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Abstract: Sweden’s relationship with the United Nations has fluctuated considerably between 1941 and 1946. The author examines how the Nordic country’s own security interests were sometimes viewed as compatible and sometimes at odds with membership in the UN. The discussions surrounding Sweden’s accession to the UN are explored at length, as are the actions of its first delegates to the international organisation, and the discrepancy between the Swedish reputation of neutrality and enthusiastic support for the UN versus the country’s internal debates and policy decisions in the 1940s. The article concludes that Sweden used the United Nations as an arena in which to manifest its indifference to security alignment and its exceptionalism in world affairs.

German abstract: Schwedens Beziehung zu den Vereinten Nationen unterlag im Zeitraum 1941 bis 1946 starken Schwankungen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz zeigt auf, wie die Sicherheitsinteressen dieses nordischen Landes als mit einer VN-Mitgliedschaft vereinbar, zu anderen Zeitpunkten hingegen als unvereinbar betrachtet wurden. Die Diskussionen im Zusammenhang mit Schwedens Beitritt zu den VN werden ausführlich unteruscht, wie auch das

**Short title:** Sweden and the United Nations, 1941 to 1946

**Word Count:** 10,115 words

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From Neutrality to Membership: Sweden and the United Nations, 1941 to 1946

The nature motifs in the corridor of the Swedish mission to the United Nations once prompted the permanent representative of Finland to tease a colleague by commenting that the wilderness imagery was full of ‘the molehills you equate with mountains in your happy Swedish mind’.¹ In this view, misperceptions about the world were the price Swedes paid for remaining unscathed by the conflicts of the twentieth century. A striking example of this is a social democratic front-bencher’s contribution to the parliamentary foreign policy debate in Sweden in October 1945. He suggested that future historiography would likely ponder why Sweden – in contrast to Norway and Denmark – had not been present when the United Nations were established.² The answer he demanded from the government was simple: As a neutral power in World War II, Sweden did not qualify as a founding member of the grand coalition’s organisation for collective security.

Nevertheless, the governments of the United Kingdom and France were the only ones to deliberately engage (for reasons of power politics) in the war against the Axis powers. All others in the anti-Hitler-alliance, including the United States and the Soviet Union, joined the war either upon having been attacked by the enemy or being at safe geographical distance. As a contemporary Swedish commentator noted, the war-time alliance, rather than being a community of values, was an assemblage of ‘nations who, by historical coincidences, have been lumped together in the United Nations’.³ This arbitrariness did not prevent their governments from claiming higher morals in world politics, and their devotion to the fight against Nazism gave weight to the claim.

The present article tracks the Swedish relationship to the UN in the period between 1941, when the world body emerged as an anti-Hitler-alliance, through 1946, when Sweden joined
what had by that time become an international organisation. This is a little explored field, both for Sweden and the UN at large, that bridges the scholarship on World War II and that of the Cold War. The focus here is on how the Swedish policy of neutrality was seen as concordant or discordant with UN membership and how the UN was then perceived in Sweden. It calls into question the well-established notion of Sweden as a determined neutral power and enthusiastic supporter of the UN. Due to the lack of specialised studies, the topic is also absent from recent surveys of Swedish history and foreign policy, although it would illuminate key aspects of Sweden’s international relations.

The article completes a series of studies by the author on the path of different Nordic countries into the UN. Prior investigation has shown that Finland was not as indifferent to being not admitted to the UN between 1947 and 1955 as politicians and researchers from that country have tended to suggest. On the other hand, the early enthusiasm for the UN generally attributed to Denmark and Norway also did not exist. Rather, the latter is a myth trying to explain the receptiveness of those countries by 1949 to military alignment within NATO as a consequence of crushed aspirations of universal collective security, or as a desire to return to a strong Atlantic orientation. Disappointed UN idealism justified Realpolitik in the face of persisting neutralist sentiments and the advocacy of a Nordic security alternative. While Norway, as a belligerent member of the Allies, was a UN member by definition, Denmark received a last-minute welcome to the charter conference that whitewashed Danish collaboration with its Nazi German occupiers and overlooked the fact that it had not been formally at war with Germany. The Norwegian government-in-exile had insisted on being given a more privileged status in the UN than Denmark, but as a latecomer to the conference the Danish government managed to enlist neighbourly support for its admission.
Like Denmark and Norway, Sweden had been neutral during World War I and had ceased to talk about neutrality as a member of the League of Nations. However, all three countries rediscovered the policy of neutrality in the mid-1930s when it became obvious that the League did not function as an organisation for collective security. The difference between the Scandinavian nations was that Sweden was able to maintain neutrality during World War II, something that distanced the country from the UN and reinforced the legalistic Swedish approach to international affairs. Thus, there was no automatic UN membership for Sweden as there was for Norway, and less political need for international recognition as Denmark required, although the line between neutrality and collaboration was fluid in the eyes of the allied powers. There was also some ambiguous evidence in the case of Sweden’s behaviour during the first years of World War II.

