Project Turnstone

Freedom of Movement and Passenger Experiences with Safety and Border Control in the Baltic Sea Area
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Sophia Yakhlef
Goran Basic
Malin Åkerström
Authors:

**Goran Basic** is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden. His research concerns fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has written articles on the post-war society and carried out an evaluation of a project in the juvenile care system. Basic’s dissertation “When collaboration becomes a struggle. A sociological analysis of a project in the Swedish juvenile care” is based on ethnographic material.

**Sophia Yakhlef** is a PhD student in sociology at Lund University, Sweden. She previously studied body image perception and cosmetic surgery and is currently completing her dissertation on cooperation, trust, and socialization between police and border authorities in Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

**Malin Åkerström** is Professor of Sociology at Lund University in, Sweden. Her research focuses on ethnographic studies of deviance and social control. She has published several books, including “Suspicious Gifts: Bribery, Morality, and Professional Ethics” (2014), “Betrayers and Betrayers”, and “Crooks and Squares”, as well as numerous articles on social control, corruption, policies for treatment of juvenile offenders, and the criminal lifestyle, among other topics. She is the Coordinator of Sociological Criminology at Lund University.
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Abstract

Project Turnstone is a collaborative project funded in part by the European Commission. The project is an initiative by the Stockholm Police. The purpose of the project is to improve day-to-day cooperation between border officers in the Baltic Sea region, decrease trans-boundary criminality, and increase security for passengers in the Baltic Sea area without compromising freedom of movement. Within the framework of Project Turnstone, the purpose of this study is to map and analyse how travellers experience, interpret, and define freedom of movement in the northern part of the Baltic Sea region. This qualitative study is based on empirically gathered material, including field interviews and fieldwork observations at Stockholm’s Arlanda airport in Sweden, a Tallink Silja Line ferry between Stockholm and Riga in Latvia, and a Tallink Silja Line ferry between Stockholm and Tallinn in Estonia. The findings of this study suggest that many passengers are positive regarding the idea of freedom of movement in Europe but are scared of threats from outside of Europe. Several interviewees viewed Sweden and the northern parts of Europe as safe and mostly identified threats as coming from outside of Europe. Passengers generally identified political and collective threats, such as terrorism and cross-border criminality, but did not mention airplane or ferry accidents as possible risks. Freedom of movement is described as a potential risk for society and passengers, thereby placing risk in a larger societal context. Nevertheless, all but three of 200 interviewed passengers claimed that they felt safe during their travels, though many also added that they might feel safer if there were consistent passport controls regarding all travellers. The respondents in this study construct safety by distinguishing themselves from others outside of Europe. Passengers emphasized that freedom of movement is positive for personal gain because it is easier for EU citizens to travel in Europe, but at the same time it is regarded as facilitating the entry of potential threats into the EU.

Key words: freedom of movement, construction of safety, field interviews, fieldwork, observations.
Projekt Turnstone:
liikumisvabadus: reisijate kogemused seoses turvalisuse ja piirikontrolliga Läänemere piirkonnas

Projekt Turnstone on koostööprojekt, mida rahastab osaliselt Euroopa Komisjon. Projekti näol on tegemist Stockholmi politsei algatusega. Projekti eesmärk on parandada Läänemere piirkonna piirikontrolli igapäevast koostööd, vähendada piiriülest kuritegevust ja tõsta Läänemere piirkonna reisijate turvalisust ilma liikumisvabadust ohustamata.

Antud uuringu eesmärk on projekti Turnstone raames kaardistada ja analüüsida, kuidas reisijad kogevad, tõlgendavad ja defineerivad liikumisvabadust Läänemere piirkonna põhjapoolses osas. See kvalitatiivne uuring põhineb empiiriliselt kogutud materjalil, nagu väliintervjuud ja välitööde vaatlused Stockholmi Arlanda lennujaamas, Stockholmi ja Riia vahel sõitval Tallinki Silja Line’i praamil ning Stockholmi ja Tallinna vahel sõitval Tallinki Silja Line’i praamil.

kirjeldatakse ühiskonnale potentsiaalse ohuna ning seega näevad reisijad ohite suuremas sotsiaalset kontekstis. Sellegipoolest väitsid kõik peale kolme intervjueritava, et nad tundsid end reisimise ajal turvaliselt, kuid paljud lisasid, et nad tunneksid end turvalisemalt, kui järjepidevalt kontrollitaks kõigi reisijate passe.

Uuringus osalejate turvalisuse loomise viis on eristada end väljaspool Euroopat elavatest inimestest. Reisijad rõhutavad, et liikumisvabadus on isikliku kasu vaatepunktist positiivne, sest EL-i kodanikel on Euroopas lihtsam reisida, kuid samal ajal peetakse seda mooduseks, mis aitab võimalikul välisohul Euroopa Liitu siseneda.

Võtmesõnad: liikumisvabadus, turvalisuse loomine, väliintervjuud, välitöö, vaatlused
Turnstone-hanke: Vapaa liikkuvuus: Matkustajien kokemukset turvallisuudesta ja rajavalvonnasta Itämeren alueella

Turnstone-hanke on Euroopan komission osarahoittama yhteistyöhanke. Hanke on pantu alulle Tukholman poliisin aloitteesta. Hankkeen tarkoitus on parantaa päivittäistä yhteistyötä Itämeren alueen rajavalvontaviranomaisten välillä, vähentää rajat ylittävää rikollisuutta ja lisätä matkustajien turvallisuutta Itämeren alueella tinkimättä vapaasta liikkuvuudesta.


Tämän tutkimuksen tulokset antavat olettaa, että monet matkustajat suhtautuvat myönteisesti vapaaseen liikkuvuuteen Euroopassa mutta pelkäävät Euroopan ulkopuolelta tulevia uhkia. Monet haastatelluista katsoivat Ruotsin ja Euroopan pohjoisosat turvallisiksi ja mielsivät uhkat lähinnä Euroopan ulkopuolelta tuleviksi. Matkustajat mieltävät yleisesti riskeiksi poliittiset ja kollektiiviset uhkat, kuten terrorismin ja rajat ylittävän rikollisuuden mutta eivät mainitse lentokone- tai lauttaonnettomuuksia
mahdollisiksi riskeiksi. Vapaata liikkuvuutta kuvataan mahdolliseksi riskiksi yhteiskunnalle, ja matkustajat näkevät riskin näin ollen laajemmassa yhteiskunnallisessa yhteydessä. Kuitenkin kaikki matkustajat, kolmea lukuun ottamatta, totesivat tuntevansa olonsa turvalliseksi matkoillaan, mutta monet lisäsivät myös, että he saattaisivat tuntea olonsa turvalliseksi, jos kaikille matkustajille tehtäisiin passitarkastuksia. 

Vastaajat tässä tutkimuksessa rakentavat turvallisuutta erottautumalla Euroopan ulkopuolelta. Matkustajat korostavat, että vapaa liikkuvuus on myönteinen asia henkilökohtaisesti, koska EU:n kansalaisten on helpompi matkustajaa Euroopassa, mutta samalla sen katsotaan helpottavan mahdollisten uhkien pääsyä Euroopan unioniin.

