Women and Corruption

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Abstract

In this paper, two assumptions about corruption levels are examined, theoretically explained and empirically tested for. The first assumption is that a higher percentage of women in the lower house in countries would decrease the level of corruption in a country. The meaning of “lower house” is in example the parliament and ministries, depending on how the country’s government looks like. If the country is governed with a parliamentary system, the lower house represent the parliament in itself and the ministry’s that comes with it and if the country is governed with a presidential system the lower house is seen as the second chamber and the institutions that goes with the chamber. The second assumption is that a country who is governed democratically would also have lower corruption levels. These assumptions are explained by studies and theories from de Beauvoir (1973), Harris and Jenkins (2006), Rudebeck (2013), and Holmberg and Rothstein (2010) amongst others. To examine the outcome, a cross-sectional dataset from the Quality of Government Institute is used and the results are shown in three models. The results show that if tested for nothing else than the percentage of women in the lower house and democracy levels, they both have a positive impact on corruption levels in countries, in other words reduce predicted corruption levels, but with a low variance explained in the dependent variable. When checked for other factors, such as an anti-corruption laws, the effects of women in lower houses becomes insignificant and democracy goes from giving a positive impact to giving a negative impact. This is probably because the anti-corruption laws becomes an intermediate variable and thus take most of the effect from the other two variables.

Key words

Corruption, Women, Democracy, Anti-corruption Laws.
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Introduction

The path towards easily earned money, favours or just some help with getting in example a company started or on-going is usually easier if one has connections. Especially if one has powerful connections. But there is a distinct line between getting help within the range of the law or not. Dishonest or illegal acts/behaviours is one of the definitions of corruption. Corruption is found everywhere and nowhere, amongst small, middle or big companies, governments, organizations, police force or justice/legal systems amongst others, the list can be made very long. Recently even the organization leader of FIFA was accused of being a part of a corrupted bribe scandal. But to limit this paper, I will focus on how the corruption perception index amongst 103 countries will vary due to influence of the percentage of women in the lower house, democracy and anti-corruption laws.

A general thought of how corruption mechanisms, in lower houses for example, is that corrupt companies or other actors will pay well-dressed officials money in white envelopes so that the corrupt companies or suchlike can keep on with their illegal or dishonest manners. Another assumption is that corruption is more common amongst less developed countries that are not govern democratically. If this is due to that corruption stagnates the development of the country or that the country is corrupted due to the slow development, one cannot conclude with complete certainty. But the matter will be further explained in the theoretical framework. This description might be an exaggeration of course, but is there any truth to these assumptions?

In this paper, the focus will lie on a couple of assumptions. The first assumption is that men are being one of the key actors to why we have corruption. Is it as such, or is it due to some other factors? Is the assumed link between men and corruption such a bad match with the real outcome and can corruption be explained by the fact that there are overall less woman positioned in the parliament in countries? Or is it due to that a country is not governed democratically? The purpose of this paper is therefore to try to prove or bust these
assumptions and give a theoretical explanation and empirics to support to why the outcome is as such.

The questions of interest for this paper are thus: Is there any truth to the thought of a lower predicted corruption level due to a higher amount of women in the lower house in a country? And, are countries who are governed democratically less corrupted or is corruption due to some other factor such as anti-corruption laws?

To examine and deal with these questions of interests I will use data samples from the QoG,¹ more specifically the “QoG Basic Dataset 2015” that holds datasets in both cross-section and time series.

The theoretical framework for this paper will consist of work from Simone de Beauvoir (1973)², Harris and Jenkins (2006) and a theoretical debate between Rudebeck (2013), and Holmberg and Rothstein (2010). Simone de Beauvoir is a famous philosopher, and feminist. For this paper Beauvoir’s theory of how the women are influenced by the society they live in will be examined. From Harris and Jenkins I will use their theories and studies which verifies that men in general are more risk-loving than women. Lastly a heated debate between the two professors will be examined. The two professors represent the two sides in a long debate that is still ongoing on weather democracy is the best way to solve growth, welfare and corruption in a country. The reason to why this thesis has not picked any side in the debate is because I believe that they both have valid points and I want the empirics to speak for itself so that You, the person who reads this, can decide for yourself.

The method that will be used in this paper to analyse the dataset is a quantitative classic linear OLS regression model and the program used for the regressions are SPSS.³ The results will thereafter be displayed in different models complemented with a description.

¹ The Quality of Government institute (QoG) is an institute that samples data from hundreds of countries to monitor the quality of the governments and countries.
² First edition of the book was given out in 1949 in France.
³ SPSS is a shortage of: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences and is a software that handles datasets.
The outline will thus be as following: In the first part the relevant theories and concepts for this paper will be examined and explained. The second part is where the method used will be presented. In the third part the results will be presented and in the following chapter examined and analysed. The forth part will debate to why I obtained these results and why they are as such. In this part I will also try to answer my questions of interest. This part will also contain a critical view for the paper and suggestions for further research. Lastly the paper end with a list of references.
Background

To better understand how corruption affects and harms a country/society, I will present a short walkthrough of the definitions of human rights, definition of democracy, and a definition with some examples of how corruption manifests and the mentality behind why one would take the corrupted path.

Human rights

The United Nations has stated basic rights for all human beings. The rights are equally entitled to all human beings without any discrimination or exclusion and are preserved by laws, general principles, customary international law, and other obligations (UN, 1948).