**From neutrality to collective security**

Sweden commonly believed that neutrality was a virtue that qualified it for a unique role in world affairs. As observed by a communist taking part in a parliamentary foreign policy debate in October 1945, ‘Inappropriate Swedish bragging about the splendour of Swedish foreign policy during the war … constitutes the most prominent feature of Swedish attempts at rehabilitation.’ Already at the beginning of the war, the social democratic ‘father of the house’ (ålderspresident), Carl Lindhagen, had advocated the idea of Sweden as a ‘spiritual great power’ (andlig stormakt) for the cause of peace. Although aware of her country’s loss of goodwill in the war, social democratic intellectual Alva Myrdal put forward the same idea in more modern phraseology: ‘We, the spared country, should have vision left.’ According to Myrdal, who went on to become
director of the UN Department of Social Affairs, the deployment of Swedish expertise in social and urban planning represented an opportunity for the world to ‘get better’. From her perspective in London in September 1941, post-war preparations appeared to have been triggered by the Western powers, and she warned that should Sweden fail to understand its mission in international reconstruction, it would mean ‘an unnecessary loss for the world’ – let alone the deterioration of the country’s position in international affairs.\(^\text{12}\)

Two and a half years later, her husband, Gunnar Myrdal, an earlier advocate of Swedish involvement in post-war planning and later Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, realised that such engagement was untimely in view of the Allied view of neutrality. However, he regarded belligerency, particularly the experience of foreign occupation, as having a negative moral impact on the affected countries. For this reason and in view of the Swedes’ inherent qualities, he pleaded that his country offer unsolicited advice on the presumption that Swedes were ‘particularly chosen to be advocates of the global interest’. His recommendation to his fellow citizens went as follows: ‘We should play our role and say our lines. We should do that even if the only thing we win is the aesthetic satisfaction and the honour of having been right.’\(^\text{13}\) Unfortunately for Myrdal as an economist, his alarming prediction of a post-war financial crisis, which he unfolded in the same book in which the lines cited above appear, proved incorrect.

In June 1940 the Swedish government withdrew its permanent representative to the League of Nations in Geneva. Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced in a report to the Swedish parliament that while Sweden’s funding of its membership obligations in the League had been appropriated, the sum was not transferred because the organisation had ceased to function.\(^\text{14}\) The ‘self-initiated withdrawal of Sweden from the ruins of the League of Nations that
had been erected on the Versailles victors’ peace’ was approved by Lindhagen in the debate on the budget. At the same time, on 14 August 1940, exactly one year before the signing of the Atlantic Charter by Churchill and Roosevelt, Lindhagen proposed a ‘Swedish initiative in transnational [mellanfolklig] foreign policy for a novel universal League of Nations based on mobilisation of the old truths’.\textsuperscript{15} For procedural reasons, the Swedish parliament declined to deal with the initiative, and Lindhagen retired the following year.\textsuperscript{16}

Voluntary Swedish organisations continued to advocate the idea of a world body during World War II. The board of the Swedish League of Nations Association managed to not mention the war in its annual report spanning July 1939 to June 1940. Instead, they merely lamented ‘the hampering events for trans-national collaboration that in the past year have occurred in the international sphere’.\textsuperscript{17} Shortly thereafter, at its annual convention, the Swedish League of Nations Association changed its name to the Swedish Association for a New League of Nations (\textit{Svenska föreningen för ett nytt folkens förbund}).\textsuperscript{18} In Autumn 1944 it merged with two other peace organisations, thereby becoming the predecessor of the current UN Association of Sweden (\textit{Svenska FN-förbundet}), which, toward the end of the war, advocated for a world federalist transformation of international relations. The recommendations put forth included the adoption of the International Labour Organisation’s tripartite structure of a collaboration of governments, labour unions, and business in national delegations. The assembly of elected representatives of the people in a bi-cameral world parliament, similar to the United States Congress, was also suggested.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite the appearance of such initiatives throughout the course of the war, references to a UN with a programme of post-war international reconstruction were sparse in Sweden.\textsuperscript{20} Not only were the defining features of a future peace organisation unknown, but neither the Swedish
government nor the general public was willing to move in that direction. In 1943 Sweden’s minister of defence, Per Edvin Sköld, held that his country’s foreign policy makers, while not uninterested in international cooperation, preferred to independently determine the extent of their involvement; and even in the coming peace, their country’s stance would have to remain ‘cautious’ (avvaktande) for some time and ‘very much like sympathetic, although armed, neutrality’.  

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, in which the four major powers presented their unified view of the proposed UN Organisation, were understood in Sweden as a signal for ‘even the uninvited … to spell out their own position’. At the same time the principle that ‘one cannot travel to Washington on ball bearings sent to Berlin’ generally limited deliberations on the matter to the domestic sphere. There was disappointment that Sweden was not allowed to participate in the preparation for the new world organisation and that it was not given a place among the founders. Nonetheless, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Utrikespolitiska institutet) summoned a study group (funded by the Rockefeller Foundation) on post-war problems. The group discussed the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in detail and reached out to an international audience in a semi-official publication, Peace and Security After the Second World War: A Swedish Contribution to the Subject, which was distributed to journalists and delegations attending the founding conference of the UN Organisation held 25 April to 26 June 1945 in San Francisco. The document expressed sympathy with the ‘realism’ of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but also noted that its basic principles were ‘in the main strongly adverse to the points of view which Sweden … maintained within the League’; it further emphasised that ‘concentration on the solution of the problem of peace and security [as opposed to justice] has
gone too far’. According to a member of the study group, the fact that most participants of the group opposed the veto power in the Security Council was not expressed in the publication.

The archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry show that the governments of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and the Netherlands were interested in learning Swedish points of view on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. However, Sweden was never asked to declare war on Germany in the closing days of World War II, which would have qualified her for admission to the UN. As explained by a Foreign Office official, the Allies were convinced that the country would not give up its policy of neutrality ‘for the mere pleasure of taking part in San Francisco’ – a correct assessment. In a radio speech shortly before the San Francisco conference, Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson declared somewhat ambiguously that Sweden did not misunderstand the reason she was not included among the invited nations. The Swedish governmental presence at the conference was limited to a lower consulate representative occasionally sitting in the public gallery.

