2	10,0	4,1	799

That there indeed are natural limits to human expansion and growth has been a significant feature of the environmental debate since the early 1970's, as emphasised by the 1972 publication of Limits to Growth (e.g. Meadows et al, 1974) as well as by the definition of sustainability outlined in Our Common Future (Bruntland, 1987). Even though the environmental debate has become somewhat more nuanced over the past 40 years, moving slightly away from more or less apocalyptic metaphors such as Boulding's (1966) 'spaceship earth'; Erlich's (1968) 'population bomb'; and Hardin's (1974) 'lifeboat ethic', it should come as no surprise that the items signalling a finite world are agreed upon by a large share of the respondents. Given the political and scientific developments during the three decades since the NEP-scale was originally designed, the understanding that natural capital is not an unlimited resource should be well established as a fact. This, however, also means that although the acknowledgement of resource scarcity is an important building block of an ecocentric ethic, these items can hardly be applied to discriminate between human-centred and eco-centred worldviews (cf. Lundmark, 2007).

Over 60 % of the respondents in both samples agree either completely or partly that "The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources"[129] and about half of the respondents that "We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support". Together these beliefs lend public support to political enterprises aiming at a limitation or at least careful planning of the outtake of natural resources as well as of human expansion. That the problem with environmental degradation caused by current social practices also is considered to be highly serious, even described in terms of a crisis or a catastrophe, is further confirmed by the data as shown in table 7.11 below. A large majority of the respondents (exceeding 60 % in both samples) agree that a major ecological catastrophe awaits if development continues on the present course, and a mere 17 % that the notion of an oncoming ecological crisis is greatly exaggerated.

TABLE 7.11. *Possibility of an eco-crisis (% of respondents)*

	Year	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe	2004	22,4	37,7	30,0	7,2	2,8	1234
	2006	25,6	38,3	24,3	9,0	2,9	802
The so-called "ecological crisis" facing human kind has been greatly exaggerated	2004	2,8	13,2	37,4	29,6	17,1	1231
	2006	3,0	14,0	38,1	28,8	16,1	795

As been stated above, how serious the environmental problem is viewed can be anticipated to determine both the possibility for society to successfully amend it as well as the extent or comprehensiveness of the solutions required. In the present surveys, the respondents report both an acknowledgement of the belief that there are nature-imposed limits for human growth as well as an understanding that humankind are approaching the limits, thus facing a major ecological catastrophe. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that this display of environmental risk awareness should underpin also a support of considerable changes in current social practices in order to reverse the present development. However, the responses given to one of the statements in the NEP-scale do not seem to fit this picture (see table 7.12 below). In contrast to the above reported strong support for beliefs acknowledging the need for a self-imposed limitation to growth, a majority of the respondents also agree that the earth indeed has plenty of resources and that the task

[129] In Widegren's (1998) survey, the spaceship-earth metaphor was completely or largely agreed to by 84,2 % of the public.

facing human society is to learn how to extract and utilise them. This, at least at first sight cognitive dissonance, might be interpreted as the effect more recently popularised environmental discourses have had on public environmental beliefs. For example, the familiar discourse of ecological modernisation, which has been described as a major inspiration for the development of Swedish environmental policy (see chapter 6 above, also Lundqvist, 2004b; Fudge and Rowe, 2000; Jamison and Baark, 1999), leaves the Limits-problematique behind for instead suggesting that a simultaneous progress towards environmental protection and economic growth is entirely possible (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Cohen, 1998; Langhelle, 2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). It clearly decouples economic development from the development of environmental problems by arguing that a restructuring of the political-economic system along more environmentally sustainable lines instead would enable a rise in productivity and growth.

TABLE 7.12. *Resource scarcity (% of respondents)*

	Year	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them	2004	24,9	44,5	20,8	7,5	2,2	1233
	2006	26,6	45,8	17,9	6,6	3,1	801

Taking agreement with the above statement as a trace of a modernisation-discourse established among the respondents certainly has effects also on how available solutions to the environmental problem are perceived. Contrary to the Limits-discourse, which predicts a future of critical resource scarcity and promotes radical solutions to halt this development, ecological modernisation instead suggests that economic reorganization and technological development will allow for the use of different resources in a more efficient and environmentally sound way. Replacing oil with biomass and nuclear power with energy from wind, water and sun constitute some examples. Although the changes suggested here are imaginative in their attempts to resolve the environment/growth dilemma, the solutions draw on the less radical need for societal adaptation rather than complete transformation.

Nevertheless, although the belief that developments in science and technology enable a better utilisation of natural resources might seem contradictory to the perceptions of problem-causes and -effects reported above, this single item needs to be interpreted in the context of other beliefs. When considering also the rather negative belief in human ingenuity's ability

to eradicate the confinement by natural laws and limits, it comes in a rather different perspective. Even though there might be plenty of resources out there to utilise, it is less likely that humans ever will learn how to do this in an efficient and ecologically rational way. This interpretation instead reaffirms the above drawn conclusion that the respondents express a need for solutions that are more comprehensive and structural in their focus than problem solving based purely on manipulated market-mechanisms and technological inventiveness.

The second question addressed within this topic concerns the respondents' understandings of for whom the identified environmental problem presents a serious threat. Following the logic of the VBN-theory outlined in chapter 3 above (cf. Stern et al, 1999; Schwartz, 1977), how an individual perceives a policy is connected not only to a basic awareness of the adverse consequences it addresses, but also to the belief that these consequences affects others of great value. Exploring a person's awareness of negative environmental consequences should therefore also incorporate an assessment of their perceived relevance for different entities; the individual herself, other human beings or the non-human world (cf. Nordlund and Garvill, 2002; Stern et al, 1995). Thus, based on the strong pro-environmental beliefs and weak support for the value-orientation SELF-ENHANCEMENT concluded above, it seems reasonable to assume that also negative environmental consequences perceived to be affecting other people (in a broad scope) and even the non-human world are important for activating a general support of pro-environmental policies among a majority of the respondents.

In order to further nuance beliefs regarding problem awareness and explore perceptions of those threatened by environmental degradation, the two surveys also asked the respondents to indicate whether, and to which degree, they agree or disagree with a number of statements addressing the seriousness and direction of the environmental threat posed by specific household-related activities. In the 2004 survey, three policy areas were included: (a) household waste-sorting and recycling; (b) private transportation choices; and (c) the consumption of eco-labelled products. These areas were selected as they to a significant extent connect to the daily choices and habits within a household, and thus include activities where the individual's personal environmental responsibility is expected to be clearly displayed. As these areas represent activities in which the individual is able to make a pro-environmental contribution, they are also frequently referred to as highly important for involving individuals in the work towards environmental sustainability and as the explicit target for household-related environmental policy on both the national and local levels (see chapter 6 above). In contrast to the questions above, exploring more basic values and

beliefs, the 2006 survey did not replicate all of the questions posed in 2004. The statements put in front of the respondents were worded in a slightly different way, and only two of the policy areas were included: private car-use and household waste-management. Although the two surveys by these accounts not are entirely comparable, exploring the answers given in both surveys still is expected to provide a better image of how the threat from environmental degradation is assessed.

TABLE 7.13. *Seriousness of problem – specific activities (% of respondents, 2004)*

	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
Unsorted household waste is such a serious problem that measures need to be taken immediately	18,3	28,8	34,7	11,4	6,7	1224
Air pollution from private car use is such a serious problem that measures need to be taken immediately	25,2	26,3	30,9	11,2	6,3	1213
The consumption and production of non eco-labelled goods is such a serious problem that measures need to be taken immediately	11,1	20,0	42,6	15,5	10,8	1219

Note: Figures show the 2004 sample only. In the 2006 survey, the range of the scale was changed to 7 points (1 = completely disagree, 4 = unsure, 7 = completely agree, 2-3 and 5-6 unlabelled), and only the threat from private car-use and household waste-management was asked about. Nevertheless, the distribution of respondents in broad agree-disagree categories were similar to the 2004 sample. 45,4 % of the respondents in the 2006 survey agreed to some extent (5-7) that private car use is a serious problem, with 29,3 % unsure (N = 795). Concerning the threat of unsorted household waste, 39,6 % agreed to some extent, with 34,8 % stating that they were unsure (N = 797).

As shown above, the general environmental risk-awareness is quite strong as a significant share of the respondents agrees to statements acknowledging both the limits of nature as well as the reality of a future ecological crisis. When faced with statements more explicitly addressing the environmental impact of specific activities this image is confirmed, although the distribution of respondents varies somewhat between activities. Consistent with the perception of a looming ecological crisis, a large share of the respondents in the 2004 sample, as illustrated below in table 7.13, agree that the environmental problems emanating from private activities in the three above mentioned areas are of such magnitude that they require immediate action-taking. Perhaps due to the extensive attention granted 'car trouble' within the environmental debate, over half of the respondents (51,5 %) either completely or partly agree that pollution caused by private car use is a highly serious problem. The lowest agreement-rate (31,1 %) is found for the statement regarding the negative environmental effects from consumption and production of non eco-labelled products, but even here is the share of

respondents agreeing larger than the share disagreeing. It should also be noted that the proportion of respondents stating that they are unsure is rather high for all three activities included in the survey, which might reflect a certain difficulty of connecting behaviour on the household-level, which do not produce distinct or even noticeable outcomes for the individual, with acute problems on a larger scale.

It stands clear that many respondents consider the adverse environmental effects of choosing not to sort household waste; taking the car instead of the bike or public transport; and purchasing non eco-labelled products, to be significant. Since these activities strongly connect to daily practices within the household, this might also be seen as indicating the presence of two further beliefs among those respondents agreeing. *First*, an acknowledgement that activities taking place within the privacy of the household have significant environmentally degrading effects that spread also outside this sphere. This deserves some further recognition as it strongly resembles the foundations for applying an expanded notion of citizenship as a step towards a more environmentally committed and responsible individual. For example, we remember that the theory of ecological citizenship aims at dismantling the constraints of the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma by redefining the state/individual relationship in a way that grants also activities within the traditionally defined private sphere of the household political connotations, therefore making them subject to the state-enforced rules of society (Dobson, 2003; see also Prokhovnik, 1998). Together with the strong support of a UNIVERSAL value-orientation in both of the two samples, the above results thereby strengthens the conclusion that a significant share of the respondents hold beliefs rather close to what is expected of an ecological citizen. *Second*, exploring perceptions of one's own personal contribution to the environmental problem is one common method for elucidating the strength of a person's AR-beliefs (ascription of responsibility, see chapter 3 above). Following the connection between predictors of pro-environmental behaviour outlined in the VBN-theory (e.g. Stern et al, 1999), it seems reasonable to assume that recognising private activities as contributing to an adverse environmental situation also indicates the presence of beliefs suggesting the ability, and perhaps even duty, of individuals to refrain from such activities. Indeed, when respondents in the 2006 survey were asked specifically about the environmental impact of their behavioural choices[130], 67,1 % and 42,2 % of the respondents respectively agreed to some extent that

[130] The statements were worded as "My [car-use/household waste] leads to negative effects on the environment". The respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) with 4 marked as unsure. The alternatives 5-7 is here considered as an expression of agreement. For both activities the share of respondents agreeing was larger than the one disagreeing, with 17,7 % and 25,2 % respectively stating that they are unsure.

their personal car use and their household waste leads to negative effects on the environment. Bearing in mind that the causal connection between personal choices and environmental consequences often are considered abstract and difficult to recognize for the single individual, this is an important result that points forward towards the final theme, more explicitly addressing beliefs on responsibility for and participation in pro-environmental activities.

Before going into this theme, however, the question of whom the serious problems emanating from unsustainable household activities affects needs to be scrutinized. Do the respondents beliefs that immediate measures should be taken primarily originate from a personal experience of environmental threat, or because they perceive non-sustainable activities as a threat towards others? In order to explore this question, the respondents in the 2004 survey were faced with a number of alternatives representing different geographical scopes of the threat from the above mentioned household-related activities, and asked to indicate their level of agreement with each one.

TABLE 7.14. *Scope of threat (% of respondents, 2004)*

	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
Unsorted household waste is a threat for…						
…plants and animals in the world	21,7	42,9	22,5	10,0	2,9	1226
…people's health in the world	21,5	41,2	24,7	9,1	3,4	1226
…plants and animals in the municipality where I live	23,1	37,6	27,0	9,5	2,9	1226
…people's health in the municipality where I live	19,7	35,7	30,0	10,8	3,9	1225
…my own health and well-being	19,7	35,5	28,6	11,0	5,2	1225
Air pollution from private car use is a threat for…						
…plants and animals in the world	41,3	39,7	12,4	5,3	1,4	1218
…people's health in the world	41,4	39,0	14,1	4,4	1,5	1216
…plants and animals in the municipality where I live	32,9	34,9	21,6	7,6	3,0	1211
…people's health in the municipality where I live	32,0	34,5	21,7	8,8	3,0	1213
…my own health and well-being	30,1	33,1	22,4	9,7	4,7	1214
Production and consumption of non eco-labelled goods is a threat for…						
…plants and animals in the world	9,7	32,5	38,1	14,0	5,7	1219
…people's health in the world	10,0	32,4	37,7	13,9	6,0	1219
…plants and animals in the municipality where I live	8,7	24,7	43,2	16,2	7,2	1220
…people's health in the municipality where I live	8,4	23,8	43,7	15,8	8,3	1220
…my own health and well-being	9,4	26,3	40,1	15,3	8,9	1219

In line with the above presented general threat assessment, the results displayed in table 7.14 above show that air pollution from private car use is considered an overall threat by the largest proportion (63-81 %) of respondents, whereas the lowest agreement-rate (35-42 %) is found for the production and consumption of non eco-labelled goods. Although the differences are quite small, a larger proportion of respondents seem to agree that the three activities present a threat to plants and animals rather than to humans. This holds true regardless if the environmental situation is viewed from a global or a local perspective, with the exception of global threats from non eco-labelled products. Although it might be expected easier for people to overlook, or even ignore, threats facing *other* species this result should be interpreted in the context of the results on the NEP-scale. The strong support for a weakly anthropocentric ethic in general (see, for example, the results presented in table 7.7 above) and for an expansion of rights to non-human entities in particular, suggest that also an experience of threat towards the non-human world works as a significant motivational factor for taking on pro-environmental responsibilities among the respondents.

A larger share of the respondents recognises environmental threats to both humans and non-humans in a global, rather than local or personal, perspective. This trend is also confirmed when looking at the data from 2006, where a larger proportion of respondents agree that household waste, private car-use and non eco-labelled products constitute a threat to people and the environment on a global and national scale, than for the local community or family. It is perhaps not surprising that most people agree to the existence of global environmental problems, in particular considering the almost daily media-reports on natural disasters, loss of bio-diversity and famine resulting from a changing climate. In the same way is it not unexpected that people in Sweden, which normally does not experience such acute environmental problems on a firsthand basis, are more hesitant towards whether environmental degradation is a threat to them personally. Considering the previously discussed importance of different group's welfare (see table 7.5 above), the strong preference for a broad-scope altruism nevertheless suggests that these experiences of a universal environmental threat are of great concern to the respondents. It should also be noted that the statements above do not concern environmental problems in general, but those stemming from specific, and very local, household-related activities. This is an important distinction to make as an agreement thereby also indicate the respondent's recognition that private activities, which she herself has the capacity to influence, have an effect in the public arena.

Moreover, acknowledging that global environmental problems are the result of local activities further confirms a presence of pro-environmental beliefs among the respondents. Thinking globally by acting locally is a

standard appeal to environmental awareness within the environmental movement (Carter, 2001) in the same way as "action at a distance" (Dobson, 2003:105) is a key concept for assigning civic obligations within the theory of ecological citizenship. The latter suggests that since most environmental problems have the tendency to spread geographically (as well as over time), civic rights, duties and responsibilities cannot be confined within the territorial or temporal boundaries of a contemporary nation-state. Instead, to properly address the environmental problematique the scope of each citizen's duties should be synonymous with the reach of negative effects from her actions, extending across both geographical borders and generations.

One exception from these trends is found when considering how the respondents are distributed regarding the threat from non eco-labelled products. Although the presence of a global threat is agreed to by the largest share, more respondents also agree that non eco-labelled products are a threat to "my own health and well-being" rather than to humans and non-humans in a local context. A possible explanation to this anomaly might be that the statement includes also the *consumption* of non eco-labelled products, which may be expected to trigger the notion of pesticides found both in foodstuffs and in other consumer goods.[131] This perhaps makes the threat to personal health more explicit for the respondents, than what would be the case if only the threat from the production-side was included in the statement.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the respondents, *first*, display a general environmental risk awareness that signals a need for both instant and comprehensive (if not radical) solutions. *Second*, view the environmental threat of specific, household-related activities as both considerable as well as slightly more significant in a global, and indeed non-human, perspective. And, *third*, thereby acknowledges the connection between private actions and global consequences. The causal connection made between unsustainable patterns of behaviour on the household level and serious environmental problems can also be taken as to imply that a large share of the respondents' hold beliefs in support of increasing individual responsibility-taking for the environment. However, connecting the private and public spheres in this manner might be fairly uncomplicated when not faced explicitly with questions regarding what individuals themselves should do. How, then, do these beliefs manifest themselves when considering explicitly the notions of distribution of authority and participation? Who are responsible for amending the environmental situation, and who holds the authority to decide on proper policy measures?

[131] Certainly, there has also been widely spread reports on, for example, cancerogenous particles in the exhaust from cars or resulting from the abrasion of car tires. It could, however, still be hypothesised that these dangers seem more abstract to the person than when eating or wearing products containing potentially harming chemicals.

Distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation

The final topic in this analysis of public values and beliefs concerns the respondents' basic views on how decision-making authority, responsibility and active participation are, or at least should be, distributed among social actors. The incorporation of these issues, which constitute core elements in environmental policy discourses, follow the relevance of basic input-oriented beliefs as outlined in chapter 2 above (e.g. the *who* and the *what* of a legitimacy evaluation). We recall from the discussions in previous chapters that beliefs on the role of the individual *vis-à-vis* the state, and questions on the extent and reach of political authority's decision-making power and the individual's responsibilities, have considerable relevance for the environmental policy-domain. Primarily as they underpin the notion of a legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma within environmental public policy. A number of more specific questions within the topic are therefore outlined in order to address these issues.

1. *Who is responsible for amending the policy problem (e.g. citizens, municipal or state authorities)?*
2. *How, and by whom, should decisions on the distribution of responsibility be taken?*
3. *What is the individual's ability to make a personal impact in remedying the policy problem?*

The value-orientations that are believed to lie at the core of a person's overall position on authority, participation and responsibility have already been explored in chapter 7.2 above. As these results concerning basic value-priorities revealed, the share of respondents attributing a strong importance to CONSERVATION-values, signalling a preference for collectiveness, stability and conformity were slightly larger than the share displaying dominant preferences for the values of individualism and self-direction. Nevertheless, connected to the rating of the opposing value-items FREEDOM and SECURITY as being the two most important guiding principles in life, neither end of this value dimension received strong support among a majority of the respondents. This result, along with the acknowledgement of basic values as very general, cross-situational guides (e.g. Sniderman et al, 1991; Rokeach, 1973), makes it relevant to consider more closely how these basic values manifest themselves when connected to precepts with more explicit empirical connotations. The two surveys therefore included a number of questions where the respondents were asked to indicate their beliefs about the proper

distribution of responsibilities, authority and participation in the environmental policy-domain.

Perceptions of different actors' responsibility to participate in pro-environmental activities are strongly associated with beliefs regarding the proper distribution of costs, in terms of either time or money, for realising a policy's goals. Through the individualistic turn of past decade's environmental politics, the cost for achieving a healthy environment has been more explicitly placed also on the collective of individual citizens. Both theory and political practice point towards an increasing awareness of the significant role played by individuals in realising long-term ecological sustainability. As environmental problems today are recognised as stemming also from household-related activities, the success of public policy in the endeavour of remedying environmental degradation relies also on responsible decisions within the daily behaviours of the household. Indeed, ecological citizenship even points towards the interpersonal (rather than state-related) duty of individuals to limit their personal unsustainable activities as these affect others negatively. From the data on environmental risk and threat above, it was possible to conclude that a large share of the respondents agrees that individual citizens hold a responsibility for *causing* the present environmental situation. The respondents generally are conscious that their patterns of consumption, transportation and waste management place considerable strain of the natural environment, even in a global perspective. It therefore seems perfectly reasonable that beliefs concerning the individual's personal responsibility also to *amend* the situation receive a strong support among the respondents. In the 2006 survey, for example, the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with several statements concerning individual environmental responsibility in a general sense. Here, a considerable majority (78,6 %) of the respondents agreed to the statement that "Every single individual holds a personal responsibility to change his/hers lifestyle in an ecologically sustainable direction". As lifestyle changes, compared to alterations of single unsustainable behaviours, signals comprehensive transformations of a range of activities and even attitudes[132], this further support the interpretation of the respondents as possessing an overall large environmental commitment. A bare (50,7 %) majority of the respondents takes this environmental responsibility even further, acknowledging it to denote also actual participation in public environmental protective activities. They do so by agreeing that the personal responsibility of each and every individual includes an active, public support of the environmentalist cause, for example through membership in environmental

[132] Following Dobson (1995:543) lifestyle-changes indicate transformations of a wide range of day-to-day activities, for instance "care with the things you buy, the things you say, where you invest your money, the way you treat people, the transport you use, and so on".

organisations or participation in demonstrations.[133] With this in mind, it is perhaps less surprising that the respondents in the 2004 sample to a significant extent agree that the individual holds a responsibility to make improvements to those specific day-to-day activities that are perceived as impacting the environment in a negative way. Thus, consistent with the recognition of unsorted household waste as a significant environmental threat, a strong majority in the 2004 sample (82 %, N = 1220) agree that households have a duty to make active contributions to the environmental work by sorting their waste at source. Even more remarkable is that the respondents clearly perceive this duty as a moral obligatory, which not should be allowed to escape by payment.[134]

Even though the respondents, following their perception of private activities as causing serious environmental problems, assign large responsibility to the collective of single individuals, other societal actors are not perceived as escaping their responsibility. On the contrary, 94,7 % of the respondents agree (55,7 % of them completely) that "State and municipality have a responsibility to contribute to an ecological sustainable development". Furthermore, as illustrated in table 7.15 below, when asked to rate the responsibility of different actors in remedying the negative environmental impacts from three specific household-related activities, it stands clear that the respondents believe that state and local authorities, along with business and industry, hold a responsibility to take action on specific environmental issues which in some instances even is perceived as larger than for individual citizens.

