The Impact of Security Forces’ Behavior on Levels of Organized Violence after Security Sector Reform
A qualitative study of rural provinces in Burundi

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the understudied subject of provincial variations in outcomes after Security Sector Reform, by examining how security forces’ behavior affect organized violence provincially. By contributing to research on organized violence and peacebuilding focusing on SSR with a regional focus, the thesis seeks an answer to why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program? Based on theories of state repression, it is hypothesized that security forces’ abusive behavior leads to higher levels of organized violence. Further, based in counterinsurgency literature, I theoretically develop that security forces’ participation in post-conflict reconstruction decreases levels of organized violence. The study tests these hypotheses by employing structured focus comparisons and process tracing of four provinces in Burundi during 2004-2014. The study finds partial support for both hypotheses. In some cases abusive behavior have escalated organized violence, and in some cases reconciling behavior decrease organized violence. The causal path suggests, beyond the level of trust and distrusts in society and towards security forces, other factors to correlate and perhaps condition the relationships.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNUB</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Belgian Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Militant fraction of the CNDD-FDD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>National Defense Forces (Forces de Défense Nationale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces for the National Liberation (Forces Nationales de Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL-Ubugabo-Burihabwa</td>
<td>Forces for the National Liberation-Ubugabo-Burihabwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREBU</td>
<td>Republican Forces of Burundi (Les Forces Republicaines du Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMBONERAKURE</td>
<td>Imbonerakure militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Movement for Solidarity and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU-FNL</td>
<td>Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People - Forces for the National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Burundi National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP GED</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Georeferenced Event Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has caught attention as program for peacebuilding and statebuilding by international community. It is implemented in post-conflict and weak states to rebuild national security and justice sectors, in order to achieve an efficient, legitimate and accountable state, able to secure its population according to democratic norms (Bleiker and Krupanski 2012, 37). Based on the notion that security generates economic and political development, and further entails comprehensive governance of legal sectors (Ball 2014), it includes various programs such as strengthening of the judiciary, disarmament of civilians and reforms of security forces. A central approach in the reforms of security forces is training, education and capacity building to improve interaction and behavior based in democratic norms. If this is successful, it will improve the relationship between state and civilians and ensure that security forces behave according to their mission (Ball 2004).

While SSR processes are national and country-wide, most peacebuilding operations are naturally conducted in urban areas because of the location of headquarters, population density and other practical reasons such as infrastructure (Ingerstad 2012). Rural and local areas are not sure to get the same efforts or outcomes. For example in Mozambique, peacebuilding activities did not reach remote rural areas, resulting in that these areas where not affected of the interventions (Lundin et al. 2000, 188). Rural and local levels are highly important to understand peacebuilding since plenty of peace processes and challenges are faced in those areas (Manning 2003). Consequently, there is evidence that SSR has not been able to bring peace to countries such as East Timor, South Sudan and Afghanistan and the result if often a recurrence of state-based violence by rebel groups.

A concept that captures the phenomena of when non-state armed groups fight the state is organized violence. It is defined as “two organized groups of specialists in coercion [, who] confront each other, each using harm to reduce or contain the other’s capacity to inflict harm” (Tilly 2003, 104). Even though policy makers and researchers evaluate and examine implications of how to create long-lasting peace with SSR to avoid recurrence of organized violence, little attention has been brought to the variations within countries by national reform programs. Rather than asserting that outcomes are the same all over the country, the major aim of this thesis is to assess variations provincially to grasp implications of SSR programs nationally. This study aims to answer why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program. The purpose of the study is to contribute to SSR research within a wider context of post-conflict violence. Hitherto, most of
the literature has focused on examining the effect of SSR on a country-, or sector-level. Thus, by answering this question the thesis will target the gap in research regarding provincial differences in levels of organized violence after a structural peace intervention has been conducted. More specifically, the thesis will investigate the effect of the type of behavior among security forces (i.e. the police and army) on levels of organized violence.

I am examining this question by drawing on understandings from two different theoretical fields. First, state repression literature argues that when state and security forces behave repressive it automatically lower support for the state. This increases risk for conflict because other groups and structures are seen as more legitimate (Young 2012; Davenport 2007a; Davenport 2007b; Gordon 2014). I am hypothesizing that abusive behavior by security forces increases levels of organized violence. Further I argue that abusive behavior increases distrust and thus also incentives to enlist in a rebel group fighting the government. Conversely, I hypothesize that absence of violence can be explained by looking at whether security forces actively engage in society and community life. The second theory relies on insights from the counterinsurgency literature which has shown that when security forces actively take part in community development and are present in society, they bring stability and security which generates trust from civilians and decreases the risk of violence (Turner 2015; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). This strand of literature often acknowledges the use of reconciling behavior while continuing with repressive and violent action. However, this fails to acknowledge the impact of the community development individually, and if that decreases organized violence. It is argued that when security forces participate in community development, organized violence does not increase because the trust in the security forces create less incentives for people to join a rebel group fighting the government. This literature and arguments have not yet entered the academic strand regarding implications of SSR and this thesis aims to develop such arguments theoretically.

Thereby this thesis contributes to various research gaps. First, the thesis has a theory developing approach regarding how reconciliatory behavior affects levels of organized violence after peacebuilding interventions. Elaborating on previous research, the thesis brings more clarity to explaining ways in which violence decreases after structural statebuilding and peacebuilding programs. Secondly, the thesis will contribute to the literature by explaining organized violence after structural peace interventions, since previous research has mainly acknowledged organized violence after armed conflicts. Moreover, it examining provincial

1 I use abusive behavior and abusively behavior interchangeably.
2 I use reconciling behavior and reconciliatory behavior interchangeably.
differences and thus also add to research on the impact of SSR programs, which so far had centered on only looking at more aggregated levels, i.e. countries and sectors. Hence, it will bring more clarity on the effects of SSR. This also ties with the lack of research on how local peacebuilding affects the overall success of SSR programs in a country. There are few standardized lessons learned from SSR programs, but by understanding it as a wider peacebuilding agenda, we can derive better holistic policies. So, I argue that there are important lessons to be learned about post-intervention violence by doing a within-country analysis of the relationship between behavior of security forces and organized violence, to provide insights on holistic peace operations after conflicts.

I test these two hypothesized relationships on four provinces in Burundi during the time period 2004-2014 using structured focused comparison and process tracing. During this period, the provinces Bubanza and Gitega had relatively high levels of state-based violence and Makamba and Ruyigi did not. These provinces are chosen as they show diverse categorization of outcome. Data is collected from various sources, e.g. reports from NGOs or think tanks, policy papers, news articles and quantitative data.

The findings suggests that abusive behavior takes place in all four provinces to various extent, but it is only in two it leads to increase of organized violence. Therefore, the first hypothesis is partly supported. Furthermore, reconciling behavior takes places in all provinces, and is able to not increase organized violence in two provinces and partly in one province. Therefore, hypothesis two is partly supported. The causal mechanisms put forwards show some explanatory value for both hypotheses. Yet, it is assumed that other factors interact and conditions the increase or decrease organized violence.

The thesis proceeds as follows. The next section reviews previous research regarding SSR and organized violence briefly, to put light on some important dynamics expected to generate organized violence. Secondly, I link together the theory on why abusive behavior increase levels of organized violence. Further, I develop the theory on why reconciling behavior does not increase organized violence. Thirdly, the thesis turns over to discuss research design, method, and case selection and material. Fourthly, the empirical results are presented and correlations are emphasized. In the fifth chapter the comparative analysis conducted and the causal path traced. Further, I present additional findings, and discuss limitations of the study and alternative explanations. The thesis concludes in chapter seven with summaries and implications for future research.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

In this part I examine previous research and bring together various strands. First, I briefly examine post-conflict peacebuilding and SSR. Thereafter, I examine effects on organized violence suggested by previous research. Third, the specific SSR literature is considered. The chapter concludes with motivating the study and identifying the research gap.

2.1 Post-conflict Peacebuilding and the Role of Security Sector Reform

Post-conflict peacebuilding has the aim to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 823). SSR is post-conflict peacebuilding program, aiming to rebuild the security sector to not only focusing on eliminating a threat or opponent, but to secure and protect safety and social order (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 5). To make SSR relevant it is important to position this thesis within the wider field of post-conflict peacebuilding and its security dimension, with a particular focus on state building and security reform processes. “Successful security sector reform ensures that weak, fragile states will not descend into violence and disorder. In addition, it helps consolidate good, responsible, and accountable governance” (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 10). The aim of SSR is to create accountability, legitimacy and efficiency through re-building the security sector through training and capacity-building of state institutions (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 5). The underlying assumption is that peace, security and development will increase through a strong and capable state. Reconstructing the security forces is a core aim of SSR in order to rebuild the country and prohibit reoccurrence of violence and disintegration. SSR aims to achieve results in these four areas; i) creation of efficient governance, accountability and legitimacy in the security sector; ii) improvements of the delivery of security and justice; iii) enhance local ownership and local leadership, and iv) creating sustainability in the justice and security sector (OECD Publishing 2008, 20). Failures and insufficient programs does not only fail to achieve the results, it puts countries back into a vicious cycle of violence and disintegration (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 6).

2.2 Effects on Organized Violence

Research agrees that when SSR fails, the risk of recurrence of violence and conflict increases and presence of rebel groups rises (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 6). There are several explanations found in the broad post-conflict research and in the focused literature examining
SSR, to why interventions and peacebuilding effort sometimes leads to organized violence, beyond the general agreement of failure of reform programs. As the thesis is interested to show the effect of SSR on organized violence, the section now turns to why organized violence occur.

First, it is generally claimed that organized violence reoccurs because of weak state capacity (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005; Bourne and Greene 2004). For example shown in Afghanistan and Iraq, absence of functioning government leads to spread of organized violence (McQuinn 2016). In line with this theme, scholars argue that it is a desire of power to control the government or political power to maintain or change governmental systems (Tilly 2003, 105), or to strengthen the role of armed groups. This undermines legitimacy of the state (Steenkamp 2009, 113). Moreover, it is explained to be used to protect territories and local orders (Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002). If post-war environments shows a spike in communal violence, it is more likely that former rebels and combatants continue in their local structures to provide security (McQuinn 2016). Secondly, some argues organized violence is a recruitment strategy where the presence and use of violence gives incentives to join, based on group identity to either wish to join the fight against the other group or to be part of an ingroup (Senechal De La Roche 2001; Steenkamp 2009, 113). Here it is found that weak political reform process and lack of political influences might increase organized violence, particularly regarding how political institutions allow former rebel groups to transform into political parties (Spear and Harborne 2010; Lyons 2004). Third, lack of reintegration and weak disarmament, re-integration and reconstruction (DDR) process may lead to organized violence (McQuinn 2016; Steenkamp 2009, 113) because the receiving communities cannot accept ex-combatants in a sufficient way. Fourth, government bias, meaning that certain groups or communities are treated differently or biased increases the risk of organized violence especially on communal level. It affects power balances and commune associations judges the reprimands on perpetrators (Brosche 2014). Fifth, depending on the levels of arms flourishing and the effect of disarmament programs might explain why organized violence recur (Spear and Harborne 2010; Kingma 1997). A sixth theme raises questions about the so called security vacuum that flourish because of some of these previous findings in a state which cannot uphold state capacity. In this vacuum, ex-combatants and rebels can govern and take advantage of the insecurity and fragility, and allows for a situation to be filled by organized groups (Baker 2006; Themnér 2011, 13).
2.3 Thematic Areas in Previous SSR Research

Previous research on SSR assesses reforms in certain countries or sectors. A strand of research examines the role, effect and outcome of local ownership within SSR and how that promotes the values of SSR (Donais 2008; Yasutomi and Carmans 2007; Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder 2004). Another strand examines the role of accountability and institutional arrangements and how to transform them in a sufficient way within SSR (Ball 2005). From this, a third strand focuses on how security forces’ behavior effect levels of violence (Baker 2006; Call and Stanley 2008; Jingushi 2015; OXFAM 2012). Research makes clear that good behavior have positive effect on developments and peace, whereas bad behavior put countries back into vicious cycle of conflict and violence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 6).

Tracing from the general SSR-argument combined with previous research on organized violence, weak states are more likely to generate violence and inadequate SSR result in violence. Jingushi (2015), Call & Stanley (2008) and Schnabel & Ehrhart (2005), takes these premises one step further. Here, the argument is that the role of security forces in SSR processes can explain organized violence, and is crucial for re-building society and create legitimacy as they are the extension of institutional procedures (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 6). This brings together the arguments found within SSR examining the security forces’ behavior, to arguments within of organized violence research. Jingushi (2015) argues that the role of police and military determines the sustainability of peace and democracy in a post-conflict country. Further, without sufficient reforms, security sector behavior could be a sprung for new conflicts and violence, as their behavior needs to reflect institutional reforms (Baker 2006). Call and Stanley (2008) argues particularly that bad behavior among police and military challenges the legitimacy of the state which might lead to organized violence. Resulting, interaction between security forces and civilians determines the legitimacy of state institutions (Call and Stanley 2008, 304). Positioning the thesis within this theme in the research field enables to particularly assessing the behavior of security forces. Further it contributes to the understanding by tying this field together with local variations in peacebuilding outcomes. It appears that this subject is particularly understudied, especially on local level.
**The importance of local level**

Going further why organized violence occurs after SSR, outcomes on local level leaves many questions without answer. Research on local post-conflict violence examine manly how local issues are incorporated in national peacebuilding programs (Arjona 2009; Autesserre 2010; Wood 2008). It seems like only Roberts (2008) examine the reverse relation in focus of this thesis, namely the variations in outcomes locally of national state building programs. He argues that local legitimacy seldom occurs by national statebuilding programs because they are to dependent on the leaders having to be legitimate by the citizens. If leaders are not legitimate, programs and interventions fails. While Roberts set up a model where local capacity and local peace are built through enabling “vital and cheap medical healthcare” (Roberts 2008, 547) to bring state institutions and public norms together to enhance social security and welfare, this study examining the behavior of security sector on local level in an SSR context.