Foreign Minister Günther characterised the Dumbarton Oaks proposals ‘incomplete and sketchy’ and ‘not tending to promote security’. In a speech that he considered his political testament he cited the failure of inviting neutral powers such as Sweden to the San Francisco conference as short-sighted. He also noted that the leading powers were unwilling to relinquish any of their sovereignty for the sake of international governance and he, therefore, advocated the continuation of Sweden’s wait-and-see stance.

After the conference, a member of the Swedish legation in Washington, DC, described the ideology of the UN as ‘alien to the Swedish mindset’. Foreign observers regarded Sweden’s profile in connection with the founding of the new security organisation as ‘cautious and reserved’.
While the war was going on, the chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy committee and ex-foreign minister, Östen Undén, attributed the Swedish lack of lively public discussion on future problems of an international organisation to ‘a natural feeling of tact’. As he saw it, ‘A nation that strives for non-involvement in the war and for a policy of neutrality should not feel obliged to supply the belligerents with good advice about the design of peace and the solution of the problem of states’ political cooperation in the future.’ However, aside from being tactful, this was a strategy to preclude ‘an invitation by deeds, not merely words to contribute to the attainment of these goals’.34

Undén himself was concerned to remain diplomatic and uphold a cautious, non-provocative stance. In the draft of a speech that probably dates back to 1943, a passage in which he described neutral countries such as Sweden as more genuine members of the UN than any country belonging to an alliance could possibly be has been crossed out.35 Instead, Undén’s public statement expressed his hope that the allies would create a true international organisation based on experience gained from the League of Nations. This would permit his country to ‘abandon a neutral line in favour of a policy of solidarity in accordance with the obligations this new organisation imposes upon us’.36

For Undén, who has a reputation for having viewed neutrality as an end in itself, neutrality was the second best choice, inferior to a legally defined, functioning system of collective security.37 In the mid-1940s, Undén hoped such a system commanding ‘military instruments of power’ and implying the ‘military commitment’ of Sweden would be established.38 In various discussions concerning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and their unresolved veto problem, Undén argued that aggressors should not be eligible to vote in the Security Council, as such leverage would narrow the UN security mechanism to a bulwark
against Axis revenge. In all other conflict situations a veto would imply ‘the resurgence of the line of neutrality’ for Sweden.\(^{39}\) Undén saw the policy of neutrality as belonging to a less developed state of world affairs that he would gladly have dispensed with, and he used it to oppose the idea of an unqualified great power veto. Undén criticised the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for failing to profit from the League’s experience that it was essential to strengthen the rule of law in international relations.\(^{40}\)

In an article entitled ‘Solidarity or Neutrality?’ that appeared five weeks after his appointment as foreign minister, Undén indicated that the veto – despite its failure to match the idea of ‘a more perfect international security organisation’ – paradoxically made it easier for small states to join the UN because it removed the risk of their getting involved in great power conflicts. However, Undén’s preference was the principle of solidarity, leaving neutrality solely as an exit-option. He reasoned that it would imply too limited an amount of ‘trust for the very league that we are even preparing ourselves to enter, if we describe the main foreign policy line of Sweden as a policy of neutrality that our country wishes to adhere to in case the league should disintegrate’.\(^{41}\) In a major post-war parliamentary foreign policy debate that took place in October 1945, the Swedish government articulated this idea as follows:

We are willing to participate in a joint security organization and, in the event of a future conflict, to give up neutrality to the extent that the Charter of the organization demands. If, however, against expectation a tendency towards a subdivision of the great powers in two camps would appear within this organisation, our policy must be not to let us be forced into such a group or bloc formation.\(^{42}\)
These multi-faceted statements implied a thorough reevaluation of Christian Günther’s foreign policy. In a document considered Undén’s manifesto as the person designated to be Sweden’s foreign minister, Undén explicitly criticised his predecessor’s adherence to the policy of neutrality in the post-war international order. A diplomatic conversation he had with the Soviet minister at Stockholm underlined where Günther’s attitude and his own were at odds: Undén’s belief in the prospect of international cooperation was the main difference between the two approaches, whereas there was no significant point of disagreement in case such cooperation were to break down. At the same time, Undén stood for a juridical understanding of neutrality, rather than the political one of his predecessor. He never left any doubt that he prioritised Swedish membership and commitment to the world organisation over cautious adherence to non-alignment. However, once the veto rule had become a fact, he opted for neutrality as the given security policy reserve line. In retrospect, Undén noted that a post-World War II creation like the UN was likely to be imbued with utopian traits, and that it was ‘of prime importance that the difference that arises between words and reality be observed’.

Application for membership in the UN

The Dumbarton Oaks formula that membership in the planned international body should be ‘open to all peace-loving states’ had bolstered expectations that the wartime alliance would be transformed into a universal organisation with countries like Sweden as members. The UN Charter confirmed this principle of openness with the qualification that in order to become members, states must be judged capable of accepting and carrying out their obligations under the
Charter. Moreover, the General Assembly was designated the authorised organ for determining
admission upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Whereas Sweden was confronted with a crisis of international goodwill in the mid-1940s,
due to concessions it had made to Germany in the early years of World War II, the overall
situation was mixed and not without its positive aspects. For example, during the San Francisco
conference, the UN Theatre showed an eighteen-minute film on life in neutral Sweden during
wartime. The title, Sweden’s Middle Road, alluded to Marquis W. Childs’ eulogy Switzerland: The
Middle Way.48 Attending the Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August 1945, US President
Harry S. Truman noted in his diary: ‘It seems that Sweden, Norway, Denmark and perhaps
Switzerland have the only real people’s governments on the Continent of Europe’. At the same
time, he lumped together the other countries as ‘a bad lot, from the standpoint of the people who
do not believe in tyranny’.49 The communiqué issued at the conference reproduced the wording
of the Charter, but also declared that the Big Three would support applications for membership
from states that had remained neutral during the war. In the discussion, Winston Churchill had
named Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal as examples of such countries.50