Considering these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that the respondents, although certainly recognising responsibilities for the citizen, also assigns them according to the actor most closely associated with the activity. For example, chapter 15 of the Swedish Environmental Code (SFS, 1998:808; see also Waste Decree [SFS, 2001:1063]) specifies that municipalities have the overall responsibility for transporting, recycling or disposing of household waste, and this is also the actor assigned the largest (although with a almost negligible margin) responsibility by the respondents. On a similar note, the respondents also believe that it is the producers of non eco-labelled goods (e.g. business and industry) which hold the largest

[133] This statement was worded as "Every single individual holds a personal responsibility to actively work for an ecologically sustainable development (e.g. support environmental organisations, participate in demonstrations)". The response-alternatives in the 2006 survey ranged from 1 (*Completely disagree*) to 7 (*Completely agree*), with 4 marked as *Unsure*. Responses between 5 and 7 are taken to signal an agreement with the statement, and responses in the 1-3 range are interpreted as disagreement. For the two statements analysed here, complete agreement (e.g. 7) was indicated by 26,4 % and 15,1 % of the respondents respectively, whereas 1,4 % and 7,1 % respectively indicated complete disagreement (N = 799).

[134] The statement was worded as "All households have a moral duty to sort their household waste, and no one should be allowed to pay their way out of it".

responsibility for remedying the negative environmental effects arising from these products.

TABLE 7.15. *Distribution of responsibility (% of respondents, 2004)*

	Very large	2	3	4	Very small	N
How large a responsibility do you consider different Swedish actors hold for taking action in order to reduce the amount of household waste, and thereby its negative effects on people and the environment?						
The state	54,3	19,0	16,1	7,2	3,4	1219
Business and industry	56,4	19,8	14,7	5,4	3,7	1218
The municipalities	56,5	25,4	13,4	3,4	1,2	1223
Private citizens	55,5	23,7	14,5	4,3	2,0	1226
How large a responsibility do you consider different Swedish actors hold for taking action in order to reduce the negative effects on people and the environment from private car use?						
The state	51,0	23,3	15,9	5,5	4,3	1208
Business and industry	37,2	28,1	19,6	7,6	7,5	1207
The municipalities	39,1	28,7	21,5	6,4	4,3	1211
Private citizens	34,5	28,3	21,1	8,9	7,1	1207
How large a responsibility do you consider different Swedish actors hold for taking action in order to reduce the negative environmental effects arising in connection with the production and consumption of non eco-labelled goods?						
The state	43,6	25,9	20,0	6,9	3,5	1214
Business and industry	47,8	23,8	17,3	7,2	4,0	1210
The municipalities	30,8	30,3	26,9	7,9	4,1	1210
Private citizens	24,5	26,1	32,7	11,8	5,0	1212

Perhaps these results in table 7.15 reveals a general sentiment among the respondents that although individuals' contributions are necessary, citizens themselves have a hard time making consistent pro-environmental choices in their daily life without supporting societal structures. The fact that people, even when reporting a strong pro-environmental orientation, generally feel their day-to-day choices being constrained also by processes and structures outside their immediate control has been demonstrated in several previous studies (cf. Flynn et al, 2008; Skill, 2008; Steg et al, 2005; Krantz-Lindgren, 2001). If this is the case, however, the fear that an increasing focus on individual responsibility might divert attention away from the need for a simultaneous structural reform (e.g. MacGregor, 2006;

Seyfang, 2006; Hobson, 2002; Joas, 2001) is at least not realised among the respondents.

On a related note, consider that the one negative environmental effect citizens are perceived as having the smallest overall responsibility to actively remedy is the one arising from consumption of non eco-labelled goods. This is certainly of interest as citizens' exertion of influence on the market by changing their patterns of consumption in a more environmentally friendly direction commonly is seen as a highly important activity for the environmentally responsible citizen to partake in. Following the perceived connection between growth and environmental sensitivity within Ecological Modernisation, contemporary political practice consistently put pro-environmental behaviour within the household on a par with sustainable consumption. Also in Sweden, my study has shown (cf. chapter 6 above), addressing unsustainable consumption patterns have at several occasions been described as *the most* important challenge for environmental policy. Despite this considerable attention granted individual patterns of consumption in the environmental debate, a comparatively small share of the respondents perceive individual citizens' responsibility for this activity as being large or very large.

Although the extent of the different actors' perceived responsibility varies, an overall conclusion is that the responsibilities for reducing the environmentally degrading effects from all of the three activities, household waste-handling, private car-use, and the production and consumption of eco-labelled goods, to a significant extent are understood as shared between citizens, market actors and political authorities. One further question that arises in this context is therefore how the respondents perceive the nature of different actors' action-taking. From the presentation of data above, it stands clear that a majority of the respondents understand the responsibility of citizens to include a transformation of current unsustainable patterns of behaviour. But what about the responsibility of state and municipal authorities? Are the responsibilities for political government understood as being restricted to enabling citizens' voluntarily change of personal unsustainable behaviours, or is political government bestowed the authority to mandate participation also from those citizens who do not whish to become involved? Should decisions on whether or not to participate in the environmental work be up to the citizen to independently make, or should these decisions be taken *for* the citizens by state or municipal authorities?

As have been shown above, basic values expressing preferences for personal autonomy, collectivism and environmental protection are all rated as of high importance by the respondents. However, when faced with statements explicitly addressing the conflict between individual self-determination and environmental duties, the respondents' priorities among these values are

made clear. In prolongation therefore, exploring prevalent beliefs on these issues strongly contributes to elucidating the nature of the legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma. Put differently, do public beliefs on the proper authority of the state constrain environmentally protective policymaking by emphasising a passively facilitating, rather than actively steering, role for the state? Moreover, how the authority of political government to actively mandate collective action is thought of might be significant also for the individuals' willingness to take on personal responsibilities. Following the notion of environmental degradation as a social dilemma, previous studies have indicated that one factor hampering voluntarily individual responsibility is the inertia arising from anticipating other people to free-ride (Flynn et al, 2008; Christie and Jarvis, 2002). It could thus be hypothesised that perceptions of a state with the responsibility also to monitor and enforce citizens' pro-environmental contributions would be conducive to the individual's motivation to participate herself. The 2006 survey addressed these issues explicitly by asking the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the two statements outlined in table 7.16 below.

TABLE 7.16. *Decision-making authority (% of respondents, 2006)*

	CA	6	5	U	3	2	CD	N
Every single individual has a right to decide independently if he/she should behave in an environmentally friendly way or not.	4,9	6,5	9,4	8,7	13,9	21,7	38,4	796
Even though the majority is against certain measures aiming to improve the environmental situation, it is nevertheless sometimes necessary to implement them	55,7	26,7	12,3	3,4	1,1	0,4	0,5	799

Note: CA (Completely agree); CD (Completely disagree); U (Unsure).

As illustrated in the table above, the respondents' views on civic environmental responsibilities and, by inference, the enforcement of these responsibilities clearly diverge from the notion of a passive political authority. From a liberal rights-perspective, this could be interpreted as a majority of the respondents clearly considering also a healthy environment to be included among those fundamental human rights that mandate a limitation of individual autonomy.[135] Only a small (20,8 %) share of the respondents agree, either completely or to a lesser extent, that individual self-determination

[135] Similar connections between liberal rights and environmental protection have been made in a range of variants all giving an inkling of what Dobson (2003) refers to as the rights-based environmental citizenship (as opposed to ecological citizenship where justice instead is the core principle). For these discussions, see, for example, Attfield and Belsey (1994); Eckersley (1992); Wissenburg (1998); Jelin (2000); Lidskog and Elander (1999); or Lundmark (1998 & 2003).

allows the single citizen to decide not to take on a private environmental responsibility, which suggests that the authority to mandate transformation of lifestyles in a pro-environmental direction lies elsewhere. This emphasis of effective environmental protection over individual rights is further accentuated when considering how the respondents position themselves on the second statement, which is framed as pointing more explicitly towards basic democratic principles. As large a share as 94,7 % of the respondents agree that a dissonant majority opinion not always should be allowed to determine the implementation of environmentally protective policies. This point towards a belief that individual self-determination in certain circumstances must be limited, in favour of other values deemed highly important. By inference, political government should therefore take responsibility for also implementing less popular (but environmentally significant) measures.

How the respondents position themselves on these questions regarding decision-making authority are consistent with their general environmental beliefs explored above. In particular, the fact that many seem to believe that the value of individual freedom not should be a hindrance for introducing collective environmental responsibilities further emphasises the notion of participation in the environmental work as being a moral duty. It also seems reasonable that the stated readiness to introduce environmentally protective measures even against the majority will follows from the perception of environmental problems as highly serious, in need of immediate action taking, and as originating in private activities. In political practice, these results give credence to the suggestion that governmental policies pointing towards comprehensive individual responsibilities, even when lacking the immediate support of public opinion, not necessarily should be dismissed as illegitimate, at least not when judged by their impact on basic values related to state/individual relations.

Again, however, although a majority of the respondents clearly expresses a belief that individual freedom and autonomy should be restricted in favour of implementing environmental codes of behaviour, the statements pointing towards civic duties and responsibilities are still rather abstract and for the most part applicable only at a macro level. This is problematic as a range of previous research efforts have shown that support for basic values and beliefs has a tendency to drop in the context of specific situations (Glynn et al, 1999), as well as that policy-specific beliefs, in particular in environmental issues, are more strongly related to behavioural outcomes than general values (Steg et al, 2005; Nordlund and Garvill, 2003; Stern, 2000). Therefore, as a final instance in the analysis of public environmental beliefs, this thesis will focus on how the respondents experience their own

environmental duties as well as their personal ability to better the environment through amendments of day-to-day behaviour.

It is evident from the survey-responses that the above reported notion of everyone's moral duty to contribute to the pro-environmental work also translates into feelings of a *personal* responsibility to change behaviour. Illustrated in table 7.17 below, a significant share of the respondents declare that they feel a responsibility to counteract the negative impact on the environment originating in their daily behaviour by sorting household waste; reducing their use of the car; as well as buying more eco-labelled products.

TABLE 7.17. *Personal responsibility and ability (% of respondents, 2004)*

	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
I do not feel a personal responsibility to sort my household waste	3,6	10,9	11,4	23,5	50,5	1215
I do not feel a personal responsibility to reduce my private car use	7,0	14,8	19,7	31,2	27,3	1004
I do not feel a personal responsibility to increase my consumption of eco-labelled goods	4,5	16,2	20,2	33,2	25,9	1218
There is no use for me to sort my household waste as this only has minor significance for the negative environmental effects	2,7	11,6	15,1	23,1	47,5	1219
There is no use for me to reduce my private car use as this only has minor significance for the negative environmental effects	5,5	17,6	19,2	31,4	26,2	1003
There is no use for me to increase my consumption of eco-labelled goods as this only has minor significance for the negative environmental effects	2,8	12,8	25,8	32,0	26,6	1217

Note: The number of respondents answering questions pertaining to private car use only includes those who actually use a car regularly.

From a policy analytical perspective, this indicates that a majority of the respondents agree to share the costs, whether in terms of time or money, for reaching the goal of ecological sustainability by taking action within their own private sphere. Moreover, following the causal chain of beliefs outlined in the VBN-theory (e.g. Stern et al, 1999), ascription of responsibility to the own person may also be evaluated by considering the prognostic beliefs held by the respondents; views on their personal ability to alleviate the environmental threat. The above demonstrated widespread acknowledgement that common household activities cause serious environmental problems implicitly denotes a belief that the single individual could prevent adverse environmental effects by making different choices in her day-to-day behaviour. When further

considering the respondents beliefs on the significance of their personal actions, this image is confirmed. Almost identical to the reported feelings of personal responsibility, a majority of the respondents agree that they do have the ability to avert negative consequences by incorporating environmental considerations in their daily behavioural choices. It can thus be concluded that also beliefs relating to the ascription of a personal responsibility are strong among the respondents.

Apart from the prognostic beliefs, that individual behaviour does have a capacity to avert negative environmental effects, the respondents' perceptions of a personal environmental responsibility can further be tested by exploring the strength of motivational factors guiding individual action-taking. According to the assumptions made in the analytical framework, pro-environmental personal norms mediate the relationship between a person's belief-structure and her behaviour, and personal norms is thereby perceived as creating a general predisposition for a range of both activist and non-activist (e.g. support for environmental public policy) behaviours (Stern et al, 1999). The existence of personal norms in this effect is of direct significance also for policy effectiveness and legitimacy. A widespread belief (or not) in the engagement in pro-environmental activities as a moral obligation has implications for how the basic balance between rights and responsibilities within the state/individual relationship is struck, as it specifies whether private environmental considerations is something which should be included in the list of civic duties and therefore mandated by the state. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 1, the existence of strong moral motivations to behave in an environmental friendly way might make policy tools drawing on external motivations for behaviour less adequate to introduce (e.g. Berglund and Matti, 2006).

TABLE 7.18. *Personal pro-environmental norm (% of respondents, 2004)*

	Completely agree	Partly agree	Unsure	Partly disagree	Completely disagree	N
I feel a moral obligation to sort my household waste	40,4	41,6	9,1	6,1	2,7	1227
I feel a moral obligation to reduce my private car use	51,0	23,3	15,9	5,5	4,3	1004
I feel a moral obligation to increase my consumption of eco-labelled goods	43,6	25,9	20,0	6,9	3,5	1214

As seen in table 7. 18 above, a large majority of the respondents reports that they feel a moral obligation to take steps for reducing the negative environmental effects of their daily behaviour. As personal norms, following Schwartz (1977), are seen as activated by both an awareness of consequences

and an ascription of personal responsibility, these results should be more or less expected. The respondents' perception of pro-environmental behaviour as a moral obligation also for them personally confirms their understanding of environmental friendly behaviour as a civic duty, rather than an activity which should be open for each individual to personally decide on. An evident policy implication that can be extracted from these results is the fact that the respondents' motivation to alter their behaviour not primarily draws on personal goals, but rather on the virtue of protecting the environment.

Summing up: policy-domain specific beliefs

From the initial survey of general environmental beliefs, it can be concluded that the respondents display an overall strong pro-environmental orientation, which is consistent with the importance assigned the value PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT above and the dominance of the SELF-TRANSCENDENCE value-orientation. Following on from this, the respondents also display a high sense of environmental risk-awareness and acknowledge that the adverse consequences from environmental degradation present a global threat to both human beings and other species. Connected to the broad-scope altruism detected in the survey of fundamental normative principles, this notion of a global threat suggests that the respondents will form strong preferences in favour of environmental protection. Furthermore, the data implies that solutions to the environmental problem draw on social restructuring and individual lifestyle-changes rather than a reliance on technological invention. An awareness of natural limits and a simultaneous rejection of human exemptionalism support this interpretation. Lastly, beliefs pertaining to personal responsibilities and personal norms are rather strong among the respondents.

7.4 CONCLUSIONS: BELIEF-SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED AMONG THE SWEDISH PUBLIC

This chapter set off with the aim of exploring, mapping and analysing publicly established values and beliefs. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the data-analyses conducted in this chapter, which also makes it possible to present an outline of a dominant public belief-system to subsequently be compared and contrasted with the policy belief-system elaborated on in chapter 6 above. How the respondents answer questions on basic normative principles and policy-domain specific beliefs is presented in table 7.19.

TABLE 7.19. *Dominant public belief-system*

Main topics	Dominant Public belief-system
Basic value priorities	SECURITY and FREEDOM most important guiding principles. CONSERVATION slightly more dominant value-orientation: a preference for stability, conformity and collectiveness over individualism and change.
Welfare of greatest concern	SELF-TRANSCENDENCE significantly more important than SELF-ENHANCEMENT. UNIVERSAL altruism signalling welfare beyond the own in-group, to a global (and even environmental) perspective.
Basic views of the problem	Strong pro-environmental orientation. General awareness of environmental problems. Human activities as significant contributors to environmental degradation. Weak trust in human ingenuity and technological development as solutions to problem. An acknowledgement of natural limits and need for social change – lifestyles and development.
Seriousness of the problem	High sense of risk-awareness. The environmental problem as highly serious – eco-crisis or catastrophe approaching –need for immediate measures. The environmental situation as a global problem (less local or personal) for both human beings and other living entities. Connection between private activities and global problems. Household-related activities a serious environmental threat.
Distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation	Shared responsibility between all major societal actors. Single individuals hold a large responsibility for causing and amending the environmental situation. Civic environmental responsibility as a moral duty. Responsibility for all to change lifestyles and actively support protection of the environment. Environmental protection trumps Freedom: environmental responsibility not open for self-determination or majority will. Strong sense of personal responsibility and ability to make a difference. Strong feeling of personal norm to take action.

The initial survey of fundamental normative principles predominately concerned how the respondents prioritised among a number of value items, arranged along two dimensions. The first dimension explored ranges between OPENNESS TO CHANGE and CONSERVATION, capturing values pertaining to basic questions on the relationship between the individual and the community (i.e. individualism vs. collectivism or liberalism vs. conservatism). Although the mean score for the respective orientations were quite even, a larger share of the respondents nevertheless displayed a priority for CONSERVATION. This priority of a conservationist value-orientation suggests that the values included in this orientation, emphasising stability and collectiveness, are deemed slightly more important by the respondents. Considering the scores for single value-items nuances this picture somewhat. Of the 20 included in the survey, two value-items from opposing orientations, SECURITY and FREEDOM, received the highest mean-scores, which clearly demonstrate the significance assigned these values as guiding principles in the respondents' lives and the importance of theses values for how the respondents react and form opinions based on their empirically related beliefs. A further six basic value-items also received high mean-scores in our two surveys validating their status as important normative principles. Relevant to note is that two of them are found in the CONSERVATION-orientation along with SECURITY. From a

perspective of legitimacy, where the alignment of public policy and public values is in focus, this would suggest that a policy exclusively placing its emphasis on one of these value-orientations over the other not will be considered legitimate, save for among a minority of the respondents. Rather, policymakers should in this regard consider that both of the single value-items FREEDOM and SECURITY are highly important as guiding principles in individuals' lives.

Whereas the respondents were quite evenly distributed on the first explored dimension, the second one, exploring values related to either social-context or personal outcomes displayed few ambiguities. When arranging the respondents along this dimension, it stands clear that SELF-TRANSCENDENCE is clearly dominant. A very small fraction of the respondents hold SELF-ENHANCEMENT as their dominant value-orientation, suggesting that values expressing altruism is of far greater significance. Further scrutinising these values also reveals that the respondents, when identifying groups or entities whose welfare is of greatest concern, have a universal perspective rather than a narrow one extending to the own in-group. The value-orientation which is clearly dominant thus represents care for all people regardless of their whereabouts. Drawing a parallel from these values to a contemporary debate within green political thought, the importance ascribed also non-territorial relationships (including the value item Social justice) aligns perfectly with the notion of the ecological citizen. This broad-scope altruism held by a majority of the respondents is certainly of significance as it opens up for considering also global environmental problems, with less (or at least an abstract) significance for the own person or in-group, as of importance to counteract.

The second part of the chapter set off with the aim of exploring the respondents' beliefs related specifically to the environmental policy-domain, considering both how the environmental situation (i.e. the policy problem) is conceived in general terms, as well as the respondents' beliefs pertaining to its seriousness and direction, and the distribution of authority and responsibility in amending it. Considering the basic direction of public environmental beliefs as expressed through the NEP-scale, the respondents display a rather strong general pro-environmental orientation. Although the ability of the NEP-scale to capture an expression of ecocentric morale has been questioned, the results from this analysis nevertheless point towards a non- (or at least very weak) anthropocentric position of the respondents. Consistent with the dominance of basic values expressing broad-scope altruism, it is evident that a large majority of the respondents recognises the rights also of other species and rejects any notion of human beings as being at the top of a nature's hierarchy. Taken together, this initial survey of environmental beliefs suggests that the respondents are favourably disposed to general acts of and policies for environmental protection. The respondents understand the environmental

problem to be highly serious (even when described as an imminent crisis or a catastrophe); global in scope and with its causes to be found both in human activities in general and in private, household-related activities. This level of environmental risk-awareness further suggests that the respondents believe that adapting social practices to nature's limits, for example through lifestyle-changes on the level of individuals, are the solutions available. This is also confirmed by the low trust in human ingenuity and technological development for combating the environmental problem.