Changing the unit of analysis to local level instead of national brings a disaggregated level, and clearance of the outcomes of peacebuilding programs nationally, and SSR programs in particular. There is weak acknowledgement of local variations of peacebuilding efforts and the research often departs from how local concerns are incorporated in national peacebuilding programs (Arjona 2009; Autesserre 2010; Wood 2008). However, this thesis questioning the reverse approach, how national concerns are implemented locally. Local variations on these types of programs are particularly understudied and not examined (Spear and Harborne 2010).

### 2.4 Tying the Research Together and Identifying the Gap

Six explanations to why organized violence occurs as a result of SSR have been put forward. As seen, previous research on security provisions in SSR contexts fails to acknowledge regional variations. Putting research fields together, this thesis assesses organized violence after SSR on provincial level. This thesis makes several contributions. First, bringing in the concept of organized violence in SSR generates explanations of its occurrence after interventions. It appears important to include this concept to bring more clarity to explaining ways in which violence decreases after structural statebuilding and peacebuilding programs.

Secondly, local variations of peacebuilding programs are particularly understudied. Assessing variations of organized violence on provincial levels reveals the outcome of national program. This contributes to a clearer picture of successes and failures nationally in a
country. Moreover, research tend to study more aggregated levels e.g. sectors, countries and elements homogenously, failing to acknowledge variations within countries or sectors that affects the outcome of new violence. This also ties with the lack of research on how local peacebuilding affects the overall success of SSR programs in a country.

Third, focusing on security forces’ behavior to explain organized violence adds to the small strand of literature recognizing its importance. This appears important because security forces are an extension of institutional arrangement and the ones interacting with the population. To fully understand how the interaction between security forces and civilians affect the levels of organized violence, I set forward two theoretical assumptions explained in the next section. First, it assesses that state repression increases the level of organized violence. The second theory assess that in order for security forces to overcome distrust and suspicions created during a previous conflict, the second theory argues that when security forces engaging in societies it lowers organized violence. Developing the second theory brings new theoretical clarity into the field of the impact of security forces’ behavior after conflict. Doing so enables the study to contribute not only to the research regarding SSR, additionally to the wider peacebuilding research.
3. THEORY

After these insights in previous literature, the theoretical section elaborates and develops two theories examined in the study to answer the research question why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program. I proceed by elaborating organized violence theoretically. Thereafter I outline the importance of understanding behavior within SSR, and emphasize it according to positive and negative peace. Thereafter, the arguments and causal stories linking type of behavior to level of organized violence are examined.

3.1 Defining Organized Violence

When scholars examine how SSR brings countries back into conflict, they talk about violence in general. However, most often it is assessed that various rebel groups conducting these fights why it is suitable to study organized violence. Organized violence derives from the concept of collective violence defined by Tilly, involving physical damage, two perpetrators and results in part from coordination among persons who performs the acts (Tilly 2003, 3). More specifically, organized violence is the phenomena when “two organized groups of specialists in coercion confront each other, each using harm to reduce or contain the other’s capacity to inflict harm” (Tilly 2003, 104). Organized violence takes parts in state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts and during one-sided violence and on all levels in society by organized groups using armed force or violence (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Non-state actors using organized violence are in this thesis referred to guerillas, militias and bandits, covered by the umbrella term rebel groups. These are further emphasized in the research design section.

Table 1: Organized Violence

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZED VIOLENCE</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Violence organized by the state or non-state armed groups.</td>
<td>Guerillas, Militias, Bandits</td>
<td>“Two organized groups of specialists in coercion confront each other, each using harm to reduce or contain the other’s capacity to inflict harm” (Tilly 2003, 104).</td>
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3.2 Conceptualizing Security Forces’ Behavior

SSR includes programs to reform the security sector and at core is the training and equipping. Training, education and capacity building aims to change the way security forces interact with civilians (DCAF and ISSAT 2012, 9). Consequently, it aims to change the behavior among security forces from what they used during the conflict, to become democratic and accountable. In this study security forces refer to the national police and army. It is assumed in lined with Young (2012) that the state consists of a number of rational actors who create state institutions, but that the outcome of institutions are dependent on the individual rationale. Two separate ways the security forces’ engage with civilians after interventions are presented as two separate independent variables, abusive behavior and reconciling behavior.

The theories capture scales of behavior. The scale has two points for each behavior. Abusive behavior in one end is opposite of no abusive behavior. Reconciliatory behavior in one end is opposite of no reconciliatory behavior. They constitute a suitable way to study the outcome of SSR programs because it relates back to state institutions and outcome of training as core part of SSR.

Differentiating between abusive and reconciling behavior allows the thesis to examine the behavior according to the logic of positive and negative peace put forward by Johan Galtung (1969). According to these dimensions, negative peace is the absence of personal, or direct violence, which would be the case if there were no abusive behavior. Absence of direct violence and negative peace “does not lead to a positively defined condition” (Galtung 1969, 183). Positive peace is the “absence of structural violence […] a positively defined condition” (Galtung 1969, 183). It aligns the argument of reconciling behavior because it brings structural public goods to societies. Further it includes rewards or additional improvements when doing something good. Even though most interventions tend to focus on the absence of direct violence, creating positive peace through statebuilding and SSR should, according to some, be the long-term goal of peacebuilding (Roberts 2008). In creating long term sustainability of security sector, one of four key areas of SSR; addressing positive peace is crucial and in line with SSR frameworks (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 3). Figure 1 elaborates the concepts deriving from Galtung’s (1969) figure of concepts of violence and peace.
3.3 The impact of Abusive Behavior on Organized Violence

The theoretical approach emphasized here is based on state repression theories arguing that state repression leads to increased violence, and that in turn increase risk of civil war (Young 2012; Goodwin 2001; Davenport 2007b). Arguments are found wherever, but specifically Young puts together a theory of how the process evolves which the thesis departs from (Young 2012). However, applying it provincially adds theoretical information of the variations of abusive behavior within one country and years, which rarely has been included before (Davenport 2007b).

Security forces acting abusively can be explained by insufficient education, lack of accountability in the governance structure, lack of personal incentives to act good or weak re-integration of ex-combatants (Steenkamp 2009, 17; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011). Abusive behavior emphasized here are the violations of human rights and of civilians including, homicides, torture and sexual violence (Young 2012; Davenport 2007a). Repression by state institutions is used e.g. as a technique to answer to threats from rebels or when there are ethnic groups that do not appreciate the state behavior, and which the state needs to overthrow (Young 2012). Non-state organized groups outside of the state are a direct challenge to the state’s legitimacy and monopoly of violence (Themnér 2011, 6) and the presence of non-state rebel groups might do states to behave abusively (Davenport 2007b).
Abusive behavior is often conducted on civilians, the victims of state repression and which the non-state armed groups want to protect (Young 2012).

The approach elaborated here argues in line with Young (2012) and general state repression theories that abusive behavior by state reduces support from civilians to the state. Especially on local level, the importance of creating trust in state institutions are often undermined in international donor programs. Roberts (2008) argues that this relationship needs to be considered more closely, as lack of legitimacy on local level may increase violence. Departing from this assumption, the theoretical argument argues that if state uses repression, it decreases societal support for state institutions by creating distrust in the state. Distrust contradicts the definition of trust used in the study; “The extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of, the words, actions and decisions, of another” (McAllister 1995). Thus distrust capture then people are not confident or willing to act upon another’s words or action. I therefore argue that if explicitly security forces act abusively, this generates lower support for government as a whole. Without civilians trusting security forces, the state will not be perceived as accountable, legitimate or responsive. Such weak relationship affect stability and the likelihood of conflict and relapse into violence is more likely (Gordon 2014; Young 2012; OECD Publishing 2008).

Abusive behavior creating distrust generates more incentives to enlist in an armed group to fight the security forces, representing the state. As abusive behavior generates lower support for state it creates an arena for rebels to grow (Young 2012). When armed groups are present and challenges the state, it hinders the set up of national governance orders which peacebuilding interventions aims at (Baker 2006; Themnér 2011, 6). I argue in line with Bourne and Greene (2004) that organized groups are more appealing to secure justice and safety if the state behave repressive and there is a common sense of distrust. This argument applies to both existing rebel groups, which are capable to attract new members, and for new formations of rebel groups that sprung from the low support to the government.

Figure 2: Causal Chain Abusive Behavior

![Causal Chain Abusive Behavior Diagram]
This chain explains how abusive behavior generates high organized violence. The causal chain explaining the link between abusive behavior and organized violence not just appear, it is a consequence of interactions and rationale deriving from weak state capacity and the security vacuum that is followed by it. Deriving from these arguments, I test the following hypotheses in this thesis: Abusive behavior among security forces increases levels of organized violence.

3.4 The Impact of Reconciling Behavior on Organized Violence

Another path is recognized based on principles that engaging security forces in society enhance positive peace, different from the one just presented. Founded in positive peace approaches (Galtung 1969), it is emphasized that the distrust, bad relations and suspicions generated during the conflicts and civil wars between civilians and the state needs to be overcome by security forces engaging positively in the community. Hence, instead of not doing something abusively, i.e., there is absence of abusive acts; security forces would actively pursue something positive to society to change societal structures to bring peace. Could the security forces engage in the societal and community life, and by interaction with civilians decrease the level of organized violence? The theory elaborated here adds to the theory-developing part of the thesis. First, it brings in positive engagement in society as explanation to decrease of organized violence locally. Secondly, the main focus is usually counterinsurgency by foreign interveners but emphasized here to follow the same logic in a domestic setting. Third, only positive actions are considered, and not the interplay between acting well while continually doing harm.

Examples of this can be found in reconciling behavior. Such behavior emphasizes security forces to be positively engaged in community development in post-conflict societies to decrease the risk of conflict and violence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Smith and Holmes 2003). It hinders the return of violence because they establish a partnership and relations to civilians. The aim is to secure population by providing security. Subsequently they control them by winning ‘hearts and mind’ as the guarantee of safety and legitimacy (Turner 2015; Branch and Wood 2010). Even though it might not take away the underlying structures of insecurity (Bradbury and Kleinman 2010), the aim is to serve as the legitimate actor for security. Especially on local level, it adds to the already established environment and institutions. If governments and donors understands and collaborate with local level in post-conflict and post-intervention states, the effects will be much greater (Ucko 2013). This
approach includes various programs and efforts such as setting up collaborations and community boards where local security issues are discussed (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005, 6). Collaborations enables security forces to cooperate with civilians during patrols and investigations (Jingushi 2015). A common tool is community policing which the German Development Agency points to: “…improve local security by changing social interaction patterns between state (police) institutions and the local community. However, enhancing public participation builds trust and creates positive spill-over effects, such as more accountability between the actors involved” (GIZ and BMZ 2014, 2).

Mainstream approaches in the counterinsurgency literature argue that this is a tactic used to win people’s ‘heart and minds’ while at the same time using violence and military interventions (Turner 2015). However, this thesis excludes violence by security forces used at the same time. It theorizes only on the positive services provided to identify the impact and effects of security forces positive actions in society. Doing so, the theory developed is based in counterinsurgency arguments and integrates the positive peace approach. This shows how structural peacebuilding brings long-lasting peace rather than just the absence of violence (e.g. negative peace). This captures what Roberts (2008) argues “local political stability is maintained in the immediate to short-term and beyond; and that such efforts will yield greater dividends in the longer term in the form of more positive peace” (Roberts 2008, 539).

Service provision establishes partnerships between security forces and civilians. It increase incentives for civilians to trust and unite with the government (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). More precisely, reconciling behavior generates trust in government. Trust is defined as a social phenomena; “The extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of, the words, actions and decisions, of another” (McAllister 1995). Trust makes citizen follow the intentions put forward by the state. Building trust is a sensitive process (OECD Publishing 2008, 34). Reconciling behavior does not only mean that creating trust from scratch, it recognizes different ways to rebuild trust, and how to overcome previous tensions in society by active means from security forces (Levine 2010). Hence, when civilians have trust in security forces they feel protected, secured and governed, generating fewer incentives to enlist armed groups. There is no need to enlist armed group and set up local orders of security provision when civilians trust and are protected by security forces.
This chain explains how reconciling behavior generates no increase of organized violence. The causal mechanism explaining the link between reconciling behavior and organized violence follows a rationale seen in all consolidated democracies and a consequence of the security forces act according to their mandate. Security forces behaving according to pillars of accountability, democracy and efficiency stabilizes and brings commitment to society which is what the causal chain shows. Based on the following arguments, the following hypothesis is put forward: If security forces engage in post-conflict reconstruction, organized violence will not increase.