Avainsanat: vapaa liikkuvuus, turvallisuuden rakentaminen, kenttähaastattelut, kenttätyö, havainnot
Projekts "Turnstone":
Pārvietošanās brīvība: Pasažieru drošības un robežsardzes pārbaužu pieredze Baltijas jūras reģionā

Projekts "Turnstone" ir kopīgas sadarbības projekts, ko dalēji finansē Eiropas Komisija. Projekts ir Stokholmas policijas iniciatīva. Šī projekta mērķis ir uzlabot ikdienas sadarbību starp Baltijas jūras reģiona dažādu dienestu darbiniekiem, samazināt pārrobežas kriminalitāti un paaugstināt pasažieru drošību Baltijas jūras reģionā, neierobežojot pārvietošanās brīvību.


Šī pētījuma rezultāti liecina par to, ka daudzi pasažieri ir pozitīvi noskaņoti attiecībā uz neierobežotu pārvietošanos Eiropā, bet baidās no draudiem ārpus Eiropas. Vairāki respondenti atzina Zviedriju un Eiropas ziemeļu daļu par drošu un visbiežāk norādīja uz to, ka draudi nāk no valstīm ārpus Eiropas. Kā riskus pasažieri minēja politiskos un vispārējos draudus, piemēram, terorisms un pārrobežu kriminalitāte, bet neminēja riskus, kas būtu saistīti ar lidmašīnām vai prāmjiem. Pārvietošanās brīvība tiek raksturota kā potenciāls risks sabiedrībai, kā rezultātā pasažieri risku uztver plašākas sabiedrības konteksta. Tomēr visi, izņemot trīs pasažierus, aptaujātie norādīja uz to, ka jutās droši savos ceļojums, bet daudzi piebilda,
ka justos drošāk, ja tiktu veiktas regulāras visu ceļotāju dokumentu pārbaudes.

Šī pētījuma ietvaros aptaujātie respondenti veido izpratni par drošību nodalot sevi no cilvēkiem ārpus Eiropas. Pasažieri uzsver to, ka pārvietošanās brīvība ir pozitīva personīgā labuma gūšanai, jo ES pilsonim ir vieglāk ceļot Eiropā, bet tajā pašā brīdī pārvietošanās brīvība tiek vērtēta kā potenciālo draudu Eiropas Savienībai avots.

Atslēgas vārdi: pārvietošanās brīvība, drošības izveidošana, intervijas, datu apkopošana uz vietas, novērojumi.
Projektas „Turnstone“: Judėjimo laisvė: keleivių patirtis saugumo ir sienų kontrolės srityse Baltijos jūros regione


tuo būdu įtraukia riziką į platesnį visuomeninį kontekstą. Nepaisant to, visi keleiviai, išskyrus tris, teigė, jog jautėsi saugiai savo kelionių metu, tačiau daugelis pridūrė, kad jautūsi saugiau, jei visų keleivių atžvilgiu būtų vykdoma sistéminga pasų kontrolė.

Šio tyrimo respondentai kuria saugumą išskirdami save iš ne europiečių tarpo. Keleiviai pabrėžia, kad judėjimo laisvė yra teigiamas dalykas, teikianti asmeninės naudos, nes ES piliečiai gali lengviau keliauti Europos viduje, tačiau tuo pat metu į šią laisvę žiūrima kaip į sudarančią palankias sąlygas įsileisti potencialias grėsmes į Europos Sąjungą.

**Raktiniai žodžiai:** judėjimo laisvė, saugumo sukūrimas, interviu ėmimas vietoje, duomenų rinkimas vietoje, stebėjimai.
Projekt Turnstone: Fri rörlighet och passagerares upplevelser av säkerhet och gränskontroll i Östersjöregionen

Projekt Turnstone är ett samverkansprojekt delvis finansierat av Europeiska kommissionen. Projektet är ett initiativ av Stockholmspolisens gränsbevakningsenhet. Syftet med Projekt Turnstone är att minska gränsöverskridande brottslighet, förbättra dagligt samarbete mellan gräns, polis och kustbevakare i Östersjöregionen och förbättra säkerheten för passagerare i Östersjöregionen utan att göra avkall på fria rörligheten.


Denna studie visar att många passagerare är positivt inställda till fri rörlighet inom Europa, men rädda för hot utifrån Europa. Flera intervjuuppersoner ansåg att Sverige och norra Europa var säkert och många nämnde att hot ofta kommer utifrån Europa. Passagerare identifierade främst hot mot samhället, såsom terrorism och gränsöverskridande brottslighet istället för flyg och färjeolyckor. Fri rörlighet beskrivs som en eventuell samhällsrisk och placeras därför i en större social kontext av intervjuuppersonerna. Trots detta har alla passagerare utom tre av tvåhundra svarat att de känner sig
säkra på sina resor. Många har även nämnt att de skulle känna sig säkrare om det fanns konsekventa passkontroller.

De intervjuade passagerarna konstruerar säkerhet genom att göra åtskillnad på Européer och icke européer. Passagerna hävdar att fri rörlighet är positivt för deras personliga intressen eftersom det är lättare för Europeiska medborgare att resa inom Europa, men nämner också att det gör det lättare för Europeiska unionen att drabbas av hot.

Nyckelord: Fri rörlighet, konstruerad säkerhet, risk, fältintervjuer, fältarbete, observationer.
Introduction

Project Turnstone is a European collaborative project funded in part by the European Commission. The main objective of the project is to increase control in the Baltic Sea area by decreasing cross border crime\(^1\). The background of the project is EU and Schengen enlargement, the abolition of internal border checks, and the implementation of freedom of movement. The abolition of borders is argued to serve as a possible security risk, and the absence of borders makes it more challenging to detect and stop criminals at border controls (Faure Atger, 2008, p. 7). Borders previously governed and monitored by passport controls must now rely on cooperation between border officers, who need to adapt to new methods of working. The nations participating in Project Turnstone are Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In addition, a research group from the Department of Sociology at Lund University, Sweden, is participating in the project with the purpose of writing the present report\(^2\). The researchers will produce a report focusing on successful cooperation and the obstacles encountered by police, border officers, and coast guard officers participating in Project Turnstone.

Within the framework of Project Turnstone, the research group is tasked with implementing two related studies. The first study focuses on cooperation between the police, coast guard, and border officers, whereas this study focuses on airplane and ferry passengers’ experiences with border

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\(^1\) [https://polisen.se/PageFiles/487243/Information.pdf](https://polisen.se/PageFiles/487243/Information.pdf)

\(^2\) In addition, the researchers will use the information gathered for additional purposes, such as a PhD dissertation written by one of the researchers (Sophia Yakhlef). For these purposes, the same confidentiality agreements, ethical considerations, and anonymity assurances apply. The research questions for these studies or presentations will be related to the topics highlighted in the present study or the additional Turnstone research report Project Turnstone: Successful Collaboration and Collaboration Obstacles in Police, Border, and Coast Guard Cooperation (Yakhlef, Basic & Åkerström, 2015).
crossings and freedom of movement. The present study is an attempt to provide passenger perspectives regarding the border crossings of the collaborative partners. Based on mainly qualitatively, but also quantitatively, gathered interview material, the purpose of this study is to map and analyze how travellers, such as airport passengers and ferry passengers in Stockholm, Tallinn, and Riga, experience, interpret, and define safety, risk, and the freedom of movement in the northern part of the Baltic Sea region. For the purpose of this study, 200 passengers (100 airport passengers at Stockholm Arlanda airport and 100 passengers at two Tallink Silja Line ferries travelling between Stockholm, Tallinn, and Riga) were interviewed.

The research questions are:

1. How do travellers in the region describe safety and risk in association with the freedom of movement?

2. How do travellers describe freedom of movement in association with border checks carried out by the border police agencies?

