The Operational Code of Tony Blair

Did he experience Learning, Stability or Change in his Belief Systems during the period he was Prime Minister?

Author: Simbarashe Nhandara

Supervisor: Michael Karlsson
Table of Contents

I. Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 3

II. 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
    1.1 Global Perspective and effects of Foreign Policy ................................................................. 6
    1.1 Problem ..................................................................................................................................... 8
    1.2 Purpose ...................................................................................................................................... 12
    1.3 Delimitations ............................................................................................................................ 15

III. 2. The Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................... 16
    2.1 The Operational Code .............................................................................................................. 16
    2.2 How are the Beliefs Calculated? .............................................................................................. 22

IV. 3. Previous Research ..................................................................................................................... 24
    3.1 Theory in Past Cases ................................................................................................................ 24
    3.1 Connecting Belief and the Op Code ......................................................................................... 27
    3.2 Why are Beliefs Important? ..................................................................................................... 28
    3.3 Fundamental Themes ............................................................................................................... 32
    3.4 Groupthink Effect on Decision-Making .................................................................................. 35

V. 4. Hypotheses .................................................................................................................................... 38

VI. 5. Method ........................................................................................................................................ 42
    5.1 The Verbs In Context System (VICS) ..................................................................................... 42
    5.2 What is Profiler Plus? .............................................................................................................. 44
    5.3 Sample ...................................................................................................................................... 45
    5.4 Procedure .................................................................................................................................. 46

VII. 6. Results of Operational Code Analysis .................................................................................... 49
    6.1 Kosovo ..................................................................................................................................... 50
    6.1.1 Post-Kosovo Results ........................................................................................................... 51
    6.2 9/11 ........................................................................................................................................... 53
    6.2.1 POST-9/11 RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 54
    6.3 IRAQ .......................................................................................................................................... 57
    6.3.1 PRE-IRAQ RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 58
    7.3.2 POST-IRAQ RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 60
    6.4 EU PRESIDENCY ..................................................................................................................... 63
    6.4.1 PRE-EU RESULTS ............................................................................................................ 64
    6.4.2 POST-EU RESULTS .......................................................................................................... 66

VIII. 7. Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 69
7.1 Blairite Theoretical Perspective ......................... 71

IX. 8. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 73

x. References ..................................................................................................................... 77
Abstract

The intention of this project is to examine whether or not; Anthony Charles Lynton “Tony” Blair, experienced any belief changes or learning, during the period he was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), a period which lasted 10 years commencing 1997 until 2007. Our analysis will cover a timeline beginning from 1999 a point in time when the UK participated in NATO’s Operation Allied Force during the Kosovo War until 2006 when Britain took on the reins of the EU presidency for a six-month period.

An exploration, of the beliefs behind a leader’s decision making logic, should always be considered a prudent undertaking especially when it comes to foreign policy studies. This is because, it is only through such activity scholars can comprehend the distinction between decisions and actions. Thus, understanding when and how; an individual leaders’ belief system changes, is of central importance in furthering our ability in explaining not only state behaviour, but, also the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’. The main purpose of an operational code analysis is to enable political scientists and policy makers alike, to deduce from a particular leader’s verbal content, what that actor's beliefs are and the premises they take in relation to their decision-making process.

The first of our two part hypotheses seeks to determine whether Tony Blair exhibited changes in his beliefs at various stages of his premiership. These stages were signified by events which were also crucial in defining his political legacy. The events are divided into three categories, Post Kosovo – Pre Iraq, Pre 9/11 – Post 9/11 and Pre EU – Post EU. On completion of our VICS and SPSS analysis on Tony Blair’s operational code belief we discovered that there were no statistically significant changes in any of his operational indices. So, due to the lack of statistically significant changes in Blair’s Philosophical and Instrumental indices we could not classify the events selected for this analysis as having produced any influence on his belief system. Thus we rejected our null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

**Key words:** Operational code, analysis, Tony Blair, statistical significance, Philosophical, Instrumental, Belief system, Foreign Policy, Other, Self, Kosovo, Iraq, 9/11, EU.
1. Introduction

The intention of this project is to examine whether or not; Anthony Charles Lynton “Tony” Blair, experienced any belief change or learning, during the period he was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), a period which spanned from 1997 to 2007. Our analysis will cover a timeline beginning in the year 1999 a point in time when the UK participated in NATO’s Operation Allied Force during the Kosovo War until 2006 when Britain took on the reins of the EU presidency for a six-month period. The analysis will be conducted using the operational code. Methodologically, the operational code seeks to describe how a country’s leadership or a specific leader’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs play vital roles in their decision making processes. Beliefs are significant, in that, they provide leaders with norms, morals, values, ethics, and standards. In brief, beliefs serve as guidelines and to an extent are also the basis for a government and its leadership’s foreign policy decision making practice (Breuning 2007). The operational code analysis, thus, is a neobehavioral approach, which enables researchers to take a glimpse of the thought process in the minds of particular leaders at given moments in time. In doing so, we more or less gain some understanding about the manner in which a specific leader comes to terms with certain notions and evaluations about the benefits and risks associated with the numerous courses of foreign policy action available to them. As we will see, the operational code achieves this by using two methods. The first method examines, the external world of events, which is generated by power and the behaviour of “Other” actors. While the Second method, is an examination of internal world beliefs, which are produced by the cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes of particular forms of leadership (Walker 2011: 6).

Hence, in a quest seeking to comprehend whether some of the key events experienced by Tony Blair, during his premiership, had any effect on his belief system, one, would inevitably need to conduct an operational code analysis, since it is through the latter, we could possibly fathom the goings on; in the minds of such individual leaders. As a trailblazer who managed to archive ten years in power, comprising of three electoral victories and foreign policy initiatives like no other, Tony Blair has been the most successful leader ever in the history of the British Labour Party. On the other hand, it is generally considered that even though he left “10 Downing Street” almost a decade ago; eight years to be precise, a lot of controversy still surrounds the issue of his legacy (Casey 2009, Burleigh 2015). What he is still and clearly remembered for, unfortunately, was his unwavering support towards the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Bearing, that in mind, one can only ponder on such questions as were any beliefs behind Blair’s support of the UK’s Foreign policy towards Iraq? Could it be that the decision to move beyond a policy of containment, and settle, instead on military invasion was a conscious one on his part? Or was there something more innate behind his decision making process? It is these very debacles and inexplicable occurrences, which make Tony Blair, not only a suitable case for the analysis of change, stability and learning in a leader’s belief system, but, a very interesting one too.

Thus, a brief exploration of information guiding our hypotheses indicates that the first of our two-part hypothesis seeks to determine whether Tony Blair exhibited changes in his beliefs at each stage of his premiership. These stages are signified by events crucial in defining his political legacy. Hence, the expectation is that Mr Blair’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs will be altered after each pre and post event analysis. The second hypothesis, sets out to test whether there was any prospect of Blair exhibiting longitudinal experiential learning. This form of learning is conceptualized within the operational code framework as being an occurrence were beliefs about the nature of the political universe are either strengthened, weakened or altered over an extensive period.

Furthermore, in the thesis we will observe how literature on “the operational code analysis” is characterised by two main groups. The first, evaluates a leader’s operational code change “longitudinally”, while the other group assess the effects of “specific” events on belief change and learning (Renshon 2011). Our hypotheses will combine both methods in order to effectively examine Tony Blair’s time in office, which had several key and definitive events take place. Namely, the war in Kosovo, 9/11 attacks, the Iraq War, and the UK’s ascension to the EU Presidency. These “events” should help us to explore and maybe even understand changes in Blair’s beliefs after each “specific” occurrence. While the “longitudinal” analysis will provide us with an evaluation of whether his beliefs evolved over the timeline covered, thereby resulting in learning or stability of beliefs. To assist in clarifying the term learning, for the purpose of this papers analysis, we can refer to Levy (1994), who considers, simple behavioural changes to be sufficient in supporting claims for learning. As a result, behaviour lacking in associated changes, which contain internal processes can be termed “simple” or “instrumental” social learning. In this form of learning actors exhibit changes in their tactics towards others, devoid of altering their own fundamental preferences and beliefs. While the instrumental form of social learning, constitutes behavioural changes and tactics, which do not
alter principal strategies and goals. In succeeding chapters, we will also evaluate and contextualise the effects of another form of learning, “experiential learning” in order to identify the types of stimuli, which are likely to generate such an effect.

Due to the complexity and yet limited work on the “operational code”, we will also explore, its theoretical character; which inevitably warrants an interpretation. As such, we will observe how the evolution of operational code analysis and its research originated with Leites (1951, 1953), work on the Soviet Bolsheviks and their Politburo. In his work, Leites (1951), used an operational code approach rooted in psychoanalysis. This method enabled him to examine the motivational foundations of the Soviet leadership belief system. Hence, the operational code, framework emphasizes the cognitive contents and motivational foundations of a groups or individuals’ belief system, which are in turn explained by Philosophical and Instrumental indices articulated by George (1969, 1979) and further formulated into a belief system typology by Holsti (1977). In 1969 George, reviewed Leites (1951, 1953) works, and suggested that a leader’s Philosophical beliefs were composed of beliefs which included; the nature of the political universe (P-1), prospects for the realization of fundamental political value (P-2), predictability of the political future (P-3), the control of historical development (P-4), and the role of chance within the political universe (P-5) (Walker 2011: 55-56). In addition to these philosophies George (1969) also included Instrumental beliefs, which considered strategic approaches to political goals (I-1), the tactical pursuits of these goals (I-2), management of risks (I-3), the role of timing (I-4), lastly the utility of different means for exercising political power (I-5) (Walker 2011: 56). Holsti’s (1977) typology was an identification and combination of Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs into a formation of six types of belief systems, which ranged from A to F (Walker 2011). As a result, the contribution this paper seeks to make will be to shed some light on which philosophical and instrumental indices, Tony Blair weighed in on the most for optimal benefits and risk averseness during his decision making process.

In so doing, the thesis endeavors to maintain the notion that within the political universe there are two basic features which constitute the world of political science. These features or components, are rationality and power, their roles conceptualise our understanding of cognition and behavior (Morgenthau 1985, Freedman 1976, Waltz 1996). The developments of these conceptualizations are linked to the amplification of theoretical explanations and patterns pertaining to continuity, learning and change within the political universe. Therefore, our investigation seeks to find answers connected to questions of how core and peripheral beliefs
embedded in an individual’s mindset influence or at least affect their foreign policy decision making processes. Especially, when we take into consideration bureaucratic and groupthink environments, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) or other situations which involve combinations of different ideologies as was the case with Tony Blair, when he allied with GW Bush in 2003. The significance of such a pursuit is designed to establish whether beliefs change or if any learning occurs from particular events, especially those consisting of exogenous shocks. According to Renshon’s (2008) study on the operational code analysis of GW Bush, traumatic or exogenous shocks can have fundamental influence on an individual’s belief system. Thus, due to our political universes’ unavoidable composition of a ‘world of beliefs’ and the ‘world of events’ it becomes imperative that we come to terms with how this system actually functions. Especially, if we are to make any intellectual sense of some of the baffling decisions political leaders have made and will continue to make. As a consequence, it is important to note that even though operational code analysis relies on written and verbal data, its basis of analysis still remains embedded on the world of beliefs and events, which in turn are linked together by the following three arbitrary proposals: i) the proposition for the World of Beliefs, suggests that there is a set of differing beliefs, whose elements help to define varying possible states of mind. These conditions include beliefs about how individuals exercise their rationality, while simultaneously comprehending the world’s unpredictability in as far as the minds of “Other” state actors is concerned. ii) Propositions concerned with the World of Events proclaim how there are sets of possible political action’s within the political universe, founded on different states of behaviour in addition to the exercise of power in an arbitrary world of events. iii) The third and final proposal, is concerned with how the Two Worlds Interact, in this scheme of things, the world of beliefs and the world of events are considered to be catalysts which reduce the entropy of possible states, equally, in each world’s state of mind as well as in its behaviour. In turn these actions account for the explanations of stability and change for each world (Walker 2011: 12-14).

We will also explore how the conceptualisation of decision making in foreign policy, combined with the concepts of rationality and power, two terms which are key elements and tend to be used interchangeably in the scholarship of international relations, are precisely what led to the formulation of the “rationality theorem” and the “concept of power”, thereby enabling scholars to specify what is actually constituted within the terms power and rationality when it comes to international politics. Simon (1985), outlines the concept of ‘rationality’ as being the
“behaviour applicable to specific goals within the context of given situations.” (p. 294). In addition to this notion, rationality can therefore be divided into arrangements, of two versions of the theorem, which are substantive rationality and bounded rationality. According to Simon (1985), substantive rationality is characterised by behaviour, which is generally refereed to objectively. While, bounded rationality expresses the behaviour of decision makers who are adaptive within the limits imposed upon them by external situations, thereby taking into consideration their capacities for problem-solving.

The counterpart of rationality, especially for the purpose of this paper’s context, is the concept of power (Walker 2011). The concept of power is considered to be an exercise which undertakes many forms during the course of strategic interactions between states or their individual leaders. During such processes nation-states attempt to shape one another’s behavior by means of their foreign policies. Thus, power is profoundly associated with the realist school of thought when it comes to international policymaking. Morgenthau (1978), essentially regarded the political universe, as an environment championed by the “struggle for power” (p. 29). While Holsti (1964), concurs with this viewpoint as he dubbed it “a struggle between independent units seeking to dominate others.” (p. 179). Walker (2011), in turn points out how this struggle for power is a systematic-level process, which at times can conveniently circumvent the question of rationality. Hence, the power theorem appeals to strategic decision making processes between actors who are informed by the definitions of power rested upon interests contained within their personal beliefs. Accordingly, within each version of the theorem; actor A would consistently engage actor B to accept the notion of embarking on a course or action, which B would not normally have been inclined to undertake or even consider.

As a result, and in similar fashion to the theorem of rationality, or the power theorem has two forms, which consist of the elements of power and the exercise of power, and can be argued as being: a) element of power, the distribution of resources necessary for one actor to exercise control over another actor in a strategic dyad. This objective is generally achieved through the use of technology, ideology, wealth and military might among other things (Walker 2011: 14). b) The exercise of power on the other hand, conceptualise’s how the use of words and deeds can be used to control behaviour. Furthermore, there are six basic formats used to distinguish behaviour within this construct. They are reward, promise; appeal/support, resist/oppose, threaten and punish (ibid). Therefore, according to Wendt (1999), strategic decisions between actors who are informed by the characterisations of power and interests in their beliefs; transform politics into a social process. In this paper we will take these concepts of rationality
and power, so as to build towards a better understanding of the political universe and its modelling and structuring principles.

While bearing in mind the above concepts, we will primarily focus our attention on Mr Blair and how the underlying patterns extracted from statements made by him can reveal his belief system. Statements and speeches, contain attributions of Self and Others as their antecedents for indicating a leader’s cognitive, motivational, and emotional structures in foreign policy. As a result, beliefs can play a role on how leaders interpret information and perceive the environments in which they make their decisions (Renshon 2011). Such an analysis can for example; help to put into perspective, Lenin’s infamous prescription “Kto-kovo: - who controls whom”, and even determine whether it still has any relevance on the decision making processes of the twenty-first century. Conversely, if we are to consider the prevailing situation in Ukraine, labelled by Blacker (2014), to be a Russian intervention looming at the cost of splitting a nation, then the answer is obvious. The ‘stale mate’, state of affairs in the Ukraine enables us to better comprehend how belief systems play vital roles in the decision making processes of international relations. If in Russia the “status quo” is still beached on the “kto-kovo” concept, then it will be difficult to envision a ceremonial and timely conclusion to the Ukraine crisis. 

For that reason, we will focus our attention on the theoretical model of the operational code analysis to find answers pertaining to questions such as: Do beliefs shift gradually over time? Do they change in fragments or in isolation? Are core belief changes instantaneous, especially when responding to traumatic events? And, are there specific factors such as learning or groupthink environments which influence belief change?

1.1 Global Perspective and effects of Foreign Policy

Another important aspect of the operational code construct, is how in the past decade the sheer size and scale of global interconnectedness has become increasingly evident. Globally we have witnessed a surge in economic and cultural integration, from real-time coordinated democratic uprisings, as was demonstrated by the Arab Spring in 2011. To the dominoes type effect; economic meltdown observed in 2008, where national economies concurrently became affected. These examples all show us how the concept of globalization, brings with it a vast array of unknown implications paired with untold processes of structural change (McGrew 2014). As a result, the twenty-first century’s international political arena can be likened to a treacherous sea, with events merely waiting to happen. Intrinsically, any blunders in the formulation of foreign policy could easily led towards irreversible collision courses of severe
magnitude. Thus, to avoid such occurrences leaders have to be cautious, on how they navigate these waters. Fortunately, and so far in this era, we have not witnessed as many man made catastrophic events like those of the twentieth-century. The twentieth-century was an era filled with many debacles and incidents. For example, there were two World Wars in the first half alone. The possibility of a nuclear cataclysm in 1962 (Allison 2012, Fernandez 2011), not to mention the Vietnam War (Espiritu 2014), the Gulf War (Yetiv 2004), wars on Decolonization (Matera 2015), unrest in the Middle East and the Cold War among others. The history of the 20th century was without doubt shaped by ever changing relations of the world’s great powers. The question which remains to be answered is was there any “learning”? As this inevitably leads to changes in future leaders’ decision making practices. Then again, since there hasn’t been a third World War, then the chances are that leaders’ beliefs might have been changed through learning from some of histories upheavals and tragic events. As we will see, Tony Blair’s Chicago speech was rooted in what Mikkel Rasmussen described as the “hegemonic western meta-narrative” on security and peace-building efforts; in which the twentieth century world is perceived to have learned. This is the case because on at least two occasions, it was established that appeasement did not work, with Hitler in the 1930s and Milosevic in the 1990s. Generally speaking, history has shown that letting dictators go unchallenged should not to be an option let alone a consideration (Rasmussen 2003). For all intents and purposes, learning within the operational code framework, occurs if and when a leader’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe, in terms of the most effective; means for achieving political goals are either strengthened, weakened or altered (Walker 2011).

Central problems faced in the world today might seem less calamitous and in some cases, are even considered minor or of a regional nature, but that does not change the fact that they are still significant. So far we have seen an enormous impact on the environment, as a result of ecologically associated disasters, not forgetting water scarcity and mineral peaks in gas, oil and uranium. In some regions, naturally occurring tragedies such as tsunamis and hurricanes have taken and destroyed many lives. While, others are still dealing the effects of economic downturns, and terror attacks. As a result, for such occurrences to be prevented or at least properly managed, states and their leaders will need to be capable of identifying the actions of ‘Others’, while still being capable of making choices which lead to more productive outcomes. Subsequently, this creates the need in world politics for the examination of pending issues on conflict, cooperation, domination and submission, from a macro level, towards that of a micro perspective (Walker 2011). Within, International Relations, these questions have been
answered differently at different stages and points in time. In the 1930s for instance, there was the “great man” approach, were only leadership mattered in explaining foreign policy outcomes. During the Cold War, conceptions changed and made more of an emphasis on states and their systematic attributors. After the Cold War, changes in the form of crisis management, inevitably led specialists to revert back to leadership based characteristic evaluations for improved foreign policy verities (Hudson 2014).