Finally, it is noted that levels of organized violence may be explained by other factors such as the success of DDR programs, legacies of conflicts, history and politics to mention a few. The aim of this thesis is however not to cover all possible explanations by creating a causal path, it is recognized that other variables exists. Studying the behavior of the security forces in countries is one step further in examining institutional arrangements. It is assumed to have enlarged effects of the level of organized violence. Moreover, training, education and adoption of skills among security forces is a cornerstone of SSR programs why it is possible to trace their behavior as a consequence within a SSR context. That is why type of behavior is assumed to affect level of organized violence.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

In this section, the research design and method are laid out to provide a comprehensive picture of how the study is conducted. I discuss various methodological aspects that are considered, and how this implicates the study. First, case comparison and analytical method used is discussed followed by discussion and examination of case selection. Third, material and time period are discussed. Fourth, indicators and measurements are presented and defined. The chapter concludes with a section describing the structures of the empirical analysis in chapter five and six.

4.1 Case Comparisons and Method

This thesis uses structured focus comparison to test the two hypotheses put forward. It is structured in that sense that questions are presented to how I treat the material in order to collect standardized and objective data. This reflects the purpose and the theory of the study, to make systematic comparisons and aggregated findings. It is focused in that sense that I will only focus on a specific time period within specific cases. Doing so enables to contribute with generic information (George and Bennett 2005, 192; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 45). The procedure of how to adopt structured focus comparison in this thesis is further presented in section 4.4.

For the purpose of this thesis, a comparative case study design between four provinces will be used. Case comparison enables to draw causal inferences (George and Bennett 2005, 389). This thesis is interested in the variation of the dependent variable, level of organized violence, and therefore, it is necessary to include comparative elements. A large-N study had not been able to capture these phenomena because data and information are limited. It would not have been satisfactory with random sampling to serve the purpose of this study. It could end up with four provinces with non-violence, which not serve the purpose. Rather a controlled and strategic selection has to be made to ensure variation in outcomes. Qualitative methods enable the thesis to capture and elaborate on the fine and complex relationship between security forces’ behavior and the level of organized violence locally. Comparing few cases is beneficial when conceptualizing a rare phenomena when only few cases can be under consideration (D. Collier 1993).

Comparing cases in within-case analysis is especially suitable for theory developing approaches as it seeks to identify the causal path (George and Bennett 2005, 179). Using a within-case design moves beyond selection bias and validity problems when comparing cross-
cases, as the covariance is more similar. This makes the temporal order better and easier to explore the causal mechanism. Thirdly, bringing in explanatory design to a within-case study leads to more well described studies (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 45) as it helps to identify new theoretical and empirical paths (Brosche 2014, 46). Case studies in general and especially within-case analysis, suffer from weak external validity since the case are less representative to the overall population, making generalization weaker. However, the expected relationship holds greater internal validity because a case study allows to go in depth when studying the expected relationship which makes it easier to claim assumed relations (Gerring 2007, 43).

Process tracing is a method that is particularly relevant for within-case studies and when testing hypothesized causal mechanisms because it generates new observations and variables. The core of this method is to identify observations that can be linked to the outcome of interest. As such, equifinality i.e. the different causal paths leading to an outcome of interest, is at the center. Tracing observations that are interacting with each other, creates powerful explanations of the causal path and inference (George and Bennett 2005, 207). This generates general explanations of the causal process and linear causalities (Bennett and Checkel 2012). Process tracing will be used to compare cases, to identify the causal path linking the independent and dependent variable to each other in each case, by observe events and observations over time to describe the causal path (D. Collier 2011). Process tracing allows identifying covariation in time and other variables interacting and leading to the same outcome (George and Bennett 2005, 205–208).

4.2 Case Selection

Cases in the study are provinces, more specifically provinces with SSR. Generally when comparing countries or other phenomena’s, there are often selection bias or validity problems. This thesis moves beyond such problematic by using diverse cases strategy. This strategy selects cases showing diverse outcome on Y. It aims to explain variation among a larger population by choosing only a few cases with diverse outcome (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Gerring 2012, 52). This case selection strategy is suitable for within-case analysis, as many factors highlighted in previous research are national wide equals all provinces in a country. Other confounding variables are not known beforehand, but traced by process tracing as part of the empirical analysis. However, confounding factors that might have interplayed with case selection are often country-variables. Because of the within-case analysis, these are held
constant automatically in this design. Following this design for how to do case selection theoretically and methodologically, I put forward the strategic selection of how to choose provinces. Firstly I systematically select provinces within a country on the following criteria’s:

1) The country has experienced civil war or minor conflict. The population referred to is post-conflict countries experiencing SSR opposed to for example ‘weak states’.
2) The country has had a SSR process after the conflict.
3) The country has thereafter relapsed into state-based conflict, which demonstrates variations of organized violence to be observed.

For the first criteria, I have used the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (UCDP 2016b). For the second criteria, countries with SSR processes has been systematically selected by using Wulf’s classification of countries experiencing SSR (Wulf 2004) together with country information from SSR Resource Center (“Security Sector Reform Resource Centre” 2016). For the third criteria, I have systematically compared those countries to the UCDP classification of countries that have returned to armed violence between state and armed groups after the starting date of SSR. Doing so allows the thesis to systematically examine a number of countries on the same premises relevant for the purpose of the thesis. I choose to focus on provinces in Burundi, a country who after decades of violence between Hutu and Tutsi embarked on SSR to overcome ethnic tensions and lead the country toward peace and democracy. This includes reforms of the security forces, DDR, strengthen judiciary and prison systems (Security Sector Reform Resource Centre 2010). It has been a leading example of SSR in terms of acknowledging the role of politics, evaluating results with a long time frame and advanced local ownership. Moreover, special focus of the SSR program has been on the reform and training of security forces, especially the police. Still, the country have relapsed into violence after SSR (Ball 2014). I select the provinces in Burundi on following criteria:

1) The province was affected by the original conflict. This ensures that variation in organized violence after the conflict is not driven by previous conflict. For instance, X

---

3 According to UCDP it includes war and minor conflicts

4 Following criteria’s for case selections, other provinces in the following countries are valid: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, South-Sudan, and Sri Lanka.
suggests that conflict begets conflict, thus I assume that the base line risk for organized violence will be more equal across provinces that have all experienced a violent history\(^5\).

\(ii\) The four provinces vary on the dependent variable: I chose two provinces with high level of organized violence and two provinces with low level of organized violence. The selection is conducted by examining levels of *state-based violence* according to UCDP GED ver. 4.0, 1989-2014 (Sundberg and Melander 2013) and recorded (violent) *battles* between state and rebels in ACLED data ver. 6 (C. Raleigh et al. 2010). Other types of violence (non-state actors and one-sided violence) are not taken into account since they are not considered to be informative for the purpose of the study. The provinces have been selected to get maximal variation on the dependent variable, to compare two provinces with high levels of state-based violence with two that show low levels of violence, as the logic of *diverse cases* proofs. The result from case selection can be seen in table 2 on the next page.

---

\(^5\) Referred to as the ‘conflict trap’ by Paul Collier. It suggests that when a country has experienced conflict, it is more likely to relapse into conflict again.
Table 2: Provincial violence in Burundi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bubanza</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bujumbura Mairie</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bujumbura Rural</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bururi</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cankuzo</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cibitoke</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitega</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karuzi</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayanza</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirundo</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makamba</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muramvya</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyinga</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwaro</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngozi</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumonge</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutana</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruyigi</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seen from table 2, most provinces have not experienced state-based violence after 2004, the year initiating the reform of the police and army. The study aims to explain variation in organized violence after SSR in provincial areas. Bubanza and Gitega are chosen as they mark high levels of organized violence in relation to other provinces. Contrasting these two cases with Makamba and Ruyigi, which were two provinces highly affected by state-based violence during the civil war and the two years following the Arusha Accords. After 2004 both provinces show low organized violence. Such a case selection strategy makes the outcome on the Y diverse⁶.

⁶ Bujumbura Rural and Bujumbura Mairie are excluded from the case selection. Bujumbura Rural surrounds the capital why levels of violence do not reflect violence in remote areas. Bujumbura Mairie is excluded because it includes the capital Bujumbura. Cankuzo, Kirundo and Mwaro are also excluded since these provinces did not show state-based organized violence between 1989 and 2000.
There are several reasons why studying provincial levels adds to the understanding of reoccurrence of violence after SSR. First, provincial levels are understudied in SSR. Secondly, comparing provinces within one country enable to hold country-specific variables constant that might have biased the study if a country-comparison was carried out. This makes the results and alternative explanations more valid. Third, part of this thesis is theory-developing. Comparing provinces may generate new hypotheses and theories to support disaggregated analyses (Brosche 2014, 48).

4.3 Material and Time Periods

The thesis starts in 2004 when the Burundi National Police (PNB) and National Defense Forces (FDN) was reformed according to SSR (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies 2015). The time period stretches until 2014, as this is the latest year the UCDP data are available at this point in time.

In order to examine the dependent variable, if state-based violence has occurred before and after SSR process has been implemented, the UCDP GED and ACLED ver. 6 are used. Both these datasets enables to assess violence geographically within countries. UCDP GED shows violence locally during the time there is an ongoing conflict or war coded as 25 vs. 1000 battle related deaths per calendar year. While recurrence of violence has been identified by UCDP, the overall development in the country has not yet gone back to conflict stage. Because of that it has not been coded by UCDP data between 2008-2013 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016). Consequently, the ACLED data ver. 6 (C. Raleigh et al. 2010) have been used to identify violence locally as an additional source. ACLED define political violence as the use of force by a group with certain purposes or motivations, which is similar to the definition of organized violence used in this thesis. While UCDP GED count fatalities, ACLED count the events per se without causality threshold. I will include the indicator of fatalities in this thesis to achieve consistency and measurement of intensity of violence. ACLED data codes battles, the relevant indicator for the scope of the study. I will use two indicators:

i) No change of territory: “A battle between two violent armed groups where control of the contested location does not change.” (Clionadh Raleigh and Dowd 2016, 8).

ii) Government regains territory: “A battle in which the government regains control of a location” (Clionadh Raleigh and Dowd 2016, 8).

These indicators has further been traced to specifically include clashes with state and
rebel groups, by using disaggregated data from Burundi for the time period 2004-2014 (ACLED 2016).

UCDP GED might experience some location coding mistakes. It has been important to check where the town, village of commune are located where the violence has taken place, as a cluster of violence presented can take place in three different provinces because the data is not local enough. This weakens reliability and might affect the thesis. However, counting of fatalities has been done several times in order to confirm numbers and locations why reliability thus increases.

The material used for the independent variables in the thesis has been collected through various secondary sources and ACLED disaggregated data (ACLED 2016). Reports from International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO’s), think tanks and research institutes consists a great part of the material. Other sources are for example Burundian and International news articles and material from Burundian state authorities. Some reports and papers have been based in fieldwork or conducted interviews in a relevant and adjacent area, which serves as a reliable way to assess the situation in the provinces. Triangulation have been used as much as possible, as the availability of data sometimes are scarce, in order to verify information from multiple sources when this has been possible. The material has been conducted both in English and French.

Material examining provincial differences are scarce and information outside the capital is scarce because of limited press freedom (Beijer 2016). In some matters, the empirical part relies on few sources available. A problem is the difficulty to confirm empirics in other material, and other’s assumptions and interpretations might influence and bias the results. However, different kinds of sources are used, and some of them have conducted fieldwork, interviews or surveys founding their reports. Data scarcity is a problem that might affect the empirical analysis, but not something that make the study infeasible. Reports and papers from various well-known INGO’s, and think tanks are used. They might be biased as they only have access to certain information or perspectives. Furthermore, sources from Burundian media and state agencies might be biased. Lack of press freedom and inability to publish certain topics or incidents affects both national and international media (Beijer 2016). Hence, data affects the validity of the study. However, scholarly reports are included which points in the same direction as other material, which makes them trustworthy. Another implication for the study is that incidents of peacebuilding and ‘positive’ news are not reported as frequently as ‘bad’ news. Consequently, there might be uncertainty on the number of reconciling incidents reported.
4.4 Operational Definitions

The operational definitions and questions posed to material resented here are adopted to adhere structured focus comparisons presented in section 4.1. Correlations will be drawn according to i) co-variation between X and Y, ii) time order, namely that x has happened before y. By measuring the causal mechanism, it will be able to see how X leads to Y. The comparison is presented according to low/mediate/high levels of the independent variables. Scoring only one indicator coded as a low results whereas all indicators (3) is a high result. Mediate is when two indicators are found. The relationship between abusive behavior and organized violence is a positive relationship meaning that increase in x leads to increase in y, whereas the reconciling relationship is a negative relationship where increase in x leads to decrease in y. The operationalization’s of the independent variables are nominal which means that it is a categorical scale where any members of the same category are not ranked against each other (Gerring 2012, 437). The thesis argues that any acts inflict the type of behavior. Ranking would need more detailed information on the presumptions of a certain act, which has not been done in the thesis. The dependent variable is an ordinal scale, where observations are members of the same category but ranked (Gerring 2012, 168). This is done by qualitative inference but ruled out by if fatalities are reported by UCDP. This is in line with the diverse case selection strategy, because it enables to ranks the outcomes of Y.

Organized Violence

Organized violence is coded as state-based violence in the UCDP. The majority of people killed in conflicts 1989-2014 were in state-based armed conflicts. This includes conflicts between the state and rebels (Melander 2015). Indicators for organized violence are based in the theoretical notions of the concept and guided by the definition “when two groups confront each other with the use of harm to undermine the other” (Tilly 2003, 104). Other research occasionally distinguish between different forms of organized violence in economical, political or criminal terms, but the organizational characteristics and strive for power is the essential in all these formations so this thesis will not distinguish between different forms of organized violence. This thesis exclusively looks at state-based clashes. That contains two-sided violence between on one side the state and one non-state armed group. State-based violence is part of the UCDP definition of organized violence (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Narrowing down to two-sided violence examines when state actors’ clashes with organized groups. To serve the scope of the study it is necessary to point out which actors that use
organized violence. The umbrella term rebel groups cover organized groups using organized violence.