The findings suggest that interviewed passengers are positive regarding the idea of freedom of movement in Europe but scared of threats from outside of Europe. Many claim that freedom of movement in the Schengen area is a safe practice regarding Europe and the Nordic countries. Passengers identified political and collective threats, such as terrorism and cross border criminality, but did not mention airplane or ferry accidents as possible risks. Freedom of movement is generally described as a potential risk for society instead of the individual person; for example, terrorism is not talked about as a personal risk but more as a general phenomenon. All but three interviewed passengers claimed that they felt safe during their travels, but many also added that they might feel safer if there were passport controls regarding all travellers. The interviewees in this study seem to construct safety by distinguishing others outside of Europe, establishing categories of insiders and outsiders. Many passengers in the study emphasized that freedom of movement is positive for personal gain, because it is easier for EU citizens to travel in Europe. Passengers also experience insecurity regarding the rules and regulations of border crossing and concerning freedom of movement.
This report is structured as follows. In the subsequent chapters we will describe the aim and structure of Project Turnstone more clearly, the research design adopted, and how the research was implemented. Previous relevant research regarding border politics, EU enlargement, risk, and safety is discussed in the following chapter. In the two analytical chapters, we describe passengers’ experiences and compare our findings to previous research. The study ends with a conclusion and suggestion for future research.
Project Turnstone is a transnational European project receiving grants from the EU commission\(^3\). Co-beneficiaries of the grant (in addition to the Stockholm Country Police, Border Division) are Helsinki Police (F), The Gulf of Finland Coast Guard District (F), Police and Border Guard Board (EE), Riga Board of the State Border Guard of the Republic of Latvia (LV), State Border Guard Service at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, Coast Guard District (LT), The Swedish Coast Guard District (SE), and Lund University, Department of Sociology (SE). The duration of the project is 24 months, starting in January 2014 and terminating in December 2015.

Project Objectives

The purpose of the project is to enhance law enforcement cooperation between border agencies (police, border police, border guard, and coast guard organizations) in the participating countries since enlargement of the Schengen area in 2007/2008. The enlargement resulted in changes concerning international cooperation and created a greater need for new models of cooperation between border agencies. The initiators also stated a growing mobility of organized mobile criminal groups and illegal immigration as prime reasons to further develop law enforcement cooperation. The objectives of Project Turnstone, as stated in the grant application, are\(^4\) to 1) increase mutual trust between the border agencies

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\(^3\) [https://eng.si.se/police-co-operate-across-borders-against-international-crime/](https://eng.si.se/police-co-operate-across-borders-against-international-crime/)

\(^4\) Annex 5- Individual Conclusion HOME/2012/ISEC/AG/4000004316, document provided by the project group.
and their officials on all levels, 2) increase and streamline day to day cross border cooperation between the border agencies, 3) increase interaction between law enforcement agencies and the academic community⁵, 4) create effective and adaptable work methods while safeguarding the right to freedom of movement, and 5) improve social and cultural knowledge between and within the border agencies. A number of collaborative activities have been used to achieve these aims, such as workshops, operative action weeks, and formal meetings with a select number of strategic commanders, intelligence experts, and operative personnel.

The short-term objectives of Project Turnstone are to increase cooperation between officers and make their interactions more flexible and coordinated. The mid-term objectives are more effective analysis of common security threats in the region, crime prevention, and the increased knowledge among their officers of their partners’ organizations. The long-term objectives focus on increased public experience of security without compromising freedom of movement and better equipping border agencies to jointly fight new criminal phenomena⁶. In addition to the mentioned objectives, Project Turnstone aims to gain an increased understanding of ferry and airport passengers’ perspective on border crossing. The objective of interviewing passengers is to gain increased knowledge on how the freedom of movement is understood and defined by (mostly) Schengen or EU citizens themselves.

The project outcomes will be circulated through two reports⁷ by the Lund University researchers at several European conferences⁸, field study reports by participating officers, joint intelligence reports, operative planning reports, and action reports, among others. The project initiators aim to present Turnstone as a successful work model that can be adapted by other border agencies or cooperation projects in the EU and Schengen area.

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⁵ This issue focuses on the interaction between the researchers and cooperation with Lund University’s Department of Sociology and law enforcement agencies.

⁶ Turnstone (document provided by the Stockholm County Police).

⁷ The second report, Project Turnstone: Successful Collaboration and Collaboration Obstacles in Police, Border, and Coast Guard Cooperation, focuses on the experiences of border police, border guards, and coast guards in the Baltic Sea area and their cooperation to fight cross-border criminality (Yakhlef, Basic & Åkerström, 2015).

⁸ This study will be presented at the 2015 European Sociological Association Conference.
The Schengen Regime and Freedom of Movement

The Schengen regime implies the guaranteed free movement of passengers without document controls at national borders in all Schengen member states. The Schengen regime (as it is constituted today) was applied in 2007/2008 and currently includes all EU member states together with Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. EU nations that are not included are Bulgaria, Ireland, Cyprus, Romania, Great Britain, and extended overseas territories\(^9\) belonging to the member states. As of July 1, 2015, the freedom of movement without passport controls is valid when traveling within the EU and not just within the Schengen area. This implies that EU citizens travelling within the EU territory are not required to go through passport control when entering a EU country. Thus, EU and Schengen passengers are not required to carry a passport, though some airlines require a valid passport or national identity card when travelling\(^{10}\). According to the information provided on the Arlanda airport webpage, passengers must be able to prove their identities with a passport or national identity card during their stay in the country that they are visiting; therefore, it is recommend that they bring a valid passport or a national identity card. When travelling to countries outside the EU, travellers are required to carry a valid passport and go through passport controls\(^ {11}\).

EU nationals also enjoy the right to move and work in another EU country without a work permit, to stay in that country even after employment has finished, and enjoy equal treatment with nationals in regards to access to employment, working conditions, and all other social and tax advantages\(^ {12}\). Non-EU nationals may enjoy similar rights depending on their own nationality or status as family members of EU nationals. Citizens of Iceland,

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\(^9\) Overseas territories belonging to the member states not included in the Schengen regime are the Portuguese Azores Islands, Canary Islands, the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Africa, the overseas territories of France, Norway’s Svalbard, the Danish autonomous territory Greenland, the Faroe Islands (not part of the EU), and overseas Dutch autonomous regions of Aruba, Curacao, Saint Maarten, Bonaire, Saba, and Saint Eustatius.

\(^{10}\) Valid identity information is required by some airlines because the airlines are responsible for bringing the right passengers with valid identity information on their planes.

\(^ {11}\) http://www.swedavia.se/arlanda/infor-resan/pass-visum-id-kontroll/

\(^ {12}\) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=457
Lichtenstein, and Norway can work in the EU because they belong to the European Economic Area, despite not being EU members. Swiss nationals are free to work in the EU area, with some restrictions in Croatia. Citizens of Bulgaria and Romania may currently find restrictions to working in Iceland, Liechtenstein, or Norway. Switzerland applies restrictions to nationals of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, though most other EU citizens do not need a work permit to work in the country. The rules regarding Turkish citizens working in the EU depend on the national laws of each member country. In addition, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Russia, Albania, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Andorra, San Marino, and 79 countries of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of states have agreements with the EU. Citizens of these states working legally in the EU enjoy the same working conditions as nationals in their host country.\(^\text{13}\)

Citizens from a number of countries outside the Schengen area must have a visa to enter the EU and Schengen. Non-EU citizens, so-called third country citizens, who have a residence permit in one of the Schengen countries, may circulate freely in other Schengen countries for 3 months. However, they may need to register with the country’s authorities upon entry and must have their passport and residence permit with them. Third country nationals who do not need a visa to enter Schengen may move freely within the Schengen area for up to 3 months for each period of 6 months. After 3 months, the person may have to leave the Schengen area for 3 months before re-entering\(^\text{14}\). A common visa policy facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU and a local border traffic regime is established to aid entry for non-EU residents who frequently need to cross the EU external border\(^\text{15}\). EU nationals may also have certain types of health or social security benefits. Those who can benefit from this are jobseekers: EU nationals who move to another EU country in search of a job, EU nationals working in another EU country, EU nationals who return to their country of origin after having worked abroad, or family members of these workers.