In turn, foreign policy has expounded from a nation-state level analysis to more of an individual ‘rational actor’ perspective, a notion predominantly embedded within the realist and power politics tradition. The assumption behind this concept is that governments and leaders act and think rationally in their quests for influence, prosperity, and status. Consequently, the vast majority of key decisions affecting global politics are either made by a small group of actors or individual leaders. Rationality, as a consequence assumes that decision makers perceive the world accurately and that misconceptions should only be treated as random accidents (Rosati 2000). Alex Mintz (2004), whom we can acknowledge as being at the forefront of advancing “Behavioural International Relations” BIR, highlights the importance of social-psychology in foreign policy analysis. Mintz (2004) regards the general systems theory which informs and unifies our social-psychological approach to be role theory. The history of role theory stems from the psychology and sociology faculties. It was used as a psychosocial model of social life, linking ‘actor’ roles with the opposing roles of ‘other’ actors, in order to delineate the social system of symbolic and strategic interactions (Walker 2011: 5). Accordingly, the application of role theory has been significant for the comprehension of world politics since the 1930s. Today, it still serves the purpose of analysing ‘decision making and learning’ in a bid to enhance our understanding of leaders and their political belief systems (Walker 2011; Wendt 1999).

1.1 Problem

The analysis presented in this thesis without doubt focuses on Tony Blair’s belief system. Thus, understanding when and how; an individual leaders belief system changes, is of central importance in furthering our ability to explain not only state behavior, but, also the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’. Yet, it is a research area which seems to have been largely undervalued (Birt 1993; George 1969). According to Allison (1971), anyone who has worked
in a bureaucratic setting, be it the private sector, government, or even universities, can acknowledge just how the decision-making process can at times be filled with egomania, pride, one up mans-ship, and other games which have nothing to do, what so ever, with the objectives of such establishments. Consequently, Birt (1993) suggests that, in social science we must, endeavor to understand “why” this is the case? In addition to knowing, when belief systems change and orchestrate transformations in the behaviour of individuals, institutions or systems of governance. This is purely because, it is at such junctures; that the subjective in theory becomes the objective of theory (p: 608).

In general terms the main purpose of an operational code analysis is to enable political scientists and policy makers alike, to deduce from a particular leader’s verbal content, what that actor's beliefs are (Walker et 2011; Walker and Schafer 2006; Malici 2007; Renshon 2008), and the premises they take in relation to their decision-making process. This in turn provides political researchers with insights for explanations of how particular actors react in regard to specific courses of action or events. Hence, the operational code analysis functions as a prism, in that when the indices of philosophical and instrumental beliefs are shown through it, they are refracted, thereby providing researchers with a glimpse of individual actors’ beliefs and perceptions, as well as, give scholars the opportunity to diagnose the reasoning behind a leaders’ political actions. Such an analysis, also helps us to make sense of actors’ definitions and estimates of particular situations, in addition to the perspectives; which consequently provide norms; standards and guidelines that influence the actors’ choices on strategy and tactics. Therefore, an actor’s structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action is determined by belief system influences, which in-turn shape their decision-making behavior (George 1969: 191).

One of the main tasks for political scientists is to explain the causes of political events, hence personality variables inevitably, become central components in assisting researchers to understand political phenomena. Unfortunately, such variables are seldom used within political scholarship, as the tendency seems instead to emphasis engagement on conventional research. Consequently, we find that international politics continues to be dominated by concepts of “state interest” political activities. In such cases the norm has a propensity to focus on traditional or “realist” explanations for state behaviour, as their central and causal elements (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1959; Keohane 1986). In this research, we acknowledge the idea that states, generally do not make collective decisions; but instead we argue, that decisions are
significantly influenced or predominantly formulated by individual leaders. We also hold the proposition that, when people make judgements, their personalities and beliefs play vital roles towards the outcomes of their final conclusions.

In 1997, the then, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, began his premiership with the intention “to establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society.” (Palmer 2004, The Telegraph). Since, spreading such values would make society safer. In addition to this, Mr Blair also wanted to develop and reformulate Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States of America. This was a friendship, which originally dated back to the period of the Second World War and was profusely, cemented during the Cold War, when both countries worked bilaterally within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to counter Soviet threats. It is important to note however that even at this point the relationship was never quite really considered a proper alliance. Looking back at NATO’s history we will find that in 1949, there were only 12 founding members of the organization, and both the UK and US, were inaugural members, which inevitably helped to increase ties (NATO, 2013). Relations, between the two countries, nonetheless, continued and were unmistakably boosted by the fact that the United States and the UK sat, and continue, as part of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This arrangement enabled both countries to perpetuate their democratically shared views, values and global vision on the international scene. It was, however, not until the aftermath of the Cold War, particularly in 1993 when President Bill Clinton was inaugurated, that a stronger push for the idea of Britain becoming ‘the bridge’ between the US and Europe really started to take effect. It is also worth mentioning, that during the early 1990s, the UK was an important protagonist in the course of events leading to Americas, first Gulf War. The then, Prime Minister John Major, initially took this leading role, alongside US President George HW Bush. Subsequently, leading to the two countries working collaboratively, towards stabilization and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans (Mix 2015: 8). During the late 1990’s, however, relations between Bill Clinton and Tony Blair seemed to strengthen the national friendship further, since the two leaders shared ideological propinquities. It is also fair to say that the two leader’s shared considerable individual differences; as far as certain opinions about resolutions were concerned (House of Commons 2008). This was relatively presented in Schafer and Walker’s (2006) Pre-9/11 operational code analyses, in which Blair and Clinton’s attitudes towards democracies and non-democracies were comparatively analyzed. The analysis presented some supporting evidence for monadic and dyadic versions of the democratic peace argument, in which institutional and
cultural differences attributed to the United Kingdom and United States of America by some scholars were confirmed. Schafer and Walker’s analysis recognized that, there was support for the dyadic argument, which showed that both the U.S and the UK were more likely to be cooperative with democracies than non-democracies. While the monadic perspective, showed that Blair and Clinton were similarly not peaceful towards all nation-states, especially non-democracies. Blair, in contrast, was found to have been a much less cooperative individual; especially when it came to issues relating to strategy and tact, in comparison to Bill Clinton. The study also presented results pertaining to the fact that Blair had a higher propensity to use threats as opposed to mediation (2006: 575).

George W Bush succeeded President Clinton in 2001, and the events which followed, 11 September 2001, propelled Blair to unite with him on the underpinning of war against terror. The catastrophic events of that fateful day, perpetuated US/UK relations further like never before. The only problem, was that Bush did not adhere to leftist ideology. If anything, he was defined as a neoconservative, and conservatives in America tend to observe, a “Realist” foreign policy alignment. On the other hand, both Blair and Bush seemed to share liberalist connotations of foreign policy dispensation. As far as their pursuit for approaches and solutions was concerned, they were grounded on strategies; which would make the world safer for the advancement of democratic values (Dunne 2014; Doyle 1997). Conversely, insofar as Blair’s international standing was concerned, his interventionist foreign policy proved most problematic; not only to his fellow Labour Party Parliamentarians (Clare Short; Robin Cook), but also for Western Europe’s; Social Democratic Parties (SDP). The policy was essentially a ‘hot potato’ and no one wanted to touch it. The social democratic parties of Western Europe may have been committed to collective security, but they were a lot more reluctant about the use of force. This essentially meant that Labour was the only SDP in Western Europe supporting the Iraq War (Bogdanor 2007: 81).

All the same, Mr Blair, unequivocally maintained that the ‘war on terror’ was justified. Furthermore, it provided him with an opportunity to demonstrate Britain’s commitment towards his intended relationship with America as well as in addition, to acting as a go-between with the rest of the world. The attempt, to make Britain the ‘bridge’ linking America and Europe, however, was rendered futile; after differences with major EU players, such as France, Italy and Germany stalled relations, over Operation Iraqi. As a result, and unsurprisingly, the Iraq War has been the subject of several major inquiries in the UK, which include, the
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the joint Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee in 2003. The Butler inquiry, which looked at the intelligence used to justify the war. The Hutton inquiry, 2004 in which, circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly where examined (BBC 2015) and the Chilcot inquiry, which began in 2009, and, whose report is yet to be published. These inquiries all set out to investigate, the UK's participation in the military action against Saddam Hussein and its aftermath (BBC 2014).

Accordingly, by the time our analysis is concluded, we should be in a better position to understand the Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs behind Tony Blair’s foreign policy decision making. Thereby, taking us a step closer to modelling the behavior which encompasses the internal biospheres in the minds of political leaders. In addition to comprehending the prevailing external world of foreign relations and its’; sometimes, baffling states of affairs (Walker 2011: 44).

### 1.2 Purpose

An exploration, of the beliefs behind a leader’s decision making logic, should be considered a prudent undertaking when it comes to foreign policy studies. This is because, only through such activity can scholars comprehend the distinction between decisions and actions. Operation Iraqi Freedom for example was meant to have been among other things a noble and admirable crusade. However, critics of that war; share the view that:

“Mr Bush effectively decided to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein by the middle of 2002. They say the UK knew this and offered to help. In his evidence, the UK’s man in Washington at the time - Sir Christopher Meyer - highlighted a private meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair in April 2002, after which Mr Blair began to talk publicly about regime change. Sir David Manning, Mr Blair's foreign policy adviser, said he had signalled his intention to back regime change but urged Mr Bush to get UN authorisation. Alastair Campbell, ex-No 10 communications director, said Mr Blair wrote private notes to Mr Bush during 2002 suggesting the UK would ultimately take part in military action if diplomatic efforts failed.” (BBC: 21 April 2015).

The question of change and stability, in foreign policy therefore, becomes, a significantly instrumental and imperative issue. Particularly, when it comes to understanding the positions,
behaviours, and actions of nation-states, on issues relating to peace and security. State actors, in foreign affairs are generally concerned with the courses of action other nation-states; may or are likely to take in the present as well as the future. In turn; this not only drives politicians to seek a better understanding and competence in their ability for forecasting such future state behaviour. But also the knowledge of how another nation-states’ policy could in turn be influenced. For that reason, scholars like Hudson (2014), suggest that every theoretical discipline has a grounding, through which the conceptualization of fundamental and foundational phenomena can be evaluated. Naturally, physicists (Feynman 1995; Goldstein 2002; Vera Rubin 1997) will work with theories pertaining to dark and antimatter, while economists (Keynes 1936; Schumpeter 1942) theorise on world market trends, grounding their research on households and corporations. However, within foreign policy theory; and more specifically in political leadership, there is still a significant amount of unresolved enquiries. These issues are usually concerned with factors which determine; when; whether, and to what extent pressure for the alteration of policy produces change.

On a state or macro level, Goldmann (1988), proposes three key problems in the analysis of international politics, these include: problems of adaptation; the problem of learning; and the problem of domestic change. Adaptation is a problem because nation-states are constantly under pressure to adapt themselves to ever changing environments. Learning for nation-states, on the other hand tends to take into account the way in which the environment responds to its policies; where negative feedback, can be the most likely catalyst for the realisation of change. While domestic change is generally determined by new people in positions of power, whose views simply differ from their predecessors. It can therefore be assumed that nation-states pursue identifiable and stable strategies. But then again on numerous occasions states have been known to go “rogue”. The term rogue was first used in the immediate post-Cold War era, and its application was aimed specifically at what the U.S state department considered unsavoury regimes (Henrikson 2001: 357).

The history of “rogue” states, can all the same be traced back to the middle ages when Gauls, and later the Germanic Visigoths and Vandals, attacked various parts of the Roman Empire (Norwich 1989). In modern times, however, an account of “rogue” can be drawn from the October Revolution 1917, which ushered into power the Bolsheviks, who advocated a radical domestic agenda, accompanied by ideological rhetoric directed against the international status quo. These radical actions emanating from Moscow, led America to isolate Soviet Russia for
at least a decade and a half because of her intended objectives (Henrikson 2001). This could also explain why the first recorded operational code model, conducted by Lieths (1951; 1953) was on the Bolsheviks and its Politburo (Walker 1990). It was not until 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, and its former client states started drifting, that modern day rogue states began to mushroom. Chiefly, amongst them were Cuba, North Korea, Libya and Iraq, who acted randomly and at times unlawfully in the absence of their great power patron. These states, however, quickly became communist relics left behind in the rush towards democratization, liberalized trade, and the free flow of information. Other states, became more dormant, Libya and Syria, for example exhibited a less vociferous attitude in their practice of terrorism. Even though they continued to pursue the development of missile systems and weapons of mass destruction (Henrikson 2001: 355). While other states, deprived of their Soviet largesse lost power, leading to the replacement of Marxism; by aspiring democratic governments in countries such as Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Mongolia (Ibid: 356).

Thus, when we consider the factors and distresses influencing changes in foreign policies around the world, the theoretical aspect of a behavioural approach to individuals still does not provide us with much academic knowledge (Goldmann 1988: 4). Except, that foreign policy is intended to be a means of protecting and safeguarding nation-state economies and their development (Mc Closky1962; Hudson 2014). Poststructuralists (Campbell 2007; Floyd 2007), nevertheless, contend that foreign policy analysis is about the identity of the “Self” in relation to threats, vulnerabilities, and challenges from the “Other”. Consequently, the challenge foreign policy analysis; exerts on the individual level; can be found to emanate from the absence of wide-ranging research, explaining the factors which account for the impacts pertaining to such levels of belief change (Hansen 2014). We, therefore, must acknowledge that the politics of representation is crucial. Subsequently, as Shapiro (1988) highlights, the manner in which leaders represent others, signifies a representation of their individual leadership beliefs. This representation also plays a decisive role on how the construction of foreign policy guidelines are selected and implemented. For that reason, we find that there is a paradox in the study of international politics especially when it comes to foreign policy decision making.

Empirically the beliefs of leaders are critical, because they provide a level of efficacy to political leadership by suggesting particular frameworks for the analysis of unique situations (Walker 2011). While theoretically, beliefs are vital for the reason that they offer a great deal
of direction especially when it comes to the outcomes of international political agendas (Walker and Schafer 2006). Accordingly, Renshon (2011) proclaims that despite the central importance of belief change, our level of understanding; why beliefs change is still far from perfect (2011: 169). In addition, the questions of: whether beliefs actually change and what causes them to change? Has over the years produced very little empirical research towards the development of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory. This is somewhat surprising, particularly when we consider how important the subject matter is towards the study of international relations. Therefore, the fact that we are still grappling, with reasons, why such few solutions have been given in regards to questions relating to factors influencing foreign policy decisions as well as the motives compelling the people who make them. Stands, as reason enough, to conduct an operational code analysis. In addition to this, its methodology rests upon a rigorously tested and proven investigational format, were data can be quantified, to provide reproducible results (Walker et al 1998; Robison 2006; Renshon 2008; Kai and Huiyun 2013). Thus, through this perception we can, denote that such an examination of information; will be immensely noteworthy, as it brings us closer to understanding some of the fundamentals emanating from belief systems, stability and learning of individual leaders and their likely patterns of change.

1.3 Delimitations

The delimitations confronted during the preparation of this project included a malfunction with the Profiler Plus software which initially failed to code the speeches. This was however, promptly rectified by the very professional team at Social Science Automation. Another delimitation was due to the changes made on the Downing Street website, which removed and transferred all of Mr. Blair’s speeches to the national archives, which was not the most user friendly website. Consequently, all 30 speeches used in this analysis where obtained from two third party sources, which were The Guardian Newspaper (with a total of 29) and Public Broadcasting Service PBS (with 1).
2. The Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of an operational code analysis, is used to elucidate how an individual leader or nation-state, manages conflict with other actors through verbal content. This is accomplished by evaluating the effects of a leader's inclinations in regards to his or her exercise of power at different levels of the decision making process (George, 1979; Walker 1990). This chapter, therefore, deliberates on how the fundamental focus of the operational code analysis is based on a diagnosis of power and its use by ‘Self and Other’ in the political universe. We will also explore, how a leader's personal predisposition as far as the exercise of political power is concerned, influence foreign policy. Walker et al (1998), contend that this explicit focus on the cooperative implementation of power by the Self and Others, is what differentiates operational code analysis from all other approaches. Included in this notion are approaches such as the ones developed by cognitive psychologists and personality trait theorists (Etheredge 1978; Shapiro and Bonham 1973). Therefore, the operational code relates the analysis of beliefs unequivocally towards the path of decisions and tactics; in relation to the perceptions of leaders. Consequently, decisions become the dependent variable and can be conceptualized within the process of tactical and strategic interactions. While, the philosophical and instrumental belief indices function as independent variables.

2.1 The Operational Code

In (1969) Alexander George, re-examined Leites (1951; 1953) work, and produced an influential piece titled, “The 'operational code: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making”, after its completion George (1969) highlighted how remarkably intricate Leites’ (1951, 1953) work was and that; while its difficulty added towards the aforementioned productivity and intellectual appeal, it was still nonetheless, considered rather challenging for general readership (George, 1969). Accordingly, George (1969), after taking Leites (1951; 1953), findings and borrowing the distinction between “epistemological” and “instrumental” beliefs, structured Leites’s results so that they could be read as answers to questions designed for the exploration of Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs within the Bolshevik ideology. In this pretext the term Philosophical, instead of epistemological belief refers to the expectations and principles about the fundamental nature of politics. While, Instrumental beliefs focus on the ends-means relationships found within the political context of deeds (Walker, 1990: p. 405).

Table 1; below illustrates, the theory’s influence, systematic approach as well as gives us an idea of how Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs enable answers and questions to act as “boundaries” for rational decision-making. According to Herbert Simon's (1953) concept of “bounded rationality”, in order for us to feel rational we tend to construct mental models of reality. This behaviour emanates from our inability to know, think and understand things, including ourselves (Hudson 2014). Converse (1964) put forward, the concept that
Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs can also be an arrangement of ideas and attitudes in which fundamental components are bound together by a limited but functional interdependence (p: 207-8). Through this conceptualization, hypotheses, which propose notions that operational code beliefs are internally coherent, or that they remain stable over time, and can therefore be extended across the problem areas faced by leaders, can thus be generated. Empirical research, to an extent has supported some of these hypotheses, but not all, as JFK’s analysis showed that ‘other’ leaders could be somewhat more complex than meets the eye (Stuart, 1979).