Rebel groups are defined to include guerrillas, militias and bandits. Guerilla group is a group, fighting for a political aim with small-scale violence. Militia is an organized group of citizens with limited training. Bandits are referred to what Olson define stationary bandits. They establish a local economic order in weak state contexts to protect civilians from outside threats (Beardsley, Gleditsch, and Lo 2015; Olson 1993). Hence, what combines the four of them is an organizational structure challenging the state.

Indicators used are first number of fatalities, which points to the degree of violence. Secondly lethal violence from rebel groups against security forces captures the direct violence from organized groups attacking security forces and grasp when there have been deaths without clashes. Thirdly, violent clashes capture occasions when there have been clashes, clashes without fatalities, or when security forces’ fought rebel groups.

Table 3: Indicators Organized Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZED VIOLENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lethal violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Violent clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fatalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions will be addressed in accordance to structured focus comparison:

- What is the number of fatalities?
- Do rebel groups engage in violent activities against the state?
- Have there been occasions when rebels and the state confront each other with the use of harm to undermine the other?

Abusive behavior

Theoretical notions found in state repression literature guide the operational indicators of abusive behavior. They are indicators of physical violence. State repression literature often includes indicators such as kidnapping or disappearance but since they do not represent physical violence such indicators are not included. This operationalization is nominal which means that it is a categorical scale where any members of the same category are not ranked against each other. The thesis argues that any of these acts inflict this of behavior. Such a ranking would need more detailed information on the presumptions of a certain act.
Torture is closely related to this indicator and has three pillars. It is intense and inhuman suffering, it is conducted purposely and it is conducted by a governmental official (Rodley 2002). Beating are considered as a form of torture.

Homicides are defined as ‘the intentional killing of a person by another’ (Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby 2010, 7). Homicide is a relevant indicator as it captures intentional killings from the security force. This captures extra-judicial killings, which are killings conducted by the state without accordance to law (Teorell et al. 2012).

Sexual violence is in this thesis defined to include rape, as this is an act of physical violence. This is the narrowest definition of sexual violence. Other definitions of sexual violence sometimes include humiliation, prostitution or forced stripping but do not represent an act of direct violence. Such acts are physically forceful but do not directly involve violence, rather they uphold certain power structures and norms which are not captured in the term of negative peace (Skjelsbæk 2001). Sexual violence are included as a indicator of state repression in some literature (Davenport 2007a, 34) and is an indicator that reveals physical and direct violence by security forces targeting civilians. Including sexual violence contributes to the growing strand of state repression research using the indicator.

Table 4: Indicators Abusive behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homicides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions will be addressed in accordance to structured focus comparison:

- To what extent are the security forces’ interactions with civilians of abusive nature?
- Are there incidents of homicides, killings and violations of civilians by the security forces?
- Are there examples of when security forces have tortured civilians?
- Are there examples of sexual violence conducted by security forces?

Reconciling Behavior

Theoretical notions found in counterinsurgency literature guide the operational indicators of reconciling behavior. This operationalization is nominal which means that it is a categorical scale where any members of the same category are not ranked against each other. The thesis
argues that any of these acts inflict this of behavior. Such a ranking would need more detailed information on the presumptions of a certain act.

Community policing is based on police and community partnership and dialogues as a key to prevent criminal acts in a community. It includes community dialogues with the police on local security threats, neighborhood watch programs, and a small and defined precinct characterized by decentralization, joint problem solving initiatives and collaboration with civilians. This is said to increase trust in governmental by establishing relationship between civilians and the authority (Donais and Burt 2014, 13).

Community Development is a broad term, but it catches the security forces’ contribution to post-conflict reconstruction. Rwanda is a typical example where police and military have contributed to infrastructure such as building roads (Rwanda National Police 2013), or the ‘police week’ when polices are out in communities to engage in socioeconomically wellbeing for example by building shelters, planting trees, burn rubbish or reducing bushy areas (Rwanda National Police 2015).

Open Houses are examples when the public is able welcome to visit security forces bases or offices. The aim is to foster trust between civilians and the security forces, and show transparency (DCAF 2011; Ingerstad 2012).

Table 5: Indicators Reconciling Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>RECONCILING BEHAVIOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community development and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Open Houses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions will be addressed in accordance to structured focus comparison:

- Are there examples of security forces’ engaging in community developments and reconstructions?
- Have security forces set up community policing structures to be engaged with locals?
- Have there been occasions of open houses?

Causal Mechanism: Trust or Distrust

In order to capture one part of the causal mechanism, namely trust or distrust, which is argued to lead to more or less incentives to enlist, I will assess how civilians perceive security by
assessing reports examining public perceptions of security. Perceptions captures for example the general assessment of security in each province (CENAP 2014). Nindorera (2011) conducted a survey of peoples perceptions of security, with a special focus on the police in Burundi during November and December 2008. This study measure amongst others confidence levels to the police in Burundi. I use confidence level as an indicator of distrust and trust as they are comparable concepts. CENAP conducted a survey in 2014 on perceived security levels in the various provinces in Burundi with 101 respondents from Bubanza, 102 respondents from Gitega and 106 respondents from Makamba and 111 respondents from Ruyigi. The study by Pézard et al. (2009) will be used as they have conducted a field study with provincial security focus in Burundi. Other relevant marks on case-basis found in these studies will be included if it captures distrust/trust.

4.5 Structure of Analysis

The empirical analysis is divided into three sections. First empirical findings and correlations are presented, secondly the comparative analysis and additional findings and thirdly, limitations of the study and alternative explanations. The first part of the analysis focuses on empirical result. It starts with a brief overview of the war and SSR process in Burundi, with particular effort to the reforms of PNB and FDN. Thereafter the empirical cases are assessed individually to find out if there is correlation by doing within-case analysis in the end of each presentation of the case. In chapter six and the second and third parts, the thesis turns to the comparative analysis to find theoretical causality by tracing the causal path to connect independent and dependent variables. That is followed by additional findings and thereafter the comparative analysis is concluded and assess. The end of the analysis scrutinizes the findings and search for alternative explanations. After this, the paper moves to the concluding remarks of the study.
5. EMPIRICS

This chapter starts with an overview of the conflict and peace process in Burundi, followed by descriptions of the national SSR program including detailed pictures of the reform of PNB and FDN. After setting the scene and context the thesis operates within, the empirics from the four provinces are presented according to the dependent and independent variables. This gives a clear overview of the situation in the four provinces. Moreover, describing snapshots of events is part of process tracing in order to later link them together by tracing the causal path (D. Collier 2011). After presenting empirics of each case, within case analysis are conducted in the end of each presentation. The information put forward is described between 2004-2014, as such only incidents occurring after the SSR process begun is included. The results are dependent on the reporting material, regarding authors’ field research, access to certain provinces and villages, or case selection in reports. Therefore, the picture here gives a hint but presumably does not provide the full picture. Still the incidents are collected from the same type of sources in all provinces, which enables to compare cases.

5.1 Overview of the Civil Wars and Peace Process in Burundi

Burundi became independent in 1962 and since then struggled with ethnic violence between the two major groups, Hutu and Tutsi. The minority Tutsi have held power since independence (Marsh 2016), leading to massacres and genocides of Hutu. The country was governed by Tutsi military regimes 1960-1990. A process towards democracy and peace started in the -90’s to end the civil war (Central Intelligence Agency 2016). In 2000 the Arusha Peace Accords was signed. Two Hutu rebel groups refused to signed this agreement; CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL. CNDD-FDD signed the peace agreement in 2003 and became a political party, and Palipehutu-FNL signed a peace accord in 2006 and became the political party FNL (BBC 2016; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2016). The first democratic election was held in 2005 and the former rebel leader of CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza became president. CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL are two old rebel groups, but new groups have been formed after the peace accords such as FOREBU, RED-Tabara and Imbonerakure, the militant youth fraction of CNDD-FDD. Fighting the government is a shared feature, and they argue to uphold democracy and the meaning of the constitution and the Arusha Accord.

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7 15 % of the population (Marsh 2016)
8 FNL had to take away Palipehutu from their name as it stands for ‘party for the liberation of Hutu people’, and it is prohibited to include ethnic notions in politically parties (UCDP 2016a; United Nations Security Council Report 2009)
**SSR Process in Burundi**

In the Arusha Peace accords from 2000, SSR was identified as a cornerstone in the peacebuilding program to overcome ethnical tensions. (Rumin 2012; CSG 2010). In 2004 PNB and FDN was reformed and established (Rumin 2012). Focus of the SSR has been the strengthening of legal institutions such as judiciary and parliament, reforms of army and police to increase legitimacy, efficiency and quality and, DDR and truth and reconciliation commission. Challenges remain in the large number of refugees and internally displaced persons, the prison system, the professionalization of the police and ethnic tensions (Security Sector Reform Resource Centre 2010).

**The Police (PNB)**

After the reform in 2004, the police force constitutes of approximately 20,000 personnel from former police officers and 40% integrated ex-combatants (Ball 2014; CIGI 2009). PNB is the authority responsible for maintaining public order (Nindorera 2007). No ethnic group can have more than 50% of the personnel. Pézard et al. states that the least talented rebels were integrated into PNB (Pézard et al. 2009). Reforming PNB included training and professionalization of the police, but due to the uneven background of the personnel they have been criticized and described as under-equipped with bad training (Nindorera 2007; CIGI 2009). PNB are supported by bilateral donors, NGO:s, BINUB and BNUB (Pézard et al. 2009, 70).

**The National Defense Forces (FDN)**

The FDN was reformed in 2004 and consists of members by the old defense force, ex-combatants and new soldiers (CIGI 2010; Central Intelligence Agency 2016). FDN are responsible for conventional military matters and national security (Nindorera 2007). No ethnic group can possess more than 50% of the personnel (CIGI 2010; Central Intelligence Agency 2016). The most talented rebels were integrated to the army (Pézard et al. 2009). Contrasting to the police, the army are more often described with positive images because they are perceived to act according to their mission (Nindorera 2007). Moreover, rules prohibit soldiers to take part in political actions to stay neutral. Moreover, people who have committed crimes against humanity or war crimes are prohibited to join (CIGI 2010). Bilateral donors mainly support FDN (Pézard et al. 2009, 70).
5.2 Bubanza

Bubanza is located in north-western Burundi, about 50 km from the capital and consists of five communes with a total of almost 350,000 inhabitants (Paris21 2010). Bubanza is part of the Western police region consisting of 9300 police officers and 73 units (Delemarle and Renou 2009). It is a province characterized by poverty and tensions between groups (“Burundi – United Nations Peacebuilding Fund” 2016) The fighting during the war in Bubanza was conducted by CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL against the state. Especially FNL have been very strong in this province (ActionAid 2006).

Organized violence in Bubanza

After the SSR process, organized violence has occurred. There have been clashes between rebels and security forces every year since 2004 until 2014, except for the year 2009 and 2013 (ACLED 2016). The rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (later FNL), have been especially strong in the Kibira forest in Bubanza, a traditional stronghold for rebels. They have engaged in violence against the security forces and have recruited actively (ActionAid 2006; ACLED 2016). The clashes have generally occurred between FDN and Palipehutu-FNL. Both soldiers and rebels have died during the clashes.

Snapshots in time reveal the following. FDN clashed with FDD, the militant fraction of CNDD-FDD in 2004. After 2008, FNL tend to attack FDN at army positions or bases. This lead to clashes, killings, and occasionally FNL seized military equipment. Both FNL and FDN have laid in ambush of the other side and attacked them. Many clashes take place in Rukoko forest, a traditional stronghold for rebel groups (ACLED 2016). Imbonerakure, the militant young group of the political party CNDD-FDD was founded in 2010 in Bubanza. They started to attack military positions in Bubanza in 2014 (TRAC 2016). They recruit members in refugee camps both in Burundi and in Democratic republic of the Congo (DRC). Children are also recruited (Nichols and Charbonneau 2016). FNL-Ubugabo-Burihabwa, was founded in 2012 as a reaction to several killings of FNL members by the political party and former rebel group CNDD-FDD (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2016; IHS 2013). This rebel groups have attacked FDN bases and seized equipment, and they were involved in clashes during 2014 at several places in Bubanza (ACLED 2016; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2016).

Organized groups have been formed in Bubanza. Some of them have support from rebels in DRC because of close geographical location resulting in that rebels move across
boarders (Human Rights Watch 2015). It has been common for these groups to sometimes use military clothing. Vigilante militias have been engaging in violence against civilians and security forces (Tomasevic 2015; ACLED 2016). These groups have been running together, or with support from PNB (ACLED 2016). Numerous of bandit groups have been formed in the Kibira forest. Other unidentified armed groups have engaged in violence against FDN and violently attacked military bases (ACLED 2016).

The snapshots presented indicate that Bubanza has experienced a large number of organized violence after SSR. The question that arises is if the violence conducted can be explained by abusive or reconciliatory behavior by security forces?

**Abusive behavior**

There have been homicides in Bubanza. PNB killed 15 people on a sugar plantation in 2010. The persons had connections to CNDD-FDD. A result was that people were afraid to go to work which are their only source of income (Human Rights Watch 2010b; IRIN 2010). The police conducted extrajudicial killing in 2010 of a man, Mr. Ndikuriyo (Human Rights Watch 2010b). Moreover, PNB have been accused of extrajudicial killings of young men who they suspected formed new rebel groups in the Kibira forest in Bubanza (Human Rights Watch 2010b).