Consistent with the fact that the respondents to a large extent agree that their private activities cause serious environmental problems, even in a global perspective, a majority also agree that single individuals hold a moral responsibility to change their unsustainable lifestyles and thus contribute to amending the environmental situation. In line with this, political government are bestowed considerable authority both to mandate environmental friendly behaviour from all citizens, as well as to introduce environmentally protective measures even when this means going against the opinion of the majority. Clearly, when the values of individual freedom and autonomy stand in direct conflict with environmental protection, the respondents are prepared to make trade-offs in favour of the latter. The intensity to which pro-environmental beliefs are held by the respondents and the connection made between private activities and serious global environmental problems, also underpin an ascription of personal responsibility for amending the environmental situation as well as a strong personal norm (or moral obligation) to take action. Following the previously outlined theory of policy legitimacy, these results have clear implications for political practice. But before embarking on this last step in our evaluation of environmental policy legitimacy Sweden, it seems reasonable to end this chapter by considering if, and in that case what aspects of, the respondents social background influence their personally held values and beliefs.

Dominant public beliefs and social background

A range of factors pertaining to the respondents' social background can have an impact on their formation of values and beliefs (e.g. Schwartz, 1992). From the perspective of this thesis, where legitimacy is seen as one important driver for increased policy performance, it seems highly relevant to ascertain also if public belief-systems, and thus conceptions of both problems and goals, differ according to social background. This in particular considering the aim of this thesis, which is formulated as an ambition not only to explore the level of legitimacy for conemporary Swedish environmental policy, but also to *analyse the prospects and prerequisites for designing future environmental policies that holds a high(er) degree of legitimacy*. Therefore, an exploration

of how four background variables (municipality, gender, age and education) impact on central elements of the dominant public belief-system outlined above is conducted. The results from this analysis are illustrated in table 7.20 below.

TABLE 7.20. *Dominant belief-system and social background (survey 2004)*

	Municipality	*Gender*	*Age*	*Education*
SECURITY	-	-0,11***	0,109***	-
FREEDOM	-	-0,058**	-	0,084***
PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT	0,062**	-0,107***	-	0,069**
UNIVERSALISM	0,074**	-0,134***	0,053*	0,088***
NEP	-	-0,111***	-0,13***	0,055*
Global threat	-	-0,232***	-0,096***	-
Moral duty	-	-0,163***	-	-

Note: Entries are partial correlations. Only significant correlations are displayed and indicated as ***p<0.01 (two-tailed); **p<0.05 (two-tailed); and *p<0.1 (two-tailed) respectively. Municipality (1 = Huddinge; 2 = Piteå; 3 = Göteborg and 4 = Växjö); Gender (1 = Female, 2 = Male); Education (1 = elementary school; 2 = upper secondary school/folk school; 3 = university/college).

As displayed in the table above, gender holds the most evident impact on the respondents' values and beliefs with women displaying significantly higher scores on all key elements in the dominating belief-system. We also note scores on the NEP-scale as well as feelings of a global environmental threat decreases with higher age, and that the importance of SECURITY as well as the value-orientation UNIVERSALISM instead increases. Education, on the other hand, displays a positive correlation with several key elements concerning both general as well as environmental values and beliefs. These results are in line with previous surveys of environmental beliefs and values where women as well as people with higher education have been shown more prone to score high on pro-environmental statements, while older people are considerably more sceptical towards them (Fransson and Gärling, 1999; Stern et al, 1993; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). However, although the correlations displayed in table 7.20 are significant, we should also note that the correlations in all significant cases is rather close to 0, indicating only a marginal impact of social background variables on the key elements of the dominant belief-system. From this, I conclude that the dominant belief-system outlined above is generally valid for our respondents irrespectively of their social background, and that the conclusions on present and future environmental policy legitimacy also can be assumed valid irrespectively of gender, age or level of education.

This concludes the second step in our empirical exploration of environmental policy legitimacy in the Swedish case. Over the past two

chapters, I have outlined the nature and structure of both the policy- and the public belief-system, and although some hints on their correspondences and divergences already has been touched upon evaluating the degree of legitimacy for Swedish environmental policy still requires a further analytical step to be taken. In the next and final chapter, therefore, I will place the conclusions from the two belief-system studies opposite each other, highlighting the aspects on which they align as well as those on which they diverge. This will enable further conclusions to be drawn both on the state of contemporary policy as well as on the prospects of increasing the level of policy legitimacy in the future.

8. EXPLORING LEGITIMACY IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY SETTING

We have now reached the eighth and final chapter of this thesis. This is the point at which we draw together, compare and contrast the findings from the two empirical studies above, thus taking the final step in exploring the degree of environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden. In the previous chapters (6 and 7), I have examined and outlined the nature of two sets of belief-systems forming the empirical core of our analysis. Now, it is time to examine the extent to which these belief-systems correspond, as well as to what degree and in which aspects they possibly diverge. It is also the time to further contemplate the meaning, significance and implications of my conclusions, for the case of (present, and perhaps in particular, future) environmental public policy in Sweden, but also in a broader, more generally applicable perspective. Although the scholarly literature abounds with analyses of environmental public policy, reviewing these texts reveals that policy *legitimacy*, in particular the here deemed crucial interplay between public values and public policy, not has been a core concern of previous studies. In an overall perspective, therefore, this thesis makes contributions both to the practice and to the theory of public policy. It does so by shedding new light on the prospects and prerequisites for positive environmental policy outcomes in the particularities of the Swedish case, as well as by suggesting a novel approach to the study, evaluation and analysis of public policy. The latter are, naturally, of particular relevance in the environmental field, but I believe them to be generally applicable also for other policy areas. Over the following pages in this concluding chapter, I will present these contributions

in more detail. I do so by revisiting my research questions; summarising my overall theoretical and empirical findings and discussing the value and applicability of the suggested analytical framework; as well as by making some suggestions regarding the direction of further research in the field of (environmental) public policy legitimacy.

8.1 APPLYING LEGITIMACY FOR THE STUDY AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC POLICY: A FRAMEWORK

In the introduction to this thesis, I formulated the overall aim guiding my study as to *explore the degree of legitimacy for environmental public policy in Sweden and analyse the prospects and prerequisites for designing future environmental policies that holds a high(er) degree of legitimacy*. Although this indeed reads like a straightforward question, which can be answered simply by conducting an empirical study of our here settled on Swedish case, we also remember that this aim in fact comprises not one but two separate analytical issues. The rationale behind writing this thesis has been that legitimacy not only presents policy makers, and then primarily those dealing with the resolving of social dilemmas, with a practical problem. A problem that public policy analysis indeed can assist in elucidating, investigating, and, ultimately, suggest solutions to. This thesis instead set off with the argument that the concept of legitimacy also amounts to an analytical problem in itself, one that cannot be solved through the craft of policy analysis, but which nevertheless requires serious consideration when attempting to properly explore and explain the long-term success or failure of political initiatives. As opposed to presenting legitimacy as an empirical policy (-maker) problem, this amounts to what I have chosen to call the problem of policy legitimacy. Before examining the conclusions from the two empirical studies above, let us therefore take a few steps back and revisit my theoretically founded conclusions on the study of policy legitimacy.

To its essence, the two central arguments underpinning the notion of this problem of policy legitimacy is *first* that many studies focusing the performance of public policy falls short by not adequately capturing the impact of legitimacy on policy outcomes. A strikingly low number of established policy analytical frameworks place the interplay between the output of the policymaking processes, that is the actual content of the official policy decided on, and publicly established values and beliefs centre stage. Instead are explanations to policy success and failure predominately sought either in the workings of the policy processes or in the implementation phase itself, where the performance of core actors or the selection and execution of

programs and policy tools are emphasised. But by doing so, and focusing the question if policymakers and –implementators are doing *things* right rather than the *right* thing, these studies misses out on the explanatory framework which studies focusing policy legitimacy provides. In the introductory chapter, I therefore outlined the reasons as to why legitimacy should be a central part of any study attempting to explain the performance of public policy, as well as a core factor to take into account when designing policy in practice. I concluded that legitimacy presents not a single but three distinct problems, which all mandates its consideration. (1) When implementing public policy or governmental programmes, legitimacy affects the effectiveness of policy tools and determines the amount of external factors needed to initiate and sustain patterns of collective action. As such, legitimacy influences performance both on the short- and on the long-term. Illegitimate policies, unable to install a feeling of moral obligation and desire for voluntary responsibility-taking among the public, can be expected to be strongly reliant on external incitement structures and therefore increasingly vulnerable to the long-term volatile workings of politics. (2) Taking the shape of a legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma, legitimacy is also expected to have an impact on political decision-making itself, by setting the limitations for (and exerting pressure on) decision-makers. Although decisions on public policy predominately are seen as being shaped by the desires and preferences held by actors participating in the process, certain outputs are still perceived as a political impossibility (or a political necessity) due to the established belief-systems in society. Thus, legitimacy not only amounts to an ex-post factor affecting policy success and failure, but can also assist in explaining why some political choices are made (or not) in the first place, thereby suggesting an ex-ante effect on policy performance. (3) Apart from the risk of unsuccessful implementation of a single policy or program due to its legitimacy deficit, policymakers need also to consider the legitimacy of their decisions from a point of view of both democracy and, perhaps more politically rational, re-election. In a normative perspective, democratic theory tells us that elected representatives of the public, in keeping with the democratic framework that has brought them to power, should take care to make decisions that at least align with a number of socially established, basic values and beliefs. In the real world of democratic politics, introducing an illegitimate policy rarely leads to revolution, but it may well be expected curb both the future performance of the particular government as well as its possibility for remaining in power after the next election.

Second, when considering those studies applying legitimacy as an analytical entity, we find that a large amount of ambiguity and contradictory statements surrounds its precise meaning and, subsequently, the methods for analysis and measurement. Legitimacy as an analytical concept indeed is

multi-dimensional, applied to describe an abundance of situations and entities (ranging from governmental programs to entire regimes); focusing on as well input and process as on outcomes; and related both to normative-philosophical conditions, to the voicing of public opinion, as well as to an overall trust in government. However, if legitimacy can mean everything, it means, at the same time, nothing. It simply becomes an empty term that we use for describing a situation, any situation, that for any number of reasons is working either poorly, or, for that matter, perfectly. It serves as a floating signifier ready to be bestowed meaning dependent only on what other concepts we attach to it and what we aim to make sense of. Studying it empirically and applying it as one variable for explaining the long-term success or failure of political initiatives, however, first require that we settle on what policy legitimacy is and what it is not, as well as on the proper analytical focus and tools for studying it.

By this account, I dedicated the first part of the thesis (chapters 2-5) to answering the following research question: *How should the concept of policy legitimacy be understood, and by the use of which tools should it be studied?* In chapter 2, the first step towards constructing an analytical framework for exploring public policy legitimacy was taken. After reviewing and elaborating on different theories surrounding legitimacy, I argued that the, in the literature hitherto dominating, emphasis on political legitimacy, pertaining to the moral acceptability of entire regimes, not is the adequate focus when concerned with the performance of a single policy. For a number of reasons, neither policymakers nor students of public policy can be certain that a general trust in government or the adherence to mutually agreed upon decision-making procedures grants legitimacy also to each and every policy resulting. *Policy* legitimacy should thus be treated as an analytical perspective separate from *political* legitimacy.

I further argued that the study of legitimacy essentially amounts to a study of belief-system correspondence; a study of the extent to which public policy aligns with publicly established, basic values and beliefs. Admittedly, legitimacy has been studied as both a social phenomenon, examining openly stated preferences towards the power relationship (or policy) in question, or as a normative issue, where the analysis is made relative to some external standard. But neither of these approaches capture, I believe, the essence of legitimacy, and they are therefore less adequate to apply when attempting to explain and amend policy performance. Whereas the latter approach places too little emphasis on the interplay between the public and the policy to be an appropriate tool evaluating the prospects for positive performance (how can we possibly know which values a policy needs to align with to be considered legitimate, if we do not ask the public their views?), the former confuses expressions of public opinion with legitimacy.

We should also note that public opinion and legitimacy, as I think of the concepts, are two separate things. The difference between them is a difference between the shallow and the deep; between the volatile and the stable; between the easily influenced and the immune to quick changes; and ultimately between a democratic reality and a democratic problem. This is, however, not to say that analyses of public opinion are less valuable or of minor interest. Not at all. But they are just not analyses of legitimacy. Studying policy legitimacy means studying the prospects and prerequisites for policy success, not success itself. Policy legitimacy, that is the extent to which governors and governed hold a common ground in terms of basic values and beliefs, is an input to policy performance, a factor influencing it that therefore can be applied to explain it, not a result of it. Conversely, the voicing of opinion, as with the expression or withdrawal of consent, is rather a reaction to policy. And this reaction can, in turn, be based on any number of factors. It may well be a reaction towards an (il)legitimate policy, but it is also possible, even likely theories of psychology and studies in the field tells us, that opinion is determined by other factors more shallow and therefore more susceptible to change, for example conflicting short-term interests; established habits; misconceptions of the rules of power; or lacking political knowledge.

This difference highlights the necessity of complementing the policy analyst's elucidations of problems and suggestions for solving them, with proper analyses of the policy's legitimacy. Take as an example a policy for, say, household waste-management; a policy requiering each and every one to sort their household waste into fractions and to dispose of them at a designated place. This apparently conflicts with our immediate personal interests (for time, for convenience and for free space under the kitchen sink) and established habits (to throw everything in the same bin). Thus, people might voice their opinion, stating what a nuisance they think this new policy to be. Initially, some might even outright declare their refusal to sort waste. But should we, based on these reactions, conclude that this is an illegitimate policy, unacceptable from both a perspective of democracy and of performance, and thus a political impossibility to introduce? As negative public reaction follows from the introduction of the policy, it is surely tempting to assume that there is something fundamentally wrong with it. And, there is certainly a possibility that a closer examination also will reveal that the voicing of opinion against the policy is indeed an expression of its underpinning illegitimacy, presenting both a democratic and performance-related problem. In terms of solutions, the latter calls for a number of long-term and ultimately expensive tools for motivating, monitoring and enforcing compliance, the former for a complete change of political direction. But as we do not have all the facts, the entire explanation to the public discontent observed, we also risk making a logical fallacy (e.g. *post hoc ergo propter hoc*)

where we assume the policy's illegitimacy based solely on the reactions it initially provoke. In other words, although illegitimacy is expressed as discontent, discontent itself is not always a sign of illegitimacy. Think of it in the opposite way, taking as an example a policy whose requirements are generally followed by those subject to it and towards which only a minimum of negative expressions of opinion is voiced (when asked directly, people might even state their support). Can we, based on these facts, conclude that this policy enjoys a high level of legitimacy (no expressed discontent equals no illegitimacy)? If we do so, we simultaneously disregard that consent can be the effect not of value-correspondence but of coercion, public apathy or the massive use of external incitement-structures. Searching for ways to make such a policy more efficient or to perform better will thereby fall short as we overlook the significance of it building on shared goals and understandings of the problem in the first place. Similarly, if we tell policymakers to avoid, for reasons of democracy, to introduce any policy which uproars opinion, then governments will be hard pressed to make any form of decision, on any topic. Conflict on issues, most of us would agree, is part of the democratic structure and introductions of policies that cause debate are therefore more the rule than the exception in an open and free society.

Returning to our initial example, if it turns out that the policy challenged by public opinion in fact builds on shared goals, strategies and worldviews, that the policy therefore in fact is legitimate, then I argue that there is a good possibility for people finding it to be morally right and thus voluntarily act accordingly. Some may still require additional support in form of changed structures or better explanations of its virtue, but the policy's underpinning legitimacy still suggests a basic public acceptance (and normative acceptability) despite disagreement and thus an ample possibility for positive policy performance. Put differently, there can be other explanations than legitimacy to a policy working well or not working at all, but dependent of which explanations that we find are valid, problem solving will require starkly different sets of strategies. On this account, asking people of their opinions or examining the level of expressed consent can indeed provide us with a sign of a policy being legitimate or not, thus being a method for discovering and locating a potential problem. But as a tool for exploring the nature of the problem and subsequently suggesting its solution, it is somewhat obtuse. For this, we also need to know if objection (or consent) is based on diverging values and beliefs (and in that case which ones) or on other, more readily amended, factors. We need to be familiar with the initial possibilities for policy performance, and this is what a study of policy legitimacy provides.

Defining legitimacy as value-correspondence, and thus dependent on the extent to which public policy aligns with publicly established values and beliefs, also explicates that illegitimacy not always results from policymakers

going too far in their decisions. For example by making too strong a policy infringing on a basic value such as freedom or autonomy (although this is a popular notion, we remember the discussions on both the legitimacy/effectiveness and the freedom/security dilemmas from above). Since the frames of legitimacy are determined by people's values and beliefs, whichever they may be, illegitimacy can also be the result of policymakers not going far enough, or moving in a completely different direction. It can, for example, be the result of too weak a policy, not adequately addressing a mutually experienced problem or of a policy resting on a view of the world and of basic causal relationships completely different from those established among the public. These situations may, for example, arise if policymakers misconceive the nature of the established belief-systems (perhaps by taking expressions of negative opinion at face value as a sign of illegitimacy) and attempt to avoid introducing an illegitimate policy. Putting this problem in terms of a legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma, if effectiveness in fact is legitimate, choosing another way will be illegitimate. For policymakers, the fact that illegitimacy can be the result also from situations like these further accentuates the necessity of considering the public/policy interplay in the process of designing policy.

A policy's legitimacy should further, I have argued, be studied focusing policy content rather than the process through which it arose or the actors participating. Subsequently, studies of policy legitimacy should apply as the main analytical entity the content of official policy documents rather than values or beliefs held by actors within the process. First of all, although policy processes certainly are important, studying them is primarily a task for evaluating political legitimacy as any shortcomings in terms of process pertains to the structures of the system as a whole rather than to the illegitimacy of a single policy. Moreover, even when processes are correct, rules are followed and relevant stakeholders invited to participate in the making of decisions (as I in this thesis' empirical explorations assume to be the case, dealing with public policy in a consolidated democracy), they cannot ensure the legitimacy of their outputs. This is essentially making the same argument as the one for treating policy legitimacy as an issue separate from its political counterpart. Lastly, remembering our here settled on definition of legitimacy as the question of policy/public interplay, it seems reasonable to assume that it is the finished product, the official policy decided on, which should be in focus for study. Decided on policy shapes the lion's share of public reactions (in particular if we can assume the decision-making processes to be reasonably fair and legally valid), either directly or through them being causally linked to the introduction of new laws, the initiation of new governmental programs, as well as the design and application of new policy tools. As such, the foundations for policy legitimacy are difficult to capture by

applying analytical frameworks focusing actors or processes, as these tell us very little about the belief-systems underpinning what is actually decided. In particular as the outputs of the policy process rarely correspond perfectly to those values initially held by any one single actor partaking in it. We know that making policy is essentially about making (belief-system informed) choices, and that decision-making therefore requires that any number of possible objectives or outcomes have to be traded off (or merged into) a single one. In complex areas, where the number of possible conflicting values and interests is high, this is particularly evident. Policies might here either be the result of a compromise among actors or of an attempt to accommodate as many interests as possible. In any case (even if our assumption is wrong and output corresponds perfectly to input), studying content rather than actors or processes ensures that the actual set of values and beliefs underpinning officially decided on policy are captured.

Building on these conclusions, I suggested at the end of chapter 2 that an evaluation of policy legitimacy essentially amounts to a comparative study of systems of belief, requiring a three-tiered analysis. First, we need to explore the content of the policy in focus for our analysis of legitimacy, mapping its underpinning system of beliefs. Second, the corresponding belief-system established among the public, those subject to the policy in question, must be mapped in a comparable way. Third and last, the evaluation of legitimacy requires that we compare and contrast these two systems of beliefs, focusing on the extent to which they correspond and in which (if any) aspects they diverge.

Identifying topics and selecting tools for studying belief-systems

Systems of belief, then, hold a key role in the exploration of policy legitimacy. Therefore, the following chapters in Part I of the thesis presented how the structure and function of public and policy belief-systems respectively are thought of. The overarching aims of these two chapters were to identify and operationalise relevant topics for analysis and thus constructing a theoretical lens through which to scrutinize both policy content and publicly established values and beliefs. Furthermore, suitable tools or frameworks for such an endeavour were presented. Since the policy/public comparison is an integral part of the study of legitimacy, particular effort was placed on examining whether these two analytical entities are, in fact, at all comparable, in particular if public policy can be conceptualised as a system of beliefs in its own right.