Even though Leites (1951; 1953; 1964) work could be used to demonstrate qualitative content analysis for the presentation of meaningful insights into the core of ruling groups. His work, displayed many of the problems associated with this form of content analysis, such as reliability and validity. George, on the other hand refined Leites technique with a list of Philosophical and Instrumental questions. This method guided a vast amount of comparable case studies involving American decision-makers, before ultimately producing a typology of operational codes. A review of these cases demonstrates how over time, content analysis techniques, have become refined and employed in contemporary Foreign Policy Analysis. In addition to operational code analysis, for linking the relationship between beliefs and behaviour.

Table 1. The table below provides a full list of the operational code questions: used in determining the Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs of leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS</th>
<th>INSTRUMENTAL QUESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?</td>
<td>1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?</td>
<td>2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?</td>
<td>3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How much &quot;control&quot; or &quot;mastery&quot; can one have over historical development? What is one's role in &quot;moving&quot; and &quot;shaping&quot; history in the desired direction?</td>
<td>4. What is the best &quot;timing&quot; of action to advance one's interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the role of &quot;chance&quot; in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
<td>5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Walker (1990: 405).
Firstly, however, we must consider the typologies and their relationship to operational coding. Holsti (1977) implemented a three-step strategy, in a further effort to develop a more refined programme of categories for operational code beliefs, thereby formulating six political belief systems based on both the Philosophical and Instrumental questions initially formulated by George (1969). Consequently, after Holsti’s inspiration from observations of George (1969) and other scholars work e.g. Jervis, 1976; and Verba, 1969. About the nature of political life and how the images of opponents are the major sources of constraint on the contents of ‘Others’ political beliefs. Holsti (1977), identified a set of hypothetical answers relevant to George’s philosophical questions, which dealt with the primary source of conflict in the political universe and whether this conflict was temporary or permanent.

Holsti (1977), is also referred to by Walker (1990), as having formulated the operational code typology which, shares similar characteristics to social-psychological theory of cognitive consistency. In this concept the basic unit of analysis is an individual’s behaviour, which is constrained by the decision maker's belief system. Its major components are both the Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs, as well as foreign policy strategies and tactics. The inference pattern, dominates the principle cognitive consistency, from which two general propositions are derived: (a) beliefs tend to reinforce one another to form coherent belief systems; (b) under specified conditions beliefs constrain the range of alternative choices, thereby influencing the final decisions (Walker, 1990: p. 409). In addition, Holsti’s (1977), application of Converse’s (1964) belief system definition, led to the development of a set of operational code categories. This inevitably turned out to have been a pivotal expansion for the development of the operational code analysis already in existence. It was through this addition, which amalgamated the case studies of the decision-making process with the beliefs systems; inspired by George's (1969) article, which in turn helped to define new lines of inquiry within cognitive consistency, psychodynamic origins, and the behavioural consequences of the operational code belief system (Walker, 1990).

The typologies referred to above are composed of sets of belief systems ranging from, A to F, and are derived as well as defined by the intersection of the two master beliefs i.e. “what is the fundamental nature of the political universe”, and “what are the fundamental sources of conflict” as shown in the figure below:

**FIG 1** Holsti’s revised typology, this version now consisted of four instead of the original six categories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical:</strong> Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A &quot;conflict spiral,&quot; based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by non-rational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. <strong>Instrumental:</strong> Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interest. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical:</strong> Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and can be deterred. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. <strong>Instrumental:</strong> One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical:</strong> Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. <strong>Instrumental:</strong> Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type DEF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical:</strong> Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Simba Nhandara

long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. **Instrumental:** Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only

(Source: Walker, 1986)

A few years on, Walker and Falkowski (1984) used Holsti’s (1977) revised, and “now” four type version, of the typology as their basis for research into the relationship between, the crisis bargaining tactics of U.S. presidents; secretaries of state and their operational codes. Walker and Falkowski’s (1984), research design endeavoured to measure the operational code beliefs of Truman, Kennedy, Eisenhower, Rusk, Marshall, Dulles, and Johnson; with the intention of linking them, while, using a selection of sequences and moves by their governments during a couple of crisis which occurred in the course of their respective administrations. The research established that the results aligned neither to the six types of belief systems in the original Holsti typology nor to the four types of the revised typology version (Walker, 1990).

It is important, nonetheless, to point out that the evolutionary process of the operational code analysis research program did not sever away its link to cognitive, emotional, and motivational focal points. It instead, has over the years advanced into a more economical process of combining the original points of Leites studies of the Bolshevik’s, into a judicious analytical and methodological framework (Walker 2011). The framework inevitably emphasises the cognitive contents of the individual’s belief system in a four quadrant typology format. In this quadrant type and format, the motivational foundations for beliefs are determined by horizontal and vertical axes emanating from the centrally positioned “nuclear self”. It is also from this point that the development of needs achievement, affiliation and power derive (Winter 2003; Walker and Falkowski 1984). Hence, it is this link between cognitive and motivational contents, which lays the ground for an individual’s personality; to organise decision making into different preference positions about political outcomes, settlement, domination, and submission. These outcomes, however, will inevitably depend on the decision makers state of mind at the time of the decision making process.

Thus if a leader’s self-image is located in one of four quadrants, then it is possible to make a deduction about behavioural predictions with different levels of confidence regarding tactics and strategies. These predictions are based on preferences for cooperation or conflict in addition to the dominant strategy and control over historical development. These predictions can be considered to be like forecasts of likely deviations from the norms of exchange. Hence, depending on the existing data from an actor’s public statements, it is also possible to refine predictions and raise the confidence level for a particular leader’s estimate.
Walker, Schafer, and Young’s (1998) study is a good example of this, when they analysed President Jimmy Carter’s operational code, and the results indicated elements of Carter’s belief system remaining relatively stable over much of his period in office. They also found that no real statistically significant changes in the VICS indices had occurred for his general operational code. Changes were only realised after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Overall, they concluded that key VICS indices which located Mr. Carter in the Type C quadrant (I-1 and I-2) did not change enough to explicitly move him into a different quadrant. However, key indices which summarised the nature of his political universe (P-1 and P-2) shifted towards the direction of the Type DEF quadrant. As shown in Fig. 2 below (Holsti, 1977: p. 156-158).

**Fig. 2.** The four types (A, B, C, DEF) shown reflect the ideal types located in the three dimensional space moulded by dimensions of power, affiliation and achievement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Preference Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type A</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type A quadrant with a relatively friendly strategic orientation and a relatively low sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Appease and Bluff associated with an Appeasement strategy. The more cooperative the tactical intensity index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Settle&gt;Deadlock&gt;Dominate&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type C</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type C quadrant with a relatively friendly strategic orientation and a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Reward and Deter associated with an Assurance strategy. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Settle&gt;Dominate&gt;Deadlock&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type DEF</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type DEF quadrant with a relatively hostile strategic orientation and a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Divide and Conquer associated with a Conquest strategy. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the higher the locus of historical control index, the lower the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Dominate&gt;Settle&gt;Deadlock&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type B</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type B quadrant with a relatively hostile strategic orientation and a relatively low sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Divide and Conquer associated with a Conquest strategy. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Dominate&gt;Deadlock&gt;Settle&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social High Achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
<td>Preferenc Order: Dominate&gt;Settle&gt;Deadlock&gt;Submit</td>
<td>Preference Order: Dominate&gt;Deadlock&gt;Settle&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Preference Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type A</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type A quadrant with a relatively friendly strategic orientation and a relatively low sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Appease and Bluff associated with an Appeasement strategy. The more cooperative the tactical intensity index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Settle&gt;Deadlock&gt;Dominate&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type C</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type C quadrant with a relatively friendly strategic orientation and a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Reward and Deter associated with an Assurance strategy. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Settle&gt;Dominate&gt;Deadlock&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type DEF</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type DEF quadrant with a relatively hostile strategic orientation and a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Divide and Conquer associated with a Conquest strategy. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the higher the locus of historical control index, the lower the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Dominate&gt;Settle&gt;Deadlock&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type B</strong></td>
<td>Leaders in the Type B quadrant with a relatively hostile strategic orientation and a relatively low sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favour the tactics of Divide and Conquer associated with a Conquest strategy. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.</td>
<td>Dominate&gt;Deadlock&gt;Settle&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social High Achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
<td>Preferenc Order: Dominate&gt;Settle&gt;Deadlock&gt;Submit</td>
<td>Preference Order: Dominate&gt;Deadlock&gt;Settle&gt;Submit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21
a relatively low sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Compel and Punish associated with a Coercive Diplomacy strategy. *The more intense the tactical conflict index and the higher the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.*

**TYPE DEF**

High Power

a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Bully and Exploit associated with a Brinkmanship strategy. *The more intense the tactical conflict index and the higher the locus of control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction.*

**TYPE B**

Holsti, 1977: p. 156-158. *Philosophical Beliefs are in bold, Instrumental are in Italics.*

### 2.2 How are the Beliefs Calculated?

Walker and Falkowski (1984), also found a series of hybrid types, in which the decision-makers' strategies were combinations of philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Their findings also indicated; that an aggregate pattern of crisis bargaining tactics by the governments, of the decision-makers in question, tended to correspond to congruent patterns of motivations and beliefs (Walker and Falkowski, 1984). The above texts in Figure 2, recapitulate the main Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs identified by George (1969, 1979) and Holsti (1977).

As such the operational code analysis enables us to aggregate these indices, which, in turn can be tested for statistical significance. Georges (1969), appraisal of Leites (1951, 1953) studies, therefore recommended that a leader’s Philosophical beliefs included the nature of the political universe (P-1) its index consists of: % Positive Other Attributions minus % Negative Other Attributions. Comments: -1.0 = Conflictual...+ 1.0 Cooperative, a leader’s prospects of realising fundamental political values (P-2) Index: Mean Intensity of Other Conflict/Cooperation Transitive Verb Attributions for Scale with Values of -3 = Punish, -2 = Threaten, -1 = Oppose/Resist, 0 = Neutral, +1 = Appeal/Support, + 2 = Promise, + 3 = Reward. Whether the political future was predictable (P-3) Index: 1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV). The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio which consists of the number of different pairs of observations within a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications (Watson and McGaw, 1980:88, cited in Walker et al 1998: 179). Comments: .00 Lowest....1.0 Highest Predictability. Control of historical developments (P-4) Index: Self Attributions divided by Self Attributions plus Other Attributions. Comments: .00
Other Locus of Control...+ 1.0 Self Locus of Control. The role of chance in the political universe (P-5) Index: 1 minus Predictability Index multiplied by the Control over Historical Development Index. Comments: .00 Lowest...1.0 Highest. These Philosophies would then be combined with; Instrumental beliefs relating to; political goals (I-1) Index = % Positive Self Attributions minus % Negative Self Attributions. Comments: -1.0 Conflictual Strategy. +1.0 Cooperative Strategy. Tactical pursuits of goals (I-2) Index: Mean Intensity of Self Conflict/Cooperation Attributions for Scale with Values of -3 = Punish, -2 = Threaten, -1 = Oppose/Resist, 0 = Neutral, + 1 = Appeal/Support, +2 = Promise, +3 = Reward. Comments: To make the scale's range more comparable to the other indices, the mean is divided by 3 to obtain a range of -1.0 Very Conflictual Tactics...+ 1.0 Very Cooperative Tactics. In calculating the mean index, cases in the zero category are omitted. Risk management (I-3) Index: 1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV), for self-attributions. Comments: .00 Risk Averse (Low Predictability) 1.0 Risk Acceptant (High Predictability). The role of timing, cooperation v conflict (I-4a) Index: Shift Propensity is 1 minus Absolute Value of [% Positive Self-Attributions minus% Negative Self-Attributions]. Comments: .00 Low Shift Propensity...1. 0 High Shift Propensity, while timing of words v deeds (I-4b) Index: Shift Propensity is 1 minus Absolute Value of [% Words minus % Deeds]. Comments: .00 Low Shift Propensity...1. 0 High Shift Propensity. Lastly the utility of means for exercising political power (I-5) Index: Percentages for Transitive Verb Categories (Punish, Threaten, Oppose/Resist, Appeal/Support, Promise, Reward). Comments: .00 Low Utility...1. 0 High Utility for each category of means (Walker et al, 1998: 178-9). Hence, the operational code analysis method has evolved in such a way as to prevent itself from losing its unique cognitive, emotional and motivational principals originally formulated by Leites (1959).
3. Previous Research

The fact that individuals, differ from one another, inevitably, means that they will inexorably behave differently. While, characteristics such as mentality and behaviour matter, distinctions still need to be made about how and whether these differences actually, substantiate the foreign policy building exercise. For that reason, this chapter emphasises, that the operational code is a psychologically based construct, with, cognitions and beliefs representing the sub-conscious and conscious annexes of an individual’s personality (Schafer et al 2011: 112-3). As a result, we are going to evaluate how some leading politicians’, personalities have brought meaning to the operational code construct. As well as to putting into perspective the link between beliefs and the operational code.

3.1 Theory in Past Cases

Over the years, political scientists have become fascinated and intrigued to say the least, by some of the bizarre and puzzling foreign policy decisions made in previous decades. This in turn has resulted, in a significant effort to analyse the belief systems of numerous policy making individuals in positions of leadership within IR. This research approach ranges in cases with personalities such as Herald Wilson to JF Kennedy, Jimmy Carter to President Obama, and Castro to Kim Il Sung (Walker 2011; Renshon 2009; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998; Malici and Malici 2005). The main drive of this kind of research stems from objectives seeking to understand leadership while building knowledge on decision makers and inquiries on central behaviour in International Relation micro-foundations, which are all based on the idea that individuals matter considerably when it comes to foreign policy analysis. Such perceptions, also present scholars with a concern. This concern is founded on the view that, if individuals matter, then we have to take into account their psychological characteristics.

In some cases, decisions may have turned out to be of little consequence and simply diminished into obscurity. While the vast majority, however, have been widely responsible for plunging many a “nation-state” into major wars and crisis. Some, examples of these puzzling incidences readily fill our historical archives. Breuning (2007), for example highlights how; Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of Britain, made what could have been considered on his part, an honourable, but vitally fateful agreement with Adolph Hitler, on the 29th of September 1938 at the Munich conference. In the treaty, Chamberlain agreed not to object to Germany’s seizure of Sudetenland, which was a former portion of Czechoslovakia, situated on the border between
the latter and Germany. Due to Sudetenland’s high percentage of German-speaking inhabitants, resulting from it having been carved out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I. Hitler, felt it was only timely and appropriate for Sudetenland to be re-incorporated into German territory. In return he promised to respect the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia (ibid p. 2). Satisfied with the agreement, Chamberlain returned to Britain confident that his personal meeting with Hitler had given him an opportunity to judge for himself; Hitler’s character and trustworthiness. Another important consideration, to point out, was that Chamberlain had counted on the recent events and memories of the just ended War which, had witnessed enormous casualties and atrocities. Unfortunately, Chamberlain could not have been more wrong, since, Germany continued with her conquests, to such an extent that shortly after their meeting, Europe was engrossed in a full scale war (Ibid).

In another incident further on in history, October 1962 to be precise, an American U-2 spy plane photographed a nuclear-tipped missile Launchpad under construction, 90 miles off the United States' coast, belonging to the Soviet’s, on Cuban soil. The then, President J F Kennedy from the outset heralded the fiasco to have been an infringement of U.S space. Embroiled Nikita Khrushchev, President of the Soviet Union into what was to become known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. After a week of intense and secret deliberations with his advisers, Kennedy publicly announced the discovery and imposed a naval blockade on shipments headed for Cuba. The objective of the blockade, was to prevent further materiel entering Cuban soil; even though not much could have been done to prevent the Soviets from operationalizing the already landed missiles (Allison 2012). Moreover, the intensity of this situation, was exacerbated by the discovery of the Bay of Pigs, shenanigans, where American trained exiles had attempted to topple the Cuban president, Fidel Castro. Not to mention that the Cold War was also at its peak. Thus, another week of tense negotiations followed during which Kennedy and Khrushchev, both stood their ground, with neither one agreeing to backing down. Kennedy; who was chief of a military in the process of building up a significant weaponry backup had a stronger strategic advantage (May & Zelikow 1997). The U. S had both intercontinental missile capability as well as missiles close to the Soviet Union at a base in Turkey (Breuning, 2007). On the contrary, Khrushchev seemed to have felt that having missiles in Cuba was comparable to the U.S. having a base in Turkey. However, what was puzzling, is that given the political climate and relations between the two countries, at the time, no American president would have allowed nuclear missile launching capabilities so close its shores, especially those belonging to the USSR. At least, that crisis was resolved without physical conflict. Khrushchev accepted
an offer from the U.S., which pledged not to invade Cuba, in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles (Ibid).

Subsequently, from an observer’s point of view or further more; a historical perspective, the decisions made by the leaders in the two cases above might be puzzling to us, however, to them and at the time of the decisions they would have probably seemed rational. We can go further and argue that the decisions were puzzling, because our anticipation is that leaders should know better. In most cases leaders are done away with for being deemed irrational, and they have their policies equally dismissed, as was the case with Khrushchev, whose political career came to a premature end; in 1964 only two years after the crisis. The dismissal of leaders in lieu to their actions, without any explanations or accountability does not help us to understand the logic behind their decisions. Therefore, it is important when seeking an explanation of foreign policy decisions, to note that the leaders who made these decisions, as puzzling as they might have been, did so under the pretext of having been rational human beings, simply looking out for the best interests of their respective sovereign states (Tetlock 1992).

This leads us to deliberate a little more on the term, “bounded rationality”. This is an axiom coined up by Simon (1995), who put into perspective situations in which, individuals almost always had reasons for doing what they did, but those reasons were never considered to have been paramount. Henceforth, consequences of actions tend to be ignored or misjudged, either because information is lacking; erroneous or the relevant computational power was insufficient to estimate the consequences of the actions (Simon 1999, 1996). Thus, trade-offs among goals are handled inadequately and potentially effective action may be unknown or even ignored. Simon (1995), goes on to exemplify this by confirming that the framers of the United States Constitution were not only bounded; but considered themselves rational individuals. He arrived at this conclusion on the basis that, America’s political founders:

“designation of the candidate scoring the second largest presidential electoral vote as vice president aimed at certain goals and equality of representation of the states, but at the expense of other goals such as equal representation of voters” (Simon, 1995: p. 47).