Sexual violence are common in Burundi, and rapes are in general numerous Bubanza as part of the armed violence between police and Paliphetu-FNL (Pézard et al. 2009). The police have raped women (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2008; EJ Dijkman 2014). For example, the police dragged a woman out of her house during night and raped her in 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2005). Another occasion, the police officer raped a girl in 2007. The police officer got 20 years in prison after this incident (Human Rights Watch 2008). FDN raped a young girl in January 2006 in Musigiati region (United Nations 2006).

Torture is common all over Burundi. Of all torture, the PNB are responsible for 44% and FDN of 10% (Pézard et al. 2009, 54). Police have been accused for torture in Bubanza during several years (Pézard et al. 2009; U.S Department of State 2011). One snapshot was when police tortured a former member of Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) in 2014 who got seriously injured (ACLED 2016).
Reconciling behavior

FDN had an open house in Bubanza in 2012 to especially attract more women to the defense forces. Women constitutes 0.5% of the personnel. The idea of open houses are aimed to be implement more frequently in the country, and this served as one first example (ICCO and OXFAM Novib 2010). It included discussions with local leaders, security forces and policymakers to highlight issues for rural women (Arib 2012).

The Belgian Development Agency (BTC) have funded equipment for community policing and reconstructed 14 police offices (BTC 2013). BTC launched a program between 2010 and 2014 which aimed to construct a professional, democratic and republican police force based on community policing activities in Bubanza (CTB 2010). These efforts are recognized by 70.3% of the population, which is above the mean value of 61.3% (CENAP 2014, 91). Another snapshot is that PNB had training on ethics to improve interaction with civilians (CENAP 2014).

Community policing, or police de proximité as it is called in Burundi, has been supported by various developments from PNB and donors. Its presence all over Burundi increased between 2012 and 2014 with 30%, now covering two thirds of the country. It is a valued tool by the Burundian government (BNUB 2011; Gitatuzi 2014; CENAP 2014; Ministère de la Sécurité Publique 2012). However, the existence is not widely examined in the material, mainly because the efforts have been launched quite late in the SSR program and evaluations are not yet made.

Measuring the causal mechanism: What does civilians perceive?

In Bubanza, 7% of the population thought security was bad (higher than the 6% nationally), while at the same time more than 70% of the population believed that security had increased during the year of 2008. However, Bubanza show low levels of appreciation of security. Only 64% perceive general security as good or very good, compared to the mean value of 84% (CENAP 2014, 24). 54.5% are confident in PNB (Nindorera 2011). Because of the violence, there are examples of how civilian protect themselves against violence and insecurity for example by organizing civil night patrols (Pézard et al. 2009, 61). Common in all provinces is that civilians keep arms home to protect themselves against threats as there are no other actors who are able to do so (Pézard and Florquin 2007).
Table 6: Bubanza

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organized Violence</th>
<th>Abusive Behavior</th>
<th>Reconciling Behavior</th>
<th>Causal Mechanism: Trust and Distrust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occasions when rebels and the state confront each other? YES</td>
<td>Homicides, killings and violations of civilians by the security forces? YES</td>
<td>Are there examples of security forces’ engaging in community development? NO</td>
<td>How does civilians perceive security? 64% appreciating general security and only 54,5% are confident in PNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do rebel groups engage in violent activities against the state? YES</td>
<td>Torture: YES</td>
<td>Community policing structures? YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fatalities: 150</td>
<td>Sexual violence: YES</td>
<td>Open houses? YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Within-Case Analysis**

To find correlation between the two independent variables and organized violence, x needs to precede y to establish *time order*. Further, it is investigated whether incidents have lead to escalation of rebel group by qualitative judgments.

In Bubanza, there have been high degrees of organized violence. Clashes between security forces and FNL, and other rebel groups have taken place almost every year since 2004. Another strong indicator of the violence is that the new rebel group *FNL-Ubugabo-Burihabwa*, was founded as a backlash because of all the killings of FNL members. *Imbonerakure* have recently been founded to fight the security forces. Moreover, the province shows highest number of fatalities during the period.

Abusive behavior is high because all indicators are found. It is spread over time during the period 2004-2014, which points to that it has taken place while clashes with rebels. When there have been incidents of abusive behavior there have been escalating clashes with rebels close in time. Moreover, abusive behavior has lead to formation of new groups. Therefore, it points to the direction that there is a correlation between abusive behavior and organized violence in Bubanza. Moreover, it points to a causal relationship since the mechanism *distrust* is high, and the province indicates low perceptions of security. In the comparative analysis, the causal path are emphasized and if the suggested causal mechanism can link the correlated relationship.
Reconciling behavior is mediate because two of three indicators are found. While levels of violence have been high during the time period, the open house by FDN in 2012 and the BTC’ community policing efforts, which were implemented in 2010-2014, might correlate with no clashes in 2013. It seems that when these two indicators have been present the violence was reduced in the following year, 2013. However, as the violence escalated again it does not seem to have a long lasting effect. Moreover, the province points to high levels of distrust so it could be questioned if this could be considered as a causal relationship.

The within-case analysis shows that there seems to be a strong correlation between abusive behavior and organized violence, which points to being causal. There might be a fine correlative relationship between reconciling behavior and organized violence during a short time lap. The question still is if these are causal relationships possible to be explained by the causal mechanism? That is further discussed in the comparative analysis.

5.3 Gitega

Gitega is located in the middle of the country. Gitega is part of the central police district with 2500 police officers divided on 35 units (Delemarle and Renou 2009). The provincial capital are the second biggest city in Burundi (Marsh 2016). The province consist of 11 communes with in total more than 700.000 inhabitants (Paris21 2010). Both Palipehutu-FNL and CNDD-FDD fought against the government during the war, and here some of the worst massacres took place.

Organized violence in Gitega

During the time period of the study, there have been clashes between security forces and rebel groups in 2004-2006, and 2014. Snapshots in time reveal that FDN killed 30 members of FNL in 2004 during a clash. During another clash in 2006, one solider and five rebels died, and FDN were able to confiscate the machine weapons used by FNL. FDN killed two leads of FNL during another clash the same year (ACLED 2016). Palipehutu-FNL continued to fight in Gitega in 2004–2006, however this group agreed on peace in 2006 and after that the organized violence decreases (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2016). During 2014, the government fought with FNL-Ubugabo-Burihabwa and five people died (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2016; IHS 2013). Many unidentified armed groups have grown in this province and have for example has killed police officers (ACLED 2016). Fatalities are almost 100 during the time period. Organized violence in Gitega are widespread and the question that
arises is if the violence conducted by these newly formed rebel groups and militias can be explained by abusive or reconciliatory behavior?

**Abusive behavior**

Abusive behavior is high in Gitega as all indicators are found. There have been *homicides* in the province FDN shot a women and her child in the beginning of 2006. This was not investigated by the local police (United Nations 2006). The police murdered Mr. Bukuru, a member of MSD in 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2012). Police used violence and beatings against a group of students in 2009 while they rioted against the government (ACLED 2016).

*Sexual violence* are a common tool in Burundi, and in general, rapes are numerous in Gitega as part of the large scale armed violence that have taken place between police and Paliphetu-FNL in the province (Pézard et al. 2009). However, there are no explicit incidents found in the material.

*Torture* is common by security forces. PNB are responsible for 44% and FDN for 10% (Pézard et al. 2009, 54). Police and civilians tortured a prisoner in 2010 in *mob justice* which is common in Burundi (Human Rights Watch 2010a). Police tortured Mr. Ndayishimiye in 2011, which later died due to the injuries. Human Right Watch are likely to think that it was by the police as PNB said to the family who wanted to report the incident: “go slowly, it's a delicate case, don't talk too much about it.” (Human Rights Watch 2012; Human Rights Watch 2014).

**Reconciling behavior**

Reconciling behavior is mediate in Gitega as two indicators are found. *Police de proximité* is known by 76,5% of the population in Gitega, which is above the mean value of 61,3% (CENAP 2014, 91). In Gitega, the introducing of the new chaplain to the area was supported by both PNB and the FDN. This ceremony was set up as a big event, almost like a *open house* where everyone was welcome so civilians could join the community leaders (Habogorimana 2014). There are no examples of *community development*.

**Measuring the causal mechanism: What does civilians perceive?**

In *Gitega* 90% appreciated the security levels, and 88,2 % had confidence in PNB (CENAP 2014, 24). People living in city centers or close to a road feel more secure because the risk of bandits or armed groups using violence in their homes are more frequent in remote areas, because it is longer distance the police station (Pézard et al. 2009, 57). As in other provinces,
people in Gitega keep arms to protect themselves against threats as there are no other actors who are able to do so (Pézard and Florquin 2007).

Table 7: Gitega

| RESULTS: GITEGA |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Organized Violence | Abusive Behavior | Reconciling Behavior | Causal Mechanism: Trust and Distrust |
| Occasions when rebels and the state confront each other? **YES** | Homicides, killings and violations of civilians by the security forces? **YES** | Are there examples of security forces’ engaging in community development? **NO** | How does civilians perceive security? **90% appreciate security in general and 88,2% has confidence in PNB.** |
| Do rebel groups engage in violent activities against the state? **YES** | Torture: **YES** | Community policing structures? **YES** |
| Number of fatalities: **97** | Sexual violence: **YES** | Open houses? **YES** |

**Within-Case Analysis**

To find correlation between the two independent variables and organized violence, x needs to precede y to establish *time order*. Further, it is investigated whether incidents have lead to escalation of rebel group by qualitative judgments.

In Gitega it has been high levels of organized violence with almost 100 fatalities during the period. Thus clashes between the state and FNL seem to have been conducted mostly in the years before FNL signed the peace agreement in 2006, and then recurred in 2014.

As there is only one occasion of abusive behavior at the same, or close in time of the clashes, incidents of abusive behavior does not seems to have been meet with escalation of organized violence. The abusive acts have taken place 2006, 2009, 2010-2011 and the clashes and violence took place during 2004-2006 and 2014. Even though organized violence has increased in recent time, it seems to not proceed by abusive behavior. Resulting, there are weaknesses in drawing a correlation between abusive behavior and organized violence. Firstly, abusive behavior has not been followed by more violence. Secondly, while organized violence stopped, abusive behavior did not. Thirdly, organized violence has escalated in 2014 without proceeding by abusive acts. Moreover, the causal mechanism seems to prove that
levels of trust is high, which could explain why organized violence has not escalated after abusive acts by security forces. Therefore, it does not suggest being any correlation.

Reconciling behavior has been moderate as two of three indicators are found. The actions in 2013 and 2014 were followed by new clashes and escalating violence between the security actors, and *FNLM-UBUGABO-BURIHABWA*, and new unidentified armed groups. Nonetheless, it points to the direction that reconciling behavior has no correlation with decreased organized violence. First, it did not decrease or stop organized violence from escalate. Secondly, organized violence recurred after several years despite the attempts of reconciling behavior during peacetime. Although, the causal mechanism, trust is high. Consequently, there must be other factors explaining why organized violence recurred in 2014 despite reconciliatory attempts.

From the within-case analysis it seems to be no correlation or support for hypotheses in Gitega. Subsequently the causal chain put forward in the thesis cannot explain the outcome.

### 5.4 Makamba

Makamba is the most southern province in Burundi with a population of 430,000 civilians divided on six communes, and one of the biggest provinces in Burundi (Paris21 2010; Marsh 2016). Makamba belongs to the southern police district consisting of 2000 police officers within 30 units (Delemarle and Renou 2009). During the war, the rebel groups who fought were *CNDD-FDD*, *Palipehutu-FNL* and *Frolina*, a fraction of FNL. The rebel group *Imbonerakure* have support in Makamba (ACLED 2016). Makamba are known for the good climate for producing sugar canes and many companies are represented.

**Organized violence in Makamba**

After SSR started, there have been clashes between security forces and rebel groups in Makamba 2004, 2008 and 2010. They day after Palipehutu-FNL signed the ceasefire in 2004; they were involved in a clash with the military. When FNL members tried to rob two civilians in 2008. It led to clashes and two rebels were killed (ACLED 2016). Several unidentified organized armed groups have been growing in this province. For example in 2010, security forces clashed against deserters who had formed a new armed group and killed 4 rebels (ACLED 2016). However, according to UCDP there have been no fatalities in state-based violence. Taken together with intensity in the violence, the ranking is *low* organized violence.
The question arises is if the few incidents of violence and the rise of rebel groups can be explained by abusive or reconciliatory behavior?

**Abusive behavior**

Levels of abusive behavior are mediate in Makamba. There have been homicides in Makamba. In 2009, the police killed a group of young scouts in Makamba, however the policeman was held in prison (U.S Department of State 2011). This year they also shot a pupil (ACLED 2016). There are few incidents of torture during some occasions 2007 and 2008 when FDN soldiers beat civilians in so called mob justice. One died of the injuries (Human Rights Watch 2010a). However, there has been no reported incident of sexual violence.

**Reconciling behavior**

Levels of reconciling behavior are high in Makamba. In Makamba, police de proximité served as a ‘testing region’ (CENAP 2014, 91). Paradoxically only 14,2% were aware of community polices, compared to 61% mean value. This efforts provides the police with positive relationships established and positive images to the civilians (Gitatuizi 2014). There was an open house at FDN in 2012, where the commander told the crowd that he was happy with the security situation. During another open house in Makamba, FDN and civilians collected rubbish together on the beaches and they got joint lectures on how to save a specific fish that only lives in the lake Tanganyika. Later, they had a football match between civilians the military. Civilians felt very happy with the organization and job the military conducts (Sindayigaya 2012; International Crisis Group 2012).

