In recent years an often acrimonious East–West debate has arisen on issues of democracy, human rights, good governance, etc. One aim of this series is to augment traditional political studies with more culturally sensitive treatments so that our knowledge of local interpretations of democracy and political legitimacy is improved. Accordingly, welcome additions to the series will be studies of local political structures and political cultures (and their operation within national political processes), new avenues of transnational interaction, and the meeting between what governments interpret as democracy and local cultural and political realities. In so doing, the series will contribute to the discussion about democracy, democratization and democratic alternatives in Asia, and provide a natural meeting place for scholars working in this field.
FROM SUBJECTS TO CITIZENS

Balinese Villagers in the Indonesian Nation-State

LYN PARKER

NIAS Press
To Bi
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It seems to have taken me most of my adult life to write this book. It began with fieldwork in ‘Brassika’ in 1980 when I was a PhD student in the Department of Anthropology at the Australian National University. In 1989 I finished my PhD thesis and celebrated with maternity. In the 1990s I held a Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University. While holding teaching positions in the Department of Humanities, the University of Tasmania and now at Asian Studies, The University of Western Australia, I spent my weekends on the rest of the work. To my many colleagues in these departments and institutions I owe thanks for intellectual stimulation and fellowship. I would particularly like to record my thanks to Helen Greese, for friendship and for sharing her knowledge; to Ian Proudfoot, for encouragement and for setting me a model of rigorous scholarship; to Kalpana Ram and Margaret Jolly for making feminism important; to Lyn and Kerry Groves for their wonderful hospitality to me and my family over many years in Canberra; to Paul Tickell for great company; to Jim Fox for his unfailing support. The community of scholars working on Bali has been supportive over the years. At UWA, Sharyn Graham, a doctoral student, has done a sterling job getting the bibliography into professional shape. In earlier years, the support staff in the Department of Anthropology, ANU, were wonderfully helpful. Thanks to Ann, Margaret and Ria.

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A Note on Names, Pseudonyms and Spelling

In line with anthropological convention, all names of people and local places are pseudonyms, though titles such as caste/status titles have been retained. Many pseudonyms were chosen by informants, who were usually disappointed that their real names were not to be used. The practice is designed to protect informants. Given the sensitivity of some of the information presented, it seemed I had the choice of either presenting information and using pseudonyms or of suppressing information and retaining real names. I chose the former. However, the cost of this is substantial: the ‘history’ presented below loses much of its value to historians who need actual names and places and documentation of primary sources to be able to check and re-use the information. As my interest here in ‘history’ is principally the meaning of narratives of the past to people in the present, I judged that the technical details were less important than the ideas about history. ‘Anthropological ahistoricism’, as one reader described it, was the price I had to pay for the revelation of other, more private information such as the trauma of the 1965 massacres. Primary sources that reveal the site of study have been suppressed, but scholars may apply to the author for specific references.

The spelling of Indonesian words is that which has been used since the spelling reforms of 1972, as in the standard Echols and Shadily dictionaries (John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily, An Indonesian–English Dictionary and An English–Indonesian Dictionary, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989). Most Balinese words are spelled as they appear in the Kamus Bali–Indonesia, compiled by the Panitia Penyusun Kamus Bali-Indonesia (Denpasar: Dinas Pengajaran Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Bali, 1978). Some older alternative spellings are given in that dictionary, and sometimes I use these to imply the weight of classical tradition (e.g. Majapahit rather than Majapaït). More noteworthy is my use of the older spellings of titles such as Tjokorda (modern usage in the dictionary is ‘Cokorda’), which is in line with the spelling used by principal informants such as Tjokorda Gede Agung. My intention is simply to convey the value these people attach to old ways of doing things, even when inefficient and outmoded.

The spellings used in quotations are as in the original written sources.
Glossary of Acronyms and Non-English Terms

Only key terms and those used frequently in the text are listed here. (B) denotes Balinese terms; unmarked terms are Indonesian. Some terms are used in both languages.

ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) Armee of Indonesia

adat (B/I) local customary law, customary practices, institutions and ritual practices

agama religion

ajengan (B) rice; staple food

alus refined, pure (opposed to kasar)

aman safe, secure

anak child

anak balita (anak bawah lima tahun) children under five years of age

awig-awig (B) community rules and regulations (e.g. of banjar, desa adat, dadia)

ayahan (B) service

azas kekeluargaan family basis; ostensibly an indigenous principle in which society operates like a family for the common good rather than for the individual interest

babad (B) dynastic chronicle or family history

bahasa daerah regional language

balé (B) pavilion; open building

balé banjar (B) community hall

Bali Aga/Bali Mula (B) original Balinese

balian (B) local or traditional healer

balian manak (B) traditional village midwife

bangsa nation

banjar (B) hamlet, local unit customary for ritual and/or government purposes

bapak father, mister, sir

bebas free
beras  hulled rice
bersih  clean
Bimas (bimbingan massal) mass guidance (lit.); rice intensification programme
bimbingan guidance
bimbingan dari belakang guidance from behind
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Unity in Diversity (national motto)
BKKBN (Badan Kordinasi Kehargga Berencana Nasional) National Family Planning Coordinating Board
brahmana (B) member of the Brahman group; sometimes called the priestly or first caste
BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia) Indonesian Farmers’ Front
buwana agung (B) great or macro cosmos
buwana alit (B) microcosm of humankind, the human body
budi (B) character and mind as with connotation of good character of soul and mind, achieved through individual effort
bupati district or regional head, below governor and above camat in bureaucracy
buta-kala (B) supernatural creatures of evil and destructive intent and nature
camat subdistrict officer
carik (B) irrigated rice fields
cuntaka (B) impure, dangerous and vulnerable to supernatural attack
dadia (B) descent-group tracing common descent from one ancestor
dalem (B) inside
Departemen Kesehatan Health Department
Depdikbud (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan) Department of Education and Culture
Depkos Department of Social Welfare
desa (B/I) village, especially as lowest administrative unit in Indonesia’s bureaucracy
desa adat (B) customary village; a ritual community
Desa Sukamaju Village of Like-To-Progress
Desa Tertinggal Left-Behind Village (lit.) nominated by government programme as a poor village
dewa (B/I) god
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dewa Agung</td>
<td>Great God (lit.); title of paramount 'king' of Bali; sometimes title of local 'kings'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewi Sri</td>
<td>goddess of rice and fertility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dharma</td>
<td>truth, moral order, good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dinas</td>
<td>official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duweg</td>
<td>clever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EICos</td>
<td>eligible couples as nominated by Family Planning programme: married couples of child-bearing age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emosi</td>
<td>emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feudal</td>
<td>feudal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G30S/PKI</td>
<td>(Gerakan Tiga Puluh September/ Partai Komunis Indonesia) attempted coup of 30th September 1965, allegedly by the Indonesian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBHN</td>
<td>(Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) Broad Outlines of State Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geria</td>
<td>house compound of brahmana family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>work groups (lit.); the government-sanctioned dominant political grouping during the Suharto regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gotong-royong</td>
<td>mutual community help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guru</td>
<td>teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gusti</td>
<td>lord, title of a wesia descent-group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hansip</td>
<td>civil defence corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>herrendienst</td>
<td>unpaid service to the lord in colonial times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollandsch-Inlandsche Scholen</td>
<td>Dutch-Native school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVV</td>
<td>High Yielding Varieties (of rice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>courtesy title for low-caste man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibu</td>
<td>mother, married woman, respected woman (e.g. teacher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ida Bagus</td>
<td>title for brahmana man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indah</td>
<td>beautiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruksi Presiden</td>
<td>Presidential Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intim</td>
<td>intimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ipeda</td>
<td>taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>social science lesson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iri hati</td>
<td>to feel jealous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUD</td>
<td>Intra-Uterine Device; method of contraception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jaba</td>
<td>outside, outsider; often used with wong to connote low-caste person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jero</td>
<td>inside; used with wong to designate high-caste (triswangska) people because they live 'inside' in puri and geria, contrasted to outsiders (wong jaba); title of low-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c socaste woman who has married a high-caste man, or of
respected woman (e.g. a balian)
kabupaten district (below province and above sub-district in
government hierarchy)
kakawin (B) epic poem
Kanda Mpat (B) the ‘four siblings’ that accompany each human baby at
birth, i.e. the amniotic fluid, the blood of childbirth,
the umbilical cord or the vernix caseosa and the
placenta
kasar coarse, crude, rough (opposed to alus)
kaula (B) servant, slave, subordinate, subject; frequent in
compound kaula-gusti to identify a servant-master or
subject–lord relationship
KB (Keluarga Berencana) Family Planning
kecamatan subdistrict office
kepala desa village head
kepala keluarga (KK) family/household head
keluarga family
kemajuan progress
klian (B) elder, official (e.g. of banjar, subak)
kolot conservative, old-fashioned
kota city, town
kotor dirty
kris dagger considered to have magical power
KUD Koperasi Unit Desa Village Unit Cooperative
laba pura (B) land designated as belonging to a temple for the
support of that temple and its priest
léak (B) witches, witch deities, evil spirits, sorcerers
LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) Council for Village
Security
lomba desa village competition
lontar (B) palm-leaf manuscript
mabasan (B) chanting
maju progressive
malu embarrassed
masyarakat society, the people
membersihkan cleanse
merdeka freedom
mess government housing
modern
From Subjects to Citizens

mebat (B) ritual meals
meten (B) sleeping quarters
mrajan (B) high-caste descent-group temple
musyawarah consensual discussion and decision-making
nadi (B) alternative state of consciousness, usually implying communication with or possession by a supernatural spirit or ancestor
nasi cooked rice
nasib fate
negara state
ngayah ring Puri (B) service at the Puri
Ni (B) courtesy title for low-caste women
NKKBS (Norma Keluarga Kecil Bahagia Sejahtera) the Small Family Norm is Happy and Prosperous
odalan (B) temple anniversary when temple is visited by its god/s
orti (B) news, story
pamong-pamong elders
Pancasila ‘Five Principles’ of Indonesian state ideology: belief in one supreme god, a just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, popular sovereignty guided by wisdom through consensual consultation and representation, and social justice
panggwa (B) black or ‘left-handed’ magic
Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI quasi-governmental body for the regulation of Hinduism in Indonesia
parekan (B) servant or retainer of the Puri
pasedahan (B) irrigation district, collection of subak
patut appropriate
PDI Indonesian Democratic Party
pedanda (B) brahmana priest
pederep (B) harvesters
pekaseh (B) active workers in a subak
pemaksan (B) temple community, congregation, who support the temple
pemangku (B) village priest attached to particular temple
pembangunan development
peranan ganda double role
perbekel (B) village head, ‘big man’
peladana (pradana) (B) female principle (paired with purusa)
pipil (B) palm-leaf certificate, e.g. showing land ownership
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) Indonesian Communist Party
**Glossary of Acronyms and Non-English Terms**

PKK (Pembinaan Kesejateraan Keluarga)   Committee for the Promotion of Family Prosperity

PMP (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila)   Moral Pancasila Education (Civics)

PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia)    Indonesian Nationalist Party

pondok   huts, often for sheltering cattle and outside the village

PPFW (Peningkatan Peranan Fungsi Wanita)   Promotion of the Role and Function of Women

pulau Bali   the Island of Bali

panggawa (B)   district head or local lord in colonial times

pura (B)   temple, e.g. pura melanting, market temple, pura dalem, death temple

puri (B)   palace, house of satria family, especially ruler

purusa (B)   penis, patriline, or male principle, ancestral essence

puskesmas (pusat kesehatan massa)   people’s health centre, clinic

puskesmas pembantu   sub-clinic

pusataka (B)   a book of magic invocations, heirloom

raja   king

rajin   industrious

rakyat   the people

rua-bhinneda (B)   two-that-are-one, principle of unity in duality

rupiah   Indonesian currency

sadar   aware

sakit   sick, hurts

sakti   magically or supernaturally powerful

SAMIJAGA (Sarana Air Minum dan Jamban Keluarga)   Family Toilet and Drinking Water Project

sanggah gede (B)   ancestor/descent-group temple

Sang (B)   title of lower satria descent-group

Saraswati   goddess of learning and knowledge

satria (B)   member of the so-called second caste or grouping, warrior or royal caste

sawah   irrigated rice fields

SD   Sekolah Dasar, primary or elementary school

sebel (B)   magically dangerous or impure (lower form of cuntaka)

sedahan (B)   head of irrigation district

sedeng (B)   comfortable, neither poor nor rich

seka (B)   voluntary association, e.g. seka manyi banjar, banjar harvesting group; seka subak, subak work-group

sekolah   school

sepi   quiet, lonely
From Subjects to Citizens

selip  rice hulling machine
SMA  Sekolah Menengah Atas, senior secondary school
SMP  Sekolah Menengah Pertama, lower secondary school
sopan  polite
subak (B)  irrigation association
sudra (B)  low-caste (wong jaba) person, not a brahmana, satria or wesia
sugih (B)  rich
swadaya  self-help
tak sadar  not aware
takut  afraid
tanah  land
tegal  dry agricultural land
tenged (B)  hot, magically potent
tirta (B)  holy water
Tjokorda (B)  title of a member of higher satria caste, considered to be rulers; Cokorda in modern usage
triwangsa (B)  three higher castes – brahmana, satria and wesia
Tweede Klasse Inandsche School  three-year vernacular school in colonial times
umat  community
UKS (Usaha Kesehatan Sekolah)  School Health Effort
UPGK (Usaha Peningkatan Gizi Kesehatan)  Effort to Promote Nutrition and Health
volkschool  people’s school in colonial times, primary vernacular school
wantilan (B)  large open pavilion for community assembly
warga negara  citizen
wengken (B)  territory
wesia (B)  member of the so-called third caste or grouping; administrator and trader caste
wong (B)  person, people, e.g. wong cilik, the little people; wong jaba, outsiders, low-caste people
SECTION I

Introduction
CHAPTER 1

Reflections on the Study of Bali and the Nation-State

This book analyses the processes by which a conservative and introverted Balinese village has been incorporated into the Indonesian nation-state. It explores the transformation of village subjects of their local ‘king’ to anonymous citizens of the Republic of Indonesia, a process which is incomplete. In focusing on one village, called ‘Brassika’, and its 4,000-odd inhabitants, the book argues that the Indonesian state, through its bureaucratic arrangements, national ideologies and development programmes, has intimately penetrated the daily lives of Balinese villagers. This has come about via the mediation of many people, mainly local villagers, who embody both state and local interests. In describing this process, the book argues against the assumed opposition of society and state and shows that we can only understand the longevity of the Suharto regime by understanding that villagers wanted to participate in the version of modernity offered by the Indonesian nation-state.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: THE NATION-STATE

Western social science has picked away at the knotty problem of state-society relations with considerable intensity and frustration for nearly as long as there have been nation-states. The nation-state became the international norm of polity after being first achieved in Europe in the period 1770–1918 (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1990). In Europe, this was a shift in economic and political power from the absolute monarchs and land-based gentry to ‘the natio’ or ‘people’ – the new capitalists, the increasingly educated middle classes and, to a lesser extent, the working classes.

The catalyst for this shift was the great philosophical watershed of the eighteenth century known as the Enlightenment. The catchword of the period was freedom and the vision was an ideal society. The origin of the movement lay in the belief that ‘man’ (sic) could achieve perfection by
being embedded in an essentially good society (Collins 1957). A political system had to be devised wherein the voice of each individual was heard. Essential components of such a political system were a freely elected parliament to decide laws, a bureaucracy independent of parliament to implement laws, a judiciary independent of other branches of the state to deal with offenders against the laws and freedoms for the individual: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom for the individual to accumulate property and so on.

The great philosophical debates of the nineteenth century often turned on the relationships between ‘the individual’ and ‘the people’. A central problem was how to establish free institutions in the nation-state. The democratic and socialist ideal – that all political power should belong to the people – seemed to the liberals to spell tyranny rather than liberty (for instance, Mill 1946 [1859]). During the nineteenth century, particularly in the United States, the idea of the sovereignty of the people came to be limited by the belief that the liberty of the individual was of prior and paramount importance. However, as Hobsbawm notes, modern nationalism is distinguished by its extremely demanding nature, claiming ultimate service to the nation-state above ‘all other obligations of whatever kind’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 9).

Another preoccupation was ‘the actual relation between the state and civil society, that is, their separation’ (Marx quoted in Abrams 1988: 59). For traditional Marxists, the engine of history was the class struggle embedded in civil society. The state had been brought into existence as a means to present the result of class struggle as the independent outcome of classless political will. It was, therefore, not real and hence lay in the superstructure of political ideas. Marxists argued over the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state in relation to the social classes.

It is no accident that the process of nation-state formation occurred during the heyday of European empire-building; nationalism flourished within an ambient awareness of an international community and, to varying degrees, among Europe’s interacting former dynasties. There were enormous populations involved, both in the various ‘motherlands’ and in the colonies. New industrial technologies were harnessed, particularly the railways, steamships and printing presses. Bureaucracies and mass schooling were introduced. National languages were institutionalized and new social arrangements (such as the pioneering role of educated youth) played their part in structuring the new polity, the European nation-state.

The people in the new nation-states were self-confident in their modernity and, inspired with pride in their new self-identity, patriotic. Disputes between nation-states were often settled by wars, claiming the ultimate sacrifice from the nation and, in the process, deepening the inscription of the nation-state in the people’s imagination.
The process of nation-state formation in Europe was and is multilinear and contested. Indeed, in today’s revivification of ethnic and religious ‘primordial loyalties’ (Geertz, C. 1973: 255–310) in the former USSR and Yugoslavia, we are apparently viewing re-runs of the nineteenth and early twentieth century process of conglomeration – the process of Balkanization. Even in the original European nation-states such as the United Kingdom, allegiances are still being tested and borders bloodied.

The second great ‘wave’ in which nation-states were imagined into existence came after World War II: 66 new countries, including Indonesia, seized their moment between 1945 and 1968 (Geertz, C. 1973: 234). The achievement of nation-state status for ‘postcolonial’ colonies after 1945 was usually a difficult birth. The impetus for the independence movements was obviously different from that of the European nation-states, being principally the experience of colonial exploitation and subjugation.

The rhetoric of many Third World nationalists borrowed both a European unilinear view of history and the European Enlightenment discourse of freedom and progress towards the light of the future. In Indonesia, in 1930, for instance, after Sukarno had been arrested and brought to trial, he delivered a two-day long defence speech which was an agenda for the nationalist struggle against the Dutch:

First: we show the people that they have a past, a glorious past;
Second: we increase the people’s consciousness that they have a present, a dark present;
Third: we show the people the rays of the future, shining and clear, and the means to bring about that future full of promise. (Sukarno 1956 quoted in Reid 1979: 290)

In the Indonesian context, ‘freedom’ (merdeka) in the nationalist format implied ‘a new kind of person … free from traditional loyalties and able to make their own decisions about what to believe and what organisation to join’ (Reid 1998b: 152). In Indonesia today, an incipient third wave of ‘kemerdekaan’, or independence, looms, with independence/secessionist movements, such as the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Movement for a Free Aceh) and the OPM (Operasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Movement), fighting for freedom from the overlordship of Indonesia.

Anderson has noted the geographic isomorphism between the new states and their colonized predecessors (Anderson 1991: 114). In terms of ethnicity, many of the new nation-states appear to be arbitrarily and artificially constructed. They are the remnants of the Age of Empire, when the parent-states could act virtually without reference to an indigenous constituency or mandate. Britain and the Netherlands could draw a bureaucratic line along the Straits of Malacca and reconstruct the Malay world as the Malay States and the Netherlands East Indies. Holland, Germany and Britain could, with a ruler, allocate half the tropical Mela-
nessian island of New Guinea to Asia and half to the Pacific (Osborne 1985). In fact, the geographical referents of many new nation-states are contested and indeterminate, not least because of their subaltern history (Chakrabarty 1992: 1). The major troubled ‘hot-spot’ of New Order Indonesia was the differently colonized province of East Timor.

Anti-colonial, or ‘second wave’ nationalism was not simply a recapitulation of the European process of nation-state formation, for its premise was different. Third World nationalism had to deal with pre-existing conditions of colonial power while simultaneously representing indigenous culture. For the nascent nation-state, there was everything left to imagine (Chatterjee 1993: 5).

Nevertheless, the two waves of nation-state formation, i.e. in Europe and Europe’s colonies, share many features. Not least is one, structurally vital, ironic contradiction. Would-be independent nation-states have had to justify to the international community the need of their people for sovereignty and independence on the grounds of their shared, authentic past and particular identity, but simultaneously they have had to appeal to their people to cast aside or place in remission their primal loyalty to their language group, religion or home territory in the interests of nationalism and national unity. ‘[Nationalism] presents itself both as a modern project that melts and transforms traditional attachments in favour of new identities and as a reaffirmation of authentic cultural values culled from the depths of a presumed communal past’ (Kandiyoti 1991: 431). The new nation-state’s identity is usually a selective and creative affirmation of cultural uniqueness and claimed authenticity. Novice nationalist elites present a Janus face: local constituents require anti-Western rhetoric promising emancipation and embodying their unique identity; international audiences of Western-trained politicians, bureaucrats and scholars of international law require assurances of rationality and stability. The difficult moment, when internal political pressures demand independence, will only be resolved in the nationalists’ favour if they can persuade already respectable nation-states that they can build a modern nation-state.

Not only is there the internal difficulty of marrying competing indigenous loyalties with the demands of a single nation and the international community but also there are tensions inherent in the conjugal relation of nation and state. Ruth McVey mused recently on the ‘ideological odd couple’ of nation and state:

The nation-state is a chimera; the hyphenation betrays its origins in two not quite compatible principles. The nation involves collective commitment; its impulses are egalitarian, its foundation is sentiment. The state, however, presents itself not as ideal but as fact. It is hierarchic, suspicious of mass energies; its element is stability, and its desire is for control. Yet in the last century this ideological odd couple
has made itself into a particularly powerful focus of organization and thought, the institution which much of mankind now considers to be its proper source of social identity and centre of loyalty, the apex of nearly all hierarchies, the almost unquestioned locus of power. (McVey 1996: 11)

The histories of the post-colonial generation of nation-states are still being written, and of course it is partly in the writing of their history that nation-states create themselves. The story of the New Order nation-state, Anderson has proposed, is a story in which the 'old state' has prevailed while the 'new society' – the popular, participatory nation – has been subsumed (1990: 94–120). This book analyses the relation between a newly created nation-state, Indonesia, and one of its local constituents, a village in Bali, within this historical context of nation-state formation and the ideals of modernity and progress that animate that process. It examines the process of nation-state formation from within. The descriptions of what happened in Brassika, particularly between 1980 and 1997, show how the apparently stable nation-state of Indonesia came to dominate village society, yet attest also to the strength of local traditions. The small, transient noble house of Brassika and its ‘double-agent’ relations with the villagers and with the Indonesian state are the centre of attention. It is clear that the locally exalted position and wealth of this house were partly a creation of the Dutch and partly due to the shifting alliances and accommodations that the various Balinese royal and powerful houses were making through the nineteenth century. The inhabitants of Brassika now, with both pride and embarrassment, describe their society as ‘feodal’ (feudal) until an indeterminate time near the present.³

The transition from subjects of a feodal society to citizens of the modern nation-state of Indonesia within an administrative desa (village) is inordinately difficult to pin down. The ‘defining moment’ of birth for Indonesia was of no moment in Brassika at the time, for it was not part of the Indonesian revolution (Taylor 1997: xi).³ Yet now Brassika people say they are maja (progressive) and moderen (modern). Their commitment to modernity and progress cannot be doubted, nor can their patriotism. The story of the Indonesian nation-state has become the master narrative in this formerly feodal village.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: STATE–SOCIETY RELATIONS

The long history of Western social science’s fascination with state–society relations is imbued with an assumed opposition between state and society. As noted above, liberal and Marxist theorists alike have assumed their opposing interests, and that they are mutually exclusive categories. Feminist and post-
structuralist theoreticians have deconstructed this opposition and many other binary oppositions that order Western social science (e.g. Benhabib and Cornell 1987, Elshtain 1981, Jay 1991, Pateman 1989, Pateman and Gross 1986, Young 1990). The state–society opposition has the effect of associating the state with a range of ‘strong’ characteristics and categories, and loading society with ‘soft’ and amorphous elements. Culture–nature, order–disorder, mind–body, man–woman, activity–passivity, public–private, strength–weakness and stability–change are examples of the binaries; the cross-associations (the state’s association with culture, order, mind, man, activity, public, strength and stability) are telling.

It is important to realize that these binary oppositions are not simply shorthand markers of difference. The application of feminist and Foucauldian theory teaches that the elements in the dichotomies are not just relations of opposition: they are hierarchized relations of power. The relation between A and Not-A has become a power relation, a non-reversible and non-reciprocal power relation (Grosz 1991: 85). It is now obvious that it is the interconnections between these formerly conceptually disparate worlds that must be analysed and evaluated. One goal of this book is to contribute to the dissolution of these oppositions, to worry afresh at the hierarchies of power and to make possible different ways of analysing the world. A feminist approach does not assume the opposition of nation and state, but it does insist on an enquiry into relations of power and a redefinition of paradigms such as politics and the state (Stivens 1991).

Scholars in the world of feminist scholarship consider that the philosophical battle over this issue was won some time ago. However, a leap into the world of Southeast Asian studies is a leap into an anachronism. The state–society oppositional view is alive and well in regional studies of Southeast Asia, as Stivens has pointed out (1991), and, particularly since the financial crisis and the toppling of Suharto, positively blooming in analyses of Indonesia. In much of the writing on Indonesia, particularly that which presented opposition to the Suharto regime and purported to represent the voices of resistance, the state was a monolithic, evil force while the poor victims of the regime were implicitly ‘good’. From my experience of fieldwork, this is a misrepresentation of the Indonesian state and people. In addition, I would argue that it is not a helpful way to analyse the longevity of the New Order.

For instance, in a work designed to be a textbook on New Order Indonesia (Hill 1994), and one which was not very critical of the Suharto regime, the chapter on ‘Politics’ was based on the theme of a division of Indonesia into state and society. The history of Suharto’s Indonesia was presented as a tug of war between two opposing forces: ‘Two main themes stand out in the political story of how the New Order has developed since 1965. One is the strengthening of state power and its corollary, the steady weakening of political parties and other society-based forces ...’ (Mackie...
and MacIntyre 1994: 3–4, also Table 1.1). Later the authors talked of the ‘tilting’ of the see-saw of state–society relations, the ‘sharp separation between state and society’ (ibid.: 16) and so on. Others, more critical of the regime, have seen the New Order in terms of an increasing state–society split, perhaps indulging in retrospective history-making.¹¹

Some analysts have come to see the Indonesian nation-state experiment as a failure, and since 1998 speculation on the possible disintegration of Indonesia has been rife. Clifford Geertz, claiming that Indonesia ‘still projects itself as a triumphalist, insurgent, liberationist power’, recently concluded that ‘Neither Sukarno’s “old order” populism nor Suharto’s “new order” paternalism … was able to impress an identity and a transcending purpose on the society as a whole, to make of it an integral community, real or imagined’ (Geertz 2000). My argument in this book is that the view from Brassika, at least until 1997, shows how there was a successful integration of nation and state in the imagined, and real, world of Indonesia.

The assumed opposition between state and society has to be explicitly interrogated and disposed of, on various grounds. The state and society are not comparable entities that can be pitted one against the other in a tug of war. Society can encompass the state – for instance, in the politics implied by the slogan, ‘the personal is political’ – and every culture shapes the structures and political style of its state, as Geertz famously noted.¹² There is no doubt that even a strong state like New Order Indonesia has had to accommodate the ‘Unity in Diversity’ that the nation presents. Now in Indonesia the moves towards greater regional autonomy and a more federalist state structure acknowledge the pressures of a heterogeneous society. The ways that states manipulate, homogenize and attempt to control social forces are too numerous to mention. In some circumstances, such as at the level of foreign relations, the state claims to represent and therefore encompass society. In short, the two elements in the dyad are excessively rigid and homogeneous categories.

It is not just a powerful, decision-making elite who implement state policy but all people who attend school, vote, get immunized or pay taxes. The state includes government, bureaucracy, the law and the military – institutions with personnel, procedures, buildings and everyday functions. Virtually all people participate in the operations of the state by virtue of existing in society. At village level in Bali, most people experience the state in the personal provision of services such as immunizations and schooling for children by benign nurses and schoolteachers, as the distant faces of the president, the first family or cabinet ministers on TV, in the payment of taxes or the filling-in of endless letters and forms. In Bali, the Indonesian state has not been experienced as a frightening, malevolent force opposed to society.

Further, an assumed opposition between state and society poses the danger for scholars that they neglect real historical flux. The state–society opposition favours a static, eternal conservation of status quo power groups.
With this approach, Indonesian society becomes too easily an essentially docile, authority-accepting populace. An emphasis on the strong state tradition may blind one to the importance of democratic and millenarian traditions in Indonesian history – traditions that continue to change the course of Indonesian history, Reid has posited, against the four waves of the strong state model – the Indic, Islamic, colonial and high modern – that ‘contractualism, plurality and diversity are the stuff of Southeast Asian social reality, against which the ideology of royal or state absolutism has had to fight a constant uphill battle’ (1998a: 28). The idea of the strong state – weak society as an inevitable essence that will out in Indonesian history is, unsurprisingly, evident in Indonesian official thinking. The state has pushed the ‘floating mass’ doctrine of a peasantry unattached to political ideology and party, free to devote all its energy to economic development.

Attention has been drawn to an apparently indigenous political theory of the organic or integralist state, rooted in pre-colonial Javanese traditions of the state, in which ‘one-ness is Power and multiplicity is diffusion and weakness’ (Anderson 1990: 36). The integralist model was behind the Constitution of 1945, drafted largely by Prof. Supomo:

According to the integralist understanding of ‘State’ … there will be no dualism between ‘state and individual’, … there will be no dualism between State and civil society, there will be no need for basic rights or human rights for the individual against the State, because individuals are organic parts of the State. (Speech by Supomo, 31.5.1945, quoted in Bourchier 1996: 81–82)

According to the organicist model, a bapak, or father-figure, rules the state as his own family. He knows the needs of his ‘children’, and, through his love for his ‘family’, rules in their best interest. There is unity of power and authority, the primacy of ‘family’ needs over individual needs and no possibility of legitimate opposition. This is said to suit the Indonesian national character. It is evident in a dense web of state ideology: in the Pancasila, which stresses unity, harmony and consensus, in the ‘family principle’ (azas kekeluargaan), in which the state is the family writ large, and in the GOLKAR idea of representing society through functional groups rather than through potentially divisive political parties.

The state ideology of Indonesia (such as in the Constitution of 1945) drew upon a vision of integrated nation and state within the ideological framework of kekeluargaan. The new nation-state was a family, an organism, a village, a gamelan: ‘[W]e can do no other than give primacy to the complete and holy Family, … who in every good family, stand side by side, have the same rights but different tasks, have a unity of interests, a unity of strengths, and a unity of soul’ (Supomo quoted in Reeve 1990: 158). ‘In that system the attitude of a citizen is not “what is my right” but “what is my duty
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as a member of this large family?” Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the ‘Father of Indonesian Education’, enthused:

To whom must we devote our services? To no other than that unity of Kawula–Gusti – ‘I’ and ‘we’ are fully united here. Fused into one. This unity is made possible and becomes the fullest reality because there is a spiritual tie inside the Family which is based upon holy and pure Devoted Love. ... It is this devoted love which arouses readiness to sacrifice. (quoted in Reeve 1990: 159)

Dewantara claimed that the word keluarga (family) derived from kawula (the one who serves) and warga (the member who shares responsibility and decisions), and that ‘these two statuses (which in our philosophy of nationhood are considered important and serious) are sufficiently well-known with the expression Kawula–Gusti, that is, the unity of humanity and God’ (quoted in Reeve 1990: 160).

Kekeluargaan, although an ideology of unity, harmony and the sublimation of the individual in the higher, collective interest, is an inherently gendered hierarchical principle. The bapak (father) or gusti (lord) at the apex enjoys a natural authority (wibawa), and those subordinate to him – the wife and children in the new keluarga inti, nuclear family – serve his interests, which are conflated with the interests of the family. The ‘state-as-family’ metaphor is not unique to Indonesia; it has been found to be generally useful in state-making not least because it ‘offers a “natural” figure for sanctioning social hierarchy within a putative organic unity of interests’ (McClintock 1993: 63).

Although the ‘state-as-family’ metaphor enabled a single, unilinear, genetic narrative for national history, ‘the family’ as a natural institution was eternalized – ‘the family’ came to be beyond politics, economics, the state and indeed history. The identification of nation-state with family is probably universally appealing: ‘family’ implies communal, shared origin, shared culture and natural home. Its evocation is the evocation of comfort, familiarity and security.

The organicist model is more or less in disgrace in the West because of its association with fascism, yet for foreign social scientists of Indonesia there is the responsibility to take seriously claims for indigenous political models which may not suit liberal Western sensibilities. However, I am not arguing that because one cannot presume the automatic opposition of society to the state one must by default argue that the state and society are one, in perfect articulation. One should interrogate state–society relations, question the existence of the state, wonder if a nation without a state can survive, even in some circumstances see an expressed opposition between state and society. ‘...[A]lmost any ideology based on an A:Not-A dichotomy is effective in resisting change’ (Jay 1991:104). Ultimately, the presumption
that state and society are opposed must be abandoned because it is neither useful nor valid. Furthermore, the presumed existence of the opposition reproduces existing inequalities which are unjust.

If Indonesia is not simply the effect of coercive action by a hegemonic, omnipotent state, how can the incorporation of the Indonesian nation-state be viewed and understood? The question is partly one for anthropology in general. With what tools does the anthropologist participate in and observe a nation-state of 200 million people, or even a province of three million?

FIELDWORK

In fieldwork, everything is potential ‘data’. Every image, from the Independence Day parade to the poster of Sukarno on the lounge-room wall, every action, from the submissive stooping of a subservient peasant to the saluting of the flag by uniformed schoolchildren, is a little clue. With a telephoto lens, to probe sites more difficult of access, one examines the perceptions, emotions, ordering principles and categorizations, motivations and things that people take into account when making decisions. One must also look through the macro-lens at the nation-state and maintain a depth of field that allows one to view both the close-at-hand village and the distant nation-state with definition.

My fieldwork has been an attempt to gain access to and analyse the experience of Balinese villagers as their world has become an integral part of Indonesia. The project is, of course, impossible. Such an approach demands fluency in local languages, a close familiarity with, and sensitivity to, ‘informants’ and, to an extent, a dissolution of inequalities between researcher and researched in rank, status, ethnicity, gender and so on.

Almost by definition the researcher enjoys the power of the right to ask questions, to enter homes and observe ceremonies. The subjects of research do fight back: they feign ignorance, absent themselves, procrastinate, poke fun at the researcher, manipulate language and the social intricacies. In almost all matters of local knowledge the anthropologist is a bumbling novice, and easily duped or discouraged. Luckily, many locals respond generously: some are flattered at the interest; a few may be intellectually attracted by the idea of cross-cultural communication; others are simply polite hosts; one or two become real friends. A chat with an anthropologist can provide a chance to gossip, to complain, to wonder, swap information and unload secrets. The ethical problems of the arrogance of European-based knowledge acquisition rise like bile in the gut immediately upon embarking upon fieldwork. One either stays and thereafter is constantly entangled in the ethics of data collection or one quits the field and retires to the academy.

The experiences and events I was observing were primarily those of villagers, so at another level I was also undertaking a village study. Because
individuals are constituted through social relations, among other things, villagers share many values, norms, experiences and so on. Many aspects of social life are collectively held.

The advantages of a long-term village study are many. Villagers are relatively confined and stable, and the researcher can, sometimes, become personally intimate with some individuals. Historical processes can be studied with intimacy and immediacy. The observer witnesses many aspects of life as disparate as birth practices and election processes. Some aspects of the lives studied are unexpected and even shocking. I have been jelly-legged in modern hospitals when witnessing the harsh treatment of women in labour; I once rushed to intervene between a man and a monkey he habitually abused; I have wept at the (avoidable) death in my arms of a tiny baby girl. The tenuous food supply of some of my informants and the fragility of life even in reasonably prosperous Bali were a source of concern. On the other hand, occasions of religious observance, such as temple prayers, and early morning walks through the village were unexpected simple pleasures. Such experiences add incomparably to understanding of both anthropological subjects of study and ourselves. Strangely, they rarely find their way into ethnographies.

This study thus has various levels of analysis. The nation-state, the village, the aristocratic village elite and the villager are all units of analysis, and there is another, much studied unit of analysis: the ethnic group and island of Bali. Tourist brochures enthuse: ‘Heaven, the Balinese will tell you, is exactly like Bali’ (Qantas Jetabout Holidays: Bali 1993(?)). Further, ‘Paradise hasn’t changed for thousands of years – except to get better’ (advertisement for Bali Beach Hotel, quoted in Vickers 1989: 192). Politically and economically, though, the Hindu island of ‘a thousand temples’ is a subset of its largely Muslim nation-state, Indonesia. Unsurprisingly, Balinese identity is problematic and changing rapidly as Bali is incorporated into Indonesia.

I conducted doctoral fieldwork in 1980–81 in ‘Brassika’, a village in eastern Bali. At that time Brassika appeared a neat, well-ordered and clearly bordered unit. I was interested in observing the process by which this introverted and conservative village was incorporated into the totalizing and homogenizing Indonesian nation-state. Since then, this busy little village world has changed such that now its inhabitants say it is empty (kosong) and quiet (sepi). Bali has changed in the opposite direction: it careers crazily along an overpopulated path of greed for the tourist dollar toward a hazy and dirty non-future which will be found ‘out there’. The world has changed. Nation-states now appear both more ephemeral and unsubstantial and more terrifyingly powerful. In a world of flows – of refugees and migrant workers, of HIV/AIDS, of tourism and terrorism, of transnational media messages and global capital, of international debt bondage, of industrial pollution, of potable and impotent water – there
can be no one object of study, no one subject and no one frame of research (Young 1990:193). Loyalties, identities and borders are fluid, contested and often merely convenient.

THE STUDY OF BALI

Balinese studies has been characterized by a substantial split along Western intellectual (and university discipline) lines. On the one hand, we have a rich literature on the art and culture of Bali, a celebration of the exotic creativity of the Balinese. On the other hand, we have (a very few) hard-nosed studies of the demography, agriculture, tourist industry and general economy of Bali. The economy of contemporary Bali is typical of Southeast Asia’s postcolonial, rapid-growth, industrializing, export-oriented economies, yet anthropologists have shown a predilection for introverted, sometimes precious, cultural studies that ignore both the Indonesian state and rapid social change in Bali. A nice corrective to this bias is the recent work by Robinson (1995), Rubinstein and Connor (1999), Vickers (1989) and Warren (1993).

Many writers on Bali have been seduced by what have been seen as the charms of Bali: a fresh and verdant nature aesthetically tamed in rice terraces; a harmonious social idyll of village life; a sexual haven of bare-breasted women and lithe young men; and an artistic treasure trove in which everyone is an artist (Vickers 1989). Said’s charge of the European colonial fascination with, and construction of, the Oriental exotic is probably nowhere more true than in Bali (Said 1995 [1978]). All of these representations can be instantly debunked. The urban sprawl now extends from the airport 25 km into Denpasar and well beyond; one can spend an hour getting through that choking noisy mess where two-stroke motorbikes and three-wheeled bajaj collude to make the eyes smart and to cake the skin and hair, and sensible passengers cover the nostrils and mouth with a handkerchief. In 1965–66 the blood-letting was such that approximately 100,000 people died – such is Bali’s social harmony. The overwhelming impression left by a quick tour of the art shop tourist destinations is of kitsch, not culture.