The principle of universal human rights was emphasized first in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and has been stated and updated several times since then. The human rights shall be followed and protected in all countries, regardless of economic situation, political beliefs, religious beliefs or cultural systems.

Some of the basic human rights are the following: We are all free and equal, We all have the same right to use the law, Fair treatment by fair courts, No unfair detention, Freedom of thought/speech, Right to democracy, Workers’ rights, The right to education, and Our responsibilities (Melody, 2009).

All of these laws are stated to ensure that humans treat other human beings fairly, equally and with a high moral. So for one to cheat one’s way into a certain position, put an opposition member in prison for not agreeing with the government’s politics or suchlike corrupt behavioural/actions, is in a way, breaking some of the basic human rights.
Democracy

Democracy, as you probably already know, is a way of governing a country. It was first practiced in ancient Greece and is now recognized as the governing structure of the people and by the people. For a country to be categorized as a democratic country it has to fulfil certain criteria such as: A political system where the government shall be chosen by fair elections, The citizens in the country shall actively participate in politics and civic life, The human rights shall be protected for all citizens and The rule of law applies to all citizens equally (Hilla University, 2004).

Democracy is thus a part of, and imbedded with, the human rights which also makes democracy a kind of counter-mechanism to combat corruption, as well as the human rights does.

Corruption

To define something that is everywhere (and nowhere) is a challenge but also to some extent necessary. Corruption is, depending on the context, not always the same and corruption in itself is, just like other human behaviour, complex. But the actions taken by corrupt actors are usually quite similar, even given different context.

Typical forms of corrupt actions are bribes, yielding to undue influence, accepting and giving favours, fold from intimidation by superior figure and suchlike (Ihekwe, 2000).

Corruption, as an act, is when one is acting for ones’ own good outside the range of the law. Instead of being a solitary, moral being, one chooses oneself in front of any significant other to serve the own cause, using all methods needed, even if they are illegal. This lack of moral and increased egoism is unfortunately not something that is easily erased or dealt with, since it is a rooted human behaviour and more so in some humans than others. Some argue that it is more likely that a man acts corruptly than a woman, due to the norms that binds her, forcing her to be tender, motherly, loyal and moral (Lander, 2003). Maybe, this thought of norms that supposedly affect woman to a greater extent than men, is why the assumption saying that men are more involved in corrupt actions than women, are as widely spread as it is. There are of course always exceptions and nothing is painted in black or white. Just because there are
norms it does not mean that all follow or feel shouldered by them. There will always be a spread range of how the outcome is divided and it is important to keep in mind that the stated results always are the mean of the outcome.

Corruption is one of the key ingredients to why countries and markets get stagnated. In order for a country to evolve and develop, a fair market with trustworthy actors has to exist, otherwise new investors will be scared off to other markets and countries where the investors see a greater chance of succeeding. In other words, there will probably be more corruption if there is a market that doesn’t function under a strict business law, thus, where savage capitalists can run freely (Ihekweme, 2000). A good (/bad) example where corruption has played its part and investors has fled the market is Nigeria. The US ambassador Carrington in Nigeria stated in the newspaper The Guardian (1993) that:

“One of the problems is that investors are worried about being able to invest in Nigeria. They are worried because of corruption; they are worried because of so many as 419 (a notorious means of dupping) scams, so they do not know who is legitimate and who is not legitimate; and there is a very psychological problem that you have in this country”.
Theoretical framework

The highly moral women

To quote one famous philosopher: “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (de Beauvoir, 1973). This was already stated by de Beauvoir in 1949 and till this day, Beauvoir’s words stand, and has been quoted and modernized by other famous and respected sociologist and feminists such as Wittig and Butler (Butler, 1985).

According to de Beauvoir the human is born without any norms, expectations or regulations shouldered on her. De Beauvoir states that one is not born anything but rather created by the society, the family and the expectations of whom. This means that a person’s personality is the product of her own choices and the recourses available from and in the society (de Beauvoir, 1973). In de Beauvoir’s most well-known work “The second sex” she explores and studies the transactions of the female body and the thoughts of the female and by the society throughout the course of time. She finds that women go through different stages of ones perception on the view of herself and that society views the female body in both positive and negative aspects and females to be both unrestricted and oppressed. Women can both use their bodies as implements to obtain freedom and feel oppressed from their bodies. But the end result of how one views oneself boils down to the power of one’s mind, does one see oneself as a free individual or as an object of society?

By following de Beauvoir’s train of thought, an individual is partly a product of the society one lives in. That would also mean that in a society where women are more controlled by for example culture, religion or other norms or laws, her freedom of choice would be less recognised and her personality would, to a larger extent, be formed by the society she lived in rather than her own choice. This, would be because she would be limited to certain choices given by the society she lives in and she could therefore not recognize her own choice to the same extent as a woman living in a freer society, given that the woman stays within the controlling society.
So, if a woman was brought up in a controlling society where women are *supposed* to be the stereotypical gentle, motherly, loyal and moral being, as Landers (2003) suggests, these women will probably be more gentle, motherly, loyal and more moral due to the norms that was shouldered on them by the society. Suppose now that these women, with this kind of personality, were to take place in the lower houses. The probability that these women would take bribes or do other corrupted actions is contradicting since one needs a more immoral, forceful and a risk-loving personality in order to be involved with corrupt actions. Because corrupt actions are carried out by actors who can stretch their morality and cross a few lines in order to get what one pleases. The probability that these women instead would try to increase the laws that limits the possibility for one to act in a corrupt manner on the other hand, is high, because these women probably would try to stop behaviour what they believed to be wrong, if they had a chance and an option. But here is where this argumentation gets tough and hard to prove. Women in more controlled societies rarely ever get to set their feet in a lower houses and therefore giving no empirical evidence to this argumentation. Contrary to this, a freer society where woman has less expectations of being tenderer, motherly loyal and moral beings, women would not be as controlled to have a morally high personality and therefore be more able to act in a more corrupted way. This would mean that some women, from certain cultures might actually be less susceptible to act corruptly than women in freer cultures, but since the women from the more controlling societies rarely get a chance to participate in the lower houses, the assumed positive effect of these women is therefore, probably, lost. But depending on the norms shouldered on women in freer societies, the effect might still give a positive outcome.