If we are to understand how leaders view the world as well as the motives behind the decisions they make, then there is not much choice except to analyse their public persona; in order to find some hints about the individual behind it. Over the years a number of strategies on how to achieve this have been proposed, they range from biographical information, speeches and
comments made during interviews, not forgetting interpretations of body language during public or even informal occasions. Such activities help with foreign policy analysis because they provide indicators, which could in turn be used for in-depth analyses of what would normally have been closed door affairs. Let us take the example of an attempt to investigate Soviet leadership during the Cold War era. The amount of data needed for such an undertaking would have been significant; i.e. notes, texts or spur-of-the-moment interviews would virtually not have been as voluntarily accessible as they are today. Even in today’s political setting, interpretations of policy and decision making processes, tend to be ‘hush hush’; or at least watered down in official news outlets. Consequently, Nathan Leites introduced the operational code construct into the domain of political psychology in his two volume classics, “The Operational Code of the Politburo” (1951) and “A Study of Bolshevism” (1953), (Walker 1990). Some ten years earlier, Merton (1940) had created the phrase "operational code" which he used as a reference to values, world views, and response collections which an individual would have acquired and shared with other members of an organisation. It was in the, A Study of Bolshevism, however where Leites (1953) broadly elucidated the scope of what the operational code analysis recognized. Leites essentially went beyond Merton’s sociological technique and ventured into the field of organisational decision-making, while using social psychology and psychoanalysis. His first acknowledgement was the shared response selection of Politburo members on decision making rules, which, highlighted their world views about how those rules were constructed. In addition to accounting for the origins of those rules and views, within a psycho-cultural analysis of the fundamental impulses linked to Bolshevism and its manifestation within varying degrees to the personalities of Lenin and Stalin (Leites, 1953; Leites, 1964 cited in Walker 1990: p. 404).

3.1 Connecting Belief and the Op Code
Hence, decision makers are constantly viewed as operating in dual-aspect settings were unrelated internal and external factors become connected through their actions (Snyder et al 1962: 85). Contemporary research, therefore considers change to be any statistically significant shift in one’s operational code. This significance not only reveals, whether real change occurs; but also, the magnitude of such change. Since through this magnitude, which reflects how pronounced the alteration would be in regards to action, inaction and a leader’s behaviour during event occurrences (Hudson 2014). Some answers may be revealed, and even knowledge enhanced regarding the question of; what types of changes occur? We should therefore not forget that a leader’s operational code links theory on belief systems, which in turn connect the
external world of events to the internal world of beliefs. Also, and according to Festinger (1962), beliefs in cognitive consistency are hierarchical. The consistency concept is founded on the notion that change usually takes the form of altering original attitudes, so that they can conform, to real behavior. This too, is reiterated by Renshon (2008), who indicates how beliefs should be thought of as continuums concerning core, important or fundamental beliefs. While, peripheral beliefs, constitute the lesser essential principles. What is significant about this notion is that core beliefs are highly resistant to change. As a result, they help to structure other peripheral beliefs, which tend to be more prone to changes. Additionally, when a core belief changes, it will alter other peripheral beliefs in a bid to maintain internal consistency. Thus both change types are noteworthy, the reinforcement of beliefs, for example shows how a statement such as “the world is friendly” can be reinforced to “the world is very friendly”. While the second form, can reverse beliefs from “I thought the world was friendly” to “now I believe the world is hostile” (Renshon 2011: 173). Operational code and belief systems; can thus be largely separated into binary forms, i.e. those focusing on the reinforcement of beliefs and systems emphasising the reversal of beliefs.

### 3.2 Why are Beliefs Important?

Some of the major findings in the past half-century, highlight how individuals filter new information through their pre-existing beliefs using methods which, reflect their maintenance and determination for the consistency of those beliefs. As such, before we can delve into earlier works and their analyses, this would be a good juncture to reflect on literature delineating “belief” significance.

According to Jervis (2006), ‘People adopt opinions not only to understand the world around them, but, to meet the psychological and social needs, required to live with themselves and others’ (ibid: 641). He goes on to highlight how beliefs can refer to inner states as well as outer realities; and how statements about beliefs can be exhortatory. Least of all, beliefs have strong elements of commitment and faith, even when there are no religious connotations involved (ibid: 642). As a result, international relations scholars seek to comprehend why political actors believe in their beliefs. In addition, to understanding whether these beliefs are correct and justified through means available evidence. The beliefs, we seek to explore in this paper are also referred to as ‘attributions’ in psychological literature, and they refer to causality in the world (Hudson 2014). Even though, these connotations differ, they still tend to be fused. Leading us to often think that, what we consider to be correct beliefs require no explanations.
While, in actual fact, misguided assumptions that correct beliefs are self-evident and follow on from ordinarily available evidence are only made plausible because such presumptions, prevent us from questioning given evidence, and as a result of this evidence, which is widely accepted, beliefs can turn out to be incorrect. Thus, according to Laudan (1977), it would be alluring, but a mistake nonetheless, to seek an explanation of correct beliefs in a manner which is fundamentally different to that of explaining incorrect beliefs. Therefore, Jervis (2006) points out, that given the complexity and ambiguity of our world, it is regrettably true that beliefs, in which a great deal of evidence has been gathered; can often turn out to be mistaken because of associations with faulty reasoning processes. For instance John Locke (1689), proposed that individuals were born without existing mental content, and that all their knowledge came from experience and perception. This was, however, proven wrong when modern research (Rutter 2006), showed that family environments and genes “nature v nurture” both played vital roles in the formation and creation of an individual’s traits. Similarly, there is often time and again, a tendency of not seriously taking into consideration beliefs we disagree with, which in-turn leads to misconceptions of the people or issues we would be trying to understand (Ibid: 643). An illustration of this would be how if; the reconstruction of Iraq continues to be hindered, future generations will then be more likely to reject the idea that Blair and Bush truly believed that Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They would, instead, be more prone in the future to accept as being true; that their intentions were motivated by other issues such as oil and Israel (Ibid).

Furthermore, Jervis (2006) contends that, the driving force behind some beliefs may be so widely shared that, they never need to be expressed, with specific actions. This is often because such beliefs are rarely analysed by the individuals who believe in them. We normally call these “assumptions”. So even though the reasons we give for most of our beliefs may be sincere, for the reason that we believe in them, it must, also be noted that these are at times simply stories we tell ourselves and others because we merely understand as little about what drives our beliefs as much as we do about what is driving the beliefs of others. Therefore, philosophies provide decision makers with crucial utility, in addition to facilitating ready frameworks for the analyses of novel situations. This sometimes occurs to such an extent that a person who might have been in favour of military intervention in Iraq due to their resentment of despotism and belief in societal democratic norms, may also be unaware of the fact that nation-states put national security interests first, and that strong societal norms merely make such state actions plausible (Chandler 2013). As a result, all we can do is infer our day to day functioning from
the principles of general behaviour. In the case of operational code analysis, this behaviour can be analysed through verbal interaction. So, when A, for example formulates a verbal message, which is in turn transmitted to B, both A and B interpret this articulation consciously as well as subconsciously. Therefore, word choices tend to be guided by a desire to bring forth predetermined cognitive, evaluative and affective responses from the individuals receiving the messages (Graber 1976: 3-4). For that reason, our understanding of politics depends heavily on verbal symbolism, and so, when we characterise a country as being “democratic” or a “dictatorship”, what is being presented to us would principally be verbal images of relationships without any other reality beyond that of the verbal connotation (ibid).

And so, we find that most physical acts affecting society within the political realm, tend to be initiated by verbal behaviour, and that they are strongly dependent on the meanings assigned to words. Another good example, of this would be how in light of past events such as the Kosovo intervention by NATO, and more specifically Iraq, there has been a growing tendency in most public debates about the negative effects of military interventions. According to Tendi (2014), there are times when military intervention could be deemed necessary and viable. In his Guardian newspaper article, he pointed out how Blair’s, Sierra Leone military intervention in 2000 helped to resolve that country’s crisis. Tendi (2014) also argued that, “we must not forget the necessity of intervention in cases of genocide”, relating this to the lack of action taken by high ranking international actors over Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, were at least 800 000 people lost their lives. The Rwanda case among others, was partly behind the notion of Blair’s “new doctrine”, in that capable nations should “intervene”. As was expressed by Abbott and Sloboda (2004), in their article “The ‘Blair doctrine’ and after: five years of humanitarian intervention”, that it may be acceptable to intervene, then again, “not for territorial interests, but in order to save the lives of peoples threatened by humanitarian disasters” (22 April 2004), this may be a potentially moral and moving concept, nonetheless, we must first consider; what the general belief is when we use the term “sovereign”. Rendering, that social constructivists consider sovereignty to have been a product of historical forces, which generated new distinctions about where political authority resided (Barnett 2014). The Westphalian concept of sovereignty consisting of a territory whose governance was exclusive to the public of that land, seems to have been displaced by a new type of sovereignty, which concedes to the idea of a shared exercise of public power and authority, the African Union (AU); European Union (EU) and the Union of South American Nations (USAN) reflect hints of this notion. This is also the result of how global enmeshment has triggered national governments to become
extensively engaged in multilateral collaborations in order to simply achieve domestic objectives (Mc Grew 2014).

Breuning (2007) on the other hand, contends that; how we perceive the world is dependent upon our ability to change. He highlights that, perceptions which may have been accurate at a point in time, but become inaccurate, could still endure and become the perspectives we continue to view the world. Thus, if circumstances change, and our beliefs do not, then, it will be through the deep-rooted and longstanding beliefs that our interpretation of new information and environments will continue to be guided. Jervis (2006), likewise, emphasises that the prevailing intellectual climates built on Social Darwinism; combined with outlooks of what leaders absorbed when they were in school, could ultimately be responsible for initiating leaders to make “assumptions”. Instead of disciplined forms of thought which are rational, unprejudiced, clear and informed by evidence.

On, 22 April 1999, in Chicago then, British Prime Minister Tony Blair offered the “international community” a set of criteria for deciding when and how to intervene militarily in the affairs of another country. Rendering, the threat posed; was not immediate, to the outside world, but instead significant to the domestic population (Abbott and Sloboda 2004), he called these proposals the “doctrine of the international community”. In his speech, Blair went on to lay out five key questions which had to be considered before any form of action was taken for intervention:

• Are we sure of our case? • Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? • Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? • Are we prepared for the long-term? • Do we have national interests involved? (House of Commons 2008: p 10)

So even though, as Tendi (2014), claimed, that intervening militarily in Kuwait during the 1990s, may have been the right thing to do, and since leaders of other countries cannot just go marching into sovereign territories and taking them over. Iraq, a decade later would have been no different? Chomsky (2001) conversely, proposed a different notion to what was considered:

“the first war in history fought “in the name of principles and values,” the first bold step towards a “new era” in which the “enlightened states” will protect the human rights of all under the guiding hand of an “idealistic New World bent on ending inhumanity,” now freed from the shackles of archaic concepts of world order.” (Chomsky: April-May 2001).
He based his argument on the fact that Cambridge University, Law Professor, Marc Weller’s introduction; to the volume on Kosovo, a document Weller edited. In which he is also quoted by Chomsky as having recognized that the NATO special operation bombings, which he had strongly supported, were a clear violation of international law, as a result, they could only have been justified on the basis of an alleged “right of humanitarian intervention.” (Chomsky 2001). Further, damming evidence on this issue was reported in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) publication “Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As Told. Volume II, 14 June- 31 October 1999” which gave an analysis of human rights findings from the OSCE Mission in Kosovo beginning in June until October of 1999. The OSCE is further cited by Chomsky (2001), as having reported on how, “the most visible change in the events were after NATO launched its first airstrikes”, on March 24, “the situation seemed to have slipped out of the control of the authorities, as lawlessness reigned in the form of killings and looting of houses” (ibid). Such, occurrences bring into debate whether concepts of justice, such as the Theory of Justice put forward by Rawls (1971) can ever be conceivable. As, such an approach should know no biases, and if anyone was to contemplate Rawls form of justice, then its conception should come through the guise of a commonly shared view.

3.3 Fundamental Themes
What follows is a brief exploration of information guiding our hypotheses. The first of our two part hypotheses seeks to determine whether Tony Blair exhibited changes in his beliefs at various stages of his premiership. These stages are signified by events which were also crucial in defining his political legacy. Thus, the expectation is that Mr Blair’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs will be altered after each pre and post event analysis. The second hypothesis, sets out to test whether there was any prospect, of Blair exhibiting longitudinal experiential learning. This form of learning is conceptualized within the operational code framework as being an occurrence were beliefs about the nature of the political universe are either strengthened, weakened or altered. The events are divided into three categories, Post Kosovo – Pre Iraq, Pre 9/11 – Post 9/11 and Pre EU – Post EU.

The events, all occurred during Tony Blair’s 10-year premiership and were partly perpetuated by his activist philosophy of ‘interventionism’. In addition, to his determination for wanting to maintain a strong alliance with the US and a commitment of placing Britain at the heart of Europe. Although the ‘special relationship’ and the issue of the UK’s role in Europe have been central to Britain’s foreign policy since the Second World War. Interventionism, however, was never a major factor. There were also other less immediately visible changes to Britain’s
Simba Nhandara

foreign policy during his premiership as a consequence of reforms to the strategic and institutional frameworks for the formulation and delivery of that policy. These events will also highlight how, regardless of the growing array of technological advancements available for strategy, planning and risk assessment. The international political scene can still present unanticipated incidences. Thus, we ask the question, could this be due to how individual leaders perceive cognitive consistency?

Cognitive Consistency Theory asserts that people are motivated to change and act consistently through their beliefs, values, and perceptions. Hence, if a psychologically inconsistent disagreement occurs between two pieces of information, conflict between these inconsistent factors will produce dissonance. This in turn leads individuals to doubt their previously held rationales, beliefs, or values. In addition, to these doubts is an uncomfortable feeling, which may interfere with the individual’s ability to act. This is because the pros and cons of each factor are examined. Dissonance, thus, can only be resolved if a particular factor is seen to be more attractive than the other. As a consequence, when dissonance is resolved, the person in question is better able to act in accordance with the more attractive factors because their beliefs, values, and perceptions will agree more, with that behaviour (Haber, Leach, Schudy & Sideleau, 1982). A good example would be Blair’s argument, justifying the lack of legal approval by the United Nations Security Council on the military intervention in Kosovo. Blair responded by stating that:

“This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.

We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour.” (House of Commons 2008: p 10).

These sentiments are reflective of Festinger's (1957) Cognitive Consistency Theory, which states that commitment to a decision can be considered to be the beginning, and not the end of
conflict. An essential building block of the Cognitive Consistency Theory is dissonance, which simply refers to the ‘lack of agreement’. Therefore, dissonance is aroused in individuals when they possess two cognitive elements about themselves or their environments, in which one is the opposite of the other. The above quote could similarly be likened to a situation in which, knowledge that a particular leader has taken a course of action, unacceptable and outside the bounds of the norm would be clearly dissonant with the knowledge that the course of action is acceptable. Furthermore, dissonance arouses tension and motivates individuals to seek ways of reducing it. The greater the magnitude of the existing dissonance, the greater the motivation. In addition, the more important the cognitions are, the greater the magnitude of their dissonance. The greater the ration of dissonant to consonant cognitions present, the greater the magnitude of any added dissonance. Alternatively, dissonance can only be reduced by: behavioural change, comprehensive evidence justifying a particular decision, and changing one’s attitude about the manner in which they are likely to act.

An Individual is also likely to change their knowledge and attitude so that it can be consistent with their behaviour, as they modify their behaviour to become consistent with new information. Such a result was realised by Malici (2005), when he concluded that evidence from his operational code analysis on Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung showed that Castro exhibited signs of simple and diagnostic learning after the Cold War, while Kim Il Sung’s beliefs did not change significantly enough to warrant any learning. This was interesting since the end of the Cold War brought about the demise of communism. So, even though Castro continued down a communist path, Malici’s research showed that he had simple learning alterations in his instrumental beliefs indicating an acknowledgement of change for the best means for achieving his goals. While, diagnostic learning indicated changes in philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political universe.

Limitations, of Cognitive Consistency theory are that it does not take into account the effects of reinforcement and other environmental factors. Thus, an individual may be cognitively and affectively predisposed to a particular political behaviour, dictatorship for example, but political and environmental factors prevent the individual from engaging in that behaviour, this could eventually result in a rogue state. Alternatively, a leader may be cognitively and negatively predisposed against, authoritarianism or similar types of behaviour, but the political environment perpetuates that behaviour. Thus, in such an instance we can argue that Blair was against Milosevic’s conduct in Kosovo, or Saddam Hussein’s governance practices so much
so that he did not let the political environment or its protocol prevent him from pursuing a course of action which he believed was truthful (Festinger 1957).

3.4 Groupthink Effect on Decision-Making

In this fragment, we analyse how the group-think environment as was highlighted above by NATO’s involvement in Kosovo (1999) presents a significant impact on beliefs’ systems. NATO’s military action in Kosovo represents some of the problems encountered in groupthink environments. Literature on organisational power and politics generally tends to be an integral part of the study on decision making in organisations. The consensus on organisations, inclines towards the notion that they are more of political coalitions than collectives (March 1962). Some of the essential variables in the decision making process stated by Pfeffer (1981), include influence, power and the level of political activity. Allison (1971) provides an insightful depiction of these three variables at work. His analysis includes some of the problems imposed upon Kennedy’s inner circle during the peak of the Cuban missile crisis. While other analysts have presented how coordination and control; when it comes to foreign policy matters can be difficult (Bouchard 1991; Sagan 1991). Hence, complications have a tendency of occurring when decision makers fail to critically examine, tricky representations and the options available to resolve them. Strong cohesion, is an example of when leaders know each other well. It tends not to be an acute variable (Flowers 1977), as it only generates less disagreement than in groups with low cohesion (Courtright 1978). This is particularly important because when beliefs shared are identical, members in a group will be unable to offer or think of alternative points of views for confronting what could be rendered complex situations. As such, groups have been known to pursue some questionable decisions, because their members could not perceive any other ways of understanding problems or let alone dared to suggest that fellow distinguished members and “experts” could be wrong (Brueuning 2007).

However, small group dynamics with low cohesion have on occasion proven to be more productive. Such, was the case during Sweden’s “black Thursday” in 1992. An appropriate decision in this case was reached through an interplay between the cabinet, a bipartisan negotiation team, major opposition party executive committee and the governing board of the National Bank (Hart et al 2000). The composition of each group in this case had its own distinct profile, but each of them played an essential role during the crisis. At the time, even insiders could not predict what the behaviour of the other actors was going to be, but then again, they
still managed to steer the country’s monetary policy towards the right direction (ibid). In an article by Carter Dougherty (2008), of the New York Times, Sweden in 1992, did not just bail out its financial institutions by having the government take over the bad debts; it also managed to extract returns from the banks investors. Banks had to write down their losses in addition to issuing warrants to the government, which essentially held them responsible, while turning the government into the owner. Thus, when the distressed assets were eventually sold, the profits flowed to taxpayers and the government was able to recoup further income from future sells of shares. At the time in 1992, Sweden’s government spent 4 percent of its gross domestic product, which amounted to 65 billion kronor or equivalent to $11.7 billion on this bailout, which in other words was a big incentive for getting it right.