Anthropologists of Bali have been impressed by the complex order and energetic activity of Balinese community life. The Geertzes have commented upon the incredible degree of regulation found in community rules (awig-awig) (C. and H. Geertz 1975: 159) and many have remarked upon the detail in cosmological categorizations expressed in religious offerings (e.g. Swellengrebel 1960). Bateson and Mead emphasized the complex busyness of Balinese everyday life (Bateson and Mead 1942). These impressions of a strong, complex and ordered society have been gleaned by anthropologists in fine-grained ethnographic studies of small village worlds, largely without reference to the larger state, be it local Bali-
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I would include in this grouping C. Geertz’s study of local history, in which he explicated his view of the nature of the nineteenth-century Balinese state: a theatre-state in which ‘Power served pomp, not pomp power’, driven by a politics of drama expressing the Balinese cultural obsessions of social inequality and status pride (Geertz 1980: 13). However, Schulte-Nordholt’s careful reconstructions of the integration of the local state and village provide a welcome revision of the model (Schulte-Nordholt 1991 and 1996). The anthropological domination of Balinese studies has perpetuated the spurious notion that Bali is the end-point in a line from Europe towards the Orient, and that it is ‘more unique’ than other Oriental places, or perhaps that it is the ultimate opposite of Europe. Images that sustain this notion include the last stands of the Balinese kingdoms against Dutch colonialization (1906–1908), the fantastic decoration of the temples and temple offerings and Bali’s highly decorative but impenetrable ritual complexity.

In rather stark contrast to the introverted cultural studies and the abundance of representations of Bali by besotted romantics, we have a small collection of papers and reports on the Balinese economy, political life and population, mainly by economists and demographers whose frame of reference is the nation-state (Bendesa and Sukarsa 1980, Daroesman 1973, Lane 1972, Lansing 1991, Raka 1955 [1948], Streatfield 1986, etc.). Bali, as one of the 27 provinces claimed by New Order Indonesia, shared in and contributed to Indonesia’s so-called ‘economic miracle’, particularly through the phenomenon of international tourism.

However, one can question how well the benefits of the economic bonanza were distributed: even in 1987 the percentage of the population of Bali in poverty was reported to be a high 40 per cent (Hill 1994: 109–110). Since the financial crisis (Krismon) beginning in late 1997, and now with the after-shocks for the global tourist industry of the 11 September 2001 attack and the 12 October 2002 bombings in Bali, poverty in Bali is increasingly prevalent.

If we take a wider frame and look at Indonesian studies generally, it is the latter, ‘hard’ type of studies that dominate the discourse. Indonesian studies is overwhelmingly dominated by books on history, politics and the economy. The state is the institutional fulcrum around which debates on economic and political life turn. In contrast, the literature on Indonesian culture is small and characterized by collected papers on the culture of individual regions and ethnic groups.

So while most academic work on Indonesia is dominated by themes and dreams of the unified state, Bali presents a special case. I submit that this is principally a product of the late arrival and peculiar nature of European colonization. In South Bali, the weight of Dutch colonization was only felt from 1908. However, the intrusive endeavour to conserve Bali as a living museum conflicted with tax and surveillance programmes that were as exploitative as any in the Indies. This was also a cultural colonization by
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artists, literati, culture-lovers and anthropologists. Many were war-weary and jaded émigré misfits from late-Victorian Europe and America. They welcomed the tropical warmth and beautiful ritual hyperactivity and did not see a strongly hierarchical society held together in dynamic tension. They were blind to Dutch economic exploitation and to the poverty of the Balinese eking out a peasant existence. The tradition of Balinese studies is one of exotic difference, of a society without an economy, history and legal system, of a local, changeless, steady state (Bateson 1972).

Ethnographic studies that do not mention state institutions and ideologies, such as schools, tax and Pancasila, are open to many charges. They are blind to the formative power of the state in the lives of the population. They assume that national ideologies are semantically universal – that Pancasila means the same thing to a Batak as to a Balinese. They assume that what goes on inside schools is already known, for have we not all been to school? They assume that what goes on inside temples is more interesting and telling than what happens inside classrooms. In these ethnographic studies, what is native or local is more real, more potent and more significant (and less understandable) than state intrusions. It is, by this logic, more in need of the anthropologist’s explanation than the operations of the state. This blindness is wrought by anthropological snobbery and is a product of the Western separation of state and society. In this book, society desires to partake of the workings of the state.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book is arranged in five sections, each consisting of two chapters. The paired chapters present contrasting or disparate material on the topic of the section. Discussion of theoretical issues introduces each section, with the exception of section II. I chose this organization to enable both the description and analysis of a broad array of different topics and engagement with the theorizing which usually accompanies their scholarly study, rather than continually tacking between ethnography and theory.

Chapter 2 begins with a description of my approach to the village, as a doctoral student. It introduces the complexity of social relations in Brassika, setting the scene for the rest of the book. It opens up understanding of the village social hierarchy and the significance of the so-called caste system. The patron-client relationships between the ruling house, the Puri, and the villagers are examined to explicate the Puri’s pre-eminent position in contemporary Brassika. The chapter also surveys the sub-cultures and functions of the hamlets (banjar) in Brassika, functions which increasingly include the implementation of central government policy.

Section II turns to the economic life of the village, which is based on the exploitation of land and water in wet rice terraces (sawah). My interest is particularly the social and political significance of economic inequalities.
Chapter 3 is an analysis of the importance of land, the principal factor of production, for Brassika people, and presents historical statistics on the distribution of land ownership. It documents the great inequality of land ownership, particularly in the period 1949–65. The dominance of the Puri in economic relations is explained. Chapter 4 analyses the massacre of over 100 people in Brassika in late 1965–early 1966. This killing was the culmination of the heated Land Reform and party politics of the early 1960s. I argue that the murders were in large part the expression of class/caste conflict. The murders were committed by the ‘haves’, a class under threat from several years of class mobilization against them, and incited by the leaders of the New Order to establish a ‘clean’, docile citizenry.

In section III, ‘Creating Order’, attention turns to the transformations wrought by the Suharto regime in the arenas generally labelled politics and development. In Chapter 5, I argue that the longevity of the New Order was the effect of a multifaceted, indeed almost all-encompassing state of order and culture. Descriptions of elections and village meetings show how Brassika villagers became de-politicized at the very points of contact with the state usually deemed ‘political’. Reaction to a tragic pregnancy and a local millenarian movement are evidence that local politics (which some may call ‘resistance’) could be lively but were marginalized by the centre. The chapter shows how New Order political life was characterized by the disjuncture between local and national political issues.

It was the ideology and implementation of development, coupled with the effects of an authoritarian school system, which most efficiently incorporated the village into the nation-state. The development project, analysed in Chapter 6, should not be seen as the imposition of an exterior ideology but one which was, to varying degrees at different times, desired by the people according to local hierarchies and understandings. Patriotism was strong and uncontested. Although locals often had a millenarian view of development, and the local ruler, the Dewa Agung, galvanized the people into action with evangelical zeal, much of this activity was empty ritual. Along the way, an array of mainly local functionaries guided the shift from subsistence-based agriculture to participation in the national and international global capitalist economic order. An intricately woven net of government apparatus was stitched into village life.

Section IV explores the place of Balinese women in the process of nation-state formation. My interest in Chapter 7 is in the relation between traditional preoccupations of fecundity and the recent dramatic fertility decline. I argue that this decline has occurred only partly because of an efficient and intrusive government programme. Socio-economic transformations have also had considerable potency in persuading village women to come to clinics to have IUDs (intra-uterine devices) inserted, because the main opportunity for them to earn money is outside the home and family farm. Children have become more expensive, and the likelihood
that pregnancies will be successful has increased. In addition, women’s acceptance of fertility control has occurred in a complex cultural and political context of male domination and control of female sexuality and reproductivity. Chapter 8 describes the shifts in birthing practices in Brassika. Women have left their homes and entered ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ sites, such as clinics and hospitals, for parturition. It is as mothers and potential mothers – because of their reproductivity – that women have been sucked into the net of government health care and its accompanying ideology of family health and welfare, hygiene and modernity.

Section V analyses the role of schooling in socializing young people in the ways of the nation-state. Chapter 9 traces the evolution of schooling in Brassika, revealing that schooling was introduced largely on the initiative of the local Dewa Agung and largely embraced by the villagers as a desirable modern innovation. Nevertheless, access to schooling in Brassika has been according to the pre-existing social inequalities of wealth, caste/class status and gender. The adoption of schooling and development shows that social practices derived from outside can be taken up enthusiastically by large numbers of locals acting apparently against the norms of society but for reasons wholly endogenous to that system of norms.

In Chapter 10, I explore the teachings of schools as they are interpreted by the future citizens of Indonesia. School lessons and textbooks contain many of the ideals of the nation-state. I examine the writings and lifestyles of students, and suggest that the process of ‘creating the state’ through schools is an open-ended and radically transforming one. Despite the centralization, totalitarianism and homogeneity of the Indonesian national education system, students do not turn out to be model schoolchildren. They create their own life histories, palimpsests of school lessons, the demands of the job market, the messages of the latest TV ads from America and the teachings of parents, the wayang and Mahabharata.

NOTES

1. ‘Brassika’ is a pseudonym chosen by the village head. There is no connection with the cabbage genus! All names of people and local places are pseudonyms, though titles such as caste/status titles have been retained.

2. In this book, the terms ‘Suharto regime’ and ‘New Order’ are used interchangeably to refer to the period 1965–1998. This reflects usage when fieldwork was conducted. Some scholars are still waiting to see if subsequent presidencies signify a regime change that justifies dropping the term ‘New Order’.

3. During the eighteenth century, philosophers usually favoured the idea that the individual possessed natural rights which were independent of the state and which the state was obliged to recognize. (This is enshrined, for instance, in the American Bill of Rights of 1776 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.) During the nineteenth century, many liberal philosophers came to favour Rousseau’s argument that the individual has no rights in nature; he (sic) merely has claims which might, in nature, be modified or struck out by the claims of other individuals. Claims become rights only when they are recognized by society and guaranteed by the state.
The state, therefore, has the duty to guarantee the civil liberty of individuals when their rights do not conflict with the liberty of others.

4. He does seem to qualify this definition two pages later when he writes ‘we cannot assume that for most people national identification – when it exists – excludes or is always or ever superior to, the remainder of the set of identifications which constitute the social being. In fact, it is always combined with identifications of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior to them’ (Hobsbawn 1990: 11).

5. Anderson (1991) calls this ‘The Last Wave’, but caution about such finality should be exercised. Reports of the demise of the nation-state are premature.

6. See also Legge 1972: 109-117. Marxist nationalists such as Tan Malaka similarly appropriated the language of the Enlightenment: ‘The true Indonesian nation does not yet have a history of its own except one of slavery ... The history of the Indonesian nation will first begin when it is freed from imperialist oppression’ (Tan Malaka 1926 quoted in Reid 1979: 296).

7. Anderson notes that ‘their current marriage is a recent and often uneasy mating’ (1990: 94).

8. The term feodal is one used by the inhabitants of the village and really deserves extended treatment. See Reynolds 1987 for some pertinent remarks on feudalism in Thailand. The adoption/adaptation of English terms in Indonesian often reveals a double need: to make some local reality intelligible to outsiders while expressing the specificity and autonomous nature of the phenomenon, i.e. as an expression of local identity.

9. Jean Gelman Taylor makes the point that ‘Indonesia’s government offers these inheritors of a free Indonesia a vision of their country’s past that makes the ending of Dutch rule the defining moment’ (Taylor 1997: xi). I would argue that although legally the villagers of Brassika were citizens of the nation-state of Indonesia from the time of this ‘defining moment’, the ‘sentiment’, self-identification, commitment and loyalty that McVey identifies as essential foundations of the nation-state were wanting at that time.

10. They have focussed on the apparently self-evident, neutral, equal and opposite binaries that have enjoyed the power of ordering principles of Western intellectual life since the time of Aristotle and Plato. One implication of these binary oppositions is that the nominals, the A, come to be identified with other positive, defined nominals, and the Not-A, the negative, nebulous Not-A, which are logically dependent upon the A, also become lumped together.

11. For example, Aspinall (1996 and 1999), Heryanto (1999) and many of the commentators in Inside Indonesia from 1998.

12. ‘One of the things that everyone knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture … [T]he god … is an understanding of how it is that every people gets the politics it imagines’ (Geertz 1973: 311–313).

13. Bourchier’s doctoral thesis debunks the idea that it is a native paradigm; his genealogy of organicist theory traces organicism back to the Leiden Law School and ultimately to the German romantic movement.

14. Pancasila (Five Principles) is the state ideology of Indonesia, first articulated by President Sukarno in 1945. The five principles are, literally translated: belief in one supreme god, a just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, popular sovereignty guided by wisdom through consensual consultation and representation (kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/ perwakilan) and social justice.

15. GOLKAR is an acronym of Golongan Karya, Work Groups, an indigenous version of a non-sectarian political party. See Reeve 1985 and 1990. Although not officially a political party, it functioned as the political party employed to electorally
support the administration of President Suharto.

The integralist model accords with the arguments of other Southeast Asian leaders such as Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia and ex-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore that there is a culturally autonomous set of ‘Asian values’, which are different from the West’s model of universal human rights.

16. See, for instance, Soeriokoesoemo 1970 [1920].

17. This is a defence of fieldwork against recent attacks on the practice of fieldwork, as well as a defence of the anthropology of place. It is not an agenda for the study of bounded, self-sufficient socio-political units. (See Augé (1998: 94ff and Gupta and Ferguson (1997)) for some of the relevant new arguments.) The ethical and epistemological problems of fieldwork are many, and these days it is not uncommon for anthropologists to opt out of fieldwork. Either one concludes, as I did, that the value of understanding human beings, which I take as the ultimate objective of anthropological research, outweighs the ethical problems incurred, or one abandons the attempt. Needless to say, if this latter choice were to become the professional universal for anthropology, sources of fresh empirical knowledge would dry up.

Despite the following paragraph, I acknowledge that the tradition of ‘village studies’ has its limitations, particularly that of blinding researchers to other, wider types of alliances and groupings (on Bali, MacRae 1998: esp. 112; Reuter 1998: 59–60).

18. There is also the important question of Balinese interpretations and reinterpretations of the idea of Bali. See Picard 1999.

19. The 27th province of East Timor, annexed by Indonesia in 1975, remained a contested territory until it was finally released, following a popular referendum in 1999. Indonesia’s annexation had never been approved by the United Nations.

20. The usual assessment of the economy under Suharto (i.e. pre-financial crisis) was upbeat, e.g.:

   The last quarter-century has been a period of extraordinarily rapid change in Indonesia. The Indonesia of the early 1990s is virtually unrecognisable from that of the mid-1960s. Since 1966 its economy has expanded by almost 500 per cent and its population by about 75 per cent. Its people are better fed, educated, and clothed than ever before. The incidence of poverty has declined significantly. For each 1000 live births, the number of babies who die before their first birthday has approximately halved. The nation is now able to feed itself. It is set to join the ranks of Asia’s ‘dragon economies’, and industrial output now exceeds that of agriculture. The country is an economic entity for the first time in its history, as the revolution in transport and communications has unified previously disparate and isolated regions. In the mid-1960s Indonesia had begun to disengage from the international community. Now it is deeply enmeshed in global and regional politics and commerce. (Hill 1994: xix)

CHAPTER 2

Introducing Brassika

The pre-eminent and powerful position of the Puri (royal house) is a singular feature of Brassika, and a description of this position is the centrepiece of this chapter. The story of my entry to the Puri and village reveals the ability of the Puri to speak for the village as well as some of the articulations of the state and the local community in New Order Bali. It also explicates the channelling of the foreign researcher that hierarchical Balinese social relations enforce and the ways in which my own subject position as researcher was shaped.

BEGINNING FIELDWORK

In August 1980 I began fieldwork in Bali to study changes in caste and hierarchy, for my doctorate. In Bali, apparently egalitarian and relatively autonomous hamlets (banjar) co-existed with a hierarchical social system that was often described as a caste system, by scholars and by Balinese. These twin and apparently opposed systems of social relations existed within polities best glossed as ‘kingdoms’.

The traditional area of Klungkung has a reputation as a feudalistic (feodal) stronghold and domain of the former paramount king of Bali, the Dewa Agung. Klungkung is a bustling but old-world town. It has the closed and mysterious air of a hot, Middle Eastern market town. It is the centre of an administrative district (Kabupaten Klungkung) in the east of the rice-growing heartland of Bali. (See Map 1.) It was the last of the eight kingdoms of Bali to succumb to Dutch suzerainty, in 1908. Klungkung is regarded as the most alus (refined) and sakti (magically powerful) court centre in Bali (Wiener 1995: 7, 11–13, 22–75). The presence of the Dewa Agung and the many cokorda (satria rulers) and other satria and brahmana families in the region contributes to the great deference to caste which is paid in the area. The language used is highly differentiated according to caste, and the demeanour and body language of the people is also highly expressive according to caste. People in Klungkung are very caste-conscious.

1
Introducing Brassika

A friend and mentor in a puri in Ubud wrote me a letter of introduction to his distant kinsman, a cokorda who was the treasurer of a sub-district in Klungkung (the sub-district of Jalananyar). (See Figure 2-1.) This cokorda treasurer suggested the village of Brassika, one of thirteen villages (desa) in the sub-district (kecamatan). His nephew was the village head (perbekel) of Brassika. Brassika had a strong puri, geria (priestly house) and solid representations of the four great Hindu social divisions known as ‘castes’: the brahmana (priestly caste), satria (warrior, ruling caste), wesia (trader/administrator caste) and sudra (commoner farmers).

He arranged for me to meet the two principal tjokorda of Brassika, the government village head (the perbekel named Tjokorda Gede Agung) and the customary village head (the klian desa adat named Tjokorda Gede Raka). We met in the perbekel’s office, the three Tjokorda, my husband and I. Tjokorda Gede Agung was a handsome, charming, fashionably dressed man in his mid-thirties. He is the son of the former punggawa, traditional lord and Dutch-appointed head of the sub-district. We were served 7-Up and pastries by underlings who kept their heads low, their bodies stooped and their hands clasped in the traditional attitude of humble respect. I was impressed by the subservience of these servants. Apparently they dared not raise their eyes. They seemed to embody a tradition of feudal ‘unfreedom’,
which was strikingly different to the egalitarian modernity of Jakarta, or even of Ubud. Tjokorda Gede Raka, another ‘nephew’, was a slight, smiling, handsome man, about forty years old. He too had a striking presence. The Tjokorda said they were amenable to our presence in the village and by the end of the meeting it was agreed that the village of Brassika would become my subject of study. Thus, by tapping into local high-caste networks that coincided with local networks of state power I had gained entrance to the village of study and I had had my first lesson in the fuzziness of the boundaries between state and society.

My husband and I came to live in the Puri. Etiquette demanded that I behave in order to honour my host. I could not commute between high- and low-caste houses within Brassika. With such an introduction and place of living I quickly realised that I could only get a top-down view of the village social hierarchy.

My subject of study shifted: I became interested in the impact of the national government on village government and social and economic life. All day, every day, I had access to the Tjokorda and his cronies, government officials and the élite of the village. I attended meetings, openings, schools and clinics, and witnessed the implementation of development programmes. Above all, it was the sight and sound of children trooping off to school down the village lanes, singing patriotic songs and proudly wearing their uniforms of Sang Merah Putih – the red-and-white of the national flag – that changed the topic of my PhD. I was struck not only by the radical effects of the invasion of the Indonesian state but also by the villagers’ apparently enthusiastic participation in nation-making.

My acceptance of Tjokorda Gede Agung’s offer of hospitality, that is, to live in his Puri, largely shaped my fieldwork. The village (desa) was his unit of jurisdiction. He was the point of contact between the villagers and the nation-state. Thus in 1980 there was no quandary for me as to what constituted my unit of study – to study anything other than the well-defined desa would have been inappropriate.

THE PURI

The distinguishing features of Brassika when I began fieldwork in 1980-81 were the power and importance of Puri Agung, the complexity of social relations and the introverted and closed atmosphere of the village.

The siting and architecture of Puri Agung (the Great Puri) reflect its central position and pre-eminence in the village and also its isolation from village life. It is a large complex of buildings situated on the most prestigious site in the village, the kaja (northeast, mountainward) corner of the central crossroads. (See Map 2.) The Puri was built on a rise. On the two sides facing the roads there were stone and brick walls four metres high. Inside, its various courtyards were flat and walled. (See Figure 2-2.) All that
was visible of the Puri from street height at the crossroads were the outer yard, high walls and in the corner a tower containing a *gendongan* or *kul-kul* (split wooden gong). Not only did the walls create an impression of grandeur and rather forbidding exclusion, they also indicated wealth and high status. Uphill from the crossroads the stone walls tailed off; by the time one reached the magnificent temple, the Mrajan Agung, of the Puri and its associated descent group, the road and buildings were virtually on the same
Figure 2-2: Puri Brassika
Introducing Brassika

EXPLANATION

- Merajan Agung  Jaba Jaba Tengah Jeroan
- Puri Agung A - living quarters for principal wife
- Puri Agung B - living quarters for secondary wife
- Puri Saren Agung
- Puri Kawan
- Bencingah or Ancak Saji - forecourt
- Puri Saren Kangin

Bale: pavilion, building
Bale Kul-Kul: pavilion for split gong
Bale Lantang: long pavilion for preparations, eg. of food
Bale Pawedaan: high pavilion for Pedanda
Bale Peninjoan: high observatory
Bale Pesanekan: reception
Bale Tegeh: high pavilion marking corner
Ketungan: rice mortar
Kios: shops
Loji: guest quarters
Panyimpenan: resting places for deities such as Sang Hyang Widi (Sanggaran Agung the god of the ocean (Betara Segara), the deity of Tulikup
Pawaregan: kitchen
Penggaruman: highly decorated pavilion/altar for offerings and holy water
Piasan: pavilion for displaying Barong and offerings
Sema Anggen/Sumanggen: area for cremations
Tempeng: rubbish/toilet
level. Puri, often impressive houses, are usually built and rebuilt by the labour of loyal kaula (subjects). Around 1990, a row of small shops was built along the main road onto the front wall of the Puri: this has the effect of hiding the Puri from the public along one of its two exterior walls. One could argue that this emphasizes its ‘insideness’ and distance from public street life, or one could say that the impression of grand high walls is largely gone. However, the shop-tenants are all Puri women, three of whom sell cooked food, snacks and petrol, and there is Tjokorda Gede Agung’s wife, who operates her clinic. This new foray into commercialism seems to me to indicate a considerable demeaning of the place and status of the Puri in village life, but I have no evidence of this interpretation from my informants.

Puri Brassika is approached through empty grassy forecourts – the jaba. The jero, or ‘inside’ of the Puri, the private quarters of the king, consists of a complicated series of rectangular walled courtyards – each separate from the other. The city-like labyrinth is laid out according to genealogical branches. In Figure 2-2, which shows the layout of the Puri,
the different shadings of the courtyards show where the different families live and correspond to the shadings of the various segments of the Puri lineage. Three lines of descent are given architectural form in the rectangular courtyards delineated by high brick walls. These compounds of segments of the lineage are named Puri Kawan, Puri Agung and Puri Saren Agung. The pre-eminent family today lives in Puri Agung. Puri Agung is headed by Tjokorda Gede Agung, and is divided into two courtyards to accommodate the families of different wives. (A third wife and her children live in a separate house-compound at the southern edge of Brassika.) Tjokorda Gede Agung is the pengarep (direct descendant, eldest son) of the former pengarep, i.e. the punggawa. Tjokorda Gede Raka currently occupies Puri Saren Agung, the innermost (dalem) or trunk courtyard of the Puri. The unequal relationship of these two high-ranking males, although acknowledged by both, is sometimes troubled, for instance, in disagreements over the management of the descent-group temple, land and material resources. In the Bali of 1981 there were convenient labels and portfolios for both: the Dewa Agung was perbekel and managed government, and Tjokorda Gede Raka was klian desa adat and organized matters of customary law and religion.

Thus, spatial orientations and social relationships reflected and reinforced each other. The architecture of the Puri mirrored social ‘insides’ (jero) and ‘outsides’ (jabo), relative social status (usually expressed in terms of relative height), temporal priority and proximity to genealogical trunk lines.
There was a considerable vertical distance between life in the Puri and village street life. This physical distance matched social distance. In many ways, the Puri was remote from the daily life of the villagers. The Tjokorda did not visit villagers socially, nor did he enter their homes. Tjokorda do not generally sit around in coffee stalls or hamlet meeting places as other men do, nor do Puri women enter into the often raucous street life that revolves around trading. Puri families keep to themselves: Puri children do not play with non-Puri children.

There are, however, many important ways in which the Puri is active in village life. All of them reinforce the pre-eminent position of the Puri in the village and express a range of asymmetrical relations between the Puri and the villagers. These patron–client ties can be glossed as the kaula-gusti relationship, because this dyadic expression was that most used by the locals when they tried to explain to me their connection with the Puri. The gusti is the lord or master, and the kaula traditionally his bondsman or servant.
Within Brassika, Tjokorda Gede Agung was usually called ‘Dewa Agung’ by his kaula. He is a descendant of the royal families of Gelgel and Klungkung. This line of kings is called the Dalem Segening line, and the king is often called ‘Dalem’ – ‘Insider’. Since the time of the shift of the capital from Gelgel to Klungkung, this king has often been called ‘Dewa Agung’ – literally ‘Great God’, the King of Klungkung and of all Bali. The use of this title by the subjects of this minor lord of Brassika is therefore quite extravagant. Sometimes visitors to the Puri would ask to see the Dewa Agung and if he were absent, say, shopping in Klungkung, I could answer gleefully that he was in Klungkung.

The kaula-gusti relationship is characterized by feelings of respect, loyalty and honour on the part of the kaula. There are no defined duties or obligations for the thousands of people who would loosely be called the kaula of the Tjokorda of Brassika, but when called upon, they would loyally respond. Most of them lived in Brassika, but over the years I became aware of possibly hundreds of loyal subjects in surrounding villages. (There were also people in Brassika who were not tied to the Puri.) They appeared at the Puri for a variety of reasons. Sharecroppers and tenants would come to pay their dues. Offerings of saté and lawar (ceremonial food) would be brought on the heads of mindful subjects when they celebrated life-cycle events. A small team of men would appear to scythe the lawn. Thousands attended the cremation (pelebon) of the Tjokorda’s mother. Tens of men worked for weeks to build a new pavilion in the Puri’s temple, the Mrajan Agung.

Some were his parekan, servants, who attended the Puri almost daily. Some lived at the Puri. One parekan was a small, misshapen man with a deformed mouth, who had trouble making himself understood in speech and often played a role as court fool. He did the most intimate domestic chores for our Puri family, washing, washing up and cleaning up after the children, and lay every night in our doorway as our guard. Other parekan gave service as guards, messengers, handymen, gardeners, butchers, drawers of water and a host of other occupations.

What are the obligations of the gusti, the patron, in this relationship? One is that the Puri traditionally provides the village with a leader who represents the village in its relations with other villages and with higher officials. When I arrived, this political role had a dual character: the Tjokorda played the traditional role of local Dewa Agung and also occupied the official (dinas) role as village-elected, government village head (perbekel or kepala desa), and for this he received a small wage. These twin roles were inextricably intertwined and the study of his position forms an important part of this book.

As the traditional head of the Puri, the Tjokorda had to advise his subjects on a wide range of matters. Villagers frequently visited the Puri, not in a friendly or casual, ‘just dropping in’ way – indeed, this is not common among villagers generally – but formally, and usually to ask for advice. A
jaba (low-caste, outsider) man would, very circumspectly, enter the Puri, stooped and with lowered head, a scarf or towel tied around his waist as a mark of respect, his right hand cupped in his left as a sign of supplication and honour. He would simply sit and wait in the porch or on a lower step in the courtyard. When the Tjokorda was ready to see him, the supplicant would state his name and problem – for instance, asking if he should make offerings at a particular temple, or if a particular choice of marriage partner for his son were suitable. Often such queries arose because of illness: a sick person might have been taken to a healer who ascertained that an offering had been neglected or that there had been a mistake in remembering the ancestors. The Tjokorda normally provided an immediate verbal answer to such questions. Sometimes the matter was more official than social, e.g. a theft had occurred – could the Tjokorda advise how to report it? Sometimes, because a matter threatened to go beyond the village, a group would ask for his advice. A new gamelan orchestra was to be bought – how did the Tjokorda advise the banjar proceed? A former servant brought his wounded aunt to the Puri. He wanted to know if the woman should report her husband to the police for assault. Sometimes the Tjokorda would give the petitioner money to assist in the problem, dropping it on the ground in the mud rather than handing it to the person.

Another important function of the Puri was to store and dispense historical information. When I was collecting information about the history of Brassika I was invariably directed to the Puri, where, I was told, Tjokorda Gede Raka, the klian desa adat and esteemed history expert, could tell me
what I needed to know.\textsuperscript{8} Updated genealogies of the various families of the Puri of Brassika adorned one whole wall of the reception room of the Puri. Visitors often expressed interest and were invited to peruse the charts. It was acceptable for visitors to comment on or ask about these genealogies, for the Puri was proud of its links to the Klungkung royal family. However, it was not these artistically presented charts but the Tjokorda’s knowledge of the history of the various descent-groups in Brassika that was the Puri’s key historical resource. He did not freely disclose this knowledge; it was therefore valuable and a source of power.\textsuperscript{9} The Tjokorda’s mental repository of information and his tight control on release of it conferred upon him a considerable political advantage: by not sharing information freely he could, to an extent, direct the ritual and kinship networks within Brassika. This was one ‘use’ of history-telling and history-knowing in Brassika. The ownership and control of historical and ritual information was a source of power for the Puri.

The Puri, by virtue of its wealth, status and political power, is and has been an important actor in the creation of communities and political networks. In the past, it was the centre of a small kingdom (there are various names: jagat, gumi, negara, buwana and, these days, in Bahasa Indonesia, kerajaan). It was ruled for about the last two hundred years by the Tjokorda’s ancestral line. Brassika is strategically located: the kingdoms of Klungkung, Bangli and Gianyar are equidistant (about 10 km as the white egret flies) and Brassika was often fought over, or switched alliance to one or another of the surrounding kingdoms. It is clear that the kingdom of Brassika was never a bounded territory, nor was there a stable and homogeneous population. Nevertheless, the local histories show that because they were tied (kaiket) to their lords, the people followed (ngiring). In times of war or flight, or when new satellite puri were established, groups of loyal subjects followed.\textsuperscript{10} In this way, the people of Brassika evolved a complicated set of overlapping social networks. They often trace their place in these networks through historical links with the Puri. The Puri has thus helped to build a complex community based on kinship (alliances based on marriage, common ancestors and of course patrilineal descent), ritual meaning, shared place-origins and migrations, and shared power.

The Puri has also been instrumental in building links within and without the village through marriage. Marriage alliances have assumed great significance in the Puri’s construction of its realm. Low-caste men typically marry endogamously within the descent-group or local community, and are usually monogamous; by contrast, high-caste men often seek wives outside their descent-group and outside the local community. Their predilection for polygyny means they have the opportunity to satisfy various desires through marriage. Caste rules state that high-caste men may not marry above themselves; as there are rarely enough equal-rank women available, marrying down and out are obvious solutions. Polygyny is also important
because of its implications for the legitimacy of multiple heirs. The origin and status of women as mothers is especially critical in determining the status of children, especially sons, and has implications for the future relations between the Puri and the group of bride-donors.

First, the Puri men can take beautiful, low-caste wives from among local villagers, creating a very local ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ through asymmetrical marriage. The rules of hypergamy and hypogamy create a social hierarchy of greatly elaborated gender asymmetry. The Brassika Dewa Agung took as birthright two pretty low-caste young women as wives while still in his teens, almost as his playthings. They were later discarded.

Second, the Puri men take wives from unrelated houses further away, in effect creating a centre and subordinate periphery. A canny man will make a strategically significant choice. A third wife of the Brassika Dewa Agung was taken from an up-and-coming commoner house in an upstream neighbouring village. This wife’s father was a man of substance in his local community, holding the position of klian subak (head of the irrigation society) for many years.

Third, the men in the various branches of the Brassika insider group give and take wives. Close, endogamous unions can be risky, and not infrequently end in divorce. They are potentially ideal because they concentrate the group, keeping it tight and closed, unpolluted and sakti (potent). Such a marriage is also charged, tenget (dangerously hot) and potentially unmanageable, for two such closely related people are thought to be too alike. One such apparently ideal marriage was contracted between the daughter of the Brassika Dewa Agung and Dr. R– of another Brassika puri. This marriage ended quickly in divorce. It surprised no one when the Dewa Agung’s daughter soon after announced her hypogamous marriage to a low-caste man. It was said by the women in the Puri that she could only see that her new husband was a hotel manager and that she chose to be blind to his non-title – an interesting expression of the clash of value-systems. Another happier marriage which I would group here was one between a young man from Geria Sakti and the Puri, i.e. between the son of a candidate for pedanda-thood and the daughter of Tjokorda Gede Raka. This marriage, far more blood-distant than the first in this group, seems to be long-lived. The arrangement of suitable marriages for the daughters of the Brassika Dewa Agung is a great problem: by one wife, he has eight daughters, and the number of suitably ranked young men is not large.

Fourth, the various Puri lines within the semetonan (descent group) of Dewa Agung Panji contract extra-local marriages. The practice of reciprocating marriage, i.e. of exchanging daughters as wives, ideally expresses the equal status of the participants of the semetonan, and stands in contrast to the asymmetrical marriage practices of the Klungkung Dewa Agung.
Introducing Brassika

(Daughters of the Dewa Agung in Klungkung may only marry close kinsmen, or, more commonly, remain unwed (Wiener 1995: 392; n.6 and 395, n.32).) Examples of such marriages in the Puri ancestral line include the three marriages of Dewa Agung Putu, to ranking women from Bangli, T– and P–. Currently, a marriage between a son of Puri Brassika and a daughter of Puri K– has resulted in another messy and tragic divorce. This resulted in a dramatic trip by Tjokorda Gede Raka to Java to retrieve the Puri progeny, virtually kidnapping the seven-year-old daughter of the failed marriage.

Over the generations the Puri has built a complex social network, based on blood and affinal ties. It must keep these ties alive, by inviting and being invited to a large number of social and ritual events, notably life-cycle celebrations such as weddings, three-month-after-birth ceremonies and death ceremonies, and odalan (temple anniversaries) of a range of temples. The Tjokorda follows an incredibly busy schedule of social/ritual events. Over the years, I have witnessed many ‘networking’ sessions when I accompanied members of the Brassika Puri to temples and puri at Bangli, Kusamba, Singahan, Ubud, Jalananyar, Besakih and Peninjoan, a collection of centres that reflects the historical development of its ritual and kinship network. In addition, I have followed the Tjokorda to a great many life-cycle ceremonies in Brassika and neighbouring villages, usually because he was invited as the patron of a poor family and he did them honour by attending their weddings or cremations.

There is one other, unusual, way in which the Puri served the people of Brassika, and that was through healing. When I arrived in Brassika, the Tjokorda practised as a balian, or healer. For some years he practised, tending a string of patients every night in the Puri. In addition, his high-caste wife, Anak Agung Biyang (hereafter ‘Gung Biyang), was a nurse and midwife. She worked as the government-paid Clinic nurse and developed her own thriving practice. This was not of the same order as the Tjokorda’s balian service, being her source of livelihood and profession, but it contributed to a community perception that the Puri was a centre of healing and service.

The above description gives a rather rose-coloured picture of the Puri and its place in the community. This is very much the picture that it liked to present to me: that it had a strong sense of noblesse oblige, that it cared for the people and had a responsibility to look after the people. The Tjokorda also liked to present an image of himself as a strong protector of the people, as befitted a satria leader. Sometimes, in trying to teach me about his role, he would draw himself up in an aggressive warrior stance, right arm cocked to form a shield and fists clenched, to show that he must be brave and bold. He also believed that he must be intelligent, of strong mind, to lead his people and outwit his enemies. However, his personal style and behaviour, and the role of the Puri, can also be seen in quite a different light, a much less flattering light, and this will become obvious in Chapter 4 and later chapters.
Brassika was a highly stratified society. The pre-eminent position of the Puri, and the high status of other puri and the geria, created a binary social divide between the ‘wong jero’ and ‘wong jaba’ (insiders and outsiders). The three upper castes were often grouped together, for instance in the term ‘triwangsa’, three groups. The system of social stratification in Bali is usually described as a caste (kasta or warna) system, but the hegemonic and totalizing claims of such a system overstate reality in Brassika. Nevertheless, in Brassika, status differentials between the four major caste groups were quantifiable. The number of sticks of saté (skewered ground meat) to which people of differing caste were entitled at ceremonies and the number of levels of roof for cremation towers and temple buildings were set for the four castes. The length of time people of different caste were thought to be sebel or cuntaka (impure, dangerous and vulnerable to supernatural attack) after death was set roughly according to caste, but with one telling variation: brahmana and satria dalem (the ruling descent-group of Puri Agung): 11 days; other satria: 17 days; wesia: 27 days; jaba/sudra: 42 days. Thus the occupation of the highest place in the hierarchy was contested in Brassika, and the neat fourfold division disturbed.
In Brassika, differential social status was most obviously expressed in language registers or levels, which consist of different vocabularies. When speaking in Balinese, acknowledgement of caste disparities is unavoidable: a commoner must use High Balinese when talking to or of a high-caste person, and a high-caste person uses Low or Middle Balinese to address a wong jaba; however, individual status, such as that of a village priest, pemangku, can cut across caste, such that a Puri person must address a commoner pemangku in High Balinese.

An important and public aspect of hierarchy in language is the use of status titles to address people. The pivotal distinction between gentry (triwangsa) and commoner (jaba) in Bali is that the former must always be addressed by their title, and the latter ... may never be addressed by them' (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 90). In Brassika, the following titles were employed, in (contested) descending rank order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Male Title</th>
<th>Female Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>triwangsa* brahmana</td>
<td>Ida Bagus</td>
<td>Ida Ayu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satria</td>
<td>Cokorda</td>
<td>Cokorda Isteri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anak Agung</td>
<td>Anak Agung Isteri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dewa</td>
<td>Dewa Ayu/Desak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sang</td>
<td>Sang Ayu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ngakan</td>
<td>Ayu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wesi</td>
<td>Gusti</td>
<td>Gusti Ayu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jaba</td>
<td>I/Pan/Nang**</td>
<td>Ni/Men***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Brassika, adult triwangsa women were usually called by titles indicating both their descent-group status and their status as mothers or grandmothers, e.g. Anak Agung Biyang (Mother Anak Agung) or Anak Agung Niyang (Grandmother Anak Agung), usually shortened to Gung Biyang or Gung Niyang. There is also the title Jero, which usually indicates that a jaba woman has married a triwangsa man. A 'Jero' drops her unmarried name and usually adds the name of a flower, e.g. Jero Puspa, Jero Melati.

** In Brassika, 'I' was rarely used and adult jaba men were usually called by titles indicating their status as fathers or grandfathers, i.e. Pan (father of) [name of child] or Nang (father of) [name of child] or Kak (grandfather of) [name of grandchild].

*** Similarly, adult jaba women were usually called by titles indicating their status as mothers or grandmothers, i.e. Men (mother of) [name of child] or Dadong (grandmother of) [name of grandchild].

There has been much discussion in the anthropological literature on Bali about a perceived opposition in Balinese society between an egalitarian social ethos and a pervasive belief in social inequality, as exemplified in the so-called caste system. In the Geertzes’ terms, this is a contest between ‘Homo aequalis’ and ‘Homo hierarchicus’ (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 167). The social institution which is said to best represent Homo aequalis is the banjar or hamlet.
From Subjects to Citizens

The desa of Brassika consisted of almost 4,000 people in eight banjar. In Brassika, one of the most complex villages I have come across, a banjar is not an area. It is an organization whose members live in houseyards on communally-held land allocated by the organization, who share certain ritual duties as part of the desa adat and banjar, and who are subject to decisions taken at the monthly meeting. Normally, a man must have been married six months to qualify as a banjar member. Next-door neighbours may belong to different banjar. Nevertheless, each banjar is thought to occupy an area within the village, even though, strictly speaking, the precisely defined area is called a kompleks. The two free-standing kompleks, Tirtawangi and Anjingan, consist entirely of their banjar members. Particularly in the border areas of the six banjar which make up the central living mass of the village, there is an intermingling of houseyards of different kompleks. There have been a variety of attempts during the past 50 years to rationalize borders, define duties and change allegiances. The people of Brassika, village leaders included, found the whole matter very confusing.