Chapter 3 focused publicly held values and beliefs. Here, one major assumption within the above outlined theory of legitimacy, that a person's

system of basic values and beliefs are crucial to how she perceives and reacts to new social objects, an thus for her formation of attitudes, preferences and choices pertaining to political issues and even specific public policies, was confirmed. I also argued that in order to obtain a realistic image of the cognitive factors determining a person's reactions, values (defined as conceptions of the desirable) and beliefs (conceptions of reality) must be combined to form a *belief-system*. Neither values nor beliefs can, by themselves, provide a complete picture of how a person understands a situation or an object, and how she subsequently reacts to it. These should instead be analysed in concert, allowing for the possibility that also empirically oriented beliefs affect a person's interpretation and application of her fundamental normative principles. Based on a range of previous studies, mainly from the fields of social and environmental psychology, I further suggested that the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) can serve as an adequate tool for measuring basic value-orientations. Dealing with the specifics of belief-systems in the environmental domain, the elements included in the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory of environmental support serves as a complement primarily for exploring more empirically oriented beliefs: environmental worldviews, awareness of consequences and personal ascriptions of responsibility. Both of these models have been tested and applied in many studies, verifying both their adequacy for capturing the key values and beliefs acting as guiding principles across a range of topics, as well as their reliability when attempting to explain attitude-formation and even behaviour.

In chapter 4, attention was then turned towards exploring the other analytical entity in our analysis of legitimacy: policy belief-systems. I showed how public policy indeed can be conceptualised as a system of beliefs, sharing key characteristics with the public belief-system outlined in the previous chapter and thus enabling a reliable comparison between the two. Values, in their own right, do matter on all stages of the public policy process and should therefore be treated as a core analytical entity when studying it.[136] Policy comprises both basic values (expressed as the selection of political aspirations and policy goals) as well as empirically oriented beliefs (manifested through the framing of the nature of the policy problem at hand and in the outline of preferred strategies for solving it). In order to further identify which specific questions, and pertaining to which particular aspects, that are relevant to focus an exploration of policy belief-systems towards, I suggested structuring our analysis according to the checklist of policy-core beliefs elaborated on

[136] This is not always the case in public policy analysis. According to Stewart (2009:187), mainstream political studies frameworks tend to treat values as tools in the service of (ideological) interests, not as fundamental guiding principles in their own right. Therefore, many approaches also exclude values from the list of entities that deserve analytical attention. The central role played by values in public policy is, I believe, further explicated in the empirical study of policy belief-systems.

within Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF holds a central role for values and beliefs as guiding public policy design and, therefore, being manifested in public policy documents. In a way much similar to the tools settled on for exploring individual's belief-system, the policy-core beliefs outlined in the ACF have guided a large number of policy studies in a vide variety of areas, thus verifying its value and reliability as a framework.

In chapter 5, the main conclusions from Part I were summed up and used for constructing an analytical framework to guide the exploration of belief-systems and, thus, public policy legitimacy. The lessons learned from the previous chapters' theoretically oriented discussions were brought together, and, based on these, five main analytical topics covering both fundamental normative principles and policy domain-specific beliefs were outlined: (a) Basic value priorities; (b) Conceptions of welfare of greatest concern; (c) Basic views of the problem; (d) Seriousness of the problem; and (e) Distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation. These were further complemented with a number of defining questions, specifying what particular aspects we should consider when exploring systems of belief. It should be noted, finally, that these topics are generally held and therefore believed to be relevant for studies also in other domains than the environmental one.

Revisiting the theoretical research question

We remember that the overarching aspiration guiding the first part of the thesis was to determine how the concept of policy legitimacy should be understood, and by the use of which tools it should be studied. At this point, we can sum up the answer to our theoretically oriented question in five statements:

i) Policy legitimacy denotes the legitimacy of the output from the policy process; the legitimacy of the rules-in-form. It should therefore be treated as an issue separate from the legitimacy of regimes and of processes.
ii) The degree of policy legitimacy affects policy performance, in several ways and in both a short- as well as long-term perspective, it is not an effect of it. It should therefore not be equalised with expressions of public opinion or (dis)consent. Legitimacy deals with the basic, long-term stable components of the individual's values-construct, and attempts to provide explanations to public reactions and, ultimately, policy performance. Expressions of public opinion, on the other hand,

highlight situations where further studies of legitimacy might be called for.

iii) Policy legitimacy is a question of belief-system correspondence, and should thus be evaluated by the extent public policy content aligns with publicly established values and beliefs. Thereby, illegitimacy is the result of policies diverging from public belief-systems, regardless if the policy in question is relatively too weak or too strong.

iv) Policy legitimacy is not an all or nothing affair, but comes in degrees. Given that several topics – basic value-priorities; views on distributive justice; beliefs concerning the nature and seriousness of the problem; as well as preferences for problem-solving strategies – are relevant to include in an evaluation, it is possible that policy and public aligns on some, and diverges on others. Studying legitimacy thereby allows for elucidating the specific aspects on which legitimacy-problems arise, and suggest relevant solutions for amending them.

v) Exploring policy legitimacy requires a three-tiered study, where policy content, in terms of basic values and empirically oriented beliefs, are compared and contrasted with the corresponding belief-system established among those subject to the policy. It thus requires analytical tools for exploring both fundamental values and policy specific beliefs held by individuals, as well as underpinning policy decisions.

Building on these theoretically derived conclusions, the reminder of the thesis then turned towards the empirical exploration of legitimacy in the case of Swedish environmental public policy.

8.2 TAKING THE FINAL STEP TOWARDS AN EVALUATION OF SWEDISH ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LEGITIMACY

Having outlined the main conclusions on the significance of legitimacy for policy performance, as well as on how to explore and evaluate it in relation to (environmental) public policy, we can now turn to answering the two remaining research questions and, thus, presenting the conclusions from our study of the Swedish case. In part II of the thesis, I applied the analytical framework from chapter 5 for guiding the exploration and mapping of two sets of belief-systems: values and beliefs in official Swedish environmental policy; as well as the values and beliefs established among the Swedish public. Chapter 6 was dedicated to outlining the fundamental normative principles

and policy-specific beliefs governing the environmental policy decisions and the direction of environmental politics in Sweden during the twelve-year period between 1994 and 2006. As the focus for this analysis was on extracting and mapping the underpinning system of belief in Swedish policy, the challenge for the text-analysis conducted was to look beyond the policy statements in order to explore the values and beliefs on which they rested. In chapter 7, the same set of analytical topics was explored using two mass-surveys targeting basic values and environmentally oriented beliefs among the Swedish public. Building on the results from these basic empirical studies in our legitimacy analysis, I will here take the final step by comparing and contrasting the two systems of belief, thus outlining my conclusions on Swedish environmental policy legitimacy. To start with, *is Swedish household-related environmental policy characterised by a legitimacy-problem, and if so, in what aspects and to what degree?*

Comparing fundamental normative principles

The five analytical topics outlined in the framework were divided into two categories highlighting both their level of abstraction, their generality, as well as how salient they are believed to be for making decisions in specific policy domains. Fundamental normative principles, comprising both basic value-priorities and conceptions of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern, are located at the highest level of abstraction. These represent the basic guiding principles in an individual's life as well as the key goals towards which a policy aspire.

TABLE 8.1. *Comparing basic value-priorities*

Basic value-priorities	
Policy belief-system	*Public belief-system*
Welfare, Security, Stability and Tradition.	SECURITY and FREEDOM most important guiding principles. CONSERVATION slightly more dominant value-orientation: a preference for stability, conformity and collectiveness over individualism and change.

Comparing the results from our empirical studies, we note that the two belief-systems build on a relatively similar set of core values. We remember that Swedish environmental policy, in describing the overarching goals for the political sustainability aspirations, draw strongly on the values of security, stability and tradition. The main policy problem outlined is finding ways to bring the Swedish welfare state into the new century, thus ensuring that the

traditional values of the Swedish model are kept intact now as well as in the future. This value-base aligns rather well with Conservation being the dominant value-orientation in the public belief-system, expressing a preference for stability, conformity and collectiveness rather than individualism and change. Furthermore, security is, among our respondents, the single value-item enjoying the strongest support as a guiding principle in life, and framing the policy problem as an issue of security, threatening both to values and entities of greatest concern ensures its further legitimacy among the public. Perhaps, one can argue, is this correspondence in very basic, core values more or less unsurprising. These types of fundamental cognitive frames are very stable, develop early in a person's life and are therefore, at least to some extent, bound by cultural socialisation processes. As such, it seems reasonable to expect that a broad social agreement on basic values, particularly when taken at face value[137], would be more readily found than a similar agreement on more empirically oriented beliefs.

TABLE 8.2 *Comparing conceptions of distributive justice*

Welfare of greatest concern	
Policy belief-system	*Public belief-system*
An anthropocentric ethic, incorporating some streaks of green. Nature subordinate to human needs. Ability of human ingenuity to expand or negotiate natural limits. Narrow-scope altruism, extending welfare *first* to the present generation (growth and economy) and *second* to future generations (a long-term stable welfare and prosperity – the Generation Goal) of Swedes.	SELF-TRANSCENDENCE significantly more important than SELF-ENHANCEMENT. UNIVERSAL altruism signalling welfare beyond the own in-group, to a global (and even environmental) perspective.

Considering the second topic within our fundamental normative principles (table 8.2), however, this correspondence between policy and public are not as evident. Admittedly, both belief-systems agree that the sphere of interest for the highly valued issues welfare and security is wider than the own person. Altruism, that is the care for others, is the guiding principle both when settling on policy goals as well as when forming reactions and responses to social objects. Nevertheless, despite this basic alignment, we should here note some significant differences between the two systems of belief. Whereas policy, in a majority of statements addressing the issue of welfare-priorities either directly or indirectly, clearly expresses a perspective of territorially bound, narrow-scope altruism, established values among the public instead convey a strong universalistic stance, extending the welfare

[137] We remember that although people agree that, for example, tradition (as opposed to change) is an important value we need to place this value into an empirical context in order to fully understand how it is interpreted and how it impacts on the political preferences or reactions towards a policy in a specific issue.

priorities further than the own in-group (or, in this case, nation-state). Although those subject to the policy, and those who subsequently are expected to change their day-to-day behaviour as a result of it, state that they predominately are motivated in their actions by a care for others in a global perspective, policy, following the ideal-type of a discourse of ecological modernisation, primarily draws on the value of a common national good for instituting collective action. Put in other words, it is a policy building on a traditional, territorial conception of citizenship, but directed towards post-cosmopolitan (even ecological) citizens.

Certainly, we could argue these statements not to be mutually exclusive (Sweden is of course a part of the global community) and therefore not an issue. But they are not the same. When contemplating the issue of distributive justice, a more fundamental difference is also noted in how the benefits from the suggested environmental policy are presented. As we have seen in chapter 6, the issue of reciprocity holds a central place for motivating action in the policy documents, and although this reciprocity is interpreted as denoting a common (even intergenerational, extended to future generations of Swedes), rather than personal good, it clearly diverts from the value of social justice and global concern expressed by the respondents. This in particular seeing as the opposing value-orientation expressing the individual's role as a rational, self-interested and motivated by personal benefits, i.e. SELF-ENHANCEMENT, receives as overwhelmingly low support among the respondents. Thus, our two systems of belief clearly diverge in this aspect. It reveals either that policymakers and the public basically hold different views as to who's welfare is most threatened by the problem addressed in policy, and who consequently benefits from the strategies outlined, or that policymakers (mistakenly) believe that the public in general are motivated by interests closer to the own person. In any case, this divergence in conceptions of distributive justice is problematic as it conveys that policy does not apply those motivations towards which a majority of the public will respond positively, as it frames the policy problem as an opportunity for reciprocity rather than as a problem of global social justice.

When moving beyond the relationship between individuals and instead approaching those values concerning welfare distribution that more specifically addresses our policy domain, we also find that the public and the policy belief-system display slightly diverging understanding on the human beings/nature relationship. A broader moral sphere, extended also to the non-human world, is clearly evident among the respondents. This is suggested by their strong preference for the universal value-orientation (incorporating, we remember, also a care for nature) and even more pronounced when considering their answers on the environmental values and beliefs in the NEP-scale. In my surveys, as well as in several previously conducted studies,

the extension of rights to the non-human world proves to be an established understanding among the Swedish public. This is further explicated both in the respondents' general pro-environmental orientation as well as in their outright rejection of human exemptionalism. The policy rhetoric, on the other hand, accentuates both nature's subordination to human needs and wants as well as its primary value as a provider of human goods. As evident from our conclusions on the expectance of reciprocity permeating the policy discourse, motivational statements focus primarily on the necessity for action in order to ensure present and future human prosperity, not upholding or protecting the rights of nature.

In sum, it is possible to conclude that although the divergences concerning fundamental normative principles are not of an all-encompassing kind; our two belief-systems still display some differences, primarily pertaining to conceptions of welfare-priorities. These, in turn, I believe are quite significant also for questions of legitimacy and policy performance. *First*, welfare-priorities, in this case the difference between a broad, non-territorial altruism (even incorporating non-human entities) and a territorially bound care for the own in-group or community, as well as between global justice and expectance of reciprocity, constitute starkly different motivational concerns. Thus, we cannot expect people falling into the former category to be as motivated to voluntary responsibility taking by arguments drawing on the latter. *Second*, these values are of significance as they set the frames for how beliefs relating more specifically to the policy area, or policy problem, in question are both formed and interpreted. A strong concern for global justice and environmental protection, which is clearly displayed in the public belief-system, means that also more abstract or distant problems of environment and development are seen as highly significant to amend, not only problems affecting the possibility for furthering a common, territorially bound, good put in predominately economic terms.

Comparing policy-domain specific beliefs

The second set of topics in our analytical framework leaves the generally held values for a focus on beliefs related specifically to the nature of the policy problem. How its causes are understood; how serious it is perceived to be; as well as how the responsibility for amending (and for deciding on this amendment) is distributed in society. When contemplating similarities and differences related to the overall image of the policy problem, we should remember that Swedish environmental policy not is a policy exclusively addressing environmental protection. Rather, it is primarily devoted to building the ecologically sustainable society, thus incorporating a range of societal concerns and perspectives. Now, although the public belief-system

rests on core values well in line with the aspiration to update the Swedish welfare state for the 21st century (e.g. collectiveness, security, stability and tradition), a closer comparison of beliefs regarding the problem reveals a number of potentially difficult divergences.

TABLE 8.3 *Comparing basic views of the problem*

Basic views of the problem	
Policy belief-system	*Public belief-system*
Building the ecologically sustainable society. The economic dimension of sustainability dominates. Main problems address the furthering of welfare and Swedish economy. Environment-as-growth, where environmental adaptation is the tool for furthering a broad range of societal goals. Unsustainable patterns of consumption (and thereby production) presented as a main cause of the problem on the individual level – the individual has the ability to impact positive development through active responsibility, primarily on the market. Strategies: sector integration (an all-inclusive responsibility); top-dow administration; public investments; partnerships; and market based policy tools. Social restructuring as modernisation rather than as radical change.	Strong pro-environmental orientation. General awareness of environmental problems. Human activities as significant contributors to environmental degradation. Weak trust in human ingenuity and technological development as solutions to problem. An acknowledgement of natural limits and need for social change – lifestyles and development.

First, although the environment certainly holds a place in policy's broad definition of the general problem addressed, the environmental dimension of sustainability is in this clearly subordinate to both the economic and the social development dimension, seeing as the overall goals towards which the Swedish environmental policy aspires predominately are expressed in terms of welfare, prosperity and growth. Protecting the environment, and taking steps towards a transition to a more ecologically rational development, is instead framed as a strategy, or a tool, for reaching these goals (e.g. new export- and employment-opportunities; development of new technology; an increase in government investments). The environmental protective parts of the policy are thereby to be negotiated so as not to curb development in other areas and, we can at least hypothesise given the evident environment-as-a-tool-for-growth perspective, are up for replacement when their role in driving socioeconomic development has passed. With this in mind, we should consider that the overall pro-environmentalism and the awareness of environmental problems (as well as the universal value-orientation containing both the goal of protected environment and of social justice) among the respondents is strongly pronounced. This, in turn, suggests a motivation for environmental protection as a value of its own, rather than as a means to a different end. Furthermore, the respondents clearly acknowledge the structural base of the environmental problematique, agreeing that addressing current human practices in a broad perspective (e.g. lifestyles and

development) and the effects of further industrialisation are at the core of solving the problem. This, again, seems counter to the belief in top-down administrated modernisation and further investments in industrial development expressed in policy.

Second, as policy primarily revolves around furthering other goals than environmental protection, its views on what is required in terms of strategies for change also follow this path. We concluded in chapter 6 that Swedish environmental policy draws strongly on a strategy for societal modernisation, where all actors are required to take part in the transitory work but where the efforts needed primarily are framed as a natural next step, as following an already chosen track, and thus as developments where no agonizing trade-offs between ends are required. This discourse of reassurance is further emphasised when considering the views of problem seriousness (table 8.4 below) expressed in the policy documents.

TABLE 8.4 *Comparing views of problem seriousness*

Seriousness of the problem	
Policy belief-system	*Public belief-system*
Environmental degradation not the main focus for policy. The environmental situation needs amendment, also on the individual level, but not in terms of an imminent crisis requiring radical and immediate measures. Rather a natural, gradual reformation of current structures. Policy primarily depicts possibilities (for further development) rather than (environmental) problems. A highly optimistic view of the future where a modernised society leads to future prosperity, and natural limits to growth can be overcome through government-led initiatives and human ingenuity.	High sense of risk-awareness. The environmental problem as highly serious – eco-crisis or catastrophe approaching –need for immediate measures. The environmental situation as a global problem (less local or personal) for both human beings and other living entities. Connection between private activities and global problems. Household-related activities a serious environmental threat.

Here we noted the environmental-threat rhetoric, following the discursive transition from environmental protection to sustainability, being strongly downplayed in preference for an optimistic framing of how the current challenges can be turned into positive opportunities for future growth. As opposed to this, however, established among the public is not only an acknowledgement of the in policy noted existence of the environmental problematique, but a strong belief in it as a serious threat or even an imminent crisis (descriptions never found in the policy documents) in need of both immediate and large-scale measures for its amendment. As opposed to the modernised environment-growth rhetoric found in policy, one of the main features of the public environmental beliefs is the notion that humanity, through its current practices, both are severely abusing an environment too fragile to cope with the pressure from further industrialisation and growth, as

well as approaching natural limits. A belief that, in prolongation, also stands in stark contrast to the ecologically modernised policy strategies of top-down administered investments in technological development as a way of counteracting limits and remedying the negative effects of the environment on prospects for further growth. In fact, the respondents place little if no faith in the prospects for human ingenuity to be able to control natural developments and instead express a belief that these types of endeavours commonly result in more or less disastrous consequences.

Third and last, we also conclude that divergences among the belief-systems are found when comparing beliefs related to the responsibilities for implementing change, and the roles for different actors in this endeavour (table 8.5).

TABLE 8.5 *Comparing views of authority, responsibility, and participation*

Distribution of authority, responsibility, and participation	
Policy belief-system	*Public belief-system*
Partnerships: an all-inclusive participation in all sectors of society required for achieving the ecologically sustainable society. The individual has a responsibility, even duty, to further the common good by amending unsustainable lifestyles and take an active part in the work. Citizens are environmentally aware, but lack in knowledge and ability. The citizen as a consumer: motivated by economic rationality and reciprocity, as well as passively reacting to governmental instructions. The state governs changes (societal as well as individual) through top-down administration and dissemination of information/education.	Shared responsibility between all major societal actors. Single individuals hold a large responsibility for causing and amending the environmental situation. Civic environmental responsibility as a moral duty. Responsibility for all to change lifestyles and actively support protection of the environment. Environmental protection trumps Freedom: environmental responsibility not open for self-determination or majority will. Strong sense of personal responsibility and ability to make a difference. Strong feeling of personal norm to take action.

In both policy and among the public is the need for a common responsibility for all actors in society clearly displayed, and subsequently also the necessity to involve individuals in the transition, amending lifestyles and counteracting the broader effects of their private activities. However, we also see that the image of the individual provided in policy not aligns with the one derived from our mass-surveys. In policy, the role of the individual is primarily framed as one of changing behaviour on the market in response to external (fiscal) incitements and top-down instructions from the government. The individual, although being willing to conform, requires that the state both informs on the direction of change necessary as well as provides, or at least clearly displays, the benefits arising from these changes. Addressing the consumer-role is thus understood as being highly relevant for the promotion of individual level responsibility-taking in Sweden, and for reaching the political sustainability aspirations. The reasons for this dominant consumer-focus in policy are multifaceted. It is certainly related to the overall framing of

the problem, where the prospects for Swedish economic development are a main target. This certainly requires a strong private consumption, but also that patterns are changed as to drive industrial renewal and making Sweden a leading nation in exporting green goods, knowledge and technology. It is also an effect of the ambition to successfully demonstrate the viability protecting the environment while simultaneously ensuring continuous economic growth and a preservation of traditional practices (i.e. a gradual reformation and modernisation through amendments of policy rather than radical changes). This requires that environmentally protective measures are devised so as not to curb growth or infringe on individual freedom and autonomy. Lastly, it is an effect of the belief that individual's primary motivation for action lies in a commitment to benefits for the own person, either directly or by the way of a common Swedish good.