Similarly, when the French representative on the Preparatory Commission of the UN,
René Massigli, argued in October 1945 for postponement of the first session of the UN, he
mentioned Portugal and Sweden as examples of countries the organisation should admit as new
members at its first meeting.51 Philip Noel-Baker in the Foreign Office was particularly eager to
pave the way for early Swedish membership. The Soviet representatives, on the other hand,
generally resisted the hasty admission of new members. According to State Department official
Leo Pasvolsky, the Soviets favoured postponing the matter until the second part of the first
session of the General Assembly, where it was eventually taken up.52
The Preparatory Commission drafted the Provisional Rules of Procedure for the General Assembly, which spelled out the steps for admitting new members. An application was to be submitted to the Secretary-General, accompanied by a declaration of readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter. If the Security Council recommended a state, the General Assembly needed to approve an applicant’s qualifications for membership by a two-thirds majority vote.\(^5^3\) Despite the existence of these rules, Albania’s request to join the UN, presented on 25 January 1946, was considered premature and its case adjourned.\(^5^4\) Reportedly, the British held that states like Sweden and Portugal should go first.\(^5^5\)

In contrast to the domestic controversies that preceded Sweden’s accession to the League of Nations on grounds of neutrality, the country’s intention of joining the UN was not questioned by any political group. The government delayed presenting the matter to the Swedish parliament while it waited for an indication that neutral countries would in fact be accepted for membership.\(^5^6\) However, the impression at the foreign ministry in the second half of 1945 was accurate: there would be no official invitation, and Sweden herself would have to submit a formal application. No action could reasonably be taken before the Western powers had given the signal. At the same time, it was doubtful whether ‘the formal Russians could imagine making a statement that would set a precedent for the decision of the UN Security Council’.\(^5^7\)

Before, during, and after the first part of the initial session of the General Assembly that convened in London from 10 January to 14 February 1946 and dealt with organisational matters, requests to jointly approach the UN arrived from Portugal and Switzerland. Other states indicated their willingness to support Sweden’s bid for membership.\(^5^8\) At an impromptu Scandinavian foreign ministers meeting at the beginning of January of that year, Undén was asked by his Danish and Norwegian colleagues whether Sweden would like their support at the
In June, the State Department offered to take an informal survey among Security Council members of potential candidates for membership.

The Swedish government, however, declined all offers of assistance. It even indicated to the State Department that it preferred to sound out other members itself. The rationale was to avoid being cast in discussions as a special case and thereby a) diminish the risk of getting caught in procedural controversies or countermoves by other accession candidates, and b) avoid being politically tied to other countries and enmeshed in their (alien) issues or become party to an accession horse trade. Instead, the Swedes tried to elicit a general UN statement on the desirability of the membership of Sweden and the former neutral powers. Apart from that, the government emphasised the logic of its parliamentary authorisation and time frame, and characterised the well-meant initiatives of others as potentially problematic.

That a danger did exist of being coupled with problems at the heart of the UN becomes clear from the decade-long controversies regarding the admission of new members. Soviet circles in 1946 were inclined to describe the status of Sweden as ‘bound up with that of the whole Baltic group, which includes Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’. For Sweden, these countries were unwanted associates because Finland’s status was subject to the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the three Baltic republics’ potential as UN members depended on Western acceptance of their occupation by the Soviet Union. There was also the counterfactual claim of their sovereignty within the Soviet Union and the feasibility of a solution analogous to the controversial UN membership granted to Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Swedish diplomats underscored that they wanted absolutely no part in any haggling ‘and, in particular, not in a Baltic context’. Their strategy was to put the Swedish cards on the table for Soviet representatives, thereby demonstrating an independent and calm approach to UN membership.
This openness coincided well with Sweden’s foreign policy priority in the immediate post-war period, namely, the establishment of trusting relations with the Soviet Union.

The government bill on authorisation ‘at such a time as might be deemed expedient to take the necessary steps for Sweden’s joining the United Nations’ was dated 8 March 1946. The bill maintained that ‘The United Nations does not represent a perfect instrument for safeguarding world peace, but its Charter is marked by a sense of reality.’ Ultimately, it stated, everything would depend on the great powers’ ability to cooperate. The bill included a comment by the commander-in-chief of the Swedish defence forces, General Helge Jung, which suggested that Sweden might play a role as bridge-builder. Moreover, it maintained that despite Sweden’s potential misgivings in regard to the military obligations tied to UN membership, as a member state it would be able to exert some influence on their implementation, whereas as a non-member she would merely be subject to the UN demand for universal conformity with its basic principles. In the group convened by the foreign ministry to comment on the Charter, one of the experts, the conservative parliamentarian and lawyer Nils Herlitz, was pressured to modify his comments in a way consistent with an overall recommendation to join the world organisation.

After extensive deliberation, the foreign affairs committee of the Riksdag found ‘predominant reason’ (övervägande skäl) for Sweden to take steps toward joining the UN, a stipulation translated for an international audience as ‘overwhelming reasons’. The statement of the committee was described as ‘somewhat harsh’ in tone, but the acceptance of the bill was nevertheless recommended. Such a recommendation was also given by Undén in a parliamentary debate in June 1946, in which he stressed the significance of purposeful international collaboration and the lack of alternatives to the UN, as follows:
It may take a long time before the United Nations have [sic!] acquired the efficiency and the stability that are essential to success, and it is not impossible, of course, that this new League may fail and collapse in a terrible Ragnarök. It is not difficult to be a pessimist, but we have greater need for a little hopefulness and confidence in the sound common sense of humanity.  