There are five, very high-caste ‘households’ in the heart of Brassika whose banjar affiliations are unusual. Prior to 1965, no members of the Punggawa’s family were members of banjar. Only the former perbekel, the Tjokorda of Puri Kawan, was a member of a banjar, Pekandelan. In 1965–
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66, following the massacres of ‘Communists’ in Brassika, members of the three highest puri ‘turun’ (descended) to banjar Pekandelan. The geria took a complementary tack. Members of the two main geria, Geria Gede and Geria Suci, ‘spread out’, joining banjar Anjingan, Manuaba, Pekandelan and Siangan ‘because none of the family belonged there yet’. Apart from the special case of the association of Geria Gede with Anjingan,14 this dispersal of the members of the most powerful and high-caste houses in Brassika among the various banjar follows no precedents or birth-rights, and is a recent phenomenon. Partly it was a politic response to the violence of 1965 – most obvious in the ‘descent’ of the Tjokorda to the banjar. It was a signal to ordinary villagers that high-caste people did not consider themselves to be ‘above’ the ordinary people, and a symbol of the willingness of high-caste people to participate in the modern egalitarianism associated with the national government. It can be seen as the preparation of a defence in case the social discontent and resulting violence of 1965 should threaten again. Simultaneously, these high-caste people have used their status, wealth and traditional power to infiltrate most of the banjar in Brassika, in which they previously had no business. This unusual affiliation, as well as certain other elitist practices, show that in Brassika the banjar are not the egalitarian, autonomous institutions that the appellation ‘Homo aequalis’ implies.

In 1979 the national government introduced a new Local Government Law, followed by a series of regulations and ministerial guidelines, which introduced many important changes to village and local government in an attempt to standardize these nationwide.15 In Bali, probably the most far-reaching of these was the incorporation of a new lowest level of administration, the dusun, formerly known as the banjar. Under this new law, the head of a hamlet, the kepala/klian dusun, was no longer elected but appointed by the camat (sub-district head) from two candidates submitted by the perbekel. The new head received a wage and was expected to carry out the wishes of government, principally implementing a range of development programmes. The banjar was now responsible for ensuring, among other things, that its members sent their children to school, practised family planning and had their small children immunized and weighed. This represented a major change in the status, autonomy and functions of the banjar and its head. Previously, the head of the banjar had led meetings and organized banjar work; he beat the kul-kul (wooden split gong) to call the members, swept the bale banjar (meeting-house) floor, prepared the betel-nut packets before the meeting, introduced the agenda and ensured that all records of attendances and fines were kept. Formerly, the main functions of the banjar were the allocation of houseyard land, public works and ritual duties.

Although the banjar is a secular political and social organisation, and increasingly an arm of government, it can also be a constituent of the desa adat and formally contributes to the functions of the desa adat. For instance,
From Subjects to Citizens

Each banjar in Brassika is obliged to pay the temple priest (pemangku) 75 kg. of rice every six months and one set of white clothes every year. The desa adat has definite religious functions, such as the support of the Kahyangan Tiga temples and priests and assistance with the cremation and burial of the dead. There are four desa adat in Brassika, each with a set of temples, pemangku and graveyard, and with distinctive adat practices. In the two free-standing banjar, the banjar and desa adat coincide. Desa adat Setra Kangin is interesting: it used to have responsibility for two cemeteries, one for the triwangsa and one for wong jaba. It was decided soon after Independence that this separation did not fit (cocok) the egalitarian mood of the day, so the bones in the jaba graveyard were exhumed and reburied in Pekandelan’s graveyard. Here we see the ‘feodal’ character of pre-Independence Brassika and an accommodation to the egalitarian ethos of the nation-state.

The following thumbnail sketches of four of the eight banjar in Brassika show their diversity.

The banjar of Pekandelan, which literally means ‘lord’s servants’ quarters’ (Geertz 1980: 263), is the dominant banjar in Brassika. It includes the main puri and geria (ruling and priestly houses) of Brassika and nearly all the most powerful men in the village – the perbekel, the klian desa adat, the former perbekel, the vice-perbekel, the head of the village guard (Hansip) and important brahmana. Pekandelan is the banjar of high castes – 70 per cent of its 129 households are triwangsa. It has a large number of members who pay the pengampel – a substitution fee to excuse members from banjar duties. It is a banjar of economic disparity: most of the people are landless, but also it has many of the largest landowners in the village. In most banjar, the klian or head is a prominent and powerful person. In Pekandelan this was never the case: the head of the banjar was the second husband of the Tjokorda’s sister (the first, a Puri man, had died) and can be seen as a Puri stooge.

About one-half of the banjar describe their relationship with the Puri as that of parekan (servant, serf). A parekan is a dependent person, a servant, attached to a traditional ruler. The relationship was sometimes described to me in terms of asking for food: someone who nunas nasi, asks for rice from ‘above’, was a parekan. The Tjokorda expected political loyalty and service in the form of labour (ngayah) from parekan, and the parekan expected, as a minimum, material assistance with life-cycle rituals and at times of emergency. Some parekan, as described above, provided intimate domestic service; others considered that they were available to serve at the Puri but did not expect to be called upon often.

Kidikan stands in contrast to Pekandelan. It is a tiny banjar of 30 households in the central living area of the village. It is difficult to reach in the wet season because of the creeks which border it and can turn into raging torrents overnight. It is a determinedly inward-looking, kolot (conservative) group, with nearly all its members belonging to one descent-group, the Pasek
Dangka. More than half of all marriages occurred endogamously. Everybody in Kidikan owns riceland; there are no rich people and no really poor people. Even in the early 1990s it did not yet have electricity, many of its children were unschooled and its houses had dirt floors and were without modern amenities such as furniture and kerosene stoves.

**Photo 2-7: Men's work: the slaughtering and butchering of pigs for consumption by the married men in banjar Anjingen**
Kidikan and Anjingan share a distinctive oppositional culture and adat (customary law) of scavenging, dog-eating and begging. Anjingan is notorious as the village of dog-eaters, a vilification of which most wong Anjingan are proud. To most Balinese, a dog-eater is one who confuses food, for dogs are scavengers and are therefore unfit food for humans. A dog-eater, therefore, is also a scavenger – one who is not civilized, not really human. The practice of begging for leftover food, particularly for paridan (leftovers of ceremonial foods, especially from cremation meals), also indicates their uncivilized lack of discrimination. Mainstream Balinese consider that the consumption of leftovers does violence not only to the integral purity (sukla) of the food and the consumer but also, in the case of paridan, to the ancestors of the consumer and the ancestors of the owners of the paridan. Food belongs to individuals, families, descent-groups and their deities (according to the occasion), and the confusion of these occasions and groups is thought to be polluting. Wong Anjingan roam all over Bali, asking for leftovers of food, clothes, money, and dogs to eat. In return, they give donors their well-made sun-hats woven from young coconut leaves. Wong Anjingan are also ubiquitous at cremations, especially in eastern Bali, 'grave-robbing' the Chinese coins (pis bolong) which are exhumed along with the corpses to be cremated.

This culture of scavenging and dog-eating is abhorrent to others in Brassika, and a source of embarrassment. It was only after a long time of fieldwork that I was able to dig out this skeleton in the Brassika closet. Nevertheless, the people of Anjingan are loyal, though not obedient, subjects of the Puri, and, as noted above, are clients of the Geria. The Tjokorda tried for many years to outlaw dog-eating but begging for dogs continued literally under cover of darkness. Nevertheless, the banjar had a reputation for being independent of Brassika and determinedly distinctive. Government workers and teachers saw it, like Kidikan, as dirty and backward, and avoided going there. One of the reasons for this was its reputation for black magic, or in Bali, ‘left’ magic (pangiwa): it was known for its powerful sorcerers.

Tirtawangi is a free-standing banjar 2.5 km. south-west of Pekandelan. It is a noticeably progressive (maju) banjar, with high rates of educational attainment, family planning acceptance and enthusiastic adoption of government development programmes. Two batches of families have transmigrated to Central Sulawesi and East Kalimantan, easing the overcrowded living conditions, and a large number of young people have moved away in search of education and employment. Through the 1980s and early 1990s the banjar was ably led by a well-educated and highly motivated head. It was a very active and united banjar, good at fund-raising both internally and externally, and effectively latching onto government development initiatives. In appearance it was always extremely neat: its wide straight roads were well-maintained, its drains were always in good working
order and the volleyball court well-tended and frequently used. Since the transmigration of its energetic head and the loss of many of the best educated and able younger people, this development-minded banjar has gone to seed somewhat, and now often appears deserted.

NOTES

1. Visitors to the area, such as officials from the capital city, Denpasar, usually preface their speeches with an apology for their kasar (coarse) language and their ignorance of the correct speech with which to address such exalted personages as the Tjokorda of Brassika.

   Tjokorda is an older spelling of cokorda. It is still used by various cokorda in Brassika and I retain their spelling where appropriate. It smacks of a certain pride in old ways of doing things.

2. The Mrajan also has a jaba, an outside courtyard: one ascends through steps and enters the jaba tengeh, the ‘centre outside’, and then the jeroan, the ‘inside’, wherein the shrines of the deities are located. The entry from outside to inside always follows from the kelod (downstream, seaward, in Brassika southwest) direction to kaja (upstream, mountainward, in Brassika northeast). Entry to the jeroan is by the medal, a representation of a meru or cosmic mountain, which in the case of the Mrajan Agung in Brassika is richly decorated. The bencingah is the forecourt of the Puri in which the king held audiences.

   Other diagrams of puri can be found in Geertz 1980: 144; Geertz and Geertz 1975; Wiener 1990: 479. A good explanation of the sociological significance of puri architecture can be found in Wiener 1990: 136 ff.

3. An important fourth branch line of descent is housed in a semi-autonomous puri, Puri Saren Kangin, to the east of Puri Agung. It is genealogically more distant from the three.

4. Ideally, only one ruling man occupies a puri at any one time. The pre-eminent one (pengarep) – the king or lord – is the eldest son of the eldest son, traceable to the apical ancestor. He is the head of the semetonan, the conical and hierarchical clan that traces descent to an apical ancestor. Currently there are two eminent men, Tjokorda Gede Agung and Tjokorda Gede Raka, ‘seated’ (malinggih) or living in Puri Agung. Tjokorda Gede Raka’s position resembles in some respects that known as rijksbestierder, royal governor, reported by Korn and other Dutch sources, i.e. that the king had a near-twin, a key advisor, who was his highest-ranking male kinsman (Korn 1932: 287–92; Wiener 1995: 157). Tjokorda Gede Raka’s superior historical and literary knowledge, and his less flamboyant lifestyle, contribute to his often seeming the elder statesman of the two.

5. The history (and architecture) of Balinese kingdoms, kings and kingship is very much a story of origins, of kinship, of hierarchy and of relations of asymmetry. The most significant of these relations is the division of architecture and of society into jero and jaba.
sex who became temple priests or healers were also addressed as Jero. In short, anak jero were all of those persons close to the inner world of gods and rulers. Everyone else was an outer person, an anak jaba (Wiener 1995: 153).

6. An excellent and complex analysis of this Dalem Segening, or Kapakisan, line is Wiener 1995. She is concerned with presenting the insider’s view of history, and excels in explication of the importance and nature of the ‘invisible realm’ (niskala), heretofore neglected by Western social scientists.

7. Balinese sate consists usually of a paste of pounded meat, spices and coconut moulded onto the end of a stick; lawar is typically uncooked chopped meat of pig, duck or chicken with chopped leaves, coconut and spices. Sometimes we in the Puri ate lawar and sate for weeks on end – a mark of both the integration of the Puri in the everyday life of villagers and the respect with which villagers viewed the Puri.

8. This was true up to a point. He certainly had an encyclopaedic knowledge of some aspects of local history, and he drilled me in the names and places. Eventually he provided me with many beautifully written genealogies of his own and other important families in Brassika and of the major ruling houses and important descent groups of Bali.

9. He only unloaded the details with which I could flesh out his very dry and succinct history after many years, when I had established my bona fides, supplied him with some of my collected sources and committed to memory the building blocks he supplied.

10. Vickers noted in comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, that Dewa Agung Oka Geg is known for having visited parts of Bali in order to ‘give’ them their history. I find that this practice, rather than subverting my contention, reinforces it: the supporting relation between the Puri/Dewa Agung and the production or re-invention of history, coupled with the pre-eminent status of the Dewa Agung, mean that the giving of history from the top down is no indiscriminate dissemination but a powerful channelling and editing of history.

11. His healing practice was of a rather unusual type. Instead of acting as a healer-medium, and letting a spirit or deity speak through him to a patient, his type of healing involved putting patients into a trance-like state in order to ascertain the source of their problems.

12. Here the writer comes up against an intractable problem of nomenclature. There are many descent groups, particularly in highland and interior Bali, but also in lowland and urban Bali, which do not acknowledge membership of a caste, nor acknowledge superior or elevated status for high-caste groups. Educated, modernized individuals may also reject the caste system. Dumont’s emphasis on relative purity as a single organizing principle of caste also seems off the mark for Balinese notions of caste difference (Dumont 1970). Another problem is that in much everyday life the binary divide between high castes and commoners is more pertinent than the four-way division: the three ‘high’ castes, the brahmana, satria and wesia, are commonly known as the triwanga or jero (insiders) and distinguished from the wong jaba (outsiders), who make up perhaps 90 per cent of the population. Tempting as it is, I will not address the issue of caste in this book because it would deviate from the
focus on the nation-state. Because I cannot adequately explicate the tensions here, I use the accepted term ‘caste’, but record my dissatisfaction with it.

Within Brassika there are individuals, usually called wong mula, Bali Mula or Bali Aga, who some see as outside the caste system. Others, such as members of the Pande descent-group, do not fit themselves into the fourfold system. The dog-eaters of Anjingan and Kidikan, two hamlets in Brassika (see Parker 1991), are regarded by some in Brassika as outside the caste system, rather like ‘Untouchables’ in India, a comparison which of course strengthens claims that this is indeed a caste society.

13. This naming system has been well analysed by C. Geertz (1973: 368–389) and Geertz and Geertz (1975). C. Geertz argued that teknonyms effectively play down sex differences, because the emphasis is not on the wife adopting her husband’s patronym, as in most Western countries, but is rather on the husband–wife pair as procreators (1973: 376–377). Apart from objecting to the argument because of the Eurocentrism implied, I would maintain that there are still the sex-markers, Pan/Nang and Men, though the emphasis shifts to the new family unit once teknonyms are used. I would add that the teknonym system, in which only high-caste males keep their personal titles throughout life, unchanged by parenthood, indicates that they are the power-holders, or unmarked category. Other groups are marked as subsets of male triwangsa (female triwangsa), as a different and subordinate order to them (male jaba) or as subsets of the subordinate order (female jaba).

14. Historically, Geria Gede has been associated with banjar Anjingan. This association dates from the time of the first bagawanta (court priest) in Brassika. According to the Puri, the raja of Brassika provided for the bagawanta by granting the population of Anjingan and Kidikan as sisia (clients). The pedanda (brahmana priest) said that the people in that place nunas tirta (ask for holy water) from him, as their Siwa (priest). Today the Pedanda from Geria Gede serves the people and temples of those two banjar, formerly comprising the desa adat Anjingan.


16. This presentation might give a false impression of the fixedness of these arrangements. Formerly, Kidikan and Siangan were one banjar and now they are two. Since 1958, desa adat Siangan has consisted of both banjar Siangan and Kidikan. Formerly, Kidikan was part of the desa adat Anjingan.

17. In the village survey conducted in 1981, respondents were asked how they described their relationship with the Puri and to choose their own terms. Sixty-six households described themselves as parekan of the Puri. About one-half lived in Pekandelan, one-quarter lived in Manuaba and the others were spread more or less evenly.

18. I cannot deal adequately with this sub-culture here. See Parker 1991 for an introduction.

19. Early on in fieldwork, before I knew that there was anything special about Anjingan, I was being pestered by people in Anjingan, who kept asking me for my pens, camera, handbag, money, even my wedding ring. I commented, half complaining, to the Tjokorda back at the Puri. Never again was I importuned: unbeknownst to me, he ordered Anjingan inhabitants not to beg for money and possessions from me.

20. It was also renowned for its connections with Sanur, on the coast. Anjingan women frequently married to Sanur, which is the origin place (kawitan) of the dominant descent group in Anjingan, the Dalem Suladri, and Sanur, as a well-known centre of magic, was the destination of wong Anjingan in search of spells, amulets and curses.
SECTION II

Land, Caste and Massacre
CHAPTER 3

Land: Its Significance and Distribution

The smallholder economy of Brassika is based on the production of rice in irrigated terraces. Most people are engaged in agriculture, and most men and some women describe themselves as farmers (wong tani). The hearthhold is the unit of production and consumption, and there is usually a married couple at the heart of this unit. Two important qualifications must be attached to this statement. It cannot be said that the married couple is the unit of ownership, for ownership of the main means of production lies with married men. Land is most frequently passed on through patrilines. Access to productive land is clearly inequitably distributed, most starkly by gender, though this is never remarked upon in the literature. Secondly, despite the fact that most villagers identify themselves as farmers, many are actually landless; land is not evenly distributed among households, and in particular there was considerable concentration of land in the hands of the Puri, a concentration which has weakened since the 1960s. These economic inequalities will be mapped and their tragic social and political ramifications analysed in the two chapters in this section. This chapter begins with a consideration of the significance of land, the most important factor of production, to the villagers, and then explores the changing patterns of land ownership in the mid–late twentieth century. The chapter ends with a brief consideration of access to land through sharecropping practices.

In this section, the links revealed between state and society, and between the national and the local in the New Order, are economic: both the type of material rewards associated with political power and the nature of political power were in flux through the twentieth century. The rewards of the precolonial and colonial eras – the so-called feudal system of patronage – had to be surrendered by the Puri to the legalistic and egalitarian demands of the nation-state, but the contest over their control was bitter and costly.

Land is precious to the Balinese: this is obvious from the beautifully manicured plots of sawah; from the miserly calibration of water distri-
bution, which conserves every millilitre of gravity-fed water and every possible kilojoule of potential energy; from the labour-intensive care of cattle and their manure; from the husbanding of green manure crops, the trimming of the paddy walls and the careful application of weeds and straw as mulch; and from the economical and meticulous transplanting of the rice seedlings.

The population of Bali has grown from 800,000 in 1817 (Raffles 1978 [1817], II: 232) to 2,778,000 in 1990 (Hull and Jones 1994: 125). It is no wonder that arguments over land and its distribution among a rapidly growing population have been salient in the recent political history of Bali. Under the Old Order of President Sukarno, and especially during the five years after land reform legislation was enacted in 1960, Balinese society became increasingly heated and polarized around this issue. With few exceptions (notably Robinson 1995), the scholarly history of Bali has been silent on the arguments, conflicts and violence that unequal access to agricultural resources has wrought.1 The massacre of perhaps 80–100,000 Balinese in 1965–66, about 5 per cent of the population, seems to have been omitted from public discourse in Bali, from Western scholarship on Bali and, needless to say, from the tourist promotion and sale of Bali as a tropical paradise. In the New Order period, access to land and the unequal distribution of this most vital means of production have not been public political issues in Bali.

This chapter focuses particularly on the value of land, and changing patterns of ownership of and access to land. The picture is an introverted one, reiterating the theme of Puri dominance but more clearly pointing to exploitation in the economic arena. The next chapter abruptly adopts an outward-looking approach, examining the way in which Brassika was sucked into, but also leapt into, the maelstrom of Indonesian politics. The murder of six senior generals in Jakarta on 30 September 1965, an event commonly but chillingly known as Gestapu (Gerakan September Tiga Puluhan, The September 30th Movement), signalled the death of the Old Order under President Sukarno, and the birth of the New under General Suharto.2 Suharto restored immediate order after the alleged coup attempt by Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) elements, but the generals’ murder was the catalyst for a sometimes orchestrated, sometimes spontaneous, outpouring of violence. The massacre of perhaps one million Indonesians, mainly in Aceh, Java and Bali, followed: in part the deliberate implementation of ‘hit lists’ compiled by army, police and civilian staff; in part the result of an intentional inflation of mass hysteria and anti-Communist paranoia after Gestapu; in part the result of a painful accommodation to a tentative, national rule of law and the egalitarianism of the new nation-state; and in part the reaction of the masses to increasing poverty (the poverty of land shortages, hyper-inflation, food shortages, etc.), unfulfilled political expectations, relative deprivation and years of radical politicization and mobilization.3
Chapter 4 deals with the murder of about 100 villagers from Brassika in the post-Gestapu massacres. My placement of these murders in this section on economic life is intended to indicate their connection to the issues of access to land and sharecropping arrangements, and to highlight the class conflict in which they were grounded. However, there are two major problems with this positioning of the massacres. First, survivors, when they did talk of the nightmare months that followed Gestapu, which was very rarely indeed, impressed upon me that the special quality of these murders, and of the political allegiances that preceded them, was that it was villager against villager, banjar-member against banjar-member, sibling against sibling, and ‘even husbands and wives were separated because of politics’. Traditional horizontal ties – of blood, kinship and marriage, banjar membership, of shared ancestors and cremation obligations – were ruptured by political alliance to local patrons and to the two major parties locally, the PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia) and the PKI. What many Balinese find shocking in the massacres is this violent rupture of former, ‘natural’ solidarity and order. The questions to be answered are: were the murders an expression of class conflict over access to the means of production, and to what extent did the murders express frustration with traditional relationships?

Second, neither in villagers’ talk of the murders nor in the literature of the period does the economic conflict figure large, if at all. It must be admitted that today the murders are not discussed in terms of class. However, this is unsurprising, for in Suharto’s Indonesia, class was not a licit social grouping, let alone acknowledged as an energizing historical force. In the Indonesian short stories about Gestapu published in Aveling 1975, the topics of land reform and of inequitable land distribution were barely mentioned. These realist stories were preoccupied with the personal agonizings that the public conflicts triggered – to kill or be killed, the emosi of revenge, the duty of loyalty to family versus the immorality of murder, calculations over the best way to act with an eye to the future, the tragedy of being caught up in a politics of ideology and violence, and so on. Brassika villagers happily described the excitement of political party rallies, the rhetoric of land reform meetings, especially the demonizing of landlords, and their nostalgia for the participatory, mobilizing oratory of Sukarno. But when it came to the local murders, the talk, rare as it was, was of displays of magic, the terror of waiting for the black hoods to appear in the middle of the night and of horrific dismemberment. Such things cannot be explained rationally, simply in terms of class analysis, economic exploitation and injustice.

The people don’t discriminate at a time like that. They have borne their anger and bitterness a long time. When it finally explodes, one cannot expect them to be rational. We can both understand that.
When anger and bitterness are king, intellect goes under. (Aleida in Aveling 1975: 92)

I conclude that the murders were, in considerable part, an expression of class/caste conflict within an emerging nation-state. However, and herein lies the rub, the murders were not committed by the underdogs, chafing under centuries of immoral exploitation – they were largely the actions of the conserving class, albeit a class under threat, whipped to a defensive emotional pitch after several years of mass mobilization and incited by the army and the new civilian leaders concerned with establishing a ‘clean’, docile New Order in Indonesia.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LAND

Irrigated rice land is one of three major types of land distinguished by villagers: wet rice fields (*sawah*), dry fields (*tegal*) and houseyard land (*kebun*).

Unlike *sawah* and *tegal*, houseyard land (*kebun*) is owned collectively by the villagers. At a more esoteric level, but one which is real and of everyday relevance to villagers, the land belongs to their ancestral deities. In Brassika, there are two types of houseyard land: *tanah karangan desa* and *tanah ayahan desa*. The former is owned by the *desa adat* and may not be bought and sold. The occupant only enjoys hereditary rights of use, which are passed on to a male descendant, in return for carrying the loads and duties of membership of the *desa*. The inheritance of this land incurs the responsibility of cremation of one’s parents. The second type of houseyard land, *tanah ayahan desa*, is also not privately tenured and only confers the right of use, not ownership. Ownership lies with the *desa adat*. It differs from *tanah karangan desa* in its history, obligations and official status. It is land that originated with the kings from the time of the kings and is that land which has been granted by a king to the *desa* or an inhabitant. Such land may be granted (and compensation for the productive vegetation is paid) when the *desa* has an interest or need and makes a request of the Puri for land, for instance, to become the site of a primary school or clinic. The land has a certificate (*pipil*) and can be taxed, and the landholder carries the load of *ayahan* (service) to the *desa*.

In Brassika, houseyard land is not considered an economic resource. However, as young couples gradually move out of the cluster settlements to their *pondok* (cattle shacks) in the fields and turn them into houses, and whenever someone buys a plot of agricultural land on the edge of the village for house land, villagers wonder how long the non-commercial and communal nature of shared land will last.

*Tegal* is considered private property, and can be bought and sold like any other commodity. *Tegal* produces root crops such as taro, yams, sweet...
potatoes, cassava, onions and garlic, and coconuts, cloves, peanuts, soy beans, chillies, cucumbers, tomatoes, leaf and pulse crops and marigolds (for use in offerings). These are thought of as cash crops. It remains to be seen whether or not tegal becomes economically more important and valuable when high-return crops such as cloves are grown on it for sale. In Brassika in 1981, clove trees were the most popular new crop, and about 100 farmers had planted them. This was a considerable investment as the trees do not produce saleable quantities of flowers for some seven years. The trees did not thrive, and the high expectations for cloves (for both their productivity and price) have been dashed.

Traditionally, tegal is considered the source of inferior tuber crops that are only consumed by poorer families when rice stocks are depleted (in the month or two before the rice crop is harvested), or when family finances are low. Produce from tegal is thus perceived as emergency, second-rate food, the consumption of which is felt to be degrading. When compared with sawah, tegal has a lowly and marginal status, and when I asked people how much land they owned, they frequently neglected to mention their tegal. The cost of tegal is normally about half that of sawah. Many women work on vegetable crops, often in partnership with their husbands: it is not uncommon to see couples planting sweet potato cuttings or pulling onions together. There is no apparent gendered division of labour as there is with the rice crop. Some tegal is unusable except as a source of grass for fodder or thatch. The picturesque steep ravines that punctuate any east–west travel in the south of Bali are covered in this alang-alang grass. Other produce collected from these ravines includes ferns, bamboo and fruits.

As rice is the traditional basis of life, sawah has value as ‘symbolic capital’ beyond its material value. The amount of sawah owned is the Balinese measure of a man’s wealth and standing in the community. Rice is the staple food. ‘To eat’, ngajeng, is the same as ‘to eat rice’, ngajeng. The standard Balinese meal consists of nasi (cooked rice) and sambel (chilli paste), to which may be added chicken, pork, vegetables, lawar, sate and so on. Only the poorest people now substitute other (cheaper) root crops in their diet. Additives and substitutes for rice are cassava (sela sawi), taro (keladi) and sweet potatoes (sela bali). Rice is usually cooked first thing in the morning – preferably steamed, but sometimes boiled – and eaten twice a day, often cold. A polygynous high-born man will only eat rice that has been cooked by his high-caste wife. It is said by some in Brassika that only brahmana and satria women can cook nasi for sale – perhaps more a comment on who is most likely to buy nasi than a proscription adhered to in practice. Rice is also a wage good: the government pays its employees in vouchers for rice redeemable at the government district warehouse.

Rice has a role as a medium for the expression of status differentiation between people. Rice stands high on the alus–kasar scale. It has the quality of ‘transformability’. In its various stages, that is, as padi (rice seeds still on
the stalk), *jijih* or *gabah* (unhulled rice), *baas* (Low Balinese) and *beras* (hulled rice) and *nasi* (cooked rice), its degree of coarseness and refinement change. As *padi* and *gabah*, rice has great potential for transformation and is considered refined (*alus*). As such, it is payment to high-caste princes and landlords from sharecroppers. Petitioners and clients of high status ritual practitioners (*balian*) and priests (*pedanda*) take with them *beras* (hulled, uncooked rice) as the essence, *sari*, of an offering. Even so, sometimes a *pedanda* passes on this rice to another lower status person, in order to avoid the suggestion of dependence that acceptance of the gift implies (Hobart 1979: 192). It is in its most processed form as food (*nasi*) that rice becomes most coarse (*kasar*). When people of lower status ‘ask for’ (*nunas*) cooked rice, that is tantamount to expressing dependence. One who receives cooked rice from another is a dependant.

Economically, *sawah* is the most important type of land, both for its market value and productivity. More esoterically, people believe that *sawah* is not just owned, pawned or inherited – it is enjoyed, tended and utilized and the results of this labour are the improvement and processing of the land. In this sense, farmers are stewards of the land. The value of *sawah* has risen appreciably over the years, even in this rural area, which is not likely to be developed for urban expansion or tourist projects. Villagers frequently insist that they will never sell their *sawah* but for most people who own *sawah* it is their only possession that they can sell to raise a large amount of cash. No one ever lets go of *sawah* willingly – it is not a casual commodity – and usually only for dire emergencies.

One man, a public servant and village health functionary, owned a comfortable estate of *sawah*, worked by others. The ill-health of his son, and the son’s request for several million *rupiah* for an operation, caused the father much angst as he considered the prospect of selling his *sawah*. When he eventually did sell a considerable block of *sawah*, under duress because it was to become the site of a secondary school, the son recovered and was no longer in need of the money. He could not think what to use the money for and bought a car, which he was the first to admit he did not need. He could not win: a man neglected by his wife, a trader, he succumbed to diabetes and was much criticized for frivolous squandering by some villagers unaware of the circumstances.

For white-collar landlords, *sawah* is a sort of superannuation, such that they can retire, contemplate their land and their life with a glow of satisfaction and know that they have provided their children with the means to provide them with a fitting cremation.

In Brassika, where the water supply is adequate (though with seasonal variations) and the quality of *sawah* quite high, half a hectare of *sawah* is considered adequate to provide for a family of four or five. People with holdings of less than 0.25 ha are generally described as *lacur* (poor), people with holdings of 0.5–2 has are *sedeng* (comfortable) and the few owners with
Land: Its Significance and Distribution

land over about two has are sugih (rich). In Brassika, owning sawah is the best guarantee of survival and well-being in this life. In practice, farmers also recognize other important conditions: first, the characteristics of individual farmers – their industry and skill at farming, the necessary good health and the amount of free family labour available; second, the beneficence of nature and the invisible forces of the supernatural world; third, farmers’ access to patronage; and fourth, outside, uncontrollable economic and political forces such as government programmes, markets, subsidies and price support. The latter two conditions will be discussed in the following chapters.

Despite everyday comments about particular farmers’ skills, industry, experience and wisdom, rice land is not usually said to have been bought and sold, sharecropped out or resumed – instead, it ‘appears’, ‘disappears’ and ‘returns’ with the rises and falls of a family’s fortunes. When villagers discuss these matters they often ignore the fact that the owner of the sawah is an active agent, acquiring and divesting himself of sawah. The two elements, the sawah and its owner, are presented as remote from each other and unconnected, especially when the owner is a non-farming landlord. Thus, when the Tjokorda was a wild, irresponsible young man, always out and about, his sawah ’disappeared’. (Actually he did not bother to chase the sharecroppers for his dues.) He ‘did not look after it’. At this time, according to the Tjokorda and his wife, he did not look after his wives and children either – his family life was a mess. In 1981, however, she said, his sawah was returning, he owned a small selip (rice hulling machine) and a mini-bus, the sharecroppers were more conscientious about paying their harvest shares, the Tjokorda and his wife spent more time at home and the Tjokorda was behaving responsibly toward his family. However, truth will out, and, as we shall see later in the chapter, his wealth did indeed disappear. This dispersal of the Tjokorda’s estate could be seen as the logical outcome of his compliance with pressures upon the affluent to conspicuously give, share and consume. Thus, if he had chased his debtors he would have been seen as grasping, uncaring and mean-spirited, which are some of the connotations of the word ‘sugih’, rich. There is considerable pressure against the accumulation of capital, especially upon a traditional ruler with a local constituency. The perspicacious brother of the pedanda, a one-time vociferous opponent of the Tjokorda, observed in 1994 that the Tjokorda ‘is a person who prefers to collect friends rather than wealth’.7 I Sugih stands as the low-caste ideal opposite of the Tjokorda: a sudra man of landed wealth as well as other investments (a large truck, a selip), he is known for his miserly payments to employees and sharecroppers and universally condemned for his greed and arrogance.

Ownership of a substantial amount of sawah is not a guarantee of a family’s well-being. If a family becomes wealthy, it neglects its ancestors at its peril. In 1981, an important factor in the Tjokorda’s recent economic
upturn was thought to have been the fact that he had renovated one of the large pavilions (bale) in the impressive temple of his Mrajan. At that time, the family of Geria Gede was thought to be tempting fate by not doing likewise. Though their living quarters were the fanciest in Brassika, with gravel in the courtyards and tiled floors in the sleeping pavilions, their ancestor temple was a small ruin.8

The ancient indigenous rice goddess, Dewi Sri, is the focal point for a fertility-and-rice ritual complex. The lovely Dewi Sri is thought to embody the sari (essence) or amerta (life-force) of all rice plants. In Brassika, farmers have a fond affection for and apparently easy familiarity with Dewi Sri. Betari or Dewi Sri is most obvious when displayed with ‘her husband’, Betara Rambut Sedana, the male deity of material prosperity, as two exquisite figurines in processions to the sea, to the subak (irrigation society) temple at Klotok, around the stations of the desa and so on. This venerated fertility couple, Sri–Sedana, play the most significant roles in agricultural religious practice and belief. They can be equated with the couple Visnu–Sri (Gonda 1973: 220 and 240; Schaareman 1986: 61).

The sawah are dotted with shrines – often just a temporary affair of a tray of offerings atop a bamboo pole – and, at different times, one sees offerings in the middle of a plot about to be ‘opened’ with the first hoe strike, offerings at water channel openings and bifurcations and near weirs and dams, offerings on the ground in the corners of fields and offerings at harvest sites and in subak temples.9 The major part of this religious practice is performed by individual farmers rather than collectivities. Its survival, despite the Green Revolution, attests to the continuing strength of villagers’ essentially and ultimately religious view of rice production.10 According to farmer exegesis, the growing of a rice crop depends upon the successful working together of various forces, including human hard work and experience and the interaction of three particular deities: Dewi Sri, Ibu Pertiwi, the goddess of earth, and Visnu, the god of water.

CONTROLLING PATTERNS OF LAND OWNERSHIP

The question of who owned the land and the water in precolonial times is a vexed one (cf. Schaareman 1986: 19–22; Van der Kraan 1983: 318 and 338; C. Geertz 1980: 67–68, 178–180, 184–185, 225–226). Van der Kraan states that, edicts show … the Balinese kings never were the sole proprietors of all the land within their realm. They demonstrate that while the kings exercised certain powers over the uncultivated land (forests and streams) outside the territories of the village communities, the lands within the village territories were owned by the village community, by institutions (temples, subaks) or, indeed, by private individuals (1983: 318).
Korn, however, states that, ‘all land within the village boundary was the possession of the king’ (1932: 588, my translation).

In Brassika, the following picture has emerged from study of local texts, other histories and primary sources, and from conversations with villagers and the Puri. The latter two agree that some village lands were the property of the raja, the tanah ayahan desa discussed above. Rulers did ‘own’ many plots of sawah, in that the king or queen could exact taxes in kind, and perhaps in cash, from the cultivators of this land. In addition, individuals were thought to also own sawah and tegal, and some of these people were subjects of the local king.

Taxes were one of many ways by which the common peasants were tied to the king. Local histories tell of a despotic and greedy king who may well have been implicated in the early nineteenth century shift in Balinese trade. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the export of slaves had provided the main source of income for the Balinese nobility. The gradual international decline in this trade and other changes in the general patterns of archipelagic trade caused the nobility to quickly shift to the export of rice, cash crops and pigs, an adaptation which strongly suggests that land was becoming a more desired, fixed resource – in short, property (Schulte Nordholt 1993: 303).

It is also clear that the ruler was at least the nominal owner of the water in the realm. As water originated in the forested hills and flowed along the valleys that were under royal control, the raja imposed water taxes (suwinih). Irrigation was never the autonomous domain of the peasant cooperatives, as Geertz implies (1980) – rather, it required inter-state negotiation at high levels, sponsorship by sakti rulers of state and the performance of state ritual to ensure a benevolent supernatural environment (Schulte Nordholt 1986).

The sedahan and sedahan gede were responsible for the overseeing of irrigation and hence were very powerful. They were virtually the treasurers of the kingdoms, controlling the rice stocks supplied by the lord’s sharecroppers, gathering taxes and rents and also adjudicating when disputes between subak arose over irrigation and agriculture (Liefrinck 1969: 11–12). (Subak are irrigation organizations consisting of people who own or work sawah that is irrigated from a single source of water. Their main functions have traditionally been the distribution of water to the rice paddies and the maintenance of temples and support of deities.) Sedahan and sedahan gede were attached to and often members of the royal houses, and they were responsible to the ruler. The Brassika tax-collector, Dewa P-, was a subordinate of Puri Agung; one descendant of this family continues bureaucratic service as a klian dinas, as did his father before him.

The Dutch changed these positions to bureaucratic posts which were organized on the basis of territory (i.e. a transformative redefinition of political allegiance to a lord) and irrigation. All the subak in a water catch-
ment area, in this case the subak fed by two parallel rivers, became the area of jurisdiction, pasedahan, of a Dutch-appointed sedahan. A territory based on the borders of the pasedahan, usually a river, was allocated to each district head (punggawa) within a regency. The pasedahan of Jalananyar was bordered by two rivers, Gai and Sema. All the sedahan in the regency of Klungkung were under the Dutch-appointed sedahan gede. Records and maps were made, klian subak (elected irrigation society heads) were made responsible to the sedahan for the collection of land taxes and some modern dams were constructed.

The implementation of the new tax and corvée system was the responsibility of local Balinese attached to the Klungkung and subsidiary courts. Locals reported the complete absence of Dutchmen in the region, and perhaps only four Brassika men (the punggawa, the perbekel and the tax-collector, from the Puri, and the village scribe, from the Geria) had official dealings with Dutchmen prior to the Japanese occupation. Thus the Dutch were largely invisible as the economic exploiters of this part of the colony. (See Robinson 1995: 52–69.) Cash payments of tax and labour contributions for local projects such as dam- and road-building were centrally organized by the tax-collector and punggawa respectively.

My local data on the details of the extractive system are scanty; what is clear are the increasingly bureaucratized nature of land ownership and the obligations entailed, and the continued existence of precolonial labour obligations to the Puri (ngayah ring Puri, ngayah ka Dalem). Secondary sources indicate the general Balinese condition: of unheard-of levels of taxation and corvée labour obligation, of severe shortages of cash, increasing landlessness and poverty and of increasing malnutrition and disease. Robinson reports that Balinese of low caste were required to perform an average of 30 days of unremunerated manual labour each year around 1920; this was reduced to 25 days in 1931 and to 20 days in 1938, under the increasing pressure of the worldwide economic depression (1995: 61). This was the heerendienst, or service to the lord, supposedly now in service to the Netherlands larger state. In Klungkung, the traditional rulers’ right to use heerendienst had been abolished in 1908 but the continuation of the practice was clear from informants who said that a major dam had been constructed near Brassika at the punggawa’s command by heerendienst. Further, Robinson points out (ibid.: 62) that both the agrarian law of 1926 and further regulations in 1933 reiterated that labour obligations to rajas and lords were no longer required by law, implying that they were being required in practice. In apparent contradiction to the spirit of these laws, the 1933 regulation stated that maintenance of roads, bridges, canals and dikes was ‘so far as possible the responsibility of the local authorities’ (ibid.).