**Measuring the causal mechanism: What does civilians perceive?**

In Makamba 82% perceive general security as good compared to the mean value of 84% (CENAP 2014, 24). Although, only 55,7% have confidence in PNB (CENAP 2014). In Makamba civilians keep arms to protect themselves against threats as there are no other actors who are able to do so (Pézard and Florquin 2007).
### RESULTS: MAKAMBA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organized Violence</th>
<th>Abusive Behavior</th>
<th>Reconciling Behavior</th>
<th>Causal mechanism: Trust and Distrust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occasions when rebels and the state confront each other? <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>Homicides, killings and violations of civilians by the security forces? <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>Are there examples of security forces’ engaging in community development? <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>How does civilians perceive security? <strong>82% perceive security as good or very good. 55,7% has confidence in PNB.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do rebel groups engage in violent activities against the state? <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>Torture: <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td>Community policing structures? <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fatalities: <strong>0</strong></td>
<td>Sexual violence: <strong>NO</strong></td>
<td>Open houses? <strong>YES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Within-Case Analysis**

To find correlation between the two independent variables and organized violence, x needs to precede y to establish time order. Further, it is investigated whether incidents have lead to escalation of rebel group by qualitative judgments.

There have been incidents of organized violence in 2004, 2008 and 2010. The mediate abusive behavior have mainly taken place during 2007-2009, which is before, or during the same time as the organized violence in 2008 and 2010. It is worth stressing the clash in 2010 between PNB and FDN, and deserters from security forces. Other new unidentified armed groups have also been formed. It points to that there is a correlation between abusive behavior and escalation of organized violence in Makamba, because it is possible to trace the time order and outcome of Y. Moreover, the general perception of security is 82%, which is just below national mean value. However confidence in PNB is only just about 50%. Consequently there might be a causal relationship, discussed further in the comparative analysis.

The reconciliatory behavior is high as all indicators are found, and these efforts have been attempted primarily after 2012, while there is no organized violence since 2010. It points to that reconciling behavior seems to correlate strongly with the absence of organized violence after 2010 supporting the hypothesis. This relationship points to being causal, because the general perception of trust is high. First, the open house and community development was conducted by FDN, not PNB that could explain why the confidence in PNB
is low. Secondly, the abusive behavior has most reportedly been conducted by PNB. However, the causal path is explicitly outlined in the comparative analysis.

From the within-case analysis it seems to be correlations between both independent variables and the dependent variable in Makamba. The question is if the correlations are possible to be explained by the causal mechanism and a causal relationship to be established. That is further discussed in the comparative analysis.

5.5 Ruyigi

Ruyigi is a province in eastern Burundi bordering Tanzania. The province consists of seven communes and has a population of 400,000 (Paris21 2010) and belongs to the central police district with 2500 officers divided on 39 units (Delemarle and Renou 2009). Ruyigi is a poor province with bad connections and communications. During the war and in the years right after the peace accord, the province experienced high level of violence, in particular between CNDD-FDD and the state.

Organized violence in Ruyigi

There have been formed local security groups in this area, or vigilante groups, which have used violence against civilians and killed suspected (Human Rights Watch 2010a). There have not reported incidents of clashes between security forces and rebels during the time period, why the province ranks as low organized violence.

Abusive behavior

Abusive behavior is low in Ruyigi. There have been rapes by the military, and the police have used sexual violence in Ruyigi as well (Human Rights Watch 2005). Moreover, PNB has raped several women in prisons in 2007 (Pézard et al. 2009, 78). However, there are no reported actions of homicides or torture.

Reconciling behavior

Reconciling behavior is mediate in Ruyigi. There are no certain reported open houses, even though some documents state that it has been implemented widely in the country. BTC launched a community-policing program in several communes in Ruyigi between 2010 and 2014. It aimed to construct a professional, democratic and republican police force, based on
community policing activities (CTB 2010). However, only 30,6% were aware of the efforts (CENAP 2014, 91) compared to mean value of 61,3%.

**Measuring the causal mechanism: What does civilians perceive?**

In *Ruyigi*, 7% believes the state generates bad security (in comparison to 6 % nationally) while at the same time the province has the lowest crime rates nationally. 81,8% have confidence in PNB (Nindorera 2011). Further, 80% of the population in Ruyigi believes that security has improved between 2005 until 2007. More than 50% of the population considers security forces to efficient in their office. It also features that more than 80% appreciates integration of former combatants into FDN because it is said to decrease levels of insecurity (Pézard and Florquin 2007).

*Table 9: Ruyigi*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>RESULTS: RUYIGI</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organized Violence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasions when rebels and the state confront each other? <strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do these groups engage in violent activities against the state? <strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fatalities: <strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Within-Case Analysis**

To find correlation between the two independent variables and organized violence, x needs to precede y to establish *time order*. Further, it is investigated whether incidents have lead to escalation of rebel group by qualitative judgments.

In *Ruyigi* there have been no reported clashes between security forces and rebels during the time period or any fatalities. Therefore the province ranks as *low* organized violence. The abusive behavior is low as only sexual violence is identified. As there is organized violence is
low, and has not escalated by abusive behavior there is no possibility to establish correlation. The hypothesis is not supported.

However, reconciling behavior is low and organized violence has not increased after the attempts, indicating that reconciling behavior seems correlates with lower levels of violence and supports the hypothesis. Moreover, the province shows high trust which points towards a causal relationship.

The within-case analysis does not suggest a correlation between abusive behavior and organized violence, because organized violence have not increased or escalated. However, there seems to be a correlation between reconciling behavior and organized violence supporting the hypothesis. However, as there is no organized violence during the time period, the results need to be treated with caution. Still, the result shows at least that organized violence has not increase. The question is if this correlation is possible to be explained by the causal mechanism and a causal relationship to be established. That is further discussed in the comparative analysis, which the thesis turns to now.
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In this section I compare the four cases put forward; Bubanza, Gitega, Makamba and Ruyigi located in Burundi during the time period 2004-2014. In previous within-case analyses it has been established modest support to the hypotheses. The correlations suggest modest support towards the hypothesis abusive behavior increases level of organized violence. Further the correlations suggest modest support towards the hypothesis if security forces engage in post-conflict reconstruction, organized violence will not increase. Here, I will analyze and trace the causal path linking the independent variables abusive behavior and reconciling behavior, to the dependent variable, levels of organized violence. Doing so allows the thesis to answer the research question why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program? Furthermore, the causal mechanisms indicate some support to be able to explain the correlations. This contributes to the purpose of the study, to assess country variances in SSR on provincial levels, which will bring more knowledge of the national outcome of SSR where implemented. This serves to increase knowledge to the wider post-conflict peacebuilding efforts carried out and to test the theory-developing part of the thesis.

6.1 Synthesizing Organized Violence

Bubanza and Gitega were selected strategically due to their high levels of fatalities after the reform of FDN and PNB in 2004. Ruyigi and Makamba were chosen due to their low levels of fatalities after 2004, while they experience high levels of violence during the war according to UCDP.

Traced from the results from the within-case analyses there has been variation in the levels of organized violence in the provinces. In Bubanza and Gitega the levels have been high because they show most fatalities according to UCDP, and violent clashes and use of lethal violence have occurred during more years than in the other cases. In Makamba there have been no fatalities according to the UCDP, but still there has been some organized violence in form of clashes and lethal violence between state and rebels. In Ruyigi there have been no organized violence since 2004. In all provinces there are unidentified armed groups or vigilante groups that have been formed, and in some regions also new rebel groups.

Variations found in the results are that three of four cases show organized violence. Even though distinguishing between cases are not done in absolute terms, it is still possible to
see the trend that Bubanza and Gitega shows relatively higher degree of organized violence because there are more incidents reported in the material. However, Makamba shows no fatalities according to the UCDP but still there has been lethal violence and violent clashes showing that organized violence thus exists to some degree in the province. Secondly, the degree of organized violence varies in time. There seems to be more intensifying organized violence in the beginning of the time period, which is more recent in time to the peace accord.

The question this thesis is interested in is if security forces’ behavior can help explain the various outcomes of why there is organized violence in some areas but not others after the initiation of a SSR program. The upcoming sections discuss variations in $x$, and elaborate on causality where correlation has been identified.

6.2 Abusive behavior as an Explanation of Organized Violence

Having briefly analyzed each case when presenting empirics, this part will compare cases by first examine interesting variations in the independent variables, secondly to discussion the implications of the hypothesis and thirdly to discuss the implication of the causal path.

Case comparisons: Interpreting the main results and interesting variations

As the within case analyses shows, abusive behavior is conducted in all provinces, but the extensions and levels differ. The degree of abusive behavior is high in Bubanza and Gitega as all indicators are found; homicides, torture and sexual violence. Makamba scores mediate degree of abusive behavior as two out of three indicators are found, homicides and torture. Ruyigi scores low levels of abusive behavior, as they only show sexual violence. The main result drawn from the within-case analyses is that it is possible to establish a correlation in Bubanza and Makamba between abusive behavior and organized violence. It correlates in time order and in intensity.

Comparing cases shows interesting variations. First, despite correlation or not, all provinces show abusive behavior. The overall picture points to that the more incidents and more frequent abusive behavior, the more organized violence. Secondly, the indicator sexual violence does not seem to affect the outcomes. Bubanza shows all indicators of abusive behavior inclusive sexual violence, but Makamba does only score homicides and torture but no sexual violence. Yet, the organized violence escalated. This is further supported if looking at the result in Ruyigi which only scores sexual violence but no organized violence. It seems
like from the case comparison it is possible to suggest that sexual violence does not trigger organized violence in the way torture and homicides do.

In table 10, the outcomes of abusive behavior and organized violence are presented. Further, it is shown that the hypothesis that abusive behavior among security forces increases levels of organized violence is supported in Bubanza and Makamba, because it is possible to establish correlation.

Table 10: Outcome Abusive Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Organized Violence</th>
<th>Abusive behavior</th>
<th>Hypothesis supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bubanza</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitega</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makamba</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruyigi</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implications for hypothesis

Table 10 shows that hypothesis one is supported in two cases of four cases. This leaves hypothesis one abusive behavior among security forces increases levels of organized violence with partial explanatory value. As theoretically expected, this reveals that abusive behavior increases organized violence in some cases. Yet, it does not seem to be merely the degree of abusive behavior that explains organized violence. Rather the causal path in this study shows some similarities in Bubanza and Makamba, which are examined further in the next section.

Further, since all cases shows abusive behavior, it is likely that something adds to the variation in outcomes. Therefore, the question is why there seems to be no escalation of violence after abusive behavior in Gitega and Ruyigi. These cases display that merely the degree of abusive behavior does not necessarily have to be low to not increase organized violence. Rather, it points to two findings. First, the causal path has some explanatory value because the level of distrust is low. Both provinces show high general perceptions of security and high confidence to PNB. Moreover, in Ruyigi the motives for committing crimes are zero as a result of ‘activity of rebel forces’. Instead theft is a strong motive for armed violence (Pézard et al. 2009, 50), pointing to that activity of rebels seems to be the concern. Moreover, the province is extremely poor and is affected by food insecurity, which rather serves as second motive for using violence (Pézard et al. 2009, 50). Secondly, it could be so that
organized violence does not increase after abusive behavior because security forces’ collaborate with rebel groups. For example, it is possible to trace that sometimes security forces’ have not intervened after crimes, they have rather protected the perpetrator or they have engaged in violence together with rebel groups. However, this seems to be found in all provinces, why it does not serve as a general explanation to why the hypothesis is not supported in these cases.

**Implications for the causal path**

As seen, in Bubanza and Makamba, abusive behavior has increased organized violence. This confirms the theory which for example suggest that state use repressive behavior against certain ethic groups in order to overthrow them, or because rebel groups threatens the government. It makes rebel groups fight against the state in order to achieve legitimacy and security (Young 2012; Baker 2006). The findings suggest the causal mechanism to have some explanatory value of the hypothesis.

Tracing the causal chain put forward in the thesis shows that the levels of distrust vary. Only 64% of the population considers the general security levels in Bubanza as good or very good, whereas in Makamba the same numbers are 82%. However, what combines them is that just above half of the population shows confidence to the PNB, 54,5% in Bubanza and 55,7% in Makamba. It points to the direction that it would rather be the low confidence in PNB that suggests a causal relationship, and not the general security levels. Although it is not possible to say if this reveals the whole logic behind as there is no study on the confidence levels to the FDN to compare with. However, it points to causality when assessing only confidence to PNB, although some modifications might be needed of the causal mechanism to better capture the distrust.

Yet, the theory put forward seems to explain the relationship especially on local level where the outcomes are more visible (Young 2012; Gordon 2014; Roberts 2008). Although incentives to enlist in a rebel group are not measured, from the qualitative reading it seems like many rebel groups forms in the Kibira forest in Bubanza. In Makamba the new armed group founded in 2010 and clashed with security forces, actually consisted of former deserters from security forces. In both provinces, rebel groups have recruited actively. This seems to indicate tensions and vacuums for rebels to operate in due to abusive behavior conducted which lead to new formations and organized violence.