**Men and risks**

There are numerous studies that all show the same results when examining the risk taking behaviour of women and men: men take more and riskier risks than women. Men take greater risks than woman in most matters, but men do not only take greater risks, they also believe that their risk will pay off more often (Harris and Jenkins, 2006). A study, made by Harris and Jenkins, examines 657 individuals and their assessed probability of engaging in several risky activities in four different spheres such as: gambling-, health-, recreation- and social-spheres. The individuals were to assess the following: (1) “Probability of negative outcome”, (2) “Severity of potential negative outcomes” and (3) “enjoyment expected from the risky activities”.

Their study found that women more often predicted a negative outcome from the risks than men did and that women believed that it would be less satisfying than men believed it to be to take the risks in the first three spheres. But in the fourth sphere, taking social risks, there seemed to be no difference between the different genders. Women seem, according to this study, to be more optimistic than men to engage in risk-averse activities, for example activities with a high predicted payoff and low fixed costs.

In order to make corrupt actions one needs to be egoistic and able to stretch ones moral guidelines, we know that now. But one must also be daring to take risks, have confidence in ones actions and follow through. That means that one needs to be either risk-neutral or risk-loving. A person who is risk-averse would probably never dare to cheat society or other significant others for one’s own cause. So, knowing that men are more willing to take risks and have a higher confidence whilst doing so, they would, according to theory, be more likely to engage in corrupt actions if the occasion occurred.

Another study called “Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis” (Byrnes, Miller and Schefer, 1999) showed the same results: that men was being more risk-loving than women in almost every category. This study did also measure the difference between genders over time. Their results showed that the differences in gender seemed to decrease over time, making women less risk-averse as they grew older whilst men had almost the same outcome no matter what age. Exactly to why these results were obtained, the authors could not pin down completely, but they believe that women got less self-conscious with higher age and more confident in their ability to make good and giving decisions.

This could mean that the gender of the person in the parliament might not matter as much as first believed, given from the previous presented theory. But instead, one should maybe emphasise the age of the people in the parliaments more than their gender. If the women who make it into the lower house are a little bit older, they might have gotten less risk-averse and more risk-loving and if both genders are risk-neutral or risk-loving in the lower house, they would both be more able to take or give bribes for example or interact in other corrupt actions, making the blame-game a little bit harder to play.
Democracy or no democracy – That is the question

There has been a lively debate since Samuel P. Huntington (1968) published his book on how to deal with growing societies, their way of governing and how to deal with corruption. In the book he looks at undeveloped countries and explains how the transition from an undeveloped to a developed country was to take place. The main thesis in his book was not that the country needs to be govern in a democratic manner, but rather that the country needs to be govern in a “good” way. One of his most famous quote is:

“The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.”

With this statement Huntington claims that the democracy level in a country is not as important as the quality of the authorities and institutes. This means that a country can be democratic but if the institutes within it are of low quality, it does not matter if the democracy is “good”. Same goes for the opposite situation, if a country has no democracy but really authentic, anti-corrup authorities and functioning institutes, the country could achieve a very low corruption level.

This has of course made a lot of professors, politicians and others upset because, as this paper stated in the earlier chapter on background facts, democracy is supposedly to be one of the main counter-mechanisms to combat corruption. I shall enlighten the entire debate, since it is still an ongoing argument and this paper will take both sides into account when regarding and interpreting the results of this paper.

In one of the big newspapers in Sweden, DN, one can follow the heated debate between Professor Lars Rudebeck from Uppsala University and Professor Bo Rothstein from the Quality of Government Institute in Gothenburg. Rothstein (2013) published a debate article in DN where he argues that the welfare of a country, taking into account for the country’s level of democracy and corruption, is not solitarily affected by the level of democracy. His empirical evidence for this statement is from several of his own different publications based on data collected by the Quality of Government Institute. One of the publications he is referring to in the debate article in DN is the study he published together with Holmberg.
(Holmberg and Rothstein, 2010). Why he chose welfare as a controlling outcome is because it explains and indicates the “healthiness” of a country. For example, the more welfare a county can offer its citizens indicates that the country has a good financial record and a fair distribution of means to the public. He stated that the quality of the society’s institutions is crucial for the welfare but the level of democracy is not. Meaning that a country could be govern in a democratic manner for decades or centuries but still have excessive issues with corruption, taking Greece, the “founder” of democracy as an example (Rothstein, 2013). He continues in the debate article to refer to another of his studies (Halleröd, Rothstein and Daoud, 2013) where Rothstein with colleagues measured the causes of children’s deprivation based on data containing more than 2.1 million children in 63 middle- and low income countries. The results showed that the level of democracy in the children’s country had no impact on the welfare of the children. But the results also showed that the quality of the country’s institutions and public administration (lowering corruption levels) had clear positive effects on food, water, healthcare and information, even when taken into account the economic level of the country. Thus proving again his point that democracy is not the single answer to how to deal with corruption. But for Rothstein’s thesis to work, the society must be rather uncorrupted as well, otherwise the legitimism of the politicians will not be valid and the trust between the society and the politicians will not be established and thus leading into a bad spiral with bad governing with high corruption levels. So, for low corruption levels and high welfare levels to be achieved Rothstein believes there are two ways to proceed; either a sustainable democracy or a good management, Rothstein has, of course, more faith in the latter.