As we have seen above, group dynamics and the beliefs they encompass affect and shape the decision making processes in more ways than we can imagine. Consequently, this is also, how they manage to create the fundamentals and dynamics observed in foreign policy belief systems. It is therefore, inadequate to presume that the decisions a leader makes are a mere reflection of the larger organisational, political or even international environment.

It should also be noted that belief system; differences in left-wing and right-wing environments do not in essence obscure fundamental similarities of how ideologues organize and process political information. As a result, true right and left believers are more inclined to view issues in more rigid and dichotomous ways than individual leaders with less extreme political views (Telock 1989). Thus, leaders with simple and less rigid cognitive approaches are more drawn towards belief systems, which offer straightforward causal analyses of problems, as well as clear cut solutions. Therefore, the relationship between individual leaders and the cognitive structure of political ideology, emanates from polarization, which in turn forces distant wing groups to draw on sharp ideology and group boundaries for the conservation of their cohesion and identity. A blunter connotation is that used by Telock (1989), where he refers to in-group solidarity as being dependant on the fact that “radical groups will always need to have enemies” (p: 132).

In lieu of this, we should therefore endeavour to examine and understand how beliefs create these profound impressions on the processes and outcomes of foreign policy design. The concept of groupthink concentrates on how particular decision-making settings and practices can affect the group decision-making process. Accordingly, Janis (1982), argues that certain situations and group structures, which involve stressful or biased leadership, could inhibit
comprehensively, unbiased consideration of the issues before a group, in a manner similar to the Swedish case, where the realisation of their national interest became the key objective. However, by not acting on the basis of an informed and diligent deliberation, some groups could instead be influenced by dangerous in-group norms such as collective rationalizations and self-censorship as was the case with NATO’s action in 1999. Where, group decisions produced unfavourable outcomes, which could have easily been avoided. Janis (1982), supplied support for this theoretical argument by providing a revision; composed of a series of prominent U.S. foreign policy decisions made within group settings (Schafer and Crichlow 2002). Other researchers have investigated in depth cases where the results of groupthink actions have led to policy failures (Hensley and Griffin 1986; Hart 1990). These include, the negative effects of factors related to groupthinks relying upon stereotypes to define a situation (Khong, 1992; Hybel, 1993), biased information processing (Jervis, 1976), and the effect of dominant group leaders on decision making (Callaway, Marriott, and Esser, 1985). Therefore, as far as NATO and Operation Allied Force, were concerned, (Daddow 2009), could Tony Blair have been simply expressing a widespread concern among some of NATO’s group allies that in 1991-5, they had failed dismally, both, on an individual and collective level, to plan rationally and engaged in a decisive course of action?

In this chapter we have seen how leadership personalities, motivations and even traits have been analysed, so as to shed light on the emotional and experiential factors motivating a leader’s decision making process within a group setting. As a result, this case study, seeks to enhance our understanding of which types of events are most likely to induce changes in the beliefs of a leader. Furthermore, previous research has already shown that beliefs change in one of two ways; they can either be reinforced or reversed, depending on the magnitude of the occurring events. Therefore, as we will see in the next chapter, the operational code as a neo-behavioural approach to political studies focuses on the explanations of foreign policy decisions and their consequences through the reference of two political worlds, external events and internal beliefs.
4. Hypotheses

Our first hypothesis seeks to determine whether Tony Blair exhibited any belief changes at various junctures of his premiership. These junctures are signified by events which were crucial in defining his political legacy. Due to the nature of these events there is an expectation that Tony Blair’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs will be altered after each pre and post event analysis. The second hypothesis, sets out to test whether there was any prospect, of Mr Blair exhibiting longitudinal experiential learning. This form of learning can be conceptualized within the operational code framework as being an occurrence were beliefs about the nature of the political universe are either strengthened, weakened or altered. Therefore, we will expect to observe changes in Mr Blair’s beliefs at the time of his final and major foreign affairs related event. For the purpose of our study and hypothesis, this will be his role as EU president for a six month period in 2005.

Even though our analysis is categorized into three parts and analyzed on each event within the three stages, Post Kosovo – Pre Iraq, Pre 9/11 – Post 9/11 and Pre EU – Post EU. Both our hypotheses can nonetheless be tested at each individual stage of the analysis separately. It is also important to stress that the learning we seek to discover; is learning in relation to changes in beliefs and not in behavior. As such the operational code analysis enables us to aggregate the indices, which, in turn can be tested for statistical significance. Therefore, when it comes to the learning; in these hypotheses we should either be able to falsify or validate our empirical findings with “status quo” scholars or the “reformist” school (Walker 2011). That is because an acknowledgement of the reformist school validates the hypothesis, while a conclusion that Tony Blair did not learn, would incline us to reject the hypothesis, meaning the status quo school bears validity.

Stage 1: At this stage we, expect a shift in Tony Blair’s operational code. Our expectation is that from the first set of events there will be a shift in Philosophical beliefs, and that these changes will reinforce as opposed to reversing or stabilizing his beliefs. We also consider Tony Blair’s prior views on the political universe, to be represented by a state of mind which believes conflict is temporary P-2. The guiding principle in this index, is summed up by Holsti (1977), whom we also find, differentiates optimistic leaders from pessimistic ones in regards to their prospects for achieving fundamental political values. Consequently, P-2 on this basis insinuates that beliefs about conflict are either temporary or permanent in the political universe.
Therefore, we can accept the idea that the more optimistic a leader's diagnosis is for realizing their political values, the less negative, but, more positive their net intensity of attributions will be to others in the political universe. As Daddow (2009) points out, Blair officially sanctioned the conventional wisdom that Kosovo's intervention was instinctively born out of a moral purpose. He was also quick to remind his audience during the “famous” 1999 Chicago speech that ‘appeasement also did not work’. What worked, in Blair’s opinion was a ‘doctrine of an international community’, which called for immediate action to be taken on such ‘dictator’s’, as Slobodan Milosevic. Thus, we would naturally expect, that in-order to understand Blair, we need to get to grips with his religious beliefs. Since orthodox interpretations of Blair's motivation for intervening in Kosovo closely follow this line of thought (Ibid 550-1). Accordingly, Kosovo was within Blair’s justifiable element, considering that he stated, ‘This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values.’ (Blair Chicago1999). As such we also expect to observe positive shifts in his I-1 (What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?) and I-2 indices (How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?). Equally supported, in this hypothesis is the contingency theory, which stipulates that effective leadership can be likened to the interaction of a leader's traits and behavior to relations, motivations and aspects of a given situations factors (Fielder 1964).

**Stage 2:** This set of events covers the post 9/11 period. A point in time where the emerging concept of Blair’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ was affected by the perceived imperatives of the ‘war on terror’ (House of Commons research paper 2008: 9). In his Chicago speech Blair outlined the five rules to consider before intervention (BBC 2004). However, the intervention in Iraq was criticised by fellow politicians on the basis of three points: that even though he might have had genuine intentions, the involvement was basically misguided, while its implementation was also inconsistent; and finally, it did not leave much room for cynic’s not to consider it as just another smokescreen for ‘business as usual’ (Ibid: 9-11). In this hypothesis we therefore expect to find a statistical shift in Blair’s operational code as we move from events in stage 1 to events in stage 2 of our analysis. We also presume that the shift will be a move away from P-2 to P-1. The key assumption dealing with the P-1 philosophical question is that beliefs about how others approach and pursue their goals within the political universe will without doubt define the nature of politics. Moreover, this definition of political conflict, and the image of opponent leaders, specifically in that, the more cooperative a leader's diagnosis towards the nature of the political universe, the higher the net frequency of cooperative attributions to ‘others’ in the political universe (Walker et al 1998). As a result, in this
hypothesis we expect there to be negative shifts in both Philosophical and Instrumental beliefs. This we presume, would identify Blair’s political universe from being less optimistic to more conflictual and could therefore be linked to the operational code typology C. Summarised as denoting, The Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliations and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development come low in an anarchy (Walker 2011: 56). In a 2003 speech, justifying the intention to invade Iraq, Blair proclaimed how; “Naturally should Hitler appear again in the same form, we would know what to do. But the point is that history doesn’t declare the future to us so plainly. Each time is different and the present must be judged without the benefit of hindsight.” (House of Commons 2008: 18 March 2003). At this stage, Tony Blair’s support for interventionism, was increasingly being expressed through examples of ‘security’ and ‘counter-terrorism’. As a point of interest Chandler (2003), noted that associating oneself with victims of international conflicts enabled leaders to gain moral authority which could otherwise not have been secured through domestic process. This essentially, signaled a move away from the reverence of human rights and international law, displayed earlier, post Kosovo. Towards a more, GW. Bush style, neo-conservative approach, which emphasized a unilateralist view of interventionism based on a policy of ‘pre-emptive action’ against al-Qaeda the Taliban and other unlawful practices such as Guantanamo Bay (Sands 2006). We will also expect changes to be observed in his I-3 and I-5 beliefs, which highlight the establishment of optimal goals within a comprehensive framework. Focused on the pursuit of shared goals, but simultaneously controlling risks by limiting means rather than ends. The shift expected in Blair’s Instrumental Beliefs was highlighted on 18 March, during his opening speech, on the debate about the Iraqi crisis in the House of Commons. In the speech he proclaimed that: “This is a tough choice. But it is also a stark one: to stand British troops down and turn back; or to hold firm to the course we have set. I believe we must hold firm.” (The Guardian, 18 March 2003).

Stage 3: Our final stage, and at this point, the hypothesis focuses on the period of Mr Blair’s third and final term in office 2005-2007, where the key issues included UK’s Presidency of the EU, and the collapse of the EU constitutional project, which had two negative referendums. During this period we do not expect any significant statistical shifts in Blair’s operational code, even though there were exogenous shocks, their element of surprise and effect were not on the
same level as those experienced during 9/11. According to Tetlock (2005), exogenous shocks, are experienced when dramatic and unforeseen events occur. Such incidences, will in turn serve as defence mechanisms for belief systems. Rendering, them to be detached views as opposed to catalysts of belief change. This was the conclusion in Tetlocks (2010), study were he states that this “can help experts to sharpen their thinking about both possible pasts and possible futures, thereby making their belief systems more logically consistent and responsive to evidence” (p. 480). As such one would expect that the coordinated bomb attacks in London on 7 July 2005, better known as 7/7, in which 52 people were killed, and more than 700 injured (CNN Library 2014). To some extent by this point in time the UK had anticipated some form of attack, and the security services as well as the public at large were all on high alert. Besides, the aftermath of 9/11, saw all major European destinations go on high security alert. In his speech delivered, about 7/7, Mr Blair exhibited classic symptoms of what Tetlock (2005) considers to be evasions of responsibility, as well as a form of distancing one’s self from one’s own belief system. In the speech Blair emphasised how ‘religious ideology’ and the violence inherent in it did not start “a few years ago in response to a particular policy. “Over the past 12 years, Al-Qaeda and its associates have attacked 26 countries, killed thousands of people” therefore, “In the end, it is by the power of argument, debate, true religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat.” (BBC 16 July 2005). As a result, we would not expect the 7/7 attacks to have produced any change in Mr Blair’s core beliefs. Since, and if any such change was to have been realised it would have most likely happened after 9/11. Nevertheless, we expect there to be signs of experiential learning, which in this context is the alteration of a leaders beliefs, due to a succession of interactive events. Generally speaking, there are three stages of experiential learning, these are simple; diagnostic and complex. According to Walker and Schafer (2011), simple learning is the process in which Self instrumental beliefs are altered in order to change a leader’s ranking and preference on the outcomes of settlement, domination, submission or deadlock. While, diagnostic learning alters the Self’s philosophical beliefs about the Other’s pre-conceptions about identical conclusions. While, complex learning is a simultaneous adjustment of both sets of preference rankings (p. 240-241). With that in mind, this phase should produce change, but, we expect it to be confined to the philosophical indices.
5. Method

5.1 The Verbs In Context System (VICS)

For the purpose and intention of this study, which was to analyze belief changes and learning in Tony Blair’s operational code. We had to process information, from his foreign policy archive, presented in an agent centred, micro-political environment, specifically aimed at his political universe interpretations. It was, therefore, appropriate and timely that we used the operational code analysis. This is a content based analysis method, which stipulates how there must be a relationship between written and spoken content when it comes to an individual’s personality. Therefore, the main reason for this methodological choice (operational code analysis) is based on how, so far, content analysis has been proven to be a more reliable form of conducting, at a distance, measures for analysing the traits, motivations, changes and personal characteristics of world leaders. In addition to this, the operational code analysis has a long and proven history (Leites, 1951, 1953; George, 1969, 1979; Holsti, 1970, 1977; Walker, 1977, 1983, 1993, Walker, Schafer and Young 1998, Walker and Schafer 2006).

As we have discussed above the objet d’art of content analysis on an individual’s personality is based on written and spoken content. Even though much of what politicians say may be ghost-written, and not to mention that they might be forced to exclude certain truths due to national interests and security reasons. Through the acquisition of a large enough amount of text, covering different time purposes. This process can, nevertheless, lead to a sufficient enough condition, for the attainment of accurate results from a content analysis (Hudson 2014). Furthermore, there are several other techniques available for analysing leaders, such as the “think aloud” (Purkitt, 1998). This technique is considered unworkable, for use on real world leaders, as you would have to interview them personally on one to one bases and ask them for their spoken aloud thoughts on foreign policy issues. Another, method applicable for leadership analysis could be cognitive mapping. Where linkages to relationships are mapped and connected to concepts, from texts (Hudson 2014). Bearing all other considerations in mind, Profiler Plus v. 5.7.0, in conjunction with the “operational code” scheme, has proven to be the best suited method for our at-a-distance analysis for Tony Blair.

Thus, in this research, Profiler Plus v. 5.7.0 was used in conjunction with the “operational code” scheme, which uses the Verbs In Context System (VICS) to analyse changes in Blair’s beliefs.
during given periods, composed of three distinct phases. A detailed explanation of VICS (see Walker 2000), is clearly not containable within the framework of this paper, however, a brief overview is well within our limits. The operational code analysis was developed as a leadership assessment tool shortly after World War II. During this period the Soviet’s negotiating behaviour became puzzling for the United States of America, to say the least, in addition to the fact that soon after, the cold war began to escalate (Walker 2000). The source of George and Holsti’s thinking was guided by the cognitive consistency theory. This theory, assumed that a leader’s operational code beliefs were internally consistent with each other and that their decisions were also consistent with those beliefs (Ibid).

The methodology of the operational code analysis bases it’s undertaking of political leaders on a narrowly focused set of political beliefs. Or, on a more general note, it analyses a set of beliefs implanted in the personality of a leader or those emanating from the cultural matrix of a given society. This standpoint, therefore, suggests that the empirical task of charting a leader’s operational code beliefs should advance from the bottom up. The consideration of the “bottom up” method, emphasises the aggregation of targeted beliefs about specific issues in different expanses of political action, say for example, from a point in time around the beginning of their leadership role onwards (Renshon 2008). As a result, predicting a leader’s behaviour from their operational code beliefs, requires caution and attention to chance conditions, which may specify the level of generalisation the prediction is based upon (Walker 2000). This is why with the aid of the Verbs In Context System (VICS) for content analysis, which was developed as part of the bottom up strategy for identifying a leaders operational code beliefs. We are going to make contingent calculations about Tony Blair’s; strategies, tactics, and moves during a seven-year period (1999-2006), of his ten-year premiership. This system has also been developed and implemented in numerous studies (Walker et al. 1999; Crichlow 1998; Feng 2005; Malici 2005; Malici and Malici 2005). VICS draws on inferences about a leader’s operational code from public sources such as speeches, interviews and other statements made by the individual. The VICS method, is also a significant foreign policy analysis tool, because it extracts values from six attributes for each recording unit or verb, and its surrounding context i.e. subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context (Ibid).

At the core of an operational code analysis is the deduction of a leader’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the use of power. As such, VICS focuses specifically on verbs in
speeches given by the individuals subjected to the analysis. It therefore works on a separate two stage basis. Where the first stage emphasises, “utterances”, which are sentences containing verbs, and are coded for directionality with, + for cooperative, or – for conflictual. Thereafter, they are detected for their intensity as either deeds or words. In this perspective “deeds” indicate the exercise of power in a relationship. While “words” represent the promises or threats to use power, in addition to the support of or in opposition of an “other.”. The intensity scaling for deeds or words ranges from −3 (punish) to +3 (reward) (Renshon 2008). The second stage of VICS coding is based on the attribution of the verbs. At this stage sentences in which, Tony Blair refers to himself, will represent his beliefs in respect to the exercise of power, they will also personify his instrumental beliefs (ibid: 833). Whereas, sentences which refer to the “other” represent beliefs about how others exercise power, within international systems and are symptomatic of the subject’s philosophical beliefs (Walker and Schafer 2006: 32).

Self or Other, designate whether the orator or some other actor is the subject of the verb. The verb is categorized in its tense as either, a positive (+) or negative (-) intransitive verb, or a positive (+) or negative (-) transitive verb. If it is a transitive verb, it will be categorized further as representing either a cooperative (+) or conflictual (-) behaviour, which takes the form of a word or a deed. Positive transitive deeds are coded as Rewards (+3) while negative transitive deeds are coded as Punishments (-3). Positive transitive words are coded as either Promises (+2) or Appeal/Support (+1), while negative transitive words are coded as Threats (-2) or Oppose/Resist (-1). Whereas, verbs that do not fit into any of these categories or do not have a political context i.e., do not deal with a policy domain or are not directed toward a political target will be coded Neutral (0) and discarded (Walker 2000: 10).

5.2 What is Profiler Plus?

This thesis examines Tony Blair’s operational code to determine if his beliefs changed significantly as a result of the Kosovo War, 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraqi War and his six month’ role as EU president. In addition to identifying if there was any learning. Thus, in order for us to measure Blair’s operational code, a total of thirty speeches, from six samples were collected. They represented three stages containing a set of before and after phases. Therefore, five speeches were selected for the Kosovo War (April 1999 – March 2000) analysis. It’s important to note, here, that one speech in particular, delivered two months before the end of
the Kosovo War was used. The reason for that exception was due to the significance of its contents. The “Chicago” speech, which Blair delivered in 1999, not only unveiled the ‘doctrine of the international community’, but it also set into motion his interventionist foreign policy. The latter was to be the cornerstone of Blair’s internationally related decision making process. In addition, the first phase may be referred to as “Post-Kosovo”, but its results were collected to be specifically used as indicators for the Pre-9/11 period. They, therefore serve two purposes, giving us an idea of what Blair’s beliefs were after his Kosovo achievements and serving as a precursor to the Post 9/11 stage. Thereafter, a further five speeches where collected after 9/11 (October – November 2001), and five more before the Iraq invasion (September – September 2003). The final set of speeches collected covered the period before the EU presidency (July 2003 – June 2005), with five more after Tony Blair’s role as the EU president (March 2006 – May 2007). See Appendices A for a complete list and dates of the speeches used. Consequently, the speeches selected spanned a seven year period from April 1999 until May 2007. The speeches were selected on the basis of their foreign policy relevance, in addition to their titles. The discourses all met the 1,500 minimum word length required by the Verbs In Context System for coding purposes. As fewer verbs make the calculations of indices volatile. All of the speeches analyzed in the study were obtained from two second party sources the first and main source being www.theguardian.com/politics, and one speech the “1999 Chicago” was obtained from www.pbs.org/newshour.