\(^\text{13}\) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=470&langId=en

\(^\text{14}\) http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Om-EU/Vad-EU-gor/Schengen-och-fri-rorlighet-for-personer/

\(^\text{15}\) External borders are borders between EU countries and non-EU countries. Land and sea borders, ports, and airports may be external borders. An international airport can be both an external and internal border depending on the passenger’s point of destination/Departure.
There may be exceptions to these rules and rights may differ for certain people, such as students, the retired, or the self-employed. There may also be other restrictions or limitations based on considerations of public security, employment in the public sector, public policy, or issues of public health\(^\text{16}\).

Freedom of movement aims to provide mobility rights within the EU and Schengen area for its citizens, as well as facilitating travel and border crossing. In addition, the EU is an example of a “network state” in which border control can occur within societies and not just at regional borders (Castells, 2000; Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Rumford, 2006, p. 157). The main purpose of eliminating borders within the Schengen area in 2007 was to abolish encounters with physical barriers and border guards. Although passport controls are no longer used in the Schengen territory for EU citizens, border checks are still in practice at three levels: 1) mobile police controls, 2) joint patrols and border police cooperation, and 3) administrative requirements enforced on European citizens and third country nationals. Identity checks are permitted in border zones connected to the border. National legislative frameworks regulate the sizes of the border areas where identity checks can be performed. These legislations vary between countries; in some cases checks can only be carried out within the border area and in others within the entire territory (Faure Atger, 2008, p. 10).

Temporary border controls may be imposed in the Schengen area or at its borders with other member states at certain types of events: during expected events (e.g., major sporting events), during unpredictable events (e.g., terrorist attacks), or when a lack of control of external borders is estimated\(^\text{17,18}\). Although Schengen states have abolished internal borders, external borders are controlled to ensure the security of citizens and travellers\(^\text{19}\). Challenges faced by border authorities in the Schengen area concern differences in legalization, restrictions regarding providing other

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18 Following the large influx of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers into Europe in September 2015, Germany decided to start temporary border controls along its borders with Austria to regain control. [http://www.bbc.com/news/world/europe-34239674](http://www.bbc.com/news/world/europe-34239674)
organizations with information, and each organization having different authority or working methods. These obstacles can be eased and overcome through closer day-to-day work, education, and interpersonal exchange. Several border authorities in the Schengen area have cooperation agreements, allowing for some border officers to conduct surveillance and follow suspected criminals across the border to another Schengen country in some circumstances.

Frontex

Frontex has been the main Schengen authority since 2004, coordinating border control cooperation between member states, organizing joint training of border control personnel, conducting risk assessments, and assisting member countries in special situations that require technical or operational assistance at external borders. The purpose of Frontex is to streamline, reinforce, and aid cooperation between EU national border authorities. Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland also participate in Frontex operations, but Ireland and the United Kingdom may only participate in certain cases. Border management is aided by a number of information sharing mechanisms, including the Visa Information System (VIS), (about visa data), and the Schengen Information System (SIS) allowing Schengen states to exchange information about suspected criminals, people that should be denied entry into the EU, missing persons, stolen goods, or information regarding falsification and counterfeit travel documents.

22 http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Om-EU/Vad-EU-gor/Schengen-och-fri-rorlighet-for-personer/
Previous Research on Border Politics, EU Enlargement, and Risk in Society

In recent decades, the social sciences have been interested in re-conceptualizing and re-interpreting the meaning of border crossing and the social and political dimensions of border management. Borders are no longer seen as lines on a map dividing nations, but as dynamic spaces and networks of importance to culture, politics, and security (Pickering & Weber, 2006, p. 2). Much scholarly work by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists has focused on the experience of border crossing with regards to restrictions, passport controls, and security limitations (Rumford, 2006, pp. 55-59), but also on the increasing global flow and movement of people, goods, and ideas (Wonders, 2006).

Globalization

One of the most important features of globalization is mobility (Wonders, 2006, p. 63), and migration is one of the most important consequences of globalization (Tirman, 2004). Globalization is characterized by “flows”, a growing awareness of units and scales, and the boundaries of regions. Globalization is also defined as a package of transnational flows of people, production, investment, information, ideas, and authority (Tsing, 2000, pp. 327). As exchange between people and nations intensifies across borders, the nature and meaning of citizenship have also changed (Brysk & Shafir, 2004, p. 3). Although borders and passports are not twentieth-
century inventions, the firm division of borders and worldwide regulation of migration as we know them did not exist before the early twentieth century (Dauvergne, 2004). Increased mobility between nation states in a globalized society requires new border regulations that old territorial borders cannot achieve (Rumford, 2006, p. 164). As borders are multiplied and reduced, their function is diminished or increased and the quantitative relationship between border and territory is overturned (Balibar, 1998, p. 220). Some borders are encountered as non-boundaries and for some people, such as within the EU, they are now easier to cross (Rumford, 2006, p. 156).

EU Enlargement and Freedom of Movement

According to researcher James Wesley Scott (2005, p. 433), the EU can be understood in terms of a shift from nation-state-centred modernity to a new multivocal and multiscaled world, a world that has many different meanings. This is due to the EU’s complex geopolitical project and transnational cooperation, allowing interdependence and multipolarity. In theory, the EU allows for a political community based on several exemplifications of citizenship and a sense of multiple identities (Diez, 2002). Dating back to the end of the Second World War, the idea of the EU emerged as a vision of a peaceful, united, and prosperous Europe. According to the official EU website, the end of the Soviet Union in Europe made the Europeans close neighbours. The Single Market with “the four freedoms” was created in 1993, causing the free movement of goods, services, people, and money. The 1990s also saw an increased awareness of security issues and consciousness of how “Europeans can act together when it comes to security and defence matters”24.

Contemporary sociological research of border politics focuses on notions such as social networks instead of societies, and border zones instead of borders (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004, p. 81). Mobility (Urry, 1999), scapes (Appadurai, 1990), flow, and fluids (Rumford, 2006, p. 155) are key metaphors for understanding modern life in a “world in motion” (Rumford,

24 http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm
In some cases, the diffusion and networking of borders have, in Rumford’s (2006, p. 158) opinion, led to a renewed importance of land borders. The border areas and border spaces, especially regarding the EU, have seen an increased need for protection and defence (Pickering & Weber, 2006). The concept of EU borderlands has been promoted in the last decade due to the creation of neighbourhood policy. The purpose of the EU neighbourhood policy is to develop friendly relationships with countries to the east and south of Europe that are unlikely to become candidates for formal agreements (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). A good relationship with neighbouring countries is beneficial in economic and social terms, increasing opportunities for networking and cooperation (Rumford, 2006, p. 61). This is also an issue in which rigid borders between the EU and surrounding countries are not as clear-cut because cooperation occurs despite the external border. Sociologist Zygmund Bauman (2002, p. 90) argued that, in global space, borders are transformed into “extraterritorial frontier lands”. Similarly, philosopher Étienne Balibar (1998) regarded the contemporary view of borders as diffuse as one in which countries can become borderlands. Therefore, entire nations and the EU itself can be interpreted as borderlands and zones of mobility and transition without territorial fixity (Balibar, 2004).