Rudebeck (2013) on the other hand is not particularly impressed with Rothstein’s conclusions and think that using the welfare as an index of the “healthiness” of a country is not a valid way to determine the state of the country. He continues his argumentation with a logical reasoning that the people have the power over their common belongings in an organized, institutionalized and constitutionally regulated and to a larger extent equality division, if the country is governed democratically. Corruption ought to decrease due to the democratization of a country, since democracy and corruption are each other’s opposites according to Rudebeck, and also states that an unequal division of the common belongings in one of the definitions of corruption. He continues his reasoning with mentioning that there of course are democracy’s with corruption issues but says that the chance of dealing with those issues ought to be a lot easier in a democracy compared to a country who is not govern in a democratic
manner since it is easier to immerse the democracy in an already democratic country compared to one who is not. Meaning that if a country has a democratic structure, it already has the tools to combat corruption and increase welfare, whilst a country who is not governed in a democratic matter lacks the right tools to deal with the corruption problems.

With these arguments Rudebeck boils the critique down to that Rothstein’s work paper has problems with the usage of the concept of democracy and that the statistics used in the working paper can be read in different ways together with some data issues about the enlargement of some countries compared to others. For example Rudebeck says that Rothstein has not taken into count that China and India are a lot bigger and consists of more than a fifth of the world’s population. These accusations are later shut down by Rothstein who claims that Rudebeck has not read the whole paper. Rudebeck has not brought any own empirical data into the debate yet, but maybe eventually he will.

One cannot deny that the empirical data presented from Rothstein and the conclusions he makes sounds promising. The thought that democracy would hold the tools to help combat corruption ought to have truth to them, but if the tools are not used in an efficient way, there is nothing pointing to that they would work, just because they exist. To say that there is only one way to govern a country successfully might be a too narrow of a perspective. One should rather put value into the quality of how it is governed rather than the way of governing. Concluding that a democracy with high quality in the public administrations would be a rather good foundation for combating correctional issues.
Methods

In this part of the paper the method used in this study will be presented along with the empirical data, variables and restrains.

Datasets

The empirical dataset that this study relies upon comes from the Quality of Government’s Basic Dataset 2015. The data material is a cross-section designed dataset which means that the unit of analysis is based on countries, not years. The cross-section dataset contains data from and around 2010 and contains 193 nations from all over the world. The Quality of Government regularly updated the dataset and it is a positive fact that the dataset is as contemporary as it is, since we want to know what the world looks like now. Some may argue that a lot has happened in the world in the past five years, taken into account the wars in Europe, the Arabic spring and the escalation of the Islamic State. This would of course be interesting to look at, but for this paper, it is a too big of a task.

To compensate if there is not data from that particular year for some variables the QoG have established a mean with the data conducted up to +/- 3 years to get the most accurate outcome. The Quality of Government institute is known for being cautious and only allowing authentic datasets that are collected in first hand or in second hand by institutions that are trustworthy. This makes their dataset highly reliable and should thus give valid and authentic results when analysing.

The reason for why I have chosen this particular dataset is because it holds all the necessary variables in contrast to the time-series dataset the Quality of Government Institute also provides. However, not using the time-series dataset will lead to another problem, which I shall further discuss in the chapter below.
Selection and Restraints

The number of observations varies within the different variables, meaning that all of the countries in the dataset have not got values for all of variables that I’m measuring for, giving internal loss. The total number of observations for this paper is thus 103 nations.

One of the issues with using the cross-sectional dataset is that one cannot determine the causality between the corruption perception level and the percentage of women in the lower house. Is it due to the low corruption level that more women are allowed into the lower houses or is it due to the percentage of women in the lower houses that the corruption level might be lower? The same causality issue comes with all the independent variables. This causality issue might have been averted if one used the time-series dataset. But the problem with the usage of the time-series dataset would have been that the paper must narrow down the number of observations massively and only observe a small fraction of countries over time and look at those countries development, due to the time frame and space for this paper. But using the time-series data would of course give a better comprehension of the countries chosen, but the results would not be as generalizable as the results that the cross-section dataset can offer. And for the sake of this paper, to answer this papers questions of interest, the decision was made that the generalizability of the results are more essential than the insight of just a small fraction of countries, even if it leads to issues of causality.