Other observations are found deductively that explains the sequence of the correlation and adds to strengthen the causal relationship, in line with the methodology of process tracing.
One such indicator is the traditional stronghold of rebel groups in the provinces. For example, the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL, have traditionally had strong support in Bubanza and Makamba. In Bubanza, they have clashed several times with the security forces both before and after the peace accord in 2006. Other groups have been strong in the provinces such as CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu-FNL and Imbonerakure. Further, in Bubanza, FNL-Ubugabo-Burihabwa has been formed and in Makamba Frolina has a traditional stronghold. Being a traditional stronghold for rebels, in Bubanza partly explained by the geographical closeness to DRC where other rebel groups are hiding and formed, seem to explain why there have been the escalations of organized violence in the provinces. In Makamba, there seems to be activities across boarder to Tanzania (Pézard et al. 2009, 107). Moreover, there are several unidentified armed groups and vigilante groups formed in the provinces that have clashed with security forces and increased organized violence. Being a traditional stronghold of rebel groups might lower the opportunity costs of taking up arms.

Another factor found that adds to the causal relationship and the low perception of security is that many civilians are armed. People believe that they need to protect themselves due to lack of security in the society. The ratio of holding arms is 1/10 in both provinces (Pézard and Florquin 2007, 17).

This comparative analysis is able to answer the research question why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program. The analysis suggest that abusive behavior is able to explain why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program. Explicitly, the causal path suggested in the study seems to explain the general implications of variations in violence. Modifications to the causal mechanism are that it is not necessarily the general distrust in society that explains why abusive behavior increase levels of organized violence since the levels in Bubanza and Makamba diverge. Rather it points to that the specific distrust in security forces links the relationship where both provinces show almost the same level of support. Weak confidence to security forces seem to increase incentives to enlist a rebel group to fight the security forces rather than the general security overall. However, with this modification it is possible to say how abusive behavior increases organized violence and that the causal path seems to explain the relationship. Additional indicators found that supports the causal path is being a traditional stronghold for rebel groups, the formations of new armed groups and vigilante groups, and higher levels of arms among the population. The findings indicate that the theory of abusive behavior can explain
case-specific variations and supports theoretical causality in general because the observations found are the same in both cases where the hypothesis is supported.

These results can be further traced to the traditional *greed* and *grievance* discussion (P. Collier and Hoeffler 2004). When there is stronghold for rebels and the levels of arms are higher, the *opportunity costs* for evoking on organized violence is lower. Moreover, the level of trust could be explained by grievances towards the state, explaining increased organized violence (P. Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

However, it does not take away the risk of equifinality, that other factors lead to the same outcome, or that organized violence only might be explained by abusive behavior. Still, the within-case analysis and the comparative analysis show that it seems to have an effect on why organized violence escalates and continues after SSR. This contributes to the bigger picture of SSR provincially, that there are variances in countries that needs to be taken into account when constructing and elaborates on SSR policies nationally.
6.3 Reconciling Behavior as an Explanation of Decreased Organized Violence

Having briefly analyzed each case when presenting empirics, this part will compare cases by first examine interesting variations in the independent variables, secondly to discussion the implications of the hypothesis and thirdly to discuss the implication of the causal path.

Case comparisons: Interpreting the main results and interesting variations

As the within case analyses shows, reconciling behavior is conducted in all provinces, but the extensions and levels differ. The degree of reconciling behavior is high in Makamba as all indicators are found; community development, community policing and open houses. In Bubanza and Gitega the degree is mediate levels of reconciling behavior, because community policing and open houses have been found. In Ruyigi the levels are low, as there is only community policing. The main result drawn from the within-case analyses is that it is possible to establish a correlation in Makamba, Ruyigi and partly in Bubanza since the reconciling behavior seem to be able to decrease violence during one year. It correlates in time order and in intensity.

Comparing the cases, interesting variations are found. First, even though reconciling behavior are found in all cases, it points to that the more frequent and comprehensive it is, the more effect it has on the decrease of organized violence. The efforts conducted in Makamba points to that more efforts leads to no increase in violence, in cases where there already had been organized violence. However, in cases where organized violence is low, the reconciling behavior does not have to fully extensive to show results. Judging qualitatively, it seems like especially when security forces has been engaged in community development, and when open house ends with joint activities between security forces and civilians, it makes the strongest impact on civilians to the decrease in organized violence.

Furthermore, all provinces show community policing efforts. Yet, some indications found show that in Ruyigi and Makamba, the knowledge of these structures was much lower than in Gitega and Bubanza. As it was discussed in the previous chapter that sexual violence might not be able to explain the variations in outcomes, it could be so that community policing might not explain variations in outcomes either. From the result it is hard to trace in what way community policing structures affect the outcome as it generates different outcomes.

The outcomes are presented in table 11 where it is seen that the second hypothesis; if security forces engage in post-conflict reconstruction, organized violence will not increase, are supported in Makamba and Bubanza, and partly in Bubanza.
Table 11: Outcome Reconciling Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Organized Violence</th>
<th>Reconciling Behavior</th>
<th>Hypothesis supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bubanza</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitega</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makamba</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruyigi</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implications for hypothesis

Table 11 shows that the hypothesis is supported in two cases and partly in one case. This leaves the hypothesis two if security forces engage in post-conflict reconstruction, organized violence will not increase with partial explanatory value. As theoretically expected this reveals that reconciling behavior does not organized violence in some cases. Yet, it does not necessarily seem to be merely the degree of reconciling behavior that explains that organized violence does not escalate, because the result shows various grades. Rather, the causal path in this study shows some explanatory value and similarities, which is examined further in the next section.

Further, since all cases shows reconciling behavior, it is likely that something adds to the variation in outcomes. The question is why there seems to be escalation of violence after reconciling behavior in Gitega and later in Bubanza. These cases show that the degree of reconciling behavior is not high. Maybe in these cases recognized by high level of organized violence it is the degree that might explain why the hypothesis is not supported. However, in these cases it could rather be so that reconciling behavior rather mitigates the effect of organized violence.

Implications for the causal path

Correlation is found in Makamba and Ruyigi as organized violence has not escalated after reconciling behavior has been conducted, and partly in Bubanza where the violence decreased for one year. This section traces whether the correlations actually points to a causal relationship. The correlation is supported by theory which argues that reconciling behavior hinders the return of violence because it establishes partnership to civilians by being the provider of security (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Smith and Holmes 2003; Turner 2015). The theory support further that the donor-supported security forces has been
cooperating with existing local structures and environments such as *police de proximité*, which is crucial to advance positive results (Ucko 2013).

The findings suggest the causal mechanism to have some explanatory value of the hypothesis. Tracing the causal chain shows that the levels of trust vary. In *Makamba* the general perception of security levels is 82%. There are no exact numbers in *Ruyigi*, but only 7% are explicitly disappointed with general security, leaving the general security perception to be good or very good approximately 80-90%. Yet, in *Bubanza*, the same numbers are only 64%. Where the hypothesis is supported it seems to be explained by perceptions of general security, whereas this cannot explain the hypothesis in Bubanza. However, both Bubanza and Makamba show low confidence to the PNB, only above 50%. However, it seems like what combines Makamba and Ruyigi where the hypothesis is supported is that general security perception in the provinces is high. Although it is not possible to say if this reveals the whole logic behind as then the confidence to PNB differ. It points to causality when assessing only general security level, although some modifications might be needed to better capture the trust. Yet, it could be argued that the aim of reconciling behavior speaks to increase general public assessment of security, which gives greater outcome of general perceptions rather than to the security forces *per se*.

The other part of the causal chain, *less incentives to enlist in a rebel group* are not measured in the thesis, from the qualitative reading it seems like in all provinces new unidentified armed groups and vigilante groups have been formed. However, it indicates that they are more common in Bubanza and Makamba than in Ruyigi. This support the causal chain in Ruyigi but not in the other two cases.

However, the causal chain put forward does not seem to be able to explain the decrease of violence in 2013 in Bubanza, and this might be the reason why violence recurred again in 2014. Moreover, the causal pathway are interrupted which points to no causal relationship, and that the hypothesized relationship might be spurious.

Other indicators are found deductively in Makamba and Ruyigi that explains the sequence of the correlation and adds to strengthen the causal relationship, in line with the methodology of process tracing (George and Bennett 2005, 207). First, ‘Activity of rebel forces’ is not a strong motive for armed violence in Ruyigi (Pézard et al. 2009, 50). This could serve as an observation that brings clarity to the causal path as there is few indicators that point towards tensions, and distrust in the province.

Secondly, Ruyigi have arms ratio of 1/20 whereas Makamba and Bubanza have 1/10. These results vary and the access to arms might not add to a general theoretical explanation of
the effect of reconciling behavior. Rather, it shows case-specific results. However, the success of DDR program might serve as an observation to support the causal chain. In Ruyigi 80% appreciate that former ex-combatants are integrated into FDN as this lowers insecurity (Nindorera 2011). Makamba also have had a widespread DDR program. A well-designed and governmental DDR seems to have effect on security and trust levels in Makamba too (Pézard et al. 2009). This adds to the causal chain regarding arms ratio, as DDR include disarmament programs. The fewer arms that flourish in society it seems like more people trust the security situation.

In general, it can be said that the degree of reconciling behavior could correspond to the degree of organized violence to give long-lasting results. Further, the open houses seem to have a particular effect for people to feel protected by security force. Other observations that seems to add to the causal explanation in Bubanza is the national Justice and Peace commission which opened centers for victims of sexual violence and raised this concern with community leaders, FDN and other local authorities (Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund 2010). This was done after the violence interrupted too.

To conclude, this comparative analysis is able to answer the research question why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program. The analysis suggest that reconciling behavior are able to explain why there is no increase of organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program. Explicitly, the causal path suggested in the study seems to explain the general implications of variations in de-escalation of violence. It seems like trust in general in society can explain why reconciling behavior not increases levels of organized violence. This can be argued for because the reconciling behavior specifically points to and addresses the provision of security, stability and safety for the population. In Makamba and Ruyigi were there seems to be a causal relationship, it rather speaks that the impact of general perception and trust provided by security forces enhance the general trust in society. Different from the specific trust to security forces per se which varies in the two cases, which does not seems to give positive results of reconciling behavior. Yet, this is supported by theory as when security forces behave well, it increases the trust and support for society in general (Turner 2015; Call and Stanley 2008).

However, the analysis also shows that reconciling behavior might not only be conducted in settings without violence or be able to stop violence. As discussed previously, abusive behavior has been conducted in all provinces to different degrees, while at the same time all provinces show reconciliatory behavior to some extent. The causality in Ruyigi and
Makamba points to causality because of time order and qualitative assessment, but it could also be so that reconciliatory behavior mitigates the effect of organized violence, if done while abusive behavior occur. This has implications for theory, as reconciliatory behavior does not have to decrease violence, or not lead to any escalation in violence when there are the same time is levels of abusive behavior. The importance might be how accountable and legitimate those actions are among the population, or if e.g. killings are conducted in a legal way. As such, modifications to theory suggest that reconciliatory behavior is not only a way to bring peace, but also a way to legitimate manners of work.

Hence, the analysis does not take away the risk of equifinality, that other factors lead to the same outcome, or that decrease in organized violence can only be explained by reconciling behavior. Other indicators found that helps explain the relationship is for example lower levels of arms flourishing, the motivation to act violent against rebel groups and how successful DDR and integration of ex-combatants is.

6.4 Additional Findings

One of the benefits of using structured focused comparisons and process tracing is that it enables to look how the causal chain links the independent and dependent variable together. As such, one aim of using process tracing is to enhance inductive findings that helps understand the relationship in focus, and to identify additional variables that might affect the hypothesized relationship. Such variables and mechanisms are explained here. Some of these findings has been briefly mentioned before but here developed as additional observations.

First, the most relevant alternative explanation that seems to have both theoretical and case-specific explanatory value is the integration of ex-combatants, as this seems to correlate with the outcomes. As the result shows in Ruyigi, people appreciated the security levels more when ex-combatants where integrated into FDN. Moreover, Pézard et al. shows that in Makamba and Gitega, it seems like higher levels of security works better as incentives to join disarmament program, rather than to get financial compensation (Pézard et al. 2009, 113) Another factor found is the number of ex-combatant usually brings insecurity (Pézard et al. 2009, 53). Found in previous research, it is argued that weak integration of ex-combatants increase the risk of organized violence. Communities and societies might have difficulties to accept ex-combatants (McQuinn 2016; Steenkamp 2009, 113) because they are supposed to be a threat to security (Pézard et al. 2009). As a matter of fact, reintegretion of ex-combatants would then serves as an additional independent variable to explain why there is organized
violence in some provinces but not others. It points to the direction that more successful reintegration correlates with reconciling behavior that it leads to no escalation in violence, and weak reintegration correlates with the results of abusive behavior that it leads to increase of organized violence. As empirical studies show provincial variation, it suggests that reintegration process varies within countries, and could be another way to explain the relationship of organized violence. Based in previous research and empirical observations found inductively it would be hypothesized that weak reintegration processes increases levels of organized violence, and that this gives sentence on provincial level.

The second alternative explanation traced shows variations provincially are the level of arms. In Gitega and Ruyigi the ratio of small arms is 1/20, whereas in Makamba and Bubanza it is 1/10 (Pézard and Florquin 2007, 17). The provincial differences in the availability of small arms seems to correlates with the relationship that abusive behavior increase levels of organized violence. This is according to previous research which state that more levels of arms flourishing increase risk of violence to recur (Spear and Harborne 2010; Kingma 1997). Level of arms suggests being an additional independent variable that might explain provincial differences of organized violence. A suggested argument for this relationship is the more arms available increases levels of organized violence.