Risk in a Globalized Society

The global age has seen an increase in global mobility (Dauvergne, 2004), but also restrictions, laws, and regulations to surveil this mobility (Wonders, 2006, p. 72). Several scholars, including Bauman (2002, p. 88) see the 9/11 terrorist attack as a symbolic end of an era followed by increased dominance of territorial power and border security. Since the EU enlargement in the early 1990s, the aim has been to facilitate cross-border and transnational cooperation. The EU security policy aims to avoid political confrontation, environmental threats, and destabilization of regional conflicts. This can be achieved through intense cooperation in areas of justice and home affairs, security, and defence. Cooperation in these areas involves controlling

irregular migration flows and trafficking of human beings, combating terrorism, and preventing organized crime (Scott, 2005, pp. 435-436).

The social construction of risk has dominated social and political consciousness in the twenty-first century, and ideas of global insecurity have developed through terrorism, epidemics, and pollution (Denney, 2005, p. 1-7). Risk has also become a major part of everyday life in regards to food, sunlight, travel, and everyday objects that have become potential health risks. The word “risk” could easily be changed to “danger” in political debate. Historically, the word danger has been associated with the concepts of nature and culture, the dangers from which society must be protected (Denney, 2005). A well-known approach to risk in sociological theory is the perspective of the "risk society" (Beck, 1986, 1992; Zinn, 2006), focusing on technical and environmental risks as unforeseen consequences of industrialization. Approaches to risk within cultural studies often refer to the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966), who argues that risk is a culturally given way of responding to threats to the boundaries of a society, group, or organization. Douglas claims that a society that is threatened will respond by regulating boundaries and increasing social control regulating these boundaries. Thus, risk is understood as a way of maintaining social order (Douglas, 1966) linked to group formation and identity construction by the distinguishing between self and other (Zinn, 2006). This perspective has been criticized for being an oversimplification, and scholars have tried to overcome the functionalistic view of risk by focusing on the complex processes in everyday life (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003; Lash, 2000). Michel Foucault’s (1991) approach to governmental risk is seen as a way of shaping and controlling populations and governing societies. Risk is characterized by an uncertainty about the outcome, and risk-taking can have both a positive and negative impact. Uncertainty is a product of existing knowledge and new information (Zinn, 2006). Contemporary notions of risk are characterized by the urge to conquer uncertainty and, therefore, “security in all aspects” is a marketable and desirable commodity (Denney, 2005, p. 12).
Two border settings were used to collect the material: 1) Tallink Silja Line ferry terminals in Stockholm, Riga, and Tallinn and two Tallink Silja Line ferries, and 2) Stockholm Arlanda airport in Sweden. The settings (airport and ferry terminals) comprise examples of different ways of handling and demanding security checks.

At the Tallink Silja Line ferry terminals in Stockholm, Tallinn, and Riga, passengers can check in using the self-check-in machines or at the check-in counters. Passengers then receive their tickets (which is also the cabin key). To board the ferries, passengers scan the card/ticket at the security gates, where a Tallink Silja Line staff member is available to assist passengers. Before boarding the cruise ship, passengers are greeted at the entrance by a ferry guard and Tallink Silja Line staff members who may ask to see the passengers’ tickets. There is no official security check or identity control before travelling with the Tallink Silja Line ferries to Tallinn or Riga.

At Arlanda airport, all passengers (including EU and Schengen citizens) must go through airport security, showing their carry-on luggage and boarding cards. The aim of this procedure is to find objects forbidden on board the aircraft. The Arlanda airport website states that the process is fast and smooth as long as the passengers are prepared. The website also lists a few suggestions for going through airport security efficiently, such as having your boarding card easily accessible and placing loose objects in the plastic bins provided. Since passport-free travel has been expanded, EU citizens travelling to other EU countries do not go through a border check upon arrival. However, some airlines still require a valid passport or ID card before the flight because they are responsible for only boarding passengers with valid information regarding their identities. Therefore, passengers are recommended to always bring a valid passport or ID card when travelling.
Passengers travelling outside the EU must go through border and passport controls\textsuperscript{26}.

The methods adopted for this study were semi-structured interviews and fieldwork observations at Stockholm Arlanda airport in Sweden, a Tallink Silja Line ferry between Stockholm and Riga, Latvia, and a Tallink Silja Line ferry between Stockholm and Tallinn, Estonia. The choice to use interviews and observations was based on the research question’s focus on the personal opinions and experiences of the passengers. An advantage of doing long-term fieldwork among the people being studied is that trust can be built and interviewees can tell researchers about their experiences in a more open and honest way than they might in a structured interview. For the present study, extensive fieldwork and close, repeat interactions with passengers was not a viable option or appropriate for the purpose of the study. However, personal interactions with the people being studied gives the opportunity to look closely at what the members say, do, and how they create meaning (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995, 134).

For the present study, 100 ferry passengers and 100 airport passengers were interviewed. Ferry passengers were interviewed on five occasions during two different journeys with two different Tallink Silja Line ferries between Stockholm and Riga and Stockholm and Tallinn in 2014 and 2015. Airport passengers were interviewed on five occasions at Arlanda airport in Stockholm, Sweden. Each interview lasted approximately 5 to 15 minutes, and all interviewees were randomly chosen. Passengers were only asked to participate if they did not appear to be very busy or, for example, eating, reading, or engaging in conversation with companions. At Arlanda airport, passengers waiting for connecting flights or who seemed unoccupied in waiting areas were asked to participate. At the Tallink Silja Line ferries, passengers were more prone to be engaging in activities, such as visiting restaurants or nightclubs, shopping, or having drinks at some of the available bars or pubs. Therefore, ferry passengers walking on deck or waiting for friends or family at various meetings points were asked to participate. The respondents varied in age and nationality. For the present study, we did not interview children or people under the age of 18 years;

\textsuperscript{26} https://www.swedavia.com/arlanda/before-the-trip/security-check/
when in doubt about a person’s age we did not conduct the interview. The interviews were conducted in Swedish or English. The researchers constructed a list of questions regarding safety and freedom of movement in the Baltic Sea area. An interview guide was designed in which different topics that the interviewer wanted to address during the interview were noted. The questions were designed to be appropriate when interviewing airport travellers and ferry passengers and encouraged the interviewees to articulate their answer rather than answering “yes” or “no”. The interviews were initiated by a short introduction to the study and the researcher asking permission to interview the selected passenger. A dictation microphone was not used during any interviews. Instead, the researchers took notes and subsequently noted important impressions from the interview and from the answers provided. The researchers also noted what language the interviewee spoke and if he or she revealed or indicated their nationality.