However, when scrutinising the results of our surveys we observe that the in policy envisioned need to deal with individuals as rational consumers, promoting individual environmental action through the use of fiscal (dis)incentives and the promise of reciprocity, not should be taken for granted. The public, we instead found, holds a strong sense of social and environmental justice, and are strongly concerned with the spread of negative effects from their personal, household-related activities in a global perspective. As a response, guided by their basic value-orientations, they also express a strong feeling of moral obligation to actively counteract these negative effects. This obligation is of such magnitude that environmental protection, according to the respondents, trumps the value of personal autonomy and the state legitimately can mandate an all-inclusive responsibility-taking. Lastly, as we previously noted, the values most clearly associated with the role of a rational consumer, i.e. those collected under the label SELF-ENHANCEMENT, only receives marginal support among the respondents. This, again, is in stark contrast to the in policy expressed belief in targeting the consumer-role and presenting assurances for reciprocity in order to accomplish broad participation at the individual level.

The legitimacy-problem in Swedish environmental public policy

The objective for this above exploration of belief-system correspondence in Swedish environmental public policy has been to draw together the results of my two empirical studies, thereby advancing towards an answer to the question if the studied policy suffers from a legitimacy problem. Furthermore, in the case of an affirmative answer, my ambition has been to outline on which aspects, pertaining to which values or beliefs, policy and public systems of belief diverges. This in order to enable also a presentation of suggestions

for how to amend the problem and how to avoid or at least reduce legitimacy-problems in the future.

The short answer to this overarching research question is that a legitimacy problem is present in Swedish environmental policy, affecting its performance and, thus, ultimately, hampering its possibilities for success. However, studying policy legitimacy, we noted above, is more a question of determining the degrees of legitimacy than of making dichotomous either/or statements, and it should indeed be noted that shared values and beliefs are found within all our analytical topics. My assertion that a legitimacy problem nevertheless permeates environmental policy in the Swedish case builds on the undisputable fact that policy and public still diverge on several aspects. In particular, policy and public draw on fundamentally different beliefs when outlining the nature, seriousness, and direction of the problem. In chapter 4, I argued that a significant part of the policymaking process amounts to a struggle between different overall problem frames, held by different actors and interests. Applying this notion agrees that policy problems indeed are socially constructed and thus can vary between groups of actors, dependent both on their more fundamental beliefs about causal relationships in the world and on the basic values they whish to promote. What is more, problem framing amounts to a critical aspect of any policy as it governs decisions and activities downstream, for example the selection of policy strategies for addressing the problem, the preference policy tools, and the motivations applied to promote (collective) action. Therefore, although a failure to align with public beliefs on the nature and seriousness of the problem may seem as a minor problem compared to, for example, a fundamental difference in basic value-priorities, this nevertheless amounts to a significant issue in terms of legitimacy.

Just as a common view of the problem is anticipated to be an important factor in bringing and holding policy coalitions together, problem framing in our case serves as to set policy and public apart. What, then, are the policy implications arising from this divergence in problem framing? As I see it, it presents, first, a problem of governmental *credibility*. A basic point of departure for this study of policy legitimacy has been that public policy is, or at least should be, the method for forwarding collectively held values and solving collective problems. Now, since the established public belief-system holds that the environmental situation amounts to a highly serious problem, in need of immediate measures to avoid an imminent crisis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the practice of directing environmental public policy towards solving other types of societal problems will be understood as unsatisfactory in the eyes of the public. On the one hand, it can be viewed as the government ignoring, or fails to notice, a pressing issue. On the other, as a more fundamental conflict of values. Regardless of the fact that the overall

goals for policy, as we have noted they do, aligns with other basic values held by the public as guiding principles in life. From chapter 3, we remember that the rationale for settling on belief-systems, that is both conceptions of the desirable and of reality, as the unit of analysis is that abstract and general values need a connection to empirically oriented beliefs in order to be interpreted, bestowed meaning and, finally, activated. This dual connection between core values and beliefs is highly relevant also for our present analysis of legitimacy. Consider, as an example, that the value-item SECURITY is an important guiding principle in the public belief-system. Although policy can be said to address issues of security (framed in terms of sustained future welfare, growth and employment), it does not address environmental security, which, seen in the context of public beliefs on the current environmental situation and the necessity take immediate action in response to it, reasonably can be assumed a similarly significant issue. Thus, although the prima facie discrepancy concern problem-related beliefs, this also amounts to a divergence on very basic policy goals.

Diverging beliefs pertaining to problem nature also amounts to a *motivational* problem, where diverging views on the world make it increasingly difficult to present acceptable, or at least efficient, arguments for individual environmental responsibility taking. For one, framing the policy problem in terms of economy and opportunities for prosperity is expected to have less an effect on behavioural predispositions. This in particular as the established beliefs among the public tell us that the major motivations for action draw on a sense of global justice and moral responsibility, rather than reciprocity. From chapter 1, we also remember that the application of external (in particular market-based) motivations even can have a reversed effect on the intended activities. In particular when considering the structure of the established public belief-system, we should note that research in the field of economic psychology point towards the danger of turning behavioural patterns into commodities as this might 'crowd out' a pre-existing sense of moral obligation. Furthermore, framing the policy problem in positive terms as an opportunity for the common Swedish good, and not as an imminent global catastrophe, can reasonably be expected to be less convincing as an argument for voluntary lifestyle changes. This both for those without pronounced pro-environmental beliefs (if it is not a serious problem, it is not important!) and for those who view the environmental situation as a pressing global problem (why make an effort if policy does not properly address the environmental situation, but rather is a tool for ensuring further growth).

Lastly, the divergence in problem framing also represents a problem for *policy decisions*, and in prolongation for the outcomes of the decided on policy (e.g. an ex-ante legitimacy problem). Considering the way in which the belief-systems diverge, we can conclude that the pre-existing legitimacy

problem not is due to policymakers proposing a too strict policy, or too extensive measures. Rather the opposite. The problem we encountered can be described as a reversed legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma, where established public beliefs actually align with taking stronger measures the sake of environmental protection. Nevertheless, across the entire period studied here, policy continuously deemphasises the seriousness of the environmental problem and focuses instead on the modernised strategy of value-accommodation, thus avoiding trade-offs between environmental protection and radical changes in contemporary ways of life. At this stage, we can only hypothesise as to the reasons for these divergences. They might be an expression of a fundamental difference in worldviews between policymakers and public, but they might also be the effect of policymakers attempting to steer clear of an ex-post legitimacy problem by aligning policy to an ideal-type of the economically rational citizen-consumer. Given that policymakers also are a part of the broader public, and therefore should be expected to share significant parts of the in society dominant belief-system, it perhaps seems more reasonable to expect the divergences to be connected to the rationality of the decision-making process (and of the role as a decision-maker), rather than to the beliefs of the people being a part of them. In either case, however, I conclude that policymakers, given the values and beliefs of those subordinate to policy, certainly have the opportunity for going further in terms of environmental protection than what presently is the case.

Prospects and prerequisites for future environmental policy legitimacy

One of the ambitions of this thesis has been to encourage policymakers and public policy scholars alike to consider also the legitimacy of a policy when evaluating and explaining its performance, as well as to grant legitimacy a central role in the processes of public policy design. In this endeavour, I initially presented the theoretically founded rationales for applying legitimacy as a unit of analysis, and subsequently attempted to apply these lessons for exploring the legitimacy-situation of contemporary Swedish environmental policy. The result of my empirical analysis was presented in the section above. Here, I concluded that Swedish environmental policy indeed is characterised by a legitimacy problem, affecting performance in a number of different ways; pertaining to credibility for political government, to the prospect for motivating collective action, as well as to initially settling on policy decisions that have good prospects for addressing the environmental problematique. We can thereby conclude that I, at this stage, have both created a problem and defined its nature. But, as Wildavsky told us in the very beginning of this thesis, public policy analysis is essentially about problem-solving; providing solutions to the identified problem presents an equally (or even more)

important task for any study. In this section, I will therefore attempt to provide some suggestions as to how the legitimacy problem of Swedish environmental public policy might be amended; how policymakers in the future can avoid the pitfalls of designing and deciding on policies characterised by a legitimacy problem; as well as, consequently, how the performance of environmental policy in Sweden can be enhanced. This task is captured by the second half of the thesis' aim, to *analyse the prospects and prerequisites for designing future environmental policies that holds a high(er) degree of legitimacy*.

Conceiving of legitimacy as belief-system correspondence, the prospects and prerequisites for a high degree of policy legitimacy can be seen as ultimately residing both with policymakers and with the public. On the one hand, policy legitimacy is determined by the extent to which policy aligns with public values and beliefs, and its legitimacy therefore becomes a question of policymakers considering established systems of belief when designing policy. On the other hand, legitimacy is conferred to policy by the public, based on shared values and beliefs. Seen in this way, policy legitimacy is, in each specific case, determined by the nature of the publicly established belief-system and the opportunities and constraints this places on political decisions. In my view, then, whereas policymakers need to take certain steps to ensure that the basic requirements, the prerequisites, for policy legitimacy are fulfilled (that is, by ensuring that policy are in fact addressing the right thing), the public ultimately determines the prospects for each policy's legitimacy by setting the frames within which legitimate policy decisions must keep. In other words, the public, through their values and beliefs, determines what this 'right thing' amounts to. Consequently, just because one holds the political *power* to make decisions within the existing legal framework, this does not mean that all possible outputs from the decision-making processes automatically will hold a high degree of legitimacy. And just because a political decision is legitimate in one context, this does not mean that it will be so in another. I acknowledge that this lack of absolutes certainly means some policies, addressing certain issues, never will have the prospects for reaching a high degree of legitimacy in a particular context, as they will be at odds with established public belief-systems. If this is positive or negative is a highly subjective question, the answer to which is, again, dependent on each person's basic values and beliefs. Some policies, we may find, are best avoided as they are counter to our own conceptions of the desirable. But legitimacy, seen in this way, may also hinder the decision on or performance of policies to which we personally attribute high importance.

In my present case of environmental public policy in Sweden, we remember that the comparison of policy and public belief-systems concludes that the present legitimacy-problem best can be characterised as a reversed

legitimacy/effectiveness dilemma. Overall, the dominant public belief-system displays a range of key features that we normally associate with a strong and long-term stable policy for environmental protection: altruism; the primacy of global social justice; a pronounced pro-environmental stance; as well as an awareness of the problem and its consequences. These results speak to the fact that the prospects for making future *environmentally protective* policies with a high degree of legitimacy are good, even if these policies include an increased responsibility-taking (even comprehensive changes in lifestyle) on the part of the individual. Considering the question of prospects for legitimacy, it is certainly of further interest to note that Sweden, despite what above has been concluded on the overall goals, direction and, ultimately, legitimacy of its environmental policy, still is seen as an international forerunner in the environmental domain. In part, this might be an effect of the high level of basic environmental awareness among its citizens. Nevertheless, we cannot evade the hypothetical question of what the status of the Swedish environmental work would be had the prospects for increasing the degree of environmental policy legitimacy been fully utilised?

However, increasing the degree of policy legitimacy indeed requires efforts also on the part of the policymakers. Following theory, the basic prerequisite for policy legitimacy is the alignment of belief-systems. The task for policymakers is, consequently, to make sure that decisions are made based on, or at least framed in a way that corresponds to, publicly established values and beliefs. As we have seen above, this concerns both the basic goals towards which policy ultimately aspires, as well as how the nature of specific policy problem addressed is presented. Realising a high level of policy legitimacy therefore requires, *first*, that policymakers are familiar with the prospects for legitimacy in each particular policy context, and, *second*, that they allow this knowledge to be guiding in the process of deciding on policy and framing its message. Although these prerequisites might be interpreted as pointing towards a strengthening and formalising of the relationship between powerful and subordinate, and thus promoting an increased public participation in decision-making processes, I will leave the suggestions for institutional restructuring as a response to legitimacy problems for others to make. Suffice to say that, in those cases where this is a practical possibility, increasing the participatory elements can certainly be one tool for reaching policy decisions that enjoy higher degrees of legitimacy.

Turning towards the case of Swedish environmental policy legitimacy, we noted that the legitimacy-problem primarily emanates from Swedish policy not adequately aligning with established beliefs pertaining to the nature, seriousness, and direction of the environmental problem. Being more specific, policy does neither match the public's strong pro-environmental beliefs and high sense of risk awareness, nor their sense of moral motivation

building on a non-territorial and non-reciprocal sense of social justice. The challenge for policymakers is therefore to, paraphrasing a well-known expression, speak truth to the public. Rather than framing the environmental problematique as an opportunity for increased growth and welfare in Sweden, calling for top-down administration; technological innovation; and transformed market-behaviours in expectance of reciprocity, environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden requires, based on what we have learned from the two surveys of public values and beliefs, quite the opposite. Given the strong environmental awareness among the respondents, the dominating broad-scope altruism and the concern for the impact private, household-related activities have on global problems, there are no reasons for policymakers to hide these facts in political discourse. If the public willingly state that there are more important values that those drawing on self-enhancement, more pressing needs than those of the own in-group, and more in the relationship to nature than merely resource extraction, these beliefs should also be presented to the public as motivations in policy. Therefore, I conclude, not until the environmental situation is framed as a serious (security) problem placed in a global context, as a situation that we therefore by necessity must and indeed also holds a *moral* obligation to properly amend, will the degree of legitimacy for Swedish environmental public policy increase.

8.3 MOVING FORWARD BY LOOKING BACK: LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXPLORING PUBLIC POLICY LEGITIMACY

Outlining a theoretically derived proposition for how to think of a concept such as policy legitimacy, including an approach for how it can be properly studied, is one thing. Applying the suggested analytical framework for exploring an empirical case is a completely different one. Not the least as putting the framework to the test has a tendency to alter (positively or, more unfortunately, negatively) the way in which the structure of the framework and its value for guiding empirical study are understood. When looking back at the now completed study of environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden, and the results emanating from it, I find that my suggested framework for studying public policy legitimacy seems to be working well. Not the least, it constitutes an instrument for distilling comparable elements from different sources, explored by the use of different techniques. Although additional applications (preferably directed towards different policy areas, and in different contexts) are needed to further confirm the relevance of its perspectives and analytical topics, I nevertheless conclude that the present

study has provided profound insights in one of the key mechanisms affecting policy performance. Analysing the correspondence between policy and public belief-systems in this way (rather than focusing on one or the other) thus generates relevant knowledge for policymakers and scholars of (environmental) public policy alike. It complements studies of decision-making procedures and implementation processes with a set of explanatory factors located in between processes and performance. However, through the intersection of theoretical conclusions and empirical analysis, valuable insights are also reached in terms of the suggested framework's applicability and usefulness, as well as on which aspects further refinement is required.

Usefulness and limitations of the approach

The perspective on legitimacy applied here emphasises the importance of policy *content*, on the values and beliefs underpinning decided on rules-in-form and materialised in the form of official policy documents. This approach has clear advantages, primarily as it ensures that only those values and beliefs that emanates from the admittedly complex and sometimes hidden policymaking processes, and thus the belief-system governing subsequent acts of implementation and public information, are included in the study. Nevertheless, although I believe this to be the best-suited approach for capturing and mapping the basic elements of policy legitimacy, we should note that by focusing solely on output, some aspects pertaining to the formation of policy decisions are disregarded. In particular, this approach makes the interpretation of ambiguous, sometimes even contradictory, official policy documents a key part of the exploration and analysis of belief-systems. While it certainly is possible to come to reliable conclusions on dominating systems of belief by considering and contrasting statements in policy documents produced by the same source over longer time periods, as well as by comparing the results to those of other scholars, a further use of primary sources would nevertheless allow for more profound insights and strengthen the interpretations made. For example, official reports and transcripts from parliamentary debates preceding the policy decision elucidates competing beliefs about the nature of problem and capture how, and by the use of which mechanism value conflicts are resolved or negotiated. In a similar way, interviews with policymakers can further enhance our interpretation of the meaning of those values and beliefs that are found underpinning the final decisions. Using interviews also allow us to come closer to understanding the rationale behind the decisions made, which, in turn, is of significance when outlining suggestions for how a legitimacy problem may be resolved.

A similar proposition can be made when considering the applications of mass-surveys for capturing public values and beliefs. How results from the

above used values- and beliefs-surveys should be interpreted, including their connection to a broader context of political preferences is extensively elaborated on and empirically tested throughout previous research. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to argue that the interpretation of these results might benefit from being complemented with interviews probing deeper into the value-based reasoning of the individual. Thus, in future studies of policy legitimacy, the methods and approaches applied above could well be accompanied by an analysis of interview-data. That said, we should also remember that it is not an objective for studies of legitimacy to systematically trace the beliefs of single actors involved in the decision-making process, or to incorporate opinions and preferences when turning towards the public. The topics outlined in the analytical framework, and how they are manifested through the content of policy as well as in the individual's basic system of beliefs, should always be the primary focus.

The way in which I have chosen to define the concept of legitimacy also implies that dichotomous either/or statements not provide a sufficiently nuanced description of the possible problems facing policy. The study above has instead been concerned with evaluating a policy's *degree* of legitimacy, and, more importantly, elucidating the specific aspects from which possible legitimacy-problems stem. In this aspect, the applied approach has provided a detailed image of the legitimacy problem in Swedish environmental public policy and allowed for the provision of possible solutions. However, as with all studies comprising an element of evaluation, further questions arise concerning how we should deal with differences within the public system of beliefs. In the present study, the aim of the mass-surveys was to present one publicly established system of belief to be compared and contrasted with policy. Consequently, the analysis and policy recommendations outlined above take their departure in one system of belief that I deemed established among the public. We remember from chapter 7 above that, although a dominating alternative emerged quite clearly on most of the analytical topics, a certain variation among the respondents could nevertheless be discerned. However small, there are also a certain number of people holding a belief-system of an entirely opposing kind: people who value individual autonomy; minimal governmental intervention; social power and personal wealth highly, and who are, if not completely so at least strongly uninterested in environmental issues and ignorant to the environmental threat perceived by the majority. Although this can be interpreted as verifying the reliability of our results (the respondents have not answered their questionnaires according to what they perceive as an established social norm, but according to their own personally held values and beliefs), it nevertheless presents a further problem of interpretation. How established, we might ask, must the interpretation of any single analytical topic found in policy be among the

public, for it not to be considered as a legitimacy problem? Is it enough that a value or belief is held by a majority, or should an established value be emphasised as a guiding principle by a larger share of the public? And, if so, how large? Furthermore, how should we consider a situation where the public is evenly split between two opposing value-orientations, and which would be our suggestions for increasing the degree of legitimacy in such a situation? These questions are of course not easily answered, but whichever alternative we finally settle on it should be acknowledged that finding (or even designing from blank piece of paper) a policy that is legitimate when subjected to comparison with each single citizen's belief-system must be considered a mission impossible.

A broader perspective on my results

This thesis has been constructed around two aims: to present a framework for the study of policy legitimacy, and to apply this framework for exploring environmental policy legitimacy. In response to the latter, using Sweden as the empirical case for study in particular given its international reputation in the environmental field, do not cater for results that travel well abroad. However, this has not been my ambition. I claim neither that my empirical conclusions are generally valid for environmental policy in other countries, nor that they can be reliably transferred to other policy domains in Sweden. Even for the environmental policy domain explored here, further research should be conducted in order to verify the structure and stability of public values and beliefs. Nonetheless, I do believe that my general findings are of a broader interest. Legitimacy is a key problem that needs to be handled by scholars and practitioners in all contexts, dealing with all kinds of different policy domains. Not the least considering that the results from my study verify a central initial assumption: even a policy seemingly working well can be characterised by a legitimacy problem hampering its level of performance, both now and in the future. Furthermore, although it is certainly true that belief-systems and institutional settings vary a great deal between different cultures and countries, making it impossible to transfer empirical results on legitimacy from one setting to another, this is accounted for in the approach to policy legitimacy. *First*, as the significance of the basic analytical entities, belief-systems, when forming policy preferences and evaluating social phenomena is generic. *Second*, as the study of policy legitimacy essentially amounts to an analysis of correspondence between two empirically derived belief-systems. Each new study thereby automatically adapts to the specific circumstances of the geographical location or cultural context in which it is conducted. This, finally, cater for future applications of the framework for analysing public policy legitimacy, also in other cases than the present.

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APPENDIX I

Letter and questionnaire from the 2004 SHARP-survey (in Swedish)

Forskningsprogrammet SHARP

Miljön och Ditt hushåll

Just nu pågår ett gemensamt forskningsprojekt vid universiteten i Luleå, Linköping och Umeå. Syftet med projektet är att öka kunskapen om hur människor uppfattar olika miljöproblem samt hushållens inställning till åtgärder som syftar till att förbättra miljön. Sådan kunskap är betydelsefull för utformning av framtida miljöarbete i Sverige. Naturvårdsverket och Formas finansierar projektet och undersökningen utförs i samarbete med Din kommun.

Undersökningen vänder sig till personer i åldrarna 20 – 75 år i fyra kommuner i Sverige. Du är en av de slumpmässigt utvalda deltagarna. Det är frivilligt att medverka i undersökningen men vi hoppas givetvis att Du vill besvara frågorna i detta frågeformulär. Dina svar kommer endast att redovisas i statistiskt bearbetad form och varje deltagares anonymitet är garanterad. För att resultaten av undersökningen skall bli tillförlitliga är det mycket viktigt att alla utvalda personer besvarar frågeformuläret.