Variables

A full variable description can be found at the Quality of Government Institutes webpage in their codebook (2015).⁴

The Corruption Perception Index

This variable is formed to focus on corruption in the public sector and describes corruption as the misuse of public instances and money for private gain. To define the variable and to get a feeling of how the misuse of public power for private benefit manifests, the researchers have asked questions on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurements. The corruption perception index measure both administrative and political corruption. The index number

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⁴ A link to their webpage and where you can find the codebook is listed in the reference list.
conducts to perceptions of the degree of corruption seen by business individuals, risk analysts and the general public and the index grades corruption on a scale from 0 to 10. The higher the number, the less corrupted the country is predicted to be and the lower the number, the higher corrupted the country is predicted to be. This variable holds 181 observations (nations).

This variable was selected because it is the most reliable variable that was available for this paper. There is, as stated earlier, hard to find real and precise numbers on how much corruption a country have or do not have. Therefore, one can only use a perception index.

**Percentage of women in the lower house of parliament**

This variable, as its name states, measures the percentage of women in the lower house. The meaning of “lower house” is for example the parliament and ministries, depending on how the country’s government looks like. If the country is governed with a parliamentary system, the lower house represents the parliament in itself and the ministry’s that comes with it and if the country is governed with a presidential system the lower house is seen as the second chamber and the institutes that comes with it. In a presidential system the lower house does not have as much power as the lower house in a parliamentary system. Why this variable was chosen is because most of the decisions in a country are made in this sector. This variable has 189 observations (nations).

This variable is formed continuously. It is important to remember that no country has more than 49% of women in the lower house in the dataset. When interpreting the outcomes given from this variable, the number shows the effect of one more percentage point of women in the lower house. So, if one wants to interpret the mean effect of, for example 10 percentage women in the lower house, the outcome should be multiplied with 10 and so forth for other amounts of percentage one may want to examine.

**Democracy**

This variable is a dummy variable that can only take two values, 1 or 0. 1 means it is a democratically governed country and 0 means it is govern in a non-democratic way. It is used in the dataset mainly to see what the effect of being a democratic country has on the perception of corruption. To fulfil the criteria for being a democratic country the country will only receive a “1” if the country has fair elections, multiple parties are permitted and there are more than one party in the country. These other parties must also be allowed in the lower
house and people must be able to vote for them in the elections hold, without there being
election fraud. This variable has 192 observations (nations).

Anti-corruption policy
This variable measures the effort and the success-rate of the government in a country to
contain corruption with respect to their anti-corruption laws. The scale of the variable goes
from 1 to 10. The variable scale is divided into four sub-divisions which are explained below.
The lower the number on the anti-corruption policy scale the worse the containing of
corruption is in the country and the higher the number on the anti-corruption policy scale the
better the containing of corruption in the country is. This variable includes 127 observations
(nations).

1. 1 to 3 means that the government fails to contain the corruption in the country and
that the mechanism that secures the integrity of the citizens are out of function.
2. 4 to 6 means that the government is only partially willing or/and able to contain the
corruption but some of the mechanism that secures the integrity of the citizens are in
function, even though most are not.
3. 7 to 9 means that the government most of the time can contain the corruption and
that some of the mechanism that secures the integrity of the citizens are in function
but limited in their effectiveness.
4. 10 means that the government is successful in contain the corruption and that the
mechanisms that secure the integrity of the citizens are functioning and effective.

In the models the variable is used as a continuous variable with values going from 1 to 10,
meaning that if one want to examine the mean of a country with, in example a value of 4
(description above), one must multiply the outcome in the model with 4 and so forth.

One step on the anti-corruption scale correspondences to the effect of the variable estimated
in the model on the dependent variable. For instance, a value of .5 indicates that a country
with one scale point higher value on anti-corruption scale have .5 higher value on the
dependent variable.
Results

To answer the papers questions, three models have been run, each containing a new explanatory variable. Each model contains a significance level, p, which is a measure for how statistically significant the outcome is. The p<0.05 means that there is less than a 5% chance of finding an effect of a variable on an outcome when the null hypothesis is true.

All three models also contain a constant (intercept). The constant shall be interpreted as the mean value for all the countries corruption perception index, given all else same (ceteris paribus), meaning that all the explanatory variables in the models (independent variables) are 0. In all the models there is an N, representing the total number of observations in the model and an R². The R² indicates the share of the total variance in the dependent variable which can be explained in the model.

The linear dataset has been checked for homoscedasticity, outliers and multicollinearity. The testing shows that there are some homoscedasticity but not enough to make the results unreliable. Fortunately, there were no outliers in the material due to the internal loss. There are however some multicollinearity in the dataset between the “anti-corruption laws” variable and the dependent variable “corruption perception index”. There is on the other hand nothing to be done about this issue but to acknowledge it and keep in mind whilst reading the results and the discussion chapters.
**Table 1.** OLS analyses of the (Anti) Corruption Perception index. High values on index indicate low level of corruption. Unstandardized b-coefficients and p-values.

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<td>0.064</td>
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<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.785</td>
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**Model 1**

In the first model an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression has been run with the "Corruption perception index" as the dependant variable and the "Percentage of women in the parliament" as the only independent variable.

\[ Y_t = \alpha + B_1 X_{1t} \]

The constant is at 2.831 giving a quite low mean on the corruption perception index indicating a quite high level of corruption, in a country that has no women in the lower house. For a country that has women in the parliament, an additional 0.071 units will be added for every percentage of women in the lower house. This means that a country that has for example 10 percentage of women in the parliament would have a mean of 3.541 on the corruption perception index, indicating quite high corruption levels. If a country have the highest amount of women in the lower house (the highest number accounted for in the dataset) 49 percentages the mean would instead be 6.310 on the corruption perception index, indicating that the country is quite corruptive but 6.310 out of 10 is not that bad.
The results in the first model thus show a positive effect of having more women in the lower house in a country. The variable is statistically significant on a 5% level. The number of observations are 103 and the $R^2$ value is 0.117, meaning that the explained variance in the corruption perception index is at 11.7%. The $R^2$ value is not as high, indicating that there are other factors which might explain the level of corruption better than this variable.