The debate that followed in both chambers of the Riksdag was summarised by a participant who said that the lack of faith in UN effectiveness, as expressed on all sides, gave rise to an uncontroversial debate with neither salient expectations nor apprehensions. The bill was passed without being put to a vote, although some speakers would have liked to prolong the application process and one legislator announced he would not cast a favourable vote. Some participants wanted to assign Sweden the role of acting as ‘democracy’s fearless outpost’ in ‘this, alas, rather dubious league’. Others resolved to ‘plead the cause of justice, the only “forcible language” that a small state has at its command’. The social democratic lawyer Vilhelm Lundstedt presciently described the UN as a ‘negotiation centre’, a necessary surrogate for an effective peace machinery. ‘Spiritual struggles within the United Nations’, he declared, ‘may have any degree of intensity; yet, they aim at being a remedy for the prevention of what is more serious, struggles outside the United Nations, i.e. war between nations.’ In regard to the consequences of UN membership for Sweden, the liberal newspaper Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning observed, ‘Behind the pleasing unity of the parliamentary parties, it is not difficult to descry a secret satisfaction at international solidarity being more of a fiction than a reality, and we still have our neutrality safe and sound.'
After the foreign affairs committee had voted to permit the government to take measures for joining the UN, Undén provided the Swedish legations in Paris, Washington, London, Moscow, and Shanghai/Nanking with a list of three questions for submission to their accrediting governments: (1) Would the government vote for the approval of Swedish membership? (2) If yes, would the Swedish application be considered independently, without being linked to the outcome of other applications? (3) Would the application have a chance to succeed even if submitted after 15 July, the deadline set by the Security Council? The responses were all positive, although only France said it would back Sweden in every respect. The British, the US government, and the Chinese recommended submitting an early application, whereas the Soviet answer came as late as 17 July. The US government did not want to bind itself to unconditional support ‘if a situation should arise where someone would move for the postponement of all applications’. The Soviets suggested the vote on Sweden would indeed be linked to other applications.

Parallel to this initiative, the US government appealed orally to the Swedish government to apply for membership in the UN before 15 July if possible, and by 1 August at the latest. In this connection, the head of division of Northern European affairs in the State Department, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., remarked that Sweden was the first country to be approached in this way, and that it would be made clear to the Russians that Sweden had never discussed the issue of accession to the UN with the US. The feeling was that the Swedish government’s recent inquiry would not even be mentioned. When Sweden’s application failed to be submitted, an official who emphasised that he was speaking on behalf of the highest level in the State Department, made it clear to the Swedish minister in Washington that the US had done everything possible to ‘grease the rails’ for Sweden’s accession, and that his country would ‘feel very disappointed’ if
no application were forthcoming. The spokesperson even suggested that, in the event the Soviet Union were to couple the Swedish candidature with those of Albania and the People’s Republic of Mongolia, the US would be prepared to accept the latter two as new members. However, the US cautioned that by waiting with its application, Sweden risked being lumped together with Hitler’s former satellites and might also be made a party to applications from the Baltic states, which the US could not to be expected to view in the same light as applications from Albania and Mongolia.\(^77\) In order to be able to plan their international strategy, the State Department directed several inquiries to the Swedes, asking whether or not they would apply for membership in 1946.\(^78\) On 3 August of the same year the Swedish foreign ministry ordered its legation to announce that Sweden would probably file its application before 16 August. Once again, the reaction was a request for ‘precise information as soon as possible on the Swedish plans’.\(^79\)

In view of Sweden’s satisfactory relations with the Soviet Union and the ongoing trade negotiations between both countries, Undén had been optimistic about his country’s accession to the UN.\(^80\) Once the ambiguous Soviet answer to the Swedish inquiry had been received, he opted to bide his time for some weeks, and ‘then take the risk of applying for accession without a clear answer from the Soviet Union’. The positive signal at the time was the report of UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, delivered at a meeting with Undén on 23 July at Bromma airport in Stockholm. Arriving directly from talks in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and his deputy Andrey Vyshinsky, Lie gave an account of attitudes in line with the Soviet answer to Sweden. However, he was ‘struck by the favourable way Stalin expressed himself about Sweden’. Stalin also seemed to agree that Sweden’s application should be approved without taking into consideration the status of other applications – a view Lie recounted at his meeting with Undén, and one that Molotov, according to Lie, despite a troubled
look, had failed to comment on. Another participant at the meeting in Moscow noted that ‘Lie had explicitly asked Stalin if the Russian side would set any qualifications for Swedish accession, to which Stalin responded in the negative.’ For their part, the Swedes overtly informed the Soviets about the answers given to their inquiry by the other powers, including of the US reservation to the Swedish request in case of general adjournment. On 5 August, Undén called Ilya Tchernychev, the Soviet minister at Stockholm, to his office and informed him that the Swedish government had decided to apply for membership in the UN and would presumably make a formal announcement that week. He thanked the Soviets for their answer to his inquiry and said that his government ‘did not expect any complications for Sweden’s part’. In case this estimation proved wrong, he added, ‘there was always the possibility to recall the application as a last resort.’

The next day, this information was transmitted to the Swedish legations in the capitals of the five permanent members of the Security Council and to those at Reykjavik, Dublin, and Lisbon. Governments in these cities had recently applied for membership in the UN and had previously had related discussions with Sweden. The Irish and Portuguese saw Sweden as a strong candidate that improved the chances of a bloc of ex-neutrals being accepted by Moscow.