A list of similar interview questions was used at Arlanda airport and the Tallink Silja line ferries. The questions were slightly modified to fit the different security checks at the airport and ferry terminals. The interview questions were:

1. Is this a business trip, leisure trip, or are you visiting friends or family?
2. Have you been asked to show your passport during this trip?
3. If yes, how did you experience this?
4. Have you passed through the security gate during this trip?
5. If yes, how did you experience this?
6. Do you think there should be more security and more control of travelling passengers?
7. Can you describe your experience with freedom of movement?
8. Do you feel safe on this journey?
9. Have you experienced anything suspicious that might interest the authorities?
10. Would you like to add something more to our conversation that you find important?
At Arlanda airport, 18 people who were asked to participate declined for various reasons, such as not having the time, being tired, or needing to rest after a long journey. At the Tallink Silja Line ferries, all 10 passengers who declined to participate in the study expressed language difficulties as the reason for not wanting to participate.
1. Passengers’ Understanding of Risk and Safety

The perception of risk has to be managed case-by-case, and the phenomenon of risk is both actual and socially constructed (Zinn, 2006). Researchers argue that risk is entwined in processes of identity formation and group construction (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2001; Zinn, 2006). Therefore, people’s associations with power, adjustments, and emotions should be considered when making sense of how people manage and understand risk (Zinn, 2006). In this study, there was not an opportunity to collect such contextual or complex data from the passengers, but it is important to bear in mind that risks are not experienced or talked about in a vacuum. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how travellers in the Baltic Sea region describe safety and risk regarding border checks carried out by border authorities at Stockholm Arlanda airport and Tallink Silja Line ferries travelling between Stockholm, Riga, and Tallinn.

According to ferry passengers, the lack of security checks before boarding the ferries is convenient for personal comfort and make travelling quick and easy. On the other hand, some passengers felt uneasy that it is possible for people to travel on the ferries unnoticed by the authorities, and that safety might be compromised because of the lack of security checks. Passengers who requested more control mainly highlighted threats towards society, such as terrorism, criminality, and irregular migration, rather than ferry accidents, encountering violent persons, or thefts. Similarly, Arlanda airport passengers focused on security issues damaging society and did not mention airplane accidents. Airport passengers regard security control as an annoying but necessary part of travelling, and most had positive experiences passing

See Appendix: Tables 1-6.
through security checks and in encounters with airport staff. Ferry and airport passengers shared the view that the risk or threat when travelling in Sweden and other northern European countries is generally low. Many emphasized great trust in Swedish and European authorities regarding safety regulations. Simultaneously, safety measures were considered to be stricter in countries outside of Europe. Passengers frequently compared these with the safety measures in other countries they had visited, such as the United States, Australia, Mexico, and Spain. Passengers explain this by arguing that there must be a greater need for amplified security measures in those areas, whereas others claim that the security procedures at Arlanda airport do not measure up.

Safety According to Arlanda Airport Passengers

All but one of the 100 passengers interviewed at Arlanda airport estimated that they were safe during their travels. Sixty-four of the passengers travelled for pleasure and 35 for business. When asked if they had noticed anything suspicious during their travels, only four people claimed to have seen anything out of the ordinary. In those cases, the travellers had detected unattended luggage or notified airport staff about unattended bags. At Arlanda airport, all passengers travelling out of Europe must show their passports. Schengen travellers do not need to go through passport controls. At Arlanda airport 52 interviewees had shown their passports at the time of the interview and 48 interviewees had not been asked to show their passports. Experienced travellers regarded passport control as routine and 50 interviewees were ambivalent, unsure about the positive or negative aspects of passport controls or did not see any problem with showing their passports. Thirty-five interviewees had a positive experience with passport controls and deemed it a necessary or useful procedure. However, 15 interviewees emphasized the importance of passport controls; some thought it necessary for all travellers to show their passports and regarded a high level of airport security as vital.

At Arlanda airport, security checks of personal belongings and carry-on luggage are mandatory for all travelling passengers. Therefore, all
interviewed passengers experienced this process. Twenty-one of the interviewed passengers found security checks necessary and 16 found them to be exaggerated, but 65 of the interviewed passengers had no opinion about this or saw it as a “necessary problem that you just have to go through”. However, most passengers were positive about the experience and the efficiency of the airport staff. A few passengers raised the issue of balancing security and personal integrity. Two passengers stated that it was necessary to balance the individual’s right to personal integrity with maintaining a high level of security. “Considering the way the world looks today,” one passenger said, “we must have strict controls even if it affects individuals.” Too much surveillance made the passengers feel uneasy, questioning the benefit of it in the long run. An important issue raised by the passengers was how security could be increased without violating personal integrity. “Out of fear I am pro more security,” one passenger stated, “but considering personal integrity I also say no [to more security].”

Sixty-three interviewees at Arlanda airport experienced the level of security checks as sufficient and 13 passengers did not offer a positive or negative answer regarding the level of security. Many of the interviewees were experienced travellers and saw airport security as a necessary part of their travel routine, though several mentioned that it was sometimes “uncomfortable” and “unpleasant”.

Twenty-four interviewees at Arlanda airport wanted more security and safety control. One passenger mentioned that safety was more important than anything else, even more important than personal integrity. Several interviewees discussed security controls in symbolic terms, claiming that it provided them “with the sense of safety”. Others argued that the abolition of passport controls would result in chaos and that it is necessary to know who is travelling. The necessity stems from “threats that get more visible all the time” according to one passenger. Several interviewees talked about ambiguous threats from outside of Europe but rarely specified what these threats are. Others mentioned terrorism, illegal immigration, and cross-border criminality as potential risks.
Previous acts of violence performed by terrorist organizations, such as IS28, or the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States were mentioned or emphasized by eight passengers as evidence of the need for increased security measures. However, a few passengers did not see security checks as sufficient enough for preventing terrorist attacks, as one interviewee stated: “Security checks are not logical since anyone can perform an attack in the underground or anywhere else where there are no security checks.” Passengers identified threats targeting society, such as terrorism and illegal activity, placing risk into a larger societal context. No passengers mentioned the possibility of personal accidents when asked about safety or risk in the context of travelling, though some might connect accidents as a result of terrorism.29

Furthermore, five passengers stated that they felt uneasy about the increased use of technology and machines at airports. These passengers placed less trust in technological safety equipment than in human security officers. In the passengers’ experience, machines often malfunctioned and there were not enough staff present to assist and guide passengers through security checks. Passengers requested more information about procedures and more explicit signs about what is expected from passengers. Insecurity made the passengers feel uncomfortable and uneasy.

Safety According to Tallink Silja Line Passengers

A vast majority of the ferry passengers interviewed found it convenient and comfortable not to have to go through security checks or passport controls before boarding the ferries. All but two of the 100 ferry passengers felt safe on the ferries. The interviewees who expressed doubt did so because they

28 IS (a group referred to as the Islamic State) seized territory in Syria and Iraq in 2014 and is notorious for its brutal actions (including mass killings, abductions and beheadings). IS seeks to to defend the Muslim community against infidels and apostates. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144

“did not know who was travelling on the ferries” and had sometimes encountered “strange people” on the ferries. However, even passengers who felt safe often expressed opinions regarding safety and “the risk of not knowing who is travelling”. Even though passengers felt safe, some confessed that they might feel “even safer” if they knew that the authorities had more knowledge about the passengers who were travelling. No ferry passengers mentioned any objections regarding checking in individually at self-check-in counters or passing through an automated ticket barrier when entering the ferries.

Only two interviewees had seen anything suspicious during their journey on the ferries, such as people acting strangely or people exchanging a sum of cash. Eight passengers wanted more security at the ferries, whereas 88 passengers regarded security as sufficient. Four passengers did not provide any definite answer. Similar to the Arlanda airport interviewees, the potential risks mentioned by ferry passengers were cross-border criminality and illegal immigration; however, terrorism was not explicitly mentioned as a threat. Seventeen passengers indicated threats or risks but did not specify what kind of risks frightened them. One passenger mentioned that she “did not know who her neighbours were” and that anything could happen if there is no control. Five passengers had heard that many criminals travelled across European borders. The interviewees did not mention ferry accidents as a potential risk.