5.3 Sample

The public and prepared samples for Blair's verbal material were collected primarily due to their availability. According to Schafer (1998), public verbal material, such as prepared speeches and spontaneous statements, are more likely to portray an accurate depiction of a leader’s psychological characteristics and state of mind at that given moment in time. There is, however, an argument among researchers about the “at a distance” process with reservations by some scholars who are in favor of spontaneous material, under the belief that prepared speeches are more likely to be the product of their speechwriters. Moreover, the argument suggests that the leader’s attributes and patterns may not be fully portrayed by the speechwriter. Most scholars such as (Crichlow 1998; Walker 2011; Malici 2007; and Renshon 2008) using prepared material disagree, denoting that the leader’s predispositions are still reflected in the general patterns of the texts they deliver. Schafer (1998), again notes that the vast majority of
leader’s play active roles in their speechwriting process through the provision of content in an endeavor to make them their own.

During, an exclusive and very informative interview, Philip Collins, a former speech writer for Tony Blair. Emphasised, how he “Collins” wrote the European Parliament speech in June 2005. Thereafter, he had a hand in every speech the Prime Minister delivered. He outlined how “the first one was quite a traditional Blair speech.” (Matthew Baker, Telegraph 07 Jun 2007). The article also shed some light on why many believe that Blair’s communications improved under Collins. As he states that since, “No one was doing this job before me, it was shared out,” he explained, “you didn't have anyone in charge of the PM's speeches and the result was that lots of people were trying to get things in them. Every department wanted to put their bit in.” (Ibid).

Asked what it is like to work for the Prime Minister, Collins felt that: “He’s fantastic to write for. He likes clear arguments and I found it very easy to get into his style. He doesn’t like jargon and stupid terminology. We’ve got to speak in an intelligent, colloquial way” (Ibid). The interview in this article clearly supports the notion that prepared speeches, still reveal a leader’s attributes and patterns, as leaders still tend to influence what is written.

5.4 Procedure

After all the speeches were selected, the next step was to transfer them onto the computer’s software for analysis. Firstly, the words were downloaded onto the computer’s software and thereafter an optical character recognition program was used to identify the discourses as text. As soon as all the speeches were scanned, they were each coded using Profiler + an automated coding program created by Michael Young (Young, 2001).

Profiler Plus is considered by Social Science Automation, to be a general-purpose text analysis engine intended for use in social sciences. It automatically codes texts, using a prebuilt coding scheme available from Social Science Automation.com. The data it produces can be used for wide-ranging content analysis tasks and it is compatible with various other data analysis programs. In a nutshell, Profiler Plus has wide applicable format, for use in social and behavioral sciences (Profiler Plus).

In addition, Profiler Plus performs, its text coding by using a highly flexible, step-wise method. It uses sets of tables or “dictionaries”, thus, the order in which coding occurs is controlled by configuration files. Its dictionaries can be held either within Microsoft Access or another forms
of compact and efficient internal formats. Results from the coding can be stored in a Results table, within Access databases or in a plain text file. The results, can also be imported into data analysis programs such as Microsoft Excel, SPSS, and SAS (Profiler Plus).

Profiler + contains a coding dictionary for VICS, which identifies transitive verbs, which we discussed earlier, and places them in either ‘self or other’ categories based upon ‘positive and negative’ valences. The Profiler + software produces numbers to ‘self and other’ categories for each speech. Thereafter each ‘self and other’ category will contain a range from +3 to -3, that represents the positive or negative attributes the orator makes to Self and Others which are used to calculate the operational code beliefs. After this point, the coding analysis produces numerical data for each ‘self and other’ category, with each philosophical and instrumental belief, calculated according to the formulas created by Walker et al. (1998) for the Verbs in Context System.

Mark Schafer, one of the originators of VICS, produced an excel spreadsheet which can be used to calculate each operational code belief. Data from Profiler Plus, was consequently placed into the corresponding ‘Self and Other’ categories within the excel spreadsheet. In addition, the spreadsheet contains formulas used in the VICS indices to create quantitative data for each philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

Subsequent calculations of Blair’s beliefs, and an average score for each belief from the five sample speeches were compared to the before and after mindset of each event. Blair’s VICS beliefs indices, for each speech at each event stage, were in turn, added together and divided by five; which was the total sum of speeches, for each Pre crisis events. Thereafter, the Post crisis event speeches for each event were added and divided likewise the above, by the five speeches sourced for those events. This process was conducted for both his instrumental and philosophical beliefs. After which, the calculations for the difference in means t-test was performed using “SPSS” software, to compare the means, with the periods “before and after” being used as the grouping variable, to determine if changes or learning occurred based upon statistically significant differences in his beliefs before and after each event.

In order to determine if Blair’s operational code indicated any learning which in this context refers firmly to a descriptive and not a normative sense of the word. This in simple terms means that new information either changes or does not, Blair’s original operational code beliefs. Thus,
changes in instrumental and philosophical belief significance were examined before and after each set of events by an independent simple t-test, to determine if the results were significant at the $p \leq .01; p \leq .05$ and $p \leq .10$ levels. Lastly, we checked the P-value to determine the probability that our data would be inconsistent with the hypothesis, this is the case, when assuming the hypothesis is true, and when you’re dealing with P-values alone, your objective would be always to reject a hypothesis. Simply because if you fail to reject the hypothesis, that will mean your experiment was inconclusive. Moreover, the reason for measuring learning with a statistical significance level, is that it allows us to draw on our conclusions with a higher level of confidence as opposed to assuming an occurrence by random chance (Malici 2005).
6. Results of Operational Code Analysis

At the core of the operational code analysis are three dimensions with a common focus upon the power relationships between self and others. They are what we call (1) diagnostic propensities, (2) choice propensities, and (3) shift propensities in the management of conflict and bargaining with others, which the leader exhibits through positive and negative attributions to the self and others (Walker et al, 1998). We infer answers to the operational code questions dealing with these different propensities, using the following reasoning to link our indices with the concepts in the operational code construct. Diagnostic propensities such as the leader's net attribution of positive/cooperative (+) versus negative/conflictual (-) valences to others indicate the answers to the first philosophical question dealing with the nature of politics (P -1) as we shall see below.

Table. 2. The table below consists of the average mean results for each indices after the VICS analysis results before they were subjected to an SPSS analysis. These mean results show us how strong or weak Mr Blairs beliefs where at each Pre event in comparison to the Post event levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs</th>
<th>Pre/Post-Kosovo (n = 5)</th>
<th>Post-9/11 (n = 5)</th>
<th>Pre-Iraq (n = 5)</th>
<th>Post-Iraq (n = 5)</th>
<th>Pre-EU (n = 5)</th>
<th>Post-EU (n = 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1 - Nature of political Universe</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 - Realization of political value</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 - Predictability of Future</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4 - Control of History/Develop</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5 - Role of Chance</td>
<td>0.97784</td>
<td>0.97354</td>
<td>0.97782</td>
<td>0.97414</td>
<td>0.97404</td>
<td>0.9764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I1 - Strategic Approach</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I2 - Tactical Pursuit of goals</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I3 - Risk Orientation</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I4a - Cooperation/Conflict</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I4b - Words/Deeds</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The average means were calculated by adding the total amount of results from each Philosophical and Instrumental indices and dividing them by the 5 sample speeches analysed for each event.

### 6.1 Kosovo

The NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, On 23 March 1999, passed on the responsibility of Kosovo’s military intervention to Alliance’s Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, for the initiation of air strikes against the military capability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This move followed after Belgrade refused to accept the peace accord negotiated in France earlier. Further, to the British Government’s willingness towards the use of air power for enforcing the demands of the international community. Tony Blair, outlined what he perceived to have been the main flaws of Western policy during the Bosnian conflict:

“NATO was slow to become engaged in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. We tried to bring peace to Bosnia through the UN and with political good offices, but without the willingness to use force which we now know was necessary. Our troops, under the auspices of the UN, did a good job at great risk, to deliver relief. But they could only deal with the symptoms of the problem. It was NATO that brought serious force to bear and gave the desperately needed muscle to end the war. Since Dayton, NATO has underpinned the peace and created the conditions in which Bosnia can rebuild. In Kosovo, we will not repeat those early mistakes in Bosnia. We will not allow war to devastate a part of our continent, bringing untold death, suffering and homelessness.” (House of Commons 1999: p 40)

Thus, Kosovo’s 1999 crisis, essentially set Tony Blair’s interventionist foreign policy into motion. During the crisis, Blair unveiled his ‘doctrine of the international community’. The
notion of ‘mutual dependence’ was linked to the belief that individual states could no longer exercise total sovereignty over their destiny by keeping to themselves and not interfering in the affairs of other states. This idea also supported the argument, made in the Chicago speech, that boundaries between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ territories had become progressively blurred in policy terms. Bearing these developments in mind, Blair’s view was that a comprehensive policy of ‘non-intervention’ was no longer justifiable (House of Commons 2008).

6.1.1 Post-Kosovo Results

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

P-1. NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE. Our result for this index was 0.266, which revealed a weak positive and cooperative approach to the political universe. The index for P-1 is also described in Holsti’s (1977) typology of operational codes, as the difference of leadership in terms of friendly versus hostile views of the political universe (see Walker, 2011).

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES. Holsti (1977) also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders on the subject of achieving one’s fundamental political values (P-2). On the basis of a belief that conflict is either temporary or permanent in the political universe. Therefore, we can assume that the more optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realising their political values, the less negative and more positive their net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. After our analysis the P-2 value was weak at 0.148 not highly optimistic but positive nonetheless.

P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE. This index represents a leader's propensity to assign different types of conflict and cooperative actions to others. It deals with the predictability of the political future. Therefore, the more unpredictable the political actions of others, the greater the variation in other-attributions among different types of cooperative or conflictual acts. For this third enquiry Blair scored a very weak and low but positive value of 0.084.

P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. The balance between a leader's Self-attributions and Other-attributions indicate the extent to which leaders can control historical developments and political outcomes. The greater a leader’s control over political
outcomes in comparison to control by others, will reflect a higher net of attributions assigned to the self. Interestingly Blair’s score was 0.252, one would have anticipated a much higher score.

**P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE.** Through the fifth philosophical question, we can get some insight into the leader’s ability; for forecasting the future and predicting political outcomes. It is understandably a function of the answers from the third and fourth philosophical questions. Explicitly, a higher role of chance is an outcome of, the greater the variation on the distribution of acts by others, leads to a lower leader's net self-attributions. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the predictability of ‘Others’ as well as the leader's control over political consequences being relatively low, therefore the role of chance will be relatively high. In this case the role of chance was very strong at 0.977.

**INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS**

**I-1. STRATEGY.** A leader's overall attribution of positive cooperative and negative conflictual valences toward the self are indicated through the first Instrumental question. This question represents a leader's strategic approach to political goals. It also assumes that the more cooperative a leader's strategic approach to political goals, the higher their net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self. Even though we may not identify the rational of how leaders’ selects their goals. It will enable us to detect the strategic direction a leader adopts towards their approach. Blair’s score here was moderately strong 0.402.

**I-2. TACTICS.** The attributer within these Instrumental beliefs presents the tactics, used for the effective pursuit of goals and objectives. The results from this approach in turn; lead us to assume, that the more cooperative a leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net intensity of cooperative self-attributions. In this question the result was 0.26.

**I-3. RISK ORIENTATION.** The ‘shift’ and ‘choice’ propensities, in addition to tactics encompass answers for the (I-3) question dealing with risk and timing. The multiplicity of attributes encompassed in these types of acts indicate the answer to the third instrumental question. The answers shed light on a leader's approach to the control, acceptance and calculation of risks in their political actions. These risks, which come in the form of undesirable outcomes, linked to cooperative and conflictual actions. They are also the risks of submission associated with cooperative acts created in the pursuit of settlement and deadlock associated
with conflictual acts encountered in the pursuit of domination. In this index Blair scored a weak 0.23.

I-4a. TIMING OF COOPERATION V. CONFLICT. This Instrumental question, provides a distinction between conflict and cooperation. In this question we expect to discover why the timing of an action in assessing risks of political acts, leads to a greater propensity in shifting between conflict and cooperation. Thus, if a leader’s propensity between conflictual and cooperative acts are low, then their strategic approach to goals will most likely be the dominant strategy regardless what others in the political universes cogitate. Blair’s index score was moderately strong at 0.598.

I-4b. TIMING OF WORDS V. DEEDS. The propensity to shift between words and deeds in this index represents another characteristic of timing, in that, the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action will determine their shift propensity. As a result, leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are comparatively acceptant when it comes to the risks associated with the direction of the distribution. While those with a higher shift propensity indicate; more risk-averse orientations toward undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock. For this question Blair logged a relatively high 0.576.

I5 UTILITY MEANS. The following distribution of self-attributions is arranged in different categories of cooperative and conflictual acts. It indicates the fifth instrumental question, with regards to the utility and role of different means in the exercise of power. The exercise of power is conceptualised as choices of control in relationships between self and other, where the self seeks to maintain control of relationships with others by using different kinds of words and deeds as positive or negatives actions. On a Functional, perspective they represent the attempts used by self to get others to say or do things they would not have otherwise done or said. The scores for these indices was: a. Punish: 0.158; b. Threaten: 0.012; c. Oppose: 0.13; d. Appeal: 0.326; e. Promise: 0.044; f. Reward: 0.33.

6.2 9/11
A total of 19 militants associated with the extremist Islamic group al-Qaeda, managed to hijack four airliners and carried out suicide attacks on targeted sites in the United States. Two planes were able to fly directly into the Twin Towers in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon, and the fourth crashed in a Pennsylvanian field. This sequence of tragic events happened on
September 11, 2001; and is often referred to as 9/11. It resulted in extensive deaths and destruction, triggering major U.S. initiatives to combat terrorism. In turn these initiatives were going to be the hallmarks, defining the Premiership of Tony Blair and the presidency of George W. Bush. Over 3,000 people were killed in New York and Washington, D.C during the attacks. That number included more than 400 police and firefighter officers (History.com).

Across the Atlantic, Tony Blair, still vitalized by the successes in Kosovo, had his commitment towards interventionism strengthened even more, especially after the 9/11 attacks in America. Blair’s enduring support for interventionism was increasingly expressed through examples in his speeches about ‘security’ and ‘counter-terrorism’ in the aftermath of 9/11 (House of Commons 2008). He was apparently in Brighton preparing for a Trade Union Congress; conference speech, on the day of the attack. His aid informed him about the situation and asked him to have a look at the television whilst he was in his room making some final preparations. He is quoted in Lisa O’Carroll’s article as having stated that after the second plane, he ‘knew it was a terrorist attack’ (Lisa O’Carroll 2011: The Guardian). According to commentators, the decision to sign Britain up to the ‘war on terror’ displayed his belief about al-Qaeda and how its network posed a serious threat to the universal values of the West. An issue he strongly advocated. In taking this position Tony Blair placed Britain’s foreign policy straight into the hands of the Bush administration, which had more of a unilateralist view of interventionism based on a doctrine of ‘pre-emptive action’(House of Commons 2008).

6.2.1 POST-9/11 RESULTS

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

P-1. NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE. Our result for this index were 0.348, which revealed a positive and cooperative approach to the political universe. The index for P -I is also described in Holsti's (1977) typology of operational codes, which differentiates leaders in terms of friendly versus hostile views of the political universe (see Walker, 2011).

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES. Holst (1977) also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders on the subject of achieving one's fundamental political values (P-2). On the basis of a belief that conflict is either temporary or permanent in the
political universe. Hence, we can assume that the more optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realising their political values, the less negative and more positive their net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. After our analysis the P-2 value was \textbf{0.192}.

**P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE.** This index represents a leader's propensity to assign different types of conflict and cooperative actions to others. It deals with the predictability of the political future. Therefore, the more unpredictable the political actions of others, the greater the variation in other-attributions among different types of cooperative or conflictual acts. For this third question Blair scored a very low \textbf{0.104}.

**P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.** The balance between a leader's Self-attributions and Other-attributions indicate the extent to which leaders can control historical developments and political outcomes. The greater a leaders control over political outcomes in comparison to control by others, will reflect a higher net of attributions assigned to the self. Blair scored \textbf{0.246}.

**P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE.** Through the fifth philosophical question, we can get some insight into the leader’s ability; for forecasting the future and predicting political outcomes. It is understandably a function of the answers from the third and fourth philosophical questions. Explicitly, a higher role of chance is an outcome of, the greater the variation on the distribution of acts by others, leads to a lower leader's net self-attributions. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the predictability of ‘Others’ as well as the leader's control over political consequences being relatively low, therefore the role of chance will be relatively high. In this instance the role of chance was strong at \textbf{0.973}.

**INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS**

**I-1. STRATEGY.** A leader's overall attribution of positive cooperative and negative conflictual valences toward the self are indicated through the first Instrumental question. This question represents a leader's strategic approach to political goals. It also assumes that the more cooperative a leader's strategic approach to political goals, the higher their net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self. Even though we may not identify the rational of how leader selects their goals. It will enable us to detect the strategic direction a leader adopts towards their approach. Blair’s score here was \textbf{0.356}.
1-2. TACTICS. The attributer within these Instrumental beliefs presents the tactics, used for the effective pursuit of goals and objectives. The results from this approach in turn; lead us to assume, that the more cooperative a leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net intensity of cooperative self-attributions. In this question the result was 0.126.

1-3. RISK ORIENTATION. The ‘shift’ and ‘choice’ propensities, in addition to tactics encompass answers for the (I-3) question dealing with risk and timing. The multiplicity of attributes encompassed in these types of acts indicate the answer to the third instrumental question. The answers shade light on a leader's approach to the control, acceptance and calculation of risks in their political actions. These risks, which come in the form of undesirable outcomes, linked to cooperative and conflictual actions. They are also the risks of submission associated with cooperative acts created in the pursuit of settlement and deadlock associated with conflictual acts encountered in the pursuit of domination. In this index Blair scored 0.234.