The formal decision to apply for membership in the UN was made during a cabinet meeting on 9 August 1946. On that day, Östen Undén sent a telegram to the UN secretary-general, referring to Article 4 of the Charter on admission to membership and expressing ‘the honour, on behalf of His Swedish majesty’s Government acting with the consent of the Riksdag, to submit the application of Sweden for membership in the United Nations Organization and to declare her readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter’.
Admission and wary steps of a downsized delegation

By the time the Swedish request was submitted, the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members had already begun its work. The Committee held fourteen meetings between 31 July and 20 August, submitting its report to the Security Council on 28 August.89 The Swedish application was discussed at three meetings during that period. A question raised by the Poles about the character of Swedish neutrality was omitted from the report after a memorandum from the Secretariat pointed out that the Swedish constitution did not prescribe permanent neutrality. The Soviet Union was not initially listed among the countries supportive of Sweden’s application. Later, the Soviet position was characterised as having an ‘open mind’ and reserving the right to ‘speak later’.90 The deputy Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, Vladimir Dekanozov, planted a seed for possible future obstruction by commenting, ‘Somebody could bring up Sweden’s policy during the war.’91

Nevertheless, the final document was to the benefit of Sweden:

The delegates of the US, UK, China, Netherlands, Brazil, France and Poland endorsed the application of Sweden for membership in the United Nations, stressing the long and peaceful relations their governments had enjoyed with that country, its democratic institutions, and the humanitarian help given by Sweden to refugees during the war. They deemed her qualified and willing to fulfil all obligations contained in the United Nations Charter.

The delegate of Mexico described the friendly relations that existed between his country and Sweden and praised the valuable attention given Mexican nationals by Sweden during
the war when Sweden represented the Mexican interests in Germany and other Axis-dominated territories. …

Conclusions: In view of the material placed before the Committee and the ensuing discussion, it was considered that sufficient basis existed for the members of the Security Council to reach a decision. …

Attitudes of Delegations: The application was supported by the delegates of the US, Mexico, UK, Brazil, China, France, the Netherlands, Poland and USSR.92

When the final decision to recommend the approval of Swedish membership in the Security Council was made on 28 and 29 August, Egypt was one of those countries voting in favour of Sweden. The only country to abstain was Australia, which had lobbied unsuccessfully to have the General Assembly – not the Security Council – pass on all new applications for membership.93

A Swedish observer at the meetings noted that the atmosphere was similar to ‘armistice negotiations between different coalitions at war’, rather than characteristic of a discussion among allies, with one exception:

during the discussion of Sweden’s application, a mood of relief and alleviation spread through the Council hall. Council members seemed to take great satisfaction in being able to speak positively about an applicant without the risk of being contradicted. While there was also agreement on the applications of Afghanistan and Iceland, there were no comparable discussions about these countries.94
While the three countries cited above were endorsed by the Security Council, Albania, Mongolia, Jordan, Ireland, and Portugal were not approved for various reasons. In contrast to later years, when the US refused to negotiate admissions to the UN, it was the Soviet Union that prevented a more universal solution in 1946.\textsuperscript{95}

The positive recommendation of the Security Council was received without enthusiasm in Sweden: public opinion remained disinterested.\textsuperscript{96} The chief of the political division of the Swedish foreign ministry, Sven Grafström, noted in his diary that confirmation by the General Assembly was now merely a formality.\textsuperscript{97} The Swedish government did not follow the suggestion of UN Secretary-General Lie that it appoint a representative empowered to sign the instrument of adherence.\textsuperscript{98} Rather, it decided to limit the credentials of its minister in Washington, Herman Eriksson, ‘to act on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in all matters pertaining to the question of Sweden’s adherence to the United Nations before the General Assembly at the second part of its first session’.\textsuperscript{99} Undén wished to sign the instrument of adherence himself once the admission of Sweden had been formalised.\textsuperscript{100}

The General Assembly unanimously approved the Security Council’s positive recommendations on 9 November, and admitted Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden to membership in the UN.\textsuperscript{101} Sweden’s admission, it was noted in the labour press at home, ‘was prepared in a splendid way by the Danish minister in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann’.\textsuperscript{102} He had characterised Sweden as ‘the window of a free world’ in World War II, and he maintained that Denmark had ‘received help from Sweden in more ways than one, and to a larger extent than is usually known’.\textsuperscript{103} By contrast, the speech of his Norwegian colleague, Wilhelm Morgenstierne, was seen as ‘not as green and fresh as would have been desirable at this historical occasion for Norden’.\textsuperscript{104} This referred to Morgenstierne’s proclamation that a Nordic bloc had never existed
and that none of the Nordic countries had ‘any desire to form such a bloc’. When confronted by the Swedish minister in Oslo, Johan Beck-Friis, who had stated that newspaper reports gave the impression of ‘a certain difference in warmth’ in the contributions of Kauffmann and Morgenstierne, the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvard Lange, explained that he himself had written the Norwegian speech and that there had been an agreement between the two countries not to mention Sweden’s help during the war, which Kauffmann had unilaterally broken. In fact, the minutes of the Norwegian delegation refer to a preliminary agreement between Lie, Lange, and Kauffmann according to which Lange was to hold a short speech to which Kauffmann merely was to concur. However, it was also agreed to consult the President of the General Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak, on this procedure, and Kauffmann prepared a manuscript from which he did not substantially depart in his actual speech. By contrast, Lange, a returnee from a German concentration camp, had dropped out the day before the speech was to be held due to problems with his schedule. Generally speaking, Lange’s biographer suggests that, despite strong Nordic ties, ‘Norden slipped, so to speak, out of his hands’ in an international environment in which the UN at large and later NATO represented the most significant political tasks.