Actual tax levels payable by the Balinese were apparently among the highest in all the Netherlands Indies. The landrente was payable in cash on
both sawah and tegal, and tax levels in Klungkung were among the highest in Bali (ibid.: 56). The Balinese had largely responded to the increased demands for cash as tax payments by producing more for export; after the crash of 1930, world commodity prices declined steeply and many Balinese had to stop paying tax (ibid.: 58). These government taxes were, of course, in addition to local contributions: payments to subak, for maintenance, temples and festivals; labour service to the banjar for local road and bridge maintenance, balé banjar upkeep and festivals; adat contributions of labour and goods for festivals, community cremations and other ceremonies; and labour service at the Puri or its temple.

Thus the tax and labour extractions were demanded by representatives of the traditional bureaucracy, particularly by the local rajas and their sedahan. The colonial regime differentiated between high- and low-caste people for corvée labour obligations, causing a scramble for documentation of triwanga-hood, the blossoming of the so-called ‘satria kertas’, paper satria, and the artificial ‘freezing’ of a formerly more fluid social stratification system. It also caused the heating of inter-caste rivalries, leading to a plethora of legal cases and triggering the phenomenon of caste as the major social issue in Bali. Robinson suggests that the virtual invisibility of the Dutch colonial masters and Balinese perceptions that exploitative demands were being made by local traditional elites, rather than by the Dutch, help to explain the absence of anti-Dutch sentiment in Bali. ‘Also important was the way in which the tax and labor systems structured class relations in the countryside, directing the antagonism of the peasantry against other Balinese’ (ibid.: 69).

In the Sedahan’s office at Jalananyar there are beautifully drawn maps of all the plots of sawah and tegal in the pasedahan. The maps are accompanied by lists showing the owner, area and class of each plot, with the amount of tax payable. The lists are dated 1949, but they derive from the 1930s. They record most official changes in ownership since 1949. The following analysis of land ownership in 1949 is based on these records; the situation in 1980–81 is based on the updated records (1980) and on my village survey (1981).11

Because of the method of tax record-making, there is no discrete compilation of land owned by Brassika residents. I have compiled a listing of land owned by Brassika residents in 1949 by cross-referencing the records of the three subak most important to Brassika residents (449 sawah owners), plus the tegal records (434 tegal owners) for Brassika. Various problems associated with the accuracy of these records are noted.12

The amount of sawah available per household was about 0.456 ha in 1949 but landholding figures show a mean holding size of 0.6 ha. Perhaps about 138 households (24 per cent of all households) owned no sawah. The 244 households which owned tegal and no sawah could be regarded as poor, unless alternative access to land was available.
Table 3-1: Land owned by Brassika residents in 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Land</th>
<th>No. of owners</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Mean holding size (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sawah</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>267.6</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tegal</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>121.4</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only tegal owned</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>614.5</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sedahan’s records, Jalananyar office.

Table 3-2 below shows that landowners in the two smaller sawah-holding categories comprised 70 per cent of all sawah owners. They owned only 32 per cent of sawah. Their holdings were all below cukupan level. At the other end of the scale, in the category of holdings of 1 ha or more, 7 per cent of owners owned 41 per cent of all sawah. This breakdown shows that the vast majority of owners had sawah holdings significantly smaller than the mean for the village of 0.6 ha. If the large sawah holdings of 1 ha or more are excluded, the total sawah area of 151.21 has is divided amongst 418 owners, giving a mean sawah holding size of 0.376 ha. If the 31 large sawah owners are excluded from the total number of households, the mean amount of sawah available per household is a low 0.272 ha.

Holdings of dry land were considerably smaller than sawah holdings and the total area of tegal was about half that of sawah. The mean size was 0.28 ha. The majority of tegal owners (64 per cent) had very small holdings, ranging up to only 0.25 ha. Another feature is the large number of people (244) who owned some dry land but no sawah.

Table 3-2: Sawah holdings by size of holding, Brassika, 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holdings (ha)</th>
<th>0.10–0.24</th>
<th>0.25–0.49</th>
<th>0.50–0.74</th>
<th>0.75–0.99</th>
<th>1 ha*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. owners</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>267.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As % of all

| sawah owners          | 29        | 41        | 16        | 8         | 7     | 100   |
| sawah area            | 8         | 24        | 16        | 11        | 41    | 100   |

Source: Sedahan’s records, Jalananyar office.
The unequal control of sawah apparently followed caste lines. The one landowner dominating the scene, Tjokorda G—O—, the punggawa and father of the present Tjokorda, owned a recorded 65.72 has of land, 17 per cent of all land owned by Brassika residents. This included 59.33 has of sawah in the three subak under examination. This represents 22 per cent of all sawah owned by Brassika residents in three subak. He also owned sawah in other subak, including 8.355 has in Subak Dlod Ambengan. Present-day estimates by people other than his family put his holdings at that time at around 100 has.\(^{13}\)

Table 3-3A: *Sawah owners by caste and size of holding, Brassika, 1949 (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding (ha)</th>
<th>Triwangsa</th>
<th>Jaba</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.10–0.24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25–0.49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50–0.74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75–0.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ha+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3B: *Area of sawah owned by caste of owner and size of holding, Brassika, 1949 (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of holding (ha)</th>
<th>Triwangsa</th>
<th>Jaba</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.10–0.24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25–0.49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50–0.74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75–0.99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ha+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjok.G—O—</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The ‘Miscellaneous’ column here includes government-owned sawah, some of which was worked by subak and village officials, and laba pura, lands belonging to the congregation (pemaksan) of temples. There were no significant holdings by descent groups at this time.

Source: Sedahan’s records, Jalananyar office.
Table 3-3b above shows how the extent of his holdings inflated the triwangsa share of sawah. Including Tjokorda G– O–, the triwangsa mean sawah holding was 1.27 ha, and the jaba mean was 0.44 ha. Excluding his 59 has of sawah, the mean triwangsa holding was 0.55 ha. Table 3-3b shows that when the Tjokorda is excluded, wong jaba comprised 76 per cent of all sawah owners who owned 72 per cent of all sawah. When Tjokorda G– O– is dropped from consideration, triwangsa domination of landholdings is not nearly so marked.

It is unfortunate that the caste composition of the whole village in 1949 is not known. By 1981, landlessness among the triwangsa was disproportionately high. (Triwangsa households comprised 21 per cent of all households and 26 per cent of landless households.) Although the figures on land ownership show that in 1949 the triwangsa had an economic status that underpinned their higher social status, it may well have been the case that many triwangsa were landless. My 1981 village survey indicated that there were extremes of wealth and poverty within the triwangsa ranks.

An examination of the dispersal of Puri land between 1949 and 1980 shows that the punggawa passed on 35.85 has of sawah through inheritance to sons and nephews and transfers to the Puri descent group, the Pemrajan Agung, in the 1950s. In the early-mid 1960s, a further 11.22 has were distributed to a large number of people, including 13 lower triwangsa and 27 wong jaba. Most transfers were recorded as sales but informants suggested these were on paper only. Notable 'buyers' included Sang N– S– (brother-in-law of the Tjokorda and head of banjar Pekandelan), the head of banjar Anjingan, and I S– (subak head and, eventually, rich man of banjar Dalem). 'Gifts' of land were made to a further ten men, mainly lower triwangsa, in several banjar. In 1966, further 'gifts' of land went to Dewa G– B–, Sang P– R– (brother of the Tjokorda's brother-in-law, Sang N– S–), Sang P– J– and Sang N– P– of Pekandelan, and to Ida Bagus of Dlodmelanting. All of these recipients can be regarded as clients of the present-day Puri – the fact that I knew most of them, or their sons, indicates their close contact with the Puri. Some of them worked at the Puri, cutting grass in the Mrajan, building the lily-pond or performing services such as butchering animals. Some, such as Sang N– S– and his brother, enjoyed close family ties, working as domestic servants and participating in Puri rituals. Some held key positions in the village bureaucracy. My village survey corroborated the general pattern, though with disparate details (Parker 1989: 123–130).

Both klian banjar and the successor perbekel received sawah from the Tjokorda. By 1980, as Table 3-4 shows, the triwangsa and Puri domination of sawah holdings had declined considerably, according to the sedahan’s figures. The triwangsa share of sawah had declined from 39 per cent of all sawah in 1949 to 27 per cent by 1980, and the Tjokorda’s share had declined dramatically from 22 per cent to 8 per cent. My 1981 household survey shows similar relative proportions (Parker 1989: 156).

The punggawa’s transfers of land between 1963 and 1968 can be mainly attributed to the dictates of law and the by-then pervasive ideology of egali-
tarianism and land reform. This is the subject of the first part of the next chapter. This radical ideology was backed up persuasively by the threat of violence and the threat of land confiscation by politicized peasants. In particular, the transfer of land to so many non-family members, in seven of eight banjar, by ‘sale’, persuades me that they were a direct result of the Land Reform Act. However, this shift to the rule of law triggered such high levels of resentment and grievance, resulting in mass killings, that they cannot be judged a success.

Table 3-4A: Sawah owners by caste and size of holding, Brassika, 1980 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding (ha)</th>
<th>Triwarga</th>
<th>Jaba</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.10–0.24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25–0.49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50–0.74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75–0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ha+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-4B: Area of sawah owned by caste and size of holding, Brassika, 1980 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding (ha)</th>
<th>Triwarga</th>
<th>Jaba</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.10–0.24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25–0.49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50–0.74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75–0.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ha+</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjok + Pemrajan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes the Tjokorda and Pemrajan Agung.

Note: In this table, ‘Triwarga’ and ‘Jaba’ groupings include sawah owned by descent groups, as these had become significant since 1949. The ‘Miscellaneous’ column here includes temple-owned sawah and subak-owned sawah.

Source: Sedahan’s records, Jalananyar office.
Finally, I present some information about sharecropping practices in Brassika. Sharecropping was the most important means by which poor people could get access to that valuable means of production, land. There were other means by which economic resources were redistributed – for instance, harvesting groups and some ritual practices – but this was the most important, in terms of the frequency with which such arrangements were made and by virtue of the amount of wealth transferred.

Sharecropping was one of the few activities in Bali in which two individuals relied solely on one another without the regulation of a group or organization. Geertz emphasized the degree of segregation of the institutions of Balinese life and commented, ‘Perhaps the most striking example of this sort of segregation… is the autonomy of the landlord-tenant tie in classical Bali’ (Geertz 1980: 66). Farmers in modern Brassika said that a tenant or sharecropper, panyakap, was usually chosen on the basis of his industry, reliability and farming ability, apparently corroborating Geertz’s claim. Contra Geertz, I would argue that although landlord informants stressed the importance of praiseworthy personal qualities in their choice of sharecropper, and although the relationship was an unusually private arrangement in the Balinese context, it frequently built upon pre-existing social relations (sometimes egalitarian banjar ties and sometimes asymmetric and feudal relations). There was no organization or forum at which sharecropping disputes could be discussed and resolved. While sharecropping can be seen to have served the interests of both the advantaged and the disadvantaged, it was also an important medium for the expression of differences in traditional social status, notably between castes. For these reasons it was potentially exploitative.

Here I will focus on sharecroppers of the Tjokorda’s land, as the example I know best. In my thesis I examined a much broader range of sharecropping arrangements, including those between other high-caste landlords and lower-caste sharecroppers, arrangements between people of low caste, between family members, especially between affines, and between corporate owners (village institutions such as banjar, subak and desa temple congregations, descent groups, as well as the government) and individuals (Parker 1989: 195–235). With regard to Geertz’s comment, about one-third of land-sharing arrangements occurred between individuals where no previous tie existed. These usually took the form of pawning (gade), and were strictly a cash arrangement. (See chapter 4, footnote 7.) About one-quarter of all land-sharing arrangements were gade. However, when a sharecropping relationship did not overlap with other types of ties (principally family or patron–client ties), landlords and sharecroppers usually chose members of their banjar, calculating that, although it was extremely unlikely that sharecropping grievances would ever be brought up in a banjar meeting, the moral force of the local community would contribute to an amicable and dependable relationship.
Sharecropping was not at all the preserve of the wong jaba. Sharecropping activities were evenly divided between the triwangsa and jaba sections of the population. However, the minute breakdown of all sharecropping arrangements indicates that differentials in caste status featured in many relationships and always such that the landlord was of higher status than the sharecropper. In this sense, sharecropping practices can be said to have expressed relative status inequalities in much the same way as inter-caste marriage practices. One-third of landlords were triwangsa. The higher triwangsa (brahmana and satria dalem groups) did not become sharecroppers. However, the lower satria were disproportionately well-represented in the sharecropper group, the Sang title-group in particular.

In Brassika I was surprised to discover that the nandu division, in which the sharecropper kept one-half of the harvest and the owner received the other half, was the most common arrangement for the division of the crop, constituting at least 42 per cent of all agreements. Geertz had reported the harsher ngapit division, in which the sharecropper kept only one-quarter of the crop, as the usual arrangement in this area (Geertz 1967: 237). I was told that only the nandu division was legal, and this may be the reason for under-reporting of more exploitative conditions. In my 1981 survey, the harshest terms of trade reported was the nelon division (one-third for the sharecropper) and nelon arrangements constituted 17 per cent of all arrangements.

The 21 sharecroppers (panyakap) of the Tjokorda about whom I had details in 1981 must have constituted less than one-half of his sharecroppers. They represented only 12 houseyards because sharecropping arrangements were often inherited by families. The Sang family of four brother- and cousin-sharecroppers was one example: the long-standing arrangement had been that they worked the land as though it were their own – i.e. without surrendering any of the crop to the Tjokorda – but they were his parekan. However, this was by no means uniform: six of the 21 sharecroppers paid the harsh nelon division (two-thirds of the crop to the Tjokorda), and four of these were occasional parekan. Some of the Tjokorda’s sharecroppers reported inheriting their sharecropping rights from their fathers or grandfathers. Two other sharecroppers whom I knew began their relationship with the Tjokorda because they were recommended by their neighbours, who were long-standing sharecroppers. They enjoyed the nandu crop division. The Tjokorda’s sharecroppers were spread in various banjar – Pekandelan, Dalem and Siangan.

Although there was no clear overlap between the villagers who self-identified as parekan and the sharecroppers of the Tjokorda – indeed only eight parekan were his sharecroppers –, the general pattern of dyadic status inequality and mobilization of pre-existing social ties persuade me that the landlord-sharecropper relationship was not the autonomous one that Geertz claimed. The above figures on land ownership highlight the economic power
of the Puri, whereas the notes on sharecropping indicate that land ownership per se is not an adequate measure of the distribution of wealth. Together, they add an economic dimension to the picture of complex and unequal social relations in Brassika.

NOTES

1. The general scholarly literature on Bali – both its Orientalist and its Culturalist traditions – is remarkable for its neglect of economics. Dutch scholars, such as Liefrinck and Korn, contributed much of our knowledge, without fully drawing out the political ramifications of their analyses. Hobart 1979 is one of the few more recent exceptions, as is Robinson 1995.


4. Terms for wet rice fields are differentiated in the language levels as sawah in High Balinese, carik in everyday language, and uma in Low Balinese; dry fields are tegal in all language levels and houseyard land is differentiated: kebun or teba in High Balinese and abiyan in Low Balinese.

Other types of land include bakti, which is land owned by the government for the payment of irrigation society officials, such as klian subak, and laba pura, which is land owned by temple congregations for the support of temples. These categories are not significant in the Klungkung region in the way that bengkok land is important in Java – i.e. where the large areas paid to government officials confer considerable economic power upon office-bearers. Both of these categories are exempt from tax. Sawah and tegal are subject to land tax and are divided into tax classes based on the quality of the land.

This analysis of types of land draws heavily on the work of Hobart 1979: 182–196.

5. In Brassika, there is only one instance of the practice of taking a sentana, i.e. the taking of a female or male non-son as jural descendant in families where no male heir has been produced. This practice is reported as frequent in some areas of Bali.

6. Hobart reported that sawah could not be sold without consulting heirs. He said that a person proposing to sell sawah must support his case to the camat and get government approval before the sale could proceed (Hobart 1979: 185–186). Such rules did not obtain in Brassika and many transfers (‘sales’) were not registered.

7. The Tjokorda had no talent for managing his inherited estates. In fact, his role as head of the larger descent group, usually called the Mrajan Agung, came to be as symbolic figurehead and public organizer, while control of the considerable resources was taken over by Tjokorda Gede Raka. In 1994 the Mrajan Agung owned about 25 has of sawah and tegal, including significant crops of cloves and coffee. Tjokorda Gede Raka and the younger brother of Tjokorda Gede Agung were always in conflict over the issue of control of the Mrajan’s resources.

8. See Hobart 1979: 195 for a definitive example of this, pointed out by villagers: a certain man who kept a descent group shrine that matched his wealth was compared with a man who had spent a good deal more money on his living quarters than on his ancestors. The former was enjoying steadily increasing wealth, while the latter had seen his sawah halved in the last twenty years.

10. This contrasts with the apparently total discontinuation of *sawah* ritual practice in much of Java. In the early 1990s in the north coast of Java, Winarto examined local farmer exegesis with regards to the rice-growing process and the reasons for success and failure. It was striking that supernatural or religious explanations were almost non-existent (Winarto 1996: 96, no.20).


12. In 1949, 693 residents of Brassika owned either *sawah* or *tegal* or both. In order to calculate the mean size of holdings, the number of landless people, etc., I have subtracted the 28 miscellaneous corporate groups registered as landowners (descent groups, village temples, the government, etc.), which leaves 665 landowners resident in Brassika. Given that the total number of households in Brassika in 1981 is 761, this figure seems very high, suggesting that most households had control of some land. Almost certainly the aggregated figure of 665 is inflated due to double-counting, but the figures of 449 owners of *sawah* and 434 owners of *tegal* are more accurate.

Unfortunately, there are no records of Brassika’s population in 1949. I have crudely estimated (by taking the population of Brassika as a proportion of the known populations of Jalananyar and Klungkung), that there were about 2,935 people living in Brassika in 1949. This means there would have been about 587 households.

All landowners not resident in Brassika were excluded from my compilation. However, not all the land owned by Brassika residents in 1949 was situated in the three *subak* and in the Brassika area of *tegal*, so the following figures underestimate the total amount of land owned and the number of owners. I have details of land ownership for most of the 21 *subak* under the jurisdiction of the *sedahan*, and with one exception have found few Brassika residents recorded as landowners in the other six *subak*. The exception is the *punggawa* (father of the *perbeke*).

Another problem is that the names of about 200 *jaba* landowners in Subak Klod are missing, so I could not cross-reference these with the names of owners in other *subak* or in the area of *tegal*. I have listed the 200 as owners of land only in Subak Klod, so those figures are probably inflated and the figures for people owning land in more than one *subak* deflated.

The Balinese habit of changing personal names several times within a lifetime also makes the job of cross-referencing fraught with difficulty. The result is that figures for people owning land in only one *subak* are largely accurate, but wherever people own land in more than one *subak*, or *sawah* and *tegal*, there is probably a deal of double-counting. Figures in the latter cases probably overestimate the number of owners.

13. The main opponent of the Puri in Brassika told me that the *punggawa* owned about 300 has of land and thus controlled about 1,000 sharecroppers.
CHAPTER 4

Memories of Massacre

This chapter addresses the murders in Brassika in late 1965 and early 1966 following the murder of six generals in Jakarta on 30 September 1965 – the event known as Gestapu. General Suharto restored ‘order’ after this alleged coup attempt, but the inception of this ‘New Order’ was marked by a bloody few months in which half a million and up to one million Indonesians were murdered. The survivors who thereby came to power have largely written the history of this time, dubbing the perpetrators of the ‘coup’ ‘Communists’, and by default, those who were killed, ‘Communists’. Many murders were committed by the military to exterminate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and other oppositional forces; some were committed by Moslem extremists ostensibly to rid the country of atheists; and some were committed by groups and individuals to settle old scores and right perceived wrongs. In Brassika the murders were committed by locals, on local initiative, not by the military and not in order to wipe out the names on a ‘hit list’. I was repeatedly told that in Brassika there was no ‘list’. The massacre should be seen within the context of the preceding few years of radical politicization and popular mobilization under Sukarno, coupled with rising expectations among the landless and poor that Land Reform would redress the economic inequalities and exploitation of the caste/class system, dominated by the Puri. That the Puri owned at least 22 per cent of sawah owned by Brassika residents in 1949 is the single most significant fact in assessing the historical context in which the massacres occurred.

As far as I know, the Brassika victims were all PKI or families of PKI, or other opponents of the Puri. My conclusion is that in Brassika the murders were motivated by revenge for the PKI attack on traditional power and outrage at the attempt to dismantle the social hierarchy. The aim was the restoration of the ‘proper’ social hierarchy after the intense and bitter onslaught by the PKI and its farmers’ branch, the BTI, on feudal privilege. This caste-based privilege was underpinned by gross inequalities in access to the means of production – land and labour. The massacre in Bali can be seen as a reaction to the agonizing twin shift from feudalism to capitalism
and to the rule of law of the new nation-state. Workers and peasants struggled to find ways to organize themselves, with declining access to land, in order to negotiate the fairest returns to labour. The nation-state attempted to redistribute resources via egalitarian new laws. Locally, it failed to implement these through a bureaucracy perceived to be fair and objective, triggering popular protests and a deadly backlash.

Nationally, it is time to analyse the killings of 1965–66. It will be difficult to claim that Indonesia has put the ‘New Order’ behind itself until it has confronted this demon. Worldwide, genocide studies suggest possible ways to analyse these killings. Scholars such as Bauman have seen in the Jewish Holocaust – a planned, efficient operation, devised by scientists and expertly managed by all the resources of a highly technological state – an affinity with ‘modern civilization’ (1989). Others have reminded us that genocidal killings – whether by machete in Rwanda or by gas chamber in Germany – still require the mass, direct and visceral confrontation of human beings, or of human beings and cadavers (Goldhagen 1996, Prunier 1995). Levene argues that genocide and the history of the twentieth century go hand-in-hand because that was the century when an international political system based on the nation-state came into existence (2000). For Indonesia, the tensions between nation and state certainly came into play in 1965, but in Brassika, the conflict was clearly not that of a ruthless state perpetrating genocidal violence upon an errant and victimized people.

This is a difficult subject to research and write about. My few informants were usually either murderers, people who were complicit in murder or fearful observers. There are many problems associated with the one-sided nature of the evidence and its interpretation.¹

There is a generation, particularly of young men, now in middle age, who are guilty of crimes against humanity. These crimes cannot be talked about, because murder is still murder, but those who committed such acts have to live with themselves and with the surviving family members of their victims, orphaned or widowed by their acts of murder. Murderers have resumed normal life, having gone unpunished, and have been allowed to avoid taking public responsibility for their violence. Throughout the New Order there was no talk of punishment, crime, justice or moral judgements upon murderers. There has been no question of compensation or of apology for victims – indeed, the descendants of PKI supporters, and also alleged supporters, have been punished by the Indonesian state up until the present. Their citizenship ID cards have been tagged with their degree of involvement in Gestapu (G30S/PKI); they have been classified, and according to their classification allowed or prevented from becoming public servants, priests, village heads, teachers, etc.

Further, the acts of murder were, collectively, not personally, valorized by the New Order regime as heroic. The following passage is an excerpt from an English language textbook for junior high school. The message is chilling:
Martin: ‘My father bought a new video. Do you like to watch it?’
Simon: ‘Yes, of course. I like it very much.’
Martin: ‘What kind of film do you like to watch? I have some cassettes.’
Simon: ‘I like battle films.’
Martin: ‘Why do you like them?’
Simon: ‘Because they show the heroic spirit. For example the extermination of G30S/ PKI. Do you have it?’
Martin: ‘I am sorry. I don’t have it. Lets rent the cassette…’

(At the video rental:)
Martin: ‘We want to rent the extermination of G30S/ PKI film.’
Shopkeeper: ‘Here it is. But you have to pay more expensive.’

(Luthfy et al 1989: 96)

In Brassika, it is not too strong to say that murderers ‘won’ the extermination of G30S/ PKI ‘battle’, and have been rewarded for their actions. From the point of view of Brassika’s many orphans and widows and others made bereft of friends and relatives by the massacres of 1965–66, this passage creates a new reality: murder and mayhem have become a heroic battle in which good has triumphed over evil. However, this textbook is comparatively recent and is directed at a different generation. This generation has been brainwashed. It accepts the new reality, for there is no alternative reality presented: no one speaks in school or in the community of the idealism and possibilities of the early 1960s, of the idea of land reform and the injustice of differences in wealth, of the power and voices of the little people (wong cilik). By glorifying the post-Gestapu massacres as a heroic mission, the Suharto regime demonized Communism to the extent that it was not possible for young people in Brassika to see Marxism or the PKI in a positive light. Textbook teaching cultivated paranoia of Communism and rewrote history.2

LAND REFORM

Land reform legislation was passed in September 1960. The stated aim of the Land Reform Act was to allow each farming family to own a minimum of 2 has of agricultural land (Republic of Indonesia 1961: 59). The regulations called for the disposal of any family holding exceeding 7.5 has sawah and nine has tanah kering (dry land or tegal).3 It is obvious that the goal could never have been achieved and that the regulations have never been rigorously enforced. Nevertheless, although the original goals were soon lost in the politics, Land reform was an important, external impetus for real and important changes in economic power in Brassika.
Memories of Massacre

The matter seems to have arisen in 1960 partly because the idea of land reform accorded well with the radical spirit behind Sukarno’s call for a ‘Guided Economy’ and ‘Socialisme a la Indonesia’, which inspired his general approach to economic policies in 1959–60 (Mortimer 1972: 14).

At this time, Sukarno needed to appease the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), which had looked set to win national elections before the declaration of ‘Guided Democracy’. Legally, Indonesia was supposed to have held general elections in 1959, four years after the 1955 elections. In 1955, the PKI had obtained 16.4 per cent of the vote, and was the smallest, at least by percentage of votes, of four major parties holding a precarious balance of power (Hindley 1964: 222–229). The years following the 1955 elections were extremely successful for the PKI. The PKI and its mass organizations such as the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers’ Front), Pemuda Rakyat (the People’s Youth) and GERWANI (the Women’s Movement) became the largest organized political force in Indonesia. The success of the PKI was mainly due to its championing of the land reform cause; in this, it was egged on by the BTI. It was widely believed, by foreign as well as Indonesian observers, that 1959 would see the first Communist Party in the world to gain control of a national parliamentary government by legal, constitutional means (Huizer 1972: 21).

[The Army] was not prepared to permit a Communist electoral victory and requested in May 1958 that elections be postponed for six years ... [T]he leaders of the PKI decided to make the most of a bad thing and began to cultivate President Sukarno in his new role as a dictator (Pauker, quoted in Huizer 1972: 21).

Thus Sukarno began his now-famous balancing act, appeasing the PKI on the one side and the Army on the other. The Act was passed in September as an Emergency Law.

Land reform regulations seem to have been implemented in Java and Bali only slowly. In Klungkung, the implementation began formally in January 1961 with the gradual registration of landlords owning more than the maximum amount of land allowed, and of absentee landlords who lived outside the kecamatan or subdistrict.4

In Jalananyar, about 80 has of land were so designated early in 1961, and from the time of this announcement, landlords were reportedly nervous (gelisah) as they awaited implementation (Sanjaya 1991: 5–6). Information about the new laws and regulations was broadcast officially and formally from Klungkung by teams from the Agriculture Office who used radio and
From Subjects to Citizens

A Kabupaten-level Committee for the Implementation of Land Reform was formed, the principal element of which was the Panitia Paripurna (the Complete Committee), with the Bupati (Gokorda Anom Putra of Puri Klungkung) heading about 15 senior army and bureaucratic functionaries, such as the Sedahan Agung, as well as a low-caste representative from each of the BTI, PETANI (Persatuan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers’ Union of the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, PNI) and Tani Marhaen (Sanjaya 1991: 119–121, App. B). Subsequently, Subdistrict Committees for the Implementation of Land Reform (Panitia Landreform Kecamatan) were formed, to be aided by village heads and functionaries. These lower level committees were to assess and adjudicate upon difficult cases of home address (in order to register absentee landlords), inheritance and marriage, death where inheritance was still pending, etc. All committees were to include representatives of the mass farmers’ organizations, the BTI and PETANI.

Given the rising pitch of mass participation in this movement to redistribute land, and the fact that landlords whose land was to be expropriated had to surrender the land to the government, it was crucial that the local government authorities were seen to be impartial and just in their expropriation and redistribution of land. In practice, the make-up of the committees was crucial. The politics of the local committee members largely determined whether these committees aided the farmers who were intent on redistributing land or assisted in the bureaucratic arrangements to keep large landholdings intact. The local committees determined the identity of landlords, the borders of property, the veracity of inheritance claims and so on. Certification was crucial – landlords had to produce pipil, proof of payment of taxes dating back to 1935, when these were first issued by the colonial administration. In Kabupaten Klungkung, there were many accusations that officials, village heads and so on, hindered the process of land reform by falsifying pipil or not confirming the existence of oral arrangements with sharecroppers or descendants (hopeful beneficiaries). Some committee members were accused of collaborating with landlords to register land in the names of family members, parekan (loyal servants) or descent groups. Others were accused of registering land in the names of trusted allies with the expectation that the sharecropper would still pay the owner’s portion of the crop to the (former) landlord (Sanjaya 1991: 49, 60ff and informants).

In the Brassika region, as in Kabupaten Klungkung generally, the traditional satria elite dominated not only the positions of head of desa, kecamatan and kabupaten, but also the lower world of officialdom. It is hardly surprising that farmers experienced great frustration with the speed and fair-mindedness with which the Law was being implemented. In particular,
an important function of the committees was the nomination of new owners for the land expropriated from landlords. The would-be landowner had to prove, usually to the village-level committee, that he had sharecropped the land, and then he had to work the land, now temporarily in the hands of the government, for at least two years, during which time he paid the government one-third of the crop or cash equivalent (known as uang wajib). One of the local problems was that the farmers working the land had no guarantee that they would be granted the right of ownership (hak milik).

Another local issue was that of the division of the crop. The Land Reform Act contained an important second regulation legislating the division of the crop under circumstances of sharecropping (Undang-Undang Pokok Bagi Hasil (UUPBH) No. 2 Tahun 1960, in Republic of Indonesia 1961: 109). The main aim was to regulate owner-sharecropper relationships in order to achieve a just division of the crop; secondarily, to protect the weaker party, usually the sharecropper, from harsh practices; and thirdly, to provide legal certainty to both sides (Sanjaya 1991: 75–76). The right to determine the division of the crop was assigned to the respective bupati. The bupati of Klungkung required an equal division of the crop for sawah and for the owner to receive two-thirds of the crop for tegal. In the Klungkung area, as elsewhere, sharecropping arrangements were complex and almost infinitely variable.

Insofar as one can generalize for the earlier period, the usual arrangement was for the landowner to receive two-thirds of the crop, and to be responsible for the payment of taxes, while the sharecropper kept only one-third (the nelon arrangement). The illegality of unequal division was a sensitive issue because sharecropping arrangements were nearly always verbal agreements based on trust in dyadic personal relationships. Agreement about crop division was between the landlord and his sharecropper; therefore, accusations of illegal crop divisions always had a local and personal referent and could quickly become contentious and acrimonious. Further, the landlord–sharecropper relationship was often not simply an economic one: the landlord was expected to fulfil a variety of patron-like obligations, for example as a source of welfare and emergency help, and sponsor of life-cycle ceremonies for the sharecropper’s family. Many sharecroppers, especially long-term sharecroppers, felt that they depended for their life on their patron. The landlord, on the other hand, expected sharecroppers to help (ngaturang ayah, to offer service without pamrih, physical reward) with his larger ceremonies and depended upon the political loyalty of his sharecroppers. Many landlords felt ‘disappointed’ with the new arrangements, especially having also had absolute amounts of land restricted (Sanjaya 1991: 76–77).

Of course, discrepant claims over sharecropping and pawning shares and repayments occur occasionally at any time, but the rash of conflicts
occurring from 1964 were occasioned by the new legislation and the need for local authorities to witness and ratify arrangements in a political environment in which they were not disinterested functionaries.

In Klungkung, intense pressure for implementation, at least from the PKI and the BTI, seems to have been applied mainly from 1964, with some exceptions such as the notorious Rudet case outlined below. By 1964, actual transfers of ownership were due and were not forthcoming. The Governor, Anak Agung Bagus Suteja from Jembrana, was writing letters and making announcements in the local paper, urging the immediate implementation of the Land Reform legislation (Robinson 1995: 266; Sanjaya 1991: 78). Indeed, the *aksi sepihak* (unilateral action) movement was now sweeping the island. It seems that in Jalananyar the actual amount of land to be redistributed was formally reduced from the original 1961 estimate of 80 has to 32 has sawah (Sanjaya 1991: 64–65). There were supposed to be 146 recipients.

There are Balinese newspaper and government reports of disputes over land distribution and sharecropping arrangements involving PKI and PNI members beginning from 1964 and continuing through 1965 (Mortimer 1972: 52–53; Robinson 1995: 266–270). In Bali, the PNI was seen as championing the cause of the landed, both aristocrats and peasants, whereas the PKI was active among the landless and sharecroppers. This division was exacerbated in the Klungkung–Gianyar region by the open allegiance of the traditional rival houses with opposing parties, the Dewa Agung’s family publicly associating with the PNI and the family of the Gianyar royal line aligning with the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia). (The PSI had been formally banned in 1960 and the general trend for PSI supporters was towards the PKI.)

The PKI (and especially its more radical wing, the BTI) appealed to the poorest, most economically disadvantaged people, with its platform of land reform and a better deal in sharecropping practices. The PNI argued for stability and security, social order and prosperity, thus serving heterogeneous interest groups, including the very wealthy landlords, landowning palaces and relatively comfortable farmers. It deliberately cultivated traditional vertical alliances, particularly between landlords and their tenants/sharecroppers.

During 1964 and 1965, in the Brassika and Klungkung area (for which my informants are nearly all PNI supporters, the opposition having been silenced or killed), political meetings were organized by *tokoh* – the ‘big men’, often idealistic teachers and *adat* leaders – of the BTI and PKI in the *balé banjar* and open spaces, combining information sessions about the redistribution of land with the establishment of new branches of the PKI. In this way, the passion and idealism of the aims of the land reform movement were allied to the national PKI to attract supporters. Meetings organized usually by the BTI, and especially by its more literate and
educated leaders, were held in most villages – in villages around Brassika as well as in semi-urban areas such as Tojan, Gelgel and Kamasan near Klungkung town. Apart from the party and political aspects of these meetings, they were notable (to my informants anyway) for the crescendo of anti-landlord sentiment and the teasing identification of landlords with the PNI. These meetings and rallies consisted of rousing speeches, noisy sloganeering (‘tanah adalah untuk tani’, land is for farmers), performances of the janger invitational dance by members of GERWANI (effectively but not formally the PKI’s Women’s Movement) and the singing of political songs.

Notorious specific actions, which are documented and which included threats of violence and actual violence, occurred in Penasan, Tangkas, Gunaksa, Jumpai, Selisihan and many other nearby villages. Typically, a landowner owned land which was worked by sharecroppers who wanted the land to be surrendered to the BTI in order that it be distributed among the PKI members or ceded to themselves. Landowners had no intention of surrendering their land, and had recourse to local officials and the local (and sometimes higher) PNI branch to help them retain it. Large, often secret, meetings of frustrated BTI adherents tried to find ways of expropriating the land of PNI landowners, e.g. by rushing in to plant where a crop had been newly harvested, or high-handedly harvesting a landlord’s crop. Many landowners successfully defended their land, sometimes by drawing upon other sharecroppers or massed PNI supporters; others were obstructed by their sharecroppers.

The most significant aksi sepihak in the Klungkung area was the so-called ‘Rudet Incident’. I Nengah Rudet, of Klungkung, was a landowner whose land near the village of Penasan had been sharecropped by Pan Kesed. I Rudet wished to withdraw his land from the arrangement, but on the death of the sharecropper, his son, I Wayan Nyanggel, wished to take over his father’s position. Without informing the son, I Rudet planted his sawah with peanuts. At harvest time, I Nyanggel arrived at the field with 50 comrades to harvest. I Rudet went with his family to seek protection from the Dewa Agung. News of the incident spread to PNI supporters, who flooded to the site, armed with weapons. A young tokoh from PNI Klungkung tried to separate the combatants, inviting the BTI to discuss the issue with the PNI. Several hundred people were involved in this event on 21 January 1963 (Sanjaya 1991: 51–52).

During this time, the estate of the Tjokorda of Brassika was being dispersed, partly because of his advanced age and partly because of the pressure exerted from his subjects. (I have been unable to ascertain whether pressure was exerted from Klungkung. There is no doubt that he was among the three largest landlords in the Kabupaten.) He was by this time an old man, who still obviously wielded enormous economic and political power in the area, by virtue of his huge landholding, his traditional
authority and personal charisma (sakti) and his simultaneous bureaucratic power as punggawa. The official version of land transfers from the Land Tax office summarized in the preceding chapter shows transfers totalling 11.22 has between 1963 and 1966. Men of lower satria status seem to have been particularly favoured, as were heads of banjar.

In Brassika, the banjar of Pekandelan, Dlodmelanting and especially Dalem contained vocal groups of PKI supporters. The elected klian banjar of Dalem was an enthusiastic supporter. Rallies and meetings were held in Brassika, with opponents interjecting throughout speeches; cries of 'Kapitalis dengkul!' (Crooked capitalists!) and 'Tuan tanah jahat!' (Landlords are Evil!) were answered with counter claims of 'Ateis!' (Atheist!) and 'Komunis!'; flags were waved and songs sung. In fact, political discourse was rapidly taking on a life of its own, divorced from reality. Political polarization over land issues increasingly carried class messages coloured with morality. On the one side, the PKI campaign cast a slur upon the good character of the Puri: they accused the local elite of hindering the just cause of land reform; the BTI attempted to unilaterally seize the land of wealthy landowners; and the general anti-feudal privilege and anti-triwangsa cause inflamed a sense of injustice and grievance among PKI supporters. A couple of physical attacks on the persons of Puri sharecroppers, no doubt aimed at the Puri rather than the sharecroppers, complicated the matter. In turn, this upped the defensive stance of the Puri and their PNI supporters, who denied the grasping claims of 'wong cilik yang ambisi' ('ambitious little people') and implied that the PKI was anti-Hindu, anti-dharma (social order) and indeed destructive of the cosmic order. (See also Robinson 1995: 270.)

MEMORIES OF MASSACRE

LP: Why were they killed?

Tjok: We were very emotional (emosi) and wanted revenge for our generals’ deaths – generals who were killed on 30.9.65 at the crocodile hole by the PKI. We were angry with the PKI. (Field notes, 23.11.80)

We now know that memory is not a matter of reproducing pristine images or scripts inscribed at significant times in the past. Memory is constantly being rewritten and edited in the light of contemporary events, the influence of other people and the need to explain satisfactorily our own behaviour in ways which are commensurate with our own sensibilities and the mores of our society. There are multiple ways in which we make and make sense of our own biographies.

The Tjokorda’s reply to my question indicates the common perception that the post-Gestapu massacres were a violent, spontaneous reaction to the
Memories of Massacre

killing of the generals at Lubang Buaya, Jakarta. But in Bali, large-scale violence began in December 1965, two months after the coup attempt of 30 September in Jakarta. The above section shows that this violence had been preceded by several years of intensifying political mobilization accompanied by some violence. Mass violence in Bali was largely preceded by violence in Java, as people in Bali ‘tried to sense where events in Jakarta were leading the country’ (Cribb 1990: 241). The total number of people killed in Indonesia is unknown: estimates range from 100,000 to one million (ibid.: 12). Certainly it was among the most significant massacres in twentieth-century world history.