**Model 2**

In the second model the OLS regression has been expanded by the inclusion of the dummy variable “Democracy”.

$$Y_i = a + B_1X_{1i} + B_2X_{2i}$$

The constant is now at 2.107 giving an even lower corruption perception index mean indicating a high level of corruption in a country that has no women in the lower house and is not governed in a democratic way. For a country that has women in the lower house, an additional 0.064 units will be added for every percentage point of women in the lower house, indicating that women has a positive effect on lowering the predicted corruption level if the country is not a democracy. This means that a country that has for example 10 percentage of women in the lower house would have a mean of 2.747 on the corruption perception index, indicating quite high corruption levels. If a country have the highest amount of women in the lower house (the highest number accounted for in the dataset) 49 percentages the mean would instead be 5.243 on the corruption perception index, indicating that the country is a lot less corruptive. The results in the Model 2 still show a positive effect of having more women in the lower house in a country but now we can see a small decrease in the effect of women in the lower house (0.064 < 0.071), due to the added second variable, but it is such a small difference it shall not be further interpreted.

If a country is democratically formed an additional 1.385 units will be added on, giving a mean of 3.482 if the country has no women in the lower house on the corruption perception index. The results show that democracy has a positive effect on the corruption perception index, giving a country lower perception levels of corruption if governed in a democratically.

If the country is democratically governed and has for example 10 percentage of women in the lower house, the mean will thus be 4.132 on the corruption perception index and if the country has the highest amount of women in the lower house (49 percentage) the mean will be 6.628, showing that both women and democracy have a positive impact on the corruption
perception index. A country which is not democratically governed and has no women in the lower house has substantially more corruption compared with a democratically governed country with 49 percent of women in the lower house (2.831 compared with 6.628).\(^5\)

All variables are statistically significant on a 5\% level. The number of observations is 103 and the R\(^2\) value is 0.222, meaning that the explained variance in the corruption perception index variable is at 22.2\%. The R\(^2\) value has gone up a bit from model 1 but is still not that high, indicating that there are still other factors which might explain the levels of corruption better than these variables.

**Model 3**

In the third model the OLS regression model has been expanded with the variable indicating “Anti-corruption laws”.

\[ Y_i = a + B_1X_{1i} + B_2X_{2i} + B_3X_{3i} \]

The constant is now at 0.718 indicating a low corruption perception index mean (in other words a very high corruption level) in a country that has no women in the lower house, is not governed in a democratic way and has no anti-corruption laws. This last variable measures the effort and the success-rate of the government in a country to contain corruption with respect to their anti-corruption laws. The scale of the variable goes from 1 to 10. The lower the number on the anti-corruption policy scale the worse the containing of corruption is in the country and the higher the number on the anti-corruption policy scale the better the containing of corruption in the country is.

In this model, the variable for the share of women in the lower house has become insignificant and shall therefore not be further interpreted in itself. The variable for democracy has become significantly negative (-0.547). Thus, democracies have slightly lower values on the index studied (in other words, higher levels of corruption) when the anti-corruption laws are controlled for. In other words, the anti-corruption laws have a better effect in countries that are not governed democratically.

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\(^5\) This is a comparison of means in two countries where the first one has neither women in the lower house nor is govern democratically and the second one is a country who has 49 percentage of women in the lower house and is govern democratically.
Why these two variables have changed this dramatically is probably because the anti-corruption laws variable acts as an intermediate variable, and now one can see its effect. An interpretation of the results is that democratic countries and countries with high representation of women are characterized by more developed anti-corruption laws. When anti-corruption laws are included into the model the direct effects of female representation and democracy disappears (or turns negative). Thus, it seems to be no direct effect of female representation when we account for anti-corruption laws. The whole effect is mediated by the anti-corruption laws. For the indicator of democracy the situation is more complicated. The anti-corruption laws might be more efficient in a non-democratic environment. However, this interpretation is somewhat speculative and should be further investigated. What we see in the model is that controlling for anti-corruption laws the effect of democracy turns negative.

For each level of anti-corruption laws a country have 0.707 higher value on the dependent variable. This means that the anti-corruption laws have a positive effect on the predicted (anti) corruption levels in the country.

If a country is on the 1st level on the anti-corruption laws scale and is governed in a non-democratic way, that country would have a mean of 1.425, indicating a high predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index. If the country is democratically governed it would have a mean of 0.878 indicating an even higher predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index.

If a country is on the 4th level on the anti-corruption laws scale and is governed in a non-democratic way, that country would have a mean of 3.546, indicating a quite high predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index. If the country is democratically formed it would have a mean of 2.999 indicating an even higher predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index.

If a country is on the 7th level on the anti-corruption laws scale and is governed in a non-democratic way, that country would have a mean of 5.667, indicating a moderately high predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index. If the country is democratically formed it would have a mean of 5.120 indicating a higher predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index.
If a country is on the 10th level on the anti-corruption laws scale and is govern in a non-democratic way, that country would have a mean of 7.788, indicating a quite high predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index. If the country is democratically formed it would have a mean of 7.241 indicating an even higher predicted level of corruption on the corruption perception index.