Comparing Nations and Security

When asked about safety procedures, a total of 31 passengers at Arlanda airport and the Tallink Silja Line ferries compared security measures in Sweden to those in their home countries or places they had previously or recently visited. Arlanda airport and Tallink Silja Line passengers wanting more security saw safety measures in Sweden as insecure and inadequate. One passenger claimed that staff working at Oslo airport in Norway claimed that staff working at Oslo airport in Norway

regarded Arlanda as an unsecure airport and that passengers travelling from Arlanda to Oslo had to be checked again more thoroughly. Other passengers claimed that there was much better security in Russia, Australia, and Mexico because of harsher procedures and stricter control of luggage as well as passengers.

Passengers maintaining a negative view regarding security checks and passport controls saw the security measures in Sweden and Scandinavia as relaxed and non-threatening. Security checks in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Australia, Afghanistan, Mexico, Spain, and countries in Africa and Asia in general were mentioned as being harsh and uncomfortable for travellers. Interviewees who mentioned these nations saw their security measures as violations towards passengers and argued that the “fear” of terrorists and attacks in these countries justify the strict security measures. However, several passengers explained that they did not see security measures and strict control as a guarantee of safety: “people will commit terrorist attacks or commit crimes despite the controls,” one Arlanda airport passenger said. Passengers argued that there was “less risk involved when travelling in Europe” than when travelling outside of Europe. Another aspect of these findings is passengers’ alleged trust in Swedish or Northern European authorities. Nineteen passengers at Arlanda airport and the Tallink Silja Line ferries explicitly mentioned that they felt safe in Sweden and neighbouring countries. Sweden and other countries around the Baltic Sea area were generally regarded as safe, and passengers did not experience any uneasiness or fear while travelling. As mentioned by Zinn (2006, p. 22), uncertainty of the future is used to create opportunities for action, but strategies that do not lead to definite solutions may cause uncertainty instead. Passengers echoed this argument, claiming that they felt safer traveling in the northern parts of Europe than in the previously mentioned countries with intensified security measures. Thus, increased action regarding security measures may cause insecurity and vagueness instead of an increased feeling of trust and safety according to passengers.
2. Freedom of Movement: Passenger Perspectives

When asked about their opinions regarding freedom of movement, 17 ferry passengers and 15 airport passengers mentioned the risk of “external threats” or “the wrong people” entering the EU or their home countries because of the freedom of movement. Classifying people and creating stereotypes implies a bureaucratic management of identity (Herzfeld, 1993, p. 3). The classic sociologist Max Weber (1964) suggested that bureaucracy is the outcome of modernity and as a rational system it is the most effective way of organizing. Nation states must establish a set of national categories in order to define who belongs and who does not belong, who is inside and who is outside. Similarly, interviewees at both Arlanda airport and at the Tallink Silja Line ferries expressed concerns that unwanted persons could travel freely because of the freedom of movement. Thus, passport controls are seen as tools for detecting those who do not belong and are considered to pose threats to the EU. However, none of the passengers mentioned the intensified control at EU external borders as a possible solution to this threat. In their opinion, even people included in the EU may pose a threat to their countries if they have a criminal background or illegal reasons for travelling. Four airport passengers and five ferry passengers identified travelling criminals or cross-border crime as potential threats to their home countries. Only two airport passengers mentioned irregular migration as a risk factor and potential harmful threat. A few interviewees mentioned the

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31 See Appendix: Tables 7-8.
potential risk of the creation of a “fortress Europe”\textsuperscript{32} excluding some people from travelling to the EU.

Drawing on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966), Michael Herzfeld (1993), who is also an anthropologist, claimed that the production of bureaucratic indifference is based on the notion that outsiders who are ambiguous and “matter out of place” must either be incorporated into or rejected from the system. Citizenship is a classificatory device, and the creation of the European identity entails both inclusion and exclusion of the other (Shore, 2000, pp. 63, 71). In Chris Shore’s (2000, p. 206) argument, the European identity is carefully designed around ideas of a shared European culture and a progressive future. Passengers were generally positive regarding the freedom of movement concerning neighbouring countries. Swedish passengers mentioned that it seemed to work fine in Sweden and with the neighbouring Nordic countries but were doubtful that it should include additional countries, European or otherwise. In passengers’ perspectives, the risk was increased further away from their home countries, especially outside of Europe.

Concepts such as self, neighbours, family, and kinship are powerful symbols used to include and exclude people and to establish who belongs and who does not belong (Douglas, 1970; Herzfeld, 1993, p. 11). Symbolic concepts such as family and kinship have played roles in the creation of the EU according to Shore (2000, pp. 24, 54-55), who sees the emphasis on culture in EU politics as proof that culture in this case is inseparable from the questions of power. Nevertheless, 66 airport passengers and 63 ferry passengers\textsuperscript{33} had a positive attitude towards the freedom of movement. Passengers who were positive about the freedom of movement mentioned security in, for example, the United States as a “nightmare” and “too much”. A majority of passengers were positive regarding the freedom of movement because it facilitates travel in the EU for EU nationals. A few people also emphasized that the freedom implies responsibility. “It is important that everyone cherishes this freedom and take responsibility for it,” one passenger claimed. Several European passengers acknowledged that freedom

\textsuperscript{32} Chris Shore discusses the concept of “Fortress Europe” in Building Europe: the Cultural Politics of European Integration, 2000, pp. 79-80.

\textsuperscript{33} Sixteen of the 100 ferry passengers interviewed and 27 of the airport passengers interviewed had no opinion or did not provide a positive or negative answer regarding freedom of movement.
of movement is a privilege for those who can enjoy it. Otherwise, few passengers mentioned injustice or fortification of Europe regarding the freedom of movement.

A number of passengers who generally expressed a positive attitude regarding the freedom of movement also added comments about the complexity of the system. They stated several benefits of EU members living, working, and travelling freely in Europe, but also highlighted security issues as a cost. Twenty-one ferry passengers and seven airport passengers saw the freedom as a problem or a potential threat. Both airport and ferry passengers opposed to the freedom of movement claimed that political instability and “the current situation in the world”, as one ferry passenger explained it, could disturb the freedom of movement, making it a potential threat. One passenger at Arlanda airport highlighted the necessity of sacrificing personal integrity for security reasons. Another interviewee argued that dishonest people could exploit the freedom of movement and engage in cross-border criminality. Several Tallink Silja Line passengers mentioned increased cross-border criminality as a potential outcome of the freedom of movement. The lack of security checks concerned passengers, claiming that “everyone and everything can come in without anyone knowing about it.” An interviewee at the Tallink Silja Line ferry to Riga described that “it might not be comfortable for some people to have control and check passports.”

Common issues described by airport and ferry passengers were uncertainty regarding EU and Schengen border crossing and security checks. In sociological research, risk is often associated with uncertainty (Zinn, 2006), and a lack of knowledge regarding border regulations, laws, and the rights that passengers enjoy cause insecurity and confusion for travellers. During interviews with passengers, it was clear that few had extensive knowledge about freedom of movement or the rights they have as EU citizens. Although information about security checks, passport regulations, and the freedom of movement can be obtained online, many passengers were unsure about what the freedom of movement actually means. Several passengers denied its existence because they always brought their passports while travelling and were often asked to show them. Thirteen of the 100 ferry passengers interviewed had been asked to show their passport at the ferry terminals in Stockholm, Riga, or Tallinn or at the ferries. Eighty-seven
passengers had not been asked to show their passports, but some had been asked to show their tickets. A majority of those who had been asked to show their passport did not find this annoying because they saw it as a common practice associated with travel.