Three days after Sweden’s admission to the UN, an extraordinary cabinet meeting was called to appoint the Swedish delegation. It consisted of Foreign Minister Undén, Minister of Supply Axel Gjöres, and the minister to Washington, Herman Eriksson. The foreign ministry’s acting specialist on international law, Gunnar Sandberg, and the acting head of the UN division, Östen Lundborg, were designated as experts (Lundberg also served as secretary). The two assistant secretaries were also named, Sverker Åström and Olof Rydbeck, both later permanent Swedish representatives to the UN.
Despite sending a few high-ranking principal delegates, the Swedish approach was reserved. Staffing of the delegation fell short of the originally estimated 12 to 14 members.\footnote{112} The delegation’s concept was articulated in the guideline: ‘We are newcomers who now appear at an ongoing meeting that has already made a fair amount of progress in its discussions and its work.’ Eriksson’s quest for broader representation in order to handle all of the expectations placed upon Sweden and to avoid the impression of half-hearted participation was to no avail.\footnote{113} The under-secretary of state, Karl-Ivan Westman in replying to Eriksson, pointed to Sweden’s commitment ‘in the field of foreign policy to use “the middle way”’. Westman added that according to his experience, ‘At the end of the day, much does not usually come out of the big noise at such conventions.’\footnote{114} Undén conducted the Swedish delegation circumspectly and did not map out particular instructions in advance.\footnote{115} The room reserved for Sweden at Lake Success, the site of the UN’s provisional headquarters, remained practically unused.\footnote{116} A low-key approach was signalled upon the arrival of the delegation:

‘We are here,’ said Mr. Unden, ‘to familiarize ourselves with the procedure and the whole machinery. We are not prepared to take a full share in the activities.’ He only smiled when asked whether he thought the admission of Sweden, Iceland and Afghanistan would change the present alignment of United Nations members. ‘You must wait and see,’ said Herman Eriksson, Swedish Minister to the United States, who was at the field to receive the arriving delegates.\footnote{117}

On the morning of 19 November 1946, in a ceremony lasting three minutes, the chief delegates of the newly-admitted member states signed the instruments of adherence to the UN Charter in
the presence of Secretary-General Lie, eight assistant secretaries-general, and the president of the General Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak. In a subsequent plenary welcome meeting Undén said that Sweden was often referred to in the US as ‘the land of the middle way’, and that this metaphor connoted ‘methods … for the solution of domestic problems, especially in the social field’, which was also to define Sweden’s attitude to the solution of international problems. The fact that Undén held his speech in French, despite being equally fluent in English, caused speculation about a show of independence from East and West.

After the formal admission of Sweden and Iceland, the Nordic delegations held a banquet in New York on the initiative of Denmark. On this occasion Undén blundered – perhaps in response to Lange’s speech that Morgenstierne had read two weeks earlier – by addressing the great discrepancy between Norway and Sweden during the war, and Sweden’s astonishment that Norway was taken by surprise when attacked by Germany, although he also suggested that military preparation would not have made a difference. Moreover, he underlined that Nordic cooperation did not represent a political bloc, and that Sweden adapted to the prevailing circumstances and sought such contact as was natural.

The press noted that ‘Sweden’s repeatedly declared refusal to join any political bloc, be it Eastern European or Western democratic, has been manifest in an interesting manner in the recently completed UN meeting.’ With a balance in the most controversial issues of three votes with the Slavic countries and four with the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Swedish position seemed dubious to non-socialist observers. In subsequent years it was noted that Sweden paradoxically tended to vote along more ‘Western’ lines than NATO members Denmark and Norway, due to the lack of a need to demonstrate its idiosyncrasies. Overall, a cautious Swedish approach to the UN and international politics prevailed while Undén was foreign minister.
Conclusions

Sweden has a reputation of being an ardent supporter of the UN, and Dag Hammarskjöld, the organisation’s second secretary-general (1953–1961), remains the beloved patron saint of the world body. According to established Swedish rhetoric, the country is the ‘best friend’ of the UN.¹²⁴ Outside observers have glorified Sweden as representing ‘the ideal of what constituted good international behaviour’, with particular reference to its profile at the UN.¹²⁵ However, there are few in-depth studies of Swedish policy toward the UN, and the details of Sweden’s accession to the UN are virtually unknown. This void may have to do in part with Sweden’s awkward first encounter with the UN against the backdrop of the country’s contradictory grand narratives of neutrality and UN enthusiasm.

In addressing the research gap on Sweden’s accession to the UN, the present article finds that a discourse on Swedish moral superiority and Sweden as the ideal member of the world organisation already existed at the time of World War II. However, in view of the fledgling UN’s character as an organisation of a strained military alliance, the official Swedish position remained reserved. The complex approach of post-war Foreign Minister Östen Undén is representative for Sweden as a whole: While agreeing with those who regarded non-belligerence as a morally unassailable position, in contrast to the dirty business of war, Undén was wise enough to avoid a self-righteous demeanour vis-à-vis those who confronted Nazi Germany and the Axis powers. He would in fact have been willing to abandon neutrality for a functioning system of collective security. Rather than being an aim in itself, neutrality represented a second-best means toward security, inferior as it was to a guarded world peace. As it increasingly
became clear that the UN would not become such a protective force, the world organisation lost significance for Sweden and the policy of neutrality re-emerged as a cornerstone of the country’s foreign and security policy.

A measure of Swedish exceptionality is evident in the intractable way in which the country pursued UN membership, keeping its distance from other accession candidates and from US offers for assistance, and withholding its application for membership until the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members had already worked for one and a half weeks. There was a striking transparency with which Swedish diplomats approached the Soviet Union, communicating openly about the prospects of UN accession as seen from Stockholm and Washington. When Sweden entered the UN, it did so with a much smaller delegation than observers anticipated and one that was not yet prepared to tackle matters of substance. Rather than acting as enthusiastic UN supporters upon their admission in 1946, the Swedes used the UN as an arena to manifest their otherness in world affairs. While this demonstration was paired with ample indifference at the time, the UN increasingly emerged as a significant transmitter of Swedish foreign policy in the Cold War.