The anti-corruption variable is statistically significant on at least 5% level. The number of observations is 103 and the $R^2$ value shows 0.785, meaning that the explained variance in the corruption perception index is 78.5%, which is very high compared to the other two models. The $R^2$ value has gone up quite a lot, indicating that there is a high explanation-rate to these variables on the corruption perception index.
Analysis

The purpose of this paper is to analyse arguments and assumptions about which factors that generate high levels of corruption in different countries represented in the Quality of Government Institute’s dataset: Can women representation in the lower houses lower the corruption level and does democracy lower the predicted corruption level. And if not, does the anti-corruption laws offer a more explanatory outcome to the phenomenon?

As seen in the Model 1, women do have a positive effect on the mean predicted corruption level in countries.

The results from Model 1 and 2 indicate that there is truth to the assumption that women make less corrupt actions and combat corruption to a higher degree than men. If it is due to the norms of a society that ‘teaches’ the women to be more tender, motherly, loyal and moral or if it is due to the fact that men takes greater risks than women, we cannot determine by these results. There is probably truth to both the theories and one theory does not necessarily rule out the other, but rather complement the other. This would by theory also mean that Rudebeck’s argumentation that democracy ought to have a positive effect on corruption levels has some truth to it as well. But there seems to be something missing in the equation that could explain the results more accurate.

There is a slight strain with these models, the R² value is not as high, both in the first and second model. These two variables only explain 22.2% of the variance in the dependent variable (the corruption perception index). This means that the percentage of women in the lower house and the level of democracy is not the main reason to why a country might have predicted low corruption levels.

If you proceed to the last model, Model 3, you can see how the variable “percentage of women in the lower house” becomes insignificant when the “anti-corruption laws” comes into the equation. The last variable describing the levels of anti-corruption laws is taking a large
effect from the two other variables and explain the corruption perception index to a much higher level (78.5%, compared with the earlier 22.2%). This is probably because the anti-corruption laws work as an intermediate variable, and the effect that the higher percentage of women in the lower house brings, is mediated through the anti-corruption laws. The anti-corruption laws variable indicate that the higher the effort a country puts into containing and protect the integrity of its citizens, the lower will the predicted corruption level be. One can also see that if the country is democratically governed, the laws will be a little less efficient in combating the predicted corruption level. An interpretation of the results is that democratic countries and countries with high representation of women are characterized by more developed anti-corruption laws. When anti-corruption laws are included into the model the direct effects of female representation and democracy disappears (or turns negative). Thus, it seems to be no direct effect of female representation when we account for anti-corruption laws. The whole effect is mediated by the anti-corruption laws. For the indicator of democracy the situation is more complicated. The anti-corruption laws might be more efficient in a non-democratic environment. However, this interpretation is somewhat speculative and should be further investigated. What we see in the model is that controlling for anti-corruption laws the effect of democracy turns negative.

My conclusion for the obtained results is that anti-corruption laws have the largest positive effect on the corruption perception index, possibly because the anti-corruption laws become an intermediate variable, stealing effect from both the percentage of women in lower houses variable and the democracy variable. The results in Model 3 indicates that Rothstein’s theory on “good”-governing ought to be the most valid one since the results point to that democratic countries with efficient anti-corruption laws do not handle corruption as well as a country who is not democratically governed. That is possibly because the greater part of the democracy variables effect mediates by the anti-corruption laws variable since the negative effect in the third model is less than the positive in the second.
Discussion

Why is it that the percentage of women in the lower house is not more distinctly relevant and why does the level of democracy go from a positive correlation to a negative correlation when looking at corruption perception indexes and taking the anti-corruption laws into account? And why is it that the predicted corruption level is much more influenced by the anti-corruption laws than the other two factors?

As stated in theoretical chapter, women are, to some extent, a product of the society the live in, the socialisation process (de Beauvoir, 1973). In the theoretical chapter, the line of reasoning according to Beauvoir’s theory was that controlling societies that shoulders women with norms of being the motherly, loyal and moral beings, the women would, according to theory, be less susceptible of corrupted actions. If one were to flip this theory 180° and look at the women in the more open societies, we should have somewhat opposite results. Women who are brought up in societies that are not controlling but rather free, ought to expand their range of own choices and make more decisions that may suite them better. It would also mean that women, who are brought up in societies where the norm is to act in a corruptive manner, would act accordingly, in other words: more corrupted. And, since the women in the controlling societies not often get a chance to interact in the lower houses, that leaves only the women in the freer societies left to the markets, making theoretically a lesser difference between the genders. But, as seen in the results, women still have a positive effect on lowering corruption levels, indication that even women freer societies are shouldered by stereotypical norms by the society.