Three ferry passengers who were selected to show their passport expressed confusion as to why they had been chosen and felt that they were being targeted. Not knowing the reason for this made them uneasy and to wonder if they looked suspicious. Passengers did not seem to have knowledge regarding exception rules for passport checks at border areas in EU territory. The seemingly random control of passports was confusing according to interviewees, and some requested more systematic procedures instead of ad-hoc controls. Passengers wanted to know when they might be asked to show their passport. Some believed that either everyone or no one should be asked to show their passport. However, the EU and Schengen agreement regarding the freedom of movement does not support systematic passport controls. On the other hand, Arlanda airport passengers were more positive or indifferent regarding passport controls. In general, passengers did not appear to be well informed about the rules and regulations regarding the freedom of movement and would benefit from more information.
Conclusion

Within the framework of the EU collaborative Project Turnstone, the purpose of this report is to analyse and describe airport and ferry passengers’ experiences, interpretations, and definitions of safety, risk, and the freedom of movement in the northern part of the Baltic Sea region. Based on empirically, and partly qualitatively, gathered material, including field observations and interviews with Arlanda airport and Tallink Silja Line ferry passengers, we have described 1) how travellers in the region describe safety and risk connected to the freedom of movement, and 2) how passengers describe the freedom of movement in connection with border checks carried out by the border police agencies.

A vast majority of all interviewed passengers (197 out of 200 interviewees) claimed that they felt safe during their travels. Only two ferry passengers interviewed had seen anything suspicious during their journey, mostly people acting in a strange manner. Ten ferry passengers wanted more security at the ferries, whereas 90 passengers regarded security as sufficient. Despite the high level of security experienced by passengers, many added comments about feeling safer if there was more control, especially on the ferries. Potential risks mentioned by ferry passengers were cross-border criminality and illegal immigration. Ferry passengers did not explicitly mention terrorism as a potential threat. An important issue raised by Arlanda airport passengers is the balance between passengers’ personal integrity and maintaining a high level of safety. The reason for maintaining a high level of security, according to the passengers, is because of threats from outside of Europe. Some passengers had trouble categorizing these ambiguous threats, whereas others mentioned terrorism, illegal immigration, and cross-border criminality as potential risks. A few passengers did not see security checks as sufficient enough for preventing
terrorist attacks and generally identified threats targeting society, such as terrorism and illegal activity, placing risk into a larger social context.

A majority of passengers were positive regarding freedom of movement because it facilitates travel in the EU for EU nationals. Sixty-six airport passengers and 63 ferry passengers saw it as a great benefit, facilitating travel and socioeconomic relations between the European countries. Several passengers emphasized that freedom of movement comes with responsibility and saw the opportunity to live, work, and travel freely in Europe as a privilege. However, interviewees also mentioned the lack of security and the risk of terrorism or travelling criminals taking advantage of open internal borders. Twenty-one ferry passengers and seven airport passengers saw the freedom as a problem or a potential threat, enabling people who “do not belong” to travel more easily. Passengers use classificatory devices (Douglas, 1966) to distinguish between those who belong (European citizens) from the outsiders who do not belong and who may be threats to Europe. Sweden and the other Northern European countries are considered safe compared to the rest of Europe and nations outside of Europe. Thus, a European identity, or a sense of inclusion, seems to be inscribed in passengers’ consciousness. Passenger discussions of risk and safety imitate the social and political consciousness in the twenty-first century (Denney, 2005, pp 1-7) and is influenced by previous events, such as terrorist attacks, news regarding irregular migration to Europe, and cross-border criminality. Passengers focus on political, criminal, or ambiguous threats, ignoring accidents or malfunctions for reasons other than terrorism.

Despite the risks mentioned, a majority of interviewed ferry passengers found it convenient not to have to go through security checks, and only three interviewees wanted more ferry security. All passengers interviewed at Arlanda airport had passed through the security check, and many airport travellers generally regarded passport control as an everyday routine. Sixty-three interviewees at Arlanda airport experienced security checks as sufficient, 24 wanted more security, and 13 had no opinion or did not offer a positive or negative answer regarding the level of security. Several passengers had positive experiences with the effectiveness of airport staff. Five passengers mentioned an uneasiness about the increased use of technology and their trust in technological safety equipment at airports being less than their trust in human security officers.
Despite generally positive attitudes regarding freedom of movement, several passengers highlighted the ambiguity and inconsistency of passport regulations. Risk is characterized by an uncertainty regarding outcome, which is in itself a product of existing knowledge and new information (Zinn, 2006). Uncertainty about procedures and rules caused insecurity among travellers. Passengers requested more information about procedures and more explicit signs about what is expected from passengers at border crossings. In addition, few passengers had extensive knowledge regarding the freedom of movement and the different rules and regulations applied by the EU. As one of the objectives of Project Turnstone is to increase public experience with security without compromising the freedom of movement and efficient measures against cross-border criminals, passengers’ construction and understanding of safety requires further study.
Appendix: Tables 1-8

Tables 1 and 2: Passport Controls

**Table 1: Passengers who were asked to show their passports at Tallink Silja Line ferries**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Had shown passport</th>
<th>Had not shown passport</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
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**Table 2: Passengers who were asked to show their passports at Arlanda airport**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Had shown passport</th>
<th>Had not shown passport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53
Tables 3 and 4:
Levels of Security

Table 3: Satisfaction with security measures at Tallink Silja Line ferries

- Sufficient: 88
- Insufficient: 4
- No Opinion/Ambivalent Answer: 4

Table 4: Satisfaction with security measures at Arlanda airport

- Sufficient: 63
- Insufficient: 24
- No Opinion/Ambivalent Answer: 13
Tables 5 and 6:
Threats or Risks Identified by Passengers

Table 5: Threats/risks identified by Tallink Silja Line ferry passengers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminals/smuggling</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecific threats</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threats</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Threats/risks identified by Arlanda airport passengers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminals/smuggling</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecific threats</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No threats mentioned</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 7 and 8: Passenger Opinions on Freedom of Movement

### Table 7: Ferry passengers' opinions on freedom of movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion/Ambivalent Answer</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8: Airport passengers' opinions on freedom of movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion/Ambivalent Answer</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Internet Sources


Project Turnstone is a collaborative project partly funded by the European Commission. The purpose of the project is to improve day-to-day cooperation between border officers in the Baltic Sea region, decrease trans-boundary criminality, and increase security for passengers in the Baltic Sea area without compromising freedom of movement. Freedom of movement aims at providing mobility rights within the EU and Schengen area for its citizens, as well as facilitating travel and border crossing. Within the framework of Project Turnstone, the purpose of this study is to map and analyse how travellers experience, interpret, and define freedom of movement in the northern part of the Baltic Sea region.

The findings of this study from field interviews and fieldwork observations at an airport and two ferries show that passengers are positive regarding the idea of freedom of movement in Europe though they also describe it as a potential risk for society, thereby placing risk in a larger societal context. Almost all passengers claimed that they felt safe during their travels. The respondents in this study construct safety by distinguishing themselves from others outside of Europe. Passengers emphasize that freedom of movement is positive because it is easier for EU citizens to travel in Europe, but at the same time it is regarded as facilitating the entry of potential threats into the EU.