Besvara frågorna så fort som möjligt och skicka det ifyllda formuläret till oss i det bifogade portofria svarskuvertet. Vi är tacksamma om Du inte hoppar över någon fråga.

Det kodnummer som finns på formulärets första sida gör det möjligt för oss att notera att just Du har svarat så att vi inte behöver besvära Dig med påminnelser. Därefter kommer kopplingen mellan kodnummer och namn att tas bort.

Har Du några frågor angående undersökningen kan Du kontakta oss på nedanstående telefonnummer.

Med vänlig hälsning

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Adressuppgifterna har erhållits från Kommunregistret i Din kommun.

FRÅGOR OM DIG OCH DITT HUSHÅLL

1. Jag är ☐ Kvinna ☐ Man

2. Jag är _____ år

3. Jag är ☐ Ensamstående ☐ Gift/sammanboende

4. Min högsta genomförda utbildning är:
☐ Grundskola/folkskola
☐ Gymnasieskola/folkhögskola
☐ Universitet/högskola
☐ Annat:_____

5. Min huvudsakliga sysselsättning är:
☐ Förvärvsarbete, heltid
☐ Förvärvsarbete, deltid
☐ Studerande
☐ Arbetssökande
☐ Hemarbetande, föräldraledig
☐ Pensionär, sjukpensionär
☐ Annat:_____

6. Jag/vi har _____ (antal) hemmavarande barn i åldrarna _____

7. Hushållets sammanlagda inkomst före skatt är _____kronor/månad

8a. Jag bor i:
☐ lägenhet
☐ radhus
☐ fristående villa
☐ annat:_____

8b. Mitt boende:
☐ är en hyresrätt
☐ är en bostadsrätt
☐ ägs av mig/oss
☐ annat:_____

9. Mitt hushålls kostnad för uppvärmning av bostaden:
☐ baseras på mitt hushålls förbrukning
☐ baseras på mitt hushålls och mina grannars förbrukning (samfällighet)
☐ ingår i hyran (fast avgift)
☐ vet ej

10. Sker uppvärmningen av Din villa med elektricitet (elvärme)?
☐ Ja ☐ Nej ☐ Vet ej ☐ Bor ej i villa

11. Mitt hushålls kostnad för hushållsel som används i bostaden:
☐ baseras på mitt hushålls förbrukning
☐ baseras på mitt hushålls och mina grannars förbrukning (samfällighet)
☐ ingår i hyran (fast avgift)
☐ vet ej

12. Mitt hushålls kostnad för vatten som används i bostaden:

☐ baseras på mitt hushålls förbrukning
☐ baseras på mitt hushålls och mina grannars förbrukning (samfällighet)
☐ ingår i hyran (fast avgift)
☐ vet ej

13. Mitt hushålls kostnad för sophantering:

☐ baseras på sopkärlets storlek och/eller hur ofta sopkärlet töms
☐ baseras endast på hur mycket soporna väger
☐ baseras dels på en avgift (t ex beroende på sopkärlsstorlek), dels på hur mycket soporna väger
☐ ingår i hyran (fast avgift)
☐ vet ej

14. Jag har körkort för personbil ☐ Ja ☐ Nej

15. I hushållet finns:

☐ 0 bilar
☐ 1 bil
☐ 2 bilar
☐ 3 bilar eller fler

16. Hushållets totala körsträcka är i genomsnitt _____mil/år

17. Min körsträcka är i genomsnitt _____mil/år

18. Hur långt är det mellan Din bostad och följande platser i kilometer:

	Avstånd	Vet ej	
Närmaste hållplats för kollektiva färdmedel t ex buss	_____km	☐	
Närmaste återvinningsstation för källsortering (t ex papper, metall, glas)	_____km	☐	
Affären där Du/Ni huvudsakligen gör inköp av livsmedel	_____km	☐	
Arbete/skola	_____km	☐	Arbetar eller studerar inte ☐
Kommunens centrum	_____km	☐	

FRÅGOR OM VAD DU TYCKER ÄR VIKTIGT I LIVET

19. Alla människor har värden som fungerar som vägledande principer i deras liv. Sådana värden kan vara olika viktiga för olika personer. Vi vill att Du anger hur viktigt vart och ett av följande värden är som en vägledande princip i Ditt liv.

Nedan och på nästa sida finns ett antal värden angivna med en kort beskrivning av innebörden inom parentes. Läs först igenom alla värden. Skriv sedan ner de två värden som är minst viktiga för Dig och de två värden som är mest viktiga för Dig på raderna nedan.

Ange sedan hur viktigt varje värde är för Dig genom att ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning. Hoppa inte över något värde och kom ihåg att det inte finns några rätt eller fel svar utan det är Din egen uppfattning om vart och ett av värdena som vi är intresserade av.

De två **minst** viktiga värdena för mig är:

1. _____ 2. _____

De två **mest** viktiga värdena för mig är:

1. _____ 2. _____

	Tvärt emot mina värderingar	Inte viktigt			Viktigt			Mycket viktigt	Av yttersta vikt
FRIHET (frihet att tänka och handla)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SJÄLVKONTROLL (lägga band på sig själv, motstå frestelser)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
TRYGGHET FÖR SINA NÄRMASTE (säkerhet för nära personer)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
FRAMGÅNGSRIK (lyckas, uppnå sina mål)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
VIDSYNTHET (vara tolerant mot annorlunda idéer och föreställningar)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SOCIAL ORDNING (ett stabilt samhälle)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
RESPEKT FÖR TRADITION (bevara gamla sedvänjor)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Tvärt emot mina värderingar	Inte viktigt			Viktigt			Mycket viktigt	Av yttersta vikt
SOCIAL MAKT (kontroll över andra, dominera)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ETT OMVÄXLANDE LIV (ett liv fyllt med utmaningar, nyheter och förändring)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
AUKTORITET (ha rätten att leda eller beordra andra)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
BEVARAD MILJÖ (bevara mångfalden i det ekologiska systemet)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
OBEROENDE (självtillit, klara sig själv)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
KREATIVITET (vara unik, fantasifull)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SOCIAL RÄTTVISA (motarbeta orättvisor, bry sig om de svaga)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PLIKTTROGENHET (fullgöra sina skyldigheter)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
INFLYTELSERIK (kunna påverka människor och händelser)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
VÄLSTÅND (materiella ägodelar, pengar)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
HJÄLPSAM (arbeta för andras välbefinnande)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
NYFIKENHET (vara intresserad av allt, utforska)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
LOJALITET (trogen sina vänner och sin grupp)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

INSTÄLLNING TILL MILJÖN

20. Nu följer ett antal påståenden om miljön. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena. *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Balansen i naturen är tillräckligt stark för att klara av de moderna industrinationernas påverkan.	1	2	3	4	5
Människan har rätt att förändra naturen efter sina behov.	1	2	3	4	5
Växter och djur har lika stor rätt att existera som människor.	1	2	3	4	5
Trots våra speciella förmågor lyder vi människor fortfarande under naturens lagar.	1	2	3	4	5
Människorna är ämnade att härska över naturen.	1	2	3	4	5
Jorden kan liknas vid en rymdfarkost med mycket begränsade utrymmen och resurser.	1	2	3	4	5
När människan ingriper i naturens förlopp får det ofta katastrofala följder.	1	2	3	4	5
Vi närmar oss gränsen för den folkmängd jorden kan föda.	1	2	3	4	5
Jorden har gott om naturresurser bara vi lär oss hur vi ska använda dem.	1	2	3	4	5
Människan förgriper sig allvarligt på naturen.	1	2	3	4	5
Människans uppfinningsrikedom kommer att garantera att vi *inte* gör jorden obeboelig.	1	2	3	4	5
Om utvecklingen fortsätter som hittills kommer vi snart att få uppleva en stor ekologisk katastrof.	1	2	3	4	5
Så småningom kommer människan att lära sig tillräckligt om hur naturen fungerar för att kunna kontrollera den.	1	2	3	4	5
Den så kallade ”ekologiska krisen” som mänskligheten står inför har kraftigt överdrivits.	1	2	3	4	5
Balansen i naturen är väldigt känslig och rubbas lätt.	1	2	3	4	5

FRÅGOR OM HUSHÅLLSAVFALL OCH KÄLLSORTERING

21. Hur mycket källsorterar Ert hushåll av olika typer av hushållsavfall? *(Kryssa för det svarsalternativ som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning för varje typ av avfall)*

	Inget	Något	Det mesta	Allt
Brännbart avfall	☐	☐	☐	☐
Matavfall/kompost	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pappersförpackningar	☐	☐	☐	☐
Plastförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Glasförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Metallförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tidningar och wellpapp	☐	☐	☐	☐
Farligt avfall (t.ex. olja, lösningsmedel, medicin)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Batterier	☐	☐	☐	☐
Elektriskt/elektroniskt avfall (t.ex. glödlampor, TV, leksaker med elektronik)	☐	☐	☐	☐

22. Hur stor del av det totala hushållsavfallet tror Du att andra hushåll i Din hemkommun källsorterar?

Inget	Något	Det mesta	Allt
☐	☐	☐	☐

23. Ungefär hur många <u>minuter</u> spenderar Ert hushåll i genomsnitt <u>under en vecka</u> för:

- Att sortera och rengöra avfall i hemmet? _____minuter
- Att frakta källsorterat avfall till återvinningsstationer? _____minuter

24. Gör Ni extra/enkom resor till återvinningsstationen för att lämna Ert hushållsavfall? *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

Nej, aldrig				Ja, alltid
1	2	3	4	5

25. Hur ofta tar Ni bilen till återvinningsstationen för att lämna sorterat hushållsavfall?

Aldrig				Alltid
1	2	3	4	5

26. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om hushållsavfall. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot växter och djur i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot människors hälsa i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot växter och djur i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot människors hälsa i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot *min* hälsa och *mitt* välbefinnande.	1	2	3	4	5
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett så allvarligt problem att åtgärder måste sättas in omedelbart.	1	2	3	4	5

27. Hur stort ansvar anser Du att olika aktörer i Sverige har för att vidta åtgärder för att reducera mängden hushållsavfall och ta hand om detta så att de negativa effekterna på människor och miljö minskas?

	Mycket litet ansvar				Mycket stort ansvar
Staten (regering, riksdag, statliga myndigheter)	1	2	3	4	5
Näringslivet	1	2	3	4	5
Kommunerna	1	2	3	4	5
Privatpersoner	1	2	3	4	5

28. Hur stort förtroende har Du för att olika aktörer i Sverige lever upp till sitt ansvar för att reducera mängden hushållsavfall och ta hand om detta så att de negativa effekterna på människor och miljö minskas?

	Mycket litet förtroende				Mycket stort förtroende
Staten (regering, riksdag, statliga myndigheter)	1	2	3	4	5
Näringslivet	1	2	3	4	5
Kommunerna	1	2	3	4	5
Privatpersoner	1	2	3	4	5

29. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om källsortering av hushållsavfall. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Jag känner en moralisk skyldighet att källsortera mer för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag känner inget personligt ansvar att källsortera mer för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är ingen idé att jag källsorterar mer eftersom det endast har liten betydelse för de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Stat och kommun vill att jag ska källsortera mer för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Viktiga personer i min närhet vill att jag ska källsortera mer för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag är villig att källsortera mer för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Alla hushåll har en moralisk plikt att källsortera, och ingen ska kunna betala sig fri från denna plikt.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag upplever källsortering som en tidsödande aktivitet.	1	2	3	4	5

30. För att minska hushållsavfallets negativa effekter på miljön diskuteras olika åtgärder som syftar till att öka källsorteringen av avfall i hushållen. Du får nu ta ställning till tre sådana åtgärder.

1. Din kommun avsätter skattemedel till en **INFORMATIONSKAMPANJ** som uppmanar hushållen att öka sina insatser gällande **sortering av uttjänta batterier**. Kampanjen ger också utförlig information om var hushållen kan lämna sina batterier.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan informationskampanj är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. I vilken utsträckning skulle Du förändra Din källsortering av batterier om en sådan informationskampanj genomfördes? Jag skulle källsortera…

Mycket mindre än tidigare		Varken mer eller mindre än tidigare		Mycket mer än tidigare
-2	-1	0	1	2

C. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att en sådan informationskampanj genomförs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

2. Din kommun inför ett **VIKTBASERAT AVGIFTSSYSTEM** för hushållsavfall som innebär att kommunen väger det icke-sorterade avfallet. Hushållen får sedan betala en avgift per kilo icke-sorterat avfall, vilket innebär att de hushåll som sorterar mer får en lägre sophämtningskostnad än de som sorterar mindre. Vissa kommuner har redan infört ett viktbaserat avgiftssystem. Oavsett om Din kommun har infört ett sådant system eller inte vill vi veta vad Du tycker om systemet.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att ett sådant avgiftssystem är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. I vilken utsträckning skulle Du förändra Dina källsorteringsinsatser om ett sådant avgiftssystem införs (Hur förändrade Du Dina källsorteringsinsatser när systemet infördes)? Jag skulle källsortera… (Jag källsorterade)

Mycket mindre än tidigare		Varken mer eller mindre än tidigare		Mycket mer än tidigare
-2	-1	0	1	2

C. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att ett sådant avgiftssystem påverkar Din frihet att själv välja vad Du ska göra med Ditt avfall?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad		Påverkar inte min frihet att välja		Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-2	-1	0	1	2

D. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att ett sådant avgiftssystem införs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

3. Din kommun beslutar att **HUSHÅLLEN INTE SJÄLVA SKA TRANSPORTERA SITT AVFALL TILL ÅTERVINNINGSSTATIONER**. Hushållen sorterar i stället sitt avfall i olikfärgade påsar som hushållen sedan lämnar i soptunnan. Renhållningsansvariga tar sedan hand om upphämtning, transport och sortering av de olika påsarna. Den extra kostnaden för detta system finansieras med en höjd avgift för alla hushåll.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att ett sådant system är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. I vilken utsträckning skulle Du förändra Din källsortering om ett sådant system införs? Jag skulle källsortera…

Mycket mindre än tidigare		Varken mer eller mindre än tidigare		Mycket mer än tidigare
-2	-1	0	1	2

C. Om Ert hushåll själva fick välja, skulle Ni kunna tänka Er att betala en höjd avfallsavgift för att någon annan hämtade och transporterade iväg sorterade sopor åt Er?

☐ Nej ☐ Ja

Om Du svarat Ja, hur mycket skulle Ni maximalt kunna tänka Er att betala per år för ett sådant system? _____kronor/år

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att ett sådant system påverkar Din frihet att själv välja vad Du ska göra med Ditt avfall?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad		Påverkar inte min frihet att välja		Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-2	-1	0	1	2

E. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att ett sådant system införs?

Helt emot		Varken eller		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

FRÅGA 31 RIKTAR SIG ENDAST TILL DIG SOM KÄLLSORTERAR NÅGOT AV DITT AVFALL. DU SOM ALDRIG KÄLLSORTERAR, GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA 32.

31. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från följande påståenden.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Jag källsorterar för jag vill att andra människor skall uppfatta mig som en ansvarsfull person.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag källsorterar för jag vill se mig själv som en ansvarsfull person.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag källsorterar för jag anser att jag själv bör göra sådant som jag förväntar mig att andra ska göra.	1	2	3	4	5
Källsortering är en aktivitet som får mig att må bra.	1	2	3	4	5
Min källsortering gynnar mitt hushålls privata ekonomi.	1	2	3	4	5

FRÅGOR OM PRIVATBILISM

32. Hur ofta använder Du nedan angivna färdsätt för resor till arbete, för inköp och för övriga resor? *(Kryssa för det svarsalternativ som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning för varje typ av resa)*

		Aldrig	1-3/mån	1-2/vecka	3-4/vecka	5/vecka eller mer
Bil som förare	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Bil som passagerare	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Kollektiva färdmedel ex. buss, pendeltåg	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cykel/gång	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

33. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om privatbilismen. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot växter och djur i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot människors hälsa i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot växter och djur i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot människors hälsa i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot *min* hälsa och *mitt* välbefinnande.	1	2	3	4	5
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett så allvarligt problem att åtgärder måste sättas in omedelbart.	1	2	3	4	5

34. Hur stort ansvar anser Du att olika aktörer i Sverige har för att vidta åtgärder för att minska privatbilismens negativa effekter på människor och miljö?

	Mycket litet ansvar				Mycket stort ansvar
Staten (regering, riksdag, statliga myndigheter)	1	2	3	4	5
Näringslivet	1	2	3	4	5
Kommunerna	1	2	3	4	5
Privatpersoner	1	2	3	4	5

35. Hur stort förtroende har Du för att olika aktörer i Sverige lever upp till sitt ansvar när det gäller att vidta åtgärder för att minska privatbilismens negativa effekter på människor och miljö?

	Mycket litet förtroende				Mycket stort förtroende
Staten (regering, riksdag, statliga myndigheter)	1	2	3	4	5
Näringslivet	1	2	3	4	5
Kommunerna	1	2	3	4	5
Privatpersoner	1	2	3	4	5

FRÅGA 36 RIKTAR SIG ENDAST TILL DIG SOM KÖR BIL. DU SOM ALDRIG KÖR BIL, GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA 37.

36. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om bilanvändning. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Jag känner en moralisk skyldighet att minska min bilanvändning för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag känner inget personligt ansvar att minska min bilanvändning för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är ingen idé att jag minskar min bilanvändning eftersom det endast har liten betydelse för de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Stat och kommun vill att jag ska minska min bilanvändning för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Viktiga personer i min närhet vill att jag ska minska min bilanvändning för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag är villig att minska min bilanvändning för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5

37. För att minska bilismens negativa effekter på miljön diskuteras olika åtgärder som syftar till att minska den privata bilanvändningen. Du får nu ta ställning till tre sådana åtgärder.

1. Din kommun avsätter skattemedel till en **INFORMATIONSKAMPANJ** där en broschyr skickas ut till alla hushåll. I broschyren uppmanas privatpersoner att minska sin bilanvändning för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön. I denna finns också utförlig information om lokala alternativa färdsätt exempelvis kollektiva färdmedel och cykel.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan informationskampanj är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. Hur mycket, uttryckt i procent av nuvarande körsträcka, tror Du att andra bilister i Din kommun kommer att minska sin bilanvändning om en sådan informationskampanj genomförs? *(0 betyder ingen minskning av bilanvändningen, 50 betyder halverad bilanvändning och 100 betyder att helt sluta använda bilen)*

_____%

BESVARAS ENDAST OM DU ANVÄNDER BIL

C. Hur mycket, uttryckt i procent av nuvarande körsträcka, kommer Du att minska Din bilanvändning om en sådan informationskampanj genomförs? *(0 betyder ingen minskning av bilanvändningen, 50 betyder halverad bilanvändning och 100 betyder att helt sluta använda bilen)*

_____%

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan informationskampanj påverkar Din frihet att själv välja färdmedel?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad		Påverkar inte min frihet att välja		Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-2	-1	0	1	2

E. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att en sådan informationskampanj genomförs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

2. Staten beslutar att **HÖJA KOLDIOXIDSKATTEN PÅ BRÄNSLE** så att privatbilismen minskas och de negativa effekterna på miljön reduceras. Kostnaden för bensin och diesel ökar som en följd av beslutet med **2 kronor/liter**.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan höjning av koldioxidskatten på bränsle är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. Hur mycket, uttryckt i procent av nuvarande körsträcka, tror Du att andra bilister i Din kommun kommer att minska sin bilanvändning om en sådan höjning av koldioxidskatten införs? *(0 betyder ingen minskning av bilanvändningen, 50 betyder halverad bilanvändning och 100 betyder att helt sluta använda bilen)*

_____%

BESVARAS ENDAST OM DU ANVÄNDER BIL

C. Hur mycket, uttryckt i procent av nuvarande körsträcka, kommer Du att minska Din bilanvändning om en sådan höjning av koldioxidskatten införs? *(0 betyder ingen minskning av bilanvändningen, 50 betyder halverad bilanvändning och 100 betyder att helt sluta använda bilen)*

_____%

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan höjning av koldioxidskatten på bränsle påverkar Din frihet att själv välja färdmedel?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad		Påverkar inte min frihet att välja		Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-2	-1	0	1	2

E. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att en sådan höjning av koldioxidskatten på bränsle införs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

3. För att minska privatbilismen så att de negativa effekterna på miljön reduceras avsätter Din kommun skattemedel i syfte att **FÖRBÄTTRA KOLLEKTIVTRAFIKEN** genom att minska biljettpriset **med 25 % och öka turtätheten.**

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan förbättring av kollektivtrafiken är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. Hur mycket, uttryckt i procent av nuvarande körsträcka, tror Du att andra bilister i Din kommun kommer att minska sin bilanvändning om en sådan förbättring av kollektivtrafiken genomförs? *(0 betyder ingen minskning av bilanvändningen, 50 betyder halverad bilanvändning och 100 betyder att helt sluta använda bilen)*

_____%

BESVARAS ENDAST OM DU ANVÄNDER BIL

C. Hur mycket, uttryckt i procent av nuvarande körsträcka, kommer Du att minska Din bilanvändning om en sådan förbättring av kollektivtrafiken genomförs? *(0 betyder ingen minskning av bilanvändningen, 50 betyder halverad bilanvändning och 100 betyder att helt sluta använda bilen)*

_____%

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan förbättring av kollektivtrafiken påverkar Din frihet att själv välja färdmedel?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad		Påverkar inte min frihet att välja		Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-2	-1	0	1	2

E. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att en sådan förbättring av kollektivtrafiken genomförs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

38. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från följande påståenden.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Det måste vara upp till var och en att bestämma om man vill minska sin privata bilanvändning eller inte.	1	2	3	4	5
Åtgärder som syftar till att minska den privata bilanvändningen bör riktas mot dem som kör bil mest.	1	2	3	4	5
Åtgärder för att minska den privata bilanvändningen bör endast införas där människor har god tillgång till alternativa färdmedel (t ex kollektivtrafik).	1	2	3	4	5
Åtgärder för att minska den privata bilanvändningen bör anpassas så att låginkomsttagare inte måste avstå från att använda bil.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är viktigt att jag har möjlighet att uttrycka min åsikt innan stat och kommun beslutar om åtgärder för att minska den privata bilanvändningen	1	2	3	4	5

FRÅGOR OM MILJÖMÄRKTA VAROR

39. En del varor i svenska butiker har någon typ av miljömärkning, som symboliserar att en vara miljömässigt uppfyller vissa kravnivåer. Vilket eller vilka av dessa miljömärken känner Du igen? (*Kryssa för i rutorna under bilderna.*)

Bra Miljöval	**Svanen**	**KRAV**	**EU-blomman**
☐	☐	☐	☐

40. Hur ofta väljer Du medvetet att köpa varor som har någon form av miljömärkning? Utgå från Dina inköpsvanor i stort.

Aldrig		Ibland		Alltid
1	2	3	4	5

41. Är Du speciellt noga med att en *viss typ av varor* har miljömärkning?