1-4a. TIMING OF COOPERATION V. CONFLICT. This Instrumental question, provides a distinction between conflict and cooperation. In this question we expect to discover why the timing of an action in assessing risks of political acts, leads to a greater propensity in shifting between conflict and cooperation. Thus, if a leaders’ alterations to propensity between conflictual and cooperative acts are low. Then their strategic approach to goals will be more likely to be the dominant strategy regardless what others in the political universes cogitate. Blair’s index score was a somewhat high 0.644.

1-4b. TIMING OF WORDS V. DEEDS. The propensity to shift between words and deeds in this index represents another characteristic of timing, in that, the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action will determine their shift propensity. As a result, leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are comparatively acceptant when it comes to the risks associated with the direction of the distribution. While those with a higher shift propensity indicate; more risk-averse orientations toward undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock. For this question Blair logged a moderately high 0.504.

15 UTILITY MEANS. The following distribution of self-attributions is arranged in different categories of cooperative and conflictual acts. It indicates the fifth instrumental question, with regards to the utility and role of different means in the exercise of power. The exercise of power is conceptualised as choices of control in relationships between self and other, were the self seeks to maintain control of relationships with others by using different kinds of words and deeds as positive or negatives actions. On a Functional, perspective they represent the attempts
used by self to get others to say or do things they would not have otherwise done or said. The scores for these indices was: a. Punish: 0.118; b. Threaten: 0.066; c. Oppose: 0.138; d. Appeal: 0.494; e. Promise: 0.052; f. Reward: 0.136.

6.3 IRAQ

As far as the strategic and institutional frameworks for formulating and providing British foreign policy were concerned, the Blair era proved to have been a period of major changes. So much, that successive governments have found it difficult to establish the distorted division between foreign and domestic issues (House of Commons 2008).

According to Ralf (2005) the reasons why the UK supported US led invasion of Iraq are still disputed, what is clear, on the other hand, is that the UK made an effort to gain UN authorisation for their action. In the summer of 2002 and in February 2003, the UK decided that additional resolutions were needed to give the coalition a clear approval for the invasion of Iraq. Ewen MacAskill and Julian Borger (2004), suggested that when this failed, Mr Blair and Jack Straw, former foreign secretary, claimed that Saddam Hussein had breached the Security Council resolution 1441 passed late in 2002, as well as previous resolutions calling on him to give up weapons of mass destruction. They go on to state, however, that Mr Annan stated that the Security Council had warned Iraq in resolution 1441, that there would be “consequences” if Hussain did not comply with its demands. He also concluded that it should have, nonetheless, been up to the Council to determine what those consequences were going to be (MacAskill and Julian Borger 2004).

Through this perspective a realization that the UK, and Prime Minister Blair in particular, had reached the conclusion that regime change was the only solution. As far as, this matter was concerned Blair was ahead of White House policy changes, and would have pushed for a tougher line of action had the Bush administration not moved away from containment. This notion is authenticated, by his April 22, 1999, and now famous Chicago speech, where he declared a new "doctrine" of international relations.

Blair’s starting point for this “new doctrine” was the Serbian bombing, a situation where the use of military force, which did not have the sanction of the UN (1999) was taken. According to Blair’s peers ‘Sir Stephen Wall’ to be exact, intervention in Kosovo was the best course of action and could be fully justified. It was acceptable, because as Blair stated in his speech “we
cannot let the evil of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo stand” (Palmer 2004, The Telegraph). Unfortunately, Blair's fateful decision to invade Iraq, was to overshadow everything his foreign policy intended to achieve. As such his conviction to support a U.S. led invasion on Iraq, and not adhere to the will of the United Nations, utterly divided Britain and the rest of the World. Unsurprisingly, this too could have been the principal cause for his failure to move Britain decisively into the heart of the European Union.

6.3.1 PRE-IRAQ RESULTS

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

P-1. NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE. Our result for this index were 0.156, which revealed a positive and cooperative approach to the political universe. The index for P-I is also described in Holsti’s (1977) typology of operational codes, which differentiates leaders in terms of friendly versus hostile views of the political universe (see Walker, 2011).

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES. Holsti (1977) also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders on the subject of achieving one's fundamental political values (P-2). On the basis of a belief that conflict is either temporary or permanent in the political universe. So, we can assume that the more optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realising their political values, the less negative and more positive their net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. After our analysis the P-2 value was 0.048.

P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE. This index represents a leader's propensity to assign different types of conflict and cooperative actions to others. It deals with the predictability of the political future. Therefore, the more unpredictable the political actions of others, the greater the variation in other-attributions among different types of cooperative or conflictual acts. For this third question Blair scored a very low 0.102.

P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. The balance between a leader's Self-attributions and Other-attributions indicate the extent to which leaders can control historical developments and political outcomes. The greater a leaders control over political outcomes in comparison to control by others, will reflect a higher net of attributions assigned to the self. Blair scored 0.218.
P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE. Through the fifth philosophical question, we can get some insight into the leader’s ability; for forecasting the future and predicting political outcomes. It is understandably a function of the answers from the third and fourth philosophical questions. Explicitly, a higher role of chance is an outcome of, the greater the variation on the distribution of acts by others, leads to a lower leader's net self-attributions. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the predictability of ‘Others’ as well as the leader's control over political consequences being relatively low, therefore the role of chance will be relatively high. In this instance the role of chance was very strong at 0.977.

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

I-1. STRATEGY. A leader's overall attribution of positive cooperative and negative conflictual valences toward the self are indicated through the first Instrumental question. This question represents a leader's strategic approach to political goals. It also assumes that the more cooperative a leader's strategic approach to political goals, the higher their net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self. Even though we may not identify the rational of how leader selects their goals. It will enable us to detect the strategic direction a leader adopts towards their approach. Blair’s score here was 0.374.

I-2. TACTICS. The attributer within these Instrumental beliefs presents the tactics, used for the effective pursuit of goals and objectives. The results from this approach in turn; lead us to assume, that the more cooperative a leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net intensity of cooperative self-attributions. In this question the result was 0.158.

I-3. RISK ORIENTATION. The ‘shift’ and ‘choice’ propensities, in addition to tactics encompass answers for the (I-3) question dealing with risk and timing. The multiplicity of attributes encompassed in these types of acts indicate the answer to the third instrumental question. The answers shade light on a leader's approach to the control, acceptance and calculation of risks in their political actions. These risks, which come in the form of undesirable outcomes, linked to cooperative and conflictual actions. They are also the risks of submission associated with cooperative acts created in the pursuit of settlement and deadlock associated with conflictual acts encountered in the pursuit of domination. In this index Blair scored 0.2.

I-4a. TIMING OF COOPERATION V. CONFLICT. This Instrumental question, provides a distinction between conflict and cooperation. In this question we expect to discover why the
timming of an action in assessing risks of political acts, leads to a greater propensity in shifting between conflict and cooperation. Thus, if a leaders’ alterations to propensity between conflictual and cooperative acts are low. Then their strategic approach to goals will be more likely to be the dominant strategy regardless what others in the political universes cogitate. Blair’s index score was a somewhat high **0.626**.

I-4b. TIMING OF WORDS V. DEEDS. The propensity to shift between words and deeds in this index represents another characteristic of timing, in that, the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action will determine their shift propensity. As a result, leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are comparatively acceptant when it comes to the risks associated with the direction of the distribution. While those with a higher shift propensity indicate; more risk-averse orientations toward undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock. For this question Blair logged a moderately high **0.584**.

I5 UTILITY MEANS. The following distribution of self-attributions is arranged in different categories of cooperative and conflictual acts. It indicates the fifth instrumental question, with regards to the utility and role of different means in the exercise of power. The exercise of power is conceptualised as choices of control in relationships between self and other, were the self seeks to maintain control of relationships with others by using different kinds of words and deeds as positive or negatives actions. On a Functional, perspective they represent the attempts used by self to get others to say or do things they would not have otherwise done or said. The scores for these indices was: a. Punish: 0.12; b. Threaten: 0.052; c. Oppose: 0.138; d. Appeal: 0.462; e. Promise: 0.056; f. Reward: 0.17.

7.3.2 POST-IRAQ RESULTS

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

P-1. NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE. Our result for this index were **0.308**, which revealed a positive and cooperative approach to the political universe. The index for P -I is also described in Holstis's (1977) typology of operational codes, which differentiates leaders in terms of friendly versus hostile views of the political universe (see Walker, 2011).

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES. Holstis (1977) also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders on the subject of achieving one's fundamental political
values (P-2). On the basis of a belief that conflict is either temporary or permanent in the political universe. As a result, we can assume that the more optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realising their political values, the less negative and more positive their net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. After our analysis the P-2 value was \textbf{0.182}.

**P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE.** This index represents a leader's propensity to assign different types of conflict and cooperative actions to others. It deals with the predictability of the political future. Consequently, the more unpredictable the political actions of others, the greater the variation in other-attributions among different types of cooperative or conflictual acts. For this third question Blair scored a very low \textbf{0.11}.

**P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.** The balance between a leader's Self-attributions and Other-attributions indicate the extent to which leaders can control historical developments and political outcomes. The greater a leaders control over political outcomes in comparison to control by others, will reflect a higher net of attributions assigned to the self. Blair scored \textbf{0.234}.

**P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE.** Through the fifth philosophical question, we can get some insight into the leader’s ability; for forecasting the future and predicting political outcomes. It is understandably a function of the answers from the third and fourth philosophical questions. Explicitly, a higher role of chance is an outcome of, the greater the variation on the distribution of acts by others, leads to a lower leader's net self-attributions. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the predictability of ‘Others’ as well as the leader's control over political consequences being relatively low, therefore the role of chance will be relatively high. In this instance the role of chance was very strong at \textbf{0.974}.

**INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS**

**I-1. STRATEGY.** A leader's overall attribution of positive cooperative and negative conflictual valences toward the self are indicated through the first Instrumental question. This question represents a leader's strategic approach to political goals. It also assumes that the more cooperative a leader's strategic approach to political goals, the higher their net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self. Even though we may not identify the rational of how leader selects their goals. It will enable us to detect the strategic direction a leader adopts towards their approach. Blair’s score here was \textbf{0.416}. 
1-2. TACTICS. The attributer within these Instrumental beliefs presents the tactics, used for the effective pursuit of goals and objectives. The results from this approach in turn; lead us to assume, that the more cooperative a leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net intensity of cooperative self-attributions. In this question the result was 0.242.

1-3. RISK ORIENTATION. The ‘shift’ and ‘choice’ propensities, in addition to tactics encompass answers for the (I-3) question dealing with risk and timing. The multiplicity of attributes encompassed in these types of acts indicate the answer to the third instrumental question. The answers shade light on a leader's approach to the control, acceptance and calculation of risks in their political actions. These risks, which come in the form of undesirable outcomes, linked to cooperative and conflictual actions. They are also the risks of submission associated with cooperative acts created in the pursuit of settlement and deadlock associated with conflictual acts encountered in the pursuit of domination. In this index Blair scored 0.206.

I-4a. TIMING OF COOPERATION V. CONFLICT. This Instrumental question, provides a distinction between conflict and cooperation. In this question we expect to discover why the timing of an action in assessing risks of political acts, leads to a greater propensity in shifting between conflict and cooperation. Thus, if a leaders’ alterations to propensity between conflictual and cooperative acts are low. Then their strategic approach to goals will be more likely to be the dominant strategy regardless what others in the political universes cogitate. Blair’s index score was a somewhat high 0.584.

I-4b. TIMING OF WORDS V. DEEDS. The propensity to shift between words and deeds in this index represents another characteristic of timing, in that, the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action will determine their shift propensity. As a result, leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are comparatively acceptant when it comes to the risks associated with the direction of the distribution. While those with a higher shift propensity indicate; more risk-averse orientations toward undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock. For this question Blair logged a moderately high 0.644.

15 UTILITY MEANS. The following distribution of self-attributions is arranged in different categories of cooperative and conflictual acts. It indicates the fifth instrumental question, with regards to the utility and role of different means in the exercise of power. The exercise of power is conceptualised as choices of control in relationships between self and other, were the self seeks to maintain control of relationships with others by using different kinds of words and deeds as positive or negatives actions. On a Functional, perspective they represent the attempts
used by self to get others to say or do things they would not have otherwise done or said. The scores for these indices was: a. Punish: 0.104; b. Threaten: 0.026; c. Oppose: 0.16; d. Appeal: 0.44; e. Promise: 0.018; f. Reward: 0.262.

6.4 EU PRESIDENCY

Britain took over the EU Presidency in July 2005. It focused its priorities on the future financing of the Union in addition to reforming the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). The role of the President of the European Council is set out in article 15 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). In 2005 the Labour Party election manifesto vowed to campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote in order to keep Britain in Europe. Labour’s objective was to make Britain a leading nation in Europe so that it could help to spread democratic values and freedoms around the world (BBC 2007).

The ratification of the European Union constitution was considerably side-tracked when France and the Netherlands voted ‘No’ on their referendums held in May and June 2005, on the adoption of an EU constitution. As a result, the British government decided to postpone the Second Reading of the European Union Bill. This was to be the case until the French and Dutch, ‘No’ votes were clarified. On the other hand, Britain had last held a referendum in 1975, only two-and-a-half years after becoming a member of the European Community. In the spring of 2006, the UK was preparing to hold its referendum, but the idea was shelved after France and the Netherlands rejected the EU constitution. It is currently 2015 and there are still no sign of Britain ratifying that constitution any time soon. Nevertheless, Blair’s approach in many respects covered more on EU policies than any other previous British governments had ever done. Blair, could, thus, essentially be acknowledged, as having contributed to the ‘Europeanisation’ of British politics. Up until 2003 and towards the run-up to the war in Iraq, things were going well for Blair in Europe. He had clearly achieved some success in bridging the gap between the US and the EU. What faulted him though was the very relationship with the US, which inevitably led to the Iraq War. This in turn was what disappointed the ‘old’ European democracies (House of Commons 2008).
6.4.1 PRE-EU RESULTS

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

P-1. NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE. Our result for this index were 0.336, which revealed a positive and cooperative approach to the political universe. The index for P-I is also described in Holsti's (1977) typology of operational codes, which differentiates leaders in terms of friendly versus hostile views of the political universe (see Walker, 2011).

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES. Holsti (1977) also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders on the subject of achieving one's fundamental political values (P-2). On the basis of a belief that conflict is either temporary or permanent in the political universe. As such, we can assume that the more optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realising their political values, the less negative and more positive their net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. After our analysis the P-2 value was 0.17.

P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE. This index represents a leader's propensity to assign different types of conflict and cooperative actions to others. It deals with the predictability of the political future. Therefore, the more unpredictable the political actions of others, the greater the variation in other-attributions among different types of cooperative or conflictual acts. For this third question Blair scored a very low 0.138.

P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. The balance between a leader's Self-attributions and Other-attributions indicate the extent to which leaders can control historical developments and political outcomes. The greater a leaders control over political outcomes in comparison to control by others, will reflect a higher net of attributions assigned to the self. Blair scored 0.21.

P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE. Through the fifth philosophical question, we can get some insight into the leader’s ability; for forecasting the future and predicting political outcomes. It is understandably a function of the answers from the third and fourth philosophical questions. Explicitly, a higher role of chance is an outcome of, the greater the variation on the distribution of acts by others, leads to a lower leader's net self-attributions. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the predictability of ‘Others’ as well as the leader's control over political consequences being relatively low, therefore the role of chance will be relatively high. In this instance the role of chance was very strong 0.974.
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

I-1. STRATEGY. A leader's overall attribution of positive cooperative and negative conflictual valences toward the self are indicated through the first Instrumental question. This question represents a leader's strategic approach to political goals. It also assumes that the more cooperative a leader's strategic approach to political goals, the higher their net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self. Even though we may not identify the rational of how leader selects their goals. It will enable us to detect the strategic direction a leader adopts towards their approach. Blair’s score here was 0.368.

I-2. TACTICS. The attributer within these Instrumental beliefs presents the tactics, used for the effective pursuit of goals and objectives. The results from this approach in turn; lead us to assume, that the more cooperative a leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net intensity of cooperative self-attributions. In this question the result was 0.244.

I-3. RISK ORIENTATION. The ‘shift’ and ‘choice’ propensities, in addition to tactics encompass answers for the (I-3) question dealing with risk and timing. The multiplicity of attributes encompassed in these types of acts indicate the answer to the third instrumental question. The answers shade light on a leader's approach to the control, acceptance and calculation of risks in their political actions. These risks, which come in the form of undesirable outcomes, linked to cooperative and conflictual actions. They are also the risks of submission associated with cooperative acts created in the pursuit of settlement and deadlock associated with conflictual acts encountered in the pursuit of domination. In this index Blair scored 0.25.

I-4a. TIMING OF COOPERATION V. CONFLICT. This Instrumental question, provides a distinction between conflict and cooperation. In this question we expect to discover why the timing of an action in assessing risks of political acts, leads to a greater propensity in shifting between conflict and cooperation. Thus, if a leaders’ alterations to propensity between conflictual and cooperative acts are low. Then their strategic approach to goals will be more likely to be the dominant strategy regardless what others in the political universes cogitate. Blair’s index score was a somewhat high 0.632.

I-4b. TIMING OF WORDS V. DEEDS. The propensity to shift between words and deeds in this index represents another characteristic of timing, in that, the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action will determine their shift propensity. As a
result, leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are comparatively acceptant when it comes to the risks associated with the direction of the distribution. While those with a higher shift propensity indicate; more risk-averse orientations toward undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock. For this question Blair logged a moderately high 0.666.

**15 UTILITY MEANS.** The following distribution of self-attributions is arranged in different categories of cooperative and conflictual acts. It indicates the fifth instrumental question, with regards to the utility and role of different means in the exercise of power. The exercise of power is conceptualised as choices of control in relationships between self and other, were the self seeks to maintain control of relationships with others by using different kinds of words and deeds as positive or negatives actions. On a Functional, perspective they represent the attempts used by self to get others to say or do things they would not have otherwise done or said. The scores for these indices was: a. Punish: 0.15; b. Threaten: 0.018; c. Oppose: 0.148; d. Appeal: 0.316; e. Promise: 0.052; f. Reward: 0.314.

**6.4.2 POST-EU RESULTS**

**PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS**

**P-1. NATURE OF POLITICAL UNIVERSE.** Our result for this index were 0.19, which revealed a positive and cooperative approach to the political universe. The index for P -I is also described in Holsti's (1977) typology of operational codes, which differentiates leaders in terms of friendly versus hostile views of the political universe (see Walker, 2011).