An additional mechanism found that can be able to explain the correlative relationship of abusive behavior and organized violence is if there is a regional stronghold for rebel groups. It seems like this matter for the likelihood of organized violence to increase after abusive behavior. If there is a traditional stronghold for rebel groups, it suggests being less costly and risky to take up arms against security forces, because it is traditionally done. Moreover, in provinces with more rebel groups traditionally, there seems to be more new rebel groups formed to enlist.

6.6 Scrutinizing the Findings

After presenting the findings, elaborated on alternative explanations and additional inductive findings that could explain the causal chain, this section discusses the limitations of the study that could bias the result presented. These are presented as three themes; theoretical limitations, research design and data availability.
**Theoretical implications**

Regarding theoretical limitations in the study, some factors needs to be highlighted. First, critics may argue that the relationships are spurious, and that the reverse order actually is plausible. Perhaps rather increased organized violence affect levels of abusive behavior, because security forces are tempted to need more harsh means to thwart violence. Regarding the abusive behavior, correlation was only found in two cases. So perhaps in Gitega, maybe organized violence rather affect abusive behavior. This would potentially show a spurious relationship. However, to prove correlation it has been necessary to look at time order but as it has not been possible to trace time more narrow than in calendar years, digging into depth of actual happenings of events might show the reverse relationship.

Secondly, the empirical findings show that neither the theory nor the causal mechanisms has been accurate to grasp all nuances of why organized violence occurs in some provinces but not others. Resulting is that the theory cannot give general explanatory value rather it can explain case-variations.

However, choosing the method process tracing, the aim is to find additional observations and variables explaining the causal path. Equifinality is part of process tracing (George and Bennet 2005: 157). While conducted the analysis, other theoretical factors has been found suggested as either additional variables or mechanisms. Since the aim of the study is not to rule out other types of theoretical factors, theoretical limitations in the study rather serves as contextual factors that may be include next time.

**Research design and method limitations**

Three factors are highlighted as to influence the result of the study in terms of research design and method.

The case selection strategy comes with a number of limitations. First, the cases were chosen on diverse outcomes on Y. After the qualitative assessment, Makamba showed greater value on the dependent variable than expected. Although this might scrutinize the findings on that case, examining case specific matters are part of within-case studies that could not have been totally foreseen beforehand (Seawright and Gerring 2008). However, with more information on beforehand, the case selection would perhaps have been differently. Second, the population after the first case selection strategy shows only about ten countries eligible. Perhaps that makes the conclusion of the study limited. Including more provinces from others countries could have increased generalizability and achieved more nuanced. Important to note is that adding more cases to achieve greater explanatory value on the independent variables
would come with less validity in terms of case comparisons. The research design that been set up in this study have been selected in order to achieve greatest explanatory value with limited data and resources, while at the same time several research gaps have aimed to be filled. Choosing more provinces in several countries would need more resources. It would change the study from being a *within-case comparative study* to a *case-comparative study*, which automatically comes with different orders of case selection strategies and validity. The benefits of the research design used are that with limited resources and material available, it has been able to exclude country-specific variable that otherwise might had an impact on the validity of the results. The results points to the direction of the importance of examining within-country variations to get a full national picture and I argue that the result nevertheless have some generalizable possibilities. SSR programs have a quite clear format conducted in all countries implemented, why the implications of the independent variable are robust. Moreover, the results might point in general to security forces’ behavior in post-conflict states, rather than just SSR contexts. While the country-specific conditions of course differ, it is the policy and the implementation that has been in in focus of this study. However, to increase generalizability and replicate the study, bringing in more provinces in various provinces with more finely developed indicators of course serve the purpose of the study but are left to future research.

Second, the variations on the independent and dependent variable must be highlighted. There are no variations on the independent variables. For abusive behavior, *sexual violence* has been conducted in all provinces. For reconciling behavior *community policing (policie de proximité)* has been implemented in all provinces. This decreases the validity in the results, because it is not ruled out if these two indicators actually make a difference for correlation and causality.

Third, a final note on limitations of research design is the comparison between cases, which are done in relative terms as high, moderate or low levels of the independent variables. Comparison has not been able to be done in absolute terms to a given threshold because no such threshold has existed theoretically or empirically. This decreases validity as it makes it harder to replicate the comparisons to other studies, and it decreases transparency for the reader. However, the relative comparison has been conducted systematically so it follows a logic framework. Finding one indicator gives low turnout, and three gives high turnout. Moderate is when two indicators have been fulfilled. It has to do the frequency and time periods the incidents are reported, which adds to the degree of behavior. However, frequency is assesses in the qualitative reading, which undermines reliability. Regarding the dependent
variable, case selection was conducted primarily by examining fatalities in provinces according to UCDP. However, the qualitative reading shows that other types of organized violence both covered by indicators and not, might modify the results. This points to weakness in the UCDP strategies, but including more nuanced indicators when choosing cases might have lead to even more strategic case selection.

**Limitations of data availability**

The research design has made it possible to dive deep into several cases within one country, which have served to give a comprehensive and clear picture of the challenges and the context in the country, and have served the understanding, the objective and neutral data presentation. As empirics sometimes have been collected from the same sources, they have been possible to compare without any major obstacles biasing the reports in any way, which could have been the case when doing for example country comparisons. Nevertheless, the main problem in the thesis is that the data have been scarce and underreported or not reported at all. The bad press freedom and environment for journalists, especially internationally, have made the news scarce in rural areas. It has been the intention to triangulate the data in order to present valid results, but this has not been able to be done. If data have been found, it has often only been found once in one type of material. Hence, the findings in this thesis have been reliant on findings on the web, as no field study or interviews have been conducted, and therefore, reliant on what have been found and what others have described, reported or studied previously. Validity and reliability in the study decreases as there might be occasions or incidents that have not been able to be grasped in this thesis because they are not been able to be found in the material. This generates that if someone brings in additional sources, the results and the correlated relationships might change or differ, and it is possible to assume that there are many homicides, torture and sexual violence that have not been reported. It is not assumed that incidents of reconciliatory behavior are as much underreported, as this portrays a positive picture of the security forces and is a societal effort aiming to develop society. To conclude, the reliability and validity of the study therefore are weak in some senses and it is possible to conclude that an abusive security force might affect the reporting of abusive behavior in the country. The second note to make is that much data have only been published in French, and many news reports are only published in French. Even though the author has basic knowledge of French and tried to overcome this problem in several ways, it might limit the study while if more data collection could have been done in French. However, as the data collection has been made strategically and logically it is the intention that the
result presented are objective and trustworthy of what have been found matching the indicators.

6.7 Alternative Explanations

Evoking previous research, six explanations to why organized violence occurs were put forward; weak state capacity, recruitment strategy, lack of integration and DDR, bias towards certain groups, access to arms or a security vacuum exists. In the previous section, it was discussed that both lack of integration of former rebels and level of arms available are significant to the causal relationships put forward in the thesis. However, they rather serve as additional independent variables that are able to explain the outcome, than alternative explanations. The alternative explanations discussed here are based in explaining provincial outcomes. Hence, other explanations might exist but have not been found in a provincial format. Therefore, much is left for previous research to examine.

However it points to that security forces bias towards certain groups in some provinces affects both the abusive behavior and organized violence, an argument found by Brosché (2014). His conclusion is that organized violence increases if the government treats communities differently, because it changes power balances and results in different reprimands of the perpetrators. Before the reforms of PNB and FDN in Burundi, the security forces consisted only of the minority Tutsi. The ceasefires with the rebel group CNDD-FDD in 2003 and Palipehutu-FNL in 2006 were settled on the premise that the ethnic division should be shared between Hutu and Tutsi and that no ethnic group could be a majority in the security forces. Still, the empirical material shows many examples found when security forces have acted abusively towards members of a certain group (often CNDD-FDD or FNL). Reprimands of acts varies across provinces and incidents. Third, found in the empirics is that security forces sometimes let rebel groups act on their behalf. For example in Bubanza, CNDD-FDD and PNB tortured people together and in another case, the security forces watched while CNDD-FDD tortured civilians. Consequently, it points to that bias towards certain groups could explain both why there is abusive behavior, and the variations in organized violence provincially because certain groups might living in one provincial area, or pose a particular threat towards the government. However, as the similar conclusion was drawn by Brosché, future research needs to look into this explanation and if that could explain the type of behavior among security forces, and the variations in organized violence
It could be argued that security forces’ bias towards certain groups allows for abusive behavior and which at the same time increases organized violence.

Another strand of research argues that organized violence occurring as a recruitment strategy is identified for provincial differences. Recruitments has been conducted actively in Makamba, Bubanza and Gitega (ACLED 2016). However, a causal relationship between abusive behavior and organized violence does only exist in Makamba and Bubanza. As the correlation does not seem to exist in Gitega, the explanation seems to fail to explain the relationship.

Other explanations found in previous research have not been able to trace with provincial variations and are left for future research to discover provincially, as most explanations are national-wide. Political influences or legal system could potentially be two explanations, but they are not examined provincially. Some explanations such as weak state capacity or security vacuum are covered in the theory of abusive behavior. As there was not put forward previous research regarding how reconciling behavior decreases organized violence, this is not examined. However, research on this specific relationship is scarce and the thesis has contributed to that strand of research.
7. CONCLUSION

SSR has drawn attention as a peacebuilding tool from both research- and policy communities. Despite assumptions drawn for aggregated levels e.g. countries or sectors, little focus has been on examining variations on a disaggregated level within countries. This thesis has emphasized this particularly understudied issue with the aim to assess variations provincially to grasp implications of SSR programs nationally.

Essential in SSR programs are training of the security sector (e.g. the police and army) to increase their behavior to interact well with civilians. The objective of this, hitherto found in previous research is the understanding that security forces’ that behave well decrease the risk of conflict. However, research examining its impact provincially has been weak. This thesis has particularly examined this issue by emphasizing the impact of security forces’ behavior on organized violence within countries, to trace its impact of recurrence of violence after SSR. Based in state repression literature, it has been hypothesized that abusive behavior among security forces increases levels of organized violence. Furthermore, based in counterinsurgency literature the thesis develops a second hypothesis asserting that if security forces engage in post-conflict reconstruction, organized violence will not increase. The study have analyzed four provinces in Burundi 2004-2014 using structured focused comparison and process tracing to test the hypotheses and reveal the causal paths.

The empirical findings show partial support for both hypotheses. Hypothesis one is supported in Bubanza and Makamba, but not in Gitega or Ruyigi. It points to a modification of the causal mechanism to specifically emphasize that distrust to security forces’ increases the levels of violence. The causal path reveals further that arms ratio and traditional stronghold for rebels interact with the outcome. Hypothesis two is supported in Ruyigi, Makamba and partly in Bubanza, but not in Gitega. The relationship points to that the more trust in general security does not escalate violence. The causal path reveals further that lower arm ratio and successful DDR program interact with the outcome. Yet, the findings show that reconciling behavior might be used in times of organized violence to e.g. legitimize security forces among the population, which are not fighting the state. Taken together, it shows that security forces’ behavior partly explains why there is organized violence in some provincial areas but not others, after the initiation of a SSR program.

The results from this study show that even though abusive behavior and reconciling behavior exists in all provinces to some extent, the degree of violence differ. Consequently it seems like other factors interacts to why there is more organized violence in some areas but
not others. Further explanations found in the study suggest that security forces bias towards certain groups might possibly explain the relationship.

First, the study reaffirms previous research acknowledging that abusive behavior by security forces increases organized violence. It this to previous research showing the importance of examining security forces’ behavior (e.g. Jingushi 2015; Call and Stanley 2008). Secondly, the study has contributed by a theory developing approach regarding how reconciliatory behavior affects levels of organized violence after peacebuilding interventions. Solitarily examining security forces’ positive efforts (i.e. not conducted while continuously using violence), the theory and empirical findings contributes to stress the importance of positive actions by security forces to mitigate and to not increase organized violence. The findings suggest that it corresponds with higher perception of trust in societies. Secondly, the thesis contributes by explaining organized violence after structural peace and statebuilding interventions, since previous research has mainly acknowledged organized violence after armed conflicts. Moreover, it has highlighted the importance of provincial differences within SSR, adding a disaggregated level to research. This ties with knowledge about local results of national SSR programs in a country. The empirical findings emphasize the importance of examining disaggregated levels in peacebuilding- and statebuilding interventions to grasp and understand fully the outcomes nationally. Further studies should investigate this interrelationship more closely. Additionally, the study has contributed empirically with in-depth knowledge about SSR in Burundi. It has added extra variables and mechanisms that help understand the relationships needed to be taken into consideration for successful results and compassions locally. Moreover, it has empirically shown that sexual violence as a non-conventional indicator of abusive behavior does not seems to explain the variation of organized violence as homicides or torture does.

The findings of the study show that the purpose of the study has been accomplished, as it has brought insights on provincial variations of SSR. Explicitly acknowledging provincial differences assists to grasp implications of SSR and peacebuilding programs nationally. In turn, this contributes to emphasize topics and issues that are important for certain provinces but not others. Finally, this study adds to the wider picture of positive and negative peace. The findings suggest going beyond the notion of absence of direct violence to fully understand the implications of SSR. Tracing the value of positive peace in SSR contexts reveals the benefits it brings to societies in terms of trust and security. Further studies in this area should continue examine actions that bring positive peace, rather than just the absence of violence.
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APPENDIX 1. MAP OF BURUNDI