In Bali, the Army, especially the RPKAD units (Army Paracommando Regiments), vigilante Islamic groups (ANSOR) temporarily roving in Bali from East Java and local gangs, PNI youth groups in particular, bent on wiping out whole neighbourhoods of PKI members or sympathizers, killed an estimated 80,000–100,000 people (Hughes, 1967: 175–179; Vickers 1989: 172). For Bali, much has been made of several reports which emphasize the enthusiasm of the Balinese for hunting down the Communists and the ferocity and gruesomeness with which the Communists were massacred. The RPKAD commander is supposed to have commented, ‘In Java we had to egg the people on to kill Communists. In Bali we have to restrain them, make sure they don’t go too far.’ (Cribb 1990: 243). Another feature unique to Bali seems to have been the calm acceptance with which PKI members met their fate, reminiscent of the *puputan* scenes (see especially Cribb, R., Soe Hok Gie et al. 1990: 252–253).

In Brassika, such scant accounts as I have collected in conversation emphasize the unofficial nature of the deaths and the grisly character of the killings. Reports from elsewhere describe how the military went into villages and produced a list of Communists to be killed – a job which was given to the village head to implement (Webb 1986: 98). Villagers carried out this order because they knew that if they did not they too could be accused of being Communist. This was not how it was done in Brassika: the Tjokorda highlighted that there was ‘no list’ (using the English words), as though proud of this local speciality. One woman, a girl of about ten at the time, contrasted the often nocturnal murders of people in their homes in Brassika with her witnessing of the killing of a group of about 15 people in day-time Bangli by uniformed military using pistols at the site of a mass grave. The Tjokorda, aged 18 at the time, said, ‘Everyone was scared because death could come at any time, and you didn’t know who was who.’ Informants included details of the method of murder and the condition of the bodies – throat slit, beheaded, guts twined around the throat, mutilated bodies, the weapons of choice being knives and *blakas* (choppers), and so on.

A shocking aspect of the politics and massacres, as noted above, was the rupture to normal social groupings such as family and *banjar*. Most striking-
ly divided were two banjar, Pekandelan – the banjar of haves and have-nots, with the Puri and other upper castes, and their retainers, parekan and kaula, all mixed in together – and Dalem, today a quiet, anonymous banjar of mainly wong jaba.

I have records of 11 murders of Pekandelan people, the majority of whom were from the ranks of the lower triwangsa: the Sang, Ngakan and Gusti title-groups. There was apparently no split in the ranks of the upper triwangsa, but the poorer lower ranks were clearly divided. Some members of the lower triwangsa in Pekandelan officially received land gifts from the Tjokorda in 1963, and again in 1966. These marginally high-status but impoverished descent groups must have been pulled in opposite directions by the twin issues of land reform and loyalty to the Puri. One of the more poignant stories is that of the impoverished family of Sang N– S–. He was one of the recipients of the Punggawa’s land gifts, and today he is a loyal, but still poor, parekan of the Puri, and brother to the brother-in-law of the Tjokorda. His wife’s parents did not agree on the twin issues, her father remaining loyal to the Puri and her mother following the PKI on land reform. She was one of the murdered, but her husband and children survived.

My notes on 31 deaths in banjar Dalem repeat the story of divided family and divided banjar, concluding with the deaths of the PKI protagonists. The head of the banjar, his wife and seven of their children were murdered, as were his brother and wife (one orphaned child survived). The banjar was so pro-PKI that barely a family remains without indirect family links to the PKI. One of the most respected senior men of the banjar today, Pan N–, was another whose wife joined the ranks of the PKI and met her punishment, along with several of their children. She was the late mother of the talented young klian dinas in 1980, Pak L., who always remained under a cloud of suspicion in the Tjokorda’s eyes. The father of the woman who became his wife was also murdered. Another mother who died was that of the man who became known as the local rich man, I S–.

There is an important gendered aspect to this tragic story. Twenty of the 45 deaths I have examined in detail were of women, married women with children. Several were already widows, and by their deaths their children were orphaned. I have been puzzled by this, partly because women do not generally own land – only 15 women, all widows, owned land in my 1981 village survey – and partly because these days women seem extraordinarily apolitical, only rarely attending a banjar meeting. The participation of, and sometimes leadership by, women in the party branches, rallies, direct actions and meetings indicate that women passionately involved themselves in the land reform issue. There were various cases of public, husband–wife splits, with the husband remaining loyal to the Puri in all cases I examined and the wife joining the PKI. The concern of housewives and mothers with the bread and butter issues, and the different interest of their husbands in
patrilineal family, political loyalty and status maintenance (and perhaps longer-term security) is striking. It seems to me that the patrilineal kinship system, with its virilocal residence pattern and patrilineal inheritance of land, worked doubly against women at this time.

The *tokoh*, ‘big man’, of the PKI in Brassika was, unexpectedly, a woman, Sang Ayu from Dalem. She was invariably described as a *sakti* figure of commanding comportment and supernatural physical strength. One informant described how if some ordinary man shouldered a load that she had been carrying, he would get flaming welts on his shoulder where her bamboo pole bore down on his body. Her ‘unfeminine’ behaviour was punished: she was slit from neck to groin.

In later times, men and women alike said that these women ‘behaved like men’. Their prominent place in the list of deaths shows that this was not tolerated; the docile, New Order model for proper, womanly behaviour probably dates from this time. Invariably they were described as GERWANI, though I found no evidence of separate GERWANI meetings or activities in the area. I suspect that by December, the information machine of the Army and New Order forces was having its effect. The local newspaper reported a story entitled, ‘Confessions of the Chairperson of Gerwani. She was Ordered to Sell Herself to Members of ABRI,’ on 21 November 1965. According to this article,

> It is clear from these revelations how base and depraved PKI plans were. After scraping as much profit as possible from their shameless sexual activities, Gerwani members were supposed to murder and at the same time cut off the genitals of their victims. ([Suara Indonesia](#), 21 November 1965 in Robinson 1995: 293n.)

Similarly, in one of the short stories mentioned above, ‘Star of Death’, set in West Bali, an elderly man described the sadistic punishment of female political activists:

> It was said that the Gerwani had been involved in Lubang Buaya: The people showed them no mercy. I found some of their bodies on the side of the river south of Kuta. Their guts hung out; their backs were full of knife wounds, carvings of open-mouthed crocodiles. (Kipandjikusmin in Aveling 1975: 30)

The comments are almost identical with those of some of my informants, and I was always struck by the geographic slippages and transferred identities: GERWANI women who, in fabricated stories about the murders at Lubang Buaya in Jakarta, had become Balinese village women. The story’s young PKI protagonist sexualized the GERWANI women and thus enabled the writer to depict the PKI as debauched and immoral:
Six months ago he had sent the Gerwani cadres home for refusing to indulge in free love after the night parades at Lubang Buaya. They were still dominated by bourgeois moral principles and not completely revolutionary in outlook. (ibid.)

As Robinson notes, ‘This tactic made the delegitimation of the party and the murder of alleged members very much easier than they otherwise might have been’ (Robinson 1995: 293).

Finally, to conclude the description of the murders in Brassika here is a statement I have from the present Tjokorda, which ended with the question and answer quoted above:

Tjok: ... Before 1965 there was a great deal of politics in the villages, but desa was ranged against desa, banjar against banjar, families against families, and even husbands and wives were separated because of politics. After the generals were murdered by the PKI at the crocodile hole, many people, members not leaders, were killed. Simple people, who didn’t realize, when asked if they were members of the PKI, were surprised when, if they answered ‘Yes’, they were then branded Communists. Then they [he drew a line at his neck]. It was a crazy time because innocent and ignorant people were killed.

LP: Why were they killed?
Tjok: We were very emotional (emosi) and wanted revenge for our generals’ deaths – generals who were killed on 30.9.65 at the crocodile hole by the PKI. We were angry with the PKI. (23.11.80)

A massacre of this order, and committed so quickly (in about two months, December 1965–January 1966), demands explanation, yet, as noted above, by its very nature it is irrational and extraordinary. The post-Gestapu massacres, especially in Bali, present various features resistant of explanation: ill-defined and problematic groupings of combatants, the large-scale and apparent ferocity of the killing, and the ‘black hole’ nature of the whole event. In finding answers to these dilemmas, I shall try to indicate where the local evidence does or does not fall into line with trends elsewhere in Bali.

A problem of historical and anthropological explanation is that it can have an excusing effect, of explaining the motivations behind crimes in such a well-rounded, all-embracing, logical way as to make the act seem, if not sensible, at least excusable. The individual is absolved from taking full responsibility for the inhumane act, while circumstances, society, etc. are more diffusely blamed. Putu Wijaya’s political fantasy, Nyali (‘Guts’, or ‘Bile’), concerns a kingdom, loosely corresponding to a modern Indonesia,
which is subject to the arbitrary violence of the subversive movement, Zabaza.

The world had become so indescribable. Human beings had been transformed into sinful, stupid creatures, who were nevertheless convinced that they were not responsible for anything that had happened. None of them cried. Fear was now pointless, as everything had already been revealed. (Wijaya n.d.: 57)

The list of massacres for the twentieth century includes such a range of leaders, societies and cultures, economic structures and ideologies – Japan’s Rape of Nanking and other war atrocities, Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s USSR, Mao’s China, Idi Amin’s Uganda, Pol Pot’s Kampuchea, Indonesia 1965–66, recently Bosnia and Rwanda – that we must surely conclude that mass murder is a possible event in any modern human population. While most individuals cannot envisage performing such acts of violence, and most feel they must decry its occurrence and work against it happening, it is apparently part of the human condition. It is not my intention to excuse mass killings, but to explore the social conditions which existed to allow and enable mass murder to occur. To this day, the massacres in Brassika and elsewhere in Indonesia are a painful enigma to me.

These massacres are a well-kept secret – no one volunteers information about the time, and of course there is the official discourse described above which rewrites the history. The murders fester under the taut but apparently murni (pure, unspotted) skin of Balinese village life, poisoning not only the lives of the victims but also the health of normal intercourse. The very landscape holds secret horrors: the ‘hot’ (tenget) spot behind the graveyard where a corpse was found; the whimsical stone statues of wayang figures missing from their position at the entrance of the Puri’s temple because stolen at this time; the haunting beauty of the subak temple abandoned because of the murder of a PKI man in its sacred grounds.

Institutionally, there are many legacies. That subak divided itself in two. For many years the two groups were known as ‘active’ and ‘passive’ members, marked by their willingness or not to build the new temple; those unwilling to build the new temple were accused of being anti-Hindu and of having PKI sympathies. Politically, the Gestapu winners have no scruples about reviving PKI ghosts: the Tjokorda suspected an opponent of being anti-Hindu and of having PKI nearly twenty years after Gestapu, and had him replaced as the head of the subak.12

In accounting for the massacres in Bali, Hughes, like other reporters much influenced by the 1930s American vision of these ‘people of grace and charm’, wrote in his famous chapter, ‘Frenzy on Bali’:

Obviously the catalyst was the sudden boiling over of resentment toward the Communists, who had been busy beneath the placid
surface of Bali but had made the serious mistake of deriding and attempting to undermine not only the island’s religious values, but its deep-seated cultural traditions, as well. (Hughes 1967: 175)

Similarly, the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia at the time, Marshall Green, theorized:

… the bloodbath visited on Indonesia can be largely attributed to the fact that communism, with its atheism and talk of class warfare, was abhorrent to the way of life of rural Indonesia, especially in Java and Bali, whose cultures place great stress on tolerance, social harmony, mutual assistance …, and resolving controversy through talking issues out in order to achieve an acceptable consensus solution. (Green 1990: 59–60 in Robinson 1995: 277)

This commonly expressed theory, that Communism did not suit the deeply tolerant, cooperative ethos of Balinese society, neglects to mention that the success of the PKI in Bali was not the result of the forced imposition of an alien ideology on an ignorant, impoverished peasantry. Hughes expressly stated that

The Communists’ fatal mistake had been to try and impose an alien ideology cruelly and harshly upon an island in a state of perpetual enchantment with its own mystique … [T]hey had failed to convince the Balinese that their brand of Communism was somehow ‘localized,’ springing from frustrations within rather than from foreign machinations without. (Hughes 1967: 178)

This theory is the discursive effect of the current repressive regime that allows, indeed encourages, those who survived the massacre to present Communism as an outside, threatening force, rather than an idealistic, attractive source of hope and inspiration for action. Those who rushed to aid fellow-tenants or sharecroppers in direct expropriating actions, or to sing the idealistic songs, or even those who just got caught up in all the flag-waving excitement, were active agents who understood the social significance of their iconoclastic actions. One of their songs goes like this:

We swear an oath of equality
Poverty will surely end
Farmers and workers will all have work
A new world will surely come
Come, come take action now
Freedom is already ours
Our flag is red
And red is the colour of the blood of the people
Memories of Massacre

Red is the colour of the blood of the people …
(Putra 1986 in Robinson 1995: 270)

In seeking to explain the massacres in Bali, we should probably reject the Communism-as-unsuitable-for-idyllic-Bali thesis. Bali is not a harmonious, non-violent idyll, as the history of this or any other century proves. Just to take my first year of fieldwork in Brassika beginning in 1980, there was a murder just before I arrived; there were various physical fights (fisticuffs, a stabbing with a bamboo stake), usually over thefts and romantic jealousies; domestic violence, usually of husbands towards wives, was not uncommon; and just before I left a couple were murdered by their crazed daughter.

An extension on this theme is the theory that, when pushed beyond some limit, the Balinese will simply run amok. Various passages of purple prose in the Hughes book and in newspaper and magazine articles ‘explain’ the massacre thus:

Nowhere but on these weird and lovely islands … could affairs have erupted so unpredictably, so violently, tinged not only with fanaticism but with blood-lust and something like witch-craft. (Moser 1966: 26–27)

There is no doubt of the crazed expressions and the irrational and grisly behaviour of some of the anti-PKI actors in Brassika and elsewhere (my informants; Robinson 1995: 278). Nor is there doubt that some rivers did run crimson (Moser), or did not run at all because of the pile-up of corpses. Nor do the numbers of Balinese killed allow any doubt as to the infectious passion with which the idea of murdering PKI sympathizers spread. However, the exotic fanaticism theory does not really explain how the idea of exterminating the PKI began, or when and why the murders occurred. Such theories tend to borrow cultural traditions, such as that of the puputan and of the renowned ferocity of Balinese front-line troops in times past, without any of the requisite historical specificity or directly comparable historical context.

A more persuasive argument, but still partial, is that the motivation for the massacres was one of cleansing, purification, purging, or, to use the journalists’ word, exorcism (‘Bali Exorcises an Evil Spirit’ by Donald Kirk, 1966 in Robinson 1995: 327). The language of exorcism overlaps with the two previous theories, and especially with the idea that the purge of the Communists was a religious frenzy. It certainly accords with one or two statements of intent I collected from informants – ‘to cleanse the village’ (untuk membersihkan desa), ‘the banjar had to be purified’ (harus banjar disucikan). I accord it some credibility. However, these sound more like after-the-fact rationalizations by the guilty than an adequate explanation for two months of mass murder.
The rhetoric of cleansing is most pertinent if examined as an effect rather than a motivation of the massacres. The language of hygiene – of purity, discipline, industry and order – pervades both colonial and New Order discourses of modernity, and effectively relegates the unclean – in this case, the Communists – to a deserved fate. In relation to this talk of ‘pollution’ and ‘cleansing’, I have also wondered about the significance of the fairly systematic wiping out of whole families of PKI supporters, and in particular the murder of ‘tainted’ young children. (In other areas of Bali, whole villages were burnt, another form of purge (Sukawati 1979: 79–80).) However, in looking to the whole Indonesian scene, one sees that the idea of pollution by inheritance is not unique to Hindu Bali: throughout New Order Indonesia, the children and grandchildren of PKI supporters had their citizenship (including employment opportunities, credit availability, freedom to travel and study) labelled accordingly, such that the ‘sins’ of the forefathers were borne by the descendants. The murder of the children of PKI parent/s in Brassika can perhaps best be explained with reference to Putu Wijaya’s Nyali (‘Guts’, or ‘Bile’). This novel concerns a fantastic kingdom, a version of New Order Indonesia, and the mysterious subversive movement, Zabaza, which turns out to be an instrument of the state. Zabaza is a machine-like organization, which operates through gratuitous, arbitrary violence, bolstering the morale of the army and keeping the kingdom stable through fear. A senior General explains to his King:

[Violence will create a certain ambience. It will be a useful process in the selection of the population for a golden future. In the future, I see this kingdom becoming a republic with a hand picked population. Those lacking the right to live, must be quickly disposed of. (Wijaya n.d.: 28)]

Although in many places in Java and Bali there was much talk of ‘kill or be killed’ as a defence for the committing of murder, this was not the case in Brassika. The murder of PKI supporters and their children secured ‘a golden future’ for the victors in the political struggles of the 1960s. This resonates with the Tjokorda’s comments that followed his above-quoted explanation of 1965:

… Now people have surrendered (terserah) or surrender politics to the government. Now government is just a matter of foreign policy. Farmers are only concerned now with problems of food and development (masalah makanan dan masalah pembangunan).

(23.11.80)

The purification theory connects the PKI with opposition to Balinese Hinduism and, by extension, to several disastrous events of a natural and
Memories of Massacre

supernatural nature (Cribb 1990: 243). The theory is that the PKI, always
now associated with atheism, offended the gods. A huge natural disaster
followed: the eruption in 1963 of Gunung Agung, the active volcano which
dominates the skyline in many parts of Brassika, causing massive
destruction, loss of life and food shortages. The eruption significantly
damaged the performance of the centennial Ekadasa Rudra ceremony at
Besakih temple on the slopes of Gunung Agung.14 Hughes noted that

[The Communists] mocked religious observances and festivals.
They obstructed the repair and building of shrines and temples.
They ridiculed traditional Balinese dance and costume. (Hughes
1967: 177)

Robinson reported that PKI and BTI members confiscated land belonging
to temples, failed to perform customary ritual obligations and refused to
comply with linguistic etiquette which demanded the acknowledgment of
social hierarchy (Robinson 1995: 270). Vickers reported the attempted
desecration of the cremation ceremony of the Klungkung Dewa Agung by
the local PKI, just prior to the attempted coup in Jakarta. This attempt was
thwarted by those loyal to the Puri, especially the local PNI in collusion with
the local military (Vickers 1989: 170). The alleged sacrilegious actions of
the PKI incurred the obligation of the pious PNI to wipe out the PKI
pollution, cleanse the island and honour the gods anew, eventually in the
successful Ekadasa Rudra of 1979. Hence, Vickers dubs the massacre ‘The
Communist “Puputan”’ (1989: 168), Hughes a ‘mass self-purification pro-
cess for the island’ (ibid.: 176) and ‘a sacrifice’ (ibid.: 182).

In Brassika, none of my informants connected the rise of the PKI in Bali
or the murders with these disasters. Crops around Brassika were not
drastically affected by the eruption, and villagers did not suffer the hunger
and starvation reported for areas further east.

There is a strong sense for Brassika that the PKI opposed not Hinduism
or even religion per se, but the established hierarchical social order, which
allowed the injustice of starkly unequal access to wealth and power. There
is no doubt that the murder in the subak temple was seen as a pollution of
the temple, but the pollution was due to the occurrence of murder, not to
the PKI affiliation of the victim. The theft of statues belonging to the Puri
from the Puri’s temple was seen by the Puri as an expression of opposition
to its power and wealth, an insubordination, not a sacrilege.

Robinson is rightly suspicious of theories which explain the massacre as
an expression of Balinese culture reasserting its centuries-old traditions of
religion, harmony, order and social equilibrium after the tumult of the
Sukarno years. He emphasized that,

Military, party, and religious authorities in Bali actively shaped and
encouraged a popular discourse of violent anticommunism based on
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existing religious ideas and cultural analogies. The fact that massive violence could somehow be justified or plausibly portrayed in terms of Balinese religious beliefs or cultural analogies undoubtedly contributed to the dynamic of killing. But this should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the victimization and the physical annihilation of the PKI were not simply or even primarily the consequences of a spontaneous or natural religious impulse, but the products of political and historical processes in which human agency played a central part. (Robinson 1995: 279)

From consideration of political and military activity in Bali (Robinson 1995: 286ff) after the coup attempt, and because mass murder did not follow closely upon the coup attempt, I would endorse this view. The Tjokorda’s statement of emosi and revenge as the motivation for massacre in Brassika must be viewed in the context of the actual chronology and nature of the preceding and intervening events. At least two months passed after the generals’ murders at Lubang Buaya before murders began in December 1965 in Brassika. The heat of the moment was well past.

The massacres in Brassika were primarily an expression of class struggle inflected with local caste particularities. Satria landed wealth was challenged by the national Land Reform legislation and the politics of radical populism. Further, the idea of mass killings was facilitated, even normalized, by the preceding violence in Java and western Bali and legitimized by the statements of the press and the activities of the supra-local political and military forces. In this limited sense, the massacres in Brassika were the violent aspect of the transformation of the village from feudal kingdom to anonymous village within the nation-state.

NOTES


2. See the excellent article by Heryanto (1999) on the New Order cultivation of the paranoia of Communism.

3. This was for an area regarded as ‘cukup padat’, reasonably dense, i.e. with a population density of 251–400 people per square km (Republic of Indonesia 1961: 57 and 71).

4. Land such as the laba pura of state and village temples and bukti (land in lieu of wages for incumbents of public office such as klian subak) was not subject to the new Law.

5. A list compiled in 1961 had ‘prioritized’ the choice of new owner: first in line was to be the sharecropper (penyakap); second, the labourer of the former owner; third, a permanent worker of the former owner (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 224/1961 in Sanjaya 1991: 62–63).


7. Pawning arrangements were also common, and almost never written down: they
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consisted of the payment of *uang tebusan* for the right to use agricultural land, with the payment to be repaid at some later date, often unspecified. Sometimes the pawn lasted across generations. The new legislation required that the pawn be repaid within seven years.

8. The inclusion of individual *triwangsa*, such as the Governor (Anak Agung Suteja from the palace of Jembrana), a few *brahmana* priests and a couple of high-caste *bupati* as members or sympathizers of the PKI, does not contradict my argument that the social basis of the two main parties was class/caste.


10. The single best source on the massacre in Indonesia is Cribb 1990; many accounts have regurgitated Hughes 1967, which has a chapter on Bali. For Bali, see Robinson 1995; Vickers 1989.

11. Civil wars, genocides and war involve definable, sometimes primordial social groups pitted against each other, who have recourse to ideological and political rationales. Soldiers who kill have been sequestred from family and home and undergone depersonalizing training; they are a cog in a hierarchical and machine-like organization; in killing, they are obeying official orders.

12. This accusation indicates an acceptable political manoeuvre – I am not suggesting that there was a real revival of Communism. See Heryanto (1999) on the cultivation of the paranoia of Communism under the New Order. In this instance, the Tjokorda was intent upon the placement of a member of his wife’s family in a position of responsibility.


14. The performance of this major ritual over several weeks was allegedly stage-managed by Sukarno, mis-timed and corrupted, according to some priests, in order to attract overseas travel agents and foreign investment. The eruption followed a plague of rats. ‘The Ekadasa Rudra could indeed be perceived as not only failing to cleanse and pacify the world but as actually unleashing the first of the great disasters, the eruption, possibly by incorrect or inappropriate ritual’ (Forge 1980: 228).
SECTION III

Creating Order
CHAPTER 5

From Subjects to New Order Citizens

This book is about an introverted, backwoods, feudal village and its transformation to an administrative unit, just one of 60,000 anonymous desa in Indonesia (Warren 1993: 265). It is also a book about a local king and his subjects and their transformation into citizens of a modern nation-state. In this section I want to try to explain the order and stability in New Order Brassika in the arenas generally labelled ‘politics’ and ‘development’ (pembangunan) by social scientists. In this chapter, I explore the ways in which Brassika villagers became depoliticized citizens at the very occasions usually deemed ‘political’: at elections and in village meetings. Indeed, the point was that to be a good citizen was to be apolitical. Later, I examine two local issues that dominated village politics in recent years. In the next chapter, I explore the idea that it was only in the realm of development that citizens could participate as citizens.

My underlying question is how to explain the longevity and stability of the New Order. I am interested in seeing how Brassika has contributed or not to the long life of the New Order. Much research has been dedicated to describing how the Indonesian nation-state has been constructed and maintained. While most writers have not explicitly addressed their work to the above question, many have implicitly advanced answers to this question. Here I present some of these, which I have grouped as three approaches: the strong state approach, the cultural politics approach and the developmentalist approach.

Some scholars have ascribed great coercive power to the state’s apparatus of terror, the dual power of the military and the state’s employment of violence, intimidation and repression as means of social control. Authoritarian laws and regulations, a propagandist education system, intrusive bureaucratic arrangements and programmes such as the family planning programme are seen to have co-opted the little people (rakyat, wong cilik) and transformed civil society into a docile and powerless citizenry. Others have pointed to the inescapable influence of government-controlled mass media, the government’s interference in and construction

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of cultural discourse and the inculcation of the population with government ideologies.\textsuperscript{4}

It is obvious that many of the above-mentioned scholars deplore this overweening power of the state, yet, ironically, their pessimistic analyses contribute to this same sense of the sinister strength of the state, the intrusion of the state in people’s lives and the co-option of citizens in the project of state-making. Sometimes their work is informed by a sense that the state is evil and the people are, by default, good, simply because there is an implicit oppositional ontology. Such instrumentalist explanations of the hegemonic state leave citizens little room for manoeuvre, diversity and variability. In exploring the power of the New Order state, it is difficult to explain how, despite the forms and structures, the Indonesian state was neither monolithic nor particularly effective. Opposition or at least pressure from non-government groups could, sometimes, operate with considerable effect – the example that springs to mind is the Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama. Further, whether through apathy, inertia, greed, sheer devilry or a host of other motivations, much of government policy was lost on its way through the bureaucracy, such that Indonesia was often described as a ‘soft’ rather than a ‘hard’ state.

In Bali, as in all other provinces, there were representatives of the military and the police at the kecamatan level of government reach (the offices of Ramil and Komsek). (See Figure 2-1, supra.) In Brassika, these men in uniform were usually explicitly excluded from the issues of the day. Periodically, fully armed men in fatigues descend upon villages in friendly overtures known as ‘ABRI Masuk Desa’ (The Army Enters the Village).\textsuperscript{5} In Brassika, although they were extended full hospitality, the military men were often the butt of jokes. Experience of the military can in no way account for the 30 years of apparent order and stability in Brassika under New Order rule.

The strong state approach does not represent accurately the reception of the state apparatus by the people: village citizens did not, generally speaking, experience the Indonesian state as a repressive, intrusive or coercive force, nor did they see themselves in opposition to it. To be effective, the strong state approach requires a careful conceptual separation of state and society, which should be followed by a robust description of the actual process wherein the state’s intrusion is shown to have had the intended effect in society. The most interesting work done on Indonesia are those fine-grained studies which document the penetration of state in society. Invariably, however, such studies documented how local communities subverted government intention (e.g. Warren 1993: 224–230), or demonstrated that the governmental message was so at odds with the local culture that it was extremely unlikely that the target group would be ‘ensnared’ (e.g. Sullivan 1994: 186). As I have been at pains to point out throughout this book, it is generally impossible to delineate a sphere which
can exclusively be nominated ‘the state’, and another ‘society’. National elections, village head elections, government development programmes such as Bimas and family planning, the national education system and government ideological drives depended for their dissemination and implementation not only upon a receptive and amenable target society but also upon individuals who were simultaneously state instrumentalities and members of society tied in a multiplicity of ways – historical, religious, familial, ethnic, class/caste – to local networks. Ethnographic and historical examination shows that the New Order Indonesian state was embedded in Indonesian society.

New Order Brassika life meandered along largely uninformed and undisturbed by the political excitement and ferment experienced by some in Jakarta, Medan, Yogyakarta or even, on the odd occasion, in Denpasar.6 Political excitation was usually occasioned by local issues – arguments over how to spend funds, embarrassment over misuse of funds or transgressions of the caste order. Terror was related to the past, to Gestapu, not to the present – though it could never be discounted, for the paranoia of Communism was constantly revived by those in power. State repression and indoctrination were evident to the outside observer, but not generally experienced as repression or indoctrination by villagers.

For instance, the video documentation of the Dili massacre was seen by millions worldwide but by no one in Brassika. A village headmaster who read the newspapers daily and was known as a village intellectual asked me in genuine and hurt bewilderment why countries such as the Netherlands were suspending aid to Indonesia. In his eyes, the issue of November 1991 was the widely reported beating of an Indonesian university student at an Australian university campus – a reaction to the Dili massacre. Knowledge of the East Timor independence movement was restricted to the government’s version of Communist insurrection and terrorism. National- (and international-) level political issues did not become local issues, and vice versa, in New Order Bali.

What was strong in Brassika was the sense of the weight and immutability of the state – mainly as a bureaucracy – and the sense of patriotically belonging to the Indonesian nation-state. These twin sensibilities had been brought about mainly through implementation of the government’s development strategy and the processing of the majority of the village population through the education system.7

The most casual visitor to a Balinese village, and indeed to villages all over Indonesia, was struck by the ostentatious display of government propaganda not only on government buildings but also in public space. In Brassika, as one entered village territory, there were signs announcing that this was ‘The Village of …, in the Subdistrict of …, in the District of …’. Recently, additional signs had been erected, in Balinese script, announcing that this was the ‘waweton (territory) of Desa Adat …’. Then, as one moved
about the village, each of the four desa adat territories was marked with a new sign.8

In the central crossroads of the village there was a statue of the mythical Garuda, national symbol of Indonesia. On each of the five facets of its plinth were carved and painted one of the five principles of Pancasila with their respective pictorial symbols. At other strategic public locations there were signs, billboards, red-and-white painted rocks, statues, etc. announcing the village’s patriotic pride. These were not put in place by the higher government, but on the initiative of the local people, usually when a visit from a high-level dignitary or day of national importance was imminent. This fever of painting, sign-writing, and cleaning up was always amusing to me, and locals laughed at themselves in acknowledgment of their apparently temporary patriotism.

The entrance to every government building was festooned with government slogans and mottoes, the ubiquitous photos of the president and vice-president, the red-and-white national flag, as well as signs specific to that building’s function. The local clinic was adorned with a flag, the clinic sign, a Blue Circle sign signifying the privatization drive for health services, some posters exhorting mothers to immunize their babies, a family planning poster or two, and a list of clinic drives and sub-organizations. A typical primary school had signs announcing the Teachers’ Union, the Teachers’ Code of Ethics, the name and number of the school and its date of opening, a special garden and ferro-cement pond fashioned into a model ‘Beautiful Indonesia Archipelago’, a banner advocating the use of Bahasa Indonesia as the national language, small signs exhorting students to ‘Jagalah Kebersihan’ – ‘be mindful of cleanliness’ – and signs marking each stair in front of each frangipani tree, reminding students that BALI was

Bersih – clean
Aman – safe
Lestari – sustainable and
Indah – beautiful.

As one moved around the village in daytime, one was struck by the number of uniformed functionaries: they seemed to outnumber those in mufti. At the central village head’s office there should have been the village head, the deputy village head (formerly the carik, or writer секретарис), the sekretaris and several pamong desa, the village administrative corps. In 1992, there were seven pamong desa employed. The klian dusun were rostered such that one or two were always in attendance. There was no village policeman but the civil defence organization, Hansip, consisted of 33 uniformed members who were also rostered to attend the central office. It was usual for this office to be attended by 6–12 functionaries.9

In addition, the office was host to visiting functionaries from government departments, the subdistrict office, the subdistrict police and army
offices or other extensions officers such as the agricultural extension officer or the family planning fieldworker.

The village sub-clinic employed three people in 1994, and was involved with several health workers who visited from time to time: the doctor visited every *banjar* once a month with a retinue of nurses, family planning workers and *kabupaten* and *kecamatan* functionaries attended regularly. Each school had its principal and vice-principal, class teachers, specialist teachers (for example, for religion or sport) as well as one or two assistants whose work seemed to consist mainly in delivering the newspaper from the front gate and passing around the morning tea. Schools were often visited by officials from the Department of Education and Culture. Official village statistics for 1996 put the number of teachers working in Brassika at 69. All of these various officials could be seen wandering about the village, visiting the *banjar*, consulting the *klian dusun* and any other relevant lower-level functionaries.10

Those government workers who lived in Brassika were also expected to attend the numerous organizations established at village level, mainly to implement development. In Brassika, the most significant of these, at varying times, were the Pamong-Pamong (Elders), the LSD (Lembaga Sosial Desa, Village Social Institution), the LeMuDes (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, Institution for Village Consensus), the LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa, Institution for the Defence of Village Society), Teruna-Teruni (Youth Organization) and PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Implementation of Family Prosperity, a women’s organization). All of these organizations had a hierarchy of positions, such as chair, vice-chair, secretary I and II, treasurer I and II, assistant plus members. The LKMD was supposed to become the principal local government organization after 1980, with different section heads in the fields of health, sport, arts, education, security, development, etc.11 In 1991, there were 59 men and 15 women listed as civil servants in Brassika. They did not all work in Brassika, but they were expected to, and did, lead these organizations.

Patriotism became ‘natural’ in Brassika. It was manifest in the display of government insignia (photographs of the president and vice-president, posters of the Pancasila principles, carved wooden statues of the Garuda) in pride of place in many homes. Proud parents showed off their toddlers to visitors by having them sing the national anthem. Teenagers declared commitment to the service of the country when they discussed their career plans. While there was much pride in ‘Balineseness’, and a growing sense of the incursions of other ethnic groups, especially the Javanese, into Bali, there was no talk of Balinese secession.

Balinese villagers’ positive experience of the state as benevolent does not, of course, contradict the proposition that the strength and intrusion of the state contributed to the longevity of the regime. Bureaucratic and military authoritarianism was a fact in Indonesia, and a necessary expla-
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ation of Suharto’s success, but to ascribe the success of the New Order solely to these dark forces is not only ideologically distasteful – it is insufficient. The existence of variability, inconsistency, diversity and corruption in interpretation of government policy, blatant political opposition, apathy and so on, all signify that we need complementary theories that, when added to our knowledge of the New Order’s formidable coercive and repressive practices, explain the success of Suharto’s regime.

The cultural politics or political culture approach, which identified aspects of Indonesian culture that help to explain the perduring strength of the New Order regime, began in the 1960s when Clifford Geertz asked:

One of the things that everyone knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture … Since 1945, Indonesia has seen revolution, parliamentary democracy, civil war, presidential autocracy, mass murder, and military rule. Where is the design in that?

… [T]he goal … is an understanding of how it is that every people gets the politics it imagines. (Geertz 1973: 311–313)

Traditional cultural values, especially Javanese values, were thought to have shaped the New Order Indonesian state; alternatively, the regime is said to have been successful because in its forms and principles it resonated with traditional modes of political control or with some sort of pan-Indonesian national political consciousness.\(^\text{12}\) In ancient, exemplary kingdoms, such as the apotheosis of the Indonesian state, Majapahit, the ruler is said to have acted in the interests of a passive population, creating a state as a microcosm of prosperity and order that mirrored the macrocosm of the divine (natural, social and supernatural) realm. The social realm consisted of a stable, hierarchical social structure, in which the Javanese ruling elite, the *priyayi*, were believed to be bound by their moral education, refined aesthetic tastes and social values, and their networks of blood and marriage, to serve the king and state. For Brassika, the theory has relevance today: the power of the Puri today illustrates the perduring strength of the Indic state model, a model which can be Balinized by the substitution of *wong jero* for *priyayi*.

Also relevant is the *kaula–gusti* (subject–monarch) principle, by which the king and his subjects, originally master and bondsmen, were in an asymmetrical but mutually dependent relationship:

1. A close, personal relationship accompanied by feelings of mutual love and respect is perceived as the standard mode of social communication.

2. Fate determines man’s place in society, whether he will be born a servant or master. A consequence is that man has no choice but to
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do his duty as is ordained by fate. These two factors result in a practice of government in which:

3. The ruler (and his officials), in terms of practical administrative policy, must care for his subjects as a parent cares for his children; thus the ruler assumes in fact an attitude of protective superiority, the ruled an attitude of acquiescent subservience. (Moertono 1981[1968]: 26)

Shiraishi (1997) saw a congruence between the kaula–gusti relationship and Suharto’s fatherly (bapak), patron relationship with his children and clients (anak buah), a triangular hierarchy which is repeated throughout society. She identified two contrasting traditions: that of the organisatie (rational, Dutch bureaucratic machine) and that of the sometimes idiosyncratic, personal power of the bapak. The rational, bureaucratic way of doing things has been seen as Western, modern and desirable by the economic rationalists and technocrats who largely guided Indonesia’s ‘economic miracle’ since 1968. There was continuing tension between this and the bapak’s so-called ‘Asian’ way of running the state.

[T]he bapak’s tolerance is a way of transforming the power and authority of his official position into personal power and authority. This transformation leads to and manifests the bapak’s innate defiance of organisatie, for once he has personalized his power and position, he has the freedom to act arbitrarily. (Shiraishi 1997: 108)

The New Order bapak are powerful because they … transform their institutional power into their personal power. And people need their protection, because the machine they control works arbitrarily. The bapak is the source of arbitrary power and its remedy. (Ibid.: 110)

In Brassika, the phrase ‘kaula–gusti’ was most often used to describe villagers’ relationship with the Puri. Whenever I asked people – the man who sold me coffee and cakes every morning, klian dusun, farmers gathering grass in the early morning, sharecroppers of the Tjokorda – about their relationship with the Puri, they invariably answered with this dyadic expression. When survey respondents were asked about their relationship with the Puri, ‘kaula–gusti’ was the most common reply. With these answers came expressions of ‘setia’ (loyal), ‘patut’ (appropriate) and ‘hormat’ (respect), or more explicit descriptions of duties such as guarding the corpse when someone at the Puri died, or ngayah ring puri (service at the Puri, e.g. washing clothes or making offerings).

From the point of view of social science, the cultural politics theories have proved attractive yet ‘soft’. Scholars have illustrated the possibilities by way of analogy, linguistic borrowings and so on, but the evidence tends to
be circumstantial. Cynics can say that the New Order borrowing of Sanskrit terms for political forms – the mancanegara, the Pancasila and so on – is simply good politics: there is nothing peculiarly Indonesian about borrowing the glories of an apparently authentic past to build a modern state.

The cultural politics approach is also beset with problems of history. Not only does it treat the state as a set piece, snap-frozen and unchanging, but also it is an ahistorical approach which ignores the particular and changing historical circumstances of both the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms and the Suharto regime. Further, it neglects the influences of Islam and European colonization. The New Order state looked not only to its nation and its past for its inspiration but also towards the global capitalist economic system in which it was embedded. Its financiers increasingly demanded, sometimes explicitly, economic liberalization and a non-patrimonial style of economic management, as well as the espousal of an international political philosophy of classic liberal democracy accompanied by an improvement in Indonesia’s human rights record. This culminated in the international drama of the financial crisis (Krismon) when the IMF demanded that Indonesia surrender its ‘Asian’ or personal way of doing business and eradicate corruption.

For Brassika, one could argue that the early 1960s era of hot politics, open class conflict and eventual mass violence was as much a typically Balinese or Indonesian pattern of politics as the bureaucratic patrimonial model, the theatre-state model or the orderly Indic state model. Indeed, Robinson’s history of twentieth-century Bali convincingly challenges the ahistorical and apolitical ‘cultural’ approach to the study of Bali (Robinson 1995).