☐Nej ☐ Ja, och speciellt följande vara/varor *(ange gärna 2-3 stycken)*:_____

_____

42. Hur ofta väljer Du medvetet att köpa *hushållspapper* som är märkt med ”Svanen” eller ”Bra Miljöval”?

Aldrig		Ibland		Alltid
1	2	3	4	5

43. Hur ofta väljer Du medvetet att köpa *livsmedel* som är KRAV-märkta?

Aldrig		Ibland		Alltid
1	2	3	4	5

44. Hur ofta tror Du att andra hushåll i Din kommun medvetet väljer att köpa varor som har någon form av miljömärkning?

Aldrig		Ibland		Alltid
1	2	3	4	5

45. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om varor som *inte* är miljömärkta. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Konsumtionen och produktionen av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta är ett hot mot växter och djur i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5
Konsumtionen och produktionen av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta är ett hot mot människors hälsa i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5
Konsumtionen och produktionen av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta är ett hot mot växter och djur i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5
Konsumtionen och produktionen av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta är ett hot mot människors hälsa i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5
Konsumtionen och produktionen av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta är ett hot mot *min* hälsa och *mitt* välbefinnande.	1	2	3	4	5
Konsumtionen och produktionen av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta är ett så allvarligt problem att åtgärder måste sättas in omedelbart.	1	2	3	4	5

46. Hur stort ansvar anser Du att olika aktörer i Sverige har när det gäller att vidta åtgärder för att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna som uppstår i samband med konsumtion och produktion av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta?

	Mycket litet ansvar				Mycket stort ansvar
Staten (regering, riksdag, statliga myndigheter)	1	2	3	4	5
Näringslivet	1	2	3	4	5
Kommunerna	1	2	3	4	5
Privatpersoner	1	2	3	4	5

47. Hur stort förtroende har Du för att olika aktörer i Sverige lever upp till sitt ansvar när det gäller att vidta åtgärder för att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna som uppstår i samband med konsumtion och produktion av varor som *inte* är miljömärkta?

	Mycket litet förtroende				Mycket stort förtroende
Staten (regering, riksdag, statliga myndigheter)	1	2	3	4	5
Näringslivet	1	2	3	4	5
Kommunerna	1	2	3	4	5
Privatpersoner	1	2	3	4	5

48. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om miljömärkta varor. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Jag känner en moralisk skyldighet att öka mina inköp av miljömärkta varor för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag känner inget personligt ansvar att öka mina inköp av miljömärkta varor för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är ingen idé att jag ökar mina inköp av miljömärkta varor eftersom det endast har liten betydelse för de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Stat och kommun vill att jag ska öka mina inköp av miljömärkta varor för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Viktiga personer i min närhet vill att jag ska öka mina inköp av miljömärkta varor för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag är villig att öka mina inköp av miljömärkta varor för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5

49. För att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön diskuteras olika åtgärder för att öka konsumtionen av miljömärkta *livsmedel*. Du får nu ta ställning till två sådana åtgärder.

1. Staten avsätter skattemedel till en **INFORMATIONSKAMPANJ** som uppmanar privatpersoner att öka sina inköp av miljömärkta livsmedel. Kampanjen ger utförlig information om vilka livsmedel som är miljömärkta samt om vad som gör dessa mer miljövänliga än andra livsmedel.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan informationskampanj är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. I vilken utsträckning skulle du förändra dina inköp av miljömärkta livsmedel om en sådan informationskampanj genomförs? Jag skulle...

Köpa mycket mindre miljömärkt än tidigare		Varken köpa mer eller mindre miljömärkt än tidigare		Köpa mycket mer miljömärkt än tidigare
-2	-1	0	1	2

C. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att en sådan informationskampanj genomförs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

2. Miljömärkta livsmedel kostar i de flesta fall mer än livsmedel som inte är miljömärkta. Staten beslutar att **HÖJA SKATTEN PÅ LIVSMEDEL SOM INTE ÄR MILJÖMÄRKTA** så att dessa *kostar lika mycket* som miljömärkta livsmedel.

A. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan skattehöjning på icke-miljömärkta livsmedel är en rättvis åtgärd?

Mycket orättvis		Varken orättvis eller rättvis		Mycket rättvis
-2	-1	0	1	2

Motivera gärna Ditt svar:_____

_____

B. I vilken utsträckning skulle du förändra dina inköp av miljömärkta livsmedel om en sådan skattehöjning på icke-miljömärkta livsmedel införs? Jag skulle...

Köpa mycket mindre miljömärkt än tidigare		Varken köpa mer eller mindre miljömärkt än tidigare		Köpa mycket mer miljömärkt än tidigare
-2	-1	0	1	2

C. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att en sådan skatt påverkar Din frihet att själv välja vilka livsmedel Du ska köpa?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad		Påverkar inte min frihet att välja		Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-2	-1	0	1	2

D. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att en sådan skattehöjning på icke-miljömärkta livsmedel införs?

Helt emot		Varken för eller emot		Helt för
-2	-1	0	1	2

50. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från följande påståenden.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Miljömärkta varor förbättrar min personliga hälsa.	1	2	3	4	5
En skatt på icke-miljömärkta varor gör det lättare för mig att göra miljövänliga inköp.	1	2	3	4	5
Miljömärkta varor ska inte få kosta mer än icke-miljömärkta varor.	1	2	3	4	5
En skattehöjning på icke-miljömärkta varor gör att det finns mindre anledning för mig att vara uppmärksam på vilka varor som är miljömärkta.	1	2	3	4	5
Miljömärkta varor är i realiteten inte mer miljövänliga än icke-miljömärkta produkter.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är svårt att veta vilka miljökrav som miljömärkta varor uppfyller.	1	2	3	4	5

Vi vill nu ställa Dig några frågor om **miljömärkt elektricitet**. El från vindkraft, biobränsle, solceller och befintlig vattenkraft kan ”märkas” med Bra Miljöval, medan el som exempelvis producerats med kol, olja, naturgas eller kärnkraft inte uppfyller kraven för miljömärkning. Eftersom produktionen av miljömärkt el är dyrare blir också miljömärkt el dyrare för konsumenten. De flesta större elbolagen i Sverige erbjuder sina kunder möjligheten att köpa miljömärkt el.

51. Har Ni i ert hushåll någon gång medvetet valt att köpa miljömärkt el, och därmed också betalat mer för hushållselen?

☐Nej ☐ Ja ☐ Vet ej

52. I vilken utsträckning *tror* Du att andra hushåll i Din kommun köper miljömärkt el?

I mycket liten utsträckning				I mycket stor utsträckning
1	2	3	4	5

53. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av följande påståenden.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Produktionen av el som *inte* är miljömärkt är ett hot mot *min* hälsa och *mitt* välbefinnande.	1	2	3	4	5
Produktionen av el som *inte* är miljömärkt är så farlig att åtgärder för att minska sådan produktion måste sättas in omedelbart.	1	2	3	4	5

FRÅGA 54 RIKTAR SIG ENDAST TILL DIG SOM SJÄLV KAN VÄLJA ELLEVERANTÖR (EXEMPELVIS DU SOM BOR I VILLA). DU SOM INTE KAN VÄLJA ELLEVERANTÖR, GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA 55.

Det finns undersökningar som visar att ungefär 75 procent av alla hushåll i Sverige kan tänka sig att köpa miljömärkt el, och ungefär 40 procent av alla hushåll kan dessutom tänka sig att betala mer för miljömärkt el än för el som inte är miljömärkt. Vi är nu intresserade av i vilken utsträckning Ert hushåll skulle vara villigt att köpa el med Bra Miljöval-märkning.

Tänk Dig nu att när Du ska förnya avtalet med Din elleverantör så kan Du välja mellan två alternativ, A eller B. A representerar miljömärkt el medan B representerar icke-miljömärkt el. För ett genomsnittligt hushåll som inte köper miljömärkt el kostar elen idag cirka 80 öre per kWh. För miljömärkt el tillkommer dock en extra kostnad.

För ett typiskt **villahushåll utan elvärme** innebär en prishöjning på 2 öre per KWh en ökad kostnad på ungefär 100 kronor per år, 4 öre per KWh innebär ungefär 200 kronor per år och 10 öre innebär ungefär 500 kronor per år. För ett typiskt **villahushåll med elvärme** innebär en prishöjning på 2 öre per KWh en ökad kostnad på ungefär 400 kronor per år, 4 öre per KWh innebär 800 kronor och 10 öre per KWh innebär 2000 kronor i högre elkostnader.

54. Tänk Dig att Du ska förnya avtalet med Din elleverantör. Vilket alternativ, A eller B, väljer Du i var och en av de tre valsituationerna (1, 2, 3) nedan? *(Kryssa för det alternativ Du väljer för varje valsituation)*

1

A. El med ”Bra-miljöval” märkning	Höjning med **2** öre per kWh	☐
B. Ingen miljömärkning	Ingen prisförändring	☐

2

A. El med ”Bra-miljöval” märkning	Höjning med **4** öre per kWh	☐
B. Ingen miljömärkning	Ingen prisförändring	☐

3

A. El med ”Bra-miljöval” märkning	Höjning med **10** öre per kWh	☐
B. Ingen miljömärkning	Ingen prisförändring	☐

55. Följande påståenden handlar om Dina motiv när Du väljer mellan miljömärkt och icke-miljömärkt el. I vilken utsträckning instämmer Du i eller tar avstånd från dessa påståenden?

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Jag skulle vilja köpa miljömärkt el men jag har inte råd.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag vill hellre stödja miljöförbättrande åtgärder inom andra områden.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag vill köpa miljömärkt el för då känner jag mig som en ansvarsfull person.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag vill köpa miljömärkt el för att jag vill att andra ska se mig som en ansvarsfull person.	1	2	3	4	5
Viktiga personer i min närhet vill att jag ska köpa miljömärkt el.	1	2	3	4	5
Stat och kommun vill att jag ska köpa miljömärkt el.	1	2	3	4	5
Jag vill inte köpa miljömärkt el eftersom jag redan stöder miljömärkt el via den s.k. elcertifikatavgiften.	1	2	3	4	5

56. Bor Du så nära något eller några av följande elproduktionskällor att Du anser att Du har *personlig erfarenhet* av de miljöeffekter som uppstår i samband med elproduktionen från dessa? *(Kryssa för det svarsalternativ som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Ja	Nej	Vet ej
Vindkraft	☐	☐	☐
Vattenkraft	☐	☐	☐
Kärnkraft	☐	☐	☐
Biobränsleeldade kraftverk	☐	☐	☐
Förbränning av fossila bränslen (kol, olja eller naturgas)	☐	☐	☐

57. I vilken utsträckning instämmer Du i eller tar avstånd från följande påståenden om miljömärkt el?

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Jag känner ett personligt ansvar att köpa miljömärkt el för att bidra till en bättre miljö.	1	2	3	4	5
Miljömärkt el är i realiteten inte mer miljövänlig än icke-miljömärkt el.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är svårt att veta vad det är för miljökrav som miljömärkt el uppfyller.	1	2	3	4	5
Miljömärkt el ska inte få kosta mer än icke-miljömärkt el.	1	2	3	4	5
Om jag väljer att köpa miljömärkt el är det inte alls säkert att det verkligen innebär ökad produktion av miljömärkt el.	1	2	3	4	5
Miljömärkt el intresserar mig inte eftersom jag inte kan vara säker på att jag får miljömärkt el till just mitt hushåll.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är statens ansvar att se till att elproduktionen är miljövänlig.	1	2	3	4	5
Det är elbolagens ansvar att se till att elproduktionen är miljövänlig.	1	2	3	4	5

Har Du några synpunkter på denna undersökning kan Du skriva dem här:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Använd det portofria svarskuvertet när Du skickar in det ifyllda formuläret till oss.

TACK FÖR DIN MEDVERKAN!

APPENDIX II

Questionnaire from the 2006 SHARP-survey (in Swedish)

BAKGRUNDSFRÅGOR

1. Jag är ☐ Kvinna ☐ Man

2. Jag är _____ år

3. Jag är ☐ Ensamstående ☐ Gift/sammanboende

4. Min högsta genomförda utbildning är:

☐ Grundskola/folkskola
☐ Gymnasieskola/folkhögskola
☐ Universitet/högskola
☐ Annat:_____

5. Min huvudsakliga sysselsättning är:

☐ Förvärvsarbete, heltid
☐ Förvärvsarbete, deltid
☐ Studerande
☐ Arbetssökande
☐ Hemarbetande eller föräldraledig
☐ Pensionär eller sjukpensionär
☐ Annat:_____

6. Jag/vi har _____ (antal) hemmavarande barn i åldrarna _____

7. Ungefär hur hög är Ditt <u>hushålls</u> sammanlagda inkomst <u>per månad före skatt</u> (inkludera alla slags inkomster, till exempel eventuell sjukpenning, föräldrapenning, studiemedel, arbetslöshetsersättning etc.).

☐ 10000 kronor eller mindre
☐ 10001-20000 kronor
☐ 20001-30000 kronor
☐ 30001-40000 kronor
☐ 40001-50000 kronor
☐ 50001-60000 kronor
☐ 60001-70000 kronor
☐ 70001-80000 kronor
☐ 80001-90000 kronor
☐ 90001-100000 kronor
☐ Mer än 100000 kronor

8a. Jag bor i:

☐ lägenhet
☐ radhus
☐ fristående villa
☐ annat:_____

8b. För Dig som bor i <u>lägenhet eller radhus</u>, finns det behållare för källsortering i den fastighet där Du bor eller i direkt anslutning till fastigheten?

☐ Ja ☐ Nej

9. Ungefär hur många kvadratmeter är Ditt hem? Inkludera även biytor som förråd och garage.

Ca _____kvadratmeter

10. Mitt hushålls kostnad för sophantering:

- ☐ baseras på sopkärlets storlek och/eller hur ofta sopkärlet töms
- ☐ baseras endast på hur mycket soporna väger
- ☐ baseras dels på en avgift (t ex beroende på sopkärlsstorlek), dels på hur mycket soporna väger
- ☐ ingår i hyran (fast avgift)
- ☐ vet ej

11. Jag har körkort för personbil ☐ Ja ☐ Nej

12a. I hushållet finns:

- ☐ 0 bilar
- ☐ 1 bil
- ☐ 2 bilar
- ☐ 3 bilar eller fler

12b. Drivs någon/några av hushållets bil/bilar med förnyelsebara drivmedel (t. ex. biogas, etanol, RME)?

☐ Ja ☐ Nej

12c. Hur troligt är det att Du inom ett år byter ut nuvarande bil/bilar mot en bil som drivs av förnyelsebara drivmedel (t. ex. biogas, etanol, RME)?

Inte alls troligt						Mycket troligt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

13. Hushållets totala körsträcka med bil är i genomsnitt _____mil/år

14. Min egen körsträcka med bil är i genomsnitt _____mil/år

15. Hur långt är det mellan Din bostad och följande platser i kilometer:

	Avstånd	Vet ej	
Närmaste hållplats för kollektiva färdmedel t ex buss	_____km	☐	
Närmaste återvinningsplats för källsortering (t ex papper, metall, glas)	_____km	☐	
Affären där Du/Ni huvudsakligen gör inköp av livsmedel	_____km	☐	
Mitt arbete eller skola där jag studerar	_____km	☐	Arbetar eller studerar inte ☐
Göteborgs centrum	_____km	☐	

16. Hur upplever Du Dina möjligheter att resa till olika platser i samhället (d.v.s. möjlighet att resa till arbetet, affärer etc.)?

Mycket dåliga möjligheter			Varken dåliga eller bra			Mycket bra möjligheter
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

FRÅGOR OM VAD DU TYCKER ÄR VIKTIGT I LIVET

17. Alla människor har värden som fungerar som vägledande principer i deras liv. Sådana värden kan vara olika viktiga för olika personer. Vi vill att Du anger hur viktigt vart och ett av följande värden är som **en vägledande princip i Ditt liv**.

Nedan och på nästa sida finns ett antal värden angivna med en kort beskrivning av innebörden inom parentes. Läs först igenom alla värden. Skriv sedan ner de två värden som är minst viktiga för Dig och de två värden som är mest viktiga för Dig på raderna nedan.

Ange sedan hur viktigt varje värde är för Dig genom att ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning. Hoppa inte över något värde och kom ihåg att det inte finns några rätt eller fel svar utan det är Din egen uppfattning om vart och ett av värdena som vi är intresserade av.

De två **minst** viktiga värdena för mig är:

1. _____ 2. _____

De två **mest** viktiga värdena för mig är:

1. _____ 2. _____

	Tvärt emot mina värderingar	Inte viktigt			Viktigt			Mycket viktigt	Av yttersta vikt
FRIHET (frihet att tänka och handla)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SJÄLVKONTROLL (lägga band på sig själv, motstå frestelser)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
TRYGGHET FÖR MEDBORGARE (trygghet och säkerhet för alla i samhället)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
FRAMGÅNG (lyckas, uppnå sina mål)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
VIDSYNTHET (vara tolerant mot annorlunda idéer och föreställningar)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SOCIAL ORDNING (ett stabilt samhälle)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Tvärt emot mina värderingar	Inte viktigt			Viktigt			Mycket viktigt	Av yttersta vikt
RESPEKT FÖR TRADITION (bevara gamla sedvänjor)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SOCIAL MAKT (kontroll över andra, dominera)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
FÖRÄNDRING (söka utmaningar och nyheter)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
AUKTORITET (ha rätten att leda och bestämma)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
BEVARAD MILJÖ (bevara mångfalden i det ekologiska systemet)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
OBEROENDE (självtillit, klara sig själv)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
KREATIVITET (vara unik, fantasifull)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SOCIAL RÄTTVISA (motarbeta orättvisor, bry sig om de svaga)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PLIKTTROGENHET (fullgöra sina skyldigheter)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
INFLYTANDE (kunna påverka människor och händelser)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
VÄLSTÅND (materiella ägodelar, pengar)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
HJÄLPSAMHET (arbeta för andras välbefinnande)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
NYFIKENHET (vara intresserad av allt, utforska)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
LOJALITET (trogen sina vänner och sin grupp)	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

INSTÄLLNING TILL MILJÖN

18. Nu följer ett antal påståenden om miljön. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena. *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån	Tar delvis avstånd ifrån	Osäker	Instämmer delvis	Instämmer helt
Balansen i naturen är tillräckligt stark för att klara av de moderna industrinationernas påverkan.	1	2	3	4	5
Människan har rätt att förändra naturen efter sina behov.	1	2	3	4	5
Växter och djur har lika stor rätt att existera som människor.	1	2	3	4	5
Trots våra speciella förmågor lyder vi människor fortfarande under naturens lagar.	1	2	3	4	5
Människorna är ämnade att härska över naturen.	1	2	3	4	5
Jorden kan liknas vid en rymdfarkost med mycket begränsade utrymmen och resurser.	1	2	3	4	5
När människan ingriper i naturens förlopp får det ofta katastrofala följder.	1	2	3	4	5
Vi närmar oss gränsen för den folkmängd jorden kan föda.	1	2	3	4	5
Jorden har gott om naturresurser bara vi lär oss hur vi ska använda dem.	1	2	3	4	5
Människan förgriper sig allvarligt på naturen.	1	2	3	4	5
Människans uppfinningsrikedom kommer att garantera att vi *inte* gör jorden obeboelig.	1	2	3	4	5
Om utvecklingen fortsätter som hittills kommer vi snart att få uppleva en stor ekologisk katastrof.	1	2	3	4	5
Så småningom kommer människan att lära sig tillräckligt om hur naturen fungerar för att kunna kontrollera den.	1	2	3	4	5
Den så kallade ”ekologiska krisen” som mänskligheten står inför har kraftigt överdrivits.	1	2	3	4	5
Balansen i naturen är väldigt känslig och rubbas lätt.	1	2	3	4	5

19. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om ansvar och rättvisa inom miljöområdet. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena. *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån			Osäker			Instämmer helt
Varje enskild individ har rätt att själv bestämma om han/hon ska bete sig miljövänligt eller inte.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Stat och kommun har ett ansvar att bidra till en ekologiskt hållbar utveckling.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Varje enskild individ har ett personligt ansvar att aktivt arbeta för en ekologiskt hållbar utveckling (t. ex. stödja miljöorganisationer, delta i demonstrationer för miljön).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Varje enskild individ har ett personligt ansvar att förändra sin livsföring i en ekologiskt hållbar riktning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
För att åtgärder som syftar till att förbättra miljön ska accepteras är det viktigt att beslut har fattats på ett rättvist sätt.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Även om majoriteten är emot vissa åtgärder som syftar till att förbättra miljön är det ibland nödvändigt att i alla fall införa dem.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

FRÅGOR OM PRIVATBILISM

20. Hur ofta använder Du nedan angivna färdsätt för resor till arbete, för inköp och för övriga resor? *(Kryssa för det svarsalternativ som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning för varje typ av resa)*

		Aldrig	1-3/mån	1-2/vecka	3-4/vecka	5/vecka eller mer
Bil som förare	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Bil som passagerare	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Kollektiva färdmedel ex. buss, pendeltåg	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cykel/gång	till arbete/studier	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för inköpsresor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	för övriga resor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

21. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om privatbilismen. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena. *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån			Osäker			Instämmer helt
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot människor och miljö i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot människor och miljö i Sverige.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot människor och miljö i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett hot mot min och min familjs hälsa och välbefinnande.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Luftföroreningar från privatbilismen är ett så allvarligt problem att åtgärder måste sättas in omedelbart.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

22. Att minska luftföroreningar från privatbilismen kan göras på olika sätt. Vad tycker Du är rättvist?

	Mycket orättvist			Varken rättvist eller orättvist			Mycket rättvist
Bilanvändare som i högre grad bidrar till luftföroreningar bör minska sina utsläpp mer än övriga.	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Bilanvändare som har behov av bil ska inte behöva minska sina utsläpp lika mycket som övriga.	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Alla som kör bil bör minska sina utsläpp i lika stor utsträckning.	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

FRÅGA 23 RIKTAR SIG ENDAST TILL DIG SOM KÖR BIL. DU SOM ALDRIG KÖR BIL, GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA 24.

23. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om Din bilanvändning. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena.

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån			Osäker			Instämmer helt
Min bilanvändning leder till negativa effekter på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det är ingen idé att jag minskar de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning eftersom det endast har liten betydelse.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån			Osäker			Instämmer helt
Jag känner en moralisk skyldighet att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag får dåligt samvete om jag inte försöker minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Stat och kommun vill att jag ska minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Viktiga personer i min närhet vill att jag ska minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag ser många personer i Göteborgs kommun som aktivt väljer bort att använda bilen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det finns många faktorer i min omgivning som hindrar mig från att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Om jag vill är det enkelt för mig att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag är villig att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av min bilanvändning.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag tycker att bil är ett bra färdmedel.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

ÅTGÄRDER FÖR ATT MINSKA PRIVATBILISMENS MILJÖEFFEKTER

24. Nedan följer ett antal politiska åtgärder som syftar till att reducera bilanvändningens negativa effekter på miljön. Ta ställning till i vilken utsträckning Du anser att åtgärderna är effektiva (d.v.s. reducerar de negativa effekterna på miljön), rättvisa för innevånare i Göteborgs kommun samt i vilken utsträckning Du är för eller emot åtgärderna.

1. Höjd skatt på fossila drivmedel (t. ex. bensin, diesel)

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

2. Ökad satsning på förbättrad framkomlighet för cyklister och fotgängare i Göteborgs kommun (t. ex. fler gång- och cykelbanor, förbättrad belysning)

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

3. Ökad satsning på personligt anpassad information om kollektiva färdmedel i Göteborgs kommun (t. ex. information via Internet eller telefon om kollektivt resande)

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

4. Ökade subventioner av kollektivtrafiken i Göteborgs kommun (t. ex. billigare biljetter, ökad turtäthet)

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

5. Subventioner av förnyelsebara drivmedel (t. ex. billigare biogas, etanol, RME)

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

6. Utvidgat bilfritt centrum i Göteborgs kommun

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

25. För att minska privatbilismens negativa effekter på miljön är det möjligt att införa olika åtgärdspaket. Nedan får Du ta ställning till två åtgärdspaket där olika åtgärder kombinerats.

1. För att minska privatbilismen **HÖJS KOLDIOXIDSKATTEN PÅ FOSSILA DRIVMEDEL**. Kostnaden för bensin och diesel ökar som en följd av beslutet med **5 kronor/liter.** För att göra det lättare att använda alternativa färdmedel får kommunerna riktade skattebidrag så att **KOLLEKTIVTRAFIKEN KAN FÖRBÄTTRAS** genom att **biljettpriset minskas med 50 % och turtätheten ökar.**

A. Hur mycket tror Du att andra bilister i Göteborgs kommun kommer att minska sin bilanvändning om detta åtgärdspaket införs?

Minskar inte alls bilanvändningen						Minskar i hög grad bilanvändningen
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

OM DU INTE ANVÄNDER BIL GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA C

B. Hur mycket kommer Du att minska Din bilanvändning om detta åtgärdspaket införs?

Minskar inte alls bilanvändningen						Minskar i hög grad bilanvändningen
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

C. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket påverkar Din ekonomiska situation?

Försämrar min ekonomi i hög grad			Påverkar inte min ekonomi			Förbättrar min ekonomi i hög grad
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket påverkar Din frihet att själv välja färdmedel?

Minskar min frihet att välja i hög grad			Påverkar inte min frihet att välja			Ökar min frihet att välja i hög grad
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

E. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket påverkar Din rörlighet (d.v.s. möjlighet att ta sig till arbetet, affärer etc.)?

Minskar min rörlighet i hög grad			Påverkar inte min rörlighet			Ökar min rörlighet i hög grad
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

F. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket är effektivt och leder till en bättre miljö i Göteborgs kommun?

Inte alls effektivt						Mycket effektivt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

G. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket är rättvist för Dig?

Mycket orättvist			Varken rättvist eller orättvist			Mycket rättvist
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

H. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att detta åtgärdspaket införs?

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

2. För att minska andelen bilar som drivs på fossila bränslen **HÖJS KOLDIOXIDSKATTEN PÅ BRÄNSLE**. Kostnaden för bensin och diesel **ökar som en följd av beslutet med 5 kronor/liter.** För att öka andelen bilar som drivs med förnyelsebara drivmedel i Sverige **SUBVENTIONERAS FÖRNYELSEBARA DRIVMEDEL** (t. ex. biogas, etanol, RME). Kostnaden för förnyelsebara drivmedel **minskar med 5 kronor/liter**.

OM DU HAR EN BIL SOM DRIVS AV FÖRNYELSEBARA DRIVMEDEL (T. EX. BIOGAS, ETANOL, RME) GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA B.

A. Hur troligt är det att Du/Ni **inom ett år** byter ut nuvarande bil mot en bil som drivs av förnyelsebara drivmedel (t. ex. biogas, etanol, RME) om detta åtgärdspaket införs?

Inte alls troligt						Mycket troligt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

B. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket är effektivt och leder till en bättre miljö i Göteborgs kommun?

Inte alls effektivt						Mycket effektivt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

C. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att detta åtgärdspaket är rättvist för Dig?

Mycket orättvist			Varken rättvist eller orättvist			Mycket rättvist
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

D. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att detta åtgärdspaket införs?

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

OM DU HAR EN BIL SOM DRIVS MED FÖRNYELSEBARA DRIVMEDEL (T. EX. BIOGAS, ETANOL, RME) GÅ VIDARE TILL FRÅGA 27.

26. Hur viktiga anser Du att följande aspekter är för att Du ska vilja köpa en bil som drivs med förnyelsebara drivmedel? *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Inte alls viktigt			Varken viktigt eller oviktigt			Mycket viktigt
Att förnyelsebara drivmedel blir billigare.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Att fler bensinstationer har förnyelsebara drivmedel.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Att den närmaste bensinstationen har förnyelsebara drivmedel.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Att kostnaden för fossila drivmedel höjs.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Att endast bilar som drivs av förnyelsebara drivmedel får parkera gratis i Göteborgs kommun.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Att alla som köper en bil som drivs av förnyelsebara drivmedel får ett ekonomiskt bidrag.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Att det finns fler bilmodeller som drivs av förnyelsebara drivmedel.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Annat:……	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

FRÅGOR OM HUSHÅLLSAVFALL OCH KÄLLSORTERING

27. Hur stor del av hushållsavfallet källsorterar Du och Din familj? *(Kryssa för det svarsalternativ som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning för varje typ av avfall)*

	Inget				Allt
Matavfall/kompost	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pappersförpackningar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Plastförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Glasförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Metallförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tidningar och wellpapp	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Farligt avfall (t.ex. olja, lösningsmedel, medicin)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Restavfall	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

28. Hur stor del av det totala hushållsavfallet tror Du att andra hushåll i Göteborgs kommun källsorterar?

	Inget				Allt
Matavfall/kompost	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pappersförpackningar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Plastförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Glasförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Metallförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tidningar och wellpapp	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Farligt avfall (t.ex. olja, lösningsmedel, medicin)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Restavfall	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

29. Ungefär hur många <u>minuter</u> spenderar Ert hushåll i genomsnitt <u>under en vecka</u> för:

- Att källsortera och rengöra avfall i hemmet? _____minuter
- Att frakta källsorterat avfall till återvinningsplatser? _____minuter

30. Gör Ni extra/enkom resor till återvinningsplatsen (för papper, glas, plast etc.) för att lämna Ert hushållsavfall? *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

Nej, aldrig						Ja, alltid
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

31. Hur stora uppoffringar (i form av t. ex. tid, pengar och känslor av obehag) tycker Du att det krävs för att källsortera nedanstående avfallstyper? *(Kryssa för det svarsalternativ som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning för varje typ av avfall)*

	Inga uppoffringar alls				Mycket stora uppoffringar	Vet ej
Matavfall/kompost	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pappersförpackningar	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Plastförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Glasförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Metallförpackningar (utan pant)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tidningar och wellpapp	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Farligt avfall (t.ex. olja, lösningsmedel, medicin)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Restavfall	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

32. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om källsortering. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena. *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån			Osäker			Instämmer helt
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot människor och miljö i hela världen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot människor och miljö i Sverige.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot människor och miljö i den kommun där jag bor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett hot mot min och min familjs hälsa och välbefinnande.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hushållsavfall som inte källsorteras är ett så allvarligt problem att åtgärder måste sättas in omedelbart.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

33. Att minska de negativa miljöeffekterna av avfall kan göras på olika sätt. Vad tycker Du är rättvist?

	Mycket orättvist			Varken rättvist eller orättvist			Mycket rättvist
De hushåll som genererar mest sopor ska källsortera mer än övriga hushåll.	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
De som har svårare att källsortera (t. ex. de som har långt till en återvinningsplats) ska inte behöva källsortera lika mycket som andra.	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Alla hushåll ska källsortera lika mycket.	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

34. Nedan följer ett antal påståenden om källsortering. Ange i vilken utsträckning Du instämmer i eller tar avstånd från vart och ett av påståendena. *(Ringa in den siffra som bäst svarar mot Din uppfattning)*

	Tar helt avstånd ifrån			Osäker			Instämmer helt
Mitt hushållsavfall leder till negativa effekter på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det är ingen idé att jag källsorterar eftersom det inte för med sig några positiva miljöeffekter.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag känner en moralisk skyldighet att källsortera.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag får dåligt samvete om jag inte källsorterar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag källsorterar för jag anser att jag själv bör göra sådant som jag förväntar mig att andra ska göra.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag källsorterar för jag vill se mig själv som en ansvarsfull person.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Stat och kommun vill att jag ska källsortera för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Viktiga personer i min närhet vill att jag ska källsortera.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag ser många personer i Göteborgs kommun som källsorterar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det finns många faktorer i min omgivning som hindrar mig från att källsortera mer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Om jag vill är det enkelt för mig att källsortera mer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag är villig att källsortera mer för att reducera de negativa effekterna på miljön.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Källsortering är bra.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

ÅTGÄRDER FÖR ATT ÖKA HUSHÅLLENS KÄLLSORTERING

35. På följande två sidor följer ett antal politiska åtgärder som syftar till att minska hushållsavfallets negativa effekter på miljön. Ta ställning till i vilken utsträckning Du anser att åtgärderna är effektiva (d.v.s. ökar hushållens källsortering), rättvisa för innevånare i Göteborgs kommun samt i vilken utsträckning Du är för eller emot åtgärderna.

1. Ökad satsning från kommunens sida på städning av återvinningsplatserna (för papper, glas, plast etc.) och områdena kring dessa

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

2. Ökad satsning på information om de positiva miljöeffekter som följer av att källsortera mera

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

3. Den kommunala sophämtningsavgiften höjs lika mycket för alla hushåll

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

4. Öka antalet återvinningsplatser (för papper, glas, plast etc.) så att hushållen får närmare att lämna sitt avfall

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

5. Ökad information om i vilken omfattning Göteborgs innevånare sorterar sina sopor

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

6. Återvinningsplatserna (för papper, glas, plast etc.) bemannas under vissa tider av dygnet så att hushållen kan få hjälp med att lägga rätt avfall i rätt behållare

Inte alls effektiv						Mycket effektiv
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mycket orättvis			Varken orättvis eller rättvis			Mycket rättvis
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

36. För att öka källsorteringen i hushållen diskuteras olika åtgärder. Du får nedan ta ställning till två sådana åtgärder, som båda skulle innebära förändringar i storleken och/eller utformningen av den kommunala avgift som Du idag betalar för sophämtningen.

Nuvarande avgifter i Göteborg skiljer sig åt mellan hushåll. Villaägare i Göteborg har vanligen möjlighet att få delar av avfallet hämtat, medan resterande avfall (glas, papper, plast etc.) ska fraktas till en återvinningsplats. Avgiften är ca 1400-2500 kronor per år beroende på storlek på kärlen/säcken och hämtning sker normalt varje eller varannan vecka. För dig som bor i lägenhet tas avgiften ut på hyran då det är fastighetsägaren som betalar avgiften. Den avgift som lägenhetsinnehavaren betalar kan skilja sig mellan olika områden, men den är generellt sett lägre än den som villaägare betalar.

1. Kommunen beslutar att utöka förekomsten av s.k. **FASTIGHETSNÄRA INSAMLING.** Detta innebär att hushållen inte själva behöver transportera det sorterade avfallet (t.ex. glas, papper, plast) till återvinningsplatser. För Er som bor i lägenhet innebär detta att Ni kan lämna sorterat avfall i olika kärl i ett soprum i direkt anslutning till Er bostad. För Er som bor i villa innebär fastighetsnära insamling att Ni lägger avfallet i en och samma tunna fast sorterade i påsar med olika färger, en för varje avfallstyp (t.ex. glas, papper, plast). Renhållningsansvariga ansvarar sedan för upphämtning vid Din tomt.

DU SOM REDAN HAR FASTIGHETSNÄRA INSAMLING (D.V.S. DU SOM HAR BEHÅLLARE FÖR BL.A. GLAS, PAPPER OCH PLAST I DIREKT ANSLUTNING TILL DIN BOSTAD), HOPPA ÖVER FRÅGA A, B, OCH C, OCH GÅ DIREKT TILL FRÅGA D PÅ NÄSTA SIDA.

A. Den extra kostnaden för utökad fastighetsnära insamling finansieras med en höjd sophämtningsavgift. Skulle Ni i Ert hushåll kunna tänka Er att betala 200 kronor per år i höjd sophämtningsavgift för denna tjänst?

☐ Nej ☐ Ja

Om Du svarat nej, hur viktiga anser Du att följande faktorer är som skäl till att Du svarat nej?

	Inte alls viktigt skäl						Mycket viktigt skäl
Sophämtningsavgiften är redan tillräckligt hög.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag vet för lite om det nya systemet.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag vill inte bli fråntagen att göra sådant som jag gärna gör själv.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jag kan tänka mig att betala extra för att slippa transportera avfallet men jag tycker att den avgiftshöjning som anges ovan är för hög.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det nuvarande systemet är bättre för miljön.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det nuvarande systemet är billigare för samhället.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det nuvarande systemet är bekvämare för mig.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det bör vara hushållens ansvar att själva transportera sitt avfall.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Om Du svarat ja, hur viktiga anser Du att följande faktorer är som skäl till att Du svarat ja?

	Inte alls viktigt skäl						Mycket viktigt skäl
Jag tycker det är tidsödande att transportera avfallet och avstår gärna.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
De återvinningsplatserna som jag åker till idag är ofta överfulla och ostädade.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det nya systemet som beskrivs är bättre för miljön.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det nya systemet som beskrivs är billigare för samhället.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det nya systemet som beskrivs är bekvämare för mig.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Det bör inte vara hushållens ansvar att själva transportera sitt avfall.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

B. Hur mycket tror Du att andra hushåll i Göteborgs kommun skulle förändra sin källsortering om fastighetsnära insamling införs?

Minskar i hög grad källsorteringen			Påverkar inte källsorteringen			Ökar i hög grad källsorteringen
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

C. Hur mycket skulle Du förändra Din källsortering om fastighetsnära insamling införs?

Minskar i hög grad källsorteringen			Påverkar inte källsorteringen			Ökar i hög grad källsorteringen
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att fastighetsnära insamling är effektivt och leder till ökad källsortering i Göteborgs kommun?

Inte alls effektivt						Mycket effektivt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

E. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att fastighetsnära insamling är rättvist för Dig?

Mycket orättvist			Varken rättvist eller orättvist			Mycket rättvist
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

F. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att det beskrivna systemet med fastighetsnära insamling införs?

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

2. Din kommun inför ett **VIKTBASERAT AVGIFTSSYSTEM** för hushållsavfall som innebär att det icke-sorterade avfallet vägs. Den nuvarande sophämtningsavgiften avskaffas och i stället betalar varje hushåll en avgift per kilo icke-sorterat avfall. Motivet till att införa ett sådant system är att de hushåll som inte källsorterar får en högre sophämtningskostnad än de som källsorterar mer. Viktbaserade avgiftssystem finns i vissa andra kommuner och tidigare studier visar att hushåll som inte källsorterar kan få betala upp till ca 500 kronor mer per år i ett sådant system.

A. Hur mycket tror Du att andra hushåll i Göteborgs kommun skulle förändra sin källsortering om ett viktbaserat system införs?

Minskar i hög grad källsorteringen			Påverkar inte källsorteringen			Ökar i hög grad källsorteringen
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

B. Hur mycket skulle Du förändra Din källsortering om ett viktbaserat system införs?

Minskar i hög grad källsorteringen			Påverkar inte källsorteringen			Ökar i hög grad källsorteringen
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

C. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att ett viktbaserat system är effektivt och leder till ökad källsortering i Göteborgs kommun?

Inte alls effektivt						Mycket effektivt
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

D. I vilken utsträckning anser Du att ett viktbaserat system är rättvist för Dig?

Mycket orättvist			Varken rättvist eller orättvist			Mycket rättvist
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

E. I vilken utsträckning är Du FÖR eller EMOT att det beskrivna viktbaserade systemet införs?

Helt emot			Varken för eller emot			Helt för
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Har Du några ytterligare synpunkter kan Du skriva dem här:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Använd det portofria svarskuvertet när Du skickar in det ifyllda formuläret till oss.

TACK FÖR DIN MEDVERKAN!

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DOES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN SWEDEN suffers from a legitimacy problem? What measures can be taken in order to increase its legitimacy? Which are the characteristics of a legitimate policy, and how should we go about exploring public policies from this perspective? Taking its departure in the contemporary political challenge to design public policies effectively promoting individual pro-environmental responsibility-taking, this thesis argues that *legitimacy* is at the core of any attempt to explain, evaluate and suggest measures for increasing policy performance, and thus should be a major concern for policymakers and scholars of public policy alike. The first part of the thesis explores the concept of public policy legitimacy from a theoretical perspective and presents an analytical framework to guide its study, generally applicable across contexts and cultures. In the second part of the thesis, the framework is put to the test in an empirical exploration of the legitimacy for Swedish environmental public policy, focusing the correspondence between established belief-systems in policy and among the public. Utilising this approach, the study provides knowledge on both trans-situational normative goals, as well as beliefs concerning the environmental problematique. These findings deepen our understanding of the character of the legitimacy problems facing Swedish environmental public policy, and offer relevant insights into how the degree of legitimacy, and thereby policy performance, might be furthered.

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