Notes


2 Riksdagens protokoll [RP], Första kammaren [FK] (1945) 32, 21 (Harald Åkerberg).

3 Gunnar Myrdal, Varning för fredsoptimism (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1944), 174.


RP, Andra kammaren [AK] (1945) 34, 12 (Set Persson).

RP, FK (1940) Urtima 2, 80.

Myrdal to Cabinet Minister Gustav Möller, Sept. 1941, National Library, Stockholm [NLS], MS, L55 [Kerstin Hesselgren], vol. 34.


RP, FK (1940) Urtima 3, 6.

RP, FK, Motioner (1940) Urtima 5.
See the report, NLS, MS, L55, vol. 43.

See the statutes of the new association, 26 Sept. 1940, NLS, MS, L55, vol. 43.


Cf. the documentation Svensk utrikespolitik under andra världskriget: Statsrådstal, riksdagsdebatter och kommunicéer (Stockholm: Kooperative förbundet, 1946).

‘Tal av försvarsminister Sköld [11 July 1943]’, in Svensk utrikespolitik under andra världskriget, 520–2, at 522 (first quotation); ‘Tal av försvarsminister Sköld [23 March 1943]’, ibid. 506–9, at 508 (second quotation).


NAS, FM, HP24/1167.

Sir Orme Sargent, as quoted in English in a cable by Erik Boheman to foreign ministry, 28 Feb. 1945, NAS, FM, HP24/1167.

Memo, 24 May 1945, National Archives, Copenhagen [NAC], FM 1946–72, 119.B.2.a.


Memo of 6 Nov. 1944 meeting between Günther and Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie, NAS, FM, HP24/1166.


Wistrand to Günther, 11 July 1945, NAS, FM, HP24/1169.


Manuscript ‘II Alliansfrihet’, approx. 1943, ibid.

‘Neutraliteten släppes när ett nytt NF bildats: Prof. Undén talar vid studiekonferensen i Insjön’, *Social-Demokraten*, 24 Aug. 1943.


Östen Undén, ‘Solidaritet eller neutralitet?’, Vi, 8 Sept. 1945.


Andrén, Power-balance, 39.


50 *The Teheran, Yalta & Potsdam Conferences: Documents* (Moscow: Progress, 1969), 186, 331.

51 FRUS 1945 I: 1458.

52 Eriksson to foreign ministry, 23 Oct. 1945, NAS, FM, HP48/1781.


55 Tamm to foreign ministry, 2 Mar. 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1775.

56 RP, FK (1945) 32: 44 (Per Albin Hansson).

57 Grafström to Westrup, 4 Dec. 1945, NAS, FM, HP48/1781.


61 Undén to Prytz, 29 Jan. 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1782. On special treatment, see e.g. Grafström to Prytz, 6 Jan. 1946, ibid., vol. 1781. On reservations toward common action of neutrals, see e.g. von Celsing to Lundborg, 26 Mar. 1946; ibid., vol. 1775.


Prytz to foreign ministry on conversation with Warner, 30 Jan. 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1782.

Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


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Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


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Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


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Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Memo by Undén on conversation with Soviet minister, Tjernysjev, 7 Feb. 1946, ibid.


Note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nanking, 29 June 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1782; Boheman, 2 July 1946, ibid.; Eriksson, 2 July 1946, ibid.; Sargent to Ihre, 4 July 1946, ibid.; Tchernychev, 16 July 1946 (presented 17 July), ibid.

Aminoff to foreign ministry, 28 June 1946, ibid.

Eriksson to foreign ministry, 1 Aug. 1946, ibid.


Undén to Lie, 13 July 1946, ibid.

Memo, 24 July 1946, ibid.

Bergenstråhle to foreign ministry, 29 July 1946, ibid.

Foreign ministry to legation at Moscow, 23 July 1946, ibid.

Memo by Undén, 5 Aug. 1946, ibid.

Cables of 6 Aug. 1946, ibid.

Various documents, ibid.


Cable of 9 Aug. 1946, ibid.


Hägglöf to foreign ministry, 20 Aug. 1946, ibid.

‘Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members’ (= S/133), Security Council, Official Records 1, 2 (1946), Suppl. 4, 32.

‘Security Council’, 90–1, 93.
Bonde to Lundborg, 2 Sept. 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1783.

*Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs* 1955, 200; ‘Special Report by the Security Council to the General Assembly on the Admission of New Members’ (= S/177).


Lie to Undén, 30 Sept. 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1783.

Credentials of 18 Oct. 1946, ibid.

Cable by Eriksson, 24 Oct. 1946, ibid.

*General Assembly, Plenary Meetings* 1 (1946) 2: 943.

‘Norden i FN’, *Arbetet*, 20 Nov. 1946.

*General Assembly, Plenary Meetings* 1 (1946) 2: 937.

‘Norden i FN’, *Arbetet*, 20 Nov. 1946.

*General Assembly, Plenary Meetings* 1 (1946) 2: 936.

Beck-Friis to Grafström, 12 Dec. 1946, NAS, FM, HP48/1783.

Delegation meeting minutes, 7 Nov. 1946, National Archives, Oslo [NAO], Foreign Ministry [FM] 1940–49, vol. 10910.


Delegation meeting minutes, 8 Nov. 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, vol. 10910.


*Förenta nationernas generalförsamlings första ordinarie mötets andra del, New York 1946, m.m.* (Stockholm: Fritzes, 1947), 8.
However, the Francophile attitude of Undén might also have played a part: he preferred to read UN documents in French. See foreign ministry to UN mission, 21 Sept. 1949, NAS, FM, HP48/1778.