Additionally, the study by Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999) that showed that women over time gets less risk-averse would make some sense whilst compared to the results obtained in this study. In most countries it takes some time to get into the lower house, since getting a place in the lower house takes a long career path. Therefore the average age for women in the lower house is higher. That would mean that in the time it takes for someone to get into the lower house, one’s risk-aversion would have had time to decrease, according to the study, making the mentality of women who get into the lower houses, more similar to the other gender, but the effect seems to be limited.
My conclusion on this matter is therefore that women in different countries and cultures are all different. Some cultures appear to produce a more loyal and moral mentality of the women who lives within it, but these women rarely ever set their feet into a parliament and thus never gets the chance of making a change. Other cultures appear to produce more freely minded women who are not affected to the same extent by the same norms as the women in the more closed societies. These freer women, who make it into the lower houses, does on the other hand seem to lose some of their risk-aversion on their way into the lower houses and therefore, no longer bring as much of a positive effect onto the predicted corruption levels as assumed. Even though the women in the lower houses seem to bring some positivity to the results, the outcome of having 1 percentage more women in the lower house is assumed by the anti-corruption laws who seems to be an intermediate variable. This is possibly due to that women have an indirect positive effect on introducing stricter anti-corruption laws in countries.

As for the debate on whether the level of democracy in a country would have a positive effect on the predicted corruption levels or not, the results from this study point to that they do not, if accounted for anti-corruption laws. If accounted for the anti-corruption levels, the results show that a country that is not governed democratically, get more positive effects from the anti-corruption laws than a country who is govern democratically. But to ensure that these are the correct effects one must further examine the interacting effect between democracy and the anti-corruption laws.

The reasoning of Rudebeck (2013) is that the usage of the concept of democracy ought to be that in a democracy, all the common belongings are divided fairly and that the concept of corruption means that the common belongings are not divided fairly amongst the citizens. Theoretically, I agree with Rudebecks reasoning, but the statistics of this study and Rothstein’s study, point to that reality and theory does not always show the same results. The results of this study shows that there seems to be a mediating factor between the democracy variable and the variable for anti-corruption laws.

Rothstein’s (2013) conclusion along with my empirics both show that a country not necessarily needs to be governed in a democratic manner as long as it is governed in a “good” manner. Rothstein’s reasoning does not exclude that democracy might have a positive effect, but he argues that the positive effect comes from the fact that most countries already dealt
with the predicted high corruption levels with anti-corruption laws and show a high quality in their public administrations, before the country was even made into a democratic one. Therefore stating that *that* is the reason why a country has low corruption levels, not the democracy in itself. Rothstein gives an example of Italy where Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, who was convicted for bribe was still re-elected, even though Italy is a democracy (Rothstein, 2013).

My conclusion on this matter is therefore that democracy does not singularly imply a higher quality in the public administrations, but it might give a better chance of managing the public administrations. There are, according to both Rothstein’s and my empirics, not a positive direct connection between lower corruption levels and a higher level of democracy. Instead, an anti-corruption law that are functioning and efficient ought to be the better solution to decrease corruption, as long as it is conducted by non-corrupted officials. But out of moral aspects, I believe that a country should strive for a combination of democracy and well-functioning anti-corruption laws as seen in, for example, Denmark who was according to the Transparency International (2014), the least corrupted country in 2014 with a score of 9.2 on the predicted corruption scale.

**Critique**

A possible critique of this study is about the dataset chosen. The dataset used for this study is a cross-sectional, which means that the unit of analysis is based on countries, not years. If this study would have used a time-series dataset, one could have studied the effects over time in a country, giving a deeper and broader analysis, possibly for causal interpretation of the result as well. The problem with using the time-series dataset, as stated earlier, is that the number of observations would decrease massively due to the limitations by the time-frame and the space-frame of this paper and using the time-series dataset would give less generalizability to the results obtained. Since a higher level of generalizability also usually gives higher credibility to a study. I had to make the contemplation that the credibility and generalizability were more desirable for this study and thus not choose the time-series dataset.

A second critique to this study would be the fact that loyalty is not taken into account in any calculations or theoretical framework. It has been shown that loyalty plays a part in corrupt acts, when such are done, in example for the family, the community or the mafia gang, made
by both men and women. The reason to why this variable is excluded is mainly because of the time-frame for this paper, but also because it is hard to find datasets that measures the loyalty the corrupt actors has to one another.

Relevance

The results from this study should shed light in two different debates, the one revolving around the effect of women’s participating in the lower houses and the level of significance the way of governing a country has on the level of corruption. The results are to a larger extent in line with some of the theories and for some, including myself, a bit surprising. The conclusions are crucial for the way one views the world. To have knowledge and information is key to build a better future world and in order to do so, one must know what mechanisms that control the outcomes, in order to change the outcome. That is why this study and further study’s on this matter are of high relevance if we want to build a better world without corruption.

Further Research

Suggestions for further research could be to examine the effect women have on the makings of anti-corruption laws and how the anti-corruption laws are determined within the different governing structures. For example examining how women in the lower houses can influence in the lower house and help developing anti-corruption laws or a qualitative study on how the anti-corruption laws are approached in the different governing structures.

It would also be interesting to further study the mentality of women in the controlling societies. Enlighten the different norms that are conducted due to cultural, religious or other social factors and how these norms prevent women from taking the equal spot in parliaments and what would happen if they did? Would the assumptions made in this study get empirical evidence or would they not act accordingly?

For other further studies one could analyse the willingness of countries to combat corruption and why some countries does not make a bigger effort. There is a clear connection between a corrupt-free society and a prosperous economy and financial markets, still, many countries chose to play pretend when it comes to battling corruption. To further analyse to why this is,
would also be giving a deeper insight in the mechanism of corruption and therefor the possibility to the change to a better future world.
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Link to the Quality of Government Institutes webpage and codebook:
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogbasicdata