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The Imagined Environmental Citizen

Exploring the State – Individual Relationship in Swedish Environmental Policy

Simon Matti



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Abstract: As environmental problems today are understood as being problems of collective action, they also depend on the broad engagement of individual citizens for their successful solution. Institutions directed towards resolving the environmental situation need, accordingly, to be perceived by the citizenry as promoting acceptable goals, for acceptable reasons and by the use of acceptable means. In short, institutions aiming at instigating and sustaining collective action need first to be perceived by the collective itself as being *legitimate*. Emanating from the notion of public acceptance as essential for long-term effective policies, this thesis takes a first step towards an evaluation of the degree of legitimacy for Swedish environmental policy. In this endeavour, its primary purpose is to elucidate and study the foundations for policy legitimacy, that is, the normative principles embedded in political sustainability aspirations and expressed through the official Swedish environmental policy discourse. The main aim of this thesis is, accordingly; *To explore, map and analyse the values, beliefs and principles underpinning Swedish environmental policy aiming at involving household members in the work towards an environmental sustainable society, as reflected through official policy documents and policy instruments in-use on both national and municipal levels of government.*

By the use of a value-oriented qualitative text analysis of both national and municipal policy documents, the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy are outlined. Through this approach, important insights are reached in terms of how people, according to policy-makers, are expected to reason in environmental matters; what motivations are used to guide behaviour in this field; and what kinds of policy instruments and motivational statements are deemed the most effective for making people comply with new environmental norms of behaviour. Additionally, by applying three different conceptions of citizenship as the analytical framework by which the environmental norm is analysed, the thesis also examines to what extent the Swedish image of the 'environmental citizen'; on the rights – obligations balance; on her motivations, values and participation in the environmental work, either express an image of a new ecological citizenship or keeps firmly within the traditional framework of the state – individual relationship.

The thesis concludes *first*, that the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy, on the national as well as the local level of government, draw strongly on collectivist values. All Swedish citizens are bound by a contract based in the membership of the Swedish community and shall therefore dutifully contribute to the common good by actively doing their bit in building the Green People's Home. The state – individual relationship is therefore interpreted as being contractual, territorially bound and based on the expectance of reciprocity. The responsibilities for political authority is, consequently, framed as to actively enlighten the citizens on what is considered the good life, and to steer the citizenry towards making (objectively defined) responsible or informed choices in everyday life. Education for sustainability thus plays an important part as the policy instrument of choice. In this context, the thesis also concludes that the environmental norm is, in almost unaltered form, transferred down to local authorities. Local level environmental policy thereby rests on the same normative foundations as the national policy discourse. *Secondly*, although Sweden has taken important steps on the way towards instigating new, environmental duties and responsibilities with the citizenry and towards expanding the citizenship sphere to encompass also the private, the image of the environmental citizen provided in the official environmental discourse still predominately resides within the framework of traditional, albeit environmentally sensitive, (civic-republican) citizenship.

Key words: Environment, Policy, Legitimacy, Discourse, Citizenship, Ecological, Values, Beliefs

Contents

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Luleå, August 20, 2006

Simon Matti

Chapter One

On the effectiveness of environmental policy

The key issue when constructing effective, democratic institutions for coming to terms with broad societal problems is one of *legitimacy*. Environmental problems today are to a large extent understood as problems of collective action, that is, a situation in which the desirable outcome is dependent on the input from several actors, but in which everyone's rational behaviour will result in a worse outcome for all (Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom & Shivakumar, 2005:15; see also Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). As such they also depend on the broad engagement of individual citizens for their successful solution and institutions directed towards resolving the environmental situation need, accordingly, to be perceived by the citizenry as promoting *acceptable* goals, for *acceptable* reasons and by the use of *acceptable* means. In short, institutions aiming at instigating and sustaining collective action need first to be perceived by the collective itself as being legitimate (see, for examples, Beetham 1991; Birch, 2001; Connolly 1984a & 1984b; Føllesdal, 2004; Knight, 1992; Levi, 1997; Lipset 1981; Lundqvist, 2004c; North, 1990; Widegren 1998).

In his doctoral thesis, Duit (2002) acknowledges the contemporary conceptualisation of environmental degradation and resource depletion as collective action problems, in need of broad societal solutions rather than end-of-pipe regulations. Duit examines the evolution of new, public institutions for environmental protection, and while focusing predominately on a 30-year process of institutionalisation exemplified by the development of Swedish environmental policy 1969-1999, he ends his thesis by reflecting also on the vast political challenges that lies ahead:

> The major challenge for the state consists, however, in building the institutions of the sustainable society – a second generation of institutions for

> environmental protection with the task of regulating the environmentally damaging consequences of citizens' ways of life, rather than those emanating from industrial discharges (Duit, 2002:258, translated from Swedish).

Now, as the political focus concerning environmental protection shifts from industry to individual, the new institutions' need for public acceptance and, thus, legitimacy, should once again be emphasized. Recognising this, Duit (2002:258, translated from Swedish and italics added) concludes that "the question is *according to which blueprint* this enormous project should be carried through". In many ways, the following study which focuses the normative foundations of contemporary Swedish environmental policy takes its starting point in the above question posed by Duit. Emanating from the notion of public acceptance as essential for long-term effective policies, it aims at elucidating and analysing the foundations for legitimacy within official environmental policy in Sweden, and, thereby, to outline the actual blueprint drawn up for this endeavour of public environmental protection[1].

1.1 Positioning the individual in environmental policy

The rapid and constant emergence of new political issues and discourses competing for attention on the contemporary global arena suggests that individuals, today more than ever, are involved in a continuous formation of preferences, attitudes and responses towards new social objects, new ideas and new policies. Not the least is this the case when considering the discourses relating to environmental issues, which over the past decades have added, and keeps on adding, new entries to the popular vocabulary such as: limits to growth, global warming, ozone-layer depletion and environmentalism; all of which contributes to form the umbrella-discourse revolving round the nodal point constituted by sustainable development. Taking as an important starting-point the publication of the Bruntland-commission's renowned report *Our Common Future* in the year of 1987, 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' have become very influential concepts[2] and in several ways marked a turn in the discursive constructions of national environmental policies and international environmental agreements throughout the world (Carter, 2001; Dryzek, 2005). Today, most national governments see themselves as being both morally and politically committed to the idea of sustainability, mostly due

[1] The notion of a *blueprint* for environmental protection might for some convey an overly optimistic view on the environmental challenges lying ahead, a view that it is possible to plan (or perhaps invent) our way out of the problematic situation. This normative belief is, however, not one advanced in this thesis. Nevertheless, as the research herein presented is concerned with official environmental policy, that is, the action-plans, guidelines and programmes outlined by the Swedish government in policy-documents with the common aim of realising the sustainable Swedish society, this term is taken to be rather adequate in describing the goals – means structure of the governmental programmes studied.

[2] In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (commonly known as the Bruntland-commission after its chair, former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland) published the report *Our Common Future* in which it called for a development "which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". This, furthermore, is perceived to be achieved when we, so to say, live of the interest without reducing the capital. This has since been the most widespread definition of sustainable development.

to the signing of numerous multilateral agreements on the topic (cf. Skr, 1992/93:13, 5). In Sweden, the current (that is, 2006) social democratic Prime Minister Göran Persson have at several occasions declared his government's aspiration to make Sweden a forerunner or role-model in the global efforts to reach sustainability, among other things by the means of combining "the revolutionary freedom of the car" with "an ecological responsibility" (Persson, 1998, translated from Swedish). Through an active environmental policy, transcending all other policy areas, the Swedish government aims at developing the existing welfare state of the 1900's into a 21st century Green People's Home (in Swedish: *Det gröna folkhemmet*, e.g. MoSD, 2005).

In its contemporary connotation, sustainable development is a political concept for change that comprises social, economic and environmental concerns all at the same time; denoting both that socio-economic considerations must be taken when introducing new environmental standards and that economic growth and development cannot be allowed to overshadow social or environmental concerns. The comprehensive and sometimes rather radical re-structuring of society as demanded by the up-and-coming environmental movements of the 1960's and 70's has thus been replaced with a more cautious, and therefore more politically feasible, goal of gradual reformation, taking into account also other aspects than the sole focus on nature preservation as promoted by the deep-ecology movements[3], and operating with a slightly different time-frame than was advocated during the 'era of the apocalypse'. Nevertheless, by also including social issues (such as equity and democratisation), the notion of sustainable development is more wide-ranging (and therefore also more ambiguous) than the closely related, policy-oriented concept of ecological modernisation, which pertains primarily to environmental protection through a (win-win) restructuring of the contemporary capitalist-economic system (cf. Dryzek, 2005; Hajer, 1995).

The inclusion of environmental issues on the national political agendas, along with the widespread acknowledgement of global environmental problems (e.g. global warming or air and water pollution), has also affected activities on the international political arena. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro during the summer of 1992 (also known as the Earth Summit) was initiated by the above mentioned Bruntland-report to further promote global efforts along the lines of the three – economic, social and environmental – interdependent dimensions of sustainability. Emanating in the signing of several multilateral agreements on the protection of the environment, the milestones of the

[3] Following Carter (2001:14), deep-ecology is a radical, ecocentric moral theory which strongly questions the contemporary (anthropocentric) divide, both physical and mental, between humans and nature and aims at removing humans from the top of the moral hierarchy through the introduction of "biocentric egalitarianism" (see also Devall and Sessions, 1985; Foreman, 1991; Naess, 1981).

1992 UNCED are the twin documents Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development[4]. These agreements establish, firstly, the shift from considering different developmental fields as conflicting or even isolated factors, towards the concept of sustainable development as defined by the Bruntland-commission, as well as the need for cooperation on several levels, global; national; and local, in order to achieve sustainability. Secondly, in addition to the need for a global partnership of states and cooperation across boundaries, the documents emanating from the Rio-summit explicitly stress the involvement of the *individual* in the work towards sustainability, most notably in those parts concerning the environmental dimension. This development marked the end of conceiving the challenges of environmental degradation as a task to be solved exclusively by the iron-triangles consisting of "governmental agencies, bureaucracy and well-organised target-group interests" (Lundqvist, 2001a:322) Instead, according to post-Rio policy documents on both national and international levels, the active participation of individual citizens is a fundamental requirement for coming to terms with environmental degradation. The recommendations lined out in Agenda 21 have therefore been interpreted as describing a bottom-up process with a focus on the local levels of action, denoting the role of municipalities; non-governmental organisations; people's movements, households and single individuals (SOU, 1997:105). As indicated by the wordings of the Agenda 21 agreement, national governments have an important role to play in the work towards sustainability in terms of encouraging and motivating its citizens to participate, and by providing local initiatives with the means necessary for their involvement. For example, section 23.2 of the Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992) states that:

> One of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making. Furthermore, in the more specific context of environment and development, the need for new forms of participation has emerged. This includes the need of individuals, groups and organizations to participate in environmental impact assessment procedures and to know about and participate in decisions, particularly those which potentially affect the communities in which they live and work. Individuals, groups and organizations should have access to information relevant to environment and development held by national authorities, including information on products and activities that have or are likely to have a significant impact on the environment, and information on environmental protection measures.

This is also echoed by the formulations found in the Rio-declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26), which's Principle 10 (here quoted at length)

[4] The Rio-conference resulted in the multilateral signing of five major documents: the above mentioned Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; along with the Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and the Statement of Forest Principles. The latter three are however, as evident by their titles, directed towards specific issues, whereas the two former set down the overall principles for the work towards sustainable development. This makes them the most relevant ones to, within the scope of this thesis, address in more detail.

concludes that involving citizens in the work towards sustainability, mainly through making them a part of the decision-making processes and by providing the citizenry with relevant information, is an important task for the national government in realising ecological sustainability:

> Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceeding, including redress and remedy shall be provided.

The main reasons for the strong focus on individuals' participation in the sustainability process are, at least, twofold. *First*, it is connected to the way in which the sources of the present environmental situation are conceived. Today, environmental problems are no longer believed to be the sole result of industrial activities in a few polluting facilities; a belief which, in the past, either implicitly or explicitly placed the responsibility for amendment exclusively on governments and corporations. Rather, it is widely acknowledged, both within the political community and the academia, that the sources of environmental problems are to be found also in the millions of choices people make every day in their diverse roles as citizens, consumers and household members (cf. UNCED, 1992; Hobson, 2002 & 2004a). This is, however, not to say that amending the environmental situation is a task to be bestowed the single citizen or the household exclusively, thus allowing for governments and multinational corporations to avoid their responsibility. Rather, there is a need for involving citizens in the day-to-day work towards sustainability *alongside* the more comprehensive efforts made and measures taken by politicians and within the global business community. This understanding on the single individual's impact on the environment, which today also is found within the international political leadership, is commonly illustrated by the ecological footprint, an idea early adapted by environmental movements and greens directing attention also towards lifestyle issues in mainly the industrialised part of the world, originally defined as:

> [T]he area of ecologically productive land (and water) in various classes – cropland, pasture, forests, etc. – that would be required on a continuous basis
>
> a) to provide all the energy/material resources consumed, and
> b) to absorb all the wastes discharged
>
> by that population with prevailing technology, *wherever on Earth that land is located* (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996:52, italics in original).

The ecological footprint and related concepts are prominently used as an illustrative indicator of the negative and asymmetrical effects the daily activities in each individual's lifestyle have; both directly on the ecosystem and indirectly on other individuals'

possibilities to meet their basic needs. As such, the idea of an ecological footprint, and in particular acknowledgement of the fact that individuals in certain parts of the world let their activities expand way beyond what would be possible had the resources been evenly distributed, also constitutes an important foundation for one of the core notions within the green movement; the principle of social justice. A major obstacle in the way of sustainability is, thus, that the size of (almost) every individual's ecological footprint is considerably larger in the industrialised, high-consumption parts of the world, than in the less developed world. This, consequently, effectively prevents both present generations living in developing countries, as well as future generations in general, to ever be able to meet their needs (cf. Carter, 2001; Dobson, 1998).

Second, since environmental problems to a larger extent than was previously imagined are believed to stem from the lifestyle choices of households and/or single individuals, it is only on this level where the problems can be properly addressed without it instead becoming a task of merely patching up a continuously inadequate system. The need for both comprehensiveness when implementing changes in lifestyles and long-term planning in solving the environmental problems is, however, not a novel idea. As early as 1972, the Club of Rome's report *Limits to Growth* suggested that the short-term, and one-sided, focus on merely technological, end-of-pipe solutions to cope with the exponential growth-problem certainly will postpone humanity reaching its limits, but will not adequately address the essence of the problem. Instead, the well-famous Club of Rome suggested we learn to live *within* the limits rather than fighting against them, indicating a self-imposed, as opposed to the otherwise unavoidable nature-imposed, limitation to growth (Meadows et al., 1974; see also Dobson, 1998). Furthermore, in a recent update of this highly influential report, the environmental problems owing to affluence, materialism and unrestricted consumerism in predominately western societies are acknowledged, highlighting the need for comprehensive *lifestyle-changes* in order to reduce the size of the ecological footprints (Meadows, Randers and Meadows, 2005:240). The long-term involvement of individuals in the work towards sustainability is therefore a necessary feature of an effective environmental policy; as further denoted by Kymlicka and Norman (1994:360): "Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible personal lifestyle decisions […]; the state cannot protect the environment if citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes". From these lines of reasoning stem also the theoretical notions prescribing the need for an increased individual responsibility for nature, within green political thought taking the form either of an *ecological stewardship* (Barry, 1999), or one of many variations on the concept of *citizenship* – from the relatively widely used *environmental citizenship*, through less common concepts such as *sustainability* or *green citizenship* (for this, see Bell, 2005:180-181 & 193n2), to the notion of an *ecological citizenship* (e.g. Dobson, 2003; see also Van Steenbergen, 1994). The crucial idea behind these different forms of individual-level-solutions is the comprehensive rethinking of the norms and

values[5] governing the balance between rights and responsibilities within both the human beings – nature, as well as the state – individual (i.e. the traditional concept of citizenship) relationships respectively (cf. Bell, 2005:182). In practice, key elements of contemporary environmental policies in Sweden and elsewhere are directed towards bringing about a necessary transformation of the current unsustainable lifestyles of its citizens, which in many cases are pointed out as the single largest obstacle *en route* towards ecological sustainability (cf. SOU, 1997:105). This support of transformed behavioural patterns commonly suggests altering the daily practices of single individuals and within households, usually through the introduction of new environmental obligations expressed as household-related activities, for example; implementing a sustainable household waste management, influencing the individual's choice of more environmentally benevolent everyday transportation and encouraging the use of consumer power to steer production in a more environmentally sound direction. The bottom line is, accordingly, that an environmental policy which includes strategies for some form of stable behavioural change also on the individual level is needed in order to effectively sustain the health of the planet in a long-term perspective. However, this has proven to be a somewhat complicated undertaking in contemporary democracies as acknowledged both by normative theory and in political practice.

1.2 Sticks, carrots and legitimate policies

Wherein then, one might ask, lays the stumbling block of constructing policies for sustainability and thereby governing behavioural change with the citizenry? Theoretically speaking, the implementation of an ecologically sustainable society, even if depending on extensive individual participation, should not necessarily meet practical challenges since means of strict regulation and enforcement always can be used to make most individuals at most times comply with new environmental standards and behavioural codes of practice, regardless of their implications for contemporary lifestyle-patterns. This straightforward solution is, however, in practice complicated by several factors. *First*, it is self-evident that a promotion of behavioural change in democratic states is limited to the sole use of democratic measures and, maybe even more importantly, by the established rules, frameworks and consequences embedded in the notion of contemporary representative government. This, in turn, indicates a need for at least a minimum of public support for both the policy goals and the instruments used to reach them; for one, since democratically elected governments are unlikely to risk

[5] The central concept of values has throughout previous research-efforts been given a plenitude of meanings, making it suffer from "definitional inconsistency" (Rohan, 2000:255, Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987:551). Throughout this thesis, however, values are defined as *guiding principles in life, which underpins the beliefs that one end-state, goal or mode of conduct is more preferable than others*. Furthermore, values are anticipated to be stable and enduring trans-situational guides, and as such to construct the foundation for both formal and informal norms (i.e. laws, rules and/or expected patterns of social interaction), as well as attitudes, world-views and ideologies (cf. Allport, 1961; Rokeach, 1973; Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992 & 1996; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).

unpopularity by introducing such environmentally protective measures that are lacking support among the majority of the citizenry. Furthermore, and on a slightly different account of democracy, the question if a representatively elected government even should *consider* implementing non- or weakly supported policies might also be posed, as put by Lundqvist (2001c:465):

> Regulating every last aspect of individual consumption behaviour would mean intrusions by a 'Green Leviathan' into the privacy of individual citizens way beyond what could be legitimised in a democracy.

Here, Lundqvist highlights the extensively debated *legitimacy – effectiveness dilemma* of environmental politics, that is, the difficulties of combining contemporary forms of liberal democracy with effective environmental protection as understood by, among others, Robert Heilbroner (1974) and William P. Ophuls (1977). Envisaging an eco-authoritarian solution to the collective-action problem of environmental degradation, Ophuls (1977:154), for example, argues that "[o]nly a government possessing great powers to regulate individual behaviour […] can deal effectively with the tragedy of the commons", a quote providing an indication of his broader conclusion on the organisation of society, namely that "democracy as we know it cannot conceivably survive" (Ophuls, 1977:152). Needless to say, the complete restructuring of society as following from eco-authoritarian suggestions has not become widely supported as a viable solution. *Second*, even when keeping within the frameworks of democratic government, the reliance on a restructuring of formal (democratic) institutions, for example legislation and regulation as policy instruments driving this change, might also prove difficult, in particular when an effective environmental policy is defined by accomplishing a stable, long-term behavioural change in most aspects of the individual's daily life. Albeit legislation constitutes formal norms of behaviour and, as Barry (1999) concludes, forces individuals to deliberate on their actions in terms of them being either legally right or wrong, which in the long-run can be expected to induce a self-assumed ecological responsibility, they also demand a constant and therefore costly monitoring system during the period before these responsibilities are internalised by the citizenry as a social norm[6]. Such a system would, especially considering the scope for change denoted by both environmental movements and by contemporary environmental

[6] A social norm is defined as a pattern of behaviour expected within a particular society in a given situation; the shared belief of what is normal and acceptable and which shapes the actions of people in a society. Although the very fact that others in society follow the norm and that the social cost for breaking it therefore is relatively high may be enough to deter norm-violation; important social norms are often, in most modern societies also enforced by law (cf. Axelrod, 1986; Bicchieri, 2005; Eisenberg, 1999; Ensminger and Knight, 1997; Gibson et al., 2005; Knight and Ensminger, 2001; North, 1990; Sunstein, 1996). If (or when) social norms have been developed as a result of formal/codified rules (i.e. legislation), a comprehensive official monitoring system is, evidently, no longer needed. The development of social norms is, however, expected to be a slow process, in particular if the rules implemented have comprehensive impact on contemporary lifestyles and day-to-day behavioural patterns. If the changes expected, in addition to being comprehensive, not are perceived to be legitimate (i.e. build on, or express, values that do not correspond with core values held by the citizenry), the successful transition of formal rules into a commonly accepted social norm is perceived to be even more uncertain.

policies (i.e. comprehensive changes in lifestyle and consciousness at least for people living in the industrialised part of the world), again simply be unrealistic for most democratic governments. In particular as most changes are perceived to take place within the private sphere of the household (e.g. household waste-management), or even within the mind of the individual (as new attitudes towards the environment), monitoring that these changes are actually implemented will be increasingly difficult and may, therefore, render legislative measures inefficient (cf. Lundqvist, 2001c:459; Offe, 1999). To exemplify, it is reasonable to assume that the use of legislation is effective in the sense that it triggers a *reciprocal* or *conditional* support for environmental activities. When legislation, combined with a corresponding enforcement of the legal rules, is in place, the individual might feel motivated or even morally obliged to co-operate since s/he can be certain that others will also do their bit (cf. Ek and Söderholm, 2005). However, from a game-theoretical perspective it can be anticipated that a lack in enforcement of these rules will take away this certainty of reciprocity. Thus, it will severely increase the risk of citizens choosing defection-strategies instead of co-operation and thereby attempting to free-ride on the engagement of others, producing a non-pareto optimum outcome for all. Therefore, without effective monitoring and a working system for sanctioning rule-violation, the citizenry's confidence in and adherence to the system run the risk of rapidly deteriorating; making the regulations both toothless and ineffective regardless of the initial public acceptance of, or commitment to, the new rule prescribing environmental protection (Axelrod, 1986; Knight, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). *Third*, a comprehensive use of economic instruments for a top-down steering of behaviour might also be both expensive and long-term inefficient since it reduces the environmental problems to a question of economy and therefore makes behavioural change subject to each individual's personal cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Barry 1999:226-230). As such, at least two problems might result. For one, the cost of providing monetary motivations might be expected to increase over time as people grow accustomed to them. For instance, this risk of a costly incentive-spiral leads Widegren (1998:78) to the conclusion that the foundations of individuals' pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) neither should be thought of, nor treated, as stemming solely from rational responses to regulation or economic incentives: "unless one resorts to very costly schemes of (positive or negative) incentives, […] some kind of moral and altruistic motivation is essential for PEB". Furthermore, too strong a reliance on monetary incentives has proven both unreliable and in some cases even counter-productive due to its crowding-out effect[7] on other

[7] In recent years research has been conducted demonstrating the importance of rethinking the interaction between different types of motivation. Among other things, it has been observed that monetary incentives can "crowd out" other sorts of motivation as it may "undermine an individual's sense of civic duty" (Frey, 1997). When an external intervention reduces individuals' intrinsic (e.g. moral) incentives to act in this manner it is referred to as "the hidden costs of reward" (see e.g. Deci, 1985; Pittman, 1987). For an overview of psychological literature on this subject, see Deci (1999); for a survey of empirical evidence, see Frey and Jegen (2001); for economic experimental evidence, see for example Fehr and Gächter (2000), Frey (1997), Frey and Götte (1999) or Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). See also Berglund and Matti (2006) and Ostrom (2000).

strands of motivation (cf. Frey, 1992 & 1999; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Thøgersen, 1996). Thus, also from within green political thought it has been suggested that, for long-term effectiveness, traditional environmental policies focusing on a change in formal, economic or legal, institutions should be complemented with a deeper rethinking of social norms and/or a change in the citizenry's values. This would, it is argued, drive a change in public behaviour not based on external motivations, but on a sense of moral rights and wrongs (Barry, 1999:228 & 1996:122-123).

As a result, parallel to the use of traditional command-and-control measures, contemporary environmental policies, at least implicitly, express a need for a more structural change; to motivate people to do right for the right reasons, that is, promoting their intrinsic motivation for a continuous environmentally benevolent behaviour by raising popular awareness of environmental problems and what can be done to amend them (Barr, 2003). For example, this is highlighted by the aspirations to, in stark contrast to the weakening of democracy put fourth by proponents of the eco-authoritarian solution, instead strengthen democracy through opening up for more deliberative or participatory decision-making processes. The rationale behind this ambition is, in short, to promote communication *between* citizens as a tool for driving the construction of more ecologically rational policies. The strong communicative element of a participatory democracy is viewed as a key for preventing the unfavourable outcomes (defection-strategies) of the social dilemma-type situations characterising environmental decision-making processes, primarily as increased personal contacts and transparency will drive the formation of trust in the system. Furthermore, deliberation is expected to effectively challenge self-interest as a guide for making political decisions as citizens will become more aware of both the interests of others, and of the impact their own choices of lifestyle have on the environment. All of the above is, in turn, anticipated to result both in more environmentally benevolent policies, and also to make these policies more legitimate among the citizenry. The citizens will themselves be an intricate part of the policy-making process and the policies will, thus, build on values forming the smallest common denominator amongst the (now more environmentally aware) citizenry (Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 2000 & 2005; Smith, 2001). As Dryzek (2001:651, italics added) writes, this form of democratic decision-making is preferable since it produces outcomes that are "*legitimate* to the extent that they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question". By this account, it can also be anticipated that the effectiveness[8] of environmental policies, also within the frameworks

[8] Policy effectiveness is here defined by the relation between, on the one hand, visions and, on the other, outcomes or results. An effective environmental policy is, thus, a policy which accomplishes the complete and long-term stable transition to, what is commonly described as, sustainable *lifestyles* among the citizenry (i.e. the consideration of environmental issues in most aspects of daily life). Following Dobson (1995:543) lifestyle-changes indicates transformations of a wide range of day-to-day activities, for instance "care with the things you buy, the things you say, where you invest your money, the way you treat people, the transport you use, and so on". This

of contemporary representative government, requires more than merely regulative measures or economic incentives directed towards the citizenry. To solve the collective-action problem of environmental degradation by involving the bulk of the citizens also in practice, and over longer periods of time, requires that individuals' attitudes and preferences towards the new environmental discourses in general, and towards the policies and policy instruments used to advance environmentally benevolent behaviour in particular, are positive. A requirement for an effectively working policy is, thus, that the citizenry in general should react positively (or at least to accept) the values and principles making up its normative foundations, that is, find it legitimate (cf. Beetham, 1991). This undoubtedly puts focus on publicly held values and beliefs towards nature in general and the risk of environmental degradation in particular, but also on the political relationships between the state and the individual; on citizens' understandings of what are to be considered the acceptable goals and means for the state to pursue and utilise respectively. Otherwise, without a positive formation of attitudes towards the policies' expressed requirements, the consensus on measures taken for environmental protection is, as for example indicated by the research conducted by Petra Krantz-Lindgren (2001), in actual fact likely to give way for what people view as hampering factors for environmentally benevolent behaviour; for example time and economy. As Krantz-Lindgren's research has shown, even people who describe themselves as being highly environmentally sensitive respond predominately to the above mentioned external factors in their behavioural decisions[9]. However, the argument advanced in this thesis is that, with a positive formation of attitudes towards new policies and policy requirements, these external factors might both be perceived differently and be given a less prominent role in the individual's behavioural decision-making process[10].

Research on the individual's development of attitudes towards new political aspirations in general and towards new sustainability aspirations in particular might, then, be an

is contrasted by policies which successfully regulates or governs certain *activities* (for example through the use of laws or economic incentives governing recycling of soda-cans) for as long as the policy-instruments are in place, but does not implement a transformation in consciousness and thus a long-term, stable change in norms of behaviour.

[9] Examples on this might be the environmentally conscious person who drives an old, polluting car – possibly because she cannot afford a new, more environmentally friendly model, in combination with the fact that the use of a car is necessary for making day-to-day chores possible within a reasonable time-frame.

[10] However, that is not to say that people always act based solely on their values or attitudes. For example D. C. North (1990) argues that when attempting to explain behaviour, one must also account for the, perceived or real, cost for acting according to ones convictions. By this reasoning, people might refrain from expressively transforming their values into action, and therefore comply with a policy deemed as being more or less illegitimate, in those cases where the social cost for non-compliance are perceived as being too high. Alternatively, one could possibly argue that compliance with a policy which essentially goes against ones general values could be a mere expression of a high level of trust in, or respect for, political authority. The latter could be defined as a considerably higher, or dominant, level of what Skogstad (2003a), among others, refers to as input, or procedural, legitimacy. The trust in the system's ability to generate the best outcomes takes here precedence over the attitudes towards the content of the outcomes themselves (see, for example, also Rawls, 1999, for a political-philosophical discussion on "procedural justice").

important factor for explaining the effectiveness of Swedish environmental policy. As explained by Widegren (1998:77, italics added): "Once legislation is in place most citizens have to be motivated by the *legitimacy* of the restrictions to be willing to abide by them […]. The same holds for market incentives". In consequence, the quote by Widegren points to the fact that policies and policy instruments used to promote an increased involvement by individual citizens in the work towards sustainability need to be constructed in a way that they not only regulate certain actions, but actually contributes to fostering a sense of environmental responsibility, an ecological conviction, amongst a majority of the citizens. In other words, the normative elements of policies must, both to work effectively and to avoid the costly enforcement of weakly supported formal rules, also enjoy the consent of those citizens towards whom they are directed; this is to say that "choices of institutions and instruments for sustainable resource use must be made in ways that secure their political legitimacy" (Lundqvist, 2004c:6)[11]. How, then, is this to be accomplished in practice? Any attempt to answer this question makes clear that the understanding of how individuals' perception of new objects, new policies and new discursive constructions are formed, and what they subsequently choose to do (or not to do) as a response, is central for any discussion on the promotion of a long-term greening of behavioural patterns in contemporary democracies. However, as a first step towards an evaluation of the degree of legitimacy for Swedish environmental policy, what these new policies and discourses themselves comprise in terms of values, principles and motivations must be examined in order to comprehend the contemporary context of individuals' decision-making process. This is the main purpose of the thesis.

1.3 Aim of the thesis

As the dominant environmental discourse, presented both in national Swedish policy documents and international environmental agreements post-Rio, establishes that participation within the households is required to implement ecological sustainability and solve the collective-action problem of environmental degradation, it is in the interest of political decision-makers at national and local levels to know how to encourage people to co-operate, that is, by adapting a sustainable attitude towards the environment, and incorporating environmental considerations in most aspects of their daily lives. Based on the above reasoning, it can be anticipated that neither formal regulative instruments, nor monetary incentives always are reliable, or even preferable, for accomplishing the changes needed on their own. Instead, it seems reasonable to assume that an effective policy (that is, one governing long-term change in most aspects of daily life, see note 7) must also be perceived as being legitimate, in the sense that it

[11] Here, it must be mentioned that Lundqvist (2004c) defines political legitimacy normatively, as dependent on the policy's, objectively evaluated, correspondence with a set of values presumed to be shared in all (liberal) democratic societies. Please see Chapter 2 for a further discussion on this issue.

builds on acceptable normative foundations enjoying the consent of the citizenry and, thus, corresponds with those values held by the citizens as "guiding principles in life" (Stern, Dietz, Kalof and Guagnano, 1995:1615; see also Thøgersen and Grunert-Beckmann, 1997). Therefore, it is in this context relevant to ask which motivational factors and policy instruments are the most legitimate when it comes to stimulating sustainability-promoting activities among the Swedish households. What motivations, and based on which values, do current environmental policies use to promote an environmental conviction among the household members? And finally, what can be done to increase the level of legitimacy among citizens for environmental policy as a whole?

However, and connecting to more of a normative-democratic perspective, very little is known about how people relate themselves and how they respond to new environmental duties. Do people perceive that they have an obligation towards the environment, and if so, for what reasons or motives? How do those who do not embrace the new environmental political aspirations understand the level of legitimacy for policy instruments – regulative, economic and/or informative – currently used with the intention to make households behave in environmentally responsible ways? Similarly, though it is a known fact that national environmental policies post-Rio include a strong focus on the individual's role in reaching a sustainable society, and that these contributions do include some form of change in lifestyle, there is less knowledge regarding what this new environmental norm actually do comprise; how extensive the suggested changes of lifestyle are and, more importantly, by what motivations these changes should be carried out. Are individuals faced a more or less uniform set of values in this regard or do they vary across policy areas? If/when value systems are mixed, how are they ranked in terms of priority? Subsequently, which values are likely to prevail in terms of conflict? In other words; is, for example, liberty at all an issue when presenting these political objectives to the public? Are people encouraged to evaluate and choose individual life projects primarily within the family, household or voluntary associations, or is this evaluation presumed to be organised "from above" by the political authority? All these are factors that might contribute to shape the reaction of individuals when faced with new policies and thus, their perception of them as legitimate or not.

Based on the perceived importance of legitimacy in order to implement effectively working policies in the environmental field, this thesis will set out to study the foundations for environmental policy legitimacy, that is, the normative principles embedded in political sustainability aspirations, as expressed through official Swedish environmental policy documents. The thesis has an explicit focus on the case of Swedish policy for ecological sustainability directed towards household participation in three specific areas: a) purchase of environmentally friendly products, b) waste

management and recycling activities and, c) environmentally aware transport behaviour[12]. The main aim of this thesis is, accordingly; *To explore, map and analyse the values, beliefs and principles underpinning Swedish environmental policy aiming at involving household members in the work towards an environmental sustainable society, as reflected through official policy documents and policy instruments in-use on both national and municipal levels of government.*

Since an important basis for policy legitimacy is comprised by the extent to which the values embedded in the policy in question match the values and attitudes held by household members[13], the main part of the thesis will be directed towards conducting a value-oriented qualitative text analysis of national and municipal policy documents, outlining both the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy directed towards environmental activities within the household, as well as the principles expressed implicitly by the policy instruments in-use. Through this approach, important insights are anticipated to be reached in terms of how people, according to policy-makers, are expected to reason in environmental matters; what motivations are used to guide behaviour in this field; and what kinds of policy instruments and motivational statements are deemed the most effective for making people comply with new environmental norms of behaviour. By further comparing the outcome of this thesis with the results of, for example, mass-surveys or in-depth interviews[14], knowledge imperative for constructing more legitimate environmental policies and selecting policy instruments will be reached. The outcome of this thesis is therefore anticipated to construct an important first step in providing relevant knowledge for future environmental policy-making, as well as implementation of environmental policy, on the national as well as municipal levels.

One additional rationale for conducting this study can also be pointed out. As evident from the discussion above, long-term ecological sustainability is (at least by some) perceived to require a new take on *citizenship*; on rights, duties and responsibilities for the individual citizen in relation both to the environment and to her fellow citizens.

[12] This thesis is written as a part of the SHARP Research Programme (www.sharpprogram.se), financed by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA, in Swedish *Naturvårdsverket*) and the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning (Formas), for a five-year period (2003-2008). The policy areas of interest (household waste-management, sustainable transportation and green consumption) have been decided on jointly within the SHARP-program, being areas where, for example, official environmental policy explicitly refers to the need for individual households' contribution in order to improve the environmental situation.

[13] Definition of legitimacy after Beetham (1991). Please see the further discussion on the concept of legitimacy in Chapter 2 below.

[14] Within the SHARP Research Programme, two mass-surveys have been conducted during the spring of 2005 and 2006. The results from these are to be used as a basis for a forthcoming legitimacy-evaluation, when the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy are to be compared with values and attitudes held by household members. The issue of value-correspondence between policy and citizens as a means for evaluating the degree of legitimacy will thus form the topic for future research and is therefore not explicitly addressed in this thesis.

Furthermore, Sweden has both the political ambition as well as the international reputation of being a forerunner in the work for sustainability. Given this, it might also be considered relevant to examine how well the Swedish image of the 'environmental citizen', on the rights – obligations balance, on her motivations, values and participation in the environmental work, corresponds with what is, both within the environmental movements and political ecology, deemed a necessity for long-term ecological sustainability. Do the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policies express the image of a new, ecological citizenship or keeping firmly within the traditional framework of the state – individual relationship?

1.4 Environmental policy and the foundations for legitimacy

The degree of legitimacy for a policy is in this thesis believed to be, to a significant extent, based in the level of correspondence between central values embedded in policy itself and the values and attitudes held by household members (cf. Beetham, 1991; Connolly, 1984a). Therefore, the first task for an evaluation of Swedish environmental policy legitimacy, and the one predominately pursued in this thesis, is to explore the nature of the Swedish environmental norm(s), as expressed rhetorically through official environmental policy documents, and practically through the policy instruments in-use. A significant foundation for legitimacy (or illegitimacy) is thereby believed to be located within the outcome of the environmental policy-making processes in the form of those values and motivations found embedded in policy-documents. However, given the "multi-level governance"-structure of contemporary environmental policy, denoting the gradual transition of policy-making power both vertically, from the national level authorities to trans-national and local levels of government, as well as horizontally, from governmental authorities to non-governmental actors (Eckerberg and Joas, 2004:406-7; see also: Fairbrass and Jordan, 2004; Lundqvist, 2004b), some further clarifications regarding the foundations for legitimacy, and, thus, the objects of analysis in this thesis, are needed. On what level(s) – vertically as well as horizontally – is it likely to expect these foundations, relevant to study for a legitimacy-evaluation, to be located? Or, in other words; given that the aim is to analyse the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy, which are its appropriate delimitations?

Here, two important clarifications need to be made regarding the scope of this thesis. *First*, it is important to emphasize that the focus of this study is on the normative foundations underpinning *official* environmental policy[15], that is, on those value-laden

[15] There are probably as many definitions of "policy" as there are policy-analysts, making descriptions ranging from the narrow (as a plan or a guideline) to the broad (encompassing also the decision-making processes and the action of implementation). In this thesis Swedish environmental policy is taken to denote first and foremost the decisions, ideas and action-plans expressed in official governmental documents, i.e. the product of those processes in which actors "based on their values and resources" (Wihlborg, 2000:18) decide upon the desirable goals for a specific issue (in this case the environment) as well as on the means or procedures for realising these goals.

guidelines (Dror, 1973:14), programmes (Premfors, 1989:9), decisions (Cochran and Malone, 1995:1; Easton, 1953:130; Jenkins, 1978:15) or sets of ideas (Hjern, 1987:3) emanating from governmental authorities. Thereby, the horizontal aspect of multi-level governance, including the policy-making processes taking place also within non-governmental actors, is disregarded. The values, principles or policy-goals expressed by these non-governmental organisations (NGO's) are, therefore, not included in the analysis. Nevertheless, several non-governmental actors will, naturally, have had a varying influence in the processes leading up to the formulations and motivations embedded in the studied official documents, for instance as bodies to which a proposed legislative measure is referred for consideration or through successful acts of lobbying. *Second*, Sweden entering the EU has made the multi-level governance-structure of environmental policy-making evident, as the membership has meant a truly increasing influence from the Community-level over the national government's policy-making processes (Dinan, 2005; McCormick, 2001). Beginning with the 1973 Environmental Action Programme – five more have passed since, the latest from 2002 (e.g. 1600/2002/EG) – the Community competence in environmental issues has produced a range of binding policies and directives in diverse areas such as air and water quality; waste-management; chemical usage; and nature conservation. These, together with the primary rules of the EU[16], strongly affect national environmental policy-making in the 25 Member States. For example, EU constraints on the use of policy-instruments (predominately economic due to the single-market) and the subordination of national laws under Community law, has allowed EU-policy to become even more comprehensive than all Member States' policies added together (Jordan, 2005:2; see also Barnes, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; McCormick, 2001; Söderholm, 2004). From the point of view of this thesis, however, resulting from this development is not so much another level of policy-making to take into account for the analysis. Rather, Community policy-making power is in this thesis viewed more as an entanglement of the environmental policy-making process and its outcomes on the national level of government, now expanded to also encompass the negotiations within the EU. For instance, according to Jordan (2005:2, italics in original) the transition of policy-making power vertically to the trans-national level has both strengthened the EU itself as a global environmental actor as well as, more importantly, merged EU- and Member State-policy into one, inseparable entity:

> [T]he pre-existing environmental policies of the Member States are no longer politically or legally separate from EU environmental policy. In fact they have undergone a progressive change ('Europeanization') through their involvement in EU policy-making. In other words, the Member States have created an institutional entity to perform certain tasks, which has, in turn, deeply affected

[16] The founding Treaties and their amendments: The Treaty of Paris (1951, expired since July 23, 2002); the two Treaties of Rome (1957); the Merger Treaty (1965); the Single European Act (1986); the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht 1992); the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997); and the Treaty of Nice (2001).

> the way they perceive and act against environmental problems. The relationship between the two levels – international and national – of this unique system of *multi-level* environmental governance, has been and remains genuinely *two-way*, creating new opportunities and constraints for the various actors involved.

Thus, given the inseparability between the these two levels, even though the influence of trans-national actors (such as the EU) is evident in the Swedish environmental policy-making on national, regional as well as local levels, neither the policy-process, nor the policy-documents emanating from this level will receive any *explicit* attention in the thesis. Given the close link between the EU- and national-levels, with community environmental policies and regulations *de facto* setting the frames for national policy-making, but also themselves being drawn up by representatives from the Member States together, it is, in order to explore the normative foundations of environmental policy *in Sweden*, entirely sufficient to focus only on those values and principles underpinning national policy-documents. It is reasonable to assume that, as the Member States are mandated to incorporate EU-policy in their national policies, any development in the environmental field on the trans-national level will transcend also to every single Member State's environmental policy documents, with no differences as such to be made between the practical consequences of policy on the two levels. Thereby, as the normative foundations underlying environmental policy in Sweden is the focus for this thesis, the analysis will not have to expand beyond the state borders, and the vertical aspect of multi-level governance is, thus, delimited to the national and local levels.

Environmental policy-making in Sweden is still seen as being divided vertically between the political authorities on two main levels of government; nationally, where the overall direction of Swedish environmental policy is decided on, and locally where national (and sometimes very general) policy objectives are transformed into practical policy tools with more explicit implications for households' day-to-day activities. As such, policy-making on the national level, within the Swedish government and in particular the Ministry of Sustainable Development, plays an important role in outlining and governing the environmental political field on the whole (and by both deciding on, as well as integrating Community policy nationally). *First*, the national government decides on and outlines the preferred direction of national environmental policy through the rhetorical formulation of policy aims, expressed through bills and written communications directed to the Parliament, and in instructions to the central environmental authority co-ordinating national and international environmental work: the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). *Second*, the national level of government has a crucial influence in determining which local-level environmental projects to be initiated and which goals to be pursued through the use of economic incentives and support (e.g. the Local Investment Programme, see for example Eckerberg and Dahlgren, 2005; Hanberger et al., 2002). According to Lundqvist

(2004c), the national Swedish environmental policy-process thereby takes the form of "management by objectives", in which the 16 National Environmental Quality Objectives (NEQO), first approved by Parliament in 1999, plays an important role as guiding the overall practical work[17].

However, following the strong focus on local processes expressed in the Agenda 21, Swedish environmental policy-making has often been described as also comprising a firm bottom-up process, where the local-level itself initiates new environmental projects in addition to them translating and implementing the 16 NEQO's in their local context (cf. Eckerberg and Mineur, 2003). The Swedish environmental policy is, thus, not exclusively a matter for the national level of government. Rather, local level governance is of crucial importance in Swedish policy-making due both to the far-reaching autonomy for municipalities to organise local government in general (as regulated through the new Municipal Act of 1991), as well as to the decentralisation of environmental affairs in particular (Lundqvist, 2004c). Following the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Swedish government directed municipal authorities towards establishing local Agenda 21-plans by the devise local solutions for local problems, explicitly expressed in the Agenda 21-document. Due to this dual nature of Swedish environmental policy-making, the foundations for legitimacy, and therefore also the objects relevant to include in the analysis, are perceived to be located both in national policy (specifying national as well as international aims and overall direction of policy), and in policy emanating from the municipal level of government (articulating local political practice for responding to the national goals for environmental policy).

By dividing the national policy-process on two levels of government, treated as separate actors or subsystems, this thesis also follows the recommendations lined out by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:137), who propose that the delineation of different subsystems in analysing policy should be made with regards to, first, legal autonomy and, second, amount of actor integration across the proposed subsystems. Due to the legal status of Swedish municipalities, with local self-government allowing for a high level of autonomy in the policy-making process, as well as the lack of actor-integration between national and local government, these two levels are taken to be two distinct areas of policy-making and therefore explored separately. The political authorities on the regional level (i.e. the County Administrative Boards) do, for instance, not enjoy the same level of legally mandated autonomy as the municipalities, as they are first and

[17] The original fifteen Environmental Quality Objectives decided on by the Swedish Parliament in 1999 are; Reduced Climate Impact; Clean Air; Natural Acidification Only; A Non-Toxic Environment; A Protective Ozone Layer; A Safe Radiation Environment; Zero Eutrophication; Flourishing Lakes and Streams; Good-Quality Groundwater; A Balanced Marine Environment, Flourishing Coastal Areas and Archipelagos; Thriving Wetlands; Sustainable Forests; A Varied Agricultural Landscape; A Magnificent Mountain Landscape; A Good Built Environment (Bill, 1997/98:145). In 2005, Parliament decided on a sixteenth NEQO: A Rich Diversity of Plant and Animal Life (Bill, 2004/05:150; Rskr, 2005/06:49). Each objective breaks down in overall and interims targets, and progress is reported on yearly by the Government (cf. SOU, 2000:52; Eckerberg and Mineur, 2003).

foremost an extension of the national government with the overarching task of implementing national policy-goals in the regions (cf. Halvarson, 1995). Therefore, the regional-level is not considered constituting a separate subsystem of the environmental policy-making process. It should however be noted that as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) argue that the trans-national level (i.e. the EU) should be regard as being a subsystem of its own due, for example, to the fact that "autonomy by nation-states is jealously guarded" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:137), this is contradicted by the above referred to developments within the EU in the environmental-policy field. To recapitulate, the legal as well as political inseparability, including the integration of actors, of the national and trans-national levels make the boundaries between the two levels blurred, with the Member States both being a part in the development process of, as well as and being subject to, community policy. Therefore, the trans-national level policy will, in this thesis, not be singled out as a separate object of analysis.

Accordingly, this study of the foundations for legitimacy (i.e. the values and principles embedded in Swedish environmental policy) will focus on two levels of government and aims at addressing three core issues throughout:

i. *to analyse the core values and principles which underpins Swedish environmental policy on the national level, predominately those values pertaining to individuals and thereby expresses the official image of the 'environmental citizen';*
ii. *to analyse these core values and principles as expressed through environmental policy and political practice on the municipal level of government; and*
iii. *to evaluate the value-correspondence between environmental policies on these two administrative levels of government.*

Issues (i) and (ii) are rather straight forward as they follow directly from the aim of this thesis, with the purpose of locating foundations for legitimacy (or illegitimacy) through elucidating those core values and principles embedded in Swedish environmental policy. However, in expanding the analysis to include policy emanating from two separate levels of government, the possibility arises also for making in-case comparisons between the outcomes of the policy-making processes within these two levels of political authority. For instance, does local political practice build on the same set of values and principles as national-level environmental policy? Are the motivations used for promoting environmental activities in a local context drawing on those values put forth as relevant motivational arguments nationally? If not, is this acknowledged as a problem? Issue (iii), therefore, indicates the aspiration also to make such a comparison, and thereby allow for the possibility that the normative foundations underpinning policy (and, consequently, the level of legitimacy) differ between the national and the local context. Whether the conclusion is that policies on the two levels are similar, or that they do display different normative foundations, this approach will provide the study with more nuanced conclusions on the foundations for (il)legitimate policy.

Moreover, in a wider context (albeit outside the immediate scope of this thesis) the level of correspondence between national policy aims and local political practice might also raise a broader discussion on democracy and local self-government in Sweden.

1.5 Methodological approach – the case of Sweden

In this thesis, the aim of mapping and analysing the normative foundations of official environmental policy in Sweden is pursued by the application of a qualitative content analysis of policy-documents emanating from the national as well as the local level of government. Sweden thus provides the empirical case and the *raison d'être* for this choice is founded on several empirical observations. In particular, Sweden has a political aspiration, and indeed also a long-standing international reputation, to "pioneer the shift to a sustainable society" (Skr, 2001/02:172) as well as to incorporate the environmental issues "in all politics, in day-to-day life, in governmental- and societal work" (SOU, 2000:52, p.25, translated from Swedish). In practice, these political aspirations have granted Sweden a place as one of the environmental 'leaders' of the EU (cf. Lifferink and Skou-Andersen, 2005) with an, according to Fudge and Rowe (2000:49), "impressive" record of environmental protection. Following on from this, also the incorporation of the principles of Agenda 21 in national, and particularly local, environmental policy was swiftly executed in Sweden during the later half of the 1990's (e.g. Brundin and Eckerberg, 1999; Khakee, 2002). Taken together, the extensive environmental-political efforts in Sweden during the last decade make this a highly relevant case for studying also the legitimacy of these efforts, as well as for the particular focus on how the role of the single individual in the environmental work is portrayed. Furthermore, as local self-government is an important constitutional principle in Sweden, not the least with regards to environmental issues (Lundqvist, 2004c), the selected case of Swedish environmental policy also allows for a close examination of the (perhaps sometimes not so smooth) interplay between policies emanating from the national and the local levels of government. As such, the general methodological approach of the thesis takes the form of a single-case study, with an aspiration not to explicitly test existing theory but to explore the case of Sweden, guided in this endeavour by a set of theoretical concepts. This type of theory-applying case-studies[18] have sometimes been wrongfully accused for being less scientifically valid as they do not explicitly aspire to make grand contributions to theory (cf. Eckstein, 2000; Lijphart 1971; Van Evera, 1997) Nevertheless, interpretative or descriptive case-studies do, following Lijphart (1974, see also King, Keohane and Verba, 1994), play an

[18] This ideal-type of a single-case-study have been given many different labels, from *interpretative* (Lijphart, 1971); to *disciplined-configurative* (Eckstein, 2000) or *case-explaining* (Van Evera, 1997). The core feature of theory-applying case-studies is the interest in the case itself, and in answering questions along the lines of where; when; how and who(m), rather than in making explicit contributions to theory (Esaiasson et al, 2004; Lijphart, 1971). Furthermore, theory-applying case-studies differ from purely descriptive (or *atheoretical*, see Lijphart, 1971) ones in that they make use of established theoretical concepts when analysing the case.

important part in all scientific research as they explore the case in-depth and, thus, lay the very foundation for comparison and theory-building. Furthermore, single case-studies in general are particularly suitable for exploring new focuses and reaching new insights in those instances where the case in question is not as well-researched, as they allow for a more detailed examination of the object of study (cf. Yin, 1994).

Another critique commonly directed towards the qualitative case-study approach, and single case-studies especially, concerns external validity; in particular the difficulty of drawing any form of generally applicable conclusions from a strictly limited material (e.g. Devine, 2002; Esaiasson et al., 2004; Lijphart, 1971; Yin, 1994). Considering, however, the focus of this thesis and its limited aspiration to at this stage develop new hypothesis or theories regarding the foundations of environmental policy valid outside the case of Sweden, the narrow external validity of a single case-study does not present an insurmountable setback. A further expansion of the study to cover more cases (i.e. several countries' environmental policies) would not, in any significant way, contribute to fulfilling the main aim of the thesis which, to recapitulate, is to explore the values embedded in Swedish environmental policy specifically. That is not to say that the empirical outcome of this thesis cannot provide a solid foundation for future comparative studies across several cases or, for that matter, in itself present relevant conclusions on the foundations for environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden. Additionally, the theoretical models and the analytical approach in this thesis might well be applied for studying the foundations for legitimacy also in other policy areas, directed towards other issues than the environment.

However, as the concept of multi-level governance (see section 1.2 above) rightly acknowledges, environmental policy-making is no longer isolated at the traditional, national level of government alone, but to a large extent also transferred down to municipal/local governments. Thus, to fully explore the case of environmental policy in Sweden the study nonetheless needs to be extended over two levels of government, national and local respectively, in order to incorporate all relevant instances from where official-governmental values, principles and motivations directed towards the citizenry originate. Furthermore, this approach makes possible in-case comparisons both *between* the two levels of government, as well as *within* the municipal level itself, allowing for further conclusions regarding the foundations for environmental policy legitimacy in Sweden. Accordingly, in the following empirical study the two levels of government are presented separately as two (or rather five, see Figure 1.1 below) coherent cases-within-the-case, allowing for a focus also on possible divergences between the normative foundations underpinning national aims on the one hand and local political-practice on the other. This approach, where the case in itself contains several units of analysis or sub-cases, is defined by Yin (1994:42) as an *Embedded, Single Case-Design*. Furthermore, the analysis of the local level policy reaches over several municipalities in

Sweden, but with the primary aim of studying local policy's correspondence with national environmental policy in general, this part of the empirical study resembles what Yin (1994:135; see also Forsberg, 2002) refers to as a cross-case analysis where "the information from the individual cases [the municipalities] would be dispersed throughout each chapter or section". As such, local environmental policies are presented and discussed thematically following the logic of the analytical framework (as presented in Chapter 3 below), and not as separate units of analysis. Nevertheless, in order not to disregard possible differences within the municipal level (where the, for example, contextual factors can vary a great deal) and to make possible a comparison also within this level, any divergences between the cases on the municipal level, as well as across time on the national level, are highlighted and presented in those instances they are considered relevant for the aim of the thesis. Thereby each one of the studied municipality's environmental policy can also independently be compared with the national level. The general case-study approach, including the in-case comparisons between the sub-cases, is illustrated in figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1: The case-study approach as an embedded, single-case design



1.5.1 Selection of municipalities

As already mentioned above, the analysis is qualitative in character due to the fact that it first and foremost aspires to reach a deeper understanding of the norms, values and principles underlying environmental policy in Sweden. Therefore, as the aspiration not is to investigate the causal relationship between different variables, the application of a quantitative approach would be less adequate. To facilitate the necessary depth in the analysis, it is nevertheless essential also to limit the number of sub-cases (i.e. municipalities) included in the study, which, again, calls attention to the problem with external validity. Now, even though the four municipalities selected for analysis are not taken to be entirely representative for all of Sweden's 290 municipalities, but rather

utilised as relevant examples of local-level environmental policy, some considerations have nevertheless been made throughout the process of selection.

Several techniques can be applied for selecting cases depending on the focus for the study. In a small-N analysis where the aim is to isolate causal relations between dependent and independent variables, either through identifying a specific variable as conducive to an outcome or to eliminate irrelevant variables for the outcome of interest, cases are predominately selected either as displaying maximum (most-different cases) or minimum (most-similar cases) variation (Frendreis, 1983; Christensen and Peters, 1999; see also Hopkin, 2002). Given that this thesis is not interested in the outcome of policy (e.g. the degree of environmental protection actually achieved, cf. Eckerberg, 1990:5) as such, but rather in the normative reasoning underpinning it, and does not aim at delineate factors conducive to a specific positive outcome, neither one of these approaches is entirely suitable. Thus, limiting the selection-process based on policy-outcome, so as to include only municipalities which either display extensive and successful environmental policies or a clear lack of the same, is not satisfactory.

Instead, the selection of municipalities, made jointly within the SHARP Research Programme, emanates from the assumption that the form and frequency of environmental work within the household might be both facilitated and obstructed by contextual factors, for example size and geographical distances, climate, and access to/amount of communal services offered[19]. As these factors are expected to vary a great deal between the Swedish municipalities, the aspiration is to select sub-cases so as to acknowledge some these differences; from large city-areas to small towns, located both in the north and the south of the country. Thus, the four municipalities selected for analysis all display to some extent different, but not in any way complete, sets of contextual factors found in Sweden. A further highly important limitation placed on the selection of municipalities is size. For the research program as a whole it has been important only to include municipalities large enough to be able to provide public transportation for its citizens, so that a viable alternative to the car is present all year round despite weather-conditions. Furthermore, even though the focus, as mentioned above, not primarily is on locating either necessary of sufficient conditions for a specific outcome, it is reasonable to assume that several contextual factors nevertheless might constitute relevant explanations to possible differences in policy-discourses and policy instruments in-use, which in turn would make them relevant to keep in mind come the analysis of local-level policy discourses. In Table 1.1 below, the four municipalities selected for analysis within the SHARP-Research Programme, along with background

[19] These are particularly relevant for the forthcoming evaluation of policy-legitimacy, as well as for those SHARP sub-projects focusing explicitly on the environmental work within the household and the constraints household members experience in attempting to pursue more sustainable lifestyles. Nevertheless, also the local-level environmental policy-making process can be anticipated to be influenced by contextual variables.

variables perceived to be relevant for a discussion on differences in environmental policy aspirations are displayed[20]. *First*, the four municipalities are selected so as to cover differences in geographic location and, consequently, climate (north – south; costal – inland) as well as different population sizes (from the small-town of Piteå, to Sweden's second largest municipality of Göteborg, with the municipality of Huddinge located in close proximity of the Swedish capital, and by population largest city, Stockholm). *Second*, the citizen's political party-support calculated both as current political majority in each municipality and as percentage of votes cast in favour of the Swedish Green-party, is anticipated to constitute a significant framework for each municipality's environmental policy-making process and is therefore accounted for. *Third*, the amount of official environmental efforts (for example the presence of Agenda 21 action plans and local environmental quality objectives or the use of environmental management systems) in place within the municipality reflects the environmental investments made to date and permits the rating of municipalities on an environmental index. *Fourth*, the financial support granted Swedish municipalities within the framework of the Local Investment Programmes (LIP's) has been shown to influence the level of local environmental work positively (cf. Berglund and Hanberger, 2003; Edström and Eckerberg, 2002; Sköllerhorn and Hanberger, 2004;). Therefore, if LIP-support has been received by the municipality is also a factor accounted for in selecting sub-cases for the study.

Table 1.1: Selection of municipalities



	Background variables				
Municipality	**Size***	**Political majority****	**Support for the Greens†**	**Environmental index††**	**LIP‡**
Göteborg	484 106	S (32,4) V (10,9) Mp (6,5)	4,3 %	43	Yes
Huddinge	88 472	S (36,2) V (7,6) Mp (3,5)	3,0 %	39	Yes
Piteå	40 862	S (51,3)	6,5 %	43	Yes
Växjö	77 285	S (35,4) V (11) Mp (4,3)	3,5 %	45	Yes

[20] Please note that the respondents in the mass-surveys conducted within SHARP during 2004 and 2006, and which will construct the basis for a forthcoming evaluation of legitimacy, are gathered from the same four municipalities. Given that the selection of respondents for the mass-surveys follows the same pattern as the selection of municipalities, the validity of the comparative results is anticipated to be significantly higher than if the survey was conducted on a sample of citizens in Sweden as a whole.

⋆ Size by population in the municipality measured at September 30, 2005. The 290 Swedish municipalities display a range from a population of 758 311 (Stockholm) to a population of 2 652 (Bjurholm) (Statistics Sweden, 2005).

⋆⋆ Parties forming the political majority in the municipality after the general election 2002 (figures in parenthesis indicate the percentage of total votes cast, in Piteå Mp-votes amounted to 3 % and votes for the Left Party to 11,5 %). Abbreviations: S = Social Democratic Party; V = Left Party; Mp = Environmental Party The Greens (The Swedish Election Authority, 2005 and municipalities' official websites). For the same period (2002-2006), the national government in Sweden was made up by the Social Democratic Party, supported in parliament by the Left Party and The Greens.

† National parliamentary votes cast in favour of Environmental Party The Greens in the general election 2002. In Sweden in total, The Greens won 4,6 % of the votes (The Swedish Election Authority, 2005).

†† The index ranges from 0-51 and collects 12 factors indicating the level of municipality environmental work for the year 1998: (1) Agenda 21 action-plan; (2) environmental objectives for reducing waste and the use of some fossil fuels; (3) waste and energy-extraction systems (4) real-estate heated with renewable energy; (5) environmental auditing with environmental balancing of the books ; (6) environmental management-systems in place at municipal establishments; (7) municipality vehicles powered by alternative fuels; (8) environmental requirements in the purchasing of cleaning chemicals etc.; (9) general environmental training for municipal staff; (10) information to households regarding reduced environmental impacts; (11) applied for governmental funding for investments in sustainable development; (12) environmental certification of businesses in the municipality (KFAKTA 03).

‡ Financial support received through the Local Investment Programme (LIP). The programme was in place during the years 1998-2002 and distributed in total SEK 6,2 billion to 161 of Sweden's municipalities (Eckerberg et al., 2005). In total the four municipalities have received SEK 78 286 256 (Göteborg); SEK 3 497 500 (Huddinge); SEK 9 104 500 (Piteå); and SEK 129 810 000 (Växjö) for local investments (SEPA, 2006).

1.6 Outline of the thesis

The thesis consists of six main chapters. Following on from this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 approaches and attempts to answer the theoretical question on what to study in an evaluation of environmental policy legitimacy. The chapter opens with a discussion on the concept of legitimacy and it's, according to Beetham (1991), three dimensions. This is followed by an account of the concept of value-correspondence and the significance of value-systems for individuals' attitudinal and behavioural decisions, in general and with regards to pro-environmental activities, as well as the relevance of values in the policy-making process. The outcome of this chapter constitutes, in turn, the starting-point for Chapter 3, where the analytical framework for use in the empirical analysis is developed. Therefore, the focus of this chapter lies in particular on developing the ideal-types by which the normative foundations of the policy-documents will be analysed, albeit a detailed description of the methodological approach applied in the thesis for analysing texts is also included herein. Based on the analytical framework, the empirical analysis is presented in Chapter 4 (national level policy) and Chapter 5 (local level policy) respectively. The final chapter (Chapter 6) contains, accordingly, the thesis' conclusions, as well as suggestions for further research on Swedish environmental policy legitimacy.

Chapter Two

Researching Environmental Policy Legitimacy

Before commencing the development of analytical tools for examining the Swedish environmental policy directed towards increasing the environmentally benevolent contributions within the household, a few definitions of the concepts central for this thesis are called for. This chapter aims therefore at, by introducing these concepts, clarify the theoretical line of reasoning and specify the underlying assumptions made regarding legitimacy and its connection to policy effectiveness. In particular, three issues need to be more closely addressed; first, how should the, for this thesis central, concept of legitimacy be defined? Second, how can the level of legitimacy properly be evaluated? And finally, what aspects of the object of study are necessary to incorporate in an evaluation of legitimacy? To the end, this chapter will also more closely address the issue of values and their role in relation to legitimacy and policy acceptance.

2.1 The concept of legitimacy

Following the argument presented above it is reasonable to assume that legitimacy is anticipated to hold a central position in the process of creating effective environmental policies in contemporary, representative democracy. To recapitulate; according to the commonly acknowledged connotation, the concept of policy-legitimacy is anticipated to be defined as the (majority of) individuals in society perceiving a policy, including both its goals and the motivations provided for achieving these goals, as normatively acceptable and thereby morally binding. A policy which in contrast is resented tends instead to be viewed as being illegitimate and therefore not perceived as a moral obligatory (cf. Beetham, 1991). There is, thus, an important relation between the

concepts of political *legitimacy* and political *authority*, where the former underpins the latter and, thus, creates the right for e.g. a state or a government to expect obedience from its citizens when exercising its power (Buchanan, 2002 & 2003). This, in turn, indicates the importance of legitimacy for the exercise of political power, as "[a] government that is regarded as legitimate should not have to use force over more than a very small minority of its citizens, just as army officers should not have to constantly put their men on disciplinary charges and police officers should not often have to use their batons" (Birch, 2002:57). For environmental policies, which to a large extent require the active engagement of individuals in a range of lifestyle-related areas, this moral-based acceptance which legitimacy is believed to induce is exceedingly central. In particular in democratic states, where the reliance on authoritarian coercion as a means for citizens' compliance with policy-decisions is not a viable way forward, the acceptance of collective decisions as binding even though they might conflict with immediate personal preferences or interests is imperative for environmental policy effectiveness. Traditional policy-instruments (e.g. laws, regulations and monetary incentives) are, for various reasons presented above, not likely to be entirely successful in achieving the necessary broad and deep-ranging lifestyle-changes on their own. Rather, an important prerequisite is that those subject to the policy in question also comprehend it, including the use and design of policy-instruments, as legitimate (cf. Citrin and Muste, 1999). In the somewhat broader context of legitimacy for power relationships, states or regimes as a whole, David Beetham (1991:29, italics added) acknowledges this line of reasoning by concluding that "legitimacy is significant not only for the maintenance of order, but also for the *degree* of cooperation and *quality* of performance that the powerful can secure from the subordinate; it is important not only for whether they remain 'in power', but for *what their power can be used to achieve*". Thus, transferring Beetham's argument to the narrower policy-perspective of this thesis, it denotes that without legitimacy people's long-term adherence to a policy of the kind referred to above might be expected to be at best partial, definitely fragile, and at worse non-existent[21]. For most environmental policies dependent on a high level of cooperation from the citizenry for their success, a lack in legitimacy would therefore simply be fatal and render the environmental goals significantly more difficult to reach. Nevertheless, legitimacy is in itself a concept given a wide range of connotations and, thus, characterized by high level of ambiguity (cf. Føllesdal, 2004; Jachtenfuchs, 1995). Therefore, in order to examine the legitimacy for Swedish environmental policy the concept in itself, and the process of studying or evaluating it, first needs to be adequately and accurately defined.

[21] It should here be mentioned that legitimacy is viewed as being a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for policy effectiveness in contemporary democratic states. Thus, without legitimacy, the all-encompassing and long-term stable change in lifestyles will not be viable. This is, however, not to say the legitimacy of a policy alone governs behaviour as a sufficient condition. As several external factors also contribute to the individual choices being made, both in terms of resources and of social norms, legitimacy alone is not a *guarantee* for people adhering to a policy.

Within the social sciences, the concept of legitimacy refers, in its most basic connotation, to the normative, moral grounds for accepting the authoritative exercise of power[22]. In particular, legitimacy has come to be used as a measure of acquiescence, more specifically denoting the acceptance or support of political authority as the sole maker of collectively binding decisions by those subject to these decisions. For example, Hanberger (2003:268) refers to legitimacy broadly as "citizens' support for a policy order and a regime" (for more definitions, see also Beetham, 1998; Connolly, 1984a & 1984b; Crook, 1987; Hauge et al., 2002; Karlsson, 2001; Lipset, 1981; Parkinson, 2003; Poggi, 1978; Schaar, 1984; Weber, 1968). Thereby, legitimacy, and in particular the comprehension of political authority as exercising legitimate power, is a core component for the very existence of a democratic state, without which the mere possibility for making legally enforceable decisions is strongly infringed. Furthermore, and connecting to the discussion on adequate use of policy instruments above, legitimacy is thereby relevant in the context of policy effectiveness, as a factor which lowers the costs associated with enforcement. According to Parkinson (2003:182) "legitimacy also has an instrumental value: legitimacy makes political processes more efficient by reducing the costs of enforcing compliance. Regimes, institutions or decisions with low legitimacy face higher costs associated with uncooperative, strategic behaviour". However, as many scholars have noted, collectively binding decisions can nevertheless be made by a state not enjoying the legitimacy (in the meaning of acceptance or consent) of its citizens. In these cases, the subordinates' adherence to authoritative decisions is instead based on coercion under the threat of punishment, a common feature in non- or semi-democracies (cf. Hauge et al. 2002). As a further connection to the context of environmental politics, this would also be the strategy advanced by eco-authoritarians, where the legitimacy – efficiency dilemma of environmental policy-making in contemporary representative democracies is a core component in the argument for the introduction of a weaker democracy (cf. Carter, 2001; Eckersly, 1992; Jagers, 2004).

How, then, should the level of legitimacy be evaluated, and by what criteria? Given the somewhat broad and imprecise definition of the concept, several approaches to conducting a study of legitimacy have been suggested. The description provided above draws strongly towards the conceptualisation of legitimacy as on a par with public consent or acceptance. Building on the commonly used Weberian (e.g. Weber, 1968) definition, an institution, a power relationship or a policy is hereby deemed as legitimate when people in general believe them to be so, and openly acts so as to

[22] This definition tends to disregard the more technical definition of legitimacy as equal to *legality*. For students and scholars in the field of law, a power relationship or a policy is most commonly considered legitimate with regards to its compliance to established formal rules. As such, a policy or power relationship in general is legally binding and enforceable by it keeping within the framework constituted by the formal rules of the society. There are also other typologies available for definitions of legitimacy, for example Føllesdal (2004) provides a highly informative overview of alternative definitions, as well as criteria, for evaluating legitimacy.

reinforce this notion (cf. Beetham, 1991; Schaar, 1984). Consequently, this amounts to an approach to legitimacy as acquiescence; as a *social* (Karlsson, 2001) or *empirical* (Tsakatika, 2005)[23] phenomenon, stemming exclusively from the subjective beliefs of the citizens. Evaluating legitimacy from this point of view therefore consists of a study of the actual acceptance for a policy or a political authority, examining whether the current object of study indeed is believed to be legitimate by those subordinated to it. This type of study is explicit and as such implicating that the question of legitimacy for a power relationship is put directly to the subordinate by the means of, for example, an opinion poll or any other form of mass-survey (cf. Beetham, 1991; Jachtenfuchs, 1995:127-128). However, what is also inferred through this definition is the simultaneous dismissal of any external reference underpinning the level of legitimacy. The approach has thereby been defined as being relativistic, and as such independent of any judgements made by the observer referring to the relationship's moral rights or wrongs. Any power relationship, regardless of its normative foundations, can therefore be defined as being either legitimate or illegitimate, depending solely on the subordinate's openly stated beliefs in its rightfulness. For example, as stated by Jachtenfuchs (1995:127-128) the value of democracy as a political system lies, according to this view, not in democracy actually being a morally superior system of government, but rather in the system's efficiency for securing the citizens' loyalty towards the state. "As a consequence", he continues, "non-democratic systems may also enjoy legitimacy" (Jachtenfuchs, 1995:127). Measuring environmental policy legitimacy as being a purely social phenomenon would, thereby, consist of asking citizens directly whether they believe the policy in question to be legitimate; an affirmative answer leading to the general conclusion that it is. Following Beetham (1991:8-11), the creation of legitimacy, when conceptualised as a social or empirical occurrence, is thereby placed exclusively in the hands of the powerful, making it possible to produce merely by convincing the citizens of its own rightfulness. Not necessarily by upholding values or producing outcomes consistent with the public expectations at the same time[24]. Further critical voices have been raised towards this evaluation of legitimacy as acquiescence since it simply may lead to false conclusions in the matter. Most prominently, compliance may not necessarily be a sign of acceptance, but of indifference or apathy on the part of the subordinate (Føllesdal, 2004).

[23] Another denomination for this conceptualisation of legitimacy is provided by Jachtenfuchs (1995:126), who refers to the 'functionalist approach to legitimacy'; evaluated empirically by exploring the citizens' stated loyalty to the outputs of the political system.

[24] This is the conception of legitimacy advanced by, for example, Lipset (1981:64-68). In response to this approach to the concept of legitimacy, Schaar (1984:108-110) concurs with Beetham's critique. By relating the level of legitimacy to the 'belief in legitimacy', the role of the state in manipulating it becomes far too important and an evaluation along these lines risks, therefore, to provide evidence of nothing outside the ability of the powerful to advance arguments of its own rightfulness. As Schaar (1984:109-110) puts it: "[t]he regime or the leaders provide the stimuli, first in the form of policies improving citizen welfare and later in the form of symbolic materials which function as secondary reinforcements […] Over time, if the rulers manipulate symbols skilfully, symbolic rewards alone may suffice to maintain supportive attitudes".

Judging from the critique towards the above method of studying legitimacy, not all would agree with Weber's empirical criteria for evaluation, as based on citizens' compliance or stated beliefs in legitimacy. For one, Beetham (1991:10-15) criticises the Weberian approach for it being merely a report on peoples beliefs, and for it not providing any foundation for *explaining* acceptance and, thus, the basis for legitimacy. Accordingly, a slightly different view on the concept is put fourth by Tsakatika (2005:193, italics added) who states that "[l]egitimacy refers to the idea that the exercise of power is *normatively acceptable* and for that reason voluntarily accepted". This implies, further, that legitimacy can be evaluated also from at least one other point of departure. In contrast to the Weberian definition, most frequently applied within the social sciences, legitimacy from the perspective of political or moral philosophy is described as being *formal* or *normative*[25], relating less to the subjective beliefs of the citizenry and considerably more to the nature of the object of study itself (Beetham, 1991; Føllesdal, 2004; Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Tsakatika, 2005; see also Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). Here, legitimacy is defined as objectively determined, something that is morally justifiable and therefore acceptable by it conforming to a predetermined set of normative criteria. Evaluating legitimacy by this normative approach is, therefore, merely a matter of determining whether this standard is met or not. Thus, the assumption made in defining legitimacy normatively is that society is founded on a set of shared values, which must be respected and upheld throughout the power relationship for its legitimacy to be at hand. In the context of this thesis, it is precisely this conception of normative legitimacy which is thought of as underpinning the legitimacy – effectiveness dilemma of environmental politics and green political thought. In particular since this dilemma refers to the commonly held position that contemporary environmental policies, to enjoy legitimacy, are confined by the boundaries of the liberal democratic state. Above all, any policy of this kind must, while effectively protecting the environment from destruction, at the same time respect a set of overarching values, commonly constituted by the likes of democracy, individual autonomy and/or state neutrality (cf. Jagers, 2002 & 2004; Lundqvist, 2001c & 2004c).

In The Legitimation of Power, Beetham (1991) rejects the application of either the normative or the social conceptualisations as criteria for the evaluation of legitimacy as, used independently, being too one-sided. The philosophical-normative definition is deemed inadequate since it does not relate sufficiently to the actual beliefs of the citizens. In the words of Karlsson (2001:107), it "neglects a common-sense understanding of legitimacy". By building the evaluation of legitimacy exclusively on the correspondence with objectively developed moral-philosophical concepts or values, the value-laden positions of the citizenry is altogether disregarded. It is simply assumed

[25] The concepts of formal and normative legitimacy are here used interchangeably, the core meaning being the same i.e. a definition of legitimacy as dependent of more than merely the empirical stated belief in (social) legitimacy. Legitimacy is, by this definition, rather evaluated in connection to some external criteria.

that consensus on a universal set of values does exist. Thus, evaluating the level of normative legitimacy for a power relationship does neither take into account the legitimacy of particular situations or contexts, nor the different understandings citizens might hold regarding the normative concepts by which it is evaluated. As such, the adoption of a normative approach to legitimacy also limits the application of the concept as culturally or historically bound variations in beliefs are easily overlooked. At the other end of the spectrum, the Weberian definition of social legitimacy goes too far in its ambition to take as its starting-point the belief of actual citizens in concrete situations. In part, Beetham agrees with the philosophical-normative critique, that the Weberian approach is amiss since it does not include any objective references for legitimacy in the form of values, but primarily his objections regards the fact that a sole focus on citizens' expressed beliefs misconceives their role in legitimising a power relationship (Beetham, 1991:10-11). Instead, he continues, legitimacy must be evaluated not by the degree to which people believe it is so, but according to the extent to which it can be justified in terms of the commonly held beliefs;

> [W]hen we seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other power relation, one thing we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified in terms of people's beliefs, how far it satisfies the normative expectations they have of it. We are making an assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification. We are not making a report on people's 'belief in its legitimacy' (Beetham, 1991:11).

It can be deduced from this critique towards the Weberian approach that legitimacy not should be evaluated directly, by asking the subordinates about the believed legitimacy of a power relationship. More accurately, the study of legitimacy in fact constitutes an indirect method, where the level of legitimacy is inferred from the *indicators* on legitimacy elucidated through the empirical analysis. It should not be expected that the empirical material in itself will provide any straight forward conclusions on legitimacy but merely serve as the foundation for a future analysis; in particular building on the amount of value-correspondence between the object of study and those subject to it.

Following this, Beetham (1991) and Tsakatika (2005), propose that an evaluation of legitimacy should take into account the prospect for a power relation to be normatively acceptable, in addition to the actual acceptance of it by the citizenry. Legitimacy is, thus, not to be described as one-directional, flowing from the subordinate and upwards in the system (or, by all means, vice versa). Rather it is a two-way, reciprocal connection between powerful and subordinated, where the former *upholds* or *pursues* legitimacy by conforming to a set of established rules and, more implicitly, values. At the same time, the subordinate has a similar role by *conferring* legitimacy to the powerful through actively displaying their consent in terms of actions which support the present power relationship; hence, "[l]egitimate power is not owned but reasserted in a

dialogue of actions between governors and governed" (Dannreuther, 1999:441). As an important contrast to the Weberian concept of social legitimacy, the active acceptance by the subordinate is, however, believed to be dependent on the extent to which both (a) a consensus on values and/or norms, underpinning the rules governing the power-relationship as a whole, is present between the powerful and the subordinate, and (b) these rules and values are respected and adhered to by the political authority in its exercise of power. Following this, Beetham argues that legitimacy is to be viewed as a multi-dimensional concept, constituted by three mutually enforcing dimensions, each of which independently contributes to the legitimation (or not) of the exercise of power. Thus, legitimacy is evaluated as being a tripartite structure: *first*, by the extent to which the subordinates openly express their consent to the power relationship; *second* by the extent to which the power relationship as such conforms to the established rules of society (i.e. legality); and *third* by the extent to which these rules can be justified in terms of shared beliefs or values generally held in society. For each one of the three dimensions of legitimacy, a contrasting form of non-legitimate power is also a possible outcome, illustrating the notion that "[l]egitimacy is not an all-or-nothing affair" (Beetham, 1991:19), but comes in many different shapes as well as of varying qualities and degrees. Table 2.1 below illustrates the three dimensions of legitimacy's relation to one another, and the form of non-legitimate power following from their absence.

Table 2.1: Three dimensions of legitimacy (adapted from Beetham, 1991:20)*

	Criteria of legitimacy	Form of non-legitimate power
1.	Expressed consent – actively given by the subordinate for the power relationship.	Delegitimation (withdrawal of consent)
	dependent on	*because of*
2.	Conformity to rules (legal validity) – the power relationship conforms to those rules established in society.	Illegitimacy (breach of rules)
	and	*or*
3.	Justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs – the rules governing the power relationship are acceptable to the subordinate, by corresponding to general values or beliefs held in society.	Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy between rules and beliefs or absence of shared beliefs).

* For the purpose of this thesis, the order in which the three dimensions is presented has been reversed, better acknowledging the fact that the actively given consent is thought of as dependent on the presence (or absence) of both the legality and the justifiability of the power relationship. If either of these two are missing, that is, if the established and justified rules are not followed in the exercise of power (illegality) or if the rules themselves are not established, i.e. are not reflecting a set of shared values, the result will be a lack of expressed consent on the part of the subordinate and, thus, a delegitimation of the power relationship.

2.1.1. Legitimacy evaluated by expressed consent

The most empirically visible dimension of legitimacy is, according to Beetham, the legitimacy conferred *by* the citizens to the powerful through the demonstrable

expression of consent, that is, a presence of such actions providing evidence of acquiescence bestowed on the power relationship under study. Here, it should again be emphasised that consent for a power relationship must be given through actions. A verbal expression of consent is therefore, in contrast to the Weberian definition of social legitimacy, not sufficient for legitimacy to be at hand (cf. Beetham, 1991:91). In particular when focusing on the field of environmental politics, this is a highly relevant distinction to make as several research efforts have brought to light the value-action gap of environmental benevolent behaviour. It has been shown that people in general tend to say one thing and to do another, as the majority of those individuals expressing strong support for environmental benevolent activities seldom transform their verbally stated attitudes into actual behaviour. For instance, as an example of this value-action gap Hobson (2004a:130) cites the '30:3 syndrome', denoting the proportion of individuals expressing preferences for sustainable consumption being strikingly higher (30 %) than the market-share of the green products themselves (3 %)[26]. Clearly, the transformation of values into action is not always an uncomplicated process. Therefore, legitimacy according to Beetham (1991) must be conferred to the powerful by consent expressed as concrete *action* on the part of the subordinate. For example, the citizens' voluntary participation in election-procedures has been viewed as being important as a way of legitimising a political system and its distribution of power. Whether this is taking place in a democratic state or not, the act of voting contributes to increase the legitimacy of the regime or the political system as a whole. In line with this, elections in contemporary representative democracies have as their prime task to legitimise political power by involving the citizens in the political process; either through creating a top-down aggregation of support for political elites (cf. Ginsberg, 1982) or by driving the bottom-up channelling of preferences from the electorate to its representatives (Harrop and Miller, 1987). By participating, the citizen openly confers legitimacy to the political authority, and, thus, acknowledges an obligation to obey by its power. In similar ways are staged elections in non- or semi-democracies an important, and commonly applied, attempt to demonstrate that political authority is in fact both rightful and legitimate in the eyes of the majority of the citizenry. Perhaps more obvious, for expressed consent to be at hand requires also an absence of actions (for example demonstrations, civil disobedience or even revolutions) openly indicating non-approval[27]. If not, the object of study can be said to suffer from a (more or less serious) legitimacy deficit (Beetham, 1991:18-19 & 90-97). However, expressed consent can not on its own carry the legitimisation of a power relationship. As evident from the critique towards the Weberian notion of social legitimacy a relationship of power, whether in the form of a political system, a regime or a single policy need not be

[26] The same pattern has been shown through other research. See, for instance, Batley et al. (2001), or for a Swedish context, Krantz-Lindgren (2002).

[27] Non-approval in the context of environmental policy legitimacy would take the form of actively protesting against the policy intentions, either through public demonstrations or by acting in contradiction to what the policy prescribes, for instance by disposing of batteries in the compost.

legitimate simply because there is no evidence of discontent, or be legitimate even when we observe people expressing their consent through activities, since both apathy and expressed consent can be founded in other sources than a legitimate power relationship. This is the reason for Beetham to, in his conceptualisation of legitimacy, also include two supplementary dimensions, both of which are drawing slightly more on the indirect normative-philosophical approach discussed above and serving as to make the concept of legitimacy more nuanced.

2.1.2. Legitimacy evaluated by rule conformity

By explicitly expressing consent through action, the subordinate confers legitimacy to the powerful. However, a high level of legitimacy also requires further criteria to be satisfied, in particular since expressed consent (or the absence of protest) also can be an effect of other circumstances than citizens' perception of political power as being legitimate. For example, coercion is not an uncommon practice for aggregating displays of public support in favour of the (powerful) regime in non-democratic states. And by the same token; abstaining from voting in democratic elections does not remove a person's general obligation to obey political authority in practice (Beetham, 1991:96). Therefore, the legitimation of power is by Beetham being characterised as a two-way flow, recognising that the powerful itself needs to take certain measures in creating or upholding the legitimacy of a power relationship. First, both the acquisition of power and the exercise of it need to conform to a set of, formal as well as informal, rules. The power relationship thus needs to enjoy *legal validity*, by respecting and abiding to the societal "rules of power" (Beetham, 1991:16 & 64-69). As a basic requirement, the exercise of power according to some set of rules is necessary in order to make the power relationship transparent for the subordinate, and in order to avoid capricious or arbitrary behaviour on the part of the powerful. Both rules that are defined as formal (i.e. laws originating from, and enforced by, the state) as well as informal (traditional and customary norms of behaviour) are therefore important, predominately for them lowering the level of uncertainty in human interaction on all levels. Without these, there will be no framework to guide the dos and don'ts of a relationship, and therefore no way of determining how, for example, a rightful acquisition of power is constituted and what may be included in the exercise of this power (cf. Beetham, 1991:65; North, 1990:3; Ostrom, 1990:50-51). Furthermore, as understood by Beetham (1991:64-69) although this dimension concerns what he calls the legal validity of the power relationship, the rules are not necessarily to be thought of as included in the formal legal code. Rather, they are given a broader and more general connotation, with regards both to their form as well as to their function;

> Social rules ensure predictability through their normative or prescriptive force; they impose obligations and create corresponding entitlements, which are publicly acknowledged and collectively enforced. As such, they both serve to

> regulate behaviour in a predictable fashion, and provide the reference point for entitlement claims which people can expect to have recognised by others. […] Social rules may be customary and conventional in form, or be part of the legal order (Beetham, 1991:65).

Albeit informal rules in many aspects govern the relationships also between the powerful and the subordinate, and impose limitations on power (one example given is the strong political position of the British PM), Beetham (1991:65-66) nevertheless recognises that for legitimising a power relationship, and thereby creating obligations for the subordinate within this relationship, the establishment of formal rules are indeed preferable. Contrary to customs, codified law is both more transparent for the citizenry as well as possible for the authority to enforce, thereby creating certainty and stability in the power relationship (cf. Axelrod, 1986). In contemporary democracies, most rules of power are therefore also formally regulated in law. Transformed to the context of environmental policy-legitimacy, this dimension thereby denotes that the making and implementation of the policy in question needs to conform to a set of social rules, and that the new environmental requirements directed towards activities within the household need to keep within the framework of existing law.

By this definition it is, thus, easy to agree with Parkinson (2003:182; see also Beetham, 1991:17), that the legality-criterion is "fairly uncontroversially subordinate to the other two [dimensions of legitimacy, e.g. justifiability and expressed consent], because the rules themselves may be just or unjust according to some external standard". Therefore, as Parkinson (2003) through the above quote rightly points out, the rules themselves need not only to be abided by in the process of acquiring or exercising power, but must also be acceptable to the subordinate and thereby firmly *established* in the society in general. Without them enjoying acceptance from the citizenry, for the political authority to merely follow these rules of power will not in any way serve as to legitimise the exercise of power. This requirement is particularly relevant for new formal rules originating from the various levels of government. For laws and regulations already in place, an implicit acceptance is assumed since formal rules-in-use for the most part are thought of as being founded in informal rules and thereby as being already established in society. Additionally, for as long as these rules-in–use do not themselves give raise to controversies, there is no reason for anyone to question them being established in society. However, from time to time situations do occur when the explicit need for further justification of formal rules is called for. According to Beetham (1991:68), examples of these situations are (a) when conflict arises over the interpretation of existing law, for example when an authoritative decision is appealed to court by the subordinate; (b) when social changes (and with them changes in the informal rules) drive popular demands for reformation of existing law; and (c) when new formal rules are being implemented, for example through the making of new environmental policy which creates new formal institutions and, to use the words of

North (1990), new restrictions on the players. In instances like these, where conflict arises either over the contents of old rules or due to the implementation of new ones, it is no longer adequate (or even possible) to assume these formal rules to be acceptable to the subordinate. Clearly, the powerful must also be able to justify them by referring to some core value or principle outside the law itself, thus proving them to be compatible with the informal rules of society. A third criterion for legitimacy is therefore introduced by Beetham, addressing the question if the normative foundations of the rules of power are shared also by the citizenry; if these rules governing the power relationship can be justified by reference to common beliefs or values[28]; if these rules in actual fact *are* established in society.

2.1.3. Legitimacy evaluated by the justifiability of rules

Underpinning both the criteria of legal validity and, by inference, the criteria of consent, is the notion of legitimacy as evaluated by the justifiability of the rules. Following Beetham's line of reasoning, the rules of power must not only be abided by (which can be fulfilled through coercion), they must also be established in society in the sense that they are justifiable with reference to beliefs or values shared between the powerful and the subordinate. Without this justifiability criteria being fulfilled, there is no basis for accepting a power relationship or its outputs as morally binding, regardless of its compliance with a set of (in this case unjust) rules or not. This, in turn, demands that the values or beliefs by which the individuals evaluate the justness of the rules must be largely shared by the powerful, and vice versa. As Beetham puts it;

> Without a common framework of belief, the rules from which the powerful derive their power cannot be justifiable to the subordinate; the powerful can enjoy no moral authority for the exercise of their power, whatever its legal validity; and their requirements cannot be normatively binding, though they may by successfully enforced (Beetham, 1991:69).

Similar ideas have been put forward by, amongst others, Pennock (1979) who states that a prerequisite for an efficient functioning and endurance of public institutions is a public consensus on the values and ideals promoted[29]. Given this, what values and beliefs, then, are relevant for an evaluation of legitimacy as justifiability? A broad

[28] In this thesis, the concepts of 'values' and 'beliefs' are used interchangeably, following Rokeach (1973:5, italics added): "a *value* is an enduring *belief* that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence".

[29] On a slightly different note; also the field of democratic theory displays several occasions where the connection between on the one hand institutional efficiency as well as acceptance-based stability and on the other value-correspondence, have been made. For example Dahl (1989), Rousseau (1994) and Mill (1991) have all emphasized the importance of shared (democratic) values for the stable functioning and acceptance of a democratic political system. Additionally, Rawls (1993:10, see also 1999 & 1985) statement on the need for the state to be "political not metaphysical" draws on the believed necessity for a stable democratic state to be able to negotiate an overlapping consensus between different doctrines of belief held by the citizenry. See also Knight (1992:171) who more specifically addresses the importance for formal rules to be based in a set of commonly shared customs and traditions.

division can be made between, first, shared values regarding the metaphysical basis of power, and, second, shared values relating to the outcome or content of the power relationship. The former concerns what is considered the rightful or preferable source of authoritative decision-making; in essence the answer to the questions regarding *who* should decide *what*, and *why*? Following Beetham, and drawing on a range of perspectives within political philosophy, values can in this aspect specify sources of authority that are broadly categorised as either external (i.e. religion, natural law, or science) or internal (i.e. democracy or tradition) to society; several of which have proven significant also in contemporary democracies. For example, in a survey of values regarding sources of political authority in contemporary Canada, Grace Skogstad (2003b:956-957) uncovered no less than four competing conceptions of the basis for political power; apart from the dominating idea of the advantages of state-centred representative democracy (rule by representatives), also preferences for expert authority; market-based/private authority; and popular authority (rule by the people directly) were to be found. For legitimacy, this, albeit being a single observation, nevertheless illustrates the relevance of evaluating the amount of value-correspondence in this matter as being one factor governing policy acceptance. Perhaps is this particularly important for evaluating the legitimacy for a policy, which, depending both on the issue at hand (i.e. the expansion of environmental rights and duties) and on the policy's significance for individuals' daily life, can be expected to trigger any one of the above conceptions. Focusing on the latter; content related values stress instead the need for a common ground between the subordinate and powerful in evaluating the *outcome* of the power relationship, a common interest uniting the two parts making the powerful representative for the society as a whole. From this perspective, the level of legitimacy builds on the existence of a consensus regarding which values should be fulfilled by an output in order for it to be regarded as being morally good, as Beetham (1991:70) puts it, a consensus on "the moral persuasiveness of their content". Thus, in order for the rules of power to be justifiable, they need to drive the pursuit of outcomes that are consistent with what is commonly regarded as desirable goals for the society, corresponding to the values held by the subordinate in this regard (see also Wilson, 1980:366-370). For policy legitimacy, the justifiability criteria as a whole therefore comprises a requirement for consensus on the, as expressed through policy, values regarding both (1) *who* has the authority to decide (a strong state, a weak state, through representation or deliberation), and *why*; (2) *what* these decision are allowed to extend over (covering only the public, or including also activities in the private sphere); and (3) which the preferable *goals* and morally acceptable *outcomes* of these decisions are.

2.2 Evaluating the legitimacy of environmental policy

Returning now to more explicitly addressing the context of this thesis; Beetham's approach to evaluating the level of legitimacy in a power relationship constitutes a well-

suited starting point also for a study of Swedish environmental policy. However, as Beetham, in line with most scholars dealing with these issues, are concerned primarily with evaluating the legitimacy of states or other political institutions (e.g. the EU), the definition of a 'power relationship' or the 'powerful' need to be adapted to appropriately suit an analysis where the object of study instead consists of a single policy-area. Beetham's tripartite criteria for evaluating the level of legitimacy will therefore be used in a somewhat modified form when studying the case of environmental policy in Sweden. *First*, expressed consent will be taken to denote the presence (or absence) of citizen support expressed for contemporary Swedish environmental policy directed towards the households. This criteria can thereby be evaluated through examining whether, and to what extent, citizens complies with policy requirements, by actively participating in the, through policy, prescribed activities. Similarly, the consent is withdrawn and the policy de-legitimated when citizens actively protest against it, either through demonstrations, or by, for example, conducting activities in stark contrast to what is prescribed through the policy. For this thesis, however, the amount of actual consent is outside the immediate scope of inquiry. Rather, the quality of this criterion, that is the active environmental engagement by the Swedish citizenry today, should be thought of merely as defining the point of departure for the following evaluation, where the aim more accurately is to evaluate the prospect for instigating actions of consent to new rules (i.e. through participation in the policy's suggested activities), based on the quality of the two other dimensions of legitimacy.

Second, rule conformity concerns the question of whether the acquisition and exercise of power is keeping within the boundaries of a contextually determined set of rules, defined by Beetham as 'legal validity'. However, considering the conception of social rules both as creating publicly acknowledged obligations and entitlements, and as regulating behavioural patterns (cf. Beetham, 1991:65), these rules themselves are taken to, to a highly significant extent, emanate from or even be constituted by official policy. Bearing in mind the above provided definition of environmental policy effectiveness as accomplishing a long-term stable behavioural change by successfully initiating new norms of behaviour, as well as the definition of policy as generating rules (cf. Knight, 1992:145, see also Premfors, 1989), this seems a valid conclusion. Therefore, the focus for this thesis is not so much directed towards the question of whether the policy implementation (what Beetham refers to as the exercise of power) in itself is legally valid, but rather on approaching the policy as an important factor driving the implementation of *new* rules regulating rights and duties within the state – individual interaction (that is, what Beetham denotes as 'the power relationship'). In particular, as the implementation of new formal rules calls attention to the need for them to be also explicitly justified by reference to shared beliefs in society the main issue to address is, by relating to Beetham's *third* criteria of legitimacy, what these new rules themselves

comprises in terms of values, principles and motivations. In short; in order to present conclusions on the prospects for long-term expressed consent towards new rules, the focus for this study is the Who, the What, the Where, the Why and the How of Swedish environmental policy.

Regardless of how the concrete evaluation of legitimacy is chosen to be approached, one other central issue remains to be addressed; what do we, then, actually study in an evaluation of legitimacy? According to Skogstad (2003a:956, see also Beetham, 1991:70), legitimacy (or its counter-part) can be examined both on the input- and on the output-side of the policy process, relating strongly to Beetham's above referred to separation between source and content[30]. That is to say that legitimacy can originate from either a state, institution or other political authority in itself, as well as from the outcomes of governing, that is, by the policies and decisions emanating from the political authority's power. This input/output division of legitimacy is also consistent with what Morris (2005, following Schmidtz, 1990) refers to as the teleological and the emergent approach of justification respectively; political authority can be legitimised either by the processes through which it arises, or by what is accomplishes in practice. The former case of *input* (or procedural) legitimacy refers first and foremost to how policy choices are made, and by whom. The key issue is that the rules governing both the decision-making and enforcement procedures, and which actors are involved in these, build on a set of commonly agreed upon values or principles and, thus, are acceptable for the citizenry. Input legitimacy is thereby comprised by the feeling that those who make the collectively binding decisions also have a right to do so; usually as democratically elected representatives or, in non-democratic states, as representatives for a higher power or class, or by reference to an external threat. This definition of legitimacy is captured by Lipset (1981:64), according to whom "legitimacy involves the capacity of the [political] system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society". The public comprehension of legitimacy builds in these cases mainly on what Beetham (1991:70-76; see also Parkinson, 2003:182) refers to as justification originating from an authoritative source, that is, from commonly held values regarding the rightful sources of authoritative decisions. As an empirical example, the proposed democratic-deficit or legitimation-crisis of contemporary political institutions, in particular the European Union, is a typical illustration of the research done on primarily input legitimacy.

Output (or substantive) legitimacy, on the other hand, is more specifically concerned with the general acceptance of actual policy-decisions emanating from the political

[30] This rough division of legitimacy in two strands relating to the input and output side respectively legitimacy respectively might seem a bit simplistic. Accordingly, there are several more intricate typologies for the analysis of legitimacy or public support. See, for example, Norris (1999) for an overview. In the context of this thesis, the dual division in input and output legitimacy is, however, entirely sufficient.

authority. As J. S. Mill (1991:229) once wrote: "[a] government is to be judged by its action upon men, and by its action upon things; by what it makes of the citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of them". Thus, for this type of legitimacy to be at hand, public policy needs to conform to the expectations, and work for the benefit, of the citizenry. Following Beetham (1991:72, 76-90; see also Parkinson, 2003:183) this type of legitimacy rests on what he defines as justification based on rule-content, that is, that the content of the outcomes should be representative for those who are subject to them. The sources of output legitimacy can hereby be seen as further branching off into two separate strands. *First*, public policy can be legitimate in the sense that it works as to promote the welfare of the political community through effectively addressing concrete societal issues, for example by "satisfying felt needs and solving perceived problems" (Hanberger 2003:258). *Second*, and perhaps even more central, policy outcomes enjoy legitimacy based on the level of which they achieve normatively justifiable or desirable ends and, accordingly, promotes a common interest. In particular, this is evaluated based on the (in the society in question) popular understanding of general values, for instance freedom; equality; and justice, the meaning of which should be shared between the subordinate and the powerful (cf. Beetham, 1991). Output legitimacy is, then, consistent with what J. S. Mill (1991) puts forward as the two criteria for good government. First, the government needs to be promoting the individual well-being of all its citizens, and, second it needs to maintain an effective and impartial representation, so as to counteract arbitrariness in promoting the collective good and, thus, strive to present outcomes expected from a just and fair government.

In the light of the above provided definitions, both of legitimacy as a concept and of the methods employed for evaluating it, consider, again, the main aim of this thesis; *to explore, map and analyse the values and principles embedded in Swedish environmental policy as reflected in official policy documents and policy instruments in-use on both national and municipal levels of government*. In other words, this thesis aims at elucidating the rules governing the power relationship indicated through policy, as well as the justifications provided for them. Therefore, both input and output legitimacy are considered to be of relevance to incorporate in the study. Naturally, factors governing legitimacy on the output side is more of an obvious feature in a study of policy legitimacy, which in essence focuses on the outcomes of a power relationship. However, since these policies, as above mentioned, are thought of as themselves constituting new rules in essence governing the balance between rights/entitlements and duties/obligations in the state – individual relationship, it can be expected that they also contain explicit as well as implicit statements relating to the role of political authority. Therefore, also questions addressing the input-side of legitimacy, for example the rightful source of authority, are relevant to consider. Not the least since environmental policies, bearing in mind previous

theoretical debates, are considered straddling the effectiveness – legitimacy divide as a result of the implications effective environmental protection is perceived to hold for neutral, limited government and the protection of individual liberty.

Accordingly, the point of departure for this thesis is to consider the two forms of input and output legitimacy respectively as co-existing and mutually enforcing. As Skogstad (2003b:956, italics added) acknowledges, "[i]t is the *combination* of input legitimacy – that is, procedural legitimacy – and output legitimacy – that is, substantive legitimacy – that leads individuals to feel a sense of obligation to obey to collectively binding decisions even when they conflict with their own preferences". The focus for the forthcoming analysis will therefore be on elucidating the content of the rules of power, in terms of values relating both to procedures and substance in the relationship between the powerful and the subordinate.

2.3 Connecting values, public policy and legitimacy

Finally, as the understanding of legitimacy as based on the justifiability of the rules of power, policy legitimacy is, accordingly, presumed to depend on the extent to which the policy in question, both procedurally and substantially, can be justified by reference to common beliefs or values. It is based on their values or beliefs that the citizenry evaluates and responds to the rules of power, and it is therefore the value-correspondence between the subordinated (e.g. the values held by individuals) and the powerful (e.g. the values embedded in policy) which are relevant for a study of this kind. As such, the discursive connection made between values, policy and legitimacy rests on two propositions; *first*, that values are highly significant for an individual's formation of attitudes towards new social objects, and *second*, that this importance also transcends the policy-making process indicating that values form an important foundation for the construction of new policies, and are thereby expressed through policy rhetoric and policy instruments in-use.

The first proposition is supported by the results of extensive research-efforts demonstrating the relevance of personally held values when exploring the formation of attitudes and behaviour on the level of individuals. Several researchers, predominately within the field of social psychology, have concluded that value-orientations play an important, if not the most important, role as an explanatory factor for individuals' development of preferences towards certain behavioural patterns as well as for the actual behaviour itself (Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973). Especially in the individual's attitudinal or behavioural decisions, value-orientations provide an important foundation since "they [values] do act as guiding principles in life, and as such are likely guideposts for action in unfamiliar conditions, including the condition of forming attitudes about new social objects" (Stern et al., 1995:1615; see also Thøgersen and Grunert-Beckmann,

1997). Furthermore, in summing up previous research on the value-attitude-behaviour connections, Rohan (2000:270-273) suggests that an individual's personal value-system, founded in the priority between a set of universal values, is the main determinant both for a person's immediate decisions on how to behave in real life situations, and for defending the chosen course of action.

Now, as the research of, among others, Krantz-Lindgren (2001) has indicated, values are not the sole determinant of a person's behaviour. In particular is this true in situations where the resource-constraints (for example a lack of time, money or adequate technology) make following one's convictions increasingly costly, or where the social costs for acting upon one's values are deemed too high (cf. Bennulf and Gilljam, 1990; Bruvoll et al., 2000; Hobson, 2002 & 2004a; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; North, 1990; Witherspoon, 1996). Thus, external factors are also important to consider as influencing individuals' behavioural choices. For example, Stern (2000) has listed four causal factors for pro-environmental behaviour; values, context, capabilities and habits, all of which are interrelated with each other and serve as to shape behavioural decisions within the individual. Even so, how individuals perceive these external factors, including their effect on such concepts as freedom and fairness is largely determined by the personal values held by each and every individual (cf. Garvill, Marell and Nordlund, 2001; Rohan 2000). Accordingly, Stern et al. (1995:1626; see also Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:131) come to the expressive conclusion that "values are linked to the frame used to interpret information provided by the media and other sources", and, in the context of environmental policy, that an individual's value-orientations have both direct and indirect "explanatory power for individuals' beliefs about environmental conditions and their willingness to take action in response to them" (Stern et al., 1995:1630). This further strengthens the anticipation that an individual's values indeed are an important explanatory factor for how policy-requirements are understood and evaluated on a personal level, thereby validating the first of the two propositions.

Drawing on the insight of the strong explanatory power of values, numerous research-projects aimed at finding and mapping both cultural and individual value-systems and their relation towards behavioural patterns in a variety of fields; for example political-ideological, religious and environmental, have been undertaken within several academic disciplines. For example, Ingelhart (1977, see also 1990) adapted the Maslowian needs-hierarchy to distinguish between materialist and post-materialist values as an explanation for the emerging activism and environmentalism with the post-war generations (for more examples see Almond and Verba 1963; Devos et al. 2002; Stern et al. 1995). The importance placed on values as a, following Allport (1961:543), "dominating force in life" has also directed researchers to the assignment of finding one, universally valid set of values to be used for categorizing and comparing value-priorities within societies,

cultures and single individuals, and if not to predict so to better explain or interpret attitudinal and behavioural decisions. This quest for a finite set of core values, applicable on individuals from diverse cultures as well as of different ages and social statuses have over the years involved a range of researchers, amounted to a massive collection of empirical data and resulted in the understanding that all personal values indeed can be sorted in under the realm of a number of *motivational value-types*, each serving one particular category of interests (e.g. Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987 & 1990; Schwartz, 1992, 1994 & 1999)[31]. In line with this, value-orientations are also anticipated to have a strong bearing on the individual's attitudes towards and preferences for political ideologies, public policy and various measures of political action. In some instances, coherent value-systems have even been defined as being ideologies in their own right (e.g. Milbrath, 1986). For example, consider the proposition posed by Tetlock et al. (1996:27; see also Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, 1994);

> Underlying all political belief systems are core or terminal values […] that specify what the ultimate goal of public policy should be (e.g., economic efficiency, social equality, individual freedom, crime control, national security, racial purity and so on). Values are the backstops of belief systems. When we press people to justify their political preferences, all inquiry ultimately terminates in values that people find it ridiculous to justify any further.

Having such a central role in individuals' attitudinal formation and behavioural decision, it is also reasonable to assume that values, in accordance with the second proposition outlined above, do play a central role in the policy-making processes and, thus, underpins the outcome of the same. Consider, for example, the definition of values provided by Schwartz (1999:24) as "conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g. organizational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions", and the definition of a policy by Dahl (1991:136) as "a path to the best situation you can reach at a cost you think it worthwhile to pay". Now, even though both concepts of values and policies respectively are multi-faceted and given a range of slightly different connotations, there should be no doubt that values are intimately connected to choice of action, whether this be in regards to individuals' private behaviour or in the process of creating public policy.

This value - policy connection is picked up on by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) who, consistent with the conclusions by Stern et al. (1995), assert that "pre-existing

[31] To clarify; a *value-type* is an overarching label used for connecting a range of closely related values (for instance, the value-type Achievement connects the values Success; Capability; Ambition; and Influence). Following the extensive research by S. H. Schwartz and colleagues (e.g. Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987 & 1990; Schwartz, 1992, 1994 & 1999) all values can in this manner be arranged into a universally valid two-dimensional structure containing 10 value-types. An individual's personal *value-system* contains all of these value-types, but the relative importance placed on each one differs from person to person. Lastly, this ascription of importance is referred to as a person's *value-priority* (Rohan, 2000:262).

beliefs constitute a lens through which actors perceive the world" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:131) and that personally held values or beliefs therefore are precisely what bring actors together into forming policy-coalitions. That is to say; coalitions advocating a specific solution on a policy problem are formed by actors sharing a set of values or beliefs, which in turn underpin their worldview and, thus, their preference for the proposed policy outcome[32]. Therefore, it can be anticipated, each public policy contains at least implicitly an expression of the set of values held in common by the members of the policy-coalitions, contributing to shape the formulations, goals and means of the policies, as put by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:119, see also Hanberger, 2001:50) public policy "can be conceptualised in much the same way as belief systems". On the same note, Hendricks (1994:51-52 & 1999:68; see also Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990) also asserts that the values, norms and convictions that policy actors hold in a specific issue are important for explaining the existence of different policy cultures, and their respective definition of the policy problem and its solutions. Given that the two propositions above seem valid, and values or beliefs indeed are a core part of both individuals' formation of attitudes and a foundation in public policy-making, which beliefs or value-systems are, then, relevant to consider in these respects? According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1999) advocacy coalition framework (ACF)-approach to the policy-process, the belief systems guiding policy elites, and serving as to bring policy coalitions together can be divided into three separate parts. As with the notion of the values-structure within social psychology, policy-relevant beliefs in the ACF-model are ordered in a hierarchical structure from stable and deep-seated basic values to more shallow, and therefore more volatile, attitudes.

First, the beliefs system that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:133) term the Deep Core is constituted by "fundamental normative and ontological axioms", which consist of basic views on human nature; the priority of ultimate values (such as freedom, security and power); the basic criteria of distributive justice and the person's socio-cultural identity. The Deep Core is therefore anticipated to be the basic source for how people view the world around them, including their view of others' perceptions and value priorities, in much similarity to the concept of the personal value-system, as informing a person's worldview and social value-system in social psychology (cf. Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992). Accordingly, the beliefs in the deep core are, as evident from its label, deep-seated, applicable on all types of issues or questions across all policy areas and therefore also to very resistant to change. Being generally relevant for all types of

[32] To be regarded as an advocacy coalition, one additional criterion is also needed to be fulfilled. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:138), apart from the actors in advocacy coalitions displaying consensus on a specific set of policy-core beliefs, they need also to display "a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time". As Szarka (2004:319; see also Rydin, 1999:472) rightly acknowledges, this makes advocacy coalitions a subset of Hajer's (1995) "discourse coalitions", which are defined primarily on the basis of actors subscribing to the same discourse, without them necessarily even being aware of each others' existence.

questions, the beliefs in the deep core are, however, not what essentially brings advocacy-coalitions together, as these rather are formed in response to a more specific policy area. *Second*, the deep core beliefs are in specific issues (see, for example how general values are believed to inform environmental values and attitudes in environmental psychology, e.g. Stern et. al, 1995), translated into Policy Core beliefs, which are the "fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133). These are, similar to the Deep Core, also quite change-resistant and consist, apart from "fundamental normative precepts" (i.e. basic value-priorities and criteria for distributive justice transferred from the Deep Core), also of "precepts with a substantial empirical component". The latter beliefs are directly oriented towards the policy-problem in question and concerns therefore views on the seriousness of the problem; its basic causes; and the appropriate means for amending it including both the proper distribution of authority between government and market as well as among levels of government and the preferred participation by the public, by experts and by elected officials (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). As expected, when advocacy coalitions are formed, a consensus on the policy core beliefs is the primary force that brings the actors together as these transforms the abstract basic values into practice for a specific policy area. *Third* and last, the relatively stable value orientations of the deep and policy cores respectively are complemented by a larger set of Secondary Aspects, each relating only to a part of the policy area as a whole. These are believed to be moderately easy for the actors to reconsider when faced with new information (cf. Sabatier, 1998:104), due to them consisting in most part of attitudes towards the narrow, instrumental aspects of actually implementing the policy core beliefs, for example budgetary allocations or administrative decisions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133).

For an analysis of policy legitimacy, the beliefs or values constituting the Policy Core are the most appropriate to focus on. These constitute, according to Sabatier (1998:105), what advocacy coalitions aspire to translate into public policy and are thereby possible to locate not only as held by actors in the policy-making process, but also in the outcomes of this process itself, in the form of official governmental programs and public policies. Furthermore, as the Policy Core builds on the fundamental, normative precepts of the Deep Core, it translates these into more context-specific beliefs while keeping the form of stable, subsystem-wide values rather than the volatile and narrow attitudes in the Secondary Aspects. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the development of an analytical framework for guiding the below analysis of official Swedish environmental policy documents (chapters 4 & 5) will strongly consider, first and foremost, the beliefs-systems inherent in the Policy Core.

Chapter Three

A framework for analysis

The first task for an evaluation of policy legitimacy, and the one predominately pursued in this study, is to explore the nature of the environmental norm(s) as expressed rhetorically through the official environmental policy-discourse. Thus, in order to fulfil the aim and thereby to advance towards exploring the prerequisites for environmental policy legitimacy, a value oriented text analysis will be employed so as to elucidate the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy. This chapter will provide the foundation for the coming exploration of official policy by developing the analytical framework applied the empirical parts of the thesis.

3.1 Ideal-type analysis as the method of choice

The focus on studying discourses as a policy analytical approach is enjoying an ever increasing interest (Szarka, 2004; Rydin, 1999 & 2005). Particularly in the study of *environmental* policy, a complete understanding of the policy process needs to incorporate also an analysis of the values, beliefs, arguments and motivations that underpin governmental programs. This as the process of environmentally protective policy-making is in countless ways being constrained by the many competing values and interests that surround environmental issues as illustrated by, for instance, the effectiveness – legitimacy dilemma or the attempt to reconcile strong economic interests with environmental protection in the discourse of ecological modernisation (cf. Dryzek, 2005). According to Rydin (1999 & 2005), environmental policy analysis has therefore much to gain by adapting a discursive approach and such a focus can be illuminating both for the policy-analyst herself, as well as for actors taking part in the policy-making process. To recapitulate, this thesis studies the environmental discourse

in Sweden as an attempt to elucidate the official Swedish environmental norm, that is, the beliefs-systems underpinning policy. Thereby its purpose is two-headed. *First*, as being the foundation for a study of environmental policy legitimacy, but also, *second*, as exploring the question of whether the officially provided image of the environmental citizen challenges traditional understandings of the state – individual relationship (within political ecology deemed a necessity) or displays an image which do not attempt to fundamentally restructure the role of the citizen in the environmental work.

Several different methodological approaches can be employed for studying discourses expressed in texts; from quantitative content analysis to the, within political science, relatively novel method of discourse theory[33]. However, for the specific research purpose guiding this thesis, the use of qualitative idea-analysis seems the most appropriate as this is predominantly used when mapping or comparing different ideological turns in texts, which, in essence, is one of this thesis' main purposes. Further, idea- (or ideological-) analysis has been previously used by scholars in order to trace ideas in political debates and to analyse ideological development among groups of actors (Bergström and Boréus, 2005). Compared to analyses of text which are founded on discourse theory, the characteristic of this methodological approach indicates that the subject for scrutiny are the actual ideas or normative statements, which in turn are viewed as reflecting a relatively stable sets of values, beliefs or principles. To exemplify this difference between discourse- and idea-analysis as methodological tools it can be said that discourse theory/analysis has a dual nature as being both a methodological approach and a social-theoretical construction. As a theory it originates from Marxist and psychoanalytical concepts for explaining and evaluating relations of power and the appearance of new discourses on the political agenda. As a method for analysing text, discourse analysis draws heavily on its linguistic roots. It is not designed to explore the ideological or ideational foundations of a policy or with an actor, but focuses rather on the context; the 'conditions of possibility' for the appearance of a certain phenomenon such as a new ideological mode of reasoning. Discourse analysis thus studies the creation of identity and social relations in a broad sense; and is not concerned with the ideas or values found in texts as such (cf. Torfing, 1999). In contrast, idea-analysis focuses more specifically on the ideas expressed through written discourses (texts) and is thus advantageously used for identifying values, ideologies and belief-systems with an actor, in a policy area or in a debate (Bergström and Boréus, 2005). In this study, which

[33] A definitional distinction is here made between the occupation with analysing or studying discourses (in the broad meaning of exploring the belief-systems or the shared way of understanding the world expressed through, for example, governmental programs) and discourse theory/analysis as one (out of many) specific theoretical and analytical approach to doing this (cf. Bergström and Boréus, 2005; see also Hannigan, 2006:36-52, for a discussion of different interpretations of 'discourse' in environmental studies). The research conducted in this thesis belongs to the former category. It is therefore important to further stress that this thesis should *not* be viewed as an attempt to conduct a Foucauldian analysis of power, thereby explaining the significance of various power-relationships (or social conditions) for the construction of contemporary Swedish environmental policy. Rather, the thesis focuses on analysing the content (i.e. values or belief-systems) of the said policy-discourse.

aims at mapping core values or belief-systems expressed through the policy discourse, idea-analysis thus presents a suitable methodological approach.

Idea-analysis is also qualitative in character since it aims at exploring the ideas, values or beliefs in, for instance, written texts, and not to quantify the use of language itself. The choice of idea-analysis in preference to different types of quantitative approaches such as content analysis can, thus, be justified by the subtle character of what here is being studied. Values are not easily quantified and when they are reflected in texts, it is critical to also evaluate the context within which they are presented. Furthermore, there are clearly no guarantees that the importance of a value is reflected in how often it, in the form of a specific word or phrase, appears in the text, which is the point of departure for quantitative approaches to text analysis (implying the counting of selected words deemed relevant for the research). Rather, when studying ideas, ideologies or values, it might be of similar importance to analyse what is *not* said than merely focusing on the frequency of which categories or words are included in the texts (Hedrén, 1994:11, see also Esaiasson et al., 2004). Although a quantitative approach undoubtedly will produce more easily measured and illustrated results, this thesis nevertheless agrees with Devine's (2002:207) conclusion that the qualitative methods' advantages "are clear where the goal of a piece of research is to explore people's experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to establish their meaning for those concerned".

There are few established ways for carrying out an idea-analysis. However, as a prerequisite, a set of categorisations possible to apply to the object of study is needed. A theoretical framework is therefore essential in order to determine what to look for and where, and as a guide for exposing the relevant parts of the texts studied (cf. Esaiasson et al., 2004; Bergström and Boréus, 2005). How this framework for analysis is designed also depends on the nature of the study. On the one hand, policy can be studied as a means to *discover* broad (and sometimes competing) discourses expressed through texts and, for example, held by different groups of actors. On the other, the study of policy might also be driven by the desire to relate the texts studied to a pre-determined set of coherent ideas or beliefs and thereby to determine the studied policy discourse's *resemblance* to an already developed ideal-type. Given this, the theoretical framework employed in idea-analysis for directing the examination and systematising the findings can take at least two different shapes; ideal-types and dimensions respectively. The former, following Weber (1977), can be used in order to analyse what kind of idea or ideology is represented in a certain document and subsequently to sort the text according to specific categories. Based on the ideal-types chosen, a range of alternative postulates can be constructed, which states the core principles, beliefs or values of each ideational system respectively. Naturally, the development of such an ideal-type and its postulates demands a starting point in some form of theoretical reasoning dependent on the ideal-types chosen (Bergström and Boréus, 2005). In doing this, ideal-types are not

to be thought of as presenting an image of reality. Rather, these are extreme constructions of certain phenomena towards which the object of study can be measured, and aim at isolating specific elements and thus clarifying important characteristics with this object. Accordingly, there are no definitive empirical counterparts to the elements included in this kind of theoretical framework. According to Eriksson (1989, quoted in Demker, 1993:71 & translated from Swedish), the use of ideal-types is nevertheless especially useful within idea- or ideological analysis, since "often, the reality is possible to describe in an illuminating manner if it can be considered as placed in between two polar ideal-types". The question to address when using ideal-types as an analytical tool is thereby whether, and to what extent, the object of study resembles any one of the ideal-types used (cf. Weber, 1977).

The use of dimensions as analytical tools implies instead the identification of important themes on which the texts are supposed to differ. Dimensions are prominently used in those cases where the ideal-types are not beforehand known or when the range of possible interpretations is wished to be left open, for example if the aspiration is to discover (previously unknown) discourses in text. In difference to the use of ideal-types, the texts are analysed by arranging them according to a set of parameters, e.g. collectivism versus individualism in the understanding of society, or optimism versus pessimism in the view of human nature (Bergström and Boréus, 2005). This provides the researcher with tools that are very broad and that, consequently, admit the material studied to be arranged on an open scale instead of being interpreted in connection with strictly structured (and sometimes not entirely adequate) ideal-types. By the same token, however, using dimensions as an analytical tool is also somewhat problematic since it tends to allow much room for interpretation, perhaps not providing the researcher with enough support throughout the analysis. For the following analysis of Swedish environmental policy documents, ideal-types will be applied as the primary tool by which the normative foundations of the documents will be analysed and categorised, as the values relevant for constructing the ideal-types, following the above discussion (see Chapter 2.3 above), already have been somewhat delineated. Nevertheless, to fully encompass the complexity of the environmental discourse, there is still a need to apply the dimensional approach by arranging the ideal-types themselves on a scale relating to their applicability on the environmental issues specifically.

When developing ideal-types as an analytical tool, two specific demands must be taken into consideration. *First*, they must be relevant, that is, they must contain elements of such nature that they can be applied on reality. For the purpose of legitimacy evaluation, this means that the ideal-types should take the form of core value-systems or normative ideological structures that are anticipated to be possible to reliably identify in textual data. Furthermore, to enable comparison these value-systems also have to be of such importance and fundamentality that they can be anticipated to have a genuine

effect on individuals' attitudes or decisions and thus being relevant for receiving attention in the context of legitimacy and efficiency. A fundamental part of an evaluation of environmental policy legitimacy is, therefore, the identification and mapping of the relevant values that are believed to both a) construct important foundations for environmental policy aspirations and b) impact attitudinal or behavioural decisions with individuals. The *second* prerequisite is that the ideal-types, naturally, must be clearly defined and structured so as to guarantee intersubjectivity throughout the analysis. Therefore, in developing ideal-types for a study of the Swedish environmental discourse the first task is to locate those normative statements by which policy documents can be reliably categorised. To start off with, it seems reasonable to revisit a previously posed question: which are the relevant aspects to focus on when analysing environmental discourses from a perspective of legitimacy?

In the above chapter (2.3), an answer to this question was initiated as the values or beliefs drawn from both policy analysis (e.g. Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004; Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) and social psychology (e.g. Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992) were established as, taken together, constituting a valid starting-point for constructing an analytical framework (being able to reliably identify in both governmental programmes and with individuals). Nevertheless, as they now stand, being broad themes merely indicating relevant components making up the policy-core, the generality of the policy-core beliefs might make them difficult to utilise as a framework for analysing the normative foundations in policy discourse. This in particular since they do not provide any suggestions on how different perspectives on these beliefs might be shaped, nor, and perhaps even more important, how these different perspectives might form coherent systems of beliefs, or following Hajer (1995) story-lines[34], relating to the individual's place in the environmental work. Accordingly, this thesis' aspiration to, by the use of ideal-types, analyse the normative foundations in policy both as a foundation for legitimacy and at the same time more specifically exploring the image of the environmental citizen requires a further development of the values and beliefs embedded in the policy-core. Therefore, to better cater for an analysis of policy and the reasoning within it, the following sections of this chapter will attempt to show how differing perspectives on the beliefs in the policy-core may be assembled into coherent sets or ideal-types, each presenting a line of reasoning deemed relevant to consider for an analysis of the Swedish environmental policy discourse.

3.2 Values and the environmental discourse

To recapitulate, values have been given a plenitude of different definitions, and is here thought of as being relatively stable and trans-situational conceptions of a desirable end-

[34] According to Hajer (1995:62), story-lines "provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding". Thus, they play an important role in bringing actors together into discourse coalitions.

state or conduct, which serve as guiding principles in the life of all individuals. Thereby, values guide the way in which societal actors (both single citizens and policy-makers) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and choices (Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994 & 1999). A wide array of values is anticipated to influence people's response and attitudes towards policy requirements and therefore also to have an impact on *environmental* policy legitimacy. Beetham (1991:69-90) himself mentions a broad selection ranging from values regarding rightful authoritative power in specific, as well as more general, or using the terminology of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) Deep-Core, beliefs concerning liberty, equality and social justice. As such, any legitimacy-analysis first has to deal with the apparent "problem of identifying which rules and norms are important, and when", as presented by the constructivist approach to legitimacy (Dannreuther, 1999:440-441). Though this is certainly true, based on previous research conducted within the social and behavioural sciences it nonetheless seems reasonable to assume that two value-systems in particular can be identified as being especially important for how people understand new environmental requirements and what they as a result choose to actually do within households that might contribute to an improved environmental situation. *First*, values regarding what constitute the proper relationship between human beings and nature comprise one important aspect of the study of environmental policy legitimacy. In particular within environmental philosophy, the re-conceptualisation of the human beings – nature relationship and its relevance for a subsequent behavioural change has been identified as constructing one of the core ideas of ecologism and underpinning the image of the future sustainable society (Devall and Sessions, 1985; Dobson, 1995; Eckersly, 1992). These value-systems have also been profoundly researched from a behavioural perspective since they comprise values presumed to have implications on how individuals understand a number of relevant factors such as the presence of environmental risk or threat and evaluations on who is responsible for handling the present environmental situation (Nordlund and Garvill, 2002; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999; Stern et al., 1995).

Second, within most fractions of political ecology it is acknowledged that the realisation of a sustainable society requires more of political practice than provided by the sole focus on philosophical perspectives constituted by the rethinking of the human beings – nature relationship. In particular, there is a need to rethink the contemporary arrangement of political and economic institutions in society, as well as the individual's attitudes towards and place within them. The belief is that reformed institutions will drive the even more important development towards some form of expanded environmental responsibility (not seldom described in terms of an environmental or ecological citizenship), characterised by transformed human preferences, attitudes and behaviour in, predominately, environmentally related issues (Carter, 2001). Therefore, the second relevant value-system identified consists of more general values regarding

the proper relationship between the individual and political authority, which, taken together, amounts to a view on those political relationships usually described in the terms of citizenship (cf. Turner and Hamilton, 1994). Particularly when considering the increased attention given to activities and engagement on the individual level (e.g. a new take on citizenship) in the environmental policy-discourses post-Rio, those values or beliefs expressed by the different views on what form the state – individual relationship should take are deemed to be of exceptional relevance for how policies envisaging an environmentally committed citizen will be received by the citizenry itself. Here, values regarding, for instance, the potential conflict between environmental obligations on the one hand, and the pursuit of individual lifestyles and the individual's freedom of choice on the other are addressed. Together, these two value-systems, regarding the state – individual and human beings – nature relationships respectively, are believed to strongly influence people's perception of, and response to, environmental policy aspirations.

So far, however, previous research on the environmental discourse, both in Sweden and elsewhere, has covered a relatively narrow spectrum of values, thereby leaving equally relevant value orientations aside. Most notably, the focus has been on variants of the former of the two above mentioned value-systems, namely how the human beings' relationship with nature is understood and how environmental issues therefore are perceived and approached, as evident from, taking one example out of many, Eckersly's (1992) focus on the classical distinction between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism in contemporary environmental thought. These perspectives have all contributed to a range of valuable conclusions and perspectives on the environmental discourse, theoretically as well as empirically. For instance, Hajer (1995), Brulle (2000), Dryzek (2005) and Hannigan (2005) all apply a discursive story-line approach in their respective analyses of contemporary environmental policy and environmental movements. The frameworks used in their respective analyses, however, focuses to a large extent on the 'state of nature in environmental discourse' and thus draw more explicitly on the human beings – nature relationship. On the same note, Hedrén (1994) and Lundmark (1998) have approached the Swedish environmental discourse by investigating how the human beings – nature relationships are expressed in political party programmes and parliamentary debates. Based in this previous research, the expectance is that anthropocentric values, though with some streaks of green, will dominate the policies' expressed views on this relationship. For this study of policy legitimacy, these perspectives are, as mentioned above, relevant to consider as they provide a stable framework for analysing both the perceived relationship between human beings and nature, fundamental in environmental politics, as well as the advocated strategies for reaching the sustainable society. Nevertheless, the political-ideological implications that might be expected to arise from a transformation of the contemporary understanding of individuals' rights, responsibilities and obligations (i.e.

the citizenship) as suggested within political ecology and environmental politics have throughout these analyses been somewhat disregarded as a factor for explaining how individuals might respond to and understand environmental policies[35]. In order to capture the full complexity of individuals' value-systems, and the range of normative foundations underpinning the official environmental policy discourse, views on the human beings – nature relationship need therefore to be complemented with theories concerning the different possible interpretations of the state – individual relationship and, thus, democratic citizenship. Values and value-systems regarding the state – individual relationship will, therefore, constitute the main focus for the forthcoming analysis and are here interpreted as drawing strongly on what Szarka (2004:319) defines as the ethical-normative frame in environmental discourse, that is, highlighting the "responsibilities, obligations and behavioural norms of individuals and organisations".

According to above, factors influencing people's inclination to engage in environmental work can be approached from the viewpoint of democratic or citizenship theory, focusing in particular on values or beliefs regarding the state – individual relationship. This focus has been highlighted by the development of ecologism as a distinct political ideology, comprising both a notion of the ideal society and political strategies for reaching it, and thus placing demands on new political arrangements. In particular, subsidiary principles within democratic ecologism prescribe a society characterised by participatory democracy, political and economic decentralisation as well as by an active citizenry (Lidskog and Elander, 1999). Due to this, the compatibility between environmental policies and ideological concepts that comprises views on how a proper relationship between the state and the individual should be constructed has, over the years, been given attention through a wide range of political research, though with a different approach than is the focus for this thesis (Dobson, 1995; Goodin, 1992). For example, in his PhD-thesis, Jagers (2002:39-43) lists four alternative types of compatibility studies previously conducted in the field of green political thought. Jagers' four-square matrix indicates that the main focus in this field of research has been on comparing environmental values or policies with liberal democratic principles or institutions in the search for a, at least theoretical, possibility of uniting the two. The major question asked in these types of compatibility evaluations is, accordingly, if environmentalist concerns even should be considered a necessary feature in contemporary democratic thought, or whether policies or values originating in environmentalism at least can co-exist, side by side with the principles underpinning a (liberal) democratic state. Thereby, previous research can provide also a study of legitimacy with valuable suggestions as to how, and what parts of environmental

[35] Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that even though the explicit focus in these above mentioned discourses are on the human beings – nature relationship, they have also an indirect bearing on the broader relationship between the state and the individual by each including some conception of how, why and by whom the environmental situation might be amended.

policies might challenge political-ideological concepts in a contemporary democracy and, thus, have an important bearing also on how individuals respond to political sustainability aspirations based on those values expressed by different conceptions of citizenship.

3.3 Environmental policies and citizenship theory

Classical conceptions of citizenship are usually described in terms of contractual relations between the individual and the state; of rights, responsibilities and duties both for the citizen and for the state itself. As Turner and Hamilton (1994:xv) establishes in the preface to *Citizenship – Critical Concepts*:

> It is in fact difficult to separate the debate about citizenship from a range of related issues such as the nature of democratic participation, the analysis of social rights, the legitimacy of the public order and the nature of the state in human societies […] The contemporary analysis of citizenship has to be seen within the broader context of the study of social and human rights, because any inquiry into citizenship necessarily raises questions about the relationship between obligation or right, or between responsibilities and entitlements.

Consequently, a common ideological division of the citizenship concept follows these lines and characterizes each type mainly by considering its normative stance regarding rights, responsibilities and the state – individual relationship, which also serves to clearly distinguish the political-theoretical underpinnings of each type. Following this, the theoretical landscape has, until relatively recently, been dominated by two distinct types or models of citizenship; liberal and civic-republican. The former relating strongly to the rights-claiming individualism of Locke's liberal ideas, whereas the latter, with its focus on citizenship duties, civic virtue and collectivism, has its foundations in Aristotelian republicanism and the citizenship ideal of the French revolution. The different understandings of the role of citizens and civic participation are in these aspects clearly noticeable between the two types of citizenship since, as Dagger (1997:13) writes, "[p]ersonal autonomy requires people to look inward so that they may govern themselves, while civic virtue demands that they look outward and do what they can to promote the common good".

From these two perspectives and their normative positions on the individual's relationship with both the state and with other individuals, a range of policies and political aspirations have been examined, assessed and debated. For example, the welfare system and the politics of redistribution would be expected to be perceived quite differently from the viewpoint of one ideological perspective over the other (cf. Rothstein, 1994). The relatively recent issue concerning politics for ecological sustainability, especially regarding the individual's contribution to it, is in this not any different. Hence, most theoretical debates on the promotion of environmentalism in

contemporary democracies have also developed along these lines of citizen rights and responsibilities included in the state – individual relationship. The prospects for an implementation of environmental policies as a step towards sustainability and for the promotion of a more environmentally benevolent behaviour amongst the public have, thus, received attention from a number of researchers and theorists approaching this issue with a centre of attention in the possible implications new environmental responsibilities might have for the individuals' freedom to independently choose and pursue their life projects, and for the prevailing image of the neutral, value-free state (for different perspectives on this issue, see Barry, 1999; Barry and Wissenburg, 2001; Dobson, 1998 & 2003; Eckersly, 1992 & 2004; Hailwood, 2004; Wissenburg, 1998).

Accordingly, most scholars within the field of green political thought also acknowledge that the relationship between ecological sustainability and contemporary western (liberal) democracy is somewhat uneasy. The predominant view is that the democratic system in its current form, especially with its strong ties to capitalist economy, will not be able to cope with the societal changes needed in order to prevent a future ecological crisis, and that it therefore must undergo more or less comprehensive modifications. Carrying this argument to its extremes, environmental theorists of the survivalist school and hard-line environmental activists even argue that contemporary liberal democracies are particularly ill-equipped for solving today's pressing environmental problems. This discourse flourished primarily in the 1970's with the Club of Rome's report Limits to Growth (e.g. Meadows, 1972) as a central ideological platform. Using the reasoning in Hardin's (1968) article *Tragedy of the commons* as one example of the disastrous impact the unrestricted freedom of liberal democracies has on the environment, the survivalists, according to Eckersly (1992:24), prescribe the need for "authoritarianism from above rather than [the liberal solution of] self-limitation from below". This eco-authoritarian perspective on green theory has, however, only attracted a few adherents as it, besides the apparent democratic-problem, "rests on the implausible assumption that the authoritarian state would be ruled by ecologist-kings" (Passmore, 1974:183). Instead, the main part of research in this field advocates a deepening of the existing democratic political system and a rethinking of the concept of citizenship as a requirement for environmentally sustainable development; to, paraphrasing Eckersly (1996:213), rebuild the liberal democratic ship while still at sea. By replacing the present political institutions with a deliberative model for democracy and thereby increasing citizen participation in both environmental decision-making and other environmental protective activities is, by several scholars, proposed to have positive effects, not the least for the problem with collective action as implied by Hardin's Tragedy (Smith, 2001; Eckersly, 1992; Dryzek, 2000).

Nevertheless, the very idea of an official governmental policy promoting ecological sustainability could be interpreted as posing a considerable challenge to the present

liberal democratic tradition and the principle of individual freedom evident in its accompanying concept of citizenship. For example, Dobson (2003:142) highlights this potential problem approached by many political theorists by asking "how can the liberal state deliver sustainability, in other words, if it has to do so with one arm tied behind its back?" Most notably, sustainability policies have been thought of as questioning the (ideal-type) liberal notion of a neutral state, i.e. a state that does not support, nor suppress, particular ways of life but rather grants each individual the liberty to, independently and by herself, choose and pursue individual life projects. Being a political goal, the desired end-state of ecological sustainability stands in stark contrast to the means-oriented politics of liberal democracy, and these two concepts are therefore often viewed as more or less impossible to successfully combine without severely distorting one or the other. Rather, the politics of sustainability has been described as being more compatible with the principles underpinning a civic-republican citizenship, where the state leaves the principle of neutrality aside for the purpose of steering its citizens in the right direction towards a common good (or, towards an acceptable way of living with respect to future generations and nature itself) (Doherty and De Geus, 1996; Jagers, 2002).

Since the vision of an actively participating and dutiful citizen is evident within both civic-republicanism and environmentalism, policies promoting sustainability can here be expected to find substantial support for its political-ideological consequences. According to Doherty and De Geus (1996:1) the need for democratic change in the direction towards the ideological concept of communitarianism or civic-republicanism is therefore evident among most green parties and movements, where the conflict between different normative ideals on the state-individual relationship is put explicitly into focus: "Only by challenging material inequalities and bureaucratic hierarchies will a new communitarianism emerge that will be powerful enough to overcome the atomised self-interest of individual consumers". Thus, the key issue within the past decades' ecophilosophical debate has, as a rule, not been a concern with whether the liberal principles prescribing a strict state neutrality and placing focus exclusively on upholding individual rights and liberties should be reformed or not, but rather whether this necessary reformation should be executed under the control of a community of citizens or by (a state-like) political authority. As maintained by Bell (2001), the history of green political theory has therefore rarely followed the lines of liberal political thought; instead, the dominating arguments have developed along the somewhat more radical lines of eco-anarchism or eco-socialism (see also Eckersly, 1992).

The questions on rights and entitlements or duties and responsibilities make up a central theme, both within traditional political- and citizenship theory, as well as within the relatively new discourses regarding sustainable development and the prospects for an environmentally sensitive (or even ecological) citizenship. Regarding the latter, the

importance of these issues is first and foremost due to the *prima facie* challenge that a politics of sustainability presents for the prevailing political system founded in liberal democratic citizenship, and reversibly its strong theoretical connections to civic-republican or communitarian ideals on civic duties and increased citizen participation. With these theoretical implications and compatibilities in mind it would not be too far fetched to anticipate that also individuals' attitudes towards new environmental discourses, promoting sometimes quite thorough lifestyle-changes, are influenced by their normative stance on the state – individual relationship, and similarly that the strategies chosen and policy core beliefs held by policy-makers are possible to arrange according to their position in these matters.

3.4 Developing citizenship ideal-types

In developing the analytical framework for the forthcoming analysis of environmental policy documents, this thesis will draw on the theoretical constructions of democratic citizenship specifying a range of separate outlooks on the relationship between the individual and political authority, as well as on the intricate balance between rights and duties. Consequently, ecological sustainability aspirations will throughout the following analysis be categorised according to those above briefly indicated values and normative statements regarding the state – individual relationship emanating from different theories of citizenship (thereby, the human beings – nature relationship will not be explored in any detail). Based on this, it is possible to identify three important ideational systems which will construct the foundation for the forthcoming analysis of policy documents. First, the two main strands of ideas making up the traditional citizenship concepts wherein the state – individual relationship is thought of as consisting of ideas on the nature of the state, the individual and the society and of different views on rights and responsibilities. These are, thus, closely related to a traditional political-ideological dimension. Based on these two broad notions of citizenship it is possible to construct two ideal-types, each relating to one of the two idea-systems presented above; traditional *liberal* citizenship and traditional *civic-republican* citizenship. The third ideal-type, *ecological* citizenship, diverges from the two traditional ones, by suggesting an altogether reinterpreted conception of the features of democratic citizenship, strongly influenced by the ideas of social justice and cross-boundary, cosmopolitan responsibilities.

Below, the main principles, values or lines of reasoning within these three ideal-types will be presented in order to provide a framework for analysis. Before this presentation is commenced, a couple of points need to be made clear for the reader. *First*, the below provided overview of theoretical concepts does by no means aspire to be all-encompassing, but rather to introduce the main principles advocated within the three ideal-types respectively, as well as how these different ideals differ between themselves.

More elaborated descriptions of the ideal-types' outlooks on specific matters (e.g. participation, responsibilities or motivations) will instead be provided in immediate connection to the empirical analyses in chapters 4 and 5. *Second*, when discussing ideological concepts such as different theories of citizenship, it is immensely difficult to construct strict categorises to which everyone would agree. Consider, for instance, the many variants, definitions and denominations of the proper state – individual relationship within liberalism and liberal citizenship itself giving rise to the division of this ideology into classical or modern; social or libertarian; and protective or developmental variants of liberalism respectively. Also the ideal-type here defined as civic-republicanism suffers from the same definitional problem, as this conception of citizenship sometimes is divided into a range of related political-philosophical varieties (cf. Delanty, 2000; Held, 1996). Nevertheless, this is neither the time nor the place to engage in an extensive theoretical discussion on these matters. Therefore, the following definitions of the ideal-types of traditional citizenship (liberal as well as civic-republican) will outline on some of the key notions regarding the state – individual relationship, leaving, for the most part, more detailed discussions regarding the origin of these notions, as well as their many varieties, aside. In this context, it is again relevant to stress the rationale for applying ideal-types as an analytical tool, which, first and foremost, is to assist an elucidation and interpretation of the normative foundations within the policy discourse. The expectation is that the following sections of this chapter will make the design of the analytical tools applied in this thesis, and thus also the employed definitions of liberal, civic-republican and ecological citizenship clear for the reader[36].

3.4.1 Traditional citizenship

Ideal-typical liberal citizenship is mainly constructed around the notion of the citizen as a bearer of inviolable rights and liberties. Based mainly in 17th and 18th century contract theory, the most important principles within the liberal citizenship is the policy of state neutrality (Ball, 1999; Holden, 1993). Mainstream liberal ideas thus presuppose a state that does not support, or suppress, particular ways of life, but merely aggregates people's preferences through a process in which they are all given equal consideration. Thereby, the state should not be authorized to favour one specific faith, morale or lifestyle, nor should it be allowed to treat a certain idea of what constitutes the good life as less valuable than others. In mainly this aspect, contemporary liberal democracy has been viewed as incompatible with sustainability aspirations also suggesting that citizens should take on environmental responsibilities and duties (cf. Barry, 1999; Barry and Wissenburg, 2001; Bell, 2001; Carter, 2001; Dobson, 2003;

[36] The following description of citizenship ideal-types, including their relationship to each other, are deeply indebted to Andy Dobson's commendably illuminating overview of these matters in *Citizenship and the Environment* (2003).

Doherty and De Geus 1996; Eckersly, 1992 & 2004; Lundmark, 1998). According to this liberal-individualistic view, state neutrality is needed for several different, though interconnected, reasons; the state must remain neutral in metaphysical matters to avoid violating individuals' nature-given freedom and equality, as well as not to interfere with each individual's prospect to find out what constitutes the good life. Since the citizen is thought of as being independent and rational and able to reflect upon her decisions, as an independent person holding individual rights and liberties the citizen must also be ensured the freedom to choose and revise her life-plans without being pressured by state or the collective to take them in a certain direction. Thereby, following the liberal ideal-type, the citizen should not be mandated to participate in any collective activities which aim at reaching a desired end-state. Rather, each individual must be allowed to decide for herself what the good life is and how to achieve it. Therefore, as pointed out by Holden (1993:23), the classical liberal view of the state is that of a "necessary evil", and an important part of liberal theory is thus concerned with how to deal with the danger of a far too extensive state, infringing on the rights and liberties it was initially set up to protect. The liberal solution is that the state's authority, on this account, must be confined to a minimum of areas specified in the social contract, prominently the upholding of law and order as well as the political institutions needed for securing freedom and equality, thus establishing the classical liberal idea of limited, neutral government. Taking it to the extreme, the only valid citizen activity is participating in the process of electing representative in the political system, and the liberal citizen is thereby thought of as taking a passive, rights-claiming role in the public sphere.

Civic-republican citizenship, on the other hand, offers a slightly different interpretation of the state – individual relationship, as it draws more heavily on the duty part of being a citizen and enjoying the benefits of the community. In contrast to the passive rights-claiming of the liberal tradition, civic-republicanism prescribes an active citizenship, where all citizens have a duty to engage in furthering the good of society. Civic-republican citizenship draws both on the republican tradition founded with Cicero and Machiavelli, and the communitarian tradition of the 1970's (Heywood, 2004). As a response towards Rawlsian liberalism, several political theorists and philosophers have turned to the writings of Aristotle, where ideas on the existence of a shared understanding of the good is elaborated, and to Hegel, who describes individuals as historically conditioned beings, finding with them a basis for critique of liberal individualism (Gutmann, 1985). One factor that constructs the basis of most communitarian critique towards liberalism is the ontological statement about the social nature of the self. The claim is that liberals in general have adapted an overly individualistic and thus far too unrealistic view of the self, as 'atomised' (Taylor, 1992) or as an 'unencumbered self' (Sandel, 1984). Thereby, liberalism contradicts the Aristotelian view of man as a social animal, dependent on the communal context and the society for her own definition and with moral values formed by the belonging to a

community. The self, communitarians believe, is constituted by various social attachments, tied so closely to the individual that they are more or less impossible to neglect (this can be viewed as a response to the Rawlsian original position, where individuals are thought to abandon their social status and choosing the institutions of a just society from behind a veil of ignorance, cf. Rawls, 1999). Contrary to the liberal emphasizing of state neutrality in questions regarding metaphysical issues and the conception of the good life, civic-republicanism prescribes a state with extensive possibilities, sometimes even obligations, to interfere in individuals' lives when deemed necessary. It thereby rejects the liberal idea of a neutral state confined to the upholding of individuals' right to self-determination. According to the civic-republicanism, the state should be synonymous with a collective moral understanding incorporating certain sets of values founded in, for example, ideas on ethnicity, nationalism or a common history (Avineri and De-Shalit, 1992; Kymlicka, 1990; Uddhammar, 1993). Furthermore, the state's duty is to promote the establishment as well as upholding of specific, culturally bound values in society and with its citizens, for the reason that the majority, or collective, regards them as being superior or more morally correct than others (i.e. the common good). Some communitarians even argue that the liberal emphasis on the individual's freedom of choice is not an expression of respect, but of indifference (Kymlicka, 1990). Following this line of reason, the citizen has a duty to promote the common good of the community rather than seeing to the good of herself. Furthermore, the state has an obligation to embrace those lifestyles deemed beneficial for the common good and to direct its citizens towards adapting them, "[T]he states primary duty", Larmore (1987:92) writes, "is not to uphold some kind of neutrality, but to embrace and support a specific conception of the good life". Figure 3.1 below illustrates these two ideal-types of traditional citizenship.

Figure 3.1: Two traditional citizenship ideal-types



3.4.2 Environmentally sensitive citizenship

Being, as ideal-types are, extreme constructions of reality, the traditional (liberal and civic-republican) types of citizenship presented above are, however, also quite inflexible with strict frames determining their respective view on what constitutes a proper political relationship between the individual and the state. Indeed, there is also a need

for a certain amount of rigidity in order to ensure reliable interpretations of the empirical material they are employed to analyse (Esaiasson et al., 2004; Bergström and Boréus, 2005). Nevertheless, as the traditional ideas on citizenship have evolved both in practice and through political theory over the years, this has made them somewhat more comprehensive and broader than what originally was the case. In particular, the prospects of combining traditional political theories with environmentalism or environmental policies have led to traditional citizenship types and their respective views on civic rights and duties being interpreted in a wider sense mainly by incorporating also environmental aspects in the catalogue of citizen rights and responsibilities (Jelin, 2000; Lidskog and Elander, 1999; Lundmark, 1998 & 2003) [37]. By doing this, the previous so rigid frames surrounding the two traditional citizenship types can be expanded to also cover questions directly relating to the environment and environmental protection. Within civic-republicanism, this expansion of the state – individual relationship to also include environmental aspects is naturally less significant than for its liberal counterpart. In its traditional form civic-republicanism has often been closer to the environmental movements' ideas of what an environmental citizenship should encompass, due to its focus on active citizenship and the duties towards the community each and every citizen holds, rather than on individual rights. Nevertheless, within a more environmentally sensitive civic-republicanism, these civic duties and responsibilities are explicitly thought of as also encompassing an environmental engagement and the civic duties prescribed can thereby also take the form of active protection of the environment in those cases it is deemed necessary by the state or the community (Curry, 2000; Dobson, 2003). According to environmentally sensitive civic-republicanism, the common good can be described in terms of sustainability and one environmental norm is thereby guiding the construction of policy.

Due to the perceived incompatibilities between the liberal citizenship type and environmentalism, several attempts have also been made to combine the two. In this endeavour, attention has been drawn to more developmental or social interpretations of liberalism (Barry and Wissenburg, 2001; Held, 1996; Jagers, 2002). According to these types, individual liberty is not interpreted in a strict Lockean sense, but rather social liberal democracy relates liberty and equality to the concept of autonomy, that is, all individuals' (equal) opportunity to formulate, choose and realise life-plans. Instead of the passive night-watchman state of strict liberalism, the state in social liberal democracy takes a slightly more active responsibility for ensuring every citizen's possibility for an autonomous life, indicating the need for both economic redistribution and other state-controlled measures (Heywood, 2004). This has given rise to an environmentally sensitive liberalism, which is still rights-based, but where the role of the citizen is

[37] Obviously, the environment is not the only political question in which the ideal-types can be expected to incorporate a broader line of reasoning. Consider, for example, how welfare-policy, taxation or economic redistribution is incorporated into versions of both the two traditional ideal-types.

thought of as including a focus on the environment as well as on environmental rights and duties. For example, from a perspective of environmentally sensitive liberalism, civic responsibilities can also, in certain cases, comprise environmental protective acts. As suggested by Attifield (1994), Nozick's side-constraints could for example, be applied to the problem with externalities and environmental justice. This would mean that people were to be prohibited to perform actions such as polluting the environment, which in prolongation have negative effects on other people's rights, liberties and autonomy. Accordingly, an environmentally sensitive liberalism acknowledges freedom from harm caused by environmental problems as a valid factor for the state to impose environmental regulations or taxes.

Thereby, the traditional citizenship ideal-types might still be thought of as placed on either end of a dimension, according to figure 3.1 above, but, as a consequence of including the environmental dimension, also being stretched out according to the environmentally sensitive interpretations of rights and responsibilities. Considering the object of study, the placement of the ideal-types in a dimensional structure incorporating also environmentally sensitive types seems a preferred method for illustrating their internal relationships as well as the additional perspectives a focus on also environmental matters demands. Nevertheless, both liberal and civic-republican citizenship keep the bulk of their traditional structure, including their anthropocentric (i.e. human centered) worldview. The environmental perspective is only a way of adding to the contents within the frames of traditional citizenship and thus to expand them slightly towards also taking consideration to the specifics of matters regarding the environment, as illustrated in figure 3.2 below.

Figure 3.2: Environmentally sensitive citizenship ideal-types

3.4.3 Beyond 'the political' and 'the state' – ecological citizenship

A greening of the citizenship concept in line with what contemporary environmentalism can be anticipated to denote is, however, not a question of slightly altering the relationship between individuals and political authority. As touched upon by, for example, Barry (1999) environmentalism or green politics presents a challenge to the contemporary notion of citizenship as a whole. Thus, there are also relevant demarcations to be made between the theoretical-ideological underpinnings of

traditional citizenship on the one hand and a new ecological citizenship on the other, which will construct the third ideal-type used for classifying policy documents. Although the two traditional types of citizenship differ in some aspects, they still have other important features in common which, in turn, contrast them with the notion promoted through an ecological citizenship. These ideas are also a central theme in Dobson's *Citizenship and the Environment* (2003:83), which holds that a greening of the citizenship concept not only challenges parts of the liberal type but rather requires a whole new framework, since it "can be neither discursively nor politically contained within the two dominant citizenship forms, liberal and republican". In line with this, Dobson also establishes that "if we, however, add in the other distinctions discussed above, these two apparently very different types of citizenship [i.e. liberal and civic-republican] turn out to have rather a lot in common" (Dobson, 2003:38).

In particular, three aspects relating to environmental obligations separate traditional and ecological citizenship. *First*, ecological citizenship implies the expansion of citizenship activities from exclusively being thought of as taking place in the narrowly defined public sphere, as in traditional citizenship, to also incorporating activities in what has previously been regarded as the private sphere (within the family, household or community, and outside the public, political institutions) as being of citizenly character (Dobson, 2003). This is first and foremost due to a shift in focus from citizenship as contained within the political state – individual relationship, to incorporating also the non-contractual relations between the citizens themselves. These previously considered private, and therefore non-citizenly, relations between individuals are now given a citizenship connotation on account of the claim, first raised within the women's movement, that 'the private is political' in the sense that private relations and acts also have an effect in the public arena and therefore should be included as a legitimate part of the new concept of citizenship (Naess, 1981; Crossley, 2002; Oskarsson, 1999; Tarrow, 1998). As a direct consequence of rethinking the boundaries for ecological citizenship, a new set of values are also recognised as core civic virtues. Whereas civic-republican citizenship draws predominately on Machiavellian values supporting civil service and protection of the community (courage, strength and obedience), ecological citizenship also recognises motivational values that draws on personal relationships (e.g. social justice, responsibility, care and compassion) (Dobson, 2003). This feature of ecological citizenship also indicates a shift in focus from the motivational values constituting the main demarcation line in the political state-individual relations of traditional citizenship theory (e.g. self-direction vs. conformity and tradition), and towards values in the range between altruistic/pro-social values, and values promoting more of a self-centred behaviour. This dimension corresponds quite well to the distinction that Sagoff (1988) has made between the citizen and the consumer, and to the, within environmental psychology often referred to, distinction between the

Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) and the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP)[38], where the values put forth by ecological citizenship are located predominately within the latter.

The *second* feature that distinguishes ecological citizenship from its traditional counterparts is the expansion of the scope of citizen duties; from being confined within a traditional nation-state, citizenship is now thought of as being global or universal in character. On this topic, Jelin (2000:53) writes: "although the ideas about citizenship and rights have been grounded in the notion of the modern nation-state, there is no intrinsic necessity that this be so: the public sphere might be 'smaller' or 'larger' than the state, or may even be different". Remembering that ecological citizenship is not exclusively defined in terms of the relations between the individual and the state, but rather expanded to also include private-sphere relations between citizens themselves, this indicates that ecological citizenship not needs to be identified with any contingent political space or a political authority towards which citizens owe duties or can claim rights. Instead the space of ecological citizenship is synonymous with the spread of negative effects our actions have for others and, since most environmental problems have the capacity to spread both geographically and over time, the scope of citizen duties can be extended both from one generation to another and across territorial borders. Pollution does not stop at national boundaries and, consequently, neither should the duties of the ecological citizen (Dobson, 2003). Therefore, it can in this context be concluded, as Christoff (1996:152) does, that the "relationship between citizen and nation-state is now one of considerable tension".

Third, based on the above expansion of the citizenship sphere, also the motivations for engaging in environmentally protective acts discern ecological citizenship from its two traditional counterparts. The fact that citizenship is thought of as comprising also the non-contractual relationship between citizens themselves has, for the obligations proposed by ecological citizenship, for effect that also the reciprocity of the relationship is missing from traditional citizenship theory. In other words, individuals are not asked to take on new duties with the motivation that they personally will gain from them and be able to claim some right or benefit in return (even if they will, especially in the long run, this is not the motivation). Rather, the duties of ecological citizenship are described as responsibilities for all personal actions that "always already" affect others

[38] The concepts of the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) and the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) refer to two contrasting sets of values and beliefs, commonly used in environmental psychology and sociology to categorise people's world views. DSP indicates a, following Dryzek (2005) promethean view of the world, where nature is given only an instrumental value and economic growth constitutes the overarching goal. Furthermore, DSP also indicates a sphere of compassion for only near and dear, leaving out both other species and future generations. Conversely, NEP stands for new, post-materialistic values and politics, with a high valuation of nature and the acknowledgement of responsibilities both to present and future generations in a cosmopolitan perspective. Inherent in NEP is also the recognition of the limits to human growth and, consequently the need for a restructuring of society (cf. Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Milbrath, 1986).

(cf. Dobson, 2003:49 & 115). Since all acts, in the case of environmentalism especially those in the private sphere, have an impact on other individuals, the civic duties therefore lies in making these impacts as sustainable as possible and not to use an unequal amount of environmental services, capital or space compared to others. The main (or only) motivation for taking on environmental obligations is, thereby, within an ecological citizenship founded in a sense of social justice; an acknowledgement that it is not right to compromise others ability to lead a full life by upholding an unequal distribution of resources (Connelly and Smith, 2003). In sum, the three ideal-types of citizenship used as an analytical framework in this thesis are thought of as relating to each other in accordance with the Figure 3.3 below.

Figure 3.3: Three citizenship ideal-types and their relation



3.4.4 The analytical framework

The analytical framework used for the analysis of Swedish environmental policy documents will emanate from the above described theoretical constructions of democratic citizenship specifying three separate outlooks on the relationship between the individual and political authority, as well as on the balance between rights and duties: liberal, civic-republican and ecological citizenship. In sum, *liberal* citizenship focuses on individual rights and liberties and considers the individual as free and rational, able to independently construct and revise life-plans. The good life is thought of as being a subjective value for every individual to determine. The state is, therefore, to remain neutral in any questions regarding the good life and instead concentrate at upholding fair political procedures as well as enabling the autonomy of all citizens. A certain amount of environmental obligations must, nevertheless, be taken by the liberal citizen not to violate the liberties of others, but environmental policies are only imposed in those cases where this is necessary in order to preserve or further the liberties of all. Whereas liberal citizenship accordingly is defined as a politics of right, *civic-republican* citizenship instead stands for a politics of the common good. Here the individual is thought of as determined by her societal context, not as being independent from it. Therefore, the enhancement and promotion of the community, including its prevailing values and traditions, are a common good towards which everyone has a duty to contribute. The state, therefore, has an active role in organising and promoting

the good life among its citizens as well as steering the citizens in the right direction. *Ecological* citizenship differs from the traditional citizenship types in several aspects. The civic duties are not defined by contractual relations with a political authority; instead they transgress both national boundaries and the membership of a community and are defined by the consequences of one's actions. Duties are thereby held towards all other individuals affected, both in time and space, in accordance with the size of the ecological footprint. Furthermore, citizen duties are motivated by a sense of social justice and care for those affected; no reciprocity is therefore expected in taking on civic obligations. The core features, or themes, of the citizenship ideal-types making up the theoretical framework for the forthcoming (in chapters 4 & 5) analysis of the Swedish environmental policy discourse are summarised in table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: The Analytical Framework

	Ideal-types:		
Themes:	**Liberal Citizenship**	**Civic-republican citizenship**	**Ecological citizenship**
Responsibilities	Selective/Asymmetrical	All-inclusive/Symmetrical	Selective/Asymmetrical
Citizenship nature	Passive (rights-claiming)	Active (duties towards the community)	Active (deliberation, engagement)
Participation	Voluntarily	Duty/contractual	Duty/non-contractual
Citizenship sphere	Public	Public	Public & Private
The State	Neutral/Facilitating	Partial/Enlightening	Partial/Normative
Policy aims	Procedures/subjective good	Goals/objective good	Goals/objective good
Motivational values	Freedom, Autonomy, Self-direction/Reciprocity	The Common Good (tradition, security, conformity)/Reciprocity	Social Justice (responsibility, care, compassion)/Non-reciprocity
Scope	Territorial (the nation-state)	Territorial (the nation-state)	Non-territorial (the ecological footprint)

As a final note on the theoretical framework, the citizenship ideal-types capture, also, all the basic normative beliefs (for example regarding priority of fundamental values and distribution of welfare) of the Deep- and Policy Core belief systems identified by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). Thereby, these ideal-types might be anticipated to elucidate those values or beliefs deemed relevant both for holding policy coalitions together and expressed as results of one coalition's ambition to transform them into public policy. Additionally, and highly relevant when dealing with an analysis of governmental policy in textual form, the use of these citizenship ideal-types also places the fundamental values or beliefs into a broader context of reasoning, thus making them possible to locate through analysing a line of argument even though the values themselves (or their order of priority) are not explicitly mentioned. Furthermore, the anticipation is that basic normative outlooks also constitute the foundation for each

actor's understanding of the policy problem at hand as well as its possible solutions from a more empirical point of view, as understood by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:133) through their incorporation of "precepts with a substantial empirical component" in the policy core belief-system. Again, the reasoning surrounding value-priorities within the three citizenship ideal-types captures also views on most of these empirically related factors, such as level of participation by the public *vis-à-vis* the state; division of authority between government and market; and use of policy instruments. Therefore, by applying citizenship ideal-types (instead of merely analysing text according to the list of policy-core beliefs) these preferences can also be connected to a specific set of value priorities, thus providing a more elaborate interpretation of the normative foundations of policy.

Thus, in order to capture the normative foundations of the Swedish environmental policy discourse, the above key notions regarding the state – individual relationship and the nature of citizenship expressed by the three citizenship ideal-types will be highlighted throughout the analysis. The focus is thereby directed towards a set of specific areas of interest used to distinguish the different ideal-types from each other:

a) The view on the citizen, citizen rights, duties and responsibilities as well as the amount of participation in environmental activities these rights and responsibilities imply for the individual.
b) The view on the state and, most notably, the role of the state in promoting citizen participation and in formulating policy aims or goals.
c) The motivational constructions in policy; how adherence to the policy requirements is motivated, and by which values.

The first two areas (a and b) focus explicitly on how the relationship between the individual and political authority are understood in the documents. The question to address here is if the reasoning within the policy documents draws more on values regarding the individual's freedom of choice, autonomy and self-determination or rather on the need for restraint, obedience towards the community will and respect for prevailing traditions? The third area of interest (c) concerns the values provided as motivations for acting in accordance with the policy-goals. Are the given motivations drawing on any one of the values of freedom, tradition, security, care or social justice? And, how far are the citizen duties or obligations expanded in time and space?

3.5 Ideal-type analysis and the problem of fit

Before commencing the empirical part of the study, it must be clarified that a perfect match between the policy documents and any one of the ideal-types comprising the theoretical framework cannot and should not be expected in an analysis of this kind. Consistent with the basic understanding of the concept, the ideal-types used in this

thesis are, as mentioned above, not aspiring to constitute perfect images of reality, but are merely used in order to structure the forthcoming analysis of the Swedish environmental policy discourse. As noted by, among others Vedung (1991), a well-known fallacy when using theoretically constructed models in research is to utilise them as a description of an attainable reality. This unreflective assessment of empirical conditions by the use of theoretical models, and when presented with an apparent divergence either criticising the model for lacking in realism or the reality for not being as perfect as it could be, has been labelled the *nirvana fallacy* (e.g. Cram, 2002:323), the *nirvana approach* (e.g. Carlsson, 1996:530) or the *scarecrow-mistake* (Vedung, 1991:164). Given this, there is a need to once again stress that this is not the aspiration of this thesis. Any comparisons made between ideal-types and statements in policy will be made merely as a means for elucidating the interpretations of its normative foundations, and as a way of facilitating further comparisons between policies from different levels of government where the policy's degree of resemblance (or not) to the ideal-types can serve as a starting point for the discussion.

Even so, the practical need for some form of comparison between theoretical ideal-types and policy discourse presents yet another difficulty which needs to be addressed. Following the acknowledgement of imperfections in reality as informing the nirvana fallacy-problematic, it is reasonable to assume that the nature of the object of analysis (i.e. the environmental policy discourse) makes "either/or" assignments exceedingly problematic. As with most social phenomena, official policy documents are highly ambiguous (or even fuzzy, see for example Ragin, 1998 & 2000) and can thus be anticipated to both (a) display resemblance to all ideal-types, albeit to a varying degree, and (b) to differ internally in their ideal-type resemblance on each of the eight analytical themes considered. Thus, it would be difficult or even impossible to point out any one of the three ideal-types as the one which the policy, either in part or as a whole, could be said to fully resemble (and which other two that, by default, should be disregarded in this respect). For example, how perfect a match with an ideal-type is demanded for describing a policy's normative foundation as, in total, resembling this value-system? How much discrepancy is permitted? What about policy documents displaying an equal amount of statements relating to all three ideal-types? Owing to this, within qualitative social science analysis, not uncommon "problem of fit" (Ragin, 1998:20) it will simply not be useful to make only dichotomous perfect/no resemblance-statements as this will fail to take into account the complexity displayed by most social phenomena, environmental policy included. Rather, as it can be anticipated that each policy analysed, to a varying degree, will display statements corresponding to all of the three ideal-types, this should also be reflected throughout the empirical analysis as to avoid oversimplifying reality. Hence, a nuanced interpretation of the correspondence between policy and ideal-types is called for, allowing the level of resemblance to come in several shades and being both more or less strong.

Nevertheless, to facilitate comparisons between policy-documents on different levels of government (e.g. national policy vs. local policy) it is crucial for the interpretations made to be as transparent as possible and, perhaps even more vital, the level of resemblance with each of the ideal-types assigned to policy to be clearly stated. Even though the qualitative analysis of policy documents as well as the accompanying evaluation of ideal-type resemblance are very much subjective; by clearly stating the basis for interpretation, as well as specifying the internal differences between the ideal-types, the aspiration is both to increase the level of internal validity of the research, as well as to make possible reliable comparisons between different policies based on their ideal-type resemblance. In an analysis using only two, dichotomous ideal-types, this comparative evaluation can be made rather straight forward. The phenomena can then be qualitatively described as being more or less close to one ideal-type, and, following conventional logic, less or more close to the other (cf. Esaiasson et al., 2004:154-159). Thereby, the in policy dominating ideal-type is easily calculated. However, in cases like the present where three ideal-types, defined by their divergence on eight different themes, constitute the analytical framework the classification need to be more precise since the level of resemblance to ideal-type two and three cannot be logically deducted from a statement on the level of resemblance to ideal-type one (except if the resemblance to one ideal-type is perfect, as it, by default, will be zero in the other two). Accordingly, in particular when using more than two dichotomous ideal-types, the meaning of evaluative-statements such as "to a lesser extent" or "in some aspects", needs to be thoroughly explained and made comparable across sub-cases.

To cope both with the problem of making either/or-statements in relation to highly ambiguous social phenomena, and the problem of opaque value-statements in the analysis, the description of the level of resemblance between policy and ideal-type will draw from a technique of quantifying qualitative evaluations developed within fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (FSQCA) (cf. Gran, 2003; Pennings, 2003; Ragin, 1998 & 2000). Originally designed to allow for interpretations of social phenomena to be treated as partially belonging to more than one category (e.g. democratic states, consensus democracies, welfare states), the fuzzy-set approach allows for the possibility that a policy, to a certain extent, express values inherent in all of the three ideal-types. As illustrated by Figure 3.4 below, qualitative statements outlining to what extent the values or beliefs derived from the analysed policy discourse resembles (or fit) with the values or beliefs inherent in each one of the citizenship ideal-types will also be assigned a numerical score; the reason for this approach being the aspiration to make the analysis more visible to the reader, as well as to assist comparisons between the sub-cases (in particular between the two levels of government). The policy's resemblance to each ideal-type (or, using the correct FSQCA-terminology, degree of membership in the set of policies drawing on those values advocated by each ideal-type), is evaluated according to the key themes outlined in section 3.4 above.

Figure 3.4: Ideal-type resemblance-score for policy according to Theme X



As evident from the figure above, where, for example, a Boolean coding only allows for a binary division (e.g. "in" or "out"), resemblance-scores are here, following the "fuzzy-logic" (cf. Arfi, 2005; Ragin, 2000), permitted to take partial values also in the range *between* the two extreme points of perfect resemblance (assigned a score of 1) and no resemblance (assigned a score of 0)[39]. To facilitate this, three additional empirical break-points are constructed in between the two extremes; resemblance to a lesser extent (a score of 0,25); no more resemblance than not (the cross-over point of 0,5); and resemblance to a greater extent (0.75). The total resemblance-score for each policy on each theme cannot exceed 1, as this score represents a perfect match and, thus, excludes any references to the other value-systems. This infers, of course, that for a policy to generate a score of 1 for one ideal-type, the other two ideal-types must score no more than 0. Finally, the reason for setting the break-points also at 0.33 and 0.66 respectively is to allow for the possibility that a policy displays an equal resemblance to all three ideal-types.

It should, however, be mentioned that the application of fuzzy-scores is used primarily as they are believed to add to the qualitative analysis of normative foundations in policy a clearer and more comparable result. The assignment of resemblance-scores is thus the last step of the analysis and as such based exclusively on the careful interpretation of the policy-documents according to the ideal-types presented above. Any further application of the FSQCA as a technique for calculating causal patterns (that is, necessary and sufficient conditions) and in this fashion determining the causation of an outcome is not relevant for the aim of this thesis. Again, the rationale behind the choice of ideal-types as analytical tools is not to expose one perfect match, but to, as clarified above by Esaiasson et al. (2004), utilize the ideal-types as categories for drawing attention to key formulations and statements in the policy documents and to interpret conflicts and

[39] For examples of political science studies where the fuzzy-set approach is applied in various fashions and contexts see, for instance, Bergman and Ström (2004); Veugelers and Magnan (2005); Pennings (2003) or Arfi (2005).

priorities among them. For the purpose of analysis this is, however, entirely sufficient. By evaluating the texts according to the main areas of interest outlined above and defined by the different ideal-typical themes, values and principles regarding the state-individual relationship underpinning Swedish environmental policy are exposed and can, thus, at the next stage be compared both over time as well as across levels of government, following the aim and outline of the study. Nevertheless, by assigning quantitative fuzzy-scores to policy according to each theme, the opportunity arises for a mean value to be calculated at the end of the analysis which demonstrates to what degree the policy as a whole displays resemblance to each of the theoretical ideal-types of citizenship. This approach is anticipated to be more representative of the admittedly complex nature of social phenomena such as official policy statements; provide a more stable foundation for comparisons than will be reached by simply presenting value-judgements as text; and allow for a higher internal validity of the research.

Chapter Four

Normative Foundations of National Environmental Policy

The following chapter constitutes the exploration of the first sub-case in the analysis of the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy: the national level of policy-making. To recapitulate, the analysis executed in the following chapter will apply the reasoning and the principles from three citizenship ideal-types elaborated on above (liberal, civic-republican, and ecological respectively) as an analytical framework for elucidating the normative foundations in the national environmental policy discourse in Sweden directed towards the citizen's role in building the sustainable society. In doing so, this analysis lays *first* the foundation for an evaluation of legitimacy defined by the value-correspondence between policy and citizens, and *second* exposes the official image of the environmental citizen as provided throughout the Swedish national policy discourse. The focus for analysis is to determine the content of the formal Swedish environmental norm with regards to the state – individual relationship and, thereby, to explore the central policy-core beliefs (cf. Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) inherent in official environmental policy on the national level; a focus for which the citizenship ideal-types are believed to constitute a well suited analytical tool. Each one of the sections in the following chapter will concentrate on a specific core aspect of the said relationship between the individual and political authority in which the three ideal-typical conceptions of citizenship differ and, thereby, serve as to highlight the specific normative aspects of Swedish policy. Nevertheless, given that the argumentative structures of all three citizenship ideal-types not easily facilitates this division into separate, unconnected parts, all sections are believed to overlap in a greater or lesser extent and the chapter will, therefore, no sooner than to the end be able to present a comprehensive interpretation of the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy.

4.1. Material used

As the empirical analysis aspires to elucidate the *official* Swedish view on the place and role of the citizen in the environmental work, it is so focused on official policy documents. During the years that have passed since the incorporation of the Agenda 21 into Swedish environmental policy-making, the Swedish government have presented a range of Bills and Communications to parliament, outlining the Swedish policy for ecological sustainability. Apart from documents focusing on specific measures in clearly defined policy areas, the government presents each year a Government Communication (Skr) outlining how the general work towards sustainability is progressing in al areas as well as, and perhaps more relevant, the perceived or desired direction of the continuous work. These Government Communications (in Swedish: *Skrivelser*) do not themselves constitute a part of the legislative process and do therefore not, as a Bill, include a proposition for a decision by the parliament. Instead, communications consist of information from the government to the Swedish parliament and aims at reporting the government's view on a certain issue; how it plans to approach it in political practice, and why. In order to analyse the principles underpinning Swedish environmental policy, communications are therefore relevant for providing an elaborate understanding of the ideational context within which national policy decisions are being made. Furthermore, Government Communications sum up the conclusions from earlier steps in the policy-making process, thereby providing a synopsis of opinions and normative statements given by, for example, external committees or in previous legislative work. The selection of documents to be included in the national-level study consists therefore, first and foremost, of these written communications from the Swedish government. Nevertheless, in case that an aspect of the official policy decision needs to be closer examined, the reports setting out the external committees conclusions, for the most part published in the Swedish Government Official Reports series (SOU) or as part of the Ministry Publications Series (Ds) along with the proposed Government Bills (Prop), are also included in the list of relevant documents. Documents concerning the policy areas of common interest in the SHARP Program (see section 1.3 above) are of course particularly relevant in the study, but also documents comprising policy decisions of a more general kind will be included since Swedish political aspirations to reach sustainability clearly reach into policy areas well outside of what may be strictly regarded as environmental politics (educational policy to give one important example). A large number of texts are available from the policy-making process on the national-level, thereby providing an elaborate understanding of the contexts within which the texts have originated.

The ambitions that have guided the selection of national-level documents are mostly concerned with the time-frame. For one, the selected documents shall take into account the development of Swedish environmental policy during the past decade (1994-2006). In this respect, the choice of documents aims at providing a chronological

context to the analysis, ranging from the 1992 signing of UNCED's Agenda 21, which initiated a new direction for national and local environmental policies, to present-day. The documents studied throughout this part of the analysis represent, thus, a distinct period in the development of contemporary Swedish environmental policy, allowing for comparison and contrasting also over time, which is anticipated to provide for a more thorough analysis of the normative foundations in policy. Additionally, as the Swedish government during the years incorporated in the study has been made up by the Social Democratic party alone (with support in Parliament from the Left Party and the Environmental Party the Greens), the impact of altered political majorities cannot explain possible changes in the political discourse over time.

Lastly, it must be acknowledged that several research efforts delineating the discourses of Swedish environmental politics and policy, although from different perspectives than the one applied here, has been made during the past years and these have also been very helpful throughout the analysis. To mention but a few, Hedrén (1994); Algotsson (1996); Lundmark (1998) and Duit (2002) have all made distinguished contributions to the study of Swedish environmental policy and the actors, political parties as well as governmental authorities and NGO's involved in developing and executing it during the past half-century. In particular, Lennart J. Lundqvist's (2004c) comprehensive work on *Sweden and Ecological Governance* deserves specific attention for providing an admirably detailed account of the development of Swedish environmental- and resource management policy, on both national and municipal levels. Also employing a different approach than this thesis', Lundqvist applies the concept of 'ecologically rational governance' as the ideal-type by which the developments in the environmental policy field are analysed and the broader issues of democracy, individual autonomy and state authority are discussed. Nevertheless, as much as these above mentioned research efforts provide highly valuable insights and interpretations of both policy-rhetoric and political practice in the case of Sweden, none of them focus explicitly on the objects on interest in this thesis, namely the policy-core beliefs related to the state – individual relationship specifically. This is where the below analysis will place its focus. To start off with, the foundation for civic engagement as described throughout the policy discourse will receive the attention; the responsibilities assigned to and the participation demanded from the Swedish citizenry.

4.2 Rights, responsibilities and citizen participation

Participation is, in its various connotations, both a central theme in the discourse of sustainable development (Rydin, 1999:447; see also Baker, Kousis, Richardson and Stephen, 1997) as well as a core part in all theories of citizenship. As noted at several instances above, the concept of citizenship itself revolves around various forms, rules and levels of interaction between the single citizen and the state or between the citizens

themselves, leading van Steenbergen (1994:2) to suggest that "[c]itizenship represents the notion of participation in the public life". The potential legitimacy-issue when governments prescribing an increased civic engagement in public life, for instance with the aspiration of effectively protecting the environment through initiating collective-action, is raised by Rydin (1999:477) as she (following Giddens, 1994) acknowledges that "not all people wishes to become involved in such political action". Nevertheless, any policy promoting increased civic participation and engagement (i.e. the new environmental policies) does, of course, also include an idea on *what form* this participation should take in the new, reformed society and *why*, issues which in turn might be expected to greatly influence also the level of public acceptance.

Turning to the analytical framework, each of the different ideal-types of citizenship treats the subject of public participation somewhat differently, primarily based on their differing interpretations of civic rights and responsibilities. Therefore, how citizenly involvement in the work towards sustainability is defined; its foundation in rights and responsibilities; as well as the amount of participation which is either expected or mandated through policy, could all serve as important steps in evaluating the normative features of Swedish environmental policy and, consequently, its resemblance to the values expressed through the citizenship ideal-types presented above. In what way is citizen participation framed through the policy documents? More specifically, is the citizen expected to be passive or active with regard to environmental protective measures? Are the environmental responsibilities underlying citizenly participation suggested to be asymmetrical or generally applicable to all members of society? These questions both serve as to elucidate the underlying motivational values referred to through the documents. As a first focus for analysis, therefore, this thesis will follow the weight given to public participation, both as a core in the citizenship-concept which to a great extent is defined by the amount of participation in substantive activities demanded (Prokhovnik, 1998), and as an important part of the policy-core beliefs (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

4.2.1 Different degrees of civic responsibilities

This following section will concentrate primarily on the factor determining the amount of citizen participation proposed and thus centre the underpinning degree of civic responsibilities as expressed through Swedish environmental policy. Due to differing outlooks on, and weight given to, civic rights and responsibilities as well as the participation demanded of citizens according to these views, traditional citizenship types can be distinguished rather straight forward according to their advocating, first, a selective (liberal) or an all-inclusive (civic-republican) participation respectively. The former strongly emphasises individual rights to freedom or autonomy and defines therefore mandated citizen participation, even if only in the public sphere, still as being

rather limited; encompassing active participation in formal political activities, e.g. the voting process, and thus upholding representative democratic government. Based on the idea of negative rights, other forms of civic responsibilities such as taking part in environmentally benevolent activities, are thereby evaluated according to the effect non-participation has on other citizens and consequently limited to the avoidance of certain activities in those cases they are deemed as being harmful to others. Therefore, the environmental responsibilities prescribed to citizens are in this case asymmetrical, only to encompass those citizens whose actions might otherwise harm others, and the character of citizenship takes the form of passive rights-claiming rather than a mandated active engagement in promoting societal goals.

Being one of the most influential political theorists of the 20th century, Hannah Arendt, follows the ideas of classical republican thinkers such as Aristotle and Rousseau when she suggests that an active citizenship is the key to be fully human (cf. Arendt, 1998). Accordingly, in contrast to liberal citizenship, civic-republicans instead prescribe far-reaching personal participation and active engagement in the broader life of the community, such as actively taking part in the decision-making processes and engaging in various forms of civil service, as fundamental parts of being a citizen. Underpinning this view, also responsibilities outside the narrowly defined political activity (as in liberal citizenship) are thought of as being symmetrical and based on the existence of all-encompassing civic duties towards the community, valid for all citizens. With the symmetrical responsibilities and the duties for all comes also the notion of an active citizenship. In order to fulfil the duties of civic-republican citizenship, the citizen has to actively take on civic responsibilities and engage in promoting the common good to a further extent than merely imposing negative rights on others' actions, for example by defending and promoting existing traditions and moral codes or by engaging actively in local level decision-making procedures. For example, the famous formulation in Kennedy's 1961 inauguration speech; "ask not what the country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country" does, according to Heywood (2004:212), provide a striking example of how this view on an active citizenship is expressed in practice. Thereby, it is here possible to make a first theoretical distinction between passive (liberal) and active (civic-republican) forms of participation; between asymmetrical and symmetrical responsibilities; as well as between participation being mandated for all, and as being selective and exclusively based on citizens' negative rights.

Further, a line of demarcation can also be drawn between traditional citizenship types and their new, ecological counterpart. The latter draws indeed on civic-republicanism in it acknowledging, and putting forward, also the duty-part of being a citizen. Nonetheless, since it relies on the notion of the ecological footprint for determining if participation is to be mandated or not, the duties for the ecological citizen are, similar to what is articulated within liberal citizenship, thought of as being asymmetrical and

not equally applicable to all. For instance, Dobson (2003:120) writes that "[o]nly those who occupy ecological space in such a way as to compromise or foreclose the ability of other in present and future generations to pursue options important to them owe obligations of ecological citizenship". By using the ecological footprint in this way, as a definition of the boundaries of citizenship, the responsibility lies with each and every one to be accountable for one's actions both in the public and private spheres (the latter presenting yet another divergence from traditional, public citizenship; see section 4.3 below). Thereby, those who take up a larger ecological space than an equal distribution permits holds a greater responsibility to actively participate by limiting their footprint, which should make the mandated participation in environmentally benevolent acts, at least in theory, selective. Ecological citizenship nevertheless discerns from the liberal type in that it also prescribes a more far-reaching, active engagement in environmental practices and decision-making processes than merely passive avoidance. Now, these theoretical notions, summarised in table 4.1 below, will be examined empirically through an analysis of the normative statements of Swedish policy relating to the degree of citizen responsibilities and the amount as well as nature of the mandated participation which follows.

Table 4.1: Different degrees of citizen participation

	Symmetrical responsibilities	**Asymmetrical responsibilities**
Active participation	Civic-republican citizenship	Ecological citizenship
Passive participation		Liberal citizenship

4.2.2 The framing of civic participation in Swedish policy

As mentioned at several occasions above, following the Rio-summit and the subsequent multilateral signing of Agenda 21 as a strategy for sustainability in the 21st century, Swedish environmental policies switched tracks and to a large extent adapted the individual-level focus set down by the aforementioned agreements. Following this, the main problem description in contemporary Swedish environmental policy draws first and foremost on individuals' unsustainable lifestyles, in particular patterns of consumption (and, by inference, production), which, in turn, indicates an important role for individual or the single consumer in amending this problem. For example, the Swedish government at several occasions throughout the policy documents acknowledges that "consumption and production in predominately the industrialised parts of the world is the single largest cause for continuous negative effects on the global environment. It is necessary to amend these negative effects and to reach sustainable patterns of consumption" (Skr, 2002/03:31, 4; see also Skr, 2001/02:172, 69; Skr, 2001/02:68, 5 & 13). Therefore, as the problems arising form an unsustainable

way of life can only be amended by everyone taking on the responsibility to transform these activities, as put by the Swedish government: "[t]he environmental problems are, to a higher degree than before, caused by the day-to-day life of single individuals", which is followed by the insight that it is "clear that the individual's actions often are crucial" (Skr, 1996/97:50, 49). Thus, the adjustment of aim and direction within Swedish environmental policy post-Rio includes a stronger focus on comprehensive societal change than previously was the case, as well as a focus on the necessity of involving individuals, both as citizens and as consumers, in the efforts for a successful development towards sustainability in all of its three dimensions. In particular, Social Democratic PM Göran Persson adapted this focus on restructuring the society as a whole towards sustainability almost immediately after him taking office in 1996, and several speeches from the early years of his period in office indicates this change in policy-rhetoric, where the individual's responsibility and active participation for shaping the future sustainable society is further emphasised.

> Nationally, we shall rebuild Sweden into an ecologically sustainable nation. This is an enormous political and individual challenge. It is a task that goes way beyond what we normally refers to as environmental politics (Persson, 1997, translated from Swedish).

In line with this, as early as the parliamentary year of 1994/95, only three months after the 1994 general election which brought the Social Democratic party to power, an all-inclusive participation from everyone in society is given a lead role in a communication from the Swedish government, setting out this new national strategy for accomplishing ecological sustainability. In the government communication, appropriately entitled "The Environment – Our Common Responsibility" (Skr, 1994/95:120 *Miljön – vårt gemensamma ansvar*) the strategy from Rio, both with a strong local and wide-ranging focus, is clearly visible throughout. Municipalities, peoples-movements and citizens are all encouraged to contribute *en mass* to accomplish the fulfilment of the new policy goals.

> Also the local and regional environmental work is important. The reality is transformed through concrete work in residential areas and workplaces. Individuals, people's movements, municipalities, county councils and county administrative boards have important roles (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3).

> The local work constitutes the foundation for a sustainable development […]. Municipal residents, interest organisations, companies and other local actors need to be engaged in the work and contribute with their knowledge (Skr, 1994/95:120, 8).

This apparent need for extensive participation on the local level, within organisations and even by individuals is further emphasized in later government communications reporting on and specifying the desirable direction of Swedish environmental policy. The need for a broad participation also among the public is evident both in general as

well as with regards to specific policy areas such as consumption and production (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 71; Skr, 1996/97:50, 49), waste-management (cf. Skr, 2001/02:68, 27), climate policy (Skr, 2001/02:172, 29) and in the choice of means of personal transportation (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 86). Thus, individuals hold environmental responsibilities both as citizens and as household members. This, in turn, implies an official governmental view on the degree of responsibilities more in line with the civic-republican citizenship ideal-type presented above. Here, it becomes apparent that responsibility for participating in the environmental work according to what is outlined in policy recommendations lies on each and every citizen. Everyone must contribute through certain, though non-specified, environmentally benevolent activities and, so to say, do one's bit in order to reach a higher order goal which in this case is an ecologically sustainable development as further specified by the Swedish government through the *Generation goal*[40] and the National Environmental Quality Objectives (NEQO's). Furthermore, the Swedish policy-rhetoric does not provide any indications on if, and in that case how, the amount of participation prescribed should be distributed among Swedish citizens. Therefore, the responsibilities constituting the foundation for citizen participation are, by that account and at this stage in the analysis, interpreted as being symmetrical and equally applicable to all, rather than dependent on an evaluation of each Swedish citizen's present actions or current way of life as motivating responsibilities within the other two, liberal and ecological, ideal-types.

> Everyone in society has a responsibility for the work towards an ecologically sustainable development and for the efforts to reach the national environmental quality objectives (Skr, 2001/02:68, 7).
>
> To reach the specified goals, there is a need for effective policy instruments for realization, indicators for following-up and, not the least, a broad participation from the society as a whole (Skr, 2003/04:129, 6 & Skr, 2001/02:172, 1).
>
> All people must take part in the adjustment [towards a sustainable society] and contribute with different experiences (Skr, 2003/04:129, 29).
>
> To create an environmental sustainable society, there is a need for all individuals and social institutions to feel co-responsible for the society's development (Skr, 2001/02:50, 29).

The need for a broad participation in environmental issues is further highlighted in the use of sustainable development indicators to follow up the progress in this work. In 2001, the government commissioned the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency to, in cooperation with Statistics Sweden, develop a set of indicators for describing and evaluating progress in the work towards a sustainable development (cf. SOU, 2000:52; Prop, 2000/01:130). As it is acknowledged throughout policy that "the participation

[40] The Generation goal is described as the overall objective of the Swedish politics for environmental protection and is defined as the aspiration to "hand over a society to the next generation in which the major environmental problems have been solved" (Skr, 2001/02:50, 6).

and involvement of all are crucial to a sustainable Sweden" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 113), one of the four themes by which the environmental indicators are classified therefore focuses on "everyone's contribution, participation, equality and distribution" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 109). As the indicators collect the progress in all three dimensions of sustainability, the greater part of the indicators in this section draws on economic and social issues, for example demographic and income-based variables. Nevertheless, also public participation, both in the political sphere through elections and more directly in the environmental work through the purchase of eco-labelled products and services are included (Statistics Sweden, 2001:21). This indicates, again, that a broad, all-encompassing participation is preferred by the government.

Following logically from this openly stated need for an all-inclusive participation, references to asymmetrical responsibilities or a selective participation in prescribed environmental activities based on each single citizen's unsustainable behavioural patterns are not explicitly made in the policy documents. In some passages of the texts the connection between lifestyle-patterns and environmental threats are indeed highlighted, which could indicate either an attempt to motivate responsibilities founded in negative rights or in the social justice argument underpinning the ascription of responsibilities within ecological citizenship. Nevertheless, and as exemplified by the quotations below, the few explicit references to the ecological footprint or other descriptions of a fair distribution of ecological space nevertheless found within the policy discourse are rather framed as either being a useful communicative tool, or serving as a general remark that contemporary patterns of consumption and production are unsustainable, not as a proposal that citizen participation in the suggested environmental work should be selective and symmetrical in accordance to the magnitude of each and every one's ecological footprint.

> Our impact on the environment through unsustainable consumption and production of goods and services constitutes already today a disastrous threat to the climate, the ecosystems and human health. This threat will probably be reinforced during the coming decades, when economic growth escalates in previously poor countries (Skr, 2003/04:129, 30).

> It is imperative that indicators are constructed and communicated in a lucid manner. The ecological footprint is an example of this. The footprint can be said to describe the area of land needed to supply an individual with what s/he consumes and take in hand the waste generated (Skr, 2003/04:129, 147).

Even so, on a broader scale, the participation and responsibilities prescribed are also portrayed as a particular duty for citizens in the industrialised world, rather than for those living in developing countries (cf. Skr, 1996/97:50, 4; Skr, 1997/97:50, 1; Skr, 2002/03:31, 5-6; Skr, 2003/04:129, 11), which, again, would draw attention to the extent of responsibilities being evaluated based on an unequal use of resources in a global context. However, this distribution of responsibilities emanates more from it

being a symmetrical responsibility for the collective of citizens living in Sweden (or, more accurately, in the developed world in general), rather than an amount of responsibility evaluated on an individual level, by the significance of each and everyone's day-to-day activities. Thus, the documents present a view on responsibilities which differs between the responsibilities we all hold as Swedish citizens, which is similar for all and underpinning a symmetrical responsibility, and the responsibilities placed on the industrialised world in general and Sweden as a state in particular. Concerning the latter, state-centred context, selective participation and asymmetrical responsibilities are more pronounced, in particular with regards to patterns of consumption and production. So far, however, the policy's resemblance to the symmetrical responsibilities embedded in the civic-republican ideal-type is interpreted as being more explicit than the others on the level of individuals.

A second, and highly significant, aspect of citizen participation and responsibility in the environmental work is to what extent the citizen is expected to participate (outside the active partaking in the formal political process of voting) in order for the policy goals to be fulfilled. Judging from the documents rhetoric, in addition to symmetrical responsibilities and all-inclusive participation deemed necessary for fulfilling the goals of the environmental policies, an *active* participation by the citizens is, as indicated in some of the above quotations, indeed also anticipated to be necessary in order to reach a sustainable future. That the active citizen-ideal is prevailing in Swedish environmental politics is a conclusion also reached by Lundmark (1998:105-116) in her analysis of Swedish political parties' standpoint in the matter, and by Algotsson (1996:41) in a similar analysis of party-programmes and political debates. Also throughout this analysis of Swedish environmental policy documents, it stands clear that participation in the work towards ecological sustainability expands beyond the passive avoidance of certain unsustainable actions, as included in the civic responsibilities within liberal citizenship, to also include an active contribution to amending the unsustainable environmental situation of today. By that account, policy documents refers to citizen participation not as avoidance, but as *achievements*; *efforts*; and to *fulfil roles* (see, for example, Skr, 2001/02:172). This implies, first, a view on citizen involvement more in line with an active citizenship ideal, as active participation is mandated as being a part of the citizen's duties within the society. As with the above statements on the level of participation, these formulations are also influenced by sections of the Agenda 21 and the Rio-agreements, concluding that an active involvement by both individual citizens and other parts of the society is a requirement for ecological sustainability (see, for example, the referred to quotes from both the Agenda 21 and the Rio-declaration in Chapter 1 above). The need for active participation on all levels is, thus, emphasised throughout Swedish policy as exemplified by a quote from the most recent government communication on the environment.

> To ensure future generations' prospect of a good living environment and adequate welfare, active contributions are demanded from all actors in society and within several policy areas (Skr, 2003/04:129, 22).

Considering the different areas in which the individual might be presumed to contribute to an ecologically sustainable development, the extent of participation is, however, more pronounced with regards to some household-related activities than to others. Primarily waste-management are, due to its nature, explicitly described as being dependent on the citizens' active contribution, whereas participation in the consumption and transportation fields rather are framed as fulfilled through avoiding the purchase of environmentally malevolent goods and services. Nevertheless, for achieving ecological sustainability in general, across all sectors, participation is needed both in a more passive way through making environmentally benevolent choices of consumption, as well as more actively though the political decision-making processes and by being an "active environmental-consumer" (Skr, 2001/02:50, 24). The latter, for example, indicates an active use of consumer power by *demanding* organic produce in the local supermarket, rather than merely refraining from purchasing products without the eco-labelling.

4.2.3 Conclusions – participation, for all?

In conclusion, when focusing on the level of participation for the citizen, as well as the underpinning responsibilities determining this level, as described in Swedish environmental policy, it is clear that its normative foundations draws rather heavily on the all-inclusive participation and the symmetrical responsibilities as found within the framework of ideal-typical civic-republican citizenship. There is a clearly expressed need for a broad participation in which all citizens in Sweden contribute to the sustainable society. Although this argument might be perceived as stemming from the uneven distribution of resources between north and south, explicit references to the need for each and every Swedish citizen to personally evaluate her (too large) occupation of ecological space and how to amend this situation is strikingly absent in the policy rhetoric. As such, this presents the conclusion that the policy discourse frames environmental responsibilities and the requests for participation as something bestowed citizens more dependent on their membership in the community as such, rather than as founded on a personal sense of (ecological) justice and a personal evaluation of the size of the ecological footprint[41].

Moreover, the nature of citizen participation is, in most parts of the environmental work, perceived both to be active, and thus to require citizens to actively contribute to this development in more areas than through voting. This active contribution is more

[41] To further this analysis, more notes on the policy's motives for civic participation are also presented in section 4.3 below.

pronounced than participation through the mere avoidance of unsustainable choices where other alternatives are present, further leaving the resemblance with the liberal citizenship ideal-type aside. As already concluded, this suggests that the initial view on the individual's environmental responsibilities and partaking in environmentally benevolent activities is leaning more towards a resemblance with the core principles and beliefs inherent to the civic-republican ideal-type and expressing more of collectivistic values than those relating to its self-determining, liberal counterpart. At some instances, however, the formulations within the studied documents do also display a certain resemblance with the line of reasoning put forward within the ecological citizenship ideal-type. Ecological citizenship does indeed, as is the case in the documents, presuppose active participation on the part of the citizens, but relates this rather to asymmetrical, personally evaluated responsibilities based in social justice, and not to all-encompassing civic duties held by merit of being a member of the state (cf. Dobson, 2003). Nevertheless, when responsibilities are expressed on a higher level than the single individual, these can be interpreted as drawing on the idea of asymmetrical responsibilities founded in the unequal use of global resources and environmental space. Therefore, policy documents are also interpreted as to a lesser extent resemble ecological citizenship-arguments, as displayed in Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1: Ideal-type resemblance-score – civic responsibilities and participation



Now, to further complicate the view on the degree of citizen responsibilities, a question that needs to be raised is what kind of activities this active participation actually includes? The fact that some of the definitions on participation in the quotes above do not halt at citizens taking part in certain specific activities, such as choosing more sustainable means of transport, only buying eco-labelled products in the supermarket, or engaging in the broader life of the community through, for example, local level decision-making processes, but rather indicate the need to alter both their lifestyle (including activities also within the household) and personal values in general,

constitute implications also for the public/private divide of traditional citizenship. In this aspect, the normative statements of policy lean towards prescribing an active citizenship thought of as encompassing activities in what previously have been regarded as the private sphere. As the definition of the *sphere* of citizenship constructs an important barrier between traditional and ecological ideal-types, this will therefore be investigated further in section 4.4 below. First however, the *character* of citizen participation will be analysed. As the analysis so far suggests that an active, all-encompassing participation is envisioned, it does not touch upon the question if these activities are to be thought of as civic duties, or merely as proposed activities open for all to, independently and by themselves, decide upon. Therefore, the question will be posed as if participation in environmentally benevolent activities is anticipated to emanate from each individual's voluntarily engagement or from it being proclaimed as a civic duty for all? This will, of course, serve as to further clarify the above made interpretation on the underlying values and beliefs as expressed in Swedish environmental policy documents.

4.3 The character of civic participation - duty or voluntariness?

Following on from the previous discussion on citizen responsibilities, the *character* of participation relates to questions on how the decision to participate is described and in particular where this decision is anticipated to be made; emanating from the citizens themselves as an independent choice or mandated in a top-down fashion from the notion of it being a civic duty which all citizens should take part in. As the analysis in the previous section showed that the policy rhetoric to a lager extent described responsibilities and participation as symmetrical and valid for all by merit of being a citizen, it is reasonable to assume that also the character of participation will draw on it being a civic duty. Nevertheless, the interpretations of the documents are not entirely straight forward and this present section might therefore assist in further elucidating the relative priority of core principles, beliefs or values within Swedish environmental policy.

4.3.1 An ideal-typical approach to civic rights and duties

Again, the character of participation is viewed upon differently within the three citizenship ideal-types, where an argumentative demarcation can be drawn, first and foremost between the two traditional citizenship ideal-types. According to ideal-typical liberal citizenship, participation in the public life of society is thought of as being based on voluntary action in most cases, with the point of departure taken in the passive citizen first and foremost enjoying rights and only to a lesser extent having duties towards the community. Nevertheless, the individual can if she chooses to do so cooperate with other citizens and participate in the public or political life, but such societal cooperation is not mandated by the state in other than very fundamental aspects

(e.g. upholding of the rule of law or the state apparatus in general). The broader public sphere is thus thought of as an arena in which the citizen autonomously acts as to further personal preferences. Within a civic-republican citizenship ideal, the view on the nature of participation draws more heavily on the duty-part of being a citizen. As the community represents the common good for all, a certain amount of public participation is therefore demanded by each and every member of the citizenry, usually taking the form of providing benefits to the community; by engaging in civil service of some kind and thus contributing to upholding the society's prosperity, stability, security and established traditions (cf. Dobson, 2003). Finally, the reasoning underpinning the ecological ideal-type agrees with civic-republicanism in that citizenship cannot be conceived as merely a question of rights, and, consequently, that duties and obligations should be granted increasingly more attention. However, what nevertheless discerns these two ideal-types lies rather in their respective idea on the foundations for civic duties. In contrast to traditional forms of citizenship, neither the rights nor the obligations for the ecological citizen are thought of as based on a *contractual* relationship between the citizen and the state. Conversely, in both liberal and civic-republican citizenship the state – individual relationship are thought of as regulated by a, at least hypothetical, contract where citizens' in the spirit of reciprocity holds rights *vis-à-vis* the state but are also bestowed corresponding duties or obligations as no less than a requirement for enjoying the benefits their membership in the community grants them[42]. How extensive these obligations are, is in turn dependent on the reasoning within each ideal-type and ranges therefore from respecting the rule of law, paying taxes or engaging in more extensive undertakings of civil service (cf. Dobson, 2003:40-50). Now, it has already been hinted in the section above that as the ecological citizen surely holds duties, these are not based on contracts but on a self-assumed responsibility for one's own occupation of ecological space. As the main duty of the ecological citizen is to do justice (without expectance of reciprocity; because it is the right thing to do), obligations are owed to anyone, anywhere negatively affected by the citizen's ecological footprint; hence the definition of ecological citizenship as also being non-territorial (Dobson, 2003:118-120). This means that the duties of the ecological citizen are not motivated by them being a prerequisite for enjoying individual rights or a good life, but rather concerns the relations between citizens themselves and the intrinsic commitment to justice. The questions for this section, therefore, concerns how the character of participation is portrayed in Swedish environmental policy; is active participation in the work towards ecological sustainability thought of as a civic duty mandated for all members of the community, or as exclusively dependent on each citizen's voluntarily engagement? And, are civic duties founded in a contractual, reciprocal relationship

[42] For this, see for example the reasoning within social contract-theory, where the association of individuals into state are characterised by giving up some rights and taking on some obligations in return for security and the possibilities to exercise most rights as free individuals, for example the life, liberty and the good life (e.g. Held, 1996; Ball and Dagger, 1999; Holden, 1993; see also Locke, 2002; Rawls, 1999 & 1993; Rousseau, 1994).

between the citizen and the state, or in a non-reciprocal, non-contractual and non-territorial pursuit of justice?

Table 4.2: The character of citizen participation

	Voluntary engagement	**Civic duty**
Contractual	Liberal citizenship	Civic-republican citizenship
Non-contractual		Ecological citizenship

4.3.2 Rights and duties in the policy discourse

Judging from the statements in policy documents, in particular at the beginning of the time-period studied in this thesis (that is, the last years of the 1900's) environmental policy in Sweden originated in the assumption that a strong environmental commitment is already to be found among the Swedish public in general. In documents from this time, citizens are described as being environmentally aware and engaged, possessing an ever-increasing environmental consciousness and interest (cf. Skr, 1994/95:120; Skr, 1996/97:50). For instance, in a communication reporting on the national environmental efforts, the Swedish government concludes that "[d]uring later years, the public's environmental consciousness and interest in environmental issues have increased" (Skr, 1998/99:63, 5). This already present environmental commitment among the general public is, for instance, described as an important factor driving the relatively swift anchoring of the Agenda 21-programme at the local level, which was introduced by the then Conservative/Liberal government through a Bill (Prop, 1993/94:111) as early as 1993 (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 90). Given the government's strong belief in individuals' commitment to these issues, participation in the work towards sustainability is also believed to come more or less natural, only requiring the positive encouragement and some additional information from national and local authorities on how individuals and households best can contribute to achieving a sustainable future. The outlook for transforming these attitudes into an environmentally benevolent behaviour within the households is thereby also described as positive.

> […] knowledge, awareness and engagement are present with many individuals today (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3).
>
> There exists a large engagement for environmental issues among children and youths. This interest should be encouraged, expanded and deepened (Skr, 1994/95:120, 26).
>
> A lot of pupils at upper secondary school have an interest in questions regarding our common environment. It is therefore important to utilize this interest and provide opportunities for them to deepen their knowledge of environmental issues (Skr, 1997/98:13, 23).

> Fortunately enough, the consumers' awareness of the connection between consumption and environment has steadily increased, and people are today willing to take on a large responsibility for the environment. Within the household sector there exists a large potential regarding the work with sustainable development. The work with facilitating for consumers to play a more active role in counteracting environmental problems should give good results (Skr, 1996/97:50, 50).

As a consequence, the general formulations regarding the character of participation for sustainability draws, throughout these early government communications, at first sight almost entirely on participation as dependent on citizens' voluntarily efforts. Thus, of the different policy instruments proposed for avoiding further negative impact on the environment by the households, informational and educational instruments, together with the state facilitating for its citizens to act on their convictions, are in overwhelming majority. For example are 'insights', 'information', 'possibilities', 'opportunities' and 'encouragement' in documents from the late 1990's given major attention as catalysts for a changed environmental behaviour of the general public. To some extent are fiscal incentives and market-based instruments proposed and indeed accredited as being very efficient for accomplishing behavioural changes also on the individual level, but command-and-control instruments such as laws and regulations are not granted any attention in the general proposals from the government[43]. Thus, the main tasks for governmental authorities are to provide information on alternatives to the present situation, as well as to encourage its citizens to follow their already existing environmental engagement and, thereby, behave in a non-harmful way towards the environment. This includes both general information made available to specific groups, for example consumers through the labelling of environmental friendly products, and education on broad environmentally related issues provided to all individuals from an early age. Note, also, that the information suggested at the middle and end of the 1990's first and foremost aims at providing objective, scientific facts on environmental issues for facilitating a fully informed choice, not to explicitly encourage the adoption of any one subjective attitude towards them.

> Education and knowledge are crucial for furthering an environmental sustainable development and improving individuals' capacities to solve environmental- and development issues [therefore, one should] strengthen the environmental education in schools [and] integrate the activities in pre-school and school (Skr, 1997/98:13, 8).

[43] That is to say that laws and regulations not are proposed in the context of participation on the individual level. However, with regards to business and industry, as well as the Swedish municipalities, formal environmental regulations are in place, not the least through the Swedish Environmental Code of 1999 (SFS, 1998:808). Additionally, due to the fact that waste-management is one area of the environmental politics heavily regulated in both national and international law, the individual have not the same opportunity to choose non-participation as is the case in other areas (cf. SFS, 1997:185, §5), for example consumption. As household waste also stands for a large percentage of the waste total, the individual's action in this area is of course important, but controlled not as much by the state as by the municipalities which are responsible for all household waste not covered by the Swedish *producer responsibility* (cf. Skr, 1998/99:63).

> The consumers should to a higher extent be stimulated to making good environmental choices when deciding between products of equivalent function. Eco-labelling and merchandise information are important instruments for facilitating a choice of goods and products not harmful to the environment or the health (Skr, 1994/95:120, 15).

This use of predominately 'soft' instruments such as information to, and education of, already committed citizens can be interpreted as suggesting a considerable freedom for individuals in choosing whether to participate in environmentally benevolent activities or not, thus respecting the autonomy and self-direction of the Swedish citizens and encouraging self-regulation from below, rather than mandating participation from above with the argument of it being a civic duty, held by all citizens based on their membership in the community.

This interpretation is of course dependent on the presence of a citizenry with the willingness to themselves take on an increased environmental responsibility and act as to help accomplish the sustainable society. If this is not the case, the government's efforts to promote citizen participation in the environmental work must nevertheless include some form of limitation on individual's freedom to themselves decide upon participation in order for the sustainable society to be realised. One question, perhaps impossible to answer but nevertheless relevant to bear in mind in the context of voluntary versus dutiful behaviour, is what can be regarded as an autonomous choice. Is it a free choice if there are no formal rules (e.g. sanctioned laws and regulations) prohibiting certain behaviours, or might the freedom of choice also be limited by other means? Consider, for example the government's statement that citizens should both "feel free to participate" and "have the will and ability to take responsibility for their actions" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 27) in order for the sustainable society to be realised. Whether or not the citizens also should feel free to abstain from participation is not further discussed in policy, but might render the aim of ecological sustainability difficult to reach, since, as already mentioned above, "[o]ne key to success is broad participation from all sectors in society" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 27). Taking this aspiration into consideration, policy instruments at first sight signalling opportunities for voluntary action might, by this account, also be regarded what Lundqvist (2001c) defines as indirect steering, where market-based instruments in reality are limiting the array of viable choices and information as well as education are employed to introduce civic duties for each citizen to behave in a set way, rather than facilitating a full range of independent choices on, for example, lifestyle issues.

Considering this line of reasoning, the use of education as a policy instrument, as presented in documents from early 21st century, certainly incorporates the notion of educating citizens about, what can be interpreted as, their duty as citizens to assume responsibility for the environment and thereby to also transform their patterns of

behaviour as a response. In actual fact, the Swedish government has during a relatively long period of time put increasing efforts into strengthening the environmental education on all levels in the Swedish educational system. The overall motivation for these efforts can be interpreted as acknowledging the need for instituting a new civic duty for the Swedish citizens by incorporating issues regarding ecological sustainable development alongside democracy, equality and human rights as foundational values on all levels of the Swedish education system (cf. Skr, 1999/00:13; Prop, 2000/01:130; Skr, 2001/02:50). For instance, in the Budget Bill for the fiscal year 2000 (Prop, 1999/00:100), a Green Adult Education Initiative (in Swedish: *grönt kunskapslyft*) was presented, with the aim to "raise public awareness of the need of conversion to sustainable development and to show how individuals can contribute to this process in their everyday lives" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 30). The government further establishes that:

> The success of the adjustment process depends on the broad participation of all sectors of society: the public sector, industry and business, organisations and individual citizens. There is therefore a need for long-term civic education in the classical sense, so that greater knowledge of the issues leads to commitment and changes both in behaviour and public decision-making (Skr, 2000/01:38, 30).

Following on this, major efforts have been made to integrate environmental and sustainability issues in the curriculum of Swedish schools and pre-schools, as well as in higher- and civic education. As an example can schools since 1999 apply for, and by the Swedish National Authority for School Improvement be granted, the honour of *Environmental School*, recognising the work with ecological sustainability within the education[44] (SKOLFS, 1998:25). Amongst the criteria for receiving the honour is that the education "shall contribute to the pupils developing a lifestyle and a pattern of consumption which promotes an ecologically sustainable development (Skr, 2001/02:68, 21). In policy documents from later date, the above mentioned need for informational policy instruments and education of the public becomes even more articulated, with an increasing focus predominately on angling the education system in total, from pre-school to adult education, towards promoting the sustainable society. In 2003, the Swedish government appointed a special committee to review the education for sustainable development in Sweden, and to make suggestions to further develop this work (Dir, 2003:68). The committee's work was presented in the Official Report *To learn for sustainable development* (SOU, 2004:104) and included, amongst others, recommendations to amend the steering documents governing the Swedish education system (i.e. the Education Act, 1985:1100; the Higher Education Act, 1992:1434; and the Decree on Government Subsidy for Liberal Adult Education, 1991:977) to

[44] In 2005, the honour was renamed to *School for Sustainable Development*, recognising a broader focus on all three dimensions of sustainability, rather than a single focus on the ecological part. Amongst other reasons, the expectation is that this broadening of the focus along side a corresponding change in directions will increase the number of schools and pre-schools receiving the honour (cf. SKOLFS, 2005:2; MfS, 2005).

explicitly express that all education and activities shall promote a sustainable development in all its three dimensions (SOU, 2004:104, 28).

Now, before continuing the analysis it must here be mentioned that the role for the state in educating citizens and, through the school-system, promoting civic virtue are highly contested subjects within political and citizenship theory, thus making the interpretation of these above suggestions of education as a policy instrument rather complex. Within civic-republicanism, where the possession of certain virtues are believed necessary for citizens to be able to contribute to the good of society (thus reaching freedom *through* the state), the government has an evident role in educating its citizens on these virtues, as well as on how to utilise them for acting as to achieve the good life. Following the now classical quote by Rousseau (e.g. 1994), citizens' shall be forced to be free and, on the same note, a state which do not take responsibility for educating its citizens on what constitutes the good life is not showing them respect (which would be the liberal interpretation), but indifference (Kymlicka, 1990). The inclusion of education for an ecological lifestyle in the Swedish curriculum might therefore be interpreted as promoting a civic-republican ideal, where the good citizen by the government are bestowed with virtues and therefore dutifully promotes the (objectively determined) common good through an active participation in community work. Similarly, ecological citizenship also draws on the need for civic education in the process of creating responsible citizens. Education on environmental issues is here believed to serve the same purpose as the strong focus on deliberative processes in political decision-making, that is, to confront citizens with the problems arising from them behaving in a certain way and thus increasing the amount of self-assumed responsibilities for their effects on global justice and the environment. This, of course, draws on the civic-republican tradition of civic duties but with a few important differences which might help to discern education for civic-republican citizenship from a curriculum aspiring at an ecological citizenship education. According to Dobson (2003:182-183), the latter would be incomplete without it building first and foremost on the virtue of justice (rather than a common good) along with the teaching of *transnational* and *intergenerational* duties and obligations (thus not only contractual obligations to the nation-state or the community). He concludes by stating that citizenship education, in order to fulfil these requirements, first and foremost should include a strong normative aspect and not merely focus on the technical aspects of education *on* sustainability.

However, to further complicate the interpretation of education as a policy tool, most liberal theorists also agree that civic education in some form is necessary to uphold the fair procedures of the liberal democratic state[45] (cf. Callan, 2004; Dudley and Gitelson,

[45] Even though the purpose here is to make a distinction between the liberal and the civic-republican understanding of political education (that is, with the aim of installing a specific set of values or virtues with the

2002; Flathman, 1996). The citizens need to hold a set of basic virtues necessary for being good liberal citizens; for example respecting democratic principles and showing tolerance towards each other (compare this to the promotion of democracy, equality and human rights as expressed through the Swedish curriculum), which the schools might be given responsibility for teaching. Nevertheless, the goal for liberal civic education would be to facilitate autonomous choices and individual freedom for which fair procedures is needed in society, not to, as is the case within the civic-republican and ecological ideal-types, promote one lifestyle as morally superior[46]. This distinction is raised by Flathman (1996:8) who calls attention to the liberal interpretation of formal education as "to enhance the prospect that individuals will formulate and will be enabled effectively to pursue ends of their own". This raises therefore a range of further questions; *first*, whether the incorporation of ecological sustainability in the Swedish curriculum is denoting the government taking responsibility for guiding citizens to *the* good way of life, or for providing its citizens with the means for making autonomous choices and critically evaluating information? Is the government, through education, promoting virtues necessary for making the *right* choice or the virtues needed for upholding just, democratic procedures facilitating an autonomous choice for all? *Second*, what is actually taught, and which ideas that are promoted, through the Swedish educational system? These are questions that will be returned to on several occasions also in the sections to come.

Now, returning to the present issue on civic duties versus voluntary action, one relevant variation can also be identified between the documents of earlier and later date, which might serve as to clarify the view on the character of civic participation. The positive view on a wide-spread environmental engagement amongst the Swedish public partly transforms from being a description of the present situation up to the turn of the century, towards being a vision of the future sustainable society in documents originating from around 2001 onwards. What is clear, however, is the notion that this vision still can be reached through providing the public with information on the environmental situation and, combined with the use of environmental education, directing the citizenry towards adapting more environmentally acceptable lifestyles. In this respect, two conclusions can be drawn from the document analysis. *First*, it seems reasonable to assume that the increasing weight given to environmental information and education in order to reach sustainability also results in a step away from the traditional understanding of individual's autonomy and towards an increased

citizenry), it is nevertheless important to point out that also prominent republican thinkers have contested this idea. This is acknowledged by Flathman (1996:19) who, as an example, points towards Arendt's assertion that political education is nothing but "coercion without the use of force".

[46] However, as Dobson (2003:197-200) acknowledges, the liberal principle of neutrality can also be interpreted as prohibiting the government form excluding certain perspectives form the curriculum. In his view, the omission of teaching ecological citizenship is more likely to be insufficient from a liberal neutrality point-of-view, than is the outright teaching of these normative perspectives as all reasonable doctrines of the good life should be given the same attention by the value-neutral school-system aspiring to provide information on all viable choices.

responsibility for the state in engaging and directing citizens towards environmentally acceptable lifestyles or behavioural patterns in the context of them being civic duties. This puts the national goal of ecological sustainability on a par with other values, for example democracy and equality, in which the educational system "shall not be value-free and neutral" but rather work actively to promote (Prop, 2004/05:1, area 16:75). For example, it is now (e.g. Skr, 2003/04:129) acknowledged that participation in the work towards ecological sustainability (in this case through consumption) indeed can, for many individuals, involve a far-reaching change of values and lifestyles which in turn demands considerably more of the informational instruments used than merely pointing towards viable alternatives already accepted in the consciousnesses of the individuals; "[c]onsumption", the Swedish government writes, "is a part of individuals' social and individual identification", changes in which are described as being, in essence, a new choice of lifestyle in a state-mandated direction (Skr, 2003/04:129, 113-114; see also Skr, 2001/02:172, 69 and Skr, 2002/03:31, 4-5). As put by Lars J. Lundgren (1999:10, translated from Swedish): "apparently, we should do (want) something other than most of us currently do (wants)". Thereby, if the goal of ecological sustainability is to be realised the task for information and/or education is, thus, to establish new values and thereby to transform more profound lifestyle-patterns among the citizenry; a task highlighting the role of policy instruments not as merely promoting voluntary engagement, but also actively employed for bringing about all citizens' participation and taking "one's part of the responsibility" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 29) as a good citizen. Furthering the interpretation that Swedish environmental policy has turned towards portraying or handling citizens' participation in the environmental work as a civic duty, rather than something open for voluntary action, is the explicit acceptance within contemporary documents that voluntariness alone might not be enough for accomplishing this change among the majority of the citizenry.

> Despite the fact that an environmental adoption of goods and services are in place today, the total consumption increases. We buy more goods, want larger houses and drive our cars more etc. (Skr, 2002/03:31, 5).

> For instance, many new surveys show that despite a positive attitude towards sustainable consumption amongst most consumers, an unsustainable behaviour still exists to a large extent (Skr, 2003/04:129, 115).

This of course further increase the pressure on proposed informational instruments for making citizens both realise the negative effects of their current behaviour and how to minimise them, as well as actually acting on this knowledge. As the government puts it in the most recent communication on the environment: "[c]ontinuous investments in information and education to demonstrate the connection between individuals' values and practical lifestyles, and between local and global sustainability problems will be needed" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 29).

Second, and connecting to the above quotations on the role of education, the character of participation is to a larger extent than before framed as being a civic duty, that is, what responsible citizens should do and not as entirely open for the voluntarily engagement of each individual. Thereby, the initially quite straightforward interpretation of informational or educational instruments as maintaining the freedom to choose environmental engagement is clouded by other, stronger formulations within the policy documents. These specify the aim of integrating questions on ecological sustainability in Swedish education with the aim of creating responsible citizens ready to do their bit in reaching the goal of ecological sustainability. The individual's freedom to choose to participate (or not) is not explicitly articulated in the policies' formulations; instead, adapting an environmental-friendly lifestyle and thus changing personal behavioural patterns is in most cases defined as a duty for all or, more accurately, as taking one's responsibility for positive development within the Swedish society[47].

> The need for good quality knowledge and a strong awareness of the environmental and developmental issues is a general prerequisite for, in principle, all future roles in the working life and as a citizen of the society (Skr, 1997/98:50, 23).
>
> A society where all feel a sense of participation and have the will and ability to take responsibility for their actions constitutes the foundation for the work with sustainable development (Skr, 2001/02:50, 28).
>
> Through education, the development of a society where all citizens feel a sense of participation and have the ability to take responsibility for their behaviour and attitudes is promoted. Everyone must be given knowledge […] on patterns of consumption and production, that is, on consumer responsibility (Skr, 2001/02:50, 31).
>
> The goal of education is that all individuals shall receive a competence that contributes to a development which meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. This means that pre-school, comprehensive school and upper secondary school all shall work for providing all pupils with such competence, values and skills necessary to be active, democratic and responsible citizens, and to be able to make decisions within different levels of society to create a sustainable society (Skr, 2003/04:129, 91).

The above quotations, which include a rather explicit focus on participation in the environmental work as being individual responsibilities and duties towards the community, echo therefore more of the proposed participation being civic duties that

[47] It must here be mentioned that lifestyle changes and environmental engagement can denote both activities in the public and private sphere, depending on the specific acts intended. Exclusively following the latter interpretation would, however, lead to the consequence that both ideal-types of traditional citizenship loose their relevance since they exclusively places citizenship in the public sphere. For the time being, both interpretations on the definition of lifestyle-related activities will therefore be kept open and instead investigated at depth in section 4.4 below.

each and every citizen holds towards society. In sum, when studying the Swedish environmental policy-rhetoric regarding the character of citizen participation, the defence of citizens' voluntary choice to engage in the, by the government proposed activities, gives way for instead framing this as more of being the duty of the good citizen and something which the state needs to actively promote within the citizenry. A comparison between earlier and more recent policy documents demonstrates a further move within policy, from relying to a greater extent on individuals voluntarily engaging in pro-environmental behavioural change, towards increasingly stressing the need for civic education to instigate a dutiful behaviour with individuals furthering the aim of ecological sustainability. Furthermore, considering the definition of key ingredients in an education for ecological citizenship, it is also possible to conclude, as Dobson (2003) does for the British context, that the Swedish curriculum certainly opens up for this type of teaching, in particular by the focus on values, consciousness and lifestyles, and by the inclusion of intergenerational justice as a key motivation. Whether or not this is what is actually taught in Swedish schools would need a more comprehensive examination of school-plans and actual education, which will not be included in this thesis. For now, it is enough to acknowledge that the education for ecological sustainability in Swedish schools certainly draws also on what might be considered necessary components in an ecological citizenship-education.

The slight divergence from voluntariness as the main principle for citizen participation might also be detected in the government's more explicit inclusion of other policy instruments in order to accomplish a sustainable behaviour among the citizenry. In particular regarding individuals' private consumption, policy documents, following the above recognition of the shortcoming in creating sustainable patterns of consumption, also display a more pessimistic outlook on the probability for informational- and educational instruments' success in driving the necessary changes in values and lifestyles. For instance, it is stated that "[e]ven if the knowledge were to increase, it is not certain that the attitude changes and even less that behaviour changes", which continues by admitting that it is "not made clear that increased knowledge automatically leads to a change in consumer behaviour" (Skr, 2002/03:31, 15-20). Therefore, in addition to policy instruments with a clear voluntary framing, serving as to *create knowledge*, *facilitate* and *inform*, also "distinct incentives and effective tools" (Skr, 2002/03:31, 5) are needed, since "information must be combined with other policy-instruments to render results" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 14)[48]. It is here reasonable to assume that the policy-makers hereby acknowledge that knowledge-driven, voluntary self-regulation by the citizens

[48] It could, of course, be argued that the needs for complementing instruments are more pressing in the period before education for sustainability has become implemented as a core feature in the Swedish curriculum and thought at all levels of education. As strong efforts to integrate environmental issues in the educational-system, with the purpose of creating more environmentally aware citizens, are relatively new (for instance with an Official Report highlighting this issue as recent as the year 2004, cf. SOU, 2004:104), this might help to explain the above expressed needs also for other forms of policy-instruments.

themselves is not an entirely successful strategy and, thus, that the free market cannot itself, without a little help from the state, accomplish behavioural change. Therefore economic incentives are introduced as an important (in actual fact 'the most important' or 'the most effective') means for driving the development towards sustainability (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 69). Hence, the question on what is to be considered a voluntary choice needs again to be revisited. It must be remembered that the policy-rhetoric still mostly concerns measures which are directed towards facilitating voluntary action in most aspects, for example to facilitate environmental choices by increasing access to communal transports or eco-labelled foodstuffs. However, as these measures, complemented by the more (indirect) steering of education and economic instruments, explicitly are directed towards one type of choice being right, the granting of full autonomy and self-direction to the citizens might, perhaps, still be questioned. That said, not even monetary incentives are always believed to trigger environmental choices by the consumers as habitual behaviour in many instances are believed to hinder choice alteration; the last option of course being for the government to reduce the supply of wrong choices by, for instance, phasing out non ecological products and/or adapting all goods and services to high ecological standards (cf. Skr, 2001/02:68; Skr, 2003/04:129), thus limiting at least the range of possible (unsustainable) choices for individuals to make on the market.

4.3.3 Motivating the environmental citizen

As a final point in this section, how the rationale for public participation is described might further contribute to elucidating the core beliefs in the policy discourse. As seen above, a slight inclination to connect the environmental work with an acknowledgement of the unfair distribution of global resources is present throughout the policy discourse. More often than not, however, these motivations are surpassed by other, and much more visible, reasons provided as explanations for why an all-encompassing participation in the environmental work is deemed important. As these clearly draw on the expectance of reciprocity as a motive for engaging in the environmental work, they also contributes to further move the policy rhetoric in a direction away from the non-reciprocal justice-argument of ecological citizenship.

As the overall aim of Swedish environmental policy conforms to the definition of sustainable development as provided by the Bruntland Commission (in Sweden translated to the 'generation goal', see Skr, 2001/02:50, 6), it is certainly true that an altruistic care for future generations is presented as an important objective throughout the policy-discourse. However, when explicitly advocating individual engagement, the main lines of argument are supported by the promise of positive returns when acting according to the policy requirements. Motives portraying a change in behaviour as beneficial for the Swedish community, particularly in the shape of improved public

health and economy, are substantially more frequent than those drawing on either rights- or social justice-aspects. For example, improved public health, economic benefits, increased competitive strength for businesses as well as positive effects on national growth and/or employment are all introduced as motivations for protecting the environment as the Swedish government resorts to highlighting the values of "competitiveness" and "long-term growth and stability in the employment sector" (Skr, 1997/98:13, 1) along with "new employment opportunities which increases welfare" (Skr, 1994/95:120, 3) as well as stressing that environmental problems implies not (only) a damage to nature, but also "substantial costs due to loss of production, destruction of materials, impaired health, destruction of the physical cultural heritage and depletion of both renewable and non-renewable natural resources" (Skr, 2003/04:129, 37).

Following the line of reasoning within the civic-republican ideal-type, the imposing of civic duties aims first and foremost to promote some conception of the common good, which in turn should be deeply rooted in the established values and traditions of society. To act according to ones responsibilities as a citizen will therefore be equal to protecting the fundamental values on which society is constructed and, thus, contributing to its stability and welfare. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that civic duties in this case are motivated by the upholding of communal values such as tradition, preservation, security, prosperity and stability for the *community*. Apart from the propositions for Swedish economic progress mentioned above, several examples on how the connection between collective traditions and the purpose of citizen duties is made can also be identified throughout the documents, most commonly relating sustainable development to democratic values. This, naturally, increases the resemblance of the policy's framing of participation with the civic-republican ideal-type, as it is drawing more on participation being a civic duty, rooted first and foremost in every citizen's will of preserving and furthering the 'Swedish way', officially motivated by the aspiration to "safeguarding and deepening Swedish democracy" (Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005:234).

> A sustainable society must build on the specific Swedish conditions (Skr, 1997/98:13, 31).
>
> An important prerequisite for reaching a sustainable society is […] a society built on basic democratic values (Skr, 2001/02:50, 41).
>
> Vision and goal touch also upon the transverse aspects which are the connecting cement and at the same time important prerequisites in a sustainable society, e.g. foundational values in an individual- as well as a social perspective, the knowledge- and cultural heritage, democracy and participation and also education and knowledge (Skr, 2001/02:172, 13).

> The Swedish strategy for sustainable development is founded on the respect for knowledge and democracy (Skr, 2003/04:129, 8).

This connection made between on the one hand a politics for ecological sustainability and on the other the Swedish democratic welfare-state, has long been in the centre of the Social Democratic government's discourse of sustainable development (cf. Lundqvist, 2001a & 2004c; Duit, 2002). As a strategy for connecting environmental values with the previously successful building of the welfare state, the election of Göran Persson as Social Democratic party-leader, and thereby also Prime Minister, in 1996 was immediately followed by the proclamation to increase Sweden's efforts towards reaching a sustainable society; framed as the realisation of "the vision of the Green People's Home" (Persson quoted in Lundqvist, 2004c:1-2). By, in this fashion, linking the discourse of sustainable development with the one surrounding the mid-1900's building of the welfare-state, commonly described by the metaphor of the People's Home (in Swedish: *Folkhemmet*), and thereby to turn environmental issues into a prerequisite for continuing both the social welfare-system and economic growth in Sweden, the government aimed at whipping up vast support for its politics from both the party, the public and, most importantly, the Swedish industry[49] (cf. Lundqvist, 2001a & 2004c). Thus, the politics for ecological sustainability was, and still is, framed as a broad social interest; a common good for all referring back to the "historical experiences" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 14), where social welfare and stability were goals in focus for the political reformations of society. The development of the ecologically sustainable society is, thus, not a novel idea but rather a natural next step in building and developing the Swedish People's Home, defending Sweden's place as a forerunner in the international development processes.

> When we make a total judgement of the welfare, we can not forget the environment (Skr, 1996/97:50, 4 & 9-10).
>
> Guidelines and a strategy for sustainable development will show how lasting changes can be made in society in order to secure welfare and a good standard of living for future generations (Skr, 2001/02:172, 5)
>
> Sweden must pioneer efforts to achieve ecologically sustainable development (Skr, 2001/02:172, 6; see also for example Skr, 2000/01:38, 5).

Thereby, by connecting its policy for sustainable development to the discourse surrounding the protection of the welfare state, the Swedish government draws explicitly on new environmental obligations and the pressure to transform behavioural

[49] In this respect Lundqvist (2004b) refers to the "path-dependency" in Swedish environmental politics, where the corporatist structure from building the welfare state is retained, causing the strong focus on reaching voluntary agreements with Swedish industry and thereby advancing, for example, the investment in "green" technology or the introduction of environmental management-systems (cf. Skr, 2003/04:129; Skr, 2001/02:172; Skr, 2001/02:50). Welfare-state corporatism might also be one explanation for the comparatively prominent place granted non-governmental organisations and people's movements as advancing the work towards sustainability through, for example, civic adult education.

patterns as being collective duties for the good of all society[50]. Needless to say, these motivations display also a strong territorial focus, in which pioneering the work for sustainability is here given a purely instrumental role as driving the reduction of cross-border pollution of the *Swedish* environment and civic environmental duties are framed as taking responsibility for the development within the Swedish borders:

> In the bilateral cooperation on knowledge building, the countries in Sweden's proximity should be prioritised, that is, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, North-West Russia and Poland primarily. In these countries, both the environmental effects and the establishment of the cooperation in itself are judged to best being able to profit beneficiary countries' as well as Swedish interests (Skr, 1994/95:120, 7).

> Pollution knows no national boundaries. We are particularly affected by emissions in Northern Europe. The EU's eastern enlargement is therefore important for the Swedish environment. All of this constitutes reasons for Sweden to pioneer the international shift to ecological sustainable development (Skr, 1997/98:13, 1).

The territorial focus apparent in the policy documents' motivations connects, obviously, to the ideal-types of traditional citizenship, where the concept of citizenship are thought of as membership in a geographically defined community. The focus on positive material gains for the state or the community connects, furthermore, to the motivations presumed to be given for environmental duties within civic-republican citizenship, where the common good is in focus. This collectivistic idea is, lastly, further highlighted by the focus on social norms as an effective instrument, in, in this case waste-management, accomplishing an environmentally behaviour among the citizenry. Apart from facilitating the sustainable behaviour by providing good alternatives, the government also points towards the effectiveness of social pressure for directing behaviour, which connects to the description of the suggested behaviour as a civic duty for the good of the community by increasing the social costs for choosing non-participation (for an example of the strength of social norms, see North, 1990). Therefore, the desire to develop such social norms are included in the policy, further indicating the state as steering towards an objective good (the environmental benevolent lifestyle) and taking an active part in directing its citizens towards preferable behaviours[51].

> […] social norms are important. […] a clear and publicly accepted conception of the desirable environmentally-adapted behaviour increases the probability

[50] Another interpretation would be that the government draws on transgenerational justice as a core motivation, thus closing in on a resemblance to ecological citizenship. However, the focus on the long-standing traditions of the Swedish welfare-state, and the transition of lifestyles as something desirable within society for primarily driving both economic growth and development, oppose drawing this conclusion.

[51] One possible challenge to this interpretation might here be acknowledged. Is, perhaps, the desire to develop social (informal) norms rather a way towards removing formal regulation (from above) from the equation altogether? If so, this might also be perceived as a way of moving towards the anarchism (in the meaning of statelessness) of green political thought, rather than as a way of strengthening governmental control.

> for the individual to internalise the behaviour. A norm must be visible in order to influence behaviour effectively. If the desirable behaviour is emphasised by the use of posters at recycling sites, stating that "This neighbourhood sorts its household waste", it can contribute to creating a social norm and make people feel that they should contribute to recycling (Skr, 2002/03:31, 20).

4.3.4 Conclusions – from voluntary engagement to contractual civic duties

To conclude, the character of citizen participation is in the analysed documents expressed both as being the result of voluntarily engagement and as being a civic duty, although the emphasis changes slightly towards the latter over time. As the initial positive image of the environmentally devoted citizen shifts, so does also the attitude towards relying on freedom of choice and voluntariness for a widespread involvement among the citizenry. The documents of later date demonstrate, accordingly, a stronger focus on the duty-part of citizen participation, backed up by connecting ecological sustainability to traditional Swedish values, respect for democracy and a promise of positive effects for the community of citizens in Sweden (underpinning the prospect of freedom *through* the state). In sum, the character of citizen participation as framed in contemporary policy leans strongly towards behaving in an environmental sensitive way and actively taking part in the environmental work being a civic duty, in line with what above have been described as a core characteristic of civic-republican citizenship.

Figure 4.2: Ideal-type resemblance-score – the character of participation



As indubitably evident from the figure (4.2) above, assigning the ideal-type resemblance-scores is, however, not as easy. First and foremost due to the voluntariness expressed by the choice and design of policy-instruments (for example are formal regulation through laws barely used at all on the individual level) which, after all, acknowledges the opportunity for the individual to make a personal choice of participating or not. Recycling of household waste or other forms of active participation is, for instance, not mandated as is the case with military service (in

Sweden) or voting (in Australia and Belgium)[52]. This suggests that participation in the broad work towards sustainability at least in part is to be considered voluntary and not a duty for all assigned by the membership in the community, thus resembling ideal-typical liberal citizenship. Nevertheless, due to the rather obvious framing of environmental work as promoting the good of the society and of policy instruments as creating good citizens or steering towards the right behaviour, this makes the resemblance to civic-republican citizenship rather pronounced. Lastly, ecological citizenship certainly draws on duties and obligations as parts of being a citizen, but connects this not to a common good of society, but to the aspect of transnational and intergenerational justice which demands that individuals not always acts in their own self-interest. Even though Swedish education for sustainability might incorporate these issues, the main part of the policy-rhetoric nevertheless leaves these issues behind for considering, instead, obligations that the good citizen holds towards the Swedish community and its traditions. Therefore, the resemblance to the ecological citizenship ideal-type is, concerning citizen participation as a whole, interpreted as being of a lesser extent.

4.4 Public or private – the sphere of civic participation

To further elucidate the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy, both with regards to the priority of basic values and to the more explicitly empirical outlook on citizen participation (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133), the analysis turns now to consider the public/private divide in citizenship theory. In an attempt to further develop the Marshallian (e.g. T. H. Marshall, 1963) concept of citizenship, Turner (1990) draws attention to the different historical interpretations made of the relationship between the private and the public or political arenas of citizenship activity. Thereby, he acknowledges that the question of citizen participation is not merely one regarding the type of participation mandated or the nature of civic responsibilities, but also one concerning the *sphere* in which the acts of involvement are presumed to be taking place.

4.4.1 Is the private political? Different conceptions of the citizenship-sphere

In difference to the above made distinction also within traditional citizenship ideal-types, the dichotomy between liberal and civic-republican citizenship is not as relevant when considering, instead, the division made between civic participation as taking place in the public or political life of society, and as also incorporating activities in what previously have been considered as the private sphere of the family or the household. As traditional (i.e. liberal and civic-republican) concepts of democratic citizenship

[52] Nonetheless, the idea of formalising an environmental citizenship in Sweden through transforming military service to environmental service has been raised in parliament by the Swedish Environmental Party The Greens, though without enjoying any broader support from other political parties (cf. Lundmark, 1998:115).

describes citizenship as participation and accountability either in "politics proper" (Curry, 2000:1062) or in the broader life of the community, denoting either a right for the citizen to participate or, correspondingly, a duty to do so; ecological citizenship instead draws on the feminist interpretation of the citizenship sphere, which recognises that 'the private is political' and, therefore, that also the private sphere should be conceived and indeed treated as an arena for citizenship activity (cf. Prokhovnik, 1998:89-92).

Certainly, as noted in the above sections, there are important differences to be made in this respect also between the two traditional citizenship ideal-types, but these do for the most part rather concern the nature of activities within the public sphere of citizenship, with the differences drawn up between the liberal citizen using the public sphere of politics and market for pursuing predominately personal interests, and the broader civic-republican interpretation of the public sphere as a place for citizens to work collectively for the common good, that is, the difference made by Rousseau (e.g. 1994) between "the will of all" and "the general will". Thus, citizens in the liberal notion have predominately rights to participate (for example the right to vote), whereas the civic-republican citizenship also connects the public sphere with duties or obligations for the citizens (cf. Prokhovnik, 1998). Furthermore, in the liberal tradition the public/private divide is an important concept for avoiding the state authority's arbitrary involvement in individual's private lives, thereby being a prerequisite for individual autonomy. According to Turner (1990:197-198) as early as the protestant revolutions in renaissance Europe and their uprisings towards papal authoritarianism a notion of the existence of a public/private divide of citizenship was suggested. Here, a private sphere closed for state authority was created, in which the "moral authority of the individual was to be achieved" (Turner, 1990:198) without involvement from the contemporary authorities. This, in turn, strongly inspired early liberal theorists to further propose a restriction of the state's power, not allowing for any state intervention in questions on the individual's faith, moral, opinion or consciousness, for example by, as J. S. Mill in *On Liberty* (1998:14) claiming that "[t]he only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (see also Turner, 1990; Rawls, 1993; Locke, 2002).

Of course, the notion of a public/private divide was evident already with the classics of political philosophy, most notable in the civic-republican tradition building on Aristotle's assertion of man as a 'political animal' where participation in the public life of society is considered the only route to the good life (cf. Heywood, 2004:55-64). An idea furthered throughout the history of political thought in, amongst others, Niccolò Machiavelli's classical writing of *The Discourses* (cf. Curry, 2000) and Hannah Arendt's

(1958) seminal work on *The Human Condition* in which she clearly distinguishes between the public sphere of citizenship and the private realm (cf. Arendt, 1998). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that despite their slightly differing understandings of, and reasons for, making this private/public divide, both proponents of the liberal and the republican traditions unites in them placing citizenship activities exclusively in the public sphere and within the relations between state and individual; citizenship thus denotes participating in decision-making processes or in other ways giving service to, or engaging in, the life of the community, whether it be in the form of voting, voluntary association or through a broader kind of public service (cf. Prokhovnik, 1998; Dobson, 2003).

Emanating from the notion of environmental problems as essentially being an issue of the unequal use of ecological space in all aspects of an individual's life, ecological citizenship follows the attempt made within feminist theory to re-conceptualise the private/public divide (Dobson, 2003:51-56 & 135-139). As each person's occupation of ecological space not intellectually nor practically can be confined to traditional public life of society, it is here recognised that also activities in the private sphere are to be thought of as being of citizenly character, thereby indicating that a governmental policy for promoting citizenly environmental activities also can include suggestions for a more far-reaching transformation of actions in the traditionally defined private sphere of individuals' lives. Thus, civic obligations can also take place outside the narrow political arena and activities within the household, for example waste-handling or private consumption, should be thought of as political and therefore also subject to the, by the state enforced, rules of society (Prokhovnik, 1998). Whether these rules themselves suggest a smaller or larger state intervention is, then, a different question altogether. The conception of the public/private divide interconnects with the types of values expressed as motivational factors for participation and recognised as civic virtues. Whereas traditional civic-republican citizenship draws on values supporting civil service and protection of the community (e.g. courage, strength and obedience), ecological citizenship also recognises motivational values that draws on the relations *between citizens themselves*, as these are what essentially defines the concept, place and obligations of ecological citizenship (e.g. social justice, personal responsibility, care and compassion, cf. Dobson, 2003:136-137).

In evaluating this final aspect on citizen participation as expressed through Swedish environmental policy, these aspects will be analysed through the empirical material; where are the prescribed activities presumed to be taking place, exclusively in the public sphere or in both the public and the private spheres respectively? And, conversely, what motivational values or civic virtues are thereby put forward through the policy documents?

Table 4.3: Different spheres of citizen participation

Public sphere	Public and Private sphere
Traditional citizenship	Ecological citizenship

4.4.2 The sphere of citizenship in Swedish environmental policy

As above mentioned, when focusing on the forms of participation prescribed in Swedish environmental policy, it is not entirely clear in what sphere the government foresees this participation to be taking place. Evidently, the policy documents define participation both as citizens resuming responsibility by (1) taking an active part in the decision-making processes, predominately on the local level, and by (2) restructuring their unsustainable lifestyles and consciousnesses to ensure an environmentally benevolent behaviour in all aspects of their daily life. *First*, the former need for political participation by the citizens draws on the strong deliberative undertone embedded in the Rio-agreements, which, again, refers to "broad public participation in decision-making" as a prerequisite for a sustainable development (UNCED, 1992:23.2). It is also, naturally, an empirical implication of the government's above referred to aspiration to build the sustainable society on "core democratic values" (Skr, 2001/02:50, 41), and therefore are, for example, access to information, open decision making processes as well as opportunities for public control, dialogue and influence highlighted as important for anchoring the decisions among the citizenry (cf. Skr, 2001/02:50, 5; Skr, 1994/95:120, 8 & 23; Skr, 1997/98:13, 37; Skr, 2000/01:38, 5). For instance:

> Open decision-making and planning processes where all citizens feel a sense of participation and have the will and the capacity to take responsibility for their actions constitutes an important foundation for the practical work with sustainable development. Important prerequisites are therefore possibilities for public control, dialogue and influence in the planning (Skr, 2001/02:50, 41).

This policy-focus on citizens' participation in making decisions on environmental issues is also given attention by Lundqvist (2004c:148-180 & 197-200) who, however, asserts that even though the Swedish government rhetorically both suggests and opens up for involving citizens in deciding on environmentally protective measures (in particular on the municipal level through the Local Agenda 21, which was to be characterised by a broad citizen partaking), the amount of participation is, in practice, not as widespread (see also Eckerberg, 2001). The same outcomes have been noted by Feichtinger and Pregering (2005:233 & 237) who confirm that for the most part, the LA21 processes were managed with very little citizen participation in the decision-making. Furthermore, following several evaluations of the Local Investment Programmes (e.g. Eckerberg et al., 2005) which followed on the LA21 in the late 1990's; when scrutinising the participatory activities surrounding these investments for ecological

sustainability it is evident that very little even was done to grant individual citizens a place in the decision-making processes. The LIP-programme focused more on local business and industry and, thus, did not utilize the already developed LA21-plans for public participation, which leads Lundqvist (2004c:173) to suggest that it was a case of "governance without the people" (see also Feichtinger and Pregering's [2005:236] description of citizens as "instructible"). In recent years, Swedish environmental policy has, nevertheless, become infused with a stronger, more formalised component promoting public participation in the environmental decision-making processes. The Swedish signing and the following implementation of the *Aarhus Convention* (Prop, 2004/05:65; Rskr, 2004/05:193) emanating from the 'Environment for Europe' ministerial conference held in the Danish town of Aarhus in 1998, indicates a step forward in the process of granting citizens a stronger position in processes regarding environmental issues. According to the convention, in environmental issues the public (i.e. single individuals as well as NGO's) shall be granted the right of access to information, participation in decision-making, and access to justice (Prop, 2004/05:65, 21).

Now, despite the somewhat weak public participation in practice (see above), the policy rhetoric thus far nonetheless places the citizenship activities suggested by the state in the public sphere, where participation is narrowly defined as being equal to political action, either by the citizen directly or through membership in interest organisations working for the benefit of the environment. Also, the Swedish policy's focus on NGO's and people's movements as highly important actors in the environmental work (e.g. Prop, 2004/05:65, 33; Skr, 1994/95:120, 8) suggest that the delineation of the public sphere of citizenship in this respect follows the definition of what Turner (1990:209) describes as "American liberalism", that is, as citizens' involvement in local voluntary organisations. Additionally, in particular the wordings of the Government Bill (Prop, 2004/05:65) on implementing the Aarhus Convention places great importance on the defence of the individual's environmental rights as a motivating factor for introducing, in particular, the access-to-justice principle and thereby further increasing the ideal-type resemblance with an (environmentally sensitive) liberal citizenship. The Swedish government thereby agrees that "a satisfying protection of the environment [is] essential in order for one to be able to enjoy basic human rights", as well as that "the convention denotes therefore that the public shall be guaranteed certain civic and political rights" (Prop, 2004/05:65, 18)[53]. In this context, however, it

[53] Connecting environmental rights to human rights in this fashion has also been suggested by, for example, Eckersly (e.g. 1996) and touches upon an important divergence between traditional citizenship rights, assigned not by "a persons humanity [but by] the fact that he or she is a fellow citizen" (Oldfield, 1990, quoted in Curry, 2000:1069) and human rights which "attach to every person by virtue of the fact that they are human" (Eckersly, 1996:232). Expanding the rights discourse outside the borders of traditional citizenship as is done in the Aarhus convention might, therefore, be interpreted as a step away from traditional, territorial concepts of citizenship and towards a cosmopolitan connotation of the citizenship space (although not to be equalised with the post-cosmopolitan definition of ecological citizenship, cf. Dobson, 2003:67-82).

is also relevant to mention that one underpinning reason for introducing a public partaking in environmental decision-making processes draws on the, within political ecology prominent, notion of deliberative or participatory democracy as a warrant for both a better environment and a higher level of legitimacy for environmental protective measures taken by the state authorities (Carter, 2001; Barry, 1999; Eckersly, 1995 Doherty and De Geus, 1996). In this fashion the Swedish government, through implementing the Aarhus Convention, attempts at solving the legitimacy – effectiveness dilemma by means of introducing a stronger democracy wherein more people have direct access to the processes of decision-making, which, in this respect, suggest more of a resemblance with either the ecological and the civic-republican ideal-types of citizenship. As both of these ideal-types include suggestions for deliberative or participatory democracy, the latter is in particular relevant as it is clearly stated in the Aarhus Convention that participation in decision-making processes in order to protect and improve the environment is not merely a right, but also a duty for each citizen,

> [E]very person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations,
>
> Considering that, to be able to assert this right and observe this duty, citizens must have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision-making and have access to justice in environmental matters […] (Skr, 2004/05:65, 140, underline in original).

As mentioned above the policy documents, secondly, include a broader view on what might be considered the sphere of citizenly participation, thereby extending beyond formal political activity as the only arena for citizenship activities and, thus, governmental influence. It is clear that the participation envisioned by the government entails more than the amendment of a few activities or the partaking in the traditionally defined public life of society. For instance, in particular framings concerning lifestyle issues, where citizens are encouraged to both "live and act environmentally adapted" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 10) and to internalise the new environmental norms (cf. Skr, 2002/03:31, 23), is explicitly described as a necessity in meeting the future requirements in the "working life and as a citizen" (Skr, 1997/98:13, 23). These forms of participation are interpreted as transgressing the conventional public or political sphere of citizenly activities, in particular when citizens are encouraged to participate by changing fundamental, normative, and previously regarded as private aspects of their life such as values and lifestyles (cf. section 4.3). Hence, it denotes a view on the citizen as taking responsibility and having duties towards the community also in the private sphere, in line with what is proposed within ideal-typical ecological citizenship.

Thus, no explicit distinction between activities traditionally viewed as located in the private and activities taking place in the public sphere is made within the policy-

documents. Judging from the policy rhetoric, the government does not seem to expect that sustainability will be at hand merely by prohibiting certain environmentally harmful activities in the public sphere or by exclusively focusing on citizen participation in local decision-making processes, although these are important contributions from legitimacy as well as an effectiveness point of view. Rather, all throughout policy the prospects for reaching sustainable development are recognized as being dependent on more profound and far-reaching citizen participation; a comprehensive rethinking and "adaptation of lifestyles" (Skr, 1996/97:50, 4) as a whole, understood as including both traditional activities in the public arena, as well as changes made in the private sphere. That is to say, the present environmental policy in Sweden can be interpreted as promoting participation denoted as the all-encompassing way of living and thinking about the environment.

> The vision of sustainable development is essentially a question of values and outlook on life. Continuous investments in information and education to demonstrate the connection between individuals' values and practical lifestyles, and between local and global sustainability problems, will be needed (Skr, 2003/04:129, 29).
>
> Patterns of consumption and individuals' behaviour can be viewed as a function of values and attitudes (Skr, 1994/95:120, 18).
>
> The consumers and the environment is a broad field which to a large extent affects our consumption and our lifestyle (Skr, 2001/02:50, 24).

The inclusion of actions in the private sphere as being of citizenly character becomes even more apparent when considering that the procedural changes and policy instruments proposed in policy also involve the creation of a deeper personal engagement towards the environment; a transformation of values and attitudes regarding first and foremost the social and environmental components of the three-dimensional sustainability concept. It is close at hand to here make the connection between the environmental engagement expressed in policy and the values of personal responsibility and social justice central in ecological citizenship (Dobson, 2003). Moreover, in line with what has been described as the key political strategies of ecologism (i.e. political decentralisation and participatory democracy, cf. Carter 2001), participation in the public activities prescribed by environmental policies (see above), as well as the use of information and environmental education will, policy-makers seem to be reasoning, generate a general environmental commitment among the citizenry. This will, in turn, be the driving force behind further development towards sustainability in society as a whole.

> The school can shape and influence children's and youths' lifestyles and attitudes towards the environment, both locally and globally […] The environmental issues should be given large attention in the education. This

> concerns all levels; primary school, upper secondary school, adult education as well as universities and colleges (Skr, 1994/95:120, 26).
>
> There is also a need for long-term civic educational activities in the classical sense, where increased knowledge leads to engagement and transformation of people's behaviour and societal decisions […] Through such studies, the individual can develop both formal merits and a social as well as an environmental engagement (Skr, 2001/02:50, 32).

Thereby, it is also reasonable to assume that the traditional (liberal) function of the private sphere of citizenship, as the area wherein individuals independently and freely developed their opinions, their values and their consciousness, without this being subject to formal regulation, or even influence, by the state (cf. Turner, 1990) has been exchanged for a view on also private aspects of citizens' lives as being open for the normative influence of the state.

4.4.3 Conclusions - a private, political engagement for the environment

The analysis of the sphere of citizenship activities suggested in Swedish environmental policy was presumed to further elucidate the policy's beliefs regarding participation by the citizens in the environmental work, as well as provide additional insights in the priority of the foundational values as highlighted by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). In this regard, resemblances to all of the citizenship ideal-types have been discovered throughout policy, as illustrated in figure 4.3 below.

Figure 4.3: Ideal-type resemblance-score – public or private participation



First, following the traditional conception of citizenship a great significance is attached to citizens participating in the traditional public sphere, by engaging in formal political activity and, predominately local-level, decision-making. *Second*, remaining in the public arena of civic participation, policy draws at first sight on Turner's (1990) conception of liberal-individualistic citizenship, by denoting public sphere participation

as citizens' involvement in people's movements. This interpretation is, however, not maintained when instead considering that the policy-rhetoric both frames public participation as a civic duty, as well as leaves the liberal conception of the private as something closed to state authority. *Third*, by expanding the view on citizen participation, from merely engaging publicly to include also profound changes in lifestyles and personal values associated with social and ecological sustainability, the analysed policy documents can be interpreted as considering citizen participation to encompass actions also in the private sphere. In this regard, Swedish environmental policy moves beyond both traditional conceptions of citizenship and towards a stronger resemblance with the ecological citizenship ideal-type.

A closer examination of the specific values and attitudes put forth as motivational factors for citizenly participation might serve as to further elucidate the policies' expressed views on the sphere of participation. This analysis will be conducted within section 4.4 below, where the analysis will focus predominately on the role of the state in promoting environmental policy-measures, as well as on the reasons or motivations provided for participation.

4.5 The role of the state in the Swedish policy discourse

Following Turner's (1990:193) *Outline of a Theory of Citizenship*, "[a]ny theory of citizenship must also produce a theory of the state". This indicates, of course, that the state – individual relationship, being at the centre of attention in traditional concepts of citizenship is not to be considered as being a one-way street; rather, the relationship is within traditional citizenship theory thought of as a mutual connection with rights and duties both for the citizen and for the state itself (Heywood, 2004). In the environmental context, the role of the state has also attracted a great deal of attention, either as a weak institution in the hands of the (not always environmentally concerned) voters which's authority must be strengthened in order for effective environmental protection to be possible, or whose authority rather should be distributed down to local communities and deliberative processes in order to transfer the environmental decision-making closer to those affected by both old problems and new solutions. For instance, de Geus (1996:188) bear in mind the former as he concludes that "in many discussions on the environmental issue the conclusion is reached that a growing interference of the state in society is absolutely necessary". Choosing this approach, however, challenge several of the familiar principles within liberal citizenship, and constitutes therefore yet another legitimacy-problem for environmental policy-making. Therefore, also the role of the state, as expressed through Swedish environmental policy, is relevant to consider in elucidating and analysing the values, beliefs or principles articulated within the policy-rhetoric. The perceived role of the state occupies also an important place within the Policy Core Beliefs, elaborated by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999:133; see also

Sabatier, 1988), in particular with regards to the proper distribution of authority between state, market and local government, as well as with regards to choice of policy instruments and level of participation by elected officials. Within the frameworks of the three types of citizenship outlined above, the state is designated to play numerous different roles which relate to the components in the policy core beliefs, including basic value orientation. The following analysis will for the most part focus on how the function of the state *vis-à-vis* its citizens is framed along the lines of the state's overarching role in formulating policy as well as promoting policy adherence; its specific or fundamental tasks, as well as the view on subjectivity or objectivity in prescribing the goals of Swedish environmental policy. Due to the dual nature of citizenship relations, the following analysis will in several aspects partly cover the previously explored aspects on citizen participation. However, the expectation is that this overlap will serve as to further clarify the interpretations made above.

4.5.1 Passive neutrality versus active partiality

Continuing the analysis of the normative beliefs or values as promoted through Swedish environmental policy, it is also relevant to incorporate a focus on the role of the state authority itself in the environmental work, as it is presented through the policy-rhetoric. This provides a further elaborated view on, for instance, empirically guided policy-principles regarding preferred policy instruments and on the proper distribution of authority, both between the state and the market as well as between different levels of government (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:133). Obviously, basic value priorities of the kind already touched upon above (e.g. the weight ascribed to freedom, autonomy, tradition, obedience etc.) are also elucidated through an analysis of the, in official policy documents envisaged, role of the state in the environmental work.

In this respect, the reasoning presented within traditional citizenship ideal-types differs considerably due, predominately, to their respective view on the rights – obligations balance as discussed at length in the previous sections. Simply put, the difference concerning the role of state authority ranges in a traditional citizenship context between neutral and partial, as well as between facilitating and enlightening respectively. The liberal ideal-type of state – individual relations suggests a vision of a rather passive and limited governmental structure, either in line with the minimal, night-watchman state of Adam Smith or in the form of the state not necessarily being physically limited, but when exercising its authority being "political, not metaphysical" (e.g. Rawls, 1993:10; see also Rawls, 1985). Thus whether focusing on classical liberal theory or more contemporary liberalism, limited and neutral government is seen as a prerequisite for citizens to enjoy freedom and personal autonomy, and for each and everyone to pursue a subjective understanding of the good life. In line with the conception of citizenship as "passive and private" (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994:354) wherein individual rights and

voluntarily participation in the public life constitute the main principles, the role of the state itself is also passive in the sense that its duties are limited to upholding either the citizenry's inviolable rights and liberties (as in classical conceptions of liberalism) or to provide fair procedures, equal opportunities and the autonomy of all citizens in realising their independently chosen lifestyles (e.g. Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1978). In order to do this, and not by itself violate the rights of its citizens, the state has to be fundamentally neutral in metaphysical questions regarding for example values, beliefs or the good life. The state should with necessity prohibit the exercise of certain freedoms as they are violating the liberties of others, but is not allowed to prescribe certain lifestyles or behavioural patterns as being more preferable than other based merely on a preference for specified morals, values or beliefs[54]. In practice, however, the neutrality and limitation of a contemporary liberal state can be expected to be less comprehensive than so far is being prescribed by the ideal-type. At least two implications circumscribing the strict neutrality of the liberal need therefore to be acknowledged.

First, as have been acknowledged on several occasions, liberalism is by no means virtue-free (cf. Dobson, 2003). In fact, certain specific virtues necessary for acting as the good, responsible citizen have been described by liberal theorists as necessary to promote also within the liberal democratic state. Therefore, also liberal government may promote civic virtue among its citizens without violating the neutrality principle (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994:365; see also Dagger, 1997). Nevertheless, as with the case of liberal civic education (see section 4.3 above) an important difference must here be highlighted between virtues referring to the fulfilment of a *common good*, in the republican tradition of Machiavelli or Rousseau, and virtues necessary for upholding *fair procedures* (for example law-abiding and open-mindedness) by which citizens, based on individual preference, can lead their subjective good life. The latter, following for example Kymlicka and Norman (1994:366), includes such virtues as engagement in public discourse and participation through elections, and builds on the idea of democracy where decisions made by the government should be open for a free discussion. Thereby, it is possible to, by the strength of one's argument persuade others without resorting to coercion, thus preserving democracy as a political system. This is, Kymlicka and Norman (1994) assert, further connected to the liberal virtue of *public reasonableness* (see also Rawls, 1993); the duty of the liberal citizen to build his or her political claims on reasons that are political rather than private, and thereby able to create an "overlapping consensus" (Rawls, 1993:134-172) among the many reasonable, but privately held, doctrines by which people unavoidably will choose to live in a free society. These types of virtues, of course, are more strongly related to the defence of individual autonomy and state neutrality in the liberal tradition, rather than to the

[54] Most commonly, to this is added 'outside the overarching democratic ideal', see for example the distinction made by Rawls (1993:38) between reasonable and unreasonable doctrines, or, for a slightly dated version, Locke's defence of Christianity as an overarching ideal which must be upheld and defended by the state.

concept of freedom through the community as in the civic-republican basis for civic virtue (cf. Flathman, 1996, see note above).

Second, there are also limitations that might be placed on the individual freedom as such, which again have consequences for the interpretation of the duties for the state within a liberal conception of citizenship. As mentioned above, extending the liberal discourse of rights towards incorporating also environmental rights might very well be interpreted as more of a natural update of an 18th century ideal, thus not presenting any insurmountable challenges to liberal democracy *per se*. This have been suggested by, among others, Eckersly (1996:220) who in her attempt to reinterpret (or revisit) the liberal-rights discourse suggests, while pointing towards the UNCHR, environmental rights to be considered "the fourth generation of human rights". Similar connections between liberal rights and environmental protection have been made in a range of variants all giving an inkling of what Dobson (2003) refers to as the rights-based *environmental* citizenship (as opposed to ecological citizenship where justice instead is the core principle). For instance, relating to environmentally sensitive interpretations of liberalism the Lockean Proviso[55] to leave "as good and as large" (Locke, 2002:16; Nozick, 1974:174-182) for others to enjoy as well his following statement that "nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy" (Locke, 2002:15) have been interpreted as carrying further opportunities for the state to limit also environmentally degrading activities without hindrance by the principle of individual liberty. So has the Rawlsian "just savings principle" (Rawls, 1999:276-284; Rawls, 1993:273-275; see also Bell, 2004 & 2001) and even Nozick's (1974) conception of the negative rights-principle been interpreted as denoting that also freedom from harm caused by environmental problems can been emphasized as a kind of liberty which the state has a duty to protect (cf. Attfield, 1994; for the liberal – environmental compatibility see also Eckersly, 1992 and Wissenburg, 1998). Following these lines of interpretation, the possibilities for a state to, in political practice and within the framework of liberal citizenship, prescribe environmental protection policies are certainly more generous than is declared through the traditional ideal-typical interpretation of the liberal state. The over-arching duties for the state to protect individual liberties and to ensure individuals' opportunities to independently decide upon the roadmap to the good life are, though, still the core principle of this reasoning, where individual autonomy and equality of opportunity should work as trumps in all policy-considerations (cf. Dworkin, 1978).

However, it should now be evident that, in contrast to liberal citizenship, the civic-republican ideal-type presents a considerably different interpretation of liberty, and thus of the role of the state. Emanating from the Aristotelian idea of the individual as a

[55] There exists, however, by no means a consensus on this interpretation of the Lockean proviso's implication for private ownership. See for example the discussion in Hansson (1999 & 2000) and Persson (2000).

political animal, true freedom can only come about *through*, unlike the liberal interpretation as freedom *from*, the state. Therefore the state or the community within the republican tradition represents the common good, protecting the citizens from corruption or an endless pursuit of narrow self-interests (cf. Curry, 2000; see also Machiavelli, 2003; Rousseau, 1994). The duty for all citizens is therefore to work towards the promotion and the furthering of this good, by engagement in the public life of society through acts of civil service and political deliberation (cf. Delanty, 2000; Held, 1996). However, as Kymlicka and Norman (1994:353) assert, in order to accomplish the collective action prescribed by civic-republicans as the basis for a good life, it is also necessary for individuals to be 'good' citizens who "desire to participate in the political process in order to promote a public good", and for this certain civic virtues are needed. Consequently, the state is in turn ascribed duties to, through for example civic education, actively engage in the creation of good citizens by promoting certain lifestyles or virtues as more preferable, or 'right', than others. Since the focus on the active citizen and on civic duties which will only be exercised by virtue is more pronounced within civic-republican citizenship, the role of the state is here also interpreted as being more comprehensive; as actively steering its citizens in the right direction towards the common good and as clearly showing preference for certain values or a certain way of life. The state thus plays an important role as an active instigator of the participation of citizens in whichever activities it deems necessary for fulfilling the policy's goals. In the case of environmental protection, the civic-republican state has no less than an obligation to embrace *the* conception of sustainability and to enlighten its citizens about its content as well as on how to best reach it. Participation is, in line with what has been elaborated on before, not voluntarily, but conceived as a civic duty and mandated in a top-down fashion by governmental authorities. Finally, political ecology has, for obvious reasons, been rather sceptical towards the liberal principle of neutrality in questions on the good life and more inclined to draw on the interpretations of collectiveness and the morality of civic duty in the republican tradition (Bell, 2001; Doherty and De Geus, 1996). In his conception of ecological citizenship Dobson (2003) draws on the duties and obligations of civic-republicanism, and opens up also for a state, through civic education and policy-making, actively advancing the normative foundations of ecological citizenship, by promoting the virtue of justice and "pointing out that justice demands that individuals act in a way that are not always in their best interest" (Dobson, 2003, 205).

Based on these differences between the ideal-types, the questions to direct to the actual policy-documents are therefore if the state is thought of as having a neutral role, facilitating the citizenry to choose independently what to do and what kind of life to lead, or as having a responsibility in directing the citizens towards a definitive version of the good way of life? Are the prescribed policy-instruments viewed as means for

facilitating voluntarily engagement by choice, or are they used as instruments for *enlightening* the citizenry and actively directing it towards *the* good way of life?

Table 4.4: The different roles of political authority

	Partiality	**Neutrality**
Passively facilitate		Liberal citizenship
Actively enlighten	Civic-republican citizenship Ecological citizenship	

4.5.2 Images of the environmental state

As it is framed within Swedish environmental policy documents, the role of the state is, again, rather ambiguous. Following the above discussion on citizen participation, the task for the government and governmental authorities is described as being constituted by a dual role. On the one hand, the need for governmental authorities to create favourable opportunities for its citizens to make independent, but informed, choices as well as choosing to act in an environmentally sensitive way in their day-to-day practices is underlined. The focus here is first and foremost on what governmental and municipal authorities can do to facilitate and assist more environmentally benevolent choices among the citizenry, which can be interpreted as expressing views in line with those on the passive state and, thus, the self-directing citizen. Regarding all household-related activities (for example consumption and transportation), the citizens will be provided with "guidelines", "knowledge", "support", "stimuli", "possibilities" and "easily accessible information" (cf. Skr, 2001/02:172, 5; Skr, 2001/02:68, 5; Skr, 2002/03:31, 28), but they are encouraged to evaluate it and select their actions independently without being explicitly steered in a specific direction by the state. Any particular actions and insights are, apart from sorting and recycling of household waste, not openly outlined as being particularly preferable in large sections of the documents. Rather, in this interpretation, the state shall support and facilitate the voluntary transition towards sustainable living, by making available to the general public the possibilities, the choices and the knowledge needed for independently evaluating the environmental situation and engaging in voluntarily action. Therefore, a range of policy-measures are also suggested which put pressure on municipalities and governmental authorities to provide the means necessary for citizens to make more sustainable choices in their day-to-day life. For example:

> Measures and initiatives are needed on all levels of society for the national strategy to be put into practice and realised. A prerequisite for reaching this is that knowledge and information on the strategy is present with all actors (Skr, 2003/04:129, 148).

> A first step on the way [towards an environmentally sustainable society] is to create such possibilities that all citizens can have access to the existing information (Skr, 2001/02:50, 29).

The work carried out up to the year 2002 has mostly been focused on knowledge mediation with the aim of in part increasing consumer information, in part influence producers, authorities and organisations, in part facilitate for the single consumer to act in an environmentally positive way (Skr, 2003/04:129, 114).

> People's individual opportunities to act in an environmentally sustainable manner in their daily life, is decisive for the effects and the breakthrough the adjustment will have (Skr, 1997/98:13, 11).

On the other hand, and tying in with what above has been said on the degree, character and sphere of citizen participation (sections 4.2 – 4.4 above), this apparently liberal account is at times contrasted with normative statements that go beyond state-passivity and bottom-up deliberation, that is, further than the sole upholding of citizens' possibilities to independently evaluate and choose life projects without them emanating from the political authority or from the values held by a majority of citizens in the community. Despite the, at least rhetorically, great weight placed initially on individuals' participation also in the decision-making processes (see the discussion in section 4.2), the policy-rhetoric here leans towards indicating more of an active role for the state in educating its citizens on the changes necessary as well as actively engaging them in carrying these specific changes through. For instance, as the environmental aim of Swedish consumer-policy is framed as "such patterns of consumption and production *shall* be developed that reduces the strain on the environment and contributes to a long-term sustainable development" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 5, italics added), the necessity of the state also directing its citizens towards making these changes should be therefore be evident. Thus, also within the above mentioned efforts for providing opportunities, the undisputable goal of the state is to accomplish "transformed patterns of behaviour with consumers and households" (Skr, 1997/98:13, 36) and thus to make citizens take responsibility for living and acting in a pre-determined way towards the environment. As already touched upon, in particular the suggestions for using educational policy-instruments do in certain aspects frame more of a necessity for directing (future) citizens towards *the* acceptable lifestyle, as laid down by the state and its authorities. This should present a, small but nevertheless, challenge towards the principles advocated within liberal ideal-type of citizenship.

> Contemporary research shows that the lifestyle established in an early age usually is retained throughout life. Education for sustainable development should therefore start as early as in pre-school and thereafter increase throughout the educational system (Skr, 2001/02:13, 31).

> [Education] shall also provide readiness-to-act for a sustainable development, for example incitements for transformed patterns of consumption, and provide

> assistance for conclusions on the protection of natural resources with regards to a concurred global economy as well as the desire to preserve regional cultural heritages (Skr, 2001/02:13, 31).

Similarly, the expressed significant role for the state in engaging citizens in decision-making processes and deliberation on environmental issues might be somewhat questioned from the point of view of the liberal ideal-type. As already established, increasing public awareness on environmentally related subjects through "access to information and opportunities for dialogue and influence" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 5) are at several occasions highlighted as being important factors for accomplishing the political goals of sustainability; a notion following both the idea of participation for increased legitimacy as presented in the Agenda 21 and the Aarhus-convention (Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005; Prop, 2004/05:65), as well as the rationale for increased citizen deliberation presented within political ecology (e.g. Dobson, 2003). Nevertheless, the actual place for citizens within the decision-making processes should, also in this context regarding the role of the state, be granted some further attention. This in particular as political practice in Sweden so far not always has been inclined to involve citizens in the processes (see above, section 4.4). The question in search for an answer is here whether the Swedish public, by the government, is treated as citizens ready to become involved and by themselves decide on which values and lifestyles policy should support; or if citizens instead are viewed as unable to make these autonomous choices? Whichever description of the citizen is more prominent, the role of the state should be correspondingly affected.

On this note, following a content analysis of two official reports (SOU's) outlining contemporary Swedish environmental policy, Lundqvist (2004c:165-168) has detected a strong consumer-bias in the official description of the Swedish general public[56]. He observes that references to individuals as citizens are only made a total of 16 times in the two documents, which also display far less an emphasis on citizens as the part initiating environmental activity or dialogue. By contrast, the epithets 'customer', 'consumer' or 'individual' are used about 470 times across, in total, 900 pages of text (Lundqvist, 2004c:166-7). Accordingly, Lundqvist also reaches the conclusion that individuals in general are portrayed as passively reacting to market incentives and on already determined values presented to them through top-down policy-instruments, for example governmental information and education. This rather than being "politically competent subjects" ready to take an active part in deliberating on the moral foundations of the policy itself. Therefore, in Swedish environmental policy, as he puts

[56] The inclination to, in official governmental policy, describe the citizen as a consumer (or as the 'citizen-consumer') follows in part the conclusions of the Agenda 21 where the key to sustainability is not to reduce overall consumption, but rather to change its impact on the environment by "enabling the consumer to make a choice which benefits a sustainable development" (Skr, 2003/04:129, p.65). The same rhetoric can be found also outside Sweden. For example, K. Hobson has located the similar patterns in the environmental discourses both in the U.K. (Hobson, 2002 & 2004a) as well as in the Asia-Pacific region (Hobson, 2004b).

it, "the role of the individual is reduced to one of 'changing behaviour' in response to future policy" (Lundqvist, 2001b & 2004c). This supports the earlier made interpretation of the Swedish education for sustainability, and of the informative instruments-in-use, as an attempt by the state to direct citizens towards making the good choice, rather than opening up for autonomous self-direction. Lundqvist's findings are further supported by Feichtinger and Pregering's (2005) investigation of the Swedish participatory processes within the framework of local Agenda 21, where the documents describe citizens' participation almost exclusively as them being fed information, both on what their real interests are, and on how to realise them. Conceiving citizens in this manner as "instructible", even unaware of which their true interests are not to mention how to reach them, also brings with it a paternalistic and advisory role for the state, where the task is to "prevent citizens acting against their own ('objective') interests" (Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005:236). These types of reasoning which depict an active state, enlightening its citizens on how to behave, bear a close resemblance with the role of the state expressed within the civic-republican ideal-type[57], where citizens not always are aware of their on good and thus must be instructed on what is expected of them as good citizens.

The above mentioned contrast between the state as either facilitating citizens' independent choices or as actively enlightening in a rather paternalistic manner, is explicitly put into focus when considering that, in particular later dated, policy-documents contain an implicit understanding that earlier informational measures to some extent have failed. A conclusion founded in the observed fact that Swedish individuals, having been provided with environmental information, still do not act according to what is described as the policy goals; for example do people's consumption continue to increase and a majority continues to drive their cars into work on a daily basis (cf. Skr, 2002/03:31, 5; see also the discussion in section 4.3 above). Therefore, policy-makers conclude, additional and more easily accessible information is called for (and, as demonstrated above, also needs to be complemented by more effectively working instruments for steering behavioural change). It thus seems reasonable to make the interpretation that the state's role in Swedish environmental policy is not solely to facilitate an informed and independent choice by citizens ready to take matters into their own hands, but rather to enlighten and steer the citizenry towards a certain perception of what constitutes good life-projects. Following this line of reasoning; as long as the particular preferred perception is not observed in the minds and daily practices of all individuals, the information has not been sufficient or adequately

[57] However, a finger of caution should be raised towards drawing this parallel too far. Depicting the citizen as predominately a consumer or taxpayer (e.g. Lundqvist, 2004; Feichtinger & Pregering, 2005; Hobson, 2004a & 2004b) might also suggest that citizenship (in the meaning participation in the public or political sphere, through either formal politics or a broader range of civil service) not is an issue at all in the Swedish environmental policy and that the individual instead is conceived as being a mere subject to state authority, rather than a citizen enjoying a balance of rights and responsibilities.

interpretable and the state's efforts to demonstrate the 'good life' for its citizens must be continued.

> It is uncertain how much knowledge the consumer possesses on the connection between the choice of foodstuffs and sustainable development. It is probably relatively limited (Skr, 2003/04:129, 65).
>
> It is not certain that the consumer today has the possibility to put his/her choice of foodstuffs in relation to the effect this choice has on sustainable development. Sufficiently clear information on the consequences of different choices is often lacking. […] A conclusion is therefore that it today is difficult for a consumer to make conscious choices which benefits a sustainable development (Skr, 2003/04:129, 66).
>
> There shall be enough information on how foodstuffs are produced and on the effects of different methods of production on sustainable development, to enable the consumer to make a choice that benefits sustainable development (Skr, 2003/04:129, 66).

In prolongation, also the connection made between the envisaged sustainable lifestyle and a change in values among the citizenry (cf. Skr, 1994/95:120, 18; Skr, 2003/04:129, 29) indicates a desire or even need for the state to take a normative, rather than neutral, stance and thus to promote a *specific* set of values and lifestyles over others in order to accomplish a sustainable society. This interpretation also provides a further basis for scrutinising the policy's narrative concerning individuals' choices along the same lines. Since the role of the state, on several occasions, is descried as a matter of "setting the frames and creating possibilities" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 104; see also Skr, 2002/03:31, 28; Skr, 2001/02:68, 5-6) the question is how strict these frames are set. Are Swedish citizens encouraged to exercise self-direction when making choices in their daily life, or are the government drawing up a strict boundary which separates the right from the wrong choices? In this respect, consider the fact that the policy-rhetoric, at the same time as pointing out the importance of individuals' ability to make market-choices regarding, for example, private consumption or mode of transportation, also express the overarching aspiration that these choices will be "well thought through" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 7) or "responsible" (Skr, 2001/02:68, 21). Judging from what has been stated above it is, however, reasonable to assume that these choices are only considered 'responsible' or 'conscious' to the extent that they follow in line with the already established governmental policy goal and that also instruments not designed as to directly steer behaviour are created with the purpose of enlightening citizens via a "one-sided transfer of information or schoolmasterly instructions" (Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005:236). This is, for example, the explicit task for a range of Swedish sectoral policies, which includes strong emphasises on the need for changes in lifestyles and attitudes driven by an information and education of individuals and households. With respect to different policy-areas (e.g. transportation, consumption or waste-management), the citizens shall consume, choose and act in a manner as to achieve the

governmental policy-goals, and the task of governmental authorities is to see to it that this 'responsible behaviour' is realised. If not on a voluntary basis, then through the introduction of more steering instruments. Here, the role of citizens in the work towards sustainability is thus strictly limited to a change of behavioural patterns in a pre-determined direction, rather than deliberating on which behavioural patterns are in fact preferable (cf. Lundqvist, 2001b & 2004c).

> The role of education in the aspiration to reach a sustainable society is to provide people with knowledge and insights that will enable them to, as citizens, making responsible choices, so that the quality of life for present and future generations can be maintained and increased (Skr, 2001/02:50, 30; see also Skr, 2001/02:172, 111).
>
> [C]onsumers shall have adequate knowledge about food and the significance of eating habits for ecologically, socially and economically sustainable development. The consumer shall have enough information to make a conscious choice of foodstuffs (Skr, 2003/04:129, 66).
>
> Eco-labelling is often viewed as one of the most important tools of consumer policy when it comes to communicating complicated messages to consumers. A small label can, when working properly, provide plenty of information, which makes it possible for the consumers to make more conscious choices on the market (Skr, 2003/04:129, 114-115).
>
> An urgent task for consumer policy is to contribute to the development of patterns of consumption which minimize the negative effects on humans and the environment (Skr, 2003/04:129, 113).
>
> An urgent task for consumer-policy is therefore to facilitate the consumers' judgement of their behaviour's environmental consequences and to link people on to patterns of consumption that puts as little stress on the environment as possible (Skr, 1996/97:50, 49).
>
> It is a question of increasing the awareness and understanding of necessary adjustments of the society as a whole, developing readiness-to-act and creating a readiness with all decision-makers on all levels in the working life as well as with single individuals (Skr, 2003/04:129, 87)

What this sustainable lifestyle actually encompasses in terms of household-related activities is not entirely clear judging from the policy-rhetoric. Through the general formulations in these policy documents from the national level, the outer boundaries for the 'environmental citizen's' lifestyle is certainly drawn up through indicating the need for, for example, a transformed transport behaviour or altered patterns of consumption. Nevertheless, any detailed specifics for what a sustainable lifestyle would include is not provided, though it is clear that also the construction of such details are both desirable and even in progress. The aim to further develop and clarify components of a sustainable lifestyle signals that there is indeed one lifestyle or, at least, pattern of private consumption more preferable than others and that the task for the government

is to educate the citizenry on what this comprises. Thus, the possible interpretation that the lack of a specified lifestyle within the policy-documents would suggest a role for the state as merely enabling the individual's freedom to independently choose her own, as long as it is not harming anyone else, is thereby not given any additional (strong) support through the analysis.

> An action plan for sustainable household consumption is being drawn up (Skr, 2003/04:129, 33).
>
> A government committee of inquiry has been set up with the task of establishing a closer definition of sustainable consumption for the households and propose a plan of action (Skr, 2003/04:129, 113).

Two further factors contradict the interpretation that a lack of specified lifestyle alternatives throughout the documents is preserving autonomy and freedom of choice, and are therefore worth mentioning briefly. *First*, without exception, Swedish environmental policy defines one further important function for the state as an environmental actor: to be a good example for its citizens. The state, including all governmental authorities, shall front the work towards the sustainable society – indeed nationally, within the borders of Sweden, but also internationally as a leading country or pioneer and thus a model for others to follow (e.g. Skr, 2001/02:172, 6; Skr, 2000/01:38, 5; Skr, 1996/97:50, 3; Skr, 1997/98:13, 6). Being an example also brings with it a need for reform which the Swedish government clearly picks up on, in particular when acknowledging that also the state has important contributions to make in the work towards ecological sustainability. One aspect of this is of course the ascription of responsibility, which not only is placed on citizens, either individually or as a collective, but also on state authorities, governmental agencies and local governments "which all have important roles to fill" (Skr, 2001/02:172, 86). "In order to create an ecologically sustainable society", the Swedish government therefore establishes, "all individuals and public bodies must share responsibility for the environment" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 27). This however, puts focus on yet another relevant question regarding the state as passive or active, namely whether the environmental issues are to be regarded as an *overarching* goal for the development of *all* relevant policy areas? One interpretation of the government taking on environmental issues as the superior goal for all sectors in society is that it will emanate in an infringement of the autonomy of citizens, and a greater role for the state as actively steering towards one, preferred end-state. For instance, Lundqvist (2004c:116) writes that "if objectives of sustainability are put above other concerns in the hierarchy of objectives of political governance, then liberal democratic concerns for individual autonomy and equality of opportunity may be jeopardised"[58]. With this in mind, it should also be pointed out

[58] Now, this interpretation does, naturally, depend also on the *extent* to which environmental issues are pursued, and in what manner this is done. Merely having a policy for environmental protection should certainly not present a dilemma for the liberal state since, as pointed out by many scholars, a healthy environment of a certain

that the long-standing strategy for sustainability in Sweden do include the aspiration to make environmental issues a core part of the policy-making processes in all areas of government, for instance:

> Environmental concerns and resource management must be integrated into decision-making in all sectors of society (Skr, 2000/01:38, 5).

> The starting-points for the strategy-work have been that the national strategy [for sustainable development] shall: […] touch upon all relevant policy-areas and thereby emanate from current Swedish politics, […] elucidate the connections between different policy areas, e.g. search for synergy-effects, raise the level of awareness in the society at large (Skr, 2001/02:172, 12 & 106).

In political practice, these aspirations pointing towards the environmental issues' incorporation in "all politics, in daily life, in governmental- and community work (SOU 2000:52, 25) stem from the international processes of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI)[59] which was initiated with the Bruntland Report's understanding that environmental issues cannot be managed as a separate policy-area, but must be incorporated as a key principle in all aspects of political and societal decision-making.

> The integrated and interdependent nature of the new challenges and issues today contrasts sharply with the nature of the institutions that exists today. These institutions tend to be independent, fragmented, and working to relatively narrow mandates with closed decision processes. Those responsible for managing natural resources and protecting the environment are institutionally separated from those responsible for managing the economy. The real world of interlocked economies and ecological systems will not change; the policies and institutions must (Bruntland, 1987:310).

Establishing its place on the international political arena, the importance of EPI was picked up by the UNCED during the 1992 Rio-conference which included as one central part in the Agenda 21 the integration of environment and development in sectoral (i.e. non-environmental policy-areas) decision-making (Persson, 2004:3). Within the European Union EPI has been a core ambition in the policy-making processes since introduced in the Third Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in 1983, and then continuously elaborated throughout the European institutions; the Single European Act of 1987, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and within the following Fourth, Fifth and Sixth EAP's (Persson, 2004:5; Lafferty, 2004). The work with

level is necessary to uphold any form of government or, for that matter, equal civic rights and opportunities (cf. Dobson, 1996; Eckersly 1996). Lundqvist (2004a) also attempts to make this distinction by separating the organisational *effectiveness* of incorporating ecological concerns as a factor in all policy-decisions, from the *strength* which these concerns are given (cf. Persson, 2004).

[59] Environmental Policy Integration (or sector integration) have throughout the literature been given a variety of slightly differing connotations (for examples, see Hertin and Berkhout, 2001 & 2003; Lafferty, 2002; Lenschow 2002; Liberatore, 1997). The core meaning of the concept is, nevertheless, the same; *to coordinate environmental and key sector policy objectives by integrating the environment as a value of consideration in habitual activities of all policy-areas* (cf. Söderberg, 2005). For an enlightening overview of EPI, both historically and as a research phenomena see Persson (2004).

integrating environmental concerns in EU sectoral policy has further continued within the framework of the Cardiff Process, in place since 1998 as an effort to advance the work towards sustainable development and sector integration in the EU, and the Lisbon Strategy, which since 2001 is complemented also with a strategy for sustainable development (Skr, 2001/02:172, 9-10).

EPI in Sweden has followed, and in some respects even preceded international developments, and has thereby had a long standing place on the national environmental policy-agenda (cf. Lundqvist, 2004c; Persson, 2004). For instance, the Government Communication 1996/97:50 focuses on the sector responsibility for the environment and comes to the conclusion that the goal of ecological sustainability shall be included as a goal in several sector policies; for example economy, communications, agriculture, fisheries, consumer issues, defence- and foreign policy. All activities in these sectors shall emanate, as the Swedish government writes, "from what nature and the environment can carry" (cf. Skr, 1996/97:50, 34). Following on from this, Persson (2004:7) lists several efforts on the national level of policy-making related to EPI in Sweden, all of which denote the environment as an overarching goal of the policy processes and sets out a clear role for the state as an instigator in these matters. For instance, the Environmental Code of 1998 (SFS, 1998:808); Green Public Procurement, where "all public contracts will be subject to environmental requirements" (cf. Skr, 2000/01:38, 15); the sixteen National Environmental Quality Objectives (Prop, 1997/98:145; Prop, 2000/01:130; Prop, 2004/05:150), which aspire to be "guiding for the development of society as a whole and to be integrated in goal for other [than environmental] policy-areas (SEPA, 1999:17-18); as well as the Annual Sustainable Reports presented to Parliament in the form of Government Communications (i.e. the main source of material for analysis within this thesis). The most explicit connection to the EU's EPI-processes is, however, made through the formalisation of the sector responsibility for Swedish governmental authorities, which indicates that "enterprises and authorities must integrate environmental concerns in their activities" (Skr, 2000/01:38, 6-7; see also Prop, 1997/98:145; Skr, 1999/2000:13, 13). It is within this framework that the Swedish government finds its role to be, for example, to assist a change in the market by directing public procurement solemnly towards environmentally friendly products (cf. Skr, 1999/2000:13, 13-14; Skr, 2001/02:172, 71). Now, as mentioned above, this of course suggests that the environmental issues occupy a very central place in national Swedish policy-making. Most importantly, connecting this to what above has been said about the importance and place of the environment, both in policy-making as a national strategy and in all aspects of individuals' lives (cf. Prop, 2000/01:130), the Swedish adoption of EPI as core principle can also be interpreted as granting "specific weight or preference" (Lundqvist, 2004c:122) to ecological concerns in policy making. Thereby, environmental issues are understood also as expressing a *normative* goal in policy,

discerned from value-neutral organisational or procedural goals where no specific outcome is prescribed (cf. Persson, 2004). This makes a point relevant to include when summarising the interpretation of the state's role as being neutral or not.

Second, it must be remembered that Swedish environmental policy on the national level in most parts is quite generally held, and do therefore not comprise any detailed suggestion as to how the widespread environmental participation should be accomplished other than through the use of "a wide arsenal of tools and policy instruments, everything from legislation and taxes to 'soft' tools such as information and voluntary commitments" (Skr, 2001/02:172). Instead, due both to the strong principle of local self-government in Sweden in general, as well as the apparent local focus of the Agenda 21, much of the responsibilities for promoting the transformation to the sustainable society is transferred down from the national level to the Swedish municipalities, thus leaving local government the freedom to decide on adequate measures (UNCED, 1992:461; SOU, 1997:105; Skr, 1996/97:50, 74-75; Skr, 2003/04:129, 26-28). Regarding, for instance, waste-management, each municipality is through the Environmental Code (e.g. SFS, 1998:808, chapter 15) legally responsible for collecting and facilitating the sorting and disposal of household waste not covered by the producer responsibility. The national government, thus, leaves much freedom for each municipality to by themselves decide how to best organise this work, but is both setting the frames, deciding on guidelines and providing financial incentives for the municipalities for falling in line with the national policy-aspirations. This, naturally, works both to enhance the degree of autonomy granted by the state, in that the political practice of environmental issues is decided on locally, and to diminish self-direction in that the desired end result (determined nationally) is both clearly pointed out as well as supported by financial incentives (cf. Skr, 2001/02:68). This also goes for the inclusion of environmental perspectives in higher education, where the national government has no legal mandate to, in detail, control the content and structure of the courses given. The autonomy of the Swedish municipalities is regulated both through the Swedish constitution and other laws, and is therefore not easily overridden (Halvarson, 1995). A similar, but not as strong, autonomy is ensured the Swedish universities and colleges through the Higher Education Act of 1992 which obviously makes a detailed governmental control more or less inadequate in both of these two cases. These might constitute reasons for the policies being unambiguous in their ambition to ensure lower levels the autonomy to independently decide on the specifics of citizen participation.

> Every educational centre is responsible for deciding on the direction and contents of the given educations. The integration of environmental concern and sound resource management should, therefore, not firsthand occur by the use of laws and regulations, but rather be lead and driven forward by the

> students, teachers, researchers and employees of the colleges (Skr, 1997/98:13, 23).
>
> Each municipal government must find the work methods and solutions best suited for the own municipality (Skr, 1994/95:120, 9).

What stands clear, however, is the governmental aspiration to direct both municipalities and universities towards, in some way, approaching the specific issue of creating environmentally sensitive citizens and promoting those environmental duties ordained by the government throughout their respective area of responsibility. The freedom for lower authorities lies merely in the details, whereas the policy frames are determined on a national level in terms of directions and goals. For example, in the most recent Official Report on environmental education in Swedish schools, *To Learn for Sustainable Development* (SOU, 2004:104, 123), it is suggested that "the pedagogical work shall be characterized by an ecological approach". Furthermore;

> The pre-school learning goals for the environmental field is that the pre-school shall contribute to children's feeling of responsibility towards nature and that they are given experiences and basic knowledge about themselves and others, about themselves in the chain of generations, about man in the relation to other species and to nature, and of the forces of nature and how we can utilize them (Skr, 1997/98:13, 23).
>
> Higher education shall not only offer a qualified training, conduct research and development work, but also promote an ecologically sustainable development (Skr, 1997/98:13, 23).
>
> It is imperative that the education curricula from pre-school up to higher education as well as within the civic education are permeated by the perspective of sustainable development. […] this places demands not only on the extent and content of the education, but also on the way it is being carried through. […] it does, for example, denote that education on economic growth must be put in the context of what is socially and environmentally acceptable (Skr, 2003/04:129, 90).

Thus, despite the lack of any specifications for what the sustainable lifestyle might encompass, the interpretation of the role of government as actively prescribing one direction of its citizens' lifestyles and a desire to educate the citizenry on this idea remains without contradiction. Although it might be considered a rather typical ambivalence of political rhetoric, the absence of an explicit definition of what should be counted as an 'ecological lifestyle' is in part explained by the constitutional freedom granted local government, and in part compensated by the governmental embracing of ecological concerns as a normative goal of all public decision-making and activities.

4.5.3 Conclusions – a case of governing from above

As previously stated, the role of the state in making as well as promoting environmental policy is, at least initially, somewhat unclear. An interpretation along the lines of the

passive, neutral state is supported by the fact that much attention is given to the state's responsibility in creating possibilities for citizens to make informed choices, that is, traditional liberal concerns. Adding to this, the lack of any one specified lifestyle or specific environmental actions throughout the documents suggests that the state might keep the door open for independent interpretations of the good also in environmental terms, in line with an environmentally sensitive liberalism. Thereby, each citizen should be granted the opportunity to independently choose among numerous sustainable lifestyles. Contradicting this interpretation is the fact that use of the phrases 'informed' or 'responsible choices' seem to denote only the choice to follow the governmental recommendation laid down in policy. Any other choice is, by policy makers, interpreted as being made by less- or even uninformed citizens. In practice therefore, the policy signals the existence of one set of environmental values that all citizens should share in order to reach the policy goal, and the possible choices for individuals are thereby not as abundant. Adding to this line of interpretation, a view on active engagement of the individuals in the actual process of deciding upon the values guiding environmental policy stands back in favour of the view of the citizen as controlled through the use informational instruments. Voluntarily deliberation is, thus, substituted for state control and influence, and freedom of action and thought for obedience and conformity. In sum, the resemblance to the two ideal-types prescribing an active, enlightening state are more explicit, illustrated in the resemblance-scores assigned to policy in Figure 4.4 below.

Figure 4.4: Ideal-type resemblance-score – the role of the state



In discerning between civic-republican and ecological citizenship, consider also that citizens are treated as, using the words of Feichtinger and Pregering (2005:235) "instructible" and subjects to a one-way communication on what duties and virtues are expected from them. The ecological state has certainly duties to both lead the way, by taking measures for sustainability, and to enlighten its citizens on the importance of doing justice, but the major part of this is perceived to take place within the framework

of a two-way dialogue between citizens, and not as a top-down distribution of information by the state. In sum, the view on citizens' ability to identify and act on their objective interests, and the state's role in looking after this, corresponds slightly more to the civic-republican ideal-type.

So far, the document analysis emanates in an interpretation of the role for the state not as a passive facilitator, but as active enlightening the citizenry on *the* good life, thereby supporting the previously made interpretation of the documents as drawing more heavily on the value-types comprising the civic-republican ideal-type. It is, however, also possible that these unspecified lifestyles might depend on the generality of the policy documents presently studied. Furthermore, this text analysis will also be accompanied by an analysis of policy documents on the municipal level, which is expected to make the interpretations more precise. This is especially relevant since the local level is where national, and as in this case very general, policy objectives are transformed into practical policy tools which come into direct contact with the citizens in their daily life.

4.6 Conclusion – core features of the Swedish environmental norm

This chapter set out to analyse and describe the core features of the first sub-case in the thesis – Swedish national policy for sustainability. Across the four analytical sections Swedish policy-rhetoric has been scrutinised and the framing of core aspects in the state – individual relationship has, accordingly, been discussed in the light of three ideal-types of democratic citizenship; liberal, civic-republican and ecological. As with most political rhetoric, the initial expectance was to find many different, and perhaps even conflicting, statements regarding the view on the citizen, on rights and duties, on participation, and on the role of the state. This has unquestionably been confirmed, but some conclusions can nevertheless be presented from the study of this first, and major, sub-case.

Bearing in mind that the use of ideal-types as analytical tools does not indicate an attempt to find a perfect match between any one concept of citizenship and the normative foundations of Sweden's environmental policy discourse, adding up the ideal-type resemblance scores for national policy might nevertheless serve as a starting-point for the concluding discussion of this chapter. Over all four sections above, the total resemblance scores amounted to, in ascending order, civic-republican citizenship (2,5); ecological citizenship (1,25); and liberal citizenship (0,25). Thereby, it can also be concluded that for the most part, the documents express values or beliefs in line with those inherent in civic-republican citizenship; an all-inclusive participation by active citizens with a contractual duty to do their bit for the good of the community, as well as a state actively enlightening the citizenry on *the* politically sanctioned lifestyle. In line

with this, the citizen is not necessarily actively involved in deliberating on the goals and values promoted by the politics for sustainability, but rather thought of as engaging in already decided on activities, promoting the politically determined 'good' ends. This top-down approach, in particular described within the later dated documents (see sections 4.2 and 4.5), is interpreted as a clear deviation from the image of the deliberating citizen, engaged in making political decisions, as proposed within ecological citizenship. On some occasions, however, the Swedish environmental discourse nevertheless displays core beliefs inherent in other citizenship traditions than the civic-republican. For instance, the use of informational instruments rather than laws and regulations might suggest that the state certainly prescribes civic duties, but refrain from enforcing them, leaving the citizens with at least a theoretical possibility for individual (liberal) self-determination. Furthermore, the expansion of the sphere of citizenship also transgresses the boundaries of the two traditional notions of citizenship as placed exclusively in the public. In this, Swedish policy draws more on the features of an ecological citizenship than on any of the traditional ideal-types. This taken into account, as not the least the resemblance-scores above reveals, connections to core beliefs of liberal or ecological citizenship are either in minority or overshadowed by stronger formulations pertaining to the civic-republican ideal-type.

Before attempting any further conclusions on the normative foundations and the image of the environmental citizen embedded in Swedish environmental policy in general, an analysis of the policy discourse closest to the people, where the national policy rhetoric is translated into more practical politics, will also be conducted. Therefore, the next chapter is devoted to an analysis of the local level environmental discourse in Sweden. No sooner than after this task is completed, the conclusions on the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy will be presented and the overarching purpose of this thesis, that is to construct the foundation an evaluation of legitimacy, will be considered fulfilled.

Chapter Five

The Environmental Policy Discourse in Swedish Local Government

As this thesis emanates from the assumption that values or beliefs embedded in and expressed through the official policy discourse to a large extent determine the citizenry's experience of the legitimacy of the policy, it is relevant for the analysis also to span the output of the policy-making process from the level of political authority closest to 'the people' (or, at least, to the context within which households' day-to-day activities takes place). Given the multi-level governance structure in which environmental policy exists and is decided on, the focus for analysis (that is, the Swedish environmental norm) is also presumed to be located on the local level of government where national policy-goals are to be transformed into political practice. Therefore, analysing the normative foundations of environmental policy in Sweden could not be confined to the national level alone but needs to take into account the image of the state – individual relationship as it is expressed also through local environmental policy. This chapter will therefore approach the issue of environmental policy rhetoric from the perspective of four selected Swedish municipalities[60], in order to further explore, elucidate and analyse how the policy core beliefs, constructing the state – individual relationship, are expressed. Will local government follow the ideational foundations outlined in national policy? Will there be differences between national and local policy rhetoric, and in that case in what aspects? Will perhaps the policy discourse differ from one municipality to another? Again, as the legitimacy for a policy is anticipated to depend on the correspondence between values expressed through the policy discourse and held by the citizenry, possible differences in discourse between levels of government will open the door for environmental policy being

[60] The four municipalities selected for analysis within the SHARP research program are: Göteborg, Huddinge, Piteå and Växjö (see more on this selection in Chapter 2 above).

understood as legitimate on one level or in one municipality, and illegitimate on/in another. It is further believed that this approach facilitates tracing the development of policy aspirations from national (or even international) rhetoric, to their translation into local political practice. From another perspective, the image of the environmental citizen, the participation required and the duties held either towards the environment, the political authority or the community might also be described in different terms between levels of government and are therefore deemed relevant to grant further attention.

5.1 Material used

As mentioned on several occasions above, the focus for interest in this analysis lies first and foremost on official environmental policy, and on the rhetorical image of the environmental citizen, including her rights, duties, motivations and relation to political authority located herein. In the previous chapter outlining national policy aspirations, the material used was therefore confined to official policy documents in which the ideational foundations of policy are believed to be either explicitly or implicitly displayed. In order to facilitate a reliable comparison between these two levels of government, the same criteria have been applied for selecting material relevant to study in the following analysis of the local policy discourse. Therefore, the analysis is, first and foremost, focussed towards each of the four municipalities' official environmental policy-documents[61]. As the major part of the environmental work of Swedish municipalities is initiated within the framework of Local Agenda 21 (LA21), their official environmental policy is also in most cases complemented with an LA21-strategy which is also included in the list of relevant documents for analysis. Wherever applicable, also included is the more overarching policy documents setting the frames and outlining aspirations for activities within the municipality in general, and within the environmental board in particular (e.g. budget documents and/or comprehensive plans for the municipality). Additionally, in an aspiration to capture policy rhetoric directed towards the municipal residents specifically, each municipality's homepage including the informational material (e.g. brochures and pamphlets) here accessible will be included. It should, lastly, also be mentioned that the amount of material available differs considerably between the four municipalities, from comprehensive environmental policies and local Agenda 21-plans to less developed documentation and information. Nevertheless, for each one of the municipalities making up the sub-cases

[61] At a later stage (outside this thesis) in the research of environmental policy legitimacy here initiated, the material collected from Swedish municipalities will be complemented and/or contrasted with the results from a mass-survey distributed to politicians and civil servants in these municipalities during the spring of 2006. The survey includes a range of questions and value-statements (e.g. regarding general value orientations, perception of environmental risk, distribution of responsibility and motivations for engaging in day-to-day environmental work) which the local policy-makers are expected to consider and answer *in their role as decision-makers*. The hope is that these will further add to the interpretation of the ideational foundations on local level policy rhetoric.

of this study, the direction of the environmental work, including the values or principles underpinning it, is deemed possible to understand from the documents available from each municipality respectively. This, thereby, makes an analysis of these aspects possible.

5.2 A starting-point for analysis

As briefly touched upon above, national policy places a strong emphasis on local government for driving the work towards ecological sustainability. The environmental issues should, according to national policy, primarily be solved on the lowest level possible. This of course follows the recommendations outlined in the Agenda 21, in which the local perspective is explicitly stressed and the accompanying "vital role" (UNCED, 1992:23) of local government in the environmental work is highlighted. The Agenda 21 has also had a great impact on the environmental work in the Swedish municipalities, even more so than on the national level (Fudge and Rowe, 2000:63). The Swedish municipalities were early on bestowed the responsibility to develop their own local Agenda 21 as a guide for the continued environmental work (Khakee, 2002), and as early as 1995, applications for Agenda 21-grants made by municipal actors widely exceeded the number of municipalities in Sweden (Brundin and Eckerberg, 1999; Forsberg, 2002). In 1998 a majority of the Swedish municipalities stated that they, accordingly, had started an Agenda 21-process, a number which had further increased in 2002 (cf. Edström and Eckerberg, 2002). The financial support from central authorities for initiating and continuing local environmental work was then later followed by the national process with the Local Investment Programmes (LIP's) which predominately were used to fund structural and technological developments in the involved municipalities (e.g. Forsberg, 2002). In addition to the explicit bottom-up perspective of the Agenda 21 (cf. SOU, 1997:105) there are also further extensive possibilities for the Swedish municipalities to themselves shape the direction and contents of the environmental work. This in particular given the strong local self-government in Sweden, as well as the apparent decentralisation of environmental decision-making allowing for a high level of autonomy in the environmental policy-making process (cf. Eckerberg and Mineur, 2003; Lundqvist, 2004b).

Nevertheless as the Agenda 21 has been a major source of inspiration for the development of both national and, evidently, local environmental policy, the initial expectance is that the normative foundations will not differ significantly between these two levels. To a certain extent, this anticipation is confirmed as the Swedish central government's "management by objectives" (e.g. Lundqvist, 2004a) seems to have penetrated also the local level policy-making process. All of the four municipalities included in the analysis have adapted the overarching aims of the environmental policies elaborated nationally. Thus, each municipality introduces both the definition of

sustainable development as defined by the Bruntland Commission along with the Swedish generation-goal as underpinning the environmental work, as well as the 16 NEQO's as providing guidance also for the process of constructing environmental policies within the municipality. For instance, the environmental board in the municipality of Göteborg is very clear in describing its own position in the hierarchical environmental objectives-structure, as the environmental goals of Göteborg consist of a local adaptation of the 16 NEQO's and the generation goal, as well as the regional environmental objectives for the county of Västra Götaland decided on by the County Administrative Board (G2, 2005:3-5). However, regardless of these apparent similarities, this following chapter will be devoted to conducting a closer analysis of official local policy and providing some elucidating examples of how the state – individual relationship is framed on this level of government. The analytical approach will closely follow the previous analysis of national environmental policy in order to facilitate a reliable comparison between the two levels of government. Thereby the analysis concentrates on the policy core beliefs embedded in local policy in relation to the values and principles outlined in three ideal-types of democratic citizenship; liberal, civic-republican and ecological. Lastly, it might be relevant to remind the reader that the rationale for conducting this text-analysis is first and foremost to elucidate the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy and thus to explore the foundations for environmental policy legitimacy.

5.3 Responsibilities and participation in local-level environmental work

As a first focus for analysis of the previous chapter, the amount of citizen participation proposed through policy, the nature of this participation (as being more or less active) as well as the assigned responsibilities underpinning the participatory arguments was presented. These parts of a policy's normative foundation capture both a central part of the policy-core beliefs, as well as constitute a divide between different theories of citizenship; the ideal-types in this regard range from prescribing symmetrical responsibilities for all (civic-republican citizenship) to asymmetrical responsibilities (ecological and liberal citizenship), as well as between a focus on an active engagement by the citizens (ecological and civic-republican citizenship) to more of a passive role of the citizen (liberal citizenship) respectively. To recapitulate, the analysis on the national level showed policy rhetoric and the normative statements embedded herein to, to a greater extent, resemble the beliefs-systems underpinning the civic-republican ideal-type, by prescribing a symmetrical responsibility for all as well as an active contribution by the citizenry. Due to the latter, national environmental policy was also interpreted as, although to a lesser extent, resemble the reasoning found within ideal-typical ecological citizenship. Now, these aspects will be examined in local level policy and their respective resemblance both to national policy rhetoric and to the three citizenship ideal-types analysed.

5.3.1 Participation – for all?

Unsurprisingly, in particular as the Agenda 21 with its strong individual-level focus has been deemed an important source of inspiration for the municipal environmental work, local environmental policy rhetoric follows closely the prescription of responsibilities found also on the national level; as being symmetrical and all-encompassing. A large share of the responsibility for the environmental situation is, thereby, indirectly placed on the households as a collective. For example, Växjö, expressing the (inter-) nationally accepted views on the causes for environmental degradation, states that "[a]bout half of the total amount of discharges in Sweden today emanates from the households" (V4, 1999:7). The responsibility for amending this unsustainable situation is in part placed on the municipal authorities themselves as societal planners and providers of possibilities for people to amend this unsustainable situation (see below for examples). However, the citizen-perspective is nevertheless a core part of the policy rhetoric as it is also clearly stated, *first* that the solution to this problem will not come about without an all-inclusive participation in the environmental work, and *second* that this necessary participation is at times more far-reaching than the avoidance of a few polluting activities. "It is necessary", the municipality of Växjö writes, "that we all do our bit and change our way of life" (V4, 1999:7).

The same rhetoric is picked up by the other three municipalities, thereby framing environmental responsibilities as something we all hold in our role as citizens. Views on participation by the public in the environmental work, in all areas, follow national goals as it for example is stated that "a better material-management requires everyone's participation, which is why information and moulding of public opinion is important" (P3, 2001:107). Thus, the municipality takes on the role of promoting the new, ecological activities among its citizens in much the same fashion as is described in national policy when discussing the distribution of roles among actors on various levels. Furthermore, the connection to national policy is evident as the municipality of Piteå on its website supplies nationally developed documents as information to its citizens on the Swedish environmental code and its significance for day-to-day life. Thereby, the municipality of Piteå clearly adapts the national rhetoric on the need for civic environmental responsibilities and all-encompassing participation, as is stated in the document at hand (cf. P5, 2000:1). Framing participation as an all-inclusive task, the Göteborg-policy (G1, 1999:1) also stresses the importance for working "together […] to improve the environment". Furthermore, as §4 in the official Göteborg environmental policy-document clearly states that "all shall be involved" and further that "all share the responsibility for how the environmental issues are handled" (G1, 1999:2), this adds to the strong similarities with national policy's framing of the participatory issues where the single citizen is given an important role in the environmental work and where all citizens of Sweden are expected to work together in the endeavour of reaching the sustainable society.

> The perhaps greatest challenge in the environmental work is to, in different ways, create a broad environmental engagement which can lead to more sustainable patterns of consumption and production (G2, 2005:6).

Also within the information directed towards the citizens of Göteborg directly, several relevant rhetorical formulations can be located, first and foremost with regards to participatory and motivational issues. For instance, under the headline "The sea is your responsibility" the old fishing and seafarer city of Göteborg establishes that "[i]t is of outmost importance that we all take responsibility for what we do and make sure that the sea feels as good as possible" (G-Internet1). In the 2006 budget-document for the Agenda 21-work within the city of Göteborg, the important role of the single citizen is even more pronounced as the prerequisite for accomplishing the sustainable society is described as a society where "all citizens feel a part and are encouraged to take responsibility" (G2, 2005:bil2, 1).

In sum therefore, local environmental policy also draws on the Agenda 21 ambition to include all citizens in the environmental work. In the same manner as was previously identified within national environmental policy, the prescription of an all-inclusive participation, underpinned by symmetrical responsibilities for all citizens in the municipality, is therefore evident also in environmental policy on the local level in Sweden. This line of reasoning follows most closely the principle within ideal-typical civic-republican citizenship, as does the framing of participation by citizens-as-a-collective on the national level. Nevertheless, some relevant divergences from the national policy-rhetoric can also be noted within the local level, in particular with regards to the foundations for civic responsibility. As seen above, several statements clearly define participation as required by the collective of citizens and draw in this on the civic-republican ascription of all-encompassing civic duties to promote the good of the (territorially defined) community. In all local policies, references are found to the motivations dominating on the national level and connecting a personal environmental responsibility either to the good of the community directly, or to benefits for personal freedom through the community (for this, see also Lundmark, 2003). For instance, the citizens' participation is required in order to ensure "a better environment for us all" (G1, 1999:1); for making "the municipality attractive as a town of residence and as a place of localisation for new businesses" (V8, 2005:11); for attracting tourists (H1, 2005:17); or to strengthen local industry's competitiveness in the same manner as has previously been noted on the national level (e.g. V4, 1999:8). Even the, in national policy made, connection between taking part in the environmental work and preserving the traditional Swedish welfare-state is expressed as the municipality of Växjö states that "[the environmental work] is really about welfare and what you and I are ready to do" (V6, 2006:6). However, to a greater extent than was noted in the analysis on national policy documents, local policy also draws on the need for social justice, as put forward within the ecological citizenship ideal-type, as a significant

reason to why participation is required by the citizenry. This, in turn, questions the interpretation of public participation as being solely based on symmetrical responsibilities for all citizens and makes the resemblance to the asymmetrical responsibilities of the ecological citizen somewhat greater.

As an example of the justice-arguments visible in local policy rhetoric, the environmental policies in both municipalities of Huddinge and Växjö draw on the reasoning within ecological citizenship as the basis for ascribing responsibilities to the citizenry. The idea that environmental problems in other parts of the world might well emanate from Sweden and, consequently, that our responsibility is to ensure that "the Earth's resources should be fairly and effectively distributed both within each country respectively and between all the countries in the world" (H1, 2005:3) is put forward as motivations throughout the policy rhetoric:

> Much of what we buy in Sweden have been produced in other parts of the world, we thereby occupy space in other countries. Maybe has a forest been cut down, maybe has a river been poisoned in order for us to be able to purchase something here. What we have purchased is transported here by help of a plane or a boat, which have polluted the air. Fair environmental space is founded on the idea that all in the world shall have the right to consume the same amount of natural resources within the frames of what can be considered ecologically sustainable (H1, 2005:59).

> All people have a right to a good life and to have their needs met – today as well as tomorrow. This is not the situation today. Therefore, we need to bring about a more fair and even distribution of the earth's resources among us humans (V4, 1999:12).

This obviously places a great deal of responsibility on the single consumer, to reduce her occupation of ecological space and, thus, contribute to a sustainable society. A further resemblance to ecological citizenship can be discerned as some aspects of municipal policy also draw slightly on the non-territoriality of environmental problems. For instance, consider the municipality of Växjö's further acknowledgement that:

> Växjö's air pollutions are transported here from sources in Europe as well as created locally by traffic and heating. Some of the air pollutions we emit in the municipality of Växjö are further transported and effects regions to the north and north-east of the municipality in the form of acid rain, eutrophication and raised levels of ground-level ozone. The air pollution problematic must thereby be amended both nationally and internationally, locally and regionally (V-Internet21).

This is followed by further articulations of the global aspect of the environmental issues, for instance that "Växjö is not able to solve the world's environmental problems, but by taking small and big steps, we can all participate and share the responsibility. What we do locally also has a global impact" (V6, 2006:1). Apparently, the municipality of Växjö here hints towards an environmental civic responsibility that transcends territorial

borders in line with what is prescribed in the reasoning within ecological citizenship. Therefore, it can be concluded that albeit an all-encompassing civic (-republican) responsibility is articulated also in local environmental policy, some of the arguments put forth in this regard draws rather on what must be interpreted as the asymmetrical, personal responsibilities of ecological citizenship. As a consequence, the ideal-type resemblance for participation on the local level is, thus far, viewed as shared between the civic-republican and ecological citizenship types.

5.3.2 The nature of participation

The next question that makes its appearance in the analysis of local-level policy is how the nature of participation is described. Are the citizens urged to actively engage in the environmental work, for example by taking part in local councils or decision-making processes, by engaging in environmental organisations or in other ways actively working to improve the environment? Or, is participation in this context denoting more of a passive, rights-claiming role for the citizens?

Again, local policies follow the framing of the nature of participation on the national level in drawing both on the need for a passive avoidance of certain environmentally degrading activities and an active participation by the citizens in the environmental work. Attention is thus granted first the need for citizens to participate passively by avoiding certain, environmentally degrading activities or choices. The municipality of Huddinge, for instance, states that "[un]necessary purchases should be avoided" and that "[q]uality should be prioritised in order to avoid bad, unnecessary purchases"[62] (H1, 2005:60). Similar suggestions on measures to take in order to improve the environment are found also with the other municipalities and on other policy-areas, for example to avoid environmentally degrading products in the day-to-day activities (cf. G-Internet3 and G-Internet2). Nevertheless, when focusing on the individual's role in the work towards a sustainable society, it is evident that this will not be realised without an active participation. Thus, the notion of citizenship presented in each of the four municipalities clearly moves beyond participation as mere avoidance and towards the notion of an active citizenship in which each and everyone takes responsibility and actively contributes to an improved environmental situation, in the same manner as is suggested nationally and through the bottom-up perspective of Agenda 21 (cf. SOU, 1997:105). For instance, it is explicitly stated that a sustainable society requires an "active citizenship" (G2, 2005:bil2, 2; see also G2, 2005:6) within the framework of which we all are expected to "do our bit" (V4, 1999:7) for the environment.

[62] It should be pointed out that what counts as a 'bad' or 'unnecessary' purchase are not further specified. However, between the lines it can be understood that the municipality of Huddinge believes there to be a form of consumption that can be objectively defined as less good, thus indicating another conclusion in the analysis of local level policy. Namely that, at least the municipality of Huddinge, moves away from the liberal principle of state neutrality for instead promoting a specific version of what is to be regarded the good life (cf. section 5.4.4).

The need for an active participation can also be interpreted from an analysis of the environmental goals set up by the municipalities since these often build on participation in explicit activities and thus would be impossible for the political authorities to accomplish if the citizens themselves are not ready to actively contribute. As an example, the municipality of Huddinge's goals for waste management encompass both a decrease in the total amount of waste produced by each person, as well as an increased sorting of the remaining parts. Given in particular the latter goal, it is reasonable to assume that also the active involvement of individuals in daily activities within their home is a prerequisite, and that a request for an active participation therefore is directed to each and every one. This is also hinted as Huddinge states that [c]itizens […] in the municipality of Huddinge shall become better at waste management" (H1, 2005:56), as well as "[t]he citizen is important in the context of waste. It is necessary that all assist by sorting their waste in order for refuse collection and recycling to work properly" (H1, 2005:57; see also P8, 2006). Similar goals, implicitly indicating the active contribution by citizens, encompass overcoming car-trouble in Göteborg and states that "[t]he environment shall be improved in Göteborg by the way of travelling with public transport and bicycle shall increase in relation to car-traffic" (G2, 2005:17). Thus, without the majority of citizens being willing to transform their personal transport behaviour and actively choose a different mode of travelling, this goal will not be reached.

The area in which the active contributions are most explicitly pronounced, on the national as well as on the local level, concerns private consumption. Here, citizens are both urged and expected to assist in developing more environmentally sound products and patters of production by themselves taking on a more sustainable consumer-behaviour and also actively working for the development of a better producer practice. The municipalities thereby outline an important task for the citizens to demand, request and in other ways actively contribute to a market-driven change, by bestowing the active citizen with a duty to "think before shopping" (G-Internet1, see also P4, 2005:9). The active consumer is thereby given a lead role in the effort of influencing businesses to adapt their production in a more environmentally friendly way. This indicates in part a belief in the market's ability to by itself resolve the problem with unsustainable patterns of production by phasing out non-environmentally friendly products, but at the same time places a heavy responsibility on the individuals to, in their role as consumers, be active and take on a personal environmental responsibility. As put by the municipality of Huddinge "[a]s consumers we can steer business and industry by making demands and through environmentally conscious shopping" (H1, 2005:49). Citizens in their role as consumers should therefore make "an active choice" (H1, 2005:59) in their contact with producers and retailers, and thereby "make an effort already in the store" with the motivation that "if you think before shopping, you make an environmental contribution which takes hardly any effort at all" (G-Internet1;

see also P4, 2005:9). In that way, citizens are urged to actively participate in the environmental work also when taking a trip to the supermarket.

> The foundation for an environmentally adapted economic life is **environmentally aware customers and businessmen**. As consumers, either as private persons or as procuring businesses or municipalities, we have great influence over what is being produced, and how. […] The public sector, businesses and single individuals can urge on the environmental development within the economic life by placing clear environmental demands on goods and services (V4, 1999:8, bold in original).

> Always make an environmentally- and fair trade-conscious choice. If you cannot make such a choice, point this out to those working in the store so that they order more eco-labelled products" (H1, 2005:61).

> Here is also environmental consciousness and taking on responsibility within businesses and with the individual very important. […] The environmentally consciousness consumer can here strongly contribute to a faster liquidation [of ozone-layer depleting facilities and products] (P4, 2005:8).

This same image of the environmentally aware consumer, driving the market towards developing more (from an environmentalist perspective) desirable modes of production, has previously been located throughout Swedish political party-programmes by Lundmark (1998:106-107). Interestingly, her conclusions on this framing of consumer participation also informs a later component in the analysis of local environmental policy as she argues that this rhetoric also represents a clear example of the "'obligation component' of environmental citizenship" expressed by most major Swedish political parties. In any circumstance, the examples above indicate that also the active contributions are needed. What, however, also should be noted here is that the key to sustainability is not described as an overall *reduction* in private consumption, but rather to change its impact on the environment by consuming differently and by actively encouraging the producers/retailers to facilitate this necessary change in patterns of consumption. The conflict between growth and ecology (cf. Algotsson, 1996; Lundmark, 1998) is thus strikingly disregarded in local level policy-making, as the message from the municipal authorities clearly indicates an unwillingness to prioritise the latter over the former and instead looks to solving the environmental problems through consumption.

Finally, also in other areas besides consumption, the citizen is urged to take on an active engagement for the environment, drawing even more clearly on the civic-republican notion of engaging actively in the life of the community and do one's bit for the common good (in this case the environment). Växjö, for instance, urges its residents to be active in the community by "[p]articipate in consultations, meetings and become engaged in your local environment", "take an environmental course" or simply "become engaged in the environmental work" and "take responsibility for your own

environmental influence" (V-Internet5). Thereby, the participation prescribed on the municipal level follows to a great deal the national rhetoric, as the responsibilities are bestowed symmetrically among the collective of citizens and the resulting need for participation are described as being active rather than passive. It is thus evident that the citizens shall actively engage in the environmental work and thereby do their bit to promote the good society, without which the ecologically sustainable society will remain a distant vision. The policies therefore, also in this regard, stronger resemble the civic-republican and ecological citizenship ideal-types, as these prescribe an active participation as being a civic requirement.

5.3.3 The public – private divide in local policy

In the context of participation, the area in which the proposed activities are presumed to be taking place provides a further indication for how the concept of citizenship is thought of by the political authorities. As the traditional division between activities in the public or political sphere (considered as being of citizenly character) and activities in the private realm are challenged within ecological citizenship, this provides a further relevant focus for the analysis of how civic responsibilities and participation is framed in policy. According to the analysis conducted on the national level, the definition of civic participation was shown to, albeit including activities in the public, also expand beyond this sphere to encompass an engagement in what has traditionally been denoted as the private realm. Civic duties were thus described as including both broad and deep-ranging changes in lifestyle and consciousness, transformation of patterns of consumption, waste-management and private transports as well as the public engagement in politics proper. Thus, the sphere of citizenship was here interpreted as slightly more resembling the ecological citizenship ideal-type. When scrutinising the public – private divide as expressed in policy, a demarcation is thereby made between activities drawing on engagement in the political life of the community, for instance as membership in environmental organisations or in the political decision-making process as such, and participation that clearly encompass practices within the household or includes changes within the mind of the single individual.

Given that the Agenda 21 encompasses sustainability from ecological, social and economical aspects, the importance of citizens' political or democratic engagement is clearly picked up on within all the four municipalities, both as a goal in itself and as a prerequisite for public acceptance of environmentally protective measures taken by the authorities. For instance, Huddinge follows the reasoning within the nationally signed Aarhus-convention, as well as within LA21, when acknowledging the necessity of creating possibilities for citizens' active participation in the decision-making processes, motivated with both the positive effects of local knowledge and the legitimacy-aspect where a broad public deliberation is expected to increase the acceptance of political

decisions (H1, 2005:7). On the same note, traditional participation in 'politics proper' is also framed as a core part in Växjö's attempt to "bridge the gap between knowledge and action" (V4, 1999:9). Dialogue, cooperation, influence and deliberative processes included in the decision-making are all described following the recommendations lined out in the international environmental work, as necessary components for resolving the effectiveness – legitimacy dilemma, and thus as a "prerequisite for […] increased engagement for the Agenda 21-vision" (V4, 1999:9). These examples all express the national (and international) aspiration to engage citizens in the public life of the community, and, thus far, a traditional view of what civic participation encompass. However, in particular when considering the role of the political authority within the state – individual relationship, it is nevertheless relevant to question the intentions behind these aspirations. Is the predominant view on public-sphere participation as it being a civic duty (or, for that matter, a civic right) which in itself provides some good for the community? Or is it merely a policy-instrument in disguise, a step on the way towards the goal of engaging citizens also in the private sphere? Judging from the statements above, the latter seems a possible interpretation as the main purpose of public deliberation is described both as to increase the engagement and the active participation in other, more practical, activities, as well as to increase the environmental awareness among the citizenry.

Further looking into the participation suggested by the municipalities strengthens the interpretation that a fusion of the public and private spheres is at hand. All municipalities express the need to first transform its citizens' attitudes in a more environmentally friendly direction and thus establish, for instance, "an increased environmental consciousness" (P3, 2001:107) or "a comprehensive view on living-environment and lifestyle" (G2, 2005:bil2:2). This, secondly, is believed to increase the possibilities for involving the citizens in a daily work towards ecological sustainability where all contributions, however small, are important for a positive outcome. The character of participation, that is, what the desired environmental work is believed to encompass for the citizens, thereby follows in suit with national policy rhetoric. The main focus is, also on the local-level, on an awareness-driven and broad behavioural-change as Göteborg states that "[a] foundational prerequisite in order to change one's behaviour is that one becomes aware of the consequences of one's actions and the possibilities for change" (G1, 1999:2), as well as that "[w]e affect the environment in many ways through our lifestyle. Many choices in the day-to-day life can be made better" (G-Internet3). To clearly point out what is perceived as the right direction for the environmental work is an evident strategy, judging by, for example, Växjö's LA21-strategy which in all major environmental policy areas provides instructions (described as a "day-to-day agenda") on what "we all can do – in our home, on our spare time or in our work" (V2, 1999:1). The major part of these instructions draws, being both normative and household-based, on activities traditionally considered being located in

the private realm and are in general written in a strong instructive (rather than suggestive) manner. Moreover, the need for "increased citizen participation" (V4, 1999:9) as expressed in the same municipality's environmental policy-document follows this rhetoric perfectly and acknowledges that albeit "[t]he easy environmental victories [i.e. sorting and recycling household waste, purchasing certain eco-labelled products] are now brought home, those who do not cost that much and do not involve as considerable changes in our lifestyles" (V4, 1999:9), the major challenges still lies ahead in transforming the whole unsustainable lifestyle-patterns of contemporary society. The sector integration of environmental considerations in all political decision-making processes is thereby expressed as valid also on the individual level, where the responsible citizen takes into account the environmental effects of all her daily practices, public as well as private, and acts on them. By this account, local level policies follow the national policy rhetoric as it leaves the traditional understandings of the state – individual relationship, with its sharp distinction between the public and the private, behind in favour of defining state mandated civic obligations as also incorporating activities in the home or in the mind of the citizenry.

5.3.4 Conclusions – ecological responsibilities and active, private participation

To conclude the analysis of how issues regarding responsibilities and participation are framed on the local level, a few points need to be stressed. First of all, it is evident that the view on responsibilities and participation expressed within the four municipalities' environmental policies at first sight entirely follows the beliefs and motivations expressed throughout national environmental policy. All citizens are thus bestowed a similar symmetrical responsibility for achieving the positive and ecologically sustainable development within society. To live up to this responsibility, an active contribution is needed; in the public sphere through engaging in the community's decision-making processes or in other way publicly contributing to an improved environment, but also in the private realm, through adapting new attitudes and values as well as a more profound restructuring of the current unsustainable lifestyle. When determining the resemblance to the three citizenship ideal-types, a picture strikingly similar to the one painted for national policy rhetoric appears. Thus, also local level policy can be interpreted as drawing mainly on the civic-republican notion of civic participation and responsibilities, and to a lesser extent on ecological citizenship due to the inclusion of activities in the traditionally defined private sphere as mandated by the state. So far, the similarities between the two levels of government are evident.

Nevertheless, on the municipal level more inconsistencies are found embedded within the policy rhetoric, making the interpretation of ideal-type resemblance less straight forward. First, among the municipalities there seems to be a somewhat stronger inclination to draw on the responsibilities as emanating from one's personal activities

and choices, than is the case in national environmental policy. Parallel to the suggestion of an all-inclusive participation, the two municipalities of Huddinge and Växjö also place considerable weight with the notion of the ecological footprint as a basis for responsibilities. According to this line of reasoning, the responsibility to ensure a just distribution of resources (locally as well as globally) is bestowed only to those occupying an unfairly large amount of ecological space. Strands of this idea are admittedly found also in national policy, but not in any way as explicit as in these local policies. Therefore, as shown in figure 5.1 below, the resemblance to the principles within ideal-typical ecological citizenship is, in the aspects concerning responsibilities and participation, deemed to be more pronounced on the local level, in particular within the environmental policy rhetoric presented by the two municipalities of Växjö and Huddinge.

Figure 5.1: Ideal-type resemblance – participation on the local level



In the following sections of this chapter, the analysis of the normative foundations of local-level environmental policy continues and points towards further relevant perspectives on the state – individual relationship. As a closer examination of how both the citizen and the political authority itself is described and thought of in policy is believed both to elucidate basic value orientations and more empirically grounded policy preferences, this will be the main focus in the sections to come.

5.4 Images of the citizen and the state

A further relevant perspective on the state – individual relationship concerns more explicitly the images provided in policy of both the citizen, including her rights and duties, and of political authority itself. This section thereby captures beliefs regarding the character of the proposed participation in the environmental work, that is, if the active involvement of citizens is viewed as a civic duty or as a voluntary engagement by each citizen individually; how the role for the state in promoting civic participation is

described; and, lastly, if policy documents express a common set of values which all citizens are expected to embrace, or if judgements on what is to be regarded the good life are left without influence from political authority. These will be the main themes for the following section of the analysis.

5.4.1 Civic duties vs. individual rights

Provided that municipal policies are rather strong in their determination to (although for slightly different reasons) include all citizens in the active environmental work, it is reasonable to assume that this participation also will be framed as a duty, rather than an engagement open for the individual to, by herself, decide the magnitude of. However, as concluded in the analysis of national environmental policy, the framing of environmental engagement as a duty does not necessarily include also a formal regulation of broad public participation (such as obligatory military- or civil service) but focuses rather on how the decision to participate is perceived to be made and how participation is framed in policy rhetoric. Voluntary engagement opens up for the citizen to make an independent choice without being pushed in a set direction by the authorities and grants instead the right for the individual to engage in the environmental work, whereas framing of engagement as a civic duty describes it as a mandated activity which, for various reasons, are imposed on the citizen either by the governmental authorities or through a personal sense of transnational and transgenerational justice and responsibility.

Following on from the previous section, outlining participation in the environmental work as valid for all by merit of being a citizen seems to draw on the proposed activities being civic duties. In several aspects, the inclination to frame an environmental engagement as a mandated contribution for the collective of citizens has also been found embedded in the policy documents; for example in the description of responsibilities or in the weight granted an all-encompassing active participation. As seen above, apart from what is mandated through the legal system it is stated that citizens *shall*, for example, increase the amount of sorted household waste (H1, 2005:56) or choose public transport for their daily trips (G2, 2005:17). Contributions on the individual level are further described as being a "responsibility" (e.g. G2, 2005:bil2, 1), as "important" (e.g. H1, 2005:57), as having "great influence" (e.g. V4, 1999:8) and being a requirement for reaching both an ecologically sustainable society, a more just distribution of resources, as well as non-environmentally connected benefits for the society (see above, section 5.3.1). That the municipalities in these descriptions draw more heavily on the duty-part of being a citizen in assigning responsibilities should be self-evident, even though the basis for these duties slightly differs as it draws both on a contractual obligation to work for the benefit of the community as well as on the non-contractual relations between citizens themselves.

However, it must still be noted that, although most local-level policy statements implicitly understand the environmental work as an obligation, none of the municipalities makes any explicit attempts to describe engagement and participation in the environmental work as being a civic duty. Quite the opposite, the municipality of Huddinge even explicitly gives attention to their LA21-plan as a document without binding power for the individual:

> No one can force individuals, businesses, organisations or associations to follow the local Agenda. It is up to each and everyone to, in their acting and planning take guidance from it (H1, 2005:6).

This statement express with clarity the individual's engagement in the environmental work as being voluntarily, or at least that environmental duties are not enforced, and opens thereby up for a more pronounced resemblance to the liberal ideal-type, where individuals shall be granted the right to participate but not bestowed the duty. As such, by explicitly pointing towards the individual's, at least theoretical, freedom of choice Huddinge is again singled out both in comparison with national level policy rhetoric, and among its fellow municipalities which do not as clearly express the freedom of choice in participatory issues, albeit the municipality of Göteborg also acknowledges as a task to "inspire to voluntary contributions" (G2, 2005:19). Nonetheless, in the statements that follows, the perceived importance of individuals' involvement is still, also in Huddinge, described in much the same way as in the in national policy rhetoric, indicating that "all *must* do what they can to decrease their environmental impact" (H1, 2005:6, italics added).

5.4.2 The image of the citizen

How participation and civic engagement is thought of by policy-makers, and how these therefore are framed in governmental programs can, however, also be approached from the perspective of the image of the citizen. In national policy, the view of the citizen slightly shifted around the turn of the century; from being described as already aware, engaged and willing to take part in the transition to a sustainable society, the image in later dated policy documents depicts instead a situation where environmental goals will not be reached by placing the trust in people's voluntary efforts. As such, the use and construction of policy-instruments is also viewed in a different light in contemporary national environmental policy. *First* as the need for instruments with a more explicit steering effect (for example the introduction of formal rules or monetary incentives) is expressed as a consequence of the positive results of information failing to appear, and *second* as informative and educational policy-instruments now are applied with the aspiration not to facilitate or increase an already existing engagement, but to introduce such an engagement or willingness to participate where there is none. As such, Lundqvist's (2001c) use of the phrase "indirect steering" for instruments which at first hand signal a theoretical freedom of choice, but which in reality strictly limit the

amount of viable alternatives, is highly suitable for describing the preference for policy-instruments as expressed in documents from the national level of government.

In local policy rhetoric, the image of the citizen is overwhelmingly positive and converges therefore with the image of the engaged citizen as expressed through the earlier dated national policy-documents (see section 4.1.2 above). Thus, similarly to what has been located in national environmental policy up to the late 1990's, local policy states, for example, that:

> The environmental issues have become all the more important during the past years and the environmental opinion has grown strong. An increasing number of people want a society in ecological balance (V5, 1993:3)[63].

> Agenda 21 Göteborg views the citizen of Göteborg as capable and engaged in the society's development (G2, 2005:bil2, 1).

This predominately positive image of the citizen resembles Feichtinger and Pregering's (2005) description of the citizen as being enlightened, or at least judicious. That is, a person who is familiar with what her 'real' (as defined by the political authority) interests are and perhaps even, at least judging from the latter quote, possessing the adequate knowledge and resources needed in order to act on them. Consequently the tasks for local authorities are confined to providing consultation, structural conditions and opening up for a two-sided exchange of information (cf. Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005:235). As such, bearing a close resemblance with the description of the role of political authority within the liberal ideal-type, the municipalities also takes on the role as to "facilitate" (e.g. P3, 2001:12) and to "provide good service" (G2, 2005:1) in the citizens' endeavour to live an ecologically sustainable life. A similar resemblance to the liberal ideal-typical image of the state – individual relationship can be found in Huddinge, as the municipality here acknowledges that "[c]hanges in infrastructure and behavioural changes must go hand in hand in order for it [sustainable travelling] to work in future" (H1, 2005:44). The responsibility for accomplishing a more ecologically benevolent mode of transportation is, furthermore, predominately placed on the municipal authorities rather than on citizens, by highlighting the provision of possibilities and alternatives as important tools and something which the municipality primarily should focus on. This image should thereby be further contrasted with the national level's contemporary description of the citizen as unable both to identify and

[63] The quotation is found in the municipality of Växjö's official environmental policy. Dated in 1993, the positive image provided of the environmental citizen is perhaps not as surprising, as it follows closely the strong belief in the citizen as environmentally aware and engaged expressed in national policy documents from this time. However, neither the more recent policy documents emanating from Växjö, nor the working-material in the presently ongoing process of developing a new environmental programme explicitly express that this positive image has changed, not the least since the 1993 environmental policy is still in use as an overarching guideline for the environmental work. That is not to say that other lines of reasoning within the policy-documents, both old and new, echoes the same entirely positive image (see below).

put interests into practice, resulting in a far more paternalistic, steering and enlightening role for the state.

The municipalities' belief in the *ability* of (the enlightened) citizens to do their bit in the environmental work should, however, not be exaggerated; in particular as a closer scrutiny of how the engagement-building activities are framed in the municipalities' policy-documents reveals that they to a large extent draw on the need also for information on *how* citizens might act to observe their interests and *what* the proposed behavioural changes encompasses. For instance, according to §5 of the municipality of Göteborg's environmental policy "[c]itizens shall be informed on how they can participate in the environmental work". Following the same lines of reasoning, the image of the citizen as aware of her interests but unable to act according to them is expressed through the many, and in stark contrast to the generality of national policy, very specific instructions on how the environment can be protected as well as a sustainable society accomplished through day-to-day activities (cf. V-Internet1-22; V2, 1999:1; H1, 2005:6, 45 & 52; see also G-Internet1). The municipal authorities themselves thereby take on a responsibility to inform on, and indeed also facilitate for, citizens to adapt a more environmentally friendly behaviour; a transition of lifestyle which might otherwise become victim to various external obstacles. As expressed by Växjö in a quote which displays both the positive image of citizens' engagement and their need for governmental assistance; "[m]ost people really want to develop a more sustainable lifestyle but find it, for various reasons, difficult to change their behaviour. It can be for economic or practical reasons or simply because it is difficult to break old habits" (V4, 1999:7).

Furthermore, in the specific policy-area of green consumption, adequate information is, again, granted major attention as it is believed to hold the key to the avoidance of environmentally degrading products. A correct formulated product labelling is therefore described as "an important instrument […] for environmentally conscious choices" by, amongst others, "ordinary consumers" (G2, 2005:15). Taken together, although the image of the citizen provided by the municipalities initially comes off as positive and thereby opens up for an interpretation of her as, using again Feichtinger and Pregering's (2005) labels, enlightened; there still seem to be some concern among the municipal authorities and policy-makers that a lack of both knowledge and opportunities of the more practical nature might keep the actual participation down. Nevertheless, adapting a needs-based definition of the role of political authority, where the publicly desired participation in the environmental work first and foremost is facilitated through information (on the *what* and the *how*) and structural transformation (for example a more accessible public-transport system or an enhanced possibilities for sorting and depositing household waste) still bears the closest resemblance to the voluntariness and self-determination of the liberal citizenship ideal.

5.4.3 The role for political authority

How the role for political authority is described is, for obvious reasons, strongly connected to and influenced by the image provided of the environmental citizen, in some parts even making these impossible to separate. Therefore, as with the previous analysis of national policy documents, this following section is believed to further inform also the interpretations made regarding the citizen being either already engaged, in need of practical assistance, or even requiring enlightenment by the political authorities. The questions that will be addressed in more detail regards, accordingly, *first* what the important tasks for the political authorities are perceived to consist of. *Second*, if these tasks are taken on with the aspiration to enable citizens to make an independent choice on which their interests are and how to reach them, or to, in the role of the benevolent, responsible guardian, direct the unaware citizenry towards leading *the* good life. And *third*, how (and which) policy instruments are used for accomplishing the necessary public participation in the environmental work.

As previously mentioned, the individual's contributions play a significant role in the work towards sustainability, in national as well as in local policy. All individuals are therefore expected to participate in transforming the society towards ecological sustainability and a central part of the tasks for political authorities is therefore described as providing opportunities, possibilities, support and guidance. For instance, the municipality of Växjö acknowledges that what is needed is "increased opportunities for citizens to actively participate in the work for sustainable development" (V4, 1999:9; V-Internet5). Furthermore, it should therefore be "easy for everyone to live and act healthy and environmentally friendly" and the municipal authorities have a responsibility to "to a higher extent contribute to make easy people's possibilities for living in an environmentally adapted way" (V4, 1999:7). These expressions, where the local authorities themselves take on a large responsibility in driving the environmental work, making available opportunities for citizens to contribute (if they want to do so) and providing guidelines on how it is possible to reduce one's environmental impact go hand in hand with the positive image of the citizen as well as a framing of the decision to participation as being made independently by each citizen (see, for example the quote from Huddinge in section 5.4.1). Thereby the role for local authorities in accomplishing, or rather facilitating, civic participation is undoubtedly great, but so far still keeping within the framework of a needs- or empowerment-model (Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005:235), rather than indicating a paternalistic and actively steering role for the municipality. Information is still perceived as an important policy instrument and, following the 'forerunner-theme' in national policy depicting Sweden's role on the international arena, local authorities all agree that the municipality should be an example for others and lead the way in the environmental work; "we [the municipality] should spread good ideas and experiences. The power of the example is great" (G1, 1999:2). Provided that the citizenry in general already are committed to the ideas of

ecological sustainability, providing good examples, inspiration and stimulation clearly keeps within the framework of the passive, neutral and value-free state as prescribed within the liberal ideal-type of democratic citizenship.

Now, albeit a somewhat positive image of the individual is found in the municipal policy-rhetoric, indicating the belief that most people want and are willing to change their lifestyle in a more sustainable direction, the municipalities still find it relevant to take on also the task of in a more instructive manner actively steering its citizens towards making good (meaning environmentally benevolent) choices. The image of Feichtinger and Pregering's (2005) enlightened or judicious citizen, aware of her true interests and where the role of the state is confined to consultation, information and empowerment, is thus contrasted with a range of statements drawing on the pressing need for, in a top-down manner, providing citizens also with knowledge and awareness on environmental issues. Perhaps, it is therefore relevant to ask, is the municipalities' belief in the citizens' ability to either identify or to act on her 'real' interests not as great as previously indicated? Perhaps is more than liberal neutrality needed from the municipal authorities in order to accomplish the ecologically sustainable society?

A first indication that the role for political authorities is interpreted as something more than the provision of adequate conditions has already been touched upon above; it is evident that the clearly stated goal of all municipalities', and indeed also the national, environmental policy is to *accomplish changes* among the citizenry. Furthermore, not only does this concern specific, non-environmentally friendly activities, but the prescribed changes are also applicable to lifestyles in general, to attitudes and to consciousness. For instance, the municipality of Piteå aspires to transform its citizens' attitudes in a more environmentally friendly direction and thereby describes the preferred outcome to be "an increased environmental consciousness" (P3, 2001:107). On the same note, Göteborg acknowledges that "[t]he perhaps greatest challenge in the environmental work is to, in different ways, *create* a broad environmental engagement (G2, 2005:6, italics added). This need for accomplishing value-changes or engagement signals two ideas. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the perceived environmental engagement is not as strong among the citizenry, despite what previously have been stated in policy. On the other, it takes the role of the authorities further than facilitating more environmental friendly choices in day-to-day life, towards clearly driving the citizens' appropriation of new values in this respect. Local policy rhetoric thus approaches a stronger resemblance to the ideal-types prescribing a more normative and active role for the state: civic-republican and ecological citizenship.

That the role for the political authority is thought of as actively driving the citizenry's adoption of the correct values also in local level policy (in national level policy this is, as has previously been shown, rather strong) is further displayed through the expressed

preference for education and knowledge-building as policy instruments in the environmental field. As the citizens are to be educated and enlightened on how to behave in order to take on the duties they hold a citizens, this clearly takes policy beyond depicting the state – individual interaction in this respect as bottom-up driven, focusing on dialogue and opportunities, towards the image of the municipality as instructing the citizens on how to behave correctly (see also Khakee, 2002:53-54). According to Huddinge's environmental policy, it is the lack of knowledge which is the main cause for negative effects on, in this case, biological diversity and the preservation of local nature and wildlife (H1, 2005:18). A conclusion which gives, by inference, that if only the authorities (being the expert-led, enlightened elite) provide the citizenry with the correct knowledge, positive effects on the environment would also result. Another example is found under the headline of "Democracy and learning for sustainable development" (V4, 1999:9), where the municipality of Växjö stresses the importance of knowledge-building for accomplishing behavioural- or lifestyle changes with the citizenry; "insight is needed to change these [unsustainable lifestyle-] patterns and knowledge is the key to insight" (V4, 1999:9). Furthermore:

> [K]nowledge is the most important source for development, so also in the area of the environment. To raise the consciousness about today's environmental problems, and what each single individual and organisation can do in order to work for a sustainable development is of outmost significance in every environmental management system. Residents, politicians and employees with a high level of environmental awareness are a prerequisite for the municipality of Växjö's work with sustainable development (V-Internet18).

The long-term goal set for this policy area is therefore that "all citizens are aware of what is required", as well as that "all citizens are familiar with what is demanded in order for a society to work […] long-term sustainable" (V-Internet5). Again, the authorities know what has to be done, and the task is to convey this knowledge on the citizenry. Therefore, in much the same fashion as is expressed on the national level, the municipal authorities, for instance the environmental- and building board in the municipality of Piteå, takes upon itself to "urge on the transition to the sustainable society" (P1, 2005:1) and to "[w]ork for increasing the environmental awareness with the single individual" (P2, 2006:47). For accomplishing this increased awareness and engagement on the individual level a "moulding of public opinion" (P3, 2001:107) is described as the necessary instrument to use. As stressed by the above quotes, the need for providing citizens with (a specific) environmental knowledge permeates the policy documents, thereby displaying a task for the municipal authorities that clearly expands beyond the above referred to neutral and facilitating role towards a role as actively altering people's values and attitudes in the preferred direction.

As evident through the analysis of national policy, one important instrument singled out by the political authorities in their endeavour to alter values and attitudes among

the citizenry is education for sustainability. The same pattern has also been found in previous analyses of municipal environmental policy in Sweden, where environmental education encompassing the comprehensive school-system as well as adult education and further training of civil servants is deemed an important feature in the environmental work (cf. Lundmark, 2003; Khakee, 2002). As above has been pointed out, the national effort of awarding schools the honour of *School for sustainable Development* (previously *Environmental School*) is one example of the national efforts to include ecological sustainability in the curriculum and to provide children and youths with a "readiness-to-act for a sustainable development" (cf. Skr, 2001/02:13, 31). A similar, and more widely spread, honour is the *Green Flag* awarded by the foundation Keep Sweden Tidy[64] to schools and pre-schools actively engaging pupils in the day-to-day environmental work (HSR, 2006). Although Green Flag-awarded schools are present in all of the four municipalities included in this analysis, and it therefore can be anticipated that learning for ecological sustainability is a permanent feature in the municipal environmental work, the two municipalities of Piteå and Växjö are the most explicit in advocating education for sustainability as an important tool for increasing the citizenry's environmental awareness and engagement. Thus, environmental policy in Piteå echoes the national environmental goals, where education is an important cornerstone in the work towards creating more environmentally conscious citizens as articulated in the national policy-documents governing the Swedish educational system (e.g. Lpfö 98; Lpo 94; Lpf 94). The goals for education are also explicitly expressed as to create environmentally aware citizens and to induce changes in behaviour. All employees in the Piteå schools are therefore bestowed the responsibility to "act so that the lifecycle-perspective [kretsloppstänkandet] permeates all work" (P6, 2005:18). Furthermore, and following on from the national policy for environmental education, the goals set for education in Piteå states, for instance, that all children, as an effect of the schooling system, should "have a positive feel for nature and all living things as well as an understanding that we are a part of a whole", and that the Piteå schools should contribute to children "creating good habits to reuse, recycle and sort waste" (P6, 2005:18; see also P3, 2001:49).

In order to tackle the major challenges posed by environmental degradation and successfully transform lifestyles and attitudes in a long-term perspective, the municipality of Växjö also acknowledges that providing people with information about the problems and ensuring the existence of more environmentally friendly alternatives is not enough as people hardly will transform their lifestyles in (what is perceived as) adequate ways on a strictly voluntary basis. The image of the citizens thus, in line with

[64] The foundation Keep Sweden Tidy was founded in 1983 by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and AB Svenska Returpack (the company responsible for recycling of cans and bottles in Sweden, owned by the packaging industry and the Swedish Brewers Association). The aim of the foundation is to "strengthen people's environmental awareness" as well as to "influence the single individual's attitudes and values surrounding the environment and sustainable development" (HSR, 2006, translated from Swedish).

national policy rhetoric, leaves the resemblance with ideal-typical liberal citizenship, where the amount and nature of participation is perceived as being based on individuals own deliberations and choices, aside for instead drawing on the role of political authority as enlightening the citizenry on their all-encompassing duties or obligations to act in a pre-determined manner for the good of the society. The resemblance with Feichtinger and Pregering's (2005:235-236) "instructible citizen" and the paternalistic approach in political programmes is thus evident. The municipal authorities must, it is argued, make far-reaching efforts to educate all people, young and old, on what is required from them in this endeavour. As a consequence, the educational system is believed to be an important arena for installing environmental values with the citizenry of all ages. Therefore, the stated aim is that "all education for children and adults is characterised by a lifelong learning for sustainable development" (V4, 1999:9; V-Internet5). In this endeavour, in particular the younger generations are reached out to by introducing educational knowledge goals in the school-plans. "That the schools spread knowledge to its pupils", Växjö writes in this context, "is very important in order to get environmentally aware children and youths" (V-Internet13);

> The municipality has a unique opportunity to influence and change the attitude with the younger generation. Therefore, the municipality shall for example actively invest in a good environmental education (V5, 1993:6).

As it is further acknowledged that "knowledge is not enough" (V4, 1999), the role for the proposed environmental education is thus interpreted not as to provide neutral education on sustainability, but rather as being normative with the aim of transforming values and attitudes in a pre-determined direction through education for sustainability. All in all, this indicates a resemblance both with the duty-part of civic-republican citizenship where the citizen is bestowed obligations "from above" as a requirement for reaching the good society, and with ecological citizenship prescribing the need for a strong normative stance in education on environmental issues (cf. Dobson, 2003);

> The school, civic adult education and further education have therefore an important role to play in increasing the environmental consciousness and building up readiness to act for changes. In school, the environmental issues should be illuminated in all forms of education, both integrated in all subjects as well as in a subject of its own. All schools should continuously develop own environmental programmes for environmental adjustment of their activities and for integrating environmental reflection in all subjects. All teachers should receive environmental education and the environment should be a part of the teacher training programmes. In the same fashion is further training of employees in private as well as public sector important, as well as civic education which has a central role to play (V4, 1999:9; see also V-Internet5).

Lastly, the role for the municipalities to be a forerunner and to lead by example (e.g. G1, 1999:2; V5, 1993:1) as well as the provision of specific and, on occasion, highly normative "environmental tips" (for example, see V4, 1999:4; V-Internet4; H1,

2005:6, 45 & 52; G-Internet1) can be interpreted as instructions on what the citizens are expected to do to further the municipal goals, rather than suggestions on what might be done; thus displaying a view on the citizen as passive in the sense that she merely reacts to instructions from above and not herself participates in deliberating on the values promoted through policy (cf. Lundqvist, 2004c) and on the municipal authorities as enlightened and familiar with the best interest of the citizenry. In sum, by adopting the national goal of education for sustainability, the municipal policies, similar to what is found within the national policy-rhetoric, resemble both ecological citizenship in allowing for an education for sustainability which is normative in character, and also civic-republican citizenship in which the role of the state is to, in a paternalistic manner, enlighten the citizenry on how to lead the good life.

5.4.4 The hierarchy of policy goals

As a last aspect of analysing the images provided of the citizen and the state respectively, some notes on the hierarchical ordering of policy goals will be made. This in order to determine whether municipal policies adapt the (officially sanctioned version of the) environmental issues as a framework for all political decision-making and thus as the overarching goal towards which all policy-making should strife, and if a specific environmental norm is singled out within this issue as expressing *the* acceptable lifestyle for its citizens. As concluded by, amongst others, Lundmark (2003) and Lundqvist (2004c), restricting the number of politically sanctioned versions of the good life on the individual level would be incompatible with the liberal principles of individual autonomy and state neutrality, and instead express more of a civic-republican notion of the state – individual relationship where the promotion of one common set of values is described as an important task for political authority. Therefore, the question if there seems to be a dominant idea on how the citizens are expected to live and on what they are expected to do is anticipated to be a further relevant issue to address in analysing the normative foundations of local environmental policy. Furthermore, and discussed in the above analysis of national policy, a hierarchical ordering of policy goals, where environmental issues take precedence also in other policy areas might be a similar indication of the weight granted the environment as a framework for all *political* decision-making thus further denoting its place as an overarching political goal.

From the analysis of national policy-rhetoric it was concluded that an important aspiration within both the Swedish and the international environmental work is to incorporate the environment as a value to strongly consider in the decision-making processes of all policy-areas. As all municipalities, as previously acknowledged, express the aspiration to both be a role model in the environmental work, and to influence, urge on, as well as "spread good ideas and experiences" (G1, 1999:2), this aspiration of environmental policy integration (EPI) permeates also the local level of policy-making

and displays the belief that ecological sustainability indeed is an important goal (or, for that matter, a common good) for the municipality and its citizens to jointly to strife towards. For instance, according to Khakee (2002:59; see also Fudge and Rowe, 2000), the municipality of Göteborg pioneered the sectoral integration of environmental considerations in the early 1990's by the development of environmental rules for public procurement. Furthermore, policy-makers in Växjö acknowledge that their position in society brings with it possibilities for accomplishing an attitudinal and behavioural change in society by stating that "[o]ur position in society shall be used for influencing authorities, businesses, organisations among others activities in an environmentally protective direction" (V5, 1993:3; V7, 2004:3). Therefore, policy-makers in the municipality of Växjö further acknowledge their responsibility to make sure their decisions, in prolongation, contribute to an ecologically sustainable development and accordingly that the environmental consequences are considered in all decision-making processes within the municipal organisation; in societal planning, procurement, as well as in further training of municipal staff (V5, 1993:4-6). Thus, Växjö adapts the sector integration of environmental issues, as environmental considerations shall "be present at all deliberations and decisions", and that "[a]ll parts of our work shall contribute to an improved environmental situation and to the society reaching an ecologically sustainable development in the long-run" (V5, 1993:3).

Similar aspirations, highlighting the weight granted the environment in political decision-making, are located within the policies and Agenda 21-plans of also the other three municipalities included in the analysis. For instance, according to the municipality of Huddinge the stated purpose of the LA21-document is to "guide and be a starting-point for *all operations and activities* carried out within Huddinge by individuals, businesses, organisations and institutions" (H1, 2005:3, italics added). This, evidently, indicates the aspiration to follow national policy in its ambition to integrate the environmental issues in all policy areas as well as to grant the environment a significant weight in all decision-making processes. Furthermore, contemplating on the tasks for its environmental board, the municipality of Göteborg also highlights, in agreement with national policy, the desire or even necessity to involve environmental considerations in decisions concerning also other policy-areas. To accomplish this, and thereby move closer towards reaching the sustainable society "it is important that the environmental board are involved on an early stage in different processes" (G2, 2005:6 & 18). On a more practical note, several efforts can be noted indicating that the municipalities also in practice aim at integrating environmental concerns in the policy processes, for instance through the eco-budget system in Växjö, or the rather strong focus on green procurement, which is presented as a core part of the environmental work, the close cooperation with both business and industry as well as NGO's on environmental issues, and the efforts made to ensure environmental training for civil servants and politicians (e.g. G1, 1999:3). Therefore, the conclusion here drawn is that EPI is indeed an

important (rhetorical) goal also on the municipal level, thus granting the politically agreed upon definition of the ecologically sustainable society a central part as *the* politically sanctioned common good to which the community, including both citizens and political authority, have a duty to contribute.

Two further observations strengthen this interpretation of the (politically determined) definition of ecologically sustainability being both in the top of the goals-hierarchy and expressing *the* sanctioned version of the good life. *First*, as national policy set down the outer (and usually quite blurred) boundaries for what the environmental citizen is expected to do, the lack of any detailed examples of what a politically sanctioned lifestyle might encompass was, to a certain extent, explained by both the self-government of Swedish municipalities and the responsibility conferred them to carry national political goals through in practice. As expected, all municipalities do therefore in more detail describe (or at least aspire to do so) what each and every citizen can do in order for the political goals to be attained. Explained by the environmental policy in the municipality of Göteborg, and given the introductory statement prescribing an all-inclusive participation, the municipality also acknowledges that "citizens shall be informed on how they can participate in the environmental work" (G1, 1999:2). What these features of the local policies encompass has already been pointed out on several occasions above, including specific calls on the citizenry to, for instance, actively act as environmentally conscious consumers (e.g. P4, 2005:8); become better at waste management (e.g. H1, 2005:56-57); only purchase eco-labelled products (e.g. G-Internet1); participate in civic adult education on environmental issues (V-Internet5); as well as choose public transport or bicycle instead of the car (G2, 2005:17; V4, 1999:4). In particular on the municipalities' websites, a range of detailed suggestions on what each and every one can do (for example which products to avoid, cf. G-Internet2) for improving the environment can be found.

Second, individuals are also, in all local policies urged to make good choices for the environment. The analysis of national policy rhetoric posed the question on what is denoted by a "conscious choice", or rather if informational efforts (such as the ones listed above) intended to actively steer citizens towards making the politically determined right choice, or to preserve individuals' freedom and self-direction by ensuring them having full-information when making day-to-day choices. The former interpretation was in this analysis considered more reasonable, and this understanding is strengthened when focusing on local level environmental policy. For instance, in the background material to Växjö's environmental program one central goal is described as to "[i]increase municipal residents' and businesses' awareness on sustainable consumption" (V3, 2005:1). What is particularly interesting in this context is that Växjö also acknowledges the somewhat problematic issue of defining what is denoted by consciousness. Nevertheless, it is argued that although "the consciousness can be about

businesses and municipal residents shall have the knowledge needed to make conscious choices", it can also be said to include the actual outcome of this knowledge, that is, "which choices one actually does" (V3, 2005:1). Thereby, the municipality of Växjö apparently views the environmentally aware citizen as one who make the 'right' choice as determined by the municipal authorities and it is, thus, reasonable to assume that the role of the municipality is not merely to facilitate but to enlighten and steer its citizens towards making these 'right' choices. The resemblance to national policy rhetoric and, consequently, to ideal-typical civic-republican citizenship is thus apparent as the policy rhetoric is constructed round the existence of one politically sanctioned good life towards which all citizens should be directed, by information, education and the amendment of external factors.

5.4.5 Conclusions

The images, of the citizen as well as of political authority itself, provided in municipal environmental policy follow closely what previously has been observed in national policy-rhetoric. The focus, first of all, is thereby on duties and on the obligation part of being a citizen, rather than on participation and environmental engagement as something open for voluntary deliberation. Admittedly, this is not explicitly expressed in any of the analysed documents (see section 5.4.1 above). Nevertheless, given the emphasis placed on participation for all, on the need for public engagement and the apparent attempts by municipal authorities to actively direct the citizenry towards changing attitudes and lifestyles, it is reasonable to assume that the framing of citizens' involvement in the environmental work signals duties rather than rights, although this neither explicitly stated nor formally enforced. In sum, local policy rhetoric is interpreted as to a greater extent resemble the two citizenship ideal-types where civic duties are more pronounced: ecological and civic-republican citizenship, but to still leave the door open for the voluntary engagement as denoted within ideal-typical liberal citizenship.

Furthermore, a similarly ambiguous picture results from the analysis of the municipals' images of citizen and political authority. When describing the engagement and interest of the citizen more explicitly, municipalities (e.g. Göteborg and Växjö) provide a relatively positive image. This is also transferred to the expressed need for facilitating measures by the municipality, which projects an image of the citizen as being capable to determine her real (that is, those in line with the goal of ecological sustainability) interests and also willing to act on them. Nevertheless, looking closer at the four municipal policies, this positive image is somewhat overshadowed by the apparently central need for municipal authorities to also enlighten citizens and mould their values or attitudes into the correct shape, predominately by the use of education. Presenting political authority as an enlightened role-model, and allowing for a normative

education for ecological sustainability are lines of reasoning found both within ecological and civic-republican citizenship. However, by presenting ecological sustainability as an overarching societal goal (rather than an individual quest for justice), attained through the government actively demanding cooperation from the citizenry and enlightening the citizenry on what is to be regarded the good life, seems to draw slightly more on the latter ideal-type. In assigning resemblance-scores for policy in these aspects, civic-republican citizenship, with its focus on civic duties and the objectively determined good life, dominates as illustrated by the figure below.

Table 5.2: Ideal-type resemblance-scores – local images of citizen and state



5.5 Conclusion - the national environmental norm in a local context

The overarching rationale for conducting this analysis of local level environmental policy in Sweden has been to determine if, and in that case how, the translation of (inter-) national goals into local political practice brings with it a change in the values or beliefs-systems underpinning the policy's normative foundations. At the outset of this analysis, the anticipation was that local policies would not, or perhaps only to a lesser extent, display a different set of policy core beliefs than national environmental policy, with a reservation made for the fact that Swedish municipalities during the past decades have enjoyed a rather extensive autonomy in deciding on environmental issues. Have this perhaps affected how the environmental issues are framed on the local level?

In summing up the results from the local-level analysis, a few points should be especially noted. On an overarching level, it must first be made clear that no strikingly large divergences were found in the comparison between the national and the local levels. Perhaps unsurprisingly, local policies display the same ambiguity as national environmental policy in their description of participation and engagement, of rights and duties as well as in their images of the citizen and political authority respectively. Nonetheless, as been illustrated in the chapters above, certain lines of reasoning display

a more frequent occurrence than others, leading to the conclusion that local policy in general, similar to what is found on the national level, most strongly resembles the reasoning within the civic-republican ideal type, albeit with a few streaks of green. Compatibility to the principles located within liberal citizenship is also found, in particular concerning voluntary engagement and political authority as a facilitator of the individual's independent choices, although these are, when closer scrutinising the documents, more often than not overridden by stronger formulations prescribing both civic duties and the need for an actively steering or enlightening government in order to reach the goal of ecological sustainability. Nonetheless are the liberal ideal-type more prominent on the local, as compared to the national, level.

On a few instances, dissimilarities both between national and local but also among the local level itself have been noted. In particular, the municipality of Huddinge stands out as it explicitly acknowledges the voluntariness, and the personal responsibility in taking on environmental obligations. It is of course true that environmental duties are, as put by Lundmark (2003:9) "propagated but not enforced" in most municipalities, even though none as explicitly as Huddinge stresses the individual choice of participating or not. Nevertheless, this isolated incidence in Huddinge's environmental policy are at most instances overshadowed by formulations clearly drawing on the pressing need for all citizens to participate, as well as the municipal goal to, through information, education and motivation, transform the citizenry's unsustainable behaviour in a more preferable direction. Therefore, the outcome of this above conducted survey on the local policy discourse in Sweden suggests that the general structure of the policy core beliefs to a large extent matches the ones found in national policy. The divergences nonetheless found do not significantly alter the image of the proposed state – individual relationship.

Chapter Six

Concluding remarks – the Imagined Environmental Citizen

The major focal point for this thesis has been the elucidation of those values or beliefs making up the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy. Emanating from both the consensus within politics and science, that individuals' collective participation in the environmental work is a prerequisite for reaching the ecologically sustainable society, as well as from the theoretical assumption that long-term collective action in this context requires legitimate (i.e. publicly acceptable) policies for initiating and sustaining it, the outline of the above chapters has been guided by the main aim of the thesis; *To explore, map and analyse the values, beliefs and principles underpinning Swedish environmental policy aiming at involving household members in the work towards an environmental sustainable society, as reflected through official policy documents and policy instruments in-use on both national and municipal levels of government*. The fulfilment of this aim has, furthermore, been expected to provide two sets of conclusions. *First*, by contributing to a detailed insight in the normative foundations of official environmental policy in Sweden the results of the thesis are expected to provide the basis for an evaluation of Swedish environmental policy legitimacy, where the normative foundations of policy are compared with the fundamental values and beliefs held by household members. *Second*, by pointing towards the, paraphrasing Duit (2002), actual blueprint chosen in ascribing (or not) new environmental duties and responsibilities to the Swedish citizen, this thesis also outlines the Swedish political authorities' view on the 'environmental citizen'. Thus, it approaches the question of whether Sweden's self-assumed role as a forerunner in the international environmental work has influenced domestic, and even local, policy-making towards expanding the traditional relations between the individual and political authority in the direction of the (theoretical) concept of ecological citizenship.

To fulfil this aim, a range of questions have been posed to the empirical material, taking as the point of departure the theoretical reasoning concerning the state – individual relationship within three citizenship ideal-types. Thereby, this thesis leaves the, in many similar studies preferred, focus on the human beings – nature relationship in environmental discourses, in preference for considering the contents of more general belief-systems pertaining to rights, responsibilities and duties both for the individual citizen, and for political authority itself. The rationale for applying different conceptions of citizenship as an analytical tool is twofold. On the one hand, the values or beliefs captured by these ideal-types are believed to be highly relevant for the understanding of the new roles and responsibilities assigned to single individuals, as well as for the (following De Geus, 1996) increasing interference of the state in society, commonly denoted by a politics of environmental protection. On the other, the use of citizenship ideal-types are also believed relevant for capturing both different understandings of those core values or beliefs underpinning public policy (as outlined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) and held by individuals (following, for instance, Schwartz, 1992), as well as for placing these beliefs in a larger, coherent line of reasoning (e.g. the story-lines of Hajer, 1995) and providing sets of different alternative interpretations of the priority of core values.

Traditional citizenship is in this thesis taken as to denote two, different, but with regards to several accounts also similar, conceptions of the state – individual relationship; liberal and civic-republican citizenship respectively. As outlined in more detail above, whereas the former is narrowly defined as proposing a politics of rights, setting the self-direction and freedom of individuals high on the agenda and incorporating, therefore, a view of the state as being value-neutral, facilitating and protective of individuals' rights, the latter draws on the duty-part of being a citizen, on the need for public participation for the good of the society and of a state that actively directs its citizens towards the common good and *the* politically sanctioned lifestyle[65]. Despite these apparent differences in the take on the state – individual relationship, the two traditional citizenship ideal-types are also complemented with a third form of citizenship in order to capture also the new (environmental) political developments which in some ways have forced citizenship to leave behind the traditional conceptions and move towards a justice-based account of inter-citizen relations, as well as expand beyond the boundaries of public life and the territoriality of the nation-state. The ideal-type of ecological citizenship thus includes an active participation through actions also in the traditional private sphere. It takes as its foundational concept Wackernagel and Rees's (1996) ecological footprint and thus leaves the contractual, territorial relationship

[65] Nevertheless, both traditional forms of citizenship are thought of as possible to somewhat expand to include also environmental issues and a politics for environmental protection, in the form of an 'environmentally sensitive citizenship' (for this, see Dobson's [2003] definition of "environmental citizenship" and section 3.4.2 above).

between the citizen and the state behind for considering instead a 'between-citizens-relationship' based on the fair distribution of ecological space.

As such, the main focus throughout the thesis has been on the variation in core beliefs presented within these different value-systems; how the Swedish environmental policy discourse approaches questions concerning the individual's rights, duties and responsibilities, the preference for policy instruments, the perceived role of political authority in guiding the environmental work, as well as the image of the citizens' motivations and environmental engagement underpinning the direction of the political authorities' efforts. Furthermore, as the initiation of a long-term stable process of collective action is perceived as being a prerequisite for effectively dealing with the problems posed by environmental degradation and resource depletion, applying the three ideal-types above as an analytical framework can be considered a means for highlighting how the environmental policy discourse in Sweden approaches questions concerning the initiation of this process. Is collective-action in Sweden considered a question of merely facilitating public participation and, thereby, placing a high level of trust in each citizen's voluntary engagement? Is collective-action thought of as something the governmental authorities explicitly must direct its citizens towards, for instance by (as the benevolent father) enlightening the citizenry on the right way of thinking and behaving? Is collective-action thought of as arising from deliberations between citizens themselves, induced by transferring political power downwards in the system and thus empowering community decision-making on the values necessary to promote in society, as well as opening up for a two-way dialogue between citizens and political authority? The next sections of this chapter will attempt to provide some answers to the questions outlined above and, thus, summarize the main conclusions from the analysis of the Swedish environmental discourse conducted.

However, before presenting some concluding remarks from the empirical study a few comments on the transferability of the results must also be made. Evidently, the thesis does not aspire to present any general conclusions on the rhetorical construction of environmental policy valid outside the Swedish context. The empirical analysis is instead narrowly concerned with Sweden and the Swedish policy for ecological sustainability directed towards the individuals' involvement in the environmental work. Similarly, the four sub-cases selected for the analysis of local level policy should not be taken to be a random, representative sample of Swedish municipalities but rather a selection aspiring to capture some (by no means all) contextual variations of local level policy making processes. Nevertheless, for fulfilling the aim of this thesis, it is firmly believed that the structure and design of the conducted embedded case-study (cf. section 1.5 above) is entirely adequate. Furthermore, even though the empirical results will not provide any transferable results on their own, the analysis of normative foundations in both national and local level environmental policy will contribute with

relevant insights for future comparative studies, either of other policy-areas in Sweden or of the environmental policy discourse in other countries. Lastly, it will also provide insights into how Swedish policy describes the citizen's place in the environmental work, conclusions which, given the theoretical reasoning surrounding this matter, will be relevant for a prolonged discussion.

6.1 A Swedish Environmental Norm?

To, in a few short sections, summarise the findings from the above analysis of the Swedish environmental policy discourse is not an altogether easy task. As evident from the chapters above, the policy rhetoric is both highly ambiguous and seems to contain an (at least implicit) aspiration to capture as many perspectives as possible on the issue in question, thereby neither ruling out any future options, nor offending anyone with a too strict policy. This accounted for; a closer scrutiny of the policy discourse nonetheless reveals some relevant, though not overwhelmingly surprising, features which might assist in outlining the values, beliefs or principles of the contemporary Swedish environmental norm. Therefore, it is possible to pose (and indeed also answer) some questions on which policy core beliefs that underpin the Swedish environmental norm. How do the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy approach core beliefs regarding both the priority of fundamental values and the image of the citizen, as well as more empirically founded components concerning civic responsibilities, participation, governmental authority, as well as use and design of policy instruments? Below follows a brief overview of the main lines of reasoning found throughout the analysis of Swedish environmental policy discourse, summarised in four propositions.

> *Environmental responsibilities are framed as being symmetrical and, thus, equally valid for all citizens in Sweden. This drives the definition of participation as all-inclusive civic duties and as encompassing active contributions also in the private sphere.*

As a starting point, Swedish environmental policy-making follows, perhaps unsurprisingly, the international consensus stemming from the 1992 Rio-conference regarding both the nature of today's environmental problem, as well as the necessary requirements for amending it. As such, a considerable share of the responsibility is ascribed the unsustainable lifestyles of people living in countries in the industrialised world, there among Sweden. Being collectively responsible for a large amount of the environmental problems, the Swedish citizenry therefore also holds a corresponding collective duty to participate in the work for amending the unsustainable situation and contribute *en mass* to the creation of the sustainable society[66]. Civic participation is thus

[66] Albeit this line of reasoning clearly can be interpreted as prescribing asymmetrical responsibilities for ones actions or occupation of ecological space, it is, for several reasons, taken as denoting instead a collective, all-encompassing duty underpinned by symmetrical responsibilities. For one, since no explicit reference to the

described in national level policy as being a duty for all, a duty which every citizen is expected take on and thereby in every aspect of day-to-day life contribute to the positive (in this sense sustainable) development of society. Thus, when drawing on participation for all, Swedish policy leans towards collectivism rather than individualism in its solutions to the environmental problems. Furthermore, participation shall, following the national policy discourse also be active, in the sense that merely avoiding the most environmentally degrading products, or not actively polluting the environment, is not taken as adequately fulfilling the role of the citizen. Apart from the apparent avoidance of activities harmful to both nature and the people living in it, the government therefore encourages citizens to become actively engaged in local politics, take part in deliberations on the environment, take up membership in an environmental organisation as well as actively live up to the responsibility for driving also producers on the market to make their businesses comply with ecological standards.

It is also noteworthy that evidence from the analysis suggests that civic participation in the environmental work is thought of as bridging the gap between the traditional public and the private spheres of citizenship activity. Indeed, citizens are both encouraged and empowered, through the signing of the Aarhus-convention (e.g. Prop, 2004/05:65), to participate in politics proper by, for example, an active involvement in local decision-making processes (although previous empirical research on the topic has revealed a discrepancy between rhetoric and practice, cf. Eckerberg, 2001; Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005; Lundqvist, 2004c). Adding to this are also other public-sphere forms of participation, such as sustainable consumption, which are given a lead role in the work towards sustainability. However, in line with the above problem description, where the household is singled out as a major pollutant, the need for citizens to also uphold their environmental engagement when entering the private sphere seems evident. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the private sphere, following the policy rhetoric, thereby also becomes an arena for the political authority to interfere in; by prescribing the need for household-related activities, mandating citizens to sort their household waste and deposit it in assigned places or simply directing them towards taking environmental consideration in all aspects of their day-to-day life, including the ones made at home[67]. Furthermore, it is evident from the policy discourse that changing the way we act with reference to the environment is not enough and that we therefore also need to transform the way we think about the environment and our place in it (which, amongst others, is framed as being an important new task for the Swedish educational system). The civic engagement and participation prescribed

ecological footprint or similar theoretical constructions highlighting a social justice-argument is made. Furthermore since the focus for most parts in the policy discourse includes a strict territorial focus where the civic duties bestowed citizens are thought of as contractual responsibilities for furthering the Swedish environment (and, in prolongation, Swedish welfare and traditions) in specific (cf. section 4.1.1 above).

[67] This is basically the same requirement as is placed on political institutions and authorities within the framework of Environmental Policy Integration.

thereby clearly transcends the public sphere of traditional citizenship, towards incorporating not only the private activities but also each individual's consciousness.

> *Engagement in the environmental work is described as a contractual duty (albeit neither formally regulated, nor subject to governmental enforcement), where each individual is expected to actively do her bit for the good of the community as a core part of being a Swedish citizen.*

How the policy rhetoric depicts the citizen is also deemed to be a relevant indicator of the core beliefs underpinning it, not the least since the image of the citizen has consequences for the role assigned the political authority itself in the environmental work. As evident from the analysis, the belief in the citizens' ability and/or willingness to take on an increased environmental responsibility is not overwhelmingly positive. As such, leaving the necessary participation to a, following Eckersly (1992), voluntary self-regulation from below is not a viable solution. As already mentioned above, the prescribed environmental engagement is instead framed as being nothing short of a civic duty. Several more findings also underpin this interpretation of the environmental discourse depicting active engagement in the environmental work as being all-encompassing duties; in particular the strong connection made between the contemporary construction of the ecologically sustainable society and the building of the Swedish social welfare state, framing sustainable development as building the Green People's Home. This, and similar parallels drawn between engagement in the environmental work and Swedish traditions, values or historical experiences, is interpreted as being a way of depicting active engagement as a duty which all responsible citizens should adhere to (consider, for instance the way any attempt to or suggestion for a dismantling of the social welfare-state is depicted as an inconceivable violation of deeply rooted Swedish traditions). Additionally, as citizens here are bestowed a duty to promote and further the Swedish society, it is reasonable to assume that these duties also are considered contractual, drawing on the exchange of rights and obligations between the citizen and political authority (rather than, for instance, the relationship between citizens themselves). This however, also has important implications for the role of political authority as it, evidence suggests, opens up for a more pronounced role of political authority in actively steering the individual towards taking on these duties. Being part of an imagined contractual agreement, promotion of environmental duties are thus as self evident a responsibility for the state as are the upholding of fair democratic procedures, equality of opportunity or the rule of law.

> *The image provided of the citizen draws predominately on the inability of the citizen to either discover or, by her self, reach her real interests. Political authority therefore assumes the role of (in addition to facilitating behavioural change) actively enlightening or steering the citizenry, where highly normative educational and informational policy instruments are employed as important tools for creating good citizens and ensuring that they make the right choice in life.*

Founded on the depiction of the individual as, at best, unable to reach her 'true' interests or, at worst, even unaware of what these interests are, as well as the framing of environmental engagement as a contractual civic duty, the analysis further revealed the role for political authority as holding the responsibilities of *first* enlightening the citizenry on what constitutes the common good, and *second* directing them towards this overarching societal goal. Thus, the Swedish government, albeit highlighting the pressing need to first facilitate a behavioural change by both structural and economic means, assumes a, following Feichtinger and Pregering (2005), paternalistic role in actively steering the citizens towards *the* politically sanctioned lifestyle. As such the expectance of an active citizenry is not as pronounced with regards to deliberating on the goals of Swedish environmental policy. Rather, the citizenry is in this respect viewed as in need of enlightenment by the benevolent state and therefore as positioned on the receiving end in a one-way communication (rather than as a part in a dialogue). As stated above; 'voluntarily deliberation is, thus, substituted for state control and influence, and freedom of action and thought for obedience and conformity' (p. 125). In sum, therefore, the self-determination and self-regulation of the individuals is not placed high on the environmental policy agenda and the "from-above" perspective (cf. Eckersly, 1992; Feichtinger and Pregering, 2005; Lundqvist, 2001c & 2004c) is thus prevailing. Rather, what is framed as responsible choices is only perceived as adequate or acceptable to the extent that they match up to an objectively defined target. If this is not accomplished, more steering, more targeted education and less a freedom of choice is necessary.

This, furthermore, also indicates the belief in the political authority's responsibility for actively promoting an overarching common good, and by all means also the existence of one. Thus, evidence suggests that the government does not assume a neutral stance in the (metaphysical) question of what is to be regarded the good life, but rather subscribing to one definition of what the sustainable society entails, outlining one politically sanctioned good lifestyle for reaching this and, furthermore, assigning environmental considerations an overarching place also in the political decision-making hierarchy[68]. All of which indicates an understanding that there indeed is a common good which all citizens should subscribe to. The rhetorical framing of policy instruments used also signals the desire to, rather than facilitating for all citizens to take a personal responsibility and participate (or, for that matter, choose not to), steer the citizenry towards *the* good and sanctioned lifestyle (incorporating specific requirements for both thought and action). Education for sustainability is therefore declared as an important policy instrument with the purpose of, at an early age, introduce children to the right mind-set (compare, again, with the central part played by the value of

[68] This is exemplified by the aspiration to grant considerable weight and importance to the environment when making decisions also in other (sectoral) policy-areas, as emphasised by, for instance, the Swedish process of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI).

democracy in the Swedish curriculum). As has been shown, for adults the civic- and further education, including higher education at university, shall by the same token also be permeated with the sustainability-concept.

> *The motivations provided for a further engagement in the environmental work draw to a significant extent on territoriality and reciprocity. The environment is granted an instrumental role as providing resources, and should thus be protected with the expectance of a continuous social welfare, employment, public health, economic growth and increased business competitiveness, as well as being a natural part of upholding Swedish traditions and the Swedish model.*

Motivations directed towards getting the citizen to engage in the environmental work also reveal the normative foundations and the belief-systems on which Swedish policy relies. However, it must here be noted that the motivations presented for citizens to engage in environmental activities have, throughout the analysis, been found drawing on a wide range of value-priorities thus making a stringent analysis somewhat complex. Nevertheless, albeit the motivations provided draw on all forms of goods, some notes on the dominant nature of the Swedish environmental norm can be made also in this respect. It should not come as a surprise that the perspective for the most part draws on the instrumental value of nature, and prescribes environmental protection as being necessary for sustaining the resources and goods nature provides; for example food, medicine or raw materials. Adding to this, also the aesthetic value of nature (as beautiful, for recreational use or to inspire culture) is occasionally presented as motivations for its protection. Thereby a clear anthropocentric perspective appears[69]. Nature is seen as a resource on which humans depend, and which has its main value as a provider of human goods. For the most part, this, and other formulations throughout the policy discourse, suggest also that taking part in environmental protective activities should be done with an expectance of reciprocity, where a healthy environment (or merely the work towards it) gives rise to positive benefits for the community of Swedish citizens, taking the form of continuous social welfare, economic growth and increased competitiveness for Swedish business and industry.

The motivations applied also reveal a territorial definition of the rights and duties inherent in the concept of citizenship. As mentioned above, civic environmental responsibilities are framed as duties for all Swedish citizens and as founded on a contractual relationship with the society or the state. As such, no aspirations to expand citizenship or citizen responsibilities to encompass a larger territory (or even remove territoriality from the equation altogether) are visible. Nevertheless, it is evident that

[69] It should be mentioned that, at a few occasions, also the inherent value of nature is presented as a motivation for environmental protection, thereby suggesting an ecocentric outlook on the human beings – nature relationship. The frequency of which this argument is used is, however, overshadowed by the strong anthropocentric motivations pervading the policy discourse.

some strands of motivation draw clearly also on the over-consumption of resources in industrialised countries, and the accompanying responsibilities for the environmental situation this brings. In this context it should, however, also be noted that the discourse seldom explicitly frames these responsibilities as founded on transnational justice. Thus, it is uncertain whether a Swedish concern for other countries' environmental situation shall be interpreted as the justice-based, causal responsibilities of the Good Citizen or as the Good Samaritan's empathy (cf. Dobson, 2003). Furthermore, when considering the welfare of greatest concern, also this seems to separate the environmental situation within the boundaries of Sweden from that in other parts of the world. Building the ecologically sustainable society is, thus, first and foremost a way of securing Swedish welfare, and even the position of Sweden as a forerunner in the international environmental work is on several occasions motivated by the positive benefits this might have for economic growth within the borders of the Swedish nation-state.

When summarising the normative foundations of Swedish environmental policy it is evident that the belief-systems granted the most attention draw, perhaps unsurprisingly given the social democratic hegemony in Swedish politics during the period studied, on collectivist rather than individualist values. In focus for this politics for sustainability is the contribution Swedish citizens shall, dutifully, make to the good of the community, taking the shape of the Swedish social welfare state albeit now coated with a layer of green paint. From this starting point, policy core beliefs regarding, for instance, distribution of authority, use of policy instruments and core value-priorities put forth as motivations also echo this path-dependency (cf. Lundqvist, 2001a & 2004c) of traditional Swedish politics. For instance, policy clearly assigns encompassing responsibilities for political authority to enlighten and steer its citizens towards the objectively defined good life and towards making responsible, informed choices in everyday life. Perhaps, however, will the contemporary strong connection made between sustainability and (the contractual duty to uphold) the Swedish welfare-state come to change in preference for a stronger focus on the environment and environmental justice as the new generation, not the least through the educational system, to a larger extent will be bestowed with new *environmental* values?

6.2 Tracing the norm closer to the people

Since this thesis also spans over the environmental discourse emanating from two levels of government, one additional focus was added to the list of aims; namely, to explore the correspondence between the policy discourse on the national level and equivalent local level policies. As the principle of local self government in Sweden opens up for autonomous policy-making in the municipalities, not the least in environmental issues, the at least theoretical possibility of finding significant divergences between these two levels of government was acknowledged. However, after repeating the ideal-type

guided analysis of the policy discourse in a survey of four Swedish municipalities, it stands clear that the similarities between the two levels are far greater than the differences. The four municipalities thus follow national policy rhetoric almost entirely as they, for instance, prescribe active environmental engagement as being collective duties for the citizenry and take on a far-reaching responsibility to, from above, direct its citizens towards a more preferable way of life (with Lundqvist's [2004c:173] words a case of "governance without the people"). This might, of course, be explained by the political majorities which in all four municipalities are made up by the same parties cooperating for political power in the Swedish parliament[70]. In some cases the municipalities nonetheless display some diverging framings of the environmental issues, for instance the slightly more pronounced focus on ecological, asymmetrical principles in assigning personal responsibilities to the citizenry (see Chapter 5 above). However, since these rhetorical differences are rather small, and therefore not significantly alter the conclusions on the Swedish environmental norm in general, they will not be granted any specific attention throughout the reminder of the analysis. In sum, therefore, it can be concluded that the national policy rhetoric appears in an almost unaltered form also in local political practice.

6.3 The image of the environmental citizen

In the introductory chapter, the many (both theoretical and practical) ideas of how society, and not the least the role of citizens, needs to be reformed in order to reach the ecologically sustainable society was briefly touched upon. As many of these suggestions draw on a new take on *citizenship*, an additional aim of this thesis posed the question on the possible connections between the policy's image of the Swedish 'environmental citizen' and the theoretical construction of ecological citizenship. Evidently, Sweden holds a rather ambitious aspiration as being a role-model in the international environmental work, and based on this objective it might be relevant to explicitly contrast the above conclusions on the Swedish environmental norm with the concept of the ecological citizen. To what extent, then, does Swedish policy's framing of civic responsibilities and involvement resembles the image of the ecological citizen, and consequently, to what extent does the environmental policy discourse in Sweden keep within the framework of traditional concepts of the state – individual relationship?

Ideal-type liberal citizenship, with the emphasis placed on individualism and individual rights, on self-determination and, therefore, on a state which does not meddle in the private lives of the citizenry, has by many political ecologists and environmental activists been pointed out as incompatible with effective environmental protection (i.e. the legitimacy – effectiveness dilemma). From a theoretical perspective, the principles

[70] The Social Democratic Party, with support from the Left Party and the Environmental Party the Greens (see table 1.1 above).

underpinning the liberal state have been viewed as unable to implement a strong policy for environmental protection[71], and on a more empirical note the vote-maximising politicians in (liberal) representative democracy along with the strong ties between liberalism and capitalism have both been viewed as obstacles for effectively protecting the environment. Accordingly, when considering the evidence from the above analysis, the Swedish environmental discourse does not present any strong support for a conception of citizenship in line with the liberal ideal-type. Needless to say, the policy rhetoric certainly displays several similarities with core beliefs in the liberal ideal-type, but, the evidence also suggests, the policy discourse usually takes one step further in prescribing civic duties and drawing heavily on the notion of the common good, thus making it impossible to fit within the rather narrow frame surrounding ideal-typical liberal principles (even so when expanding this frame towards an environmentally sensitive liberalism, see section 3.4.2 above).

As an alternative to the rights-claiming liberal citizen and the principle of freedom *from* (interference by) the state, many political ecologists have instead turned their attention to the, within civic-republican citizenship central, duty-part of being a citizen, where the collective enterprise of working for the good of the community, in this case in the form of environmental protection, takes precedence over the (following Doherty and De Geus, 1996) individual atomism of the liberal citizen. As the evidence from the analysis rightly suggests, this line of reasoning is found also within the Swedish environmental discourse, where an active engagement, civic duties, collectiveness, the common good, as well as the state as actively and normatively pointing out the direction for the good citizen to move in, are highlighted. Therefore, the imagined environmental citizen in Swedish policy discourse could very well be interpreted as founded on the policy core beliefs of the civic-republican citizenship ideal-type. However, it is also these lines of reasoning which underpin Dobson's (2003) concept of ecological citizenship, in this thesis applied as the third ideal-type in the analytical framework. Also within ecological citizenship, the core values or beliefs prescribe to the duty-part of being a citizen rather than to civic rights as well as to the role of the state as driving the development by, for instance, introducing a normative education for sustainability (rather than a neutral or scientific education on sustainability). In addition, and in difference to what is being prescribed within the civic-republican ideal-type, Swedish policy expands the notion of citizenly activity beyond the political sphere, thus opening up what traditionally has been considered private as an arena in which the state has a mandate to make demands on its citizens to behave in a certain way (by placing demands on alteration of both household-related activities and the consciousness of the citizen). It is thus reasonable to ask if the Swedish environmental discourse outlines an

[71] For diverging views on this issue, consider the propositions made by, for example, Bell (2002 & 2005) or Wissenburg (1998).

image of the *ecological* citizen. Have the Swedish government left behind the traditional citizenship concepts in preference for a new take on rights, responsibilities and duties?

Despite the apparent connections between the policy discourse and the beliefs inherent in Dobson's ecological citizenship, the answer to these above questions is negative. It is obvious that the Swedish government's long-term commitment to a politics for ecological sustainability provides an image of the citizen which in several ways are stumblingly close to the principles outlined within ideal-type ecological citizenship. However, some important challenges to the ecological conception of citizenship are found within the policy discourse. *First*, the focus on contractual duties and the strong relationship with the state (rather than the non-contractual between-citizens-relations); *second* the territorial scope of citizenship, civic responsibilities, and motivations; *third* the image of the citizen as instructible and a passive receiver of instructions 'from above' (rather than as engaged and involved in community-level political deliberation and decision-making); *fourth and last* for the reciprocal motivations drawing more on welfare and public health, on personal benefits, and on the good for the Swedish community (than on the moral right of doing justice). When considering these deviations from core beliefs within ecological citizenship, the unavoidable conclusion is that core ecological citizenship ideals, at present, still lack significant support in the Swedish policy discourse and, all taken together, an environmentally sensitive civic-republicanism therefore hit closer to home than an ecological citizenship. Nevertheless, during the years that have passed since Rio, Sweden has taken significant and important steps on the way towards instigating new, environmental duties and responsibilities with the citizenry. Therefore, even though it perhaps is unreasonable to even expect a stronger resemblance with ecological citizenship at the present time, considering the recent developments of Swedish environmental policy (e.g. the work with initiating large-scale environmental education in the Swedish curriculum and the signing of the Aarhus-convention formally opening up for a more frequent civic involvement in decision-making) the prospects for developing a new take on citizenship and civic duties in the future seem promising.

6.4 Environmental policy legitimacy: the direction for further research

When approaching the legitimacy-problem for contemporary environmental policies, whether the aim being to point out the inconceivability of liberal environmental protection or attempt a reconciliation of the two belief-systems, the debate usually revolves around the *normative* definition of legitimacy. Thus, the issues here raised focus to an overwhelming degree on the theoretical incompatibility between those ideological principles underpinning the liberal state (as being the dominant political form for contemporary industrialised democracies) and those values or policies put fourth by proponents of an increased environmental protection (cf. Jagers, 2002). A

mismatch, which it probable will be if adapting a strict interpretation of classical liberalism, on this theoretical level contributes thereby to underscore either the, from an environmentalist perspective, problematic political structures of contemporary society and the need to reform and rethink not the least the role of the citizen, or the, from a liberal-theoretical perspective, illegitimacy of comprehensive environmental policies. As evident from the above analysis and interpretation of the Swedish environmental discourse, this would most likely be the outcome if adapting a normative view on legitimacy as the main approach of this thesis. However, as presented in Chapter 2 above, normative legitimacy emanates from the assumption that an objectively defined set of values or beliefs (usually liberal) is either more principally right, or more widely supported by the citizenry towards which the policy in question is directed. In this, however, the actual question of whether or not these values or beliefs indeed are shared by the subordinate (thus forming the basis for legitimacy), is disregarded. A focus on normative legitimacy thus lacks, in a manner of speaking, an important piece of the legitimacy-puzzle[72].

Therefore, the core theoretical assumptions of this thesis instead follow Beetham's (1991) definition of legitimacy as a tripartite structure and focus, first and foremost, on the prospect of new societal rules (in this case governing the state – individual relationship) being able to justify with reference to commonly held beliefs and values. As such, the focus for this thesis was described as to elucidate 'the Who, the What, the Where, the Why and the How of Swedish environmental policy' (p. 40), which also has been the focus for analysis so far and emanated in the conclusions on the Swedish environmental norm presented above. In order to complete the evaluation of Swedish environmental policy legitimacy, and by inference the prospects for successfully and effectively initiating new environmental duties, responsibilities and policy instruments directed towards the Swedish citizens, also a survey of the values already established in society needs to be performed and an analysis of value-correspondence executed. Only by, in this fashion, gathering all pieces of the legitimacy-puzzle together will a reliable legitimacy-evaluation be possible to complete. This, however, will form the centre of attention for forthcoming research. This thesis ends here.

[72] A similar, but reversed, critique can be directed towards the Weberian conception of social legitimacy (see Chapter 2 above).

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