Further, like the ‘strong state’ approach, the ‘cultural politics’ approach tends to work against the possibility of socio-political change. It does this by focussing on traditional symbols, structures and forms rather than on economic and political processes, social flux and class and other types of conflict. In emphasizing the meaning of political symbols, the language of politics and the rituals of elections, its scholars neglect the political economy of Indonesia.13

In so doing, the cultural politics approach fails to explicate the internal forces of social change as well as the international power relations which shaped the New Order state. It describes the colourful effects of state power, but one is left wondering: is it really all a deliberate strategy? who is garnering all these authentic symbols of ancient glory to re-create the theatre-state?14 and what of the political economy which must support this cultured edifice? Further, one might ask what happens when the New Order/Java cultural paradigm meets the clearly different cultural paradigm of Hindu Bali? There is no doubt that Balinese religion and ritual have been rationalized in the process of incorporation into the Indonesian nation-state (as, for example, was displayed internationally in the 1979
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Ekadasa Rudra ceremony (Forge 1980); see also Geertz 1973: 170–189), and that much Balinese dance, history and theatre have been co-opted in the service of the nation-state (e.g. Hough 1999, Picard 1999), but such accommodations do not explain the longevity of the Java-centric New Order regime. In an archipelago of the ethnic diversity of Indonesia, one would expect a cultural polity to take on a more multicultural shape.

A third approach to an explanation of the longevity of the Suharto regime is the developmentalist or political economy approach. While there are several distinct arguments, they share an economics approach to politics. Put crudely, this group pointed to the rapidly improving economic conditions provided by the Suharto regime and argued that enough people benefited from the economic growth to keep discontent at bay and political opposition quiet. The theory is that Indonesians were seduced by the modernity and wealth that the New Order nation-state offered, and feared that any political change would threaten their new-found prosperity. In many ways, this approach mirrored that of the government itself, which believed, correctly, that it would stand or fall on the success of its development strategy.

Mackie and MacIntyre claimed that

almost no popular protest movements or radical organisations (or even significant reformist ones) have raised their voices in public since the 1960s... incomes have risen at almost all levels, and the regime has won acceptance owing to their improvement in conditions for nearly everyone. Moreover, the New Order has effectively coopted key elements of Indonesian society into the power structure at every level by controlling access to the benefits which it can offer its supporters, and withhold from its opponents. The socio-political system that has emerged provides rewards to those who conform or at least do not rock the boat, but penalises dissidents or critics heavily. Hence the costs for any individual of opposing the system openly are high. (1994: 3)

The new wealth had the effect of ‘buying off’ those who may have been tempted to make reformative or oppositional moves, especially the middle classes, and was crucial in tying provinces, ethnic groups and even religious groupings into the nation-state.

...[T]he trading networks, banking and credit system and almost universal dependence on Jakarta for capital and know-how have had the same [unifying] effect, especially in the boom conditions since 1979 (Mackie 1980; Drake 1989). Regional secession is now simply not an attractive option for most parts of the country, apart from a few provinces with large resources of oil or timber (Hill 1989). (Hill 1994: 29)
The large body of work on democratization in newly wealthy Asia conventionally looks to the emerging middle class as the agent for change away from authoritarian regimes towards participatory democracies.15

According to this influential theory, the increasingly educated, moneyed middle classes are a significant liberalizing force as they demand predictable, safe, rational, legal, socio-political contexts in which to run their businesses, educate their children and live their comfortable lives – ‘No bourgeoisie, no democracy’ was how Barrington Moore put it (1969: 418).

In fact, economic theories have been marshalled as explanations both for and against the longevity of the New Order. In contradiction with the views expressed by Mackie and MacIntyre, for example, many saw the new wealth as a source of discontent and jealousy felt by the surrounding poor masses, who could be mobilized for political action. Others saw a growing gap between the beneficiaries of the regime and those who suffered or just missed out on the goodies.16 In terms of class, there seems to have been a widening opposition to the regime, including increasingly frequent inter-class alliances (Aspinall 1996; Berger 1997; Chalmers 1997; Hadiz 1997).

In Brassika, by 1997, I estimate that at least one-third of the population remained intransigently poor, i.e. without sufficient land, without a reliable income, without sufficient income to finance their children through nine years of school, without the means to pay for clean water and electricity, without savings to cover health emergencies and the like. There were still many women cooking over wood fires, fetching water from filthy ditches, making the evening meal squatting outside or on the dirt floor. In particular, women whose husbands had died or left and who had children to support struggled to find food for their families. There did not seem much fodder here for middle-class-led democratic transitions.

There were beneficiaries of the Green Revolution and of development generally: usually they were those who owned at least 0.5 ha sawah and/or were from high-caste, educated, wealthy houses. Wealth was not conspicuously displayed in Brassika: new gateways and new vehicles were the most obvious signs of new wealth, and the occasional opulent wedding or cremation was revealed by the count of cars parked along the village lanes. There were some indications of the growth of a middle class from Brassika: the number of wealthy townsfolk deigning to attend a village ceremony; the large influx of town-living, ex-villagers when temple and life-cycle ceremonies were held in Brassika; the long lists of absentee, subscription-paying banjar members. Though not all who left the village can be designated middle class, and indeed there were members of the rural middle class in Brassika, it is clear that the shift from peasant to middle-class status was most likely to occur through education and employment outside the village in the towns and tourist centres of Bali. Those few members of the middle class who lived their increasingly prosperous lives in Brassika had no motive for radical political action unless their security were threatened.
Possibilities for democratic change lay most of all with the group who had left Brassika and lived and worked in urban Bali or Java.

Perhaps most illuminating of all as an explanation of the long life of the New Order is reaction to the massive violence through which Suharto came to power in 1965–1966. (See Chapter 4 supra.) For those now middle-aged or older, especially for those whose family members were massacred or otherwise implicated in the activities of the PKI, fear of the consequences of oppositional action, or even of airing viewpoints at variance to those of government and the local elite, rendered them silent. The younger generation must in great part be free of the post-Gestapu trauma, but they were indoctrinated with the paranoia of Communism and the sense that, even though there was a lot wrong with the regime, it was better than blood in the streets. For all, the message of Gestapu was that open democracy is dangerous.

The connecting theme that seemed to unite Indonesians in their acceptance of the Suharto regime was the identity of a unified nation. A corollary of adherence to this identity was the idea that political opposition was illegitimate and threatened that identity. Opposition was anything that threatened the unity of the nation.

The holding of elections in Suharto’s Indonesia can be seen as a ‘going through the motions’ – a ubiquitous but empty ritual, the outcome of which was predictable – performed at least in part to satisfy international audiences. Nevertheless, Indonesian elections remain something of a mystery when considered as an internal political process. Why did they bother? Elections were held in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997, and Golkar, the government umbrella organization, secured 65 per cent, 64 per cent, 67 per cent, 75 per cent, 70 per cent and 76 per cent of votes cast in those elections (Jakarta Post 1997). In Brassika, the Golkar figures are similarly impressive, with the intriguing exception of 1992. Why was there always an extended period of tension, as if it were an open-ended process, in the months and even years preceding these five-yearly events? Why was there so much concern among those in the state apparatus with ‘successing’ (menyukseskan) the elections and with ‘security’ (keamanan)? Was there anything at stake in Indonesian elections, and how was success in elections measured? Finally, what was the meaning of national elections for Balinese villagers?

N. G. Schulte Nordholt (1980) provided a cultural politics explanation of the holding of Indonesian national elections in Central Java in 1971 and 1977:

Javanese society is still strongly governed by etiquette, and external behaviour is ritualized to a considerable degree. The ideals of harmony and solidarity, which belong to the basic principles of the Pancasila state, and the daily reality of tensions and conflicts, give rise
to a dualism of form and content, of formal behaviour and concrete acts: there is external conformity and inner individuality. Reality moves on two different levels. The upper represents the world of ideal behaviour patterns: a direct, free and secret ballot. But separated from this by a deep chasm is the everyday world of bribery, intimidation and intrigue. This lower level of reality, in which everyone is caught, is ethically unjustifiable and so must remain hidden. (Schulte Nordholt 1980: 179–180)

According to this explanation, the pragmatic conditions of election-holding (such as laws and regulations, bribery, intimidation and corruption and the nature of local politics) as well as ancient principles of social hierarchy, harmony and tolerance shaped the Indonesian national elections.

Indeed there was much in Brassika’s performance of national elections that seems to support Schulte Nordholt’s analysis of elections as cultural products: all the formal rules and regulations were applied but corruption was rife; kaula–gusti relationships were put to work; the rhetoric was of solidarity-making, Pancasila, unity and stability. In this view the dominant culture of harmony and solidarity prevails over the darker, sordid undercurrents of realpolitik, producing predictable election results.

Pemberton has challenged this view of the causal relationships between culture and politics in his description of the 1982 elections in Solo (1994: 9). Indonesia under Suharto was ‘a culture state’ (negara kebudayaan) (ibid.: 317), in which all aspects of life – national elections, tidiness, even traffic rules – were diperbudayakan (culturalized). New Order Indonesia became a culture state because culture was safe – traditional, patriotic, orderly, classifiable, a wellspring of identity and diversity. There were no particular perpetrators or strategists behind an Indonesia which was diperbudayakan – it was an all-encompassing effect and way of life, contrived and believed in as much by bureaucrats and little people as by the president and his late wife.

The security and ubiquity of ‘culture’ – by which national elections became Pesta Demokrasi or Festivals of Democracy, cleanliness became a civic duty and road rules became culture – allowed most political events to occur, but not as politics. Local issues went nowhere, passionate pleas for social justice withered and a culture of powerlessness prevailed. The ‘repressive reification of “culture”‘ (Hatley 1996: 155) not only encouraged the codification and cataloguing of indigenous ‘song and dance’, but also allowed insurrection to be neutralized. Even subversive millenarian movements – such as the Kalki movement described below – and the most political events – national elections – were subsumed under the rhetoric of ‘culture’ and thereby made innocuous.

Below, I quote from my field notes of a meeting of the camat (subdistrict officer) and all the perbekel in the subdistrict in the perbekel’s office in Brassika.
This morning, 'Gung Biyang went off by bemo early, and when she came back to the Puri there was a lot of fuss over the domestic chores, with extra washing-up of glasses and plates. Dayu Ngurah arrived to help. There were flowers to arrange, banana leaves to clean and cut, traycloths to place on trays, plates to fill with cakes and cover with embroidered throw-overs against the flies, and glasses to take to the perbekel's office. By eight o'clock the Tjokorda was fidgety, nonchalantly but frequently walking out to his vantage point (a small, high balcony overlooking the crossroads, market and office complex) and sometimes crossing to his office to arrange tables and chairs and to greet guests…

[The meeting began late, having been held up by the non-arrival of the camat.]

…The Tjokorda had just started welcoming his guests and outlining the aims of the meeting – to make the relations between the villages closer, to exchange information and to be united in their aims – when the camat, Sang P–S– (B.A.), arrived. The secretary, Wayan S–, perbekel of the village of Pande, had to move out of his seat in favour of the camat, and as the only empty seat was at the back of the room, that’s where he had to sit. [I’m afraid my presence had foiled the Tjokorda’s careful seating arrangements.] This was an awkward moment but the Tjokorda quickly restored the poise of the meeting and resumed his speech.

He welcomed the camat, re-outlined the aims of the meeting, apologized for having started without the camat and for the inadequacy of the meeting room, and asked his permission to continue. [This was a gracious, elegant welcome.] The secretary then stood up, welcomed the camat and reiterated the aims of the meeting, adding, significantly, that these included the discussion of problems and the facilitation of the flow of information. [The secretary also spoke fluently, and appeared accustomed to public speaking.]

The camat answered, not standing to address the meeting. He began by asking me why I was writing things down, saying there might be trouble (repot) later and that things said at the meeting might be secret. I explained that I was doing private research, that I was always making notes, etc., but that I would desist if that was what he wanted. I desisted, and fortunately was allowed to continue observing.

The camat then began his speech proper. He thanked the Tjokorda and secretary for the welcome, confirmed the aims of the meeting and noted, with help, the names of four (of 13) perbekel absent. Then
he embarked upon the day’s business, a speech-cum-discussion lasting two hours. He had listed six points for discussion in a black notebook:

1. The 1982 general election
2. Rp.200,000 of development funds was to be made available by the camat for each village. The camat wanted each perbekel to prepare a plan of how it would be spent
3. Ipeda (land taxes) were to be paid by villagers
4. Taxes on bicycles and radios were to be paid by villagers
5. A tax on the sale of cattle was to be paid by villagers
6. Badges and material for the new official government shirts were available

First the elections were discussed. The camat requested a united front for Golkar. The camat requested a quiet, uncontroversial, safe election. He wanted each perbekel to make a list of people who had moved away from, died or become adults in each village since 1977, the year of the last election. A Golkar representative would be coming in December and he asked the perbekel to make the way smooth for this visit. The only questions from the perbekel concerned the list of names and the date of arrival of the Golkar representative.

The second item on the agenda was the dispersal of the Rp. 200,000 of development funds for each village, to be spent on public buildings. For instance, the camat said that in Brassika there was a proposal to cement the floor of the wantilan desa and to build a public toilet onto the back of it. The money would be arriving very soon, and he needed a written proposal, with building plans, before funds could be distributed. The various perbekel asked questions to clarify what the money could be spent on – it transpired that it was only to be spent on perbekel offices – and when it would actually arrive.

The third matter, the payment of Ipeda, caused the camat and several perbekel great consternation. There were targets to be met and the kecamatan was way behind. The camat exhorted the perbekel to do everything possible to get their villagers to pay … There was a long discussion, initiated by the perbekel of Pande. He tried to give the camat some idea of the problems involved in trying to get people to pay: the farmers were always out in the sawah, they said they did not have the cash or that they would pay tomorrow. The perbekel of Pande gave one example of procrastination, then the Tjokorda of Brassika pitched in with another, then the perbekel of Segar helped out with another. This latter was trotted out in such an inane style that everyone had to laugh. Then, more seriously, the perbekel of Pande
said that people asked where the money went, that they did not understand why they, who were obviously poor, should give their money away and get nothing in return.

The discussion of the other taxes was also notable for the amount of upward pressure exerted by several of the *perbekel*, especially the *perbekel* of Pande. After the discussion about the cattle tax, he insisted that something had to be done about the raising of credit. The villagers, and the village, he said, the very ones who most needed capital and security, could not raise loans because they did not have sufficient security to offer the banks. Because they had so few resources, the branches of BRI (Bank Republik Indonesia) and other *bank desa* would not give them loans. In short, his complaint was that those who most needed loans were the ones least likely to have the security (collateral) to guarantee them. The *camat* agreed to ask the appropriate officials at the banks and the *kabupaten*-level administration for a meeting at which this problem would be addressed.

... The meeting broke up ... [While lunch was served] I remained seated next to the *camat* and began mending fences. I realized that he did not know who I was despite the fact that I had presented myself to his lesser officials with all the official documentation from Jakarta, the governor’s office and the *kabupaten* office. I had been cordially received and registered at his office. I introduced myself properly and we ended up talking amicably about universities. He was born elsewhere in Klungkung and had studied Public Administration at university in East Java. This was his first post, and he’d been here almost a year. (27.11.80)

This was a moment of contact between the government-appointed civil servant and the elected village heads. It shows the attempted intrusion of government will into village life via the *perbekel*, who were the filter through which government policies and funds flowed. On the issue of the election there was no discussion, only the predictable plea for a united front for Golkar and a ‘safe’ electoral process. On issues which demanded payment of real money from the *perbekels’* constituencies to the state there was considerable resistance by the *perbekel*. Government development moneys and their local expenditure were highly controlled: the projects were predetermined and designed to enhance the prestige of the state and the *perbekel* rather than improve the quality of life in villages. The meeting gives an impression of the top-down and authoritarian quality of administration, politics and economic development in Indonesia, yet the *perbekel* managed not only to indicate the difficulties of implementing the state’s requirements but also, amazingly, to introduce an entirely new issue which did not appear on the *camat*’s agenda: the problem of how villagers can raise bank loans.
The meeting also shows some different styles of leadership. The well-educated camat, the youngest man in the room, was plainly nervous at the beginning, but soon got into his stride and made his points clearly and concisely – he had a much more direct delivery style than the Tjokorda of Brassika. His command of Bahasa Indonesia was noticeably superior to that of the other perbekel; he had a wider vocabulary, and used the state-speak – the strings of abstract nouns much beloved of bureaucrats and the plethora of acronyms – with aplomb. But the Tjokorda of Brassika won the clothing stakes in his blue body shirt and shiny black boots; the camat came second in his synthetic grey safari suit and shiny, black lace-up shoes. All the others wore cheap, shiny trousers with shirts ranging from the new official blue batik to a loud orange and green, and slip-on synthetic sandals.

The village heads showed considerable solidarity and opposition. The perbekel of Pande was quite impressive in the amount of resistance he displayed on the Ipeda issue. He was neat in his blue batik shirt, rather blunt compared with the Tjokorda, but very berani (brave) in the pressure he exerted and the awkward points he made. He was often supported by the Tjokorda of Brassika and Ambengan and by the perbekel of Segar. A couple of perbekel did not say a word during the entire meeting, and a couple of others only added weak comments or asked practical questions. All except the perbekel of Segar had notebooks in which they wrote the dates, figures and other requirements. The perbekel of Segar only had a loose sheet of paper and had to borrow a pen. He was an amusing character – kasar (rough, uncouth) compared with the others. There were a few strands of hair falling over his forehead, which he kept brushing hopelessly away; he virtually chain-smoked; and when he was not sprawled across his chair, one foot on the other knee, he was sprawled across the table. The Tjokorda of Brassika played the part of the perfect host, lightening the mostly boring and serious discussion with a joke (once or twice at the expense of the perbekel of Segar, who responded generously), sometimes clarifying a point of action for the perbekel to note, and often supporting the perbekel of Pande in his pleas for leniency and exemption from taxes on the part of poorer farmers.

The meeting also highlights the importance of the appearance of graciousness, hospitality and good form in the administration of Indonesia. Despite the crowdedness of the venue and the awkward beginning, the meeting was at all times a civilized gathering. The Brassika hosts provided a proper reception and special lunch, complete with decorated tables; the opening speeches emphasized in their content the common grounds of the participants and the aim of unity and rapprochement between the villages; in their style the speeches tended towards elegance and conciliation. The two jarring notes were the sometimes impassioned pleas by the perbekel, and my own awkward, marginal position in the meeting.

Three days after this meeting I attended a meeting of the Pamong-Pamong (Elders), one of two organizations of village administration at this
time – the other being the LKMD. The Tjokorda immediately took control of the meeting (even though he was not the official chairman), held on a Sunday in a school classroom. Among other matters, his agenda included the Rp. 200,000 of development funds to be spent. He said he wanted to concrete the floor of the *balé desa*. He asked if they agreed. There was silence and he asked them again. The answer was a unison ‘*Inggih*’ (Yes). He said it was for the benefit of the whole *desa*. (There was no reference to the source of the funds or the *camat*’s stipulation that they be spent on *perbekel*’s offices.) Ipeda taxes had to be paid by December. The village target was Rp. 2.24 million. He admitted this was ‘a heavy burden’. He asked the *klian subak* (heads of irrigation societies) to help with the collection of taxes and said that Rp. 1 million would be enough. Later, the Tjokorda handed over to the chairman, Dewa Made Raka. He is an elegant, well-groomed public servant in the regional court and an eloquent public speaker. He said he would welcome questions concerning ‘developing and uniting the village’ (*membangun dan mempersatukan desa*). There was a long silence, then the chairman elaborated on the function of the organization: discussion (*musyawarah*) of matters of development, progress and unifying the village. After a couple of minor additional points, the Tjokorda mentioned the general election coming up next year and told everyone to ‘be careful’ (*hati-hati*). He asked if there were any problems in the village, and then asked each *klian dinas* individually (by *banjar*, not by personal name). They all reported ‘Safe!’ (*Aman!* ) in turn. Just as the chairman was about to close the meeting, Tjokorda Lingsir, the elderly *klian desa adat* and former *perbekel*, knocked loudly on his school desk and very concisely put forward the view that the Pura Melanting (Market Temple) should be repaired. Tjokorda Gede Raka (*klian desa adat*) said quickly that the Rp. 200,000 had already been spent [1] but agreed wholeheartedly in principle to the proposal. There was no general discussion of this point. The Tjokorda then returned to the matter of the Rp. 200,000 and asked the meeting again if it agreed to spend the money on the concrete floor, saying also that one estimate of the cost was Rp. 150,000. The question was not answered – apparently the matter was considered closed – and the chairman closed the meeting (30.11.80).

We see the same vocabulary of unity and progress as in the *camat*’s meeting, but most striking was the Tjokorda’s authoritarian meeting style and the complete lack of *musyawarah* (consensus decision-making through discussion). His only challenger was the ex-*perbekel*, another Puri man, who was overrun. It seemed that, internally, the Tjokorda’s voice prevailed. Although I have no idea whether his estimate of the Rp. 2.24 million needed to pay village Ipeda debts was accurate, it was interesting that he publicly reduced the total to Rp. 1 million. This open softening of government commands, a form of corruption in which the village head deprived the government of funds in order to enhance his appeal to his constituency, was quite acceptable.
Why did the Klian Dinas choose the word ‘safe’ in reply to the question, ‘were there any problems in their banjar?’ Why did they not answer, ‘no’, or ‘calm’ (tenang)? The possibility of danger (bahaya) was omnipresent in New Order paranoia about Communism: it was the ever-present ‘other’ that the Suharto regime implied in its culturalization of stability and order.

The main concern of the camat in November 1980 was that the 1982 election be safe and successful; this statement was repeated time and again in Brassika and in the newspapers. The cartoon published in the Bali Post on 26 February 1981 captured the bureaucracy’s attitudes perfectly: it showed the 1982 election as a big bad wolf lurking around the corner. Official local government documents in Brassika identified the Gestapu/ PKI as the ‘latent danger’ (bahaya laten) that must be ‘erased’ (dikikis). In village meetings from November 1980 to July 1981, when I left, village leaders were exhorted to make the elections proceed in a ‘safe’ (aman), ‘calm’ (tenang) and ‘orderly’ (tertib) manner.

After returning to Australia I asked the perbekel’s wife in a letter, ‘How were the [1982] elections in Brassika?’ The answer came back, ‘Concerning the elections in Brassika, all was happy (senang), safe (aman) and successful (sukses). Inhabitants total 3867 souls, only 75 to PDI. These 75 are people who have wandered (merantau) then voted in Brassika…’ (9.6.82)

By 1981 the ‘floating mass’ doctrine (massa mengambang) – in which villages had to be ‘free of political parties’ (bebas parpol) outside the fixed periods of election campaigns so that villagers would devote themselves to economic development – prevailed in Brassika. There was virtually no discussion of national politics or of the elections in terms of policies and parties. There was no possibility that elected representatives could represent local voices on national issues, that local issues could become national concerns or that upward pressure could be exerted to change policies. In fact, it was hard to discern any issues, let alone any that seemed pertinent to Brassika. For this reason, the elections and politics in general were not important points of contact between the government and villagers. This was impressed upon me by all village leaders: ‘Village people are not political now’, ‘Village politics has the character of a disciple or follower now’, ‘We think only of the next day’s food’, and so on. The apolitical situation in the village was contrasted by informants with the high level of political excitement in the pre-Gestapu period and with what was assumed to be a high level of political activity in Australia.

During my next stint of fieldwork in 1989 I was stunned to find that the Tjokorda had apparently defected from his village realm to the supra-village sphere of government. In 1981 my impression had been of an apolitical, conservative village, apathetically, or perhaps ‘safely’, supporting Golkar, going through the rituals of development, under the benevolent paternalism of the Tjokorda. I had been told, and it seemed a safe prediction, that the Tjokorda was likely to be village head for 50 years (new
government regulations notwithstanding!). In 1987 he had obtained a new, well-paid position as head of the market in Klungkung. In fact, the whole position of the Puri and of the Tjokorda in particular seemed to have been considerably weakened. As far as I could tell, none of his wives was approached by villagers asking for rice (the ultimate sign of dependency). The various parekan who had haunted the Puri in 1981 were rarely to be seen – even the misshapen, dwarf-like parekan had returned home. There was not a single servant in our household. The impressively high walls of the Puri along the main road had been converted to a row of small rooms opening onto the street. These were used by Puri women as shops and clinic. Further, the Tjokorda had given up his nightly trance healing sessions. The Puri was extraordinarily quiet (sepi).

The Tjokorda’s advance to the supra-village bureaucratic echelons left the village without a natural leader. In January 1989 there was an election for a new village head or ‘Pilkades’ (Pilihan Kepala Desa). The election process was long and complicated: first the Tjokorda announced to the LKMD that the position was open; the LKMD chose the two candidates, both brahmana men: Ida Bagus Gede, already well into his fifties, a very quiet, sakti-less headmaster of a local primary school, and the Tjokorda’s pick, and Ida Bagus Kekeran, I.B. Gede’s son-in-law and head of the banjar of Dlodmelanting. The Tjokorda told me after the event that the winner was a suitable candidate because he was already a civil servant (pegawai negeri). In banjar discussions (musyawarah), the candidates were agreed to and one new suggestion made (the head of Tirtawangi banjar) but he begged off. The two candidates’ names were submitted to the camat, the bupati, and the governor’s offices for screening, then employers were consulted for their assessments. There was another meeting of the LKMD devoted to the election, then the election was held in the wantilan. The winner received 1,287 votes and the loser 680.

In Bali, the village head was not the beneficiary of extensive landholdings held in lieu of pay, as in Java. Rather, the position of village head was financially onerous: one was constantly asked to help those in trouble, to support people from the village in their enterprises, ceremonies and so on. Much of this ‘work’ had been done as a matter of course by the Tjokorda, though I was often unsure under which hat he was operating as he fulfilled these duties – i.e. as local Dewa Agung or as perbekel. He was a very busy man, often attending several functions in one day. He was frequently double booked for weddings, death ceremonies, temple ceremonies, meetings, and so on, not to mention plagued with his subjects’ constant requests for advice, assistance, information, intercession, representation and so on. He was duty bound to attend with gifts to newlyweds, bereaved families and temple congregations, and to pay associated costs such as transport, bureaucratic fees and pay-offs. His official salary in 1981 was a measly Rp. 30,000 a month.
What then were the advantages of being a village head in Bali? For many, increasingly, there were few. The monetary balance was probably a substantially negative amount. Unless one was clever with the development funds and could work the books creatively, or well-connected with contractors for the various development-funded building jobs in the village, candidates could see little advantage in the position except for those with an interest in local politics. The Tjokorda claimed he was tired of all the claims on his time, after twenty years in the job, and wanted the equivalent of a nine-to-five job with all the perks of the public service.

The new village head was jerked unhappily into a very public office: he complained openly that he had been looking forward to a well-earned retirement from teaching. He managed to survive through apathy, illness, absenteeism and lack of interest. In the five-year period of his appointment, the village exhaled very slowly, seeming to lose life and soul.18

Many contrasted Independence Day under the Tjokorda, when everybody – the schoolchildren, all the village and banjar officials and even the temple priests – paraded and afterwards celebrated in fine style, with the non-event under the new man, who didn’t even bother to turn up.

In the meantime, the Tjokorda ran into serious strife in Klungkung. Although popular with the stall-holders for his re-organization of the market, he ran foul of the kabupaten administration, notably the bupati from Puri A–, Klungkung. In a fracas that reached the newspapers, he was finally removed from office on the grounds that he was not a public servant, but with undertones of accusations of embezzlement. He wrote a forced letter of resignation (15.7.91), and defended himself against charges of corruption in a letter to the editor of a newspaper written, with typical Tjokorda self-righteous symbolism, on Independence Day, 1991.

One day early in 1992, I got a lift into Klungkung with the Tjokorda in his lime green safari-style mini-jeep. As usual with the Tjokorda, the journey was punctuated with friendly overtures to people along the way, polite enquiries, regal waves, jovial chats and the odd handover of money. I was very interested to overhear the conversation with a farmer we picked up. The Tjokorda raised the issue of the elections, still four months away, and took on the role of political advisor to this man, who said he didn’t know anything about politics. The Tjokorda said that the PDI was the successor to the PNI. He said Cokorda A– [ex-bupati, ex-PNI man, Puri Klungkung] had sent word that ‘we’ should choose individuals on their own merits, not the parties, because there was not much difference between them. He mentioned how he still remembered President Sukarno, and he turned to me, calling upon me to verify that he assiduously studied Sukarno’s speeches. I concurred, for every morning for the last month my daughter and I had been awakened by the tapes of Sukarno’s speeches being played at distorted volume, outside my door.
I was amazed: here was the Tjokorda, formerly the good Golkar perbekel who had produced a Golkar majority in Brassika that almost exactly reflected the national Golkar majority for the last four elections, advocating a vote for the opposition: the PDI. The Tjokorda never revealed his reasons for his change of heart, but his opposition to the bupati and his ‘cruel’ treatment as head of the market must have been instrumental.

Not long after this, I got out of bed one morning to find a major reorganization of the main reception area of the Puri under way. The aim was to change the position of the photographs on the walls, in order to place the poster of Sukarno on the kaja wall (i.e. the most auspicious wall, in the direction of Gunung Agung and the seat of the gods). The previous night the Tjokorda had had a disturbing dream, which he interpreted to mean that he must focus his mental energies, and authority, on Sukarno. The photo of the Tjokorda’s father and family group was relocated and that of Sukarno took pride of place. (In my room, which was the Tjokorda’s when I was not there, there was a poster of Sukarno with a small shrine under it on the kaja wall. It was obviously the focus of the Tjokorda’s prayers and meditations as it was littered with dead incense sticks and flowers.)

About the same time, early in 1992, the major local controversy was the renovation of the wantilan or village meeting hall. This rather grand pavilion had been the object of government development funds totalling Rp. 200,000 in 1981. According to Puri sources, the wantilan had originally been built by the Puri for Puri affairs and ceremonies opposite the Puri in the central village crossroads. In the colonial period, Brassika was perceived to have been graced with three defining edifices: the Puri, Geria Suci and the wantilan. The Puri had surrendered the building to the people (masyarakat) of Brassika in the Independence period.

By 1992 it was decided, apparently by the village head, that the building needed substantial repairs. There was supposed to have been Rp. 10 million allocated from Bandes (Village Assistance) funds for the purpose, and the job had been contracted out to a firm, PT Anu. The contractor began work, and then the Tjokorda opposed the beginning of work on the grounds that the masyarakat had not been consulted. The Tjokorda claimed that only Rp. 7 million had arrived; he challenged the village head about the funding, and asked, to which masyarakat had the funds been surrendered? He asked, was it the masyarakat adat (the society of customary law) or the masyarakat pemerintah (the society of government)? (field notes: 19.6.94) The village head ordered the contractor to dismantle or, according to ‘Gung Biyang, damage (merusakkan) the wantilan. Then the Tjokorda became incensed. On one memorable occasion, which was an election rally, there were almost fisticuffs between the Tjokorda and one of the brahmana clan. The Tjokorda claimed that the village head was acting out of spite and jealousy (iri hati), and against the interests of the masyarakat. The Puri and Geria
clashed in almost predictable style on this and many other issues. The contractor was investigated and finally arrested for corruption.19

The issue certainly coloured the 1992 national election campaign in Brassika, which was marked by a major split within the village. Many described for me the rowdy election rallies, with jostling and heckling between the ‘red shirts’ of the PDI and the ‘yellow’ shirts’ of Golkar. On many occasions past, such as the birth of the high-caste bastard described below, and on the issue of the wantilan, the classic split was between the Puri and Geria Suci, and therefore, among the ‘people’, between satria loyalists and brahmana clients. Usually, the Tjokorda’s will prevailed, often without opposition, but he could rarely act without taking into account that there might be opposition from the brahmana. This election, however, demonstrates very clearly the real power of the Tjokorda. Because he had decided to switch to the PDI, many in the formerly-Golkar village turned out to vote for the PDI, and, in many cases, to register an informal vote. In 1992 approximately 43 per cent of Brassika voters switched to the PDI. Many people preferred the option of entering the Indonesian version of an informal vote.20 The banjar line-up is also instructive. All banjar except Anjingan and Geria voted solidly for the PDI. Anjingan followed the combined lead of the pedanda and its klian dinas, who remained solidly Golkar, and Geria likewise followed the lead of its pedanda-candidate, the respected village secretary, and the klian dinas. Clearly, the geria remained influential, but this was a major display of the local Dewa Agung’s clout. The ineffectual brahmana village head remained a Golkar man.21

It must be mentioned that the 1992 national election did show a nationwide trend toward the PDI, and that it came after a period of comparative ‘openness’ in Indonesian politics.22 However, the coincidence of voting trends at national and local levels was due not to national party politics affecting Brassika directly nor to party politicking in Brassika by supra-village PDI loyalists but to the Tjokorda’s disaffection with the government machinery and his direct power to pull votes.

THE SMALL POLITICS OF BRASSIKA CULTURE

There are two issues of local politics that I will survey here. The first was an illegitimate pregnancy and the second was a millenarian movement known as the Kalki movement.

The pregnancy first became a village issue, ostensibly at least, because the pregnant woman did not know or would not confess the name of the father-to-be. She was Dewa Ayu in banjar Pekandelan. I was first apprised of the problem at the meeting of the Pamong-Pamong in February 1981. This was a regular village meeting, and when the matter was raised the Tjokorda’s first reaction was to declare it a banjar matter and banish it from discussion. However, various villagers, including the chairman of the Pamong-Pamong
– an employee of the Department of Justice and her kinsman – Dewa Made Raka, said the matter was beyond Pekandelan and indeed beyond Brassika. He called upon Tjokorda Gede Raka, klian desa adat, to explain the awig-awig (customary rules). The Tjokorda said that all births must be reported to the klian dinas. Ida Bagus Sucita said that if a couple were married, the birth is reported to the banjar, but in this case, with no husband, the krama banjar does not know what is going on. Everybody agreed that once the father was known, the couple should be made to marry. The Tjokorda said he thought there were two problems: one of reporting to government and the other one of adat: is the mother/child an adat unit? Can they enter the temple? He caved in and said because of this dual nature, the matter could be discussed at this meeting. The problem was that although this is an age-old problem, there is no awig-awig. The klian desa adat adjudged that the baby could not enter the temple and that the mother and child were not an adat unit. He urged the klian dinas to find out the identity of the father. The discussion was concluded by the chairman saying that such a pregnancy is like a criminal theft. The proof is the pregnancy, but there is no witness.

Post-meeting discussions were extraordinary and for two days and nights the Tjokorda was busy trying to ascertain the identity of the father. I was not surprised to learn that it was Cokorda N–P–, a playboy Puri son who lived and worked as a teacher outside Brassika. As he was already married – to a Sang Ayu – and as the new Marriage Law and its regulations discourage polygyny for public servants by obstructing career advancement, Cokorda N–P– had decided to abandon his new child and its mother. His older brother took pity upon her and married her briefly. The younger brother was finally prevailed upon to marry the mother, in January 1982, though in name only.

Without going into the years of argument and acrimony, not to mention the heartfelt anguish of at least one deserted wife and child, the case became ever more complicated, eventually reaching the courts and the newspapers some thirteen years after the original pregnancy (Bali Post, 17.6.94). The Cokorda took another wife, I Gusti Ayu, in 1990, and they had a child, but Dewa Ayu brought the matter to court, arguing that she had not given her consent to her husband’s second marriage, as required by Indonesian national law. The court case severely damaged the reputation of the local pedanda, who had witnessed that Dewa Ayu had agreed to the Cokorda’s second marriage. Dewa Ayu argued that this was not the case and that she had not known about, let alone consented to, her husband’s second marriage.

This agonizing drama dominated Brassika politics on and off for many years. In the first meeting the discussion was characterized by goodwill and puzzlement, but once the identity of the father became known it degenerated into a heated series of battles. As the issues mutated, the constitution of the opposing groups mutated. Originally, for instance, the brahmana opposition, keen to challenge the reputation of the Puri, had cast
aspersions on the moral character of this satria womanizer. However, many years later, as the pedanda’s actions – it seemed he had merely gone through the paperwork without actually consulting the first wife about the second wife – came under examination, the high castes tried to close ranks.

This tragic case can also be seen as an expression of profound problems between the genders, and in the nature of the gendered social hierarchy in Bali. Divorce is not common in Bali, partly because of the nature of marriage and partly because it demands great sacrifice on the part of women. There are various types of marriage in Bali, but this is not the place to explore these. It suffices to note that marriage is not just a love-inspired coupling of two individuals: it is a social and religious undertaking in which a new social unit is created, with family, descent group, adat, banjar and other responsibilities. When an illicit sexual coupling occurs before marriage, social pressure is almost invariably brought to bear to force the couple to marry. The new unit is a node in the purusa, or male line of the descent group. The woman leaves her natal houseyard and family and takes leave of her ancestral deities to join her husband’s group. To reverse this flow is possible, with the divorcing woman taking leave of her husband’s ancestors, and sometimes returning home and sometimes living on her own. Although it is not explicitly made clear that the woman is ‘used goods’ or sullied by a first marriage and sexual experience, in practice divorced women either marry a brother of the first husband or ‘marry down’. In Brassika, divorce is felt to be against the proper social and religious order, though Bali-wide it is probably becoming more common.

Secondly, divorce is extremely difficult for women because they cannot bear the thought of physically surrendering their children to their husband’s group. This is not just a selfish sense of their own loss but also a concern that their children will not be well looked after by another wife of their husband or by a grandparent of the children. They are often extremely worried about how they will survive, and about their untenable position in society. The vast majority of unhappily married women say it is best just to surrender, to accept their fate and concentrate on their children.

Polygyny is far more common among the high castes than among wong jaba. The decision whether or not to take more than one wife is quite a common quandary for high-caste public servant men. Despite the state ideology accompanying the 1974 Marriage Law – an ideology that promotes monogamy as the modern type of marriage – a second wife confers enhanced status upon the man because it signifies that he is both wealthy and virile. Co-wives and their children are supposed to live together in one big happy family, cooperating with cooking, childcare and the domestic labour, getting on like sisters. I know of no happily married co-wives: in my experience, they are bitter about sharing their husbands, constantly on the alert as to his whereabouts, concerned about the fair dispersal of household moneys, and in particular worried that their children are treated fairly.
At one level, the case of the illicit pregnancy is just a soap opera of an event that happens all the time everywhere. Yet this set of domestic relationships is enmeshed in the gender and caste politics of Bali. It catches at the dominant paradigm of male supremacy and female subordination, a paradigm enforced through the caste and purusa system. This system proscribes hypogamy, encourages polygyny, supports male-only inheritance, prescribes a marginal position for women in genealogical lines, discourages divorce and has many ramifications that in daily life place women in a position of dependency and inferiority to men.

Indeed, this case is of national significance, for the protagonists are invoking national laws and their interface with Balinese ‘tradition’. Yet it should not appear that ‘the national’ – the Indonesian state’s laws and regulations that seem to afford women greater protection from powerful men – equates with ‘the modern’ – i.e. with a more autonomous position for women. The state’s stated gender ideology is one of gender equality, with the genders occupying equal but different spheres, but in rhetoric and practice the female is subordinate to the male (Sullivan 1994; Suryakusuma 1996).

Nor should it be that gender politics are local politics rather than national politics. Throughout Indonesia abutments of gendered local practice and national law are having to be realigned; women have attempted appropriations of the national laws or even appeals to international mores to achieve justice. Yet often the domestic conflict is squashed and the voice unheard because of the power of local men as fathers, husbands, village heads and police, and because of the operation of the culture of order. The New Order state’s laws and organizations for women frequently galvanized them into action – into sports competitions, official receptions, divisions of labour, contraceptive practices – and yet it was rare indeed for national women’s organizations to be able to represent the injured party in domestic conflicts, to go public with local issues of gender inequality and to make national issues out of women’s subordination.

The second issue I want to discuss is the rise and fall of a local millenarian prophet, known as Kalki. There is a distinct silence in the historical and anthropological literature on Bali about millenarian movements in Bali, though such movements were commonplace in Java in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Kalki movement shared elements common to Javanese millenarian movements, including the building of the movement along family lines, around one charismatic individual who was held to possess supernatural powers and who would bring about the millenium or just society. The messianic vocation of the Ratu Adil (Just King) was usually conveyed through a divine revelation, dream or inner conversion. Messianic leaders were usually traditionalistic and nativistic, indicating a nostalgia for a golden age and a rejection of contemporary materialism, foreign domination or a corrupt regime. Millenarian movements were usually very local
and small, being restricted to a single village or community, and short-lived. Although essentially religious, they represented a profound rejection of the prevailing socio-political situation.

Outside Brassika, the Kalki movement was presented as a minor millenarian movement (aliran kepercayaan) of no great moment, but within Brassika a different spin was put upon it. The local newspaper only reported the movement once it became associated with dramatic events (i.e. from 15.4.94) – whence it rapidly became ‘a bloody event’ (peristiwa berdarah) (Bali Post, 20.4.94) and a bloody tragedy (tragedi berdarah) (Bali Post, 18.4.94). For the newspaper it was all over in two weeks.

The story began with Pak A–, who came from a village not far away in Gianyar. He claimed to be the tenth avatar or reincarnation of Vishnu and he traced his descent down the most prestigious royal lineage – that of the Gelgel (Dalem) kings. He claimed the title of Ida Batara Dalem, the Dalem God-King. The symbols of his enhanced status included various titles: Bhatara Hyang Kalki (The God Kalki), Ida Batara Kalki Hyang Nrepatih, Bhatara Hyang Kalki Nrepatih and Ratu Dalem Mahawiyasa Sakki Agung. His followers also claimed high-caste titles (e.g. his wife claimed the name Bhatari Sri Amertaningrat and one of his followers in Brassika, Ni Rasmi, claimed the title Anak Agung Biyang, a satria title). His followers brought food and offerings to him on their heads, as would normally be done to the gods, priests and kings. Kalki bathed in his houseyard temple, as is done by priests. His followers constructed capped entranceways to their house-compounds in the manner of a puri-entrance, and painted puri titles on these cross-beams. In short, Kalki was claiming god-king status.

The man known as Kalki had studied at the Parisadha Hindu Dharma Institute, graduating with a BA degree, and then turned to a more individualistic and meditative style, practising yoga and meditating, until his sudden realization that he was Kalki – the name of the tenth avatari of Vishnu. He then began practising as a dukun, spreading his belief that organized religion had become too elaborate and too full of pretence; he believed that people are equal, and married hypogamously an Anak Agung woman in an idiosyncratic ceremony at the summit of Gunung Agung, Bali’s highest mountain and sacred site. There followed a succession of trouble-filled events: as he moved around, his travels were marked at each place by conflict with the authorities, damage to property and escalating levels of violence and death until he was finally arrested.26

Many of his followers were students and intellectuals such as high school teachers. The catchment area was extensive, and included people from Klungkung, Bangli and Singaraja. His teachings emphasized a rejection of the social hierarchy, the strength of individual spiritual powers and the value of contemplation, and a rejection of institutionalized religious practice. I was told that many such groups, called aliran (currents) and kepercayaan (beliefs) were springing up, as people were increasingly feeling
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that mainstream religion (especially the Parisadha Hindu Dharma) pandered too much to government and that religion was controlled by government; that mainstream religious practice was overly preoccupied with rituals and offerings – with religious praxis – and with increasingly ostentatious and expensive displays of wealth and status; that mainstream religion neglected the content (isi) – the doctrines and philosophy, the strict discipline of abstention, fasting, mediation and so on – of religion.

After these incidents in 1994, the government assiduously compiled lists of aliran and kepercayaan groups in Bali. Rather than acknowledge them as ‘religions’ or ‘cults’, registered with the Department of Religion, or, even more unthinkable, as political groups, inventories were made by the Department of Education and Culture. In a range of actions we see the state fearing and attempting to control and suppress millenarian movements, interpreting them as threats to public order, the unitary state and homogeneous Balinese religion. (We also see the propensity of the Balinese to allow issues of caste to permeate all social spheres.)

Talking of the role of the ‘wild’ rural kyai (Islamic leaders in Java) in the collapse of an old order, Anderson said,

It is the abrupt emergence of such figures into the political arena that reveals the inner decay or disruption of the social order. Indeed precipitates it. (Anderson 1990: 65)

The classification of the Kalki movement as an aliran groups it with the aliran kebatinan (the spiritual movements) of Java – movements which had an ambiguous legal status under the Suharto regime. Although not defining themselves as ‘religions’, they were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religion until 1978. From then, they were dubbed kepercayaan (beliefs), so long as they were focussed on belief in One God, and came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Culture with their own independent Directorate (Stange 1989: 124–125). Identifying the Kalki movement as ‘culture’ rather than religion neutralized it, for although this was clearly a religious movement focussed on one charismatic leader (gerakan Ratu Adil), it was also oriented towards a new social order. It was interpreted as politically threatening and hence disarmed by the appellation ‘culture’.

The Kalki movement in Brassika, according to the brahmana village head, only involved 11 people, all from one family. He saw it as a millenarian movement – a genuine religious movement – but also as trouble for him, for Kalki had applied to banjar Dlodmelanting for membership. This banjar, the stronghold of brahmana households related to the village head, and the family who were followers of Kalki, was divided on the issue. He said it was just like Gestapu: there was a killing, and fighting – Kalki’s followers got involved in a fight with the young people’s groups (Muda-Mudi) in banjar
Pekandelan, Manuaba and Dlodmelanting; there were rifts within the banjar and the family; the army was involved; there was much conflict within society over the issue of caste, for Kalki, with his title of Ida Batara Dalem, thought he was above the Dewa Agung of Klungkung. He said he had been afraid it would spread and tried to calm things down and not take sides (acuh tak acuh).

The Tjokorda of Brassika stated that the Kalki movement was a family matter: a conflict within a descent group, family or caste (warga). Kalki came to Brassika because there was a branch of his descent group in Brassika. Kalki never lived in Brassika but visited often after his marriage and applied to settle in banjar Dlodmelanting. His main followers in Brassika were Ni Rasmı, the largest stall-holder in Brassika, and her high school teacher husband, I Semadi. The reason his movement was interpreted as a family affair by the Tjokorda is that Kalki’s only followers in Brassika came from a particular family. It was this family that had been most tragically ruptured by the politicization and massacre of the mid-1960s. There were four brothers in banjar Dlodmelanting: the first three had followed the PKI and were killed, and the youngest, I Suradnya, was a PNI man who became a respected primary school teacher. The two sons of the first brother, both well-educated teachers by Brassika standards, followed Kalki: the older, I Semadi, was the high school teacher married to Ni Rasmı. The son of the second brother did not follow Kalki. The third of the four brothers had one daughter and three sons – all followed Kalki. The fourth brother was openly opposed to Kalki. Thus, as the Tjokorda said, the development of Kalki in Brassika was only a possibility because of the connection with the political problems of the past.

The Kalki movement was all over by mid-1994: a minuscule, local blip of no moment. Yet the New Order state took it seriously and dealt with it in characteristic manner. Brassika people also took it seriously – some young people even passionately. It was a polysemic affair triggering caste ambitions, religious dissatisfaction coupled with revolt against state-organized religion, nasty festering sores from Gestapu and village citizenship.

CONCLUSION
I would not like this chapter to be read as some sort of kernel or essence of the book, as if the processes of nation-state formation and citizen-making were only to be found in some arena called politics. My feeling is that, ironically, the arena called politics was one of the least effective mechanisms of nation-state incorporation. At the very time Brassika became increasingly entangled in the state bureaucracy, it became politically emasculated and irrelevant. I have argued in the rest of the book that the process of incorporation was nearly all-embracing. Later I will conclude that the success and longevity of the New Order regime must be
explained with reference to this deep and broadly encompassing quality of
the New Order regime – in sites as intrusive as marital and birthing beds, as
vital for survival as rice fields and as potentially transformative as the minds
of six-year-old children.

This chapter shows that it was the pre-existing *kaula–gusti* relationships
that particularly shaped New Order political life within Brassika, such as it
was. Further, these relationships were explicitly nourished by the ideology
of the *bahaya laten*, the latent danger of Communism, and implicitly fed by
fear of rampant oppositional democracy attended by the fear that anything
might happen once criticism was brooked.

The weight and busyness and intrusiveness of the bureaucratic
enterprise, usually in the guise of working for development, reinforced a
‘not-politics’ characterized by a culture of order and stability. In the next
chapter, I analyse how the development enterprise in Brassika was embedded
in power relations even as it dislocated individuals from communities, broke
communal ties and produced open-endedness in individual and communal
futures.

NOTES
1. These three groups are not exclusive: some scholars’ work fits into two or even
three of my ‘approaches’. For instance, anthropologist Carol Warren has written
both of the new, and transformative laws on local government in Bali, and of the
subtle manipulation and sometimes subversion of governmental ideological terms
by members of Balinese hamlets in order to achieve their own ends, which can be
described as developmental (Warren 1993).
2. For instance, Amnesty International 1985; Asia Watch 1990; Bourchier 1990;
3. For example, Emmerson 1978; MacAndrews 1986, esp. pp. 20–41 (though
MacAndrews emphasizes the tension between the growth in central government
authority and the strengthening of provincial governmental apparatuses to provide
stability and the infrastructure for regional development). See also Parker 1992a
4. See various papers in Budiman 1990, especially those by Heryanto, Foulcher and
6. At the end of 1997, as the rupiah went into freefall against the U.S. dollar and the
legitimacy of the regime seemed to be open to question because of economic
mismanagement, I travelled from Surabaya to Brassika. In Surabaya, large numbers
of unemployed roamed the streets or squatted on street corners; Chinese friends
decided that the anti-Chinese paranoia, and indeed physical attacks, were
unbearable and organized emigration to Singapore; the excited talk everywhere was
of bankruptcies, factory closures, inflation, the government’s reactions (would the
corruption-ridden Timor car project be suspended?) and the possibilities for
political, as well as economic, reform. The next day, en route to Ubud, I dropped in
on friends in Pujung who work as agents for an international insurance company.
Not unexpectedly, they were most interested in discussing the ramifications of the
financial crisis. In Ubud, street sellers and shopkeepers groaned about the inflation
and wondered at the impact on the tourist industry. I was only in Brassika for a day,
but no one mentioned the subject.
7. Since the early 1990s, the nation-making effects of the education system have been strongly augmented through exposure to television because the major part of the village has had electricity. The most obvious effect of television viewing in New Order Indonesia, as far as nation-making is concerned, was the greatly improved understanding of and fluency in Bahasa Indonesia, but of course a complicated mix of nationalizing and globalizing messages was televised.

8. The waweton signs were an innovative response to the perception that outsiders were keen to settle in Balinese villages. Many villagers noted the increasing numbers of Javanese travelling the Brassika road, selling bakso (meatball soup) and trinkets and their labour. The Tjokorda mentioned, in response to my question as to why they were erected, that after the Kalki movement, described below, it was felt that Brassika villagers must delineate both their territory and the meaning of being a resident or member of the desa adat. The waweton signs were accompanied by new regulations in the awig-awig (adat rules), which stipulated that a resident must obey the rules of the desa adat, be willing to follow the Hindu Balinese religion and participate in the communal death rituals of the desa adat.

9. On one day in 1992, neither the village head nor his deputy were present, but during the hour or so I spent in the office there were the sekretaris and six pamong desa present (mostly writing or copying letters it seemed), a uniformed ABRI man visiting, two klian dusun, a man who held a position in the tempek (work-group) of a subak (irrigation society), an official from the income section of the bupati’s office in Klungkung, and an official from the Department of Education and Culture come to organize the rehabilitation of the school.

10. Other useful descriptions of the weight of government presence in village life can be found in Antlov 1994: 73–96 and Schiller 1996.

11. By Presidential Decision no. 28 of 1980, following the Law on Village Government (U.U.No.5), the LKMD was ‘to grow from, by and for the people (masyarakat), to activate the participation of the people in development, which unites the implementation of various Government activities and the wish for the people’s self-help (swadaya) mutual assistance (gotong royong) in all aspects of lifestyle and livelihood in its plan to realize National Endurance, which covers aspects of ideology, Politics, economics, socio-culture, religion and security defence. LKMD has as its objectives to help the Village Government in the promotion of Government service and the distribution of the proceeds of development in the growth of the desire as well as the implementation of the people’s self-help mutual assistance in development, so that the people have perseverance and integrity which contains the capability for developing endurance in facing and overcoming all challenges and obstacles in the territory’s implementation plan (Keputusan Presiden 28, 1980, Bab I and II).

In Brassika, the Pamong-Pamong continued to be the principal local decision-making organization, though the LKMD was, as required by law, consulted on the village budget. See also Warren 1993: 238–244.

12. Anderson’s classic account (1972, reprinted 1990) was another foundational paper. Arguably, until the downfall of Suharto the cultural politics approach prevailed, e.g. in the US, Pemberton (1994) and Shirashi (1997); in Australia, Chalmers has re-invoked a political culture approach (1997).

13. A piercing critique of this neglect is found in Robison (1981). It is notable that as the New Order became entrenched and the Indonesian government gradually expunged class conflict from public discourse so did the international scholarly discourse on Indonesia gradually, though not entirely, expunge class struggle from its analyses.


15. One of the earliest works was Lipset (1960); extremely influential was Diamond (1989). For Indonesia see Berger (1997), Bourchier and Legge (1990) and Tanter and Young (1990).
16. Geographically, opposition to the Suharto regime spread as a response to nationally-felt social dislocation, particularly occasioned by urban drift and rapid industrialization, and triggered by government action in particular areas (e.g. protests over the Kedung Ombo dam in Central Java, church burnings in East Java, anti-government riots in Ujung Pandang over motorbike helmet regulations, large strikes and industrial protests in Medan over minimum wage rates, ethnic killings in Western Kalimantan and Ambon and significant industrial opposition and ethnic strife in many of the towns in Java).

17. I was sometimes quizzed in Brassika about the nature of politics in Australia, and was impressed by my interlocutors’ incomprehension of the possibility of the co-existence of political opposition and an orderly public life. The idea that the mass media have a duty to criticize the government – indeed, that the questioning of all aspects of public life may be its principal duty – was never swallowed. Audiences were invariably shocked when I openly criticized the Australian Prime Minister of the day, or cynically questioned politicians’ motives such as the Keating government’s ‘engagement with Asia’ policy. The shock was not that I did not agree with the government – that is normal – but that I would brazenly state my opposition, even to a foreign audience. In Indonesian eyes I was challenging the citizen’s duty of loyalty and patriotism.

18. People variously described him as sleepy, stupid, with a brain like water and so on. Those in the Puri were even less flattering: he wouldn’t acknowledge the intelligence of others (just about everybody was smarter than him); he didn’t take responsibility for his actions; he didn’t back up his staff and liked to humiliate and criticize those from the Puri in village administration. In short, he was not like a satria – here my informant, the Tjokorda, froze in the strong-arm pose of an aggressive warrior.

19. By 1994 the issue had been conveniently resolved: in 1992 all work stopped because there was insufficient money to complete the project. The village head had tried to raise the funds ‘voluntarily’ (secara swadaya), by asking for a contribution from every family, but this had been rejected by the villagers. Later, further extra funds under another scheme became available, and the wantilan had its renovation.

20. The voting paper consists of three pictures, party symbols, one of which must be pierced. Many people either did not clearly pierce one of the pictures, or, in folding the paper into three, pierced all three. Also I was told that many young people, eligible to vote from the age of 17 years, did not register.

21. The position of ‘Gung Biyang, and of other public servants at this time was extremely difficult. She described to me how many people would come to visit the Tjokorda to discuss politics, and as his wife she felt duty-bound to provide them with coffee, as usual. However, as a public servant, she was also bound to vote Golkar, and was anxious lest her serving of coffee to the Tjokorda’s followers would be seen as support of the PDI. In the end, she preserved her political purity and job security, sacrificing the demands of hospitality and wifely loyalty by not serving the coffee.


23. This is a very large Pandora’s box to have opened. See, for instance, Boon 1977 and Geertz and Geertz 1975, Hobart 1979.

24. This is apparently true not just in Bali but in many Muslim societies where polygyny is acceptable. Probably the most successful action of women’s groups in Indonesia during the Independence period has been the restricting of polygynous practice and the instituting of strict requirements for obtaining co-wives’ consent, at least on paper.

25. Most famously, Diponegoro was the messianic Ratu Adil (Just King) of the Java War (1825–1830); as recently as 1973, the Sawito Affair enjoyed the stature of an internationally recognized, regime-threatening political movement. See Sartono Kartodirdjo 1973, esp. pp. 64–105; Van der Kroef 1959; Stange 1986 and 1989; and for an excellent documentation of the Sawito Affair, Bourchier 1984. Certainly
many features of the Kalki movement bear the same characteristics as those in Java, though without the elements of Islam such as the jihad or holy war, the active role played by rural pesantren or Islamic schools, and the tradition that the Mahdi or Islamic Saviour would appear at the end of time.

While it is dangerous to speculate that there may have been millenarian movements when there is little in the historical record to suggest such a thing, it can be pointed out that most of our evidence of messianic movements in Java comes from the colonial records (Kartodirdjo 1973: 78). One reason for this may be that in this period messianism was partly a hostile reaction to uneven but deepening penetration of colonial rule. Bali’s comparatively short period of European colonization may have precluded the chance for such an effect to have developed.

26. He requested a new residence card (KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk) in his new Kalki name from his village head, but this was rejected. He filed a case with the courts, and moved to S. in Gianyar. There he had problems with the krama banjar, who claimed he was not active in local affairs and refused him land rights when he tried to buy land there. He moved to T. in Bangli, where he had uniforms made for his growing band of followers. The black T-shirts were imprinted with the slogan Taloh Léak, a label meaning ambiguously Egg or World (Taloh) of the Evil Spirit, Witch or People (Léak), and his followers wore white destar (ceremonial headband) and selendang poleng (checked sash). The people of T. complained and he was forced to return to S.

His house in S. was damaged by locals; Kalki was incensed and roared off in his car, nearly running over and wounding four young people in his rage. On the day before Nyepi, in April 1994, the huge papier-mâché statues (ogoh-ogoh) that traditionally roam the villages on this day damaged the penjor (decorated bamboo pole) in front of his houseyard. At one stage (the chronology is a bit shaky, as this is a compilation from various informants!), there was a fight and one of Kalki’s supporters, an ABRI man, was arrested and held in a lock-up. He hanged himself in his cell. Then on Kuningan, the day of celebration for friends and family, the mantan klian banjar of S. was killed, reportedly by a group of some 50 or so pemuda (youth), who also burned four stalls and the kulkul (split gong, used for summoning help). Several of his followers were army men, but police said that it was Kalki and his group who were behind the murder. Kalki and some of his followers (described as anak buah or clients in the newspaper) hid near Gunung Agung for a couple of weeks, out of reach of the police; eventually 31 people were arrested and Kalki was brought to trial.

27. Parisadha has functioned as the political arm of the Balinese within the Department of Religion, successfully lobbying in the 1950s for recognition of Balinese Hinduism as one of the five allowable state religions in Indonesia. It has become extremely political: ‘The PHD was political in that it was used as a stronghold against “communism” and, later, as a propaganda medium for the New Order.’ (Schulte Nordholt 1991: 19). Nowadays PHD has become PHD Indonesia. It has its headquarters in Jakarta, from where it controls Hinduism throughout Indonesia, including growing numbers of adherents in Java and Kalimantan. In Bali it has representatives down to kecamatan level, and directives from PHDI arrive at village level in the form of meetings, visits of representatives, sets of instructions about ritual practice, etc. The PHDI also examines and registers all sulinggih (priests such as pedanda, mpu, rsi, pande, etc.), organizes instruction in Pancasila for priests, and so on (Forge 1980; Geertz 1973: 170–189; Pitana 1995).

Professor I Gusti Ngurah Bagus, Bali’s preeminent anthropologist, suggested that there was a ‘spiritual crisis’ in the Hindu religious community (Bali Post, 26.4.94).

28. The bupati of Bangli was reported in the Bali Post as ‘forbidding officials and the Hindu community in Bangli’ from following these ‘liar’ (wild) and ‘illegal adiran kepercayaan (Bali Post, 25.4.94). The chairman of the Institute for Adat in Gianyar, Cok. N.M., said that Kalki could be threatened with adat law for claiming status as a god, and mentioned similar attempts by members of low caste groupings to change their names or titles in ways not commensurate with their caste status (Bali Post, 30.4.94).
‘Development’ is a cosmopolitan trope meaning the engineering of economic and social change in poorer ‘Third World’ countries, usually via industrialization, towards higher material standards of living as in Western, ‘developed’ societies. In New Order Indonesia, development (pembangunan) was desired by all and especially by the Suharto regime. Indeed, Suharto’s Independence Day Speech of 1980 stated that pembangunan was the only way to realize progress and prosperity. Through ‘dynamic social stability’ pembangunan would be implemented (Hooker 1993: 277). In New Order Indonesia, it was not possible to argue against pembangunan, though pembangunan was often argued over. Pembangunan had the same slippery, all-things-to-all-people quality as Pancasila. Consequently there was much room for manipulation and negotiation in its implementation.

I suggested in the previous chapter that in Brassika it was in the arena identified as pembangunan, rather than that of ‘politics’, that citizens were allowed, indeed encouraged, to participate as citizens of the nation-state. We have seen that under the New Order ‘culture state’, village society became considerably detached from political parties, ideological commitment and formal political processes. The dramatic activation of traditional patron–client ties as the Tjokorda engineered a 180-degree swing in voting preferences in the 1992 election, the effacement of idealistic commitment to revolutionary (subversive) social causes, the ‘nipping in the bud’ of the incipient local messianic movement, and the absence of connection between local issues and national political issues demonstrate how Brassika society appeared as a depoliticized ‘floating mass’.

Yet, by the end of the Suharto regime, Brassika hummed with activity and transformative socio-economic change. In the eighteen years I had been associated with Brassika, many dramatic innovations – electricity, TV, piped water, roads and motorized transport, family planning, education, the Green Revolution and the manufacture of textiles for export – faithful to the model of international development had been made.
From Subjects to Citizens

The impetus, funding and infrastructure necessary for such change lay not in Brassika but with the central, and to a degree, provincial, governments. Through development, New Order Indonesia became an ‘interventionist nation-state’. The litany of pembangunan was inescapable in Suharto’s Indonesia: it was so hegemonic there was nary a voice of opposition. Pembangunan was a major tool of national integration, smoothly articulating nation and state and, of course, delivering material benefits desired by all. Occasionally, intellectuals, students or priests expressed concern about environmental degradation or, more usually, about the overly materialistic development of Balinese society. It was fairly commonplace to decry the commodification of dance and drama in Bali, because of the tourist industry, or the demise of the Balinese language, but few mentioned the corrosion of inter-personal ties or of the spirit of community that resulted when communal voluntary labour was performed by individuals for wages. Yet, at village level, local people were not simply the passive recipients of pembangunan from the state. On the contrary, I will argue that national pembangunan, while having undeniable incorporative force, became entangled in local relations of power and subject to local interpretations. Pembangunan funding and the amazingly dense net of bureaucratic arrangements set up to implement pembangunan were manipulated to serve local interests and local ideas of the good life.

In this chapter I explore these varied meanings of pembangunan for Brassika villagers by examining some of the pembangunan practices and programmes.

Perhaps most obvious to me was the Brassika understanding that pembangunan meant buildings. This understanding was not just a local one – I have heard it in Sumbawa and Java, as well as Denpasar. Whenever I returned to Brassika I asked people, what's happened since I was last here? Almost invariably the reply was in terms of the material development of the village: Well, we've built a new balé banjar or we've renovated the temple, the new high school has been built, etc. The list of new or renovated public buildings was indeed long, and villagers were generally proud of this progress. We see this understanding in children’s writings: ‘Pembangunan in my village is already flourishing. For example, building the village hall, building the clinic. Implementing that pembangunan through mutual assistance (dengan cara gotong-royong).’ (Composition, 5th class, 3.2.1981). This was measurable progress, and often the words pembangunan and kemajuan, progress, were interchangeable.

Have you ever seen the progress (kemajuan) in the village of Sukarasa? Because the villagers’ schooling needs increase each year, the inhabitants build school buildings. They build these buildings through mutual assistance (bergotong-royong). Apart from building school build-
ings, the citizens of the village build a market, a clinic, a mosque and so on using mutual assistance. (Permadi 1980 for Kelas 4: 38)

*Pembangunan* thus equated with ‘buildings’, and in a broader sense, with tangible objects, rewards and money. The in-flow of *pembangunan* funds to each *desa* potentially enriched, either materially or politically, those who

*Photo 6-1: Pancasila statue in the central cross-roads of the village*
controlled the flow – notably the perbekel – and those who could divert some of the flow into their own territory – usually village contractors.\(^6\)

When I began fieldwork, the most significant government funds received by the village were those of the Bandes (Bantuan Desa, Village Assistance) scheme. It was the government’s single most important pembangunan project in rural areas of Indonesia apart from the Bimas scheme for rice agriculture.\(^7\)

Three Bandes projects were chosen by the perbekel in 1980–81: first the concreting of the wantilan floor and the construction of market stalls and then the renovation of the Pura Melanting. All were public, desa-owned buildings in the centre of the village.\(^8\)

There were only a few public buildings eligible for pembangunan using Bandes funds; naturally villagers did not want to spend their pembangunan money on projects for which various government departments were already responsible (such as roads, drinking water and electricity). It was decided at the January 1981 meeting of the LKMD that the 1981/82 Bandes funds of Rp. 1 million would be spent on the Pura Melanting, with additional self-help contributions of Rp. 800 per household. This was the only time that Bandes funds were spent on a temple: all other projects in the years 1969–1983 were infrastructural. At no time were pembangunan funds spent on income-producing activities, training or economic restructuring.\(^9\)

In most years the villagers’ contributions matched or exceeded the government’s grant. In the years 1969–1983, government funds totalled Rp. 5 million and people’s contributions (swadaya masyarakat) totalled Rp. 6.039 million (Monografi 1983: 18). However, the villagers also contributed a much more considerable sum in pembangunan projects called ‘swadaya murni’ (pure self-help). Between 1979 and 1983 they raised Rp. 22.8 million for these projects, all of which was spent on temples. Of course, villagers have always been responsible for their own temples, and raised money and commanded labour contributions as needed. Most of this total of Rp. 22.8 million was raised by the particular, local community (pemaksan) of supporters who were responsible for each temple – desa adat, subak, etc. – but some temples were the responsibility of the whole desa, e.g. Pura Melanting. Nevertheless, in the New Order period, the support of temples (and of temple priests) was increasingly organized by the desa administration.\(^10\)

However, Brassika villagers, and in particular the klian desa adat, have been nervous about spending government pembangunan funds on temple support. The klian desa adat justified the Pura Melanting project as pembangunan, saying it was the utilization of pembangunan moneys ‘to secure religious consciousness’ (memantapkan kesadaran beragama).

The Pamong-Pamong meeting in February 1981 shows that pembangunan funds became entangled in local power conflicts. This was one of very few occasions when I witnessed the public expression of satria–brahma competition. The meeting was about the disbursement of pembangunan funds, but the alignment of forces became obvious during the meeting.
The meeting did not get off to a good start, as the perbekel was angry about the absence of many members of the LKMD at the meeting the previous day. He said the discussion at the LKMD meeting had been unsatisfactory because of the small numbers present. The topic for discussion had been the expenditure of the remaining Rp. 650,000 of the year’s Bandes allowance, and he apologised with false humility for the inadequacy of his report. He handed over to Tjokorda Sede Raka who reported on the LKMD’s decision, which coincided with the perbekel’s plans, to build 5 stalls and to use approximately half the funds for the materials and half for the contractor. A figure of Rp. 225,000 for materials was supported by the two Tjokorda. A teacher agreed with this, and the chairman wrote this figure and the teacher’s name on the board.

Then the topic for discussion became the choice of building materials to be used in the new ‘kios’. The two protagonists were the perbekel and Ida Bagus Wangun, a building contractor, and the argument centred on the choice of glass or some sort of cheaper plywood/fibro/plaster board for the front panels. The perbekel favoured the choice of glass, saying it would look more pleasing and be better for the customers. He implied that the contractor was just trying to do a quick, shoddy job and questioned the contractor’s motives. The cladding versus glass battle waged long and fiercely, with the contractor losing all composure, his bulging eyes glazing over and his voice raised. The perbekel, as usual, appealed to known supporters in the meeting and asked for musyawarah (consultation). Several people, including Sang Nyoman Siyana, Ni Rasmi and I Nyoman Tinut, were invited to answer the perbekel’s (partly rhetorical) questions and they confirmed his statements. He asked for whom the kios was to be built, the convenience of the contractor or the people of the village. The contractor then suggested a materials price of Rp. 200,000, and this was noted on the board beside his name. The perbekel always appealed to the meeting as a whole, while the contractor addressed himself solely to the perbekel. It was thus a very personal attack by Ida Bagus Wangun, and smooth oratory on the part of the perbekel. The matter was not resolved, because of the contractor’s unusual steadfastness, and a new matter, that of the taxes levied on traders, led to further argument between the two protagonists. (8.2.81)

After this lively grandstanding session, a couple of Geria representatives – Ida Bagus Wangun, the village contractor, and Ida Bagus Sucita, the head of Hansip – came to discuss the matter with the Tjokorda over the next few days. "Pembangunan" funds were thus inserted into pre-existing relations of political power as the bone which was fought over. In this case, the contract
for the market stalls dramatically flushed out the long-standing status competition between the Puri and the Geria.\textsuperscript{11}

In a more recent case, it was the ubiquitous practice of gotong-royong, or mutual assistance, in the service of pembangunan which surfaced.\textsuperscript{12} Most pembangunan projects required considerable contributions from the citizenry, in the form of labour and/or in the form of cash. The latter were usually dubbed self-help (swadaya) contributions: one example was the Rp. 800 required of each household for the renovation of the Pura Melanting. These contributions were always ‘equal’, i.e. they were not means-tested, so the Puri paid the same as the poorest widow with four children. Gotong-royong was the means by which most of the public maintenance, repair and construction work was done in Brassika, and it was organized on a banjar basis. The klian dinas compiled lists of members who had to turn up to work and of those who were exempt and had to pay the ‘ngoot’. The latter included those who had dinas (official) jobs such as teachers, those who lived or worked out of the village and members of the brahmana and high satria castes. This last exemption was challenged by the new priest (pemangku) of the Temple of Fragrant Water in 1997, on the grounds that in Indonesia all were equal (sama rata) in rights and responsibilities. In banjar Tirtawangi the descent group of the pedanda had long been exempt from labour contributions, but the pemangku was organizing a major pembangunan project in the form of several long flights of concrete steps to the Temple of Fragrant Water, and he proposed a new, egalitarian distribution of gotong-royong duties, with all the brahmana, except the pedanda, participating.

Thus, pembangunan funds became objects of contestation – a contestation that could inflame long-standing social rifts – and even instigated social rupture. The near eruption of a physical fight over the renovation of the wantilan in 1992, noted in the previous chapter, was a case in point.

Pembangunan, according to the New Order government rhetoric, aimed at the establishment of a just and prosperous Indonesia. Questions arose, as the pemangku noted, as to ‘just’ and ‘prosperous’ for whom, and whether or not these twin goals were compatible. In the field of agricultural development, which was largely implemented through the subak or irrigation societies, there were tensions between the interests of small individual farmers and those of larger farmers, and between the interests of farmers and those of government.

Most of Brassika’s farmers owned or worked sawah in the three subak which surround the village.\textsuperscript{13}

The main functions of the subak as far as the farmers were concerned were the distribution of water to the rice paddies in its territory and the maintenance of its temples and support of its deities. Clearly the government had a different view of its functions. At a meeting held to mark the handover of the position of head of the subak (klan subak) to a new incumbent in 1981, the head of all subak in kabupaten Klungkung, the
sedahan agung, remarked that the two main sources of authority for subak members were the written rules (awig-awig) and the farmers’ daily requirements on the one hand, and the needs of government on the other. ‘What is important is that a) taxes (Ipeda) are paid, b) the administration is good, and c) irrigation is good.’ (Parker 1989: 190)

In fact, dams and irrigation channels were increasingly becoming the responsibility of the Department of Public Works as the technology became more sophisticated – larger and more permanent dams, concreted channels and distribution points – and expenditure rose.

In the literature, subak are portrayed as democratic and egalitarian societies: ‘In the irrigation association members act as a body for work without regard for differences in wealth or the distribution of holdings in water.’ (Hobart 1979: 175). Birkelbach reported that ‘... the pekaseh [workers] are usually the poorer subak members...’ (1973: 167). In contrast, in the subak around Brassika the members who did the work and who went to meetings owned or controlled much larger holdings than the average. The de jure or de facto exclusion of the poorer, smaller landholders from the right and obligation to work and to participate in decision-making implies that in Brassika the subak were not the democratic organizations they are generally perceived to be. Exclusion from work groups and decision-making could work against the production of successful crops. Water was regarded as a scarce resource, and instances of theft and accusations of misappropriation were rife. Water channels and

Photo 6-2: A complicated and newly concreted intersection of irrigation channels
openings were sometimes guarded 24 hours a day. All klian subak and other farmers regarded participation in guard duty shifts as crucial to a high yield. The implication was always that passive (non-) members, who tended to be the smaller owners and sharecroppers, would receive less water and hence their crops would suffer.

The subak in Brassika in 1980 were organized in such a way as to ‘get things done’, without being held back by the poorer, sometimes more conservative farmers who were less inclined to gamble with debts for new technology than the wealthier, active subak members. The government agricultural extension officer commented to me in 1981 that in the New Order period, and especially since the introduction of the HYVs (High Yielding Varieties of rice), farmers had become very progressive (maju), trying to maximize yields, and that this had been done through the subak system. At this time, the subak were used by government to introduce the Green Revolution technology – this was how the major agricultural development programme, Bimas, was implemented in Bali. Each farmer calculated his order for purchased inputs and placed his order with the klian subak. A typical order for a 0.4 ha plot in 1981 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 kg IR36 seed</td>
<td>@ Rp. 200/kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rp. 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 kg TSP (Triple Superphosphate)</td>
<td>@ Rp. 70/kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rp. 1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 kg Urea</td>
<td>@ Rp. 70/kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rp. 7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diazinon (insecticide)</td>
<td>@ Rp.1,300/kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rp. 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rp.10,650</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Input orders were recorded by the klian and added to those of the rest of the subak members who wanted to buy their rice-growing supplies from the government-run KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa, Village Unit Cooperative) in Ambengan, using a loan from BRI, Bank Rakyat Indonesia. Such farmers were Bimas participants, as were the vast majority of farmers in this part of Bali. The subak’s order was compiled and checked by the klian subak, who discussed it with the agricultural extension officer. She visited Brassika every week, riding down from her home in a nearby village on her government-owned motor-bike. The klian subak then went to the bank at Jalananyar, to submit the order for the members of his subak. Loans and orders were usually approved with sawah as security. The klian subak went to the houses of Bimas participants with bank books. In these were recorded the details of the loans and the 1 per cent per month interest payable immediately after harvest. Farmers were not given loans in cash. Money from BRI was sent to the government cooperative (KUD) in Ambengan to pay for the inputs and seeds, which were bought from Klungkung.

Because of the introduction of HYVs, farmers had to obtain credit and outlay a substantial sum to pay for their inputs. Formerly, seed was saved
from the previous year’s crop, and all inputs were organic. In 1981, according to my village survey, 70 per cent of farmers kept all of their rice for their own consumption. There was therefore very little spare cash with which to pay back their Bimas loans after harvest. Farmers had to either sell a portion of their crop or find an off-farm source of income. Farmers reported that the major sources of cash were wage labour, the sale of ducks, the sale of handicrafts such as mats, baskets and hats, the sale of copra, and wives’ incomes derived from trading and the sale of pigs, handicrafts and copra.

All farmers are at the mercy of natural forces, but the adoption of Green Revolution technology and practices increased farmers’ risks and dependence on forces beyond their control. The necessity to buy seed, fertilizers and pesticides on credit, plus the greater likelihood of extensive damage wrought by pest and virus attack on the few strains of rice planted, increased both the risk that farmers took with each crop and their dependence on the uncontrollable exogenous forces of the global political economy.
An important feature of the use of the *subak* to implement the new technology was that defaulters on bank loans were punished by the *subak*. In two cases in 1981 the *subak* actually auctioned off the crop of loan defaulters. Another job for which the *klian subak* were made responsible was the collection of taxes. (Later this was changed and the village administrative office was made responsible for tax collection.)

Small farmers were not necessarily reluctant to become enmeshed in the Green Revolution, but there were several forces working against them. First, as we have seen, the *subak* were dominated by the wealthier landowners, who organized the introduction of the new technology, made the decisions about access to water and inputs and even enforced debt repayment. Second, it was much easier to obtain credit if the applicant were an owner rather than a sharecropper or tenant. Third, small landowners tended to harvest the crops themselves, or use traditional community groups (*seka manyi*) for harvest, while larger landowners were beginning to switch to commercially-based wage-labour harvest arrangements. Finally, small farmers’ calculations of risk were based not so much on profit or loss as on food sufficiency and hunger. In the event, by 1981 very few farmers did not participate in Bimas, and even fewer did not use the Green Revolution technology. Only seven farmers reported growing the old, non-high yielding varieties of rice in 1981.

Thus, in the New Order period the *subak* increasingly became an arm of government. The *subak*, controlled by the wealthier farmers, spearheaded the push for the use of Green Revolution technology. There was no opportunity for small, poorer farmers to voice reservations or opposition to the substantial indebtedness that most experienced. Many farmers experienced the Green Revolution as a heightening of worry and anxiety about their crops: now the failure of a crop meant not only hunger for the next half-year but also double indebtedness before the next crop could be sold. Many farmers increased their yields dramatically with the use of the new inputs, but there was also the suspicion that crops were more likely to fail now. Pest and disease infestation had increased with the HYVs, despite the large amounts of dangerous organophosphate pesticides that were sprayed in the vain hopes of providing an umbrella (*payung*) against attack and a medicine (*obat*) against sickness. The investment in an HYV crop was many times greater than that in a crop of traditional rice, and even though profits were greater, potential losses were also magnified.

Agricultural development was also occurring privately, in the extra-institutional spheres of harvesting, processing, transport, storage and consumption. Changes in harvesting in Brassika show how transformative change occurred simply for reasons of individual profit and to avoid sometimes messy interpersonal arrangements.

In 1981 in Brassika the bulk of the rice crop was harvested by voluntary harvesting groups (*seka manyi*). Apart from sharecropping, this was pro-
haply the most significant labour arrangement by which access to agricultural land was shared.

**Table 6-2: Choice of harvesting group in Brassika, 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvester</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Sharecroppers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no.</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvester</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seka manyi*</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/seka dadia*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seka banjar</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents often did not define the type of *seka manyi* in the questions on harvesting. Interviews on *seka* revealed that many *seka manyi* were composed of descent groups. These two categories were not well differentiated.


Not unexpectedly, smaller farmers tended to harvest by themselves. Although it was generally acknowledged that this was a cheaper and more efficient way to harvest, because incidental losses were kept to a minimum, farmers who chose this method were sometimes accused of meanness or selfishness.

*Seka manyi* of various types – permanent and transitory, *seka* of corporate groups such as *dadia* and *banjar* as well as groups of individuals with no aim other than the accumulation of cash – were used by 78 per cent of all owners and 78 per cent of all sharecroppers. The arrangement was standard: the harvesters received 12 per cent of the crop, divided equally immediately after harvest.18

Tirtawangi’s *seka manyi banjar* was used by most of the *sawah* owners and sharecroppers in Tirtawangi. It was not used by farmers outside the *banjar*. It was a long-lived *seka*, having been in existence since 1960. Usually two-thirds of the money earned (the harvested unmilled rice (*gabah*) was usually sold) was contributed to *banjar* funds for the upkeep of its temples and *balé banjar*, and the remaining one-third was divided equally among the workers. Members borrowed from its earnings at an interest rate of 3 per cent per month. The *seka* consisted of both male and female workers. Participation was voluntary and the membership fluctuated. In 1981 there
were about 30 currently active members divided into three groups and activated according to the area to be harvested. This seka displayed a high degree of egalitarianism, comprising both brahmana and wong japa members, and it functioned as an excellent redistributive mechanism for the banjar as a whole. The interesting feature is that the payment made to the seka manyi banjar was four kg gabah for every 25 kg harvested, a payment of 16 per cent. (The usual payment to other seka was 12 per cent of the harvest.) The fact that the majority of the members of the banjar used it, despite the fact that it was more expensive than conventional seka manyi, shows the high level of 'banjar-consciousness' that was felt by the Tirtawangi community.

Photo 6-4: A typical ‘development’ meeting in the village wantilan – note the tablecloths and vases of flowers

In 1981, 35 Brassika farmers – mainly the larger, wealthier landowners – had recently begun to pay a harvester (pederep) to harvest their crop. Two such were I Sugih, the rich rice miller, and Dewa Putu Siangan, the new klian subak, who both sold 50 per cent of their crop in 1980–81 prior to harvest to the Gianyar pederep. This was the beginning of a trend. The pederep used by most of these farmers came from the Gianyar area. He had his own permanent team of labourers who travelled around. Payment to a pederep was 12 per cent of the crop – the same as was paid to most seka. Using the pederep, with his small team of experienced wage-labourers, the job was done more cleanly, and a higher yield was obtained by the farmer. Further, the farmer did not become involved in community squabbles over choice of team. However, the pengemu, the poor people who usually followed seka
harvesters, scrounging for leftovers and dropped heads, were excluded from contracted fields and so suffered the loss of a kilogram or two of rice.

By 1989, the harvesting and storage/consumption stages of the rice production process had completely changed. The klian subak said that, ‘Since IR rice (HYVs) arrived, seka panen have almost disappeared.’ The majority of farmers were selling their rice. This added another element of uncertainty, with dependence on government pricing policies and seasonal price fluctuations. Also, many farmers were selling crops, and the right to harvest them, before harvest (the tebasan system) to rice traders (tengkulak) or to contract harvesters (pederep). This was an unfortunate but necessary response to the demand for cash. Tebasan can reduce a farmer’s risk and vulnerability to seasonal price fluctuations, though sometimes at considerable cost. It can also increase dependence on local middlemen and their profit margins. In fact, many descent-group seka were no longer active and contributions for temple upkeep and odalan were simply exacted in cash. The one notable exception to the trend was the continuing existence of Tirtawangi’s seka manyi banjar in 1989, an exception which was not sustained after about 1992.

By 1992 most farmers sold most of their crop, often before harvest. In the latter cases, the crop was sold to a contractor (tengkulak) from outside the village. The tengkulak’s workers came from the same villages as the tengkulak. Prices were standard:

- Rp. 10,000 per are (0.01 ha) for Class I sawah
- Rp.  8,000 per are for Class II sawah
- Rp.  7,000 per are for Class III sawah

The aim of the farmer who sold before harvest was to get cash quickly at a time (the pre-harvest paceklik) when he was desperately short of cash. In 1989, loan repayments on a typical fertilizer credit package for a 0.40 ha plot totalled Rp. 24,000. If he sold his crop before harvest, the owner might get Rp. 40,000 without the expense, work and worry of the harvest. If he sold the crop after harvest he might get about Rp. 86,000.

In 1989, those farmers who could afford to wait until after harvest to sell their crop, or the major part of it, sold their crops to one of four rice traders who had seemingly appeared out of thin air in Brassika: I Sugih, rice-miller of Dalem, I Dewa Made Kayun of Dalem, and I Supa and I Wayan Muntab of Dlodmelanting. Everybody now used rice mills to husk their rice. The four rice mills used by Brassika residents are owned by I Sugih, rich man of Dalem, the Tjokorda, the klian desa adat of Anjingan and the KUD (Village Cooperative) of Ambengan, a neighbouring village. Thus there have been individuals – notably the traders, millers and larger landowners – who have used cheap loans or otherwise managed to profit from the Green Revolution.
By 1989, those rice barns which still existed were mostly empty, and most people bought hulled rice for daily food. In the Puri, 'Gung Biyang, the Tjokorda’s principal wife, obtained rice from a trader with access to government stores in Klungkung. She cooked only enough rice for her family’s daily needs, earned as part of her civil servant’s wage. Former parekan no longer came to the Puri to ask for cooked rice (nasi) – there was no surplus nasi to distribute. Whereas previously the flow of rice through the Puri to various dependents had added a considerable social value to the Puri, now the Puri’s involvement in the rice trade was exteriorized and commercialized: sharecroppers never came to the Puri; the Tjokorda’s selip (rice mill) was situated at the southern border of the village and managed by one of his wives and employees; and there were no longer asymmetrical relationships between patrons and clients expressed through the gift of nasi. As far as the provision of basic food was concerned, we may as well have lived in the city.

Balinese farmers now grow rice not for food but for cash. The food chains in Brassika grew long and tenuous within the space of ten years. Biscuits, noodles and take-away food became common; many children came to subsist on instant noodles and Javanese-style meat-ball soup (bakso) peddled by itinerant Javanese men outside schools. Miniature rice barns are now manufactured as quaint emblems of rural life and adorn both government offices and tourist hotels in the metropolitan centres of Bali.

This examination of the membership of the subak and the introduction of the Green Revolution shows how Brassika’s pre-existing economic structure, with its domination by wealthier landlords, was responsible for much of the transformation of rice-growing. It also shows the contradictions inherent in the idea of pembangunan as ‘dynamic social stability’: the majority of farmers favoured, at harvest time, a modern and impersonal form of labour organization, the small, wage-labour harvest group headed by the tengkulak, over the traditional, personal group known as seka. Further, in the processing and post-harvest stages of the rice crop, individuals took advantage of new technology, cheap loans and the shift towards the cash economy to set up businesses as traders, millers and transporters, further commercializing the rice crop and severing the ties that connect people. The potential for social instability, and in particular the growth in the disparity of wealth between those who benefited from the Green Revolution and those who did not, would seem to have increased.

The transformations in the rice sector highlight one of the major contradictions inhering in the ideology of the pembangunan process in New Order Indonesia. One of the major themes of school textbooks, repeated ad nauseum through primary and high school, was that the individual had to sacrifice him/herself to the common good, to community interests and, above all, to national interests. At the same time, the individual was encouraged on all fronts to maximize profit, to shuck off old-fashioned
(kolot) beliefs and behaviours that resulted in time wasting and resource consumption, to cut back on irrational sumptuous ritual and so on. The school textbook for PMP (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, Pancasila Moral Education) states that,

Each citizen must have a social and national conscience (kesadaran), accompanied by a national spirit which is alive and dynamic. With this spirit, we must always place the interests of the state (kepentingan negara) above those of the individual (pribadi) or group (golongan).

The tension inherent in this perennial tug of war between individual interest and common good can be seen in the myriad examples of corruption and cheating involving pembangunan funds at village level. In Brassika, the local Dewa Agung was never, to my knowledge, accused of enriching himself through misuse of pembangunan funds as perbekel – though this was the accusation underlying his dismissal from his Klungkung position as head of the market. However, there was the contractor who used such green timber in the roof trusses of the school that the whole roof dramatically collapsed one day, fortunately not injuring anybody, as the timbers dried and shrunk. This contractor was not a Brassika villager, and this fact confirmed for villagers the wisdom of choosing local contractors to do local jobs.

There was the brahmana perbekel who was recently forced to step down over misuse of village funds. Finally, one could argue that in every school and office whenever teachers and public servants turn up late or not at all, citizens have been cheated of their public service. One Brassika school-teacher left school almost every mid-morning in order to meet the tourist buses at Klungkung and work as a guide.

There was both general acknowledgment that remunerations for public office were low and general acceptance that people in positions of power had the right to perks, contracts and gifts because they had the duty to be generous and to look after their own. A real bapak (father, patron) looked after his anak (children, clients). In turn, they were loyal, grateful and beholden to their bapak. The bapak turned a blind eye to the misdemeanours of his anak, tolerating, for instance, their lack of punctuality and ‘borrowing’ of the office motorcycle for private use.

[T]he Bapak’s tolerance is a way of transforming the power and authority of his official position into personal power and authority. … [O]nce he has personalized his power and position, he has the freedom to act arbitrarily. (Shiraishi 1997: 108)

The local Dewa Agung relished his position of power, and from time to time switched from jovial, charming host to cruel dictator at no notice.
following is an excerpt from 1981 field notes of three concurrent meetings held in the village offices. There were many important guests, including the sedahan agung, the camat, the sedahan, the head of the kecamatan office of the Department of Defence and a representative of the police.

The LKMD meeting was relaxed and jolly, the most informal one I had attended... The filing-out of the participants in the sedahan's meeting seemed to signal an abrupt end to our meeting. The atmosphere suddenly changed, the perbekel suddenly ranting and raving about the large numbers of people absent. The perbekel told a klian dinas to fetch Ni Rasmi, who was responsible for sending out messages to the participants to let them know when the meeting was to be held. The perbekel said the number of meetings for the LKMD would have to be increased to four or five a month, because of all the pembangunan in progress, and if people weren’t going to be conscientious about attending, they could leave and he would choose someone else. Ni Rasmi came in looking very flustered, the perbekel thumped on the desk, calling those absent 'lazy-bones'. Everyone was very embarrassed, and kept their eyes down, while the perbekel complained that his guests had been held up. At this stage, he commented that a friend of his had told him that he was known in Bangli as a “diktator”, like Hitler. He seemed quite pleased by this appellation, and laughed. Everyone then adjourned to the wantilan.

The Tjokorda’s arbitrary change from genial host to diktator not only showed off his power to his superiors – it was a source of power, for villagers were afraid of his potential for anger.

In 1980–81 there was a plethora of small pembangunan projects being implemented at village and banjar level in Brassika and elsewhere in Bali. I briefly describe four Department of Social Welfare projects to show, first, how limited in scope they were; second, how they were manipulated by the village elite, and third, how they identified needy people in the village without helping them. Frequently the leaders of the organizations had forgotten the meaning of the acronym names of these projects. Three positions, called PSM (Pembimbing Sosial Masyarakat – social welfare guides), were created as one-year contract positions in 1978 to implement social welfare programmes. The three incumbents, Ni Made Rasmi, Ida Ayu Ngurah and I Ketut Suwita, were close relatives of village officials: Made Rasmi the niece of the klian dinas of Dlodmelanting, Ketut Suwita his cousin and 'Dayu the daughter of the vice-perbekel.

Both women were very active: Made Rasmi was the treasurer of both the LKMD and Pamong-Pamong (though Tjokorda Gede Raka somehow operated as village treasurer), and 'Dayu was involved in all the logistical and administrative work of the projects.
The four projects were capably implemented by the two female PSM. The first project was the PPFW (Peningkatan Peranan Fungsi Wanita, Promotion of the Role and Function of Women). One of its ventures was the purchase of a set of cooking utensils (small kerosene stove, pans, bowls and utensils plus two dozen cups) valued at Rp. 45,000. The Department of Social Welfare contributed Rp. 20,000 to PPFW for this project. The cooking utensils were for the use of any one person or organization or the village itself. They were used twice in the first month, first for the inaugural meeting of the Organisasi Wanita Tani (Organization of Farming Women) and then by ‘Dayu, one of the PSM, for making cakes for sale. She paid Rp. 100 per day to PPFW for the use of the equipment. Thereafter, the utensils did not see the light of day in public.

The second project, LU (Lanjut Usia, Old Age), again with Made Rasmi and ‘Dayu in charge, involved the gift of small goat kids to 15 old people identified as poor by the PSM and the klian dinas. The animals were small and weak. On arrival in Brassika, they were unceremoniously dumped at the marketplace and left trussed up in the sun. No one took responsibility for their delivery, and some died on their first day in the village. The third and fourth projects, BPKM (Badan Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat, Body for the Implementation of Social Prosperity) and BPAT (Badan Penyantunan Anak Terlantar, Body for the Assistance of Neglected Children) involved 30 families, some from each banjar, again identified by the PSM in consultation with the respective klian dinas as needy. They were given a package of household utensils – a large bucket, a plastic four-litre container with screw lid, a knife, a kerosene stove and an aluminium water pot, plus a piglet. The piglets somehow found their way to the houseyards of various PKK functionaries, including the Puri.

A major project which illustrates several problems associated with the implementation of pembangunan was the programme to improve the nutrition of ‘Anak Balita’ (Children Under Five Years of Age). This national programme, organized by the Department of Health, was part of a crash programme to improve the health of the nation. Under the auspices of the UPGK (Usaha Peningkatan Gizi Kesehatan, Effort to Promote Nutrition and Health), the ‘Anak Balita’ programme involved the preparation and distribution of nutritious foods to children who were identified as being under size for their age.

The staff of the Puskesmas Pembantu in Brassika were issued with several cartons of glossy, coloured cardboard forms, one for each of the 511 anak balita in the village. The form, called Card Towards Health (Kartu Menuju Sehat), had a coloured photograph of a woman breastfeeding her baby on the front cover and coloured pictures of nutritious meals on the back. Inside were spaces for biographical details about the family, information about rehydration drinks for babies, information about the timing of immunizations and graphs of height and weight to be filled in and
compared with ideal height/weight graphs. The forms were well designed to be educational and to provide the opportunity for parents to become aware of their children’s health status and follow their history. They were produced by the Department of Health and UNICEF. In Brassika, the educational function of the fancy forms was wasted as the clinic staff kept the forms at the clinic.

In Brassika, the children in three *banjar* were weighed and measured on three occasions. Eighty children out of 201 (40 per cent) were found to be below par. (*Bali Post* articles reported that in all Bali 24 per cent of anak balita were nutritionally deficient. 3.1.81) The weighing and measuring sessions were held in the respective *bale banjar*. The *klian dinas* notified the *banjar* at regular *banjar* meetings. The two nurses from the Puskesmas Pembantu (sub-clinic), ‘Gung Biyang and Ni Wayan Seger, recorded names and plotted the graphs; three of the five women who worked on the project did the actual weighing and measuring, using a set of fulcrum scales and a measure suspended from the rafters; and the male family planning field
worker from Ambengan, the village to the south of Brassika, administered a family planning-cum-nutrition questionnaire to all the participant mothers. (I saw only three fathers bring their children to these sessions.) He worked with the clinic staff on this and several other child health projects. The head of the Puskesmas Pembantu, a man with nursing training, looked in at the activities several times, but never entered the balé and never did any work.

The children were to be given some uncooked mung beans to take home, and also to be fed nutritious cooked food on certain days. The finance for the food ingredients totalled Rp. 50,000, the allowance for each portion of food being Rp. 60. This meant that theoretically each child would be fed nine or ten times. There were various weigh-in sessions, as well as cooking-and-distributing mornings which involved a great deal of shopping, food preparation and cooking, budgeting and preparation of lists of names to be submitted to health officials in Klungkung. It was a very busy fortnight for the Puskesmas staff and the PSM.

The food distribution activities began on a Monday morning when 'Gung Biyang went to Klungkung to submit a report on 'Anak Balita' in Brassika and to buy their food. In the afternoon, she and five younger women, including two PSM and two from PKK, prepared food in the Puri: washing glasses and plates and utensils, bringing, cleaning, cutting and folding banana leaves into cones filled with cooked rice, eggs and meat. 'Gung Biyang supervised the operation and the other women formed a production line. They also made coffee and took the trays of food and glasses to banjar Manuaba.

These activities continued for the rest of that week and the following week, and again for another two weeks the following month. There was a variety of foods prepared: rice and vegetable packets, rice and eggs and vegetables, rice and dried fish and leaves, fried peanuts, mung bean soup and drinks of coconut water and palm sugar. It was expected that children would gain half a kilogram of weight in the month. The following is a description from field notes:

One Wednesday morning at about 8.30 a.m. the nurse, Ni Wayan Seger, dropped in at the Puri to collect 'Gung Biyang, and they took from the Puri piles of plastic bags of mung beans, a basin, some cooking utensils and a lump of palm sugar.

About 9 a.m. I went down to the balé banjar of Pekandelan and found the two nurses, the klian dinas, the two PSM women, and two men, one of whom was wearing a Hansip uniform. The klian dinas was grating coconut in the balé and Made Rasmi had set up a kerosene stove in the little room behind the balé. As no-one had yet arrived, despite the fact that a Hansip messenger had been sent around to the houses, 'Gung Biyang told the other Hansip man to strike the kul-kul
[split wooden gong used to summon villagers to meetings, temple ceremonies, and in case of emergencies]. Women and children began turning up. The perbekel arrived on our motorbike sporting a body-shirt, tight trousers, a soft black wool beret set at a jaunty angle, and sunglasses. He was most put out that only a few women had turned up and also that the food was not ready yet. He poked around in the ‘kitchen’ for a while, ranted a bit and said that if the women did not want the food they would not get it and that it could be given to the children at primary school. He spoke in Indonesian, about the only Indonesian I heard all morning. The workers were all busy... By this time, there was a crowd of mothers clad in batik sarongs and a couple of fathers, plus a swarm of children. Most were sitting on the steps around the edge of the balé, chatting and just sitting. No obvious caste distinctions in seating places.

’Gung Biyang had a list of the names of the eligible children (plus parents’ names, ages and sex of children). As she read each name, the child was given about three-quarters of a glass of mung bean soup, and it was obvious that there was far too much mixture. After Wayan Seger had doled out each child’s soup, the PSM women handed each mother and child their quarter-of-a-kilogram of mung beans. The mothers and children went back to the perimeter to drink their mixture slowly. It was all done in a very orderly manner. After all the names had been read out, ’Gung Biyang and Wayan Seger checked the lists to see who was absent. ’Dayu A– (wife of Ida Bagus Suci) arrived late, and had forgotten her glass. Her twin brahmana children were led to the one bamboo chair in the middle of the balé, which was occupied by ’Gung Biyang’s son and an old man. The man vacated the chair, and the three high-caste children, one satria and two brahmana, sat there above the throng. ’Dayu returned with a glass and she was given one portion for her daughter.

It was established that eight children from Pekandelan and one from Manuaba had been absent. Everybody sat around for a while, then rather diffidently ’Gung Biyang, who was sitting at a desk, gave a lecture from her seat, in Balinese, about the importance of giving children balanced meals. She gave examples of recipes and emphasized the importance of vegetables, particularly dark green leafy vegetables. Then she took a photo.

The mothers and children left rather abruptly after the lecture, and all the workers (and I) ate up the remaining soup – more than half a bucketful. We could not finish it. (Nobody commented on the apparent wastage and futility, though everyone laughed when I joked about my malnourished condition. They assured me that it did not matter if we finished the soup.) (19.12.80)
By the next month, attendances had dropped off and on one occasion no-one turned up to receive the food handouts. Privately, a couple of the workers admitted it was a great deal of work for insignificant returns, but they continued to buy and make the food.

Another pembangunan project was the construction of toilet buildings and the supply of concrete floor toilets for each household in banjar Tirtawangi. The cost of a single toilet (building plus toilet) was Rp. 50,000. The finance for the toilets was a combination of self-help (swadaya) funds (about Rp. 37,500 from each household), an incentive scheme of the government (Rp. 7,500 per household) and contributions from banjar funds (Rp. 5,000). Government funds for toilets were distributed under the SAMIJA/GA project (Sarana Air Minum dan Jamban Keluarga, Family Toilet and Drinking Water Project) of the Inpres Kesehatan (Presidential Instruction for Health) programme. I attended the handing-over-of-toilet-bowls ceremony in the balé banjar:

It was a typical pembangunan ceremony, attended by a range of government officials: a representative of the kabupaten office, two officers from the Department of Public Works in Klungkung, Pak S. from Komsek (the kecamatan representative of the defence forces), the head of the Kecamatan Puskesmas (Clinic), the perbekel and vice-perbekel, Pak Nyoman Resik (the head of Brassika’s Puskesmas Pembantu), Pak Semangat (TKS, Tenaga Kerja Sukarela, Volunteer Labour28), Pak Ketut Ledang (the klian dinas of Tirtawangi), and all the banjar members. Before the ceremony, the men paid Rp. 3,625 each, collected by the vice-perbekel. Along one side of the balé baniar were the toilet-bowls.

Pak Nyoman Resik chaired the ceremony, and began the speeches, making the connection between the use of toilets, a clean water supply and the prevention of diseases such as cholera and typhus. He was succeeded by his superior from Jalananyar, and then one officer from the Department of Public Works gave a short talk in Indonesian (for which he apologized), and he introduced his off-sider, the Pemimpin Proyek Jamban (Toilet Project Leader). He gave an excellent, informative lecture in Indonesian, complete with explanatory diagrams of toilet buildings, toilet holes placed ten metres from wells, people washing hands with soap, etc. He explained where toilets should be sited, the usual construction of the building (concrete floor, brick walls, tin roof, a water container) and, most importantly, he stressed that the toilets should be used. It is well known that the construction and supply of toilets in Bali has often been unsuccessful because people do not use them, and this official said he hoped to return and find a banjar full of well-used toilets in three months’ time! (General laughter at this.)
Then the representative of the *bupati* talked in Balinese, said that this was an Inpres project and that Dr. C– O– (from Brassika) was the leader of the project. He said the “New Order” was concerned about the “development of village society” (*pembangunan masyarakat*). He cited economic *pembangunan* evidenced by the availability of fertilizers and new seeds, and said that now the field of health was to be developed. Now that cockfights have been made illegal, he said, there should be much more money around to spend on toilets! The *perbekehl* then made a short speech in Balinese, making connections between nutrition, health and the eradication of disease. After this there was a hurried serving of 7-Up and cakes to the officials, who had to move on to another village. (27.1.81)

This ceremony impressed one with the weight of government. Not only were the local village officials and clinic people in attendance, but also the defence force representative, and health and public works officials from the *kabupaten* and *kecamatan* levels. All the speeches, except that of the *perbekehl*, were made by outsiders: although the project involved a great deal of self-help funds – a considerable sacrifice by peasant farmers – the *banjar* leader was not required or allowed to speak and no mention was made of the contribution, unity and progressive consciousness (*kesadaran*) of the *banjar* members. Ironically, when I talked with the model *klan dinas* about this project, he suggested that he much preferred squatting outside in the fields, admiring the view, to going inside a dark box to defecate. I surmised that the fears of the Toilet Project Leader were well-founded.

An interesting innovation in the 1979–80 flurry of laws and instructions regarding local government was the formation of the PKK organization (*Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*, Promotion of Family Prosperity) to ‘promote the role of women in *pembangunan*’ through:

1. The living and experience of Pancasila;
2. Mutual help (*gotong-royong*);
3. Necessities;
4. Food;
5. Housing and organization of households;
6. Education and skills;
7. Health;
8. The development of a cooperative life;
9. The sustainability of the environment;
10. Healthy planning.

(Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 10, tahun 1980 Tentang Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga in Soedjono, 1981; my translation)
Each level of national administration was to have a PKK ‘team’ headed by the (unpaid) wife of the head of that bureaucratic level.29

In Brassika, the *perbekel’s* wife was head of the PKK. The various office-bearers included the few women teachers, civil servants and wives of teachers. As far as I could ascertain, they were appointed by the *perbekel*. There was one assistant from each *banjar*, in most cases the wife of a teacher. The formation meeting of the PKK was held in a primary school in March 1981, and the Perbekel chose about 30 women to attend. Most were young mothers who had had some schooling. They wore T-shirts and Western-style skirts and dresses, some with respectful scarves around their waists. The *perbekel* chaired the meeting and supervised the election of officers. His manner with the women contrasted with his usual serious, elegant and sometimes angry style at other village meetings. He addressed them as girls (*gadis*), even though many were married, and joked with them; his tone was that of a paternalistic schoolmaster. Pak Semangat, the TKS attached to the village, assisted in the explanation of the role of the organization. The *perbekel’s* wife did not attend this meeting, but a couple of the minor office-holders (the two teachers from the Puri) addressed the meeting.

Only three meetings of the PKK were held while I was in Brassika. The organization had received funds of Rp. 20,000 for the purchase of books, and the job of buying these was delegated to the *perbekel’s* wife at the second meeting. She ostensibly bought books on nutrition which turned...
out to be mainly recipe books, stored at the Puri. Another topic of discussion was raised by Ni Made S–, a tailor and farmer’s wife from Singaraja. She was well educated by Brassika standards. She proposed that the PKK celebrate Kartini Day in Brassika by organizing a maypole dance (!). (Kartini Day is a national holiday to commemorate the work and inspiration of Kartini, a famous young Javanese woman who promoted the education of native women in Dutch times.) This was a little radical for Brassika, but the idea of celebrating Kartini Day in some special way was considered an excellent one. As the government had given the PKK Rp. 80,000 to spend, the expenditure budget was another major topic for discussion. It was decided to build a village garden and to contribute to the village fish-pond.

As with many other organizations and projects starting life in Brassika in 1980–81, most members of PKK did not know the meaning and intended function of their organization. Even before the new perbekel took over, the PKK had died a natural death from lack of interest. The wife of the new perbekel steadfastly ignored her civic responsibilities as loyal wife-citizen, and continued to spend every day in her stall at the Brassika market.

Much of the work of implementing the social welfare aspects of pembangunan was performed by women, invariably the more educated, modern women of the village and those associated with male village leaders by blood, marriage or patronage. They were civil servants (nurses and teachers), part-time government employees (notably the two female PSM), and the wives of civil servants.

The invention and delegation of domestic tasks associated with pembangunan to women indicate that the government had a clear picture of the role of women in pembangunan: women were to help men achieve pembangunan – to be responsible for social welfare, the health and well-being of the family and the organization of the household. In particular, this was a role for women of the emerging rural middle class. Women were of marginal usefulness in the government’s main project, that of the economic development of the nation, and were delegated a service role in the private domain. This envisaged role represents a considerable constriction of women’s roles in everyday Balinese life, which included trading, the organization of ritual, partial responsibility for the family’s economic well-being, harvesting of the rice crop, the production of non-rice crops and the raising of livestock.

In contrast, the government expected men to achieve pembangunan: to provide for their family’s economic well-being by growing the miracle rice or becoming civil servants, to raise loans from the bank, attend meetings and make the decisions as to how to spend pembangunan funds. This represents a considerable expansion of male responsibilities.

Much of the work of implementing pembangunan was of marginal usefulness – particularly women’s work. There was a strong emphasis on the
appearance and the doing of the work, rather than on its developmental effect. It did not matter if the mung bean soup did not fatten the skinny children: what mattered was that the necessary work was carried out, that everyone sat in the right place, that the soup was there, that a ceremony was held to display it and that there were flowers on the tables. It looked good in the photo.

This was Geertz’s ‘orthopraxy, not orthodoxy’ in New Order Bali guise. Of Balinese religion, Geertz said, rather harshly,

[W]hat is crucial is that each ritual detail should be correct and in place … the worshippers usually don’t even know who the gods in the temples are, are uninterested in the meaning of the rich symbolism, and are indifferent to what others may or may not believe. You can believe virtually anything you want to actually, including that the whole thing is rather a bore, and even say so. But if you do not perform the ritual duties for which you are responsible you will be totally ostracized, not just from the temple congregation, but from the community as a whole. (Geertz 1973: 177)

Although Geertz’s claim for Balinese religion has been contested, notably by Hooykaas (1976), the degree to which the performance of the rituals of pembangunan conformed with Geertz’s description of the rituals of religion was striking. Workers were ignorant of the names and functions of the various pembangunan organizations. There was a preoccupation with table settings, the shapes of the cut-out banana leaves, the colours of the tablecloths. Non-believers commented (in private) that it did not matter if the wrong people benefited from the ritual and that it was a lot of work for little return. Workers showed overriding concern with the evidence (a photograph) of the performance of the pembangunan ritual rather than with its effect or meaning.

In 1981, from my vantage point in the Puri, Brassika was humming with new activity. Every day there were new meetings to attend, a new project to implement, new activities of new organizations in which to participate. There were tablecloths to wash and iron for the next day’s ceremonial handing-over of vegetable seeds to the new PKK garden, flowers to arrange for the tables of the Denpasar dignitaries who would introduce a programme of artificial insemination for cattle to the village men or food to buy and cook to supplement the diets of under-weight children.

By mid-1981 a multitude of new village organizations had been spawned in Brassika. These included: Pemuda-Pemudi (Young People), the PKK, Organisasi Wanita Tani (Organization of Farming Women), a sports organization, a students’ organization, a chanting group and Study Groups for schoolchildren. Others were being planned: an organization for civil servants and a group to co-ordinate the activities of the Pemuda-Pemudi and the PKK. Other projects which all ‘entered the village’ were:
ABRI Masuk Desa (The Army Enters the Village)
Koran Masuk Desa (Newspapers Enter the Village)
KB Masuk Desa (Family Planning Enters the Village)
Kawin Suntik Masuk Desa (Artificial Insemination Enters the Village)
PAM Masuk Desa (Piped Drinking Water Enters the Village)
KKN Masuk Desa (University Students Enter the Village)

The pembangunan energy of the period was captured in a headline in the Bali Post on 20 January 1981: ‘Rame-Rame Masuk Desa’ (Busyness Enters the Village). I am still not sure if the newspaper’s headline was cynical.

The above-mentioned groups were organized by the perbekel. He would decide that the village would be improved by the existence of a certain group, choose a suitable leader and order the formation of the organization. The perbekel was assisted in the formation and leadership of these organizations by Pak Semangat (TKS – he led the children’s study groups and the Pemuda-Pemudi), the school teachers (a male teacher led the sports group and another male teacher led the secondary school students) and the former perbekel (he led the chanting group).

The Tjokorda had been inspired by a trip to P., the winning village of the village competition (lomba desa) for all of Bali. (The Tjokorda entered Brassika in the competition a couple of years later.) The excursion had been organized by the kabupaten government for the edification and inspir-
Pembangunan and Patronage

Myriad new social organizations were brought into existence in many villages, and their contributions to pembangunan and social welfare were published every day in the Bali Post. Also, the perbekel was in contact with perbekel in other parts of the kabupaten and kecamatan, and he heard about pembangunan in their villages. He said he had a picture in his mind of how happy he would feel as he walked through the village of an evening, seeing boys playing volleyball and soccer, children laughing and playing and having exercise, old men sitting in the bale banjar chanting, young men playing chess under the trees.

The Tjokorda’s pastoral idyll was neither practical nor directed at pragmatic problems. Pembangunan was intended to bring honour to his domain rather than to ameliorate the lot of impoverished peasants. In some ways his idea of pembangunan resembled the cargo cult mentality of communities in Melanesia. His father, as Dewa Agung, punggawa and rich landowner, had presided over the distribution of locally derived resources, mainly the produce of his sharecroppers. The present Tjokorda, in contrast, distributed the New Order government’s proceeds from international oil sales and income from foreign debts. These trickled down through routine village budgets and pembangunan programmes, mainly taking form as buildings or building repairs. His contributions to pembangunan in Brassika were mainly his motivational leadership and ability to mobilize people and resources.

Eventually, Brassika was declared a Desa Tertinggal, a ‘left-behind village’, and consequently allocated Rp. 20 million as a handout. The Tjokorda was genuinely puzzled and hurt that Brassika was considered not only a basket case but also an anti-pembangunan and old-fashioned village. (The fact that he had not been village head since 1989 was little consolation: his pride was hurt.)

Some villagers’ perceptions of pembangunan can be described as millenarian. Desirable new objects, especially buildings, were identified as pembangunan; Pembangunan funds were used in Brassika not for economic investment in income-producing activities but for physical infrastructure; self-help funds were spent on temples rather than pembangunan; people were preoccupied with the appearance of ‘doing’ pembangunan rather than with actually ‘developing’ village society. Pembangunan was desirable, but most people were hazy about the details of what it might consist and of how a future Brassika might look. Village people, in their individual lives, were adapting to pembangunan, adopting pembangunan and sometimes reacting against pembangunan, but there was little idea of a corporate identity as a ‘developed’ community, apart from a vague conception that the future might be more prosperous.

Millenarianism is usually associated with an anti-development stance by sections of Third World populations – as, for example, in the book title The...
Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic Development in Conflict by A. Sievers. In the Tjokorda’s vision we have a local version of pro-pembangunan millenarianism, almost at the polar opposite to the usual interpretation of millenarianism as a nativist obstruction of acculturation towards Western, developed models of society.

The Tjokorda’s evangelical enthusiasm for pembangunan was shared by some other village leading lights, notably the klian dinas of Tirtawangi and a later klian dinas of Siangan, both of whom became adept at hooking into pembangunan programmes: obtaining subsidies and sponsorship for their banjar and arranging new social welfare and educational programmes, introducing training courses and seed money for retraining programmes. Theirs was a much more technocratic and instrumentalist approach than the Tjokorda’s, and they were much more in tune with the government’s vision of how pembangunan might lead to material prosperity than was the Tjokorda. In addition, the klian desa adat, Tjokorda Gede Raka, repositioned himself cannily, through his acquisition of report-writing, awig-awig writing and accountancy skills. His historical role as village historian and scribe became a far more pragmatic and instrumental role as mediator between village traditions and government pembangunan policy. His expertise in the jargon of pembangunan and the national rhetoric of state-making and the presentation of Brassika to supra-village authorities was employed whenever Brassika was entered in the various competitions such as lomba desa, subak and banjar.

In the mid-1990s, women in three banjar – Tirtawangi, Siangan and Manuaba – began employment as piece-workers and tailors, making clothes
and shoes for tourists and the export trade. Men in Manuaba also began work as carvers, making painted wooden statues for sale to tourists and for contract exporters. In two banjar, the work grew out of government pembangunan projects which involved the training of young women in sewing. When the initial classes were held the project seemed farcical: electricity had not yet ‘entered the village’ and there were only a few pedal sewing machines in the village. At the end of the sewing course I was ceremonially presented with a hideous, huge, green T-shirt emblazoned with a sequin-encrusted cockatoo – the first completed article – which I, as the only representative of the potential global market, had to model. The klian dinas followed through, combining outside seed money from the Department of Industry with local contributions to buy sewing machines and materials, exploiting villagers’ contacts in tourist areas to get contracts and initially coopting local men with suitable vehicles to transport the supplies and completed product to the shops in Kuta and other centres. I remember some hilarious conversations I had with women as we wondered about the incredibly stiff and pointy brassieres they were covering in multi-coloured sequins. When did Western women wear these? Did they wear something over the top? Were they prostitutes? Could I try them on? Perhaps there would be a Madonna-inspired fashion in mind-boggling bras?

So, there were some village leaders who saw that pembangunan required pro-active and planned manoeuvring with supra-village authorities. Some enjoyed superior education, were ambitious in their careers and were genuinely committed to the pembangunan of their nation and locality. Some were from local, usually high-caste, families – e.g. the family planning official in Klungkung from Geria Suci and the kabupaten doctor from the Puri. They tended to be enthusiastic about pembangunan, sharing the Tjokorda’s evangelism with the more technocratic approach of their work milieu. These people played crucial roles in mediating village and supra-village interests, as well as sometimes winning valuable funds and patronage from extra-village institutions such as the university or Parisadha Hindu Dharma, the government-sponsored Hindu organisation.

Finally, I want to foreshadow two aspects of pembangunan which are explored in later chapters. One aspect is that those pembangunan programmes which have brought about real improvements in aspects of villagers’ lives were usually successfully implemented because they met a pre-existing need. Rice mills were welcomed as the successor to women’s hand-pounding of rice mainly because that work was arduous and time-consuming. No one considers reverting to that work arrangement. Further, most pembangunan innovations were adopted when they came via pre-existing social relations or institutions. The subak’s role in the adoption of Green Revolution technology has been examined above, and below I examine the role of the banjar in implementing the now ubiquitous practice of family planning by married couples with two or more children.
A second aspect of *pembangunan* which I investigate in the chapter on birthing practices is that one of the consequences of *pembangunan* has been the growth of perceived ignorance and underdevelopment in village society. As Western medical practice and knowledge spread among the health professionals and health bureaucrats, village women increasingly came under attack as ignorant and dirty. Women were castigated by the medical professionals for giving birth at home and for having a difficult or problematic labour. Doctors described village women to me as stupid, backward and unaware (*tak sadar*), at the very moment they turned up for treatment by the doctor.

As systematic knowledge grows, so does the possibility of ignorance. Ignorance, however, is not a simple antithesis of knowledge. It is a state which people attribute to others and is laden with moral judgement. So being underdeveloped often implies, if not actual iniquity, at least stupidity, failure and sloth. (Hobart 1993: 1)

We have seen that the Tjokorda saw the nomination of Brassika as a Desa Tertinggal as a source of shame. He was not the only one: when I returned to the village that year, after an absence of two years, many people cited that nomination as the first answer to my standard question as to what had happened since I had last left. The Tjokorda’s wife said she was embarrassed (*malu*) in front of family and friends from Klungkung, and ‘not proud’ (*kurang bangga*) when she had to go to Denpasar for a seminar. Like school examinations, *pembangunan* was competitive. It had the effect of streaming Indonesian society into those who were successfully developing and those who were hopelessly struggling.

By 1989, the rituals associated with *pembangunan* seemed not only to have become routine but also to have become more efficient and effective. Every month the doctor and nurses visited each *bale banjar*: mothers lined up with their babies and toddlers for their immunizations; the mung bean soup was only doled out by a couple of extremely conscientious *kliaan dinas*; mothers now took home their ‘Card Towards Health’, complete with the newly noted weights and immunizations.

Although I may have given the impression that much of *pembangunan* was only a facade, there were some real improvements in villagers’ lives as a result of *pembangunan*: villagers said they had benefited from the introduction of piped drinking water, the use of contraception, mass immunization of young children and the extension of schooling. Brassika is now connected to the world through electricity, television and bitumen roads. Most people experienced improvements in their physical standard of living and educational level, when compared with those of their parents.

Much else though remained useless, harmful or problematic. There were still endless *pembangunan* ceremonies involving mainly women in
much work and no useful product. ‘Gung Biyang still had to record the cumulative statistics – how many babies went up in weight and how many babies went down – but no action ever came of it. Competition in pembangunan continued, with lomba desa, lomba subak and a constantly changing plethora of competitions and categorizations being used to grade the villages of Bali according to externally derived criteria of well-being and modernity. Instead of the Desa Tertinggal appellation, there was a complicated set of criteria by which villagers were graded. These included important criteria such as access to clean drinking water but also alien middle-class values such as the practice of sitting down to a dining table to eat meals three times a day. The use of pesticides in rice-growing was so harmful that President Suharto announced the withdrawal of the organophosphates from the Bimas package in 1989 – though the withdrawal was not fully implemented. The widespread planting of clove trees was not profitable (partly because of the monopoly on clove trading by President Suharto’s son, Tommy). The transformation of Brassika’s subsistence rice farming economy into private, agricultural businesses signalled the demise of an intricate net of local social relations involving sharecropping and harvesting practices, and pushed the farmers into wage labour practices and relations of dependency with banks. The employment of craftspeople selling their handiwork to tourists and to the export trade integrated Brassika villagers into the Bali-wide and global economy.

Thus, while the desirability of pembangunan was unquestioned, there was a striking lack of realization that national pembangunan involved complex and truly transformative processes, with many unintended and undesirable consequences.

NOTES

1. It remains to be seen whether or not the goal of development is toppled in a post-Suharto era. Indications are that the goal remains, while the means by which it is to be attained are questionable. One could argue at this stage that the change in leadership has not involved a change in direction.

2. See Morfit 1981.

3. The outstanding example of protest against development in the New Order in Bali was the opposition to the construction of the Bali Nirwana Resort near the Tanah Lot temple in Tabanan. This involved many articles in the Bali Post and a campaign of letters to the editor of the Bali Post; there was vigorous public discussion about the religious ramifications of building so close to Tanah Lot, which involved the Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indonesia and an organization of Hindu intellectuals; in many areas, such as Brassika, the Balinese saw the Resort as taking up too much valuable, first class sawah and water resources; there were even street demonstrations at the height of the campaign. A new Environmental Impact Study (Amdal) was forced and some concessions made as to the location of certain constructions in the resort complex, but the project went ahead.

4. The word pembangunan derives from the verb, bangun, to