**P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES.** Holsti (1977) also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders on the subject of achieving one's fundamental political values (P-2). On the basis of a belief that conflict is either temporary or permanent in the political universe. Hence, we can assume that the more optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realising their political values, the less negative and more positive their net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. After our analysis the P-2 value was a very weak 0.052.

**P-3. POLITICAL FUTURE.** This index represents a leader's propensity to assign different types of conflict and cooperative actions to others. It deals with the predictability of the political future. Therefore, the more unpredictable the political actions of others, the greater the
variation in other-attributions among different types of cooperative or conflictual acts. For this third question Blair scored a very low 0.12.

**P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.** The balance between a leader's Self-attributions and Other-attributions indicate the extent to which leaders can control historical developments and political outcomes. The greater a leaders control over political outcomes in comparison to control by others, will reflect a higher net of attributions assigned to the self. Blair scored 0.206.

**P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE.** Through the fifth philosophical question, we can get some insight into the leader’s ability; for forecasting the future and predicting political outcomes. It is understandably a function of the answers from the third and fourth philosophical questions. Explicitly, a higher role of chance is an outcome of, the greater the variation on the distribution of acts by others, leads to a lower leader's net self-attributions. The reasoning for this conclusion is based on the predictability of ‘Others’ as well as the leader's control over political consequences being relatively low, therefore the role of chance will be relatively high. In this instance the role of chance was very strong at 0.976.

**INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS**

**I-1. STRATEGY.** A leader's overall attribution of positive cooperative and negative conflictual valences toward the self are indicated through the first Instrumental question. This question represents a leader's strategic approach to political goals. It also assumes that the more cooperative a leader's strategic approach to political goals, the higher their net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self. Even though we may not identify the rational of how leader selects their goals. It will enable us to detect the strategic direction a leader adopts towards their approach. Blair’s score here was 0.448.

**I-2. TACTICS.** The attributer within these Instrumental beliefs presents the tactics, used for the effective pursuit of goals and objectives. The results from this approach in turn; lead us to assume, that the more cooperative a leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net intensity of cooperative self-attributions. In this question the result was 0.238.

**I-3. RISK ORIENTATION.** The ‘shift’ and ‘choice’ propensities, in addition to tactics encompass answers for the (I-3) question dealing with risk and timing. The multiplicity of
attributes encompassed in these types of acts indicate the answer to the third instrumental question. The answers shade light on a leader's approach to the control, acceptance and calculation of risks in their political actions. These risks, which come in the form of undesirable outcomes, linked to cooperative and conflictual actions. They are also the risks of submission associated with cooperative acts created in the pursuit of settlement and deadlock associated with conflictual acts encountered in the pursuit of domination. In this index Blair scored 0.19.

I-4a. TIMING OF COOPERATION V. CONFLICT. This Instrumental question, provides a distinction between conflict and cooperation. In this question we expect to discover why the timing of an action in assessing risks of political acts, leads to a greater propensity in shifting between conflict and cooperation. Thus, if a leader’s alterations to propensity between conflictual and cooperative acts are low. Then their strategic approach to goals will be more likely to be the dominant strategy regardless what others in the political universes cogitate. Blair’s index score was a somewhat moderate at 0.552.

I-4b. TIMING OF WORDS V. DEEDS. The propensity to shift between words and deeds in this index represents another characteristic of timing, in that, the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action will determine their shift propensity. As a result, leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are comparatively acceptant when it comes to the risks associated with the direction of the distribution. While those with a higher shift propensity indicate; more risk-averse orientations toward undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock. For this question Blair logged a moderately strong 0.684.

I5 UTILITY MEANS. The following distribution of self-attributions is arranged in different categories of cooperative and conflictual acts. It indicates the fifth instrumental question, with regards to the utility and role of different means in the exercise of power. The exercise of power is conceptualised as choices of control in relationships between self and other, were the self seeks to maintain control of relationships with others by using different kinds of words and deeds as positive or negatives actions. On a Functional, perspective they represent the attempts used by self to get others to say or do things they would not have otherwise done or said. The scores for these indices was: a. Punish: 0.108; b. Threaten: 0.022; c. Oppose: 0.148; d. Appeal: 0.452; e. Promise: 0.038; f. Reward: 0.263.
7. Discussion

On completion of our VICS and SPSS analysis on Tony Blair’s belief system we discovered that there were no statistically significant changes in any of his operational indices. So, due to the lack of any statistically significant change in Blair’s indices we cannot classify the events selected for this analysis as having yielded any shifts in his beliefs. Thus we reject our null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. Since our null hypothesis advocated the likelihood of belief change due to the effects of significant and exogenous shocks. While the alternative hypothesis supported none to minimal belief change. Surprisingly, the traumatic events seemed not to have had much effect on Mr. Blair’s beliefs. Especially when we take into consideration, P-3 “Predictability of Political Future”, very little change occurred in its average means, when we consider, for example how much of a shock the 9/11 terror attacks where the world over. Hence, we deduce from this evidence that traumatic shocks do not necessarily have the capacity to cause any fundamental change within an individual’s belief system. The findings also provide further support against our argument that Blair’s beliefs would have been significantly altered by the domestic and international pressure against operation Iraqi. Equally, the absence of statistical significance in Tony Blair’s operational code analysis, makes it difficult for us to confirm whether the pre and post 9/11 events gave him a sense of purpose or any confirmation of his prior beliefs.

Another important argument worth emphasizing is that for the individual, philosophical indices are at the center of their political universe views. As such in this research an individual’s inability to change significantly, supports in confirming that models which predict consistency of beliefs are credible. Secondly, another substantive concern of this thesis was whether the events experienced by Tony Blair during his stint as Britain’s Prime Minister would result in learning. Considering that our analysis did not disclose any substantial perceptions on Mr. Blair’s part, when it came to all the indices, but more specifically I-1 “strategic approach to goals”, I-4 “timing of action” and P-2 “realization of goals”, what these findings implicate is that for our investigation, little to no support was offered for the reformist group of scholars who advocate that leader’s beliefs can be altered. While a strong amount of support is given towards the status quo group of scholars, given the fact that Blair did not engage in any learning.
Other beliefs central to the operation code which could have changed and signified learning included P-1 “the image of the external environment” and P-4 “belief in control over historic events”, these beliefs help in exemplifying changes which illustrate whether leaders perceive the world as more hostile or more friendly. Consequently, the influence of experienced and observed events are what theoretically lead to learning. In the same notion, Blair exhibited signs of being aware of his international environment, by demonstrating an urge to influence others’ behavior via speech. As a result, it could be the case that learning may not occur because the ‘self’ realizes that he/she can actively influence the outside world by means of how others interpret and perceive them.

As Jarvis (1976) argues, the beliefs of political elites tend to be established during the early stages of their time in office or would simply have been held prior to their ascension. It would be therefore left to major external shocks or an accumulation of information indicating a contradiction to the ‘self’ existing view of the world. This analysis on the other hand has presented findings which indicate that changes tend not to be substantial, alternatively indicating in this case that beliefs are relatively stable.

Table. 3. The table below contains the t-statistic results from our SPSS analysis. When calculated for a p value the t scores yielded no significant results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs</th>
<th>Pre/Post-9/11 (n = 10)</th>
<th>Pre/Post-Iraq (n = 10)</th>
<th>Pre/Post-EU (n = 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P1-Nature of political Universe</strong></td>
<td>-.504</td>
<td>-1.102</td>
<td>0.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P2-Realization of political value</strong></td>
<td>-.342</td>
<td>-1.487</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P3-Predictability of Future</strong></td>
<td>-.1132</td>
<td>-.691</td>
<td>0.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P4-Control of History/Development</strong></td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-.447</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P5-Role of Chance</strong></td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>-.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I1-Strategic Approach</strong></td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>-.292</td>
<td>-.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I2-Tactical Pursuit of goals</strong></td>
<td>1.272</td>
<td>-.728</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I3-Risk Orientation</strong></td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.089</td>
<td>0.546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I4a-Cooperation/Conflict</strong></td>
<td>-.309</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I4b-Words/Deeds</strong></td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>-.389</td>
<td>-.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I5 Utility Means</strong></td>
<td>0.685</td>
<td>.338</td>
<td>.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Punish -</td>
<td>1.599</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td>-.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Threaten -</td>
<td>-.131</td>
<td>-.423</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Oppose -</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>-.1375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Appeal -</td>
<td>-.250</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Promise -</td>
<td>1.755</td>
<td>-.965</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Reward -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.1 Blairite Theoretical Perspective

When considering foreign policy decision making contexts, which allow a leader’s personal characteristics to play major roles in the decision-making process. There generally tends to be two types of situations, the ambiguous or uncertain situations. In a pre-9/11 operational code analysis conducted by Walker and Schafer (2006), in which Tony Blair was found to have
viewed democracies as being friendly, and non-democracies as being hostile. The study found Blair to have been less willing and cooperative in his tactical propensities, as he held a greater disposition towards the use of threats. Conclusively, the same paper found Blair to have had a significantly strong belief in his ability to control historical development (2006: 578).

Thus, Hermann (1984) argues that leaders without prior training in international diplomatic situations, tend to rely more heavily on their personal world views when it comes to foreign policy resolutions, than those who may have spent time in the diplomatic service. Tony Blair is described by Grainger (2013) as a politician who emerged from no obvious mould, nor had he treaded on any well-beaten path towards the high office. He was also seen as having had few affinities of tone, character or style with his predecessors. Thus, Mr Blair was your typical outsider, not having belonged to any given British political sect, but yet still he dedicated himself to its outmost transformation. Grainger (Ibid) goes on to state that, not only was Prime Minister Blair more than a determined and resolved statesman, but, that he was a rational, and moral representative in an irrational world. A covenanted ruler, charged to fulfil God’s purpose, through the transformation of human relationships under a New Labour government.

Not surprisingly Barber (1985), vied to highlight how psychobiology brought to light emotional and experiential factors when it came to understanding a leader’s motivation in decision-making. Prior to his death in 2004, Barber had developed a scheme consisting of a fourfold category, made up of two axes; active-passive and positive-negative. Hudson (2014), describes active-passive as the exploration of leader’s energy in relation to their making a difference in human affairs. While, the post-negative dimension focuses on a leader’s motivation for seeking office and their overall viewpoint on life. Therefore, Barber (1985), believed that it was those two traits, which were shaped long before a leader was elected in office, which provided insight into what type of a leader the individual would become. On this perspective Hudson (2014) gives a viewpoint on what Barber (1985) referred to as active-passive leaders. In this category he included leaders like Truman and JFK, who made good presidents because they remained willing to work hard, influence advancements and were not driven by other motives. On the other hand, leaders who exhibited active-negative traits, such as Nixon and Hoover, were compelled to rigid thinking, especially when threatened (p. 59). Prompting Barber’s (1985), analysis of such leaders to be in a category of actors willing to circumvent the rule of law in order to maintain their own influence. An appropriate and compelling psychobiography study of Tony Blair was conducted by Stephen Dyson (2009), where he used content analysis to analyse answers given by Blair on foreign policy question in the House of Commons between
1997 and 2007. After the analysis, Dyson linked his results with those of a trait analysis, in order to identify any positive or negative manifestations. In return the manifestations indicated that Blair’s leadership characteristics on the following: belief in ability to control events; conceptual complexity; and the need for power. Exhibited a leader who was clearly hands on and preferred to be in control of everything.

According to Dyson (2009), Tony Blair had exceeding beliefs in his ability to control events, but scored lower on the conceptual complexity indicator, which according to Daddow (2011) resulted in Blair’s propensity to view the world as a dualist, who was hesitant to consider compromise once having embarked on a given path (Daddow 2011: 343). Dyson’s (2009) analysis also showed that Blair had a high personality trait when it came to taking personal charge. This was an issue well documented and specified by some of his former Cabinet members (Robin Cook; Clare Short; David Blunkett; and Peter Mendelson). Blair also had a tendency of selecting small, hand-picked élites as his advisers (Lance Price; Alastair Campbell) to help him formulate foreign policy. Dyson’s (2009) research also build upon Malici’s (2005) work, “a comparative operational code analysis between French and British governance”. The study indicated that the “British diagnosed the situation in Iraq to have been comparable to the state of affairs, they encountered after the 9/11 terrorist terror campaign as well as the ensuing war in Afghanistan” (Malici 2005: 114). In contrast to the French, who viewed post-September 11, 2001, and the period preceding the Iraq war to have been highly threatening but, less prone to further extremist attacks because of Iraq. In this case, the Blair leadership exhibited low conceptual complexity, as its diagnostic and prescriptive propensity remained conflictual, while the perceptions of the French leadership stood in complete contrast (Ibid).

8. Conclusion

This analysis endeavored to examine Tony Blair’s operational code and its findings seem to justify many aspects of the cognitive consistency model, which features important characteristics pertaining to the fact that beliefs are stable over time, and that they are internally consistent, interdependent as well as hierarchical. In general cognitive consistency expects relative stability of core beliefs over time, due to the strong tendencies of an individual’s information assimilation methods, where new data is made to conform to pre-existing beliefs. Since cognitive consistency was not the primary purpose of this paper, we proceed to conclude with how the analysis results contributed to our hypotheses.
Stage 1, of the first hypothesis expected a shift in Blair’s operational code. Our expectation was that the first set of events (Post Kosovo and Post 9/11) would have realized a shift in Blair’s Philosophical beliefs, and that those changes would have in turn reinforced as opposed to reversing or even stabilizing his beliefs. The results however produced evidence reflecting a stabilized belief system. We also considered Tony Blair’s prior views on the political universe, to have been represented by a state of mind which believed conflict was temporary P-2. Therefore, we can accepted the idea that the more optimistic a leader's diagnosis is for realizing their political values, the less negative, but, more positive their net intensity of attributions will be towards others in the political universe. However, Blair officially sanctioned Kosovo’s intervention under the pretext that it was an act born out of a moral purpose, as a consequence, we conclude that such beliefs are core as well as being preconceived. This is because Blair remind his audience during the “famous” 1999 Chicago speech that ‘appeasement did not work’, referring to the prior experiences of Hitler and Milosevic. In addition, his religious beliefs also seem to have played a fundamental role during his premiership, since our findings as well as orthodox interpretations of his motivation for intervening in Kosovo closely follow that line of thought (Daddow, 2009: 550-1). While also taking into considering that he stated, how it was ‘a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values.’ (Blair Chicago1999). Equally supported, in this hypothesis was the contingency theory, which stipulates that effective leadership can be likened to behavior relations, motivations and aspects of a given situations factors (Fielder 1964). Having won three consecutive elections Blair’s beliefs clearly had a positive effect on his leadership skills.

The second stage of our hypotheses covered the post 9/11 period. A period where the emerging concept of Blair’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ seemed to have been affected by the apparent constraints of the war on terror. We say this because even though our results did not prove significant we still refer to them for hints on what could have transpired, as such we observed an increase in Blair’s P-1, from 0.156 pre Iraq to 0.308 post Iraq. There was also an increase in P-2 from 0.048 to 0.182 and I-5f from 0.17 to 0.262. These shifts would signify that Blair was cooperative and supportive towards his beliefs because they provided him with an opportunity to realize high utility.

The final stage of our hypotheses focused on Mr Blair’s third and final term in office 2005-2006, where by the key issues included UK’s Presidency of the EU, and the collapse of the EU constitutional project. During this period we did not expect any significant statistical shifts in
Mr. Blair’s operational code, even though there were exogenous shocks. The view was that the element of surprise and effect of any traumatic event was not going to be on the same scale or level as those experienced after 9/11. A supporting outlook would be that of Tetlock (2005), where he considers exogenous shocks, to be experienced when dramatic and unforeseen events occur and such incidences, can serve as defence mechanisms for a leader’s belief system. This is due to the fact that beliefs become detached views as opposed to catalysts of belief change. In another piece Tetlock (2010), supports his previous work and states that such incidents “can help leaders to sharpen their thinking about both possible pasts and possible futures, thereby making their belief systems more logically consistent and responsive to evidence” (p. 480). For example, in his speech delivered on the 7/7 incident, Mr Blair, exhibited classic symptoms of what Tetlock (2005) considered evasions of responsibility, accompanied with distancing one’s self from one’s own belief system. During the speech Mr. Blair emphasised how religious ideology and its inherent violence did not “start a few years ago in response to a particular policy, instead over the past years, associated terrorist groups have attacked 26 countries, killed thousands of people” therefore, “In the end, it is by the power of argument, debate, true religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat.” (BBC 16 July 2005). As our results show those where clearly the views of a leader exhibiting a relatively stable belief system.

As far as signs of experiential learning where concerned, the lack of statistical significance again indicates to us that Mr. Blair’s beliefs where established prior, or least at the early stages of him entering office. According to Walker and Schafer (2011), simple learning is a process in which Self instrumental beliefs are altered in order to change a leader’s ranking and preferences. While, diagnostic learning alters the Self’s philosophical beliefs about the Other’s pre-conceptions about identical conclusions. While, complex learning is a simultaneous adjustment of both sets of preference rankings (p. 240-241). On the issue of learning we can therefore conclude from our results and the fact that previous research has shown belief change to be an infrequent occurrence which at times is only accentuated by major shocks or volumes of conflicting information (Jervis 1976; Robison 2011).

Overall, and despite structuralist arguments that “external shocks” should lead to change in belief or foreign policy behaviour, Tony Blair seems to have continued on the status quo path. This leads me to contend, therefore that belief change is something we should rarely expect to happen on the international political stage, since Mr. Blair’ case has highlighted to us that
leaders do not always respond in a rational manner towards foreign policy issues. Instead, change in leadership might be the only effective way of dealing with continuity and change. This in turn also highlights the significance of adhering to democracy and the democratic process as it in most cases can be the only sure way of reformulating foreign policy. Consequently, this leaves scope for future research on whether individual beliefs can have any influence or bearing even if there was a change in leadership but the successor came from a similar ideological standpoint. This was the situation when Tony Blair was succeeded by Gordon Brown. Sentiments of continuity rather than change in British foreign policy where felt between the Blair era and that of Gordon Brown. In a way it couldn’t have been that surprising, since Brown had been Chancellor of the Exchequer for a period equally as long as Tony Blair was Prime Minister. Not to mention that Mr. Brown could have effectively been one of the most instrumental architects in Blair’s policy formulation (House of Commons 2008). As a result, further research could also consider whether belief change is based on an individual’s personality, where some characters are more open to new ideas while others as our results have shown could simply be more stringent on how the process new information. In view of that, we strongly feel that there are many more prospects for varying types of research paths which would yield fruitful results and we also very confident that the operational code approach offers one of the most productive means of achieving such objectives.
References


**Web resources**


Profiler Plus, Social Science Automation. [http://socialscience.net/tech/profilerplus.aspx](http://socialscience.net/tech/profilerplus.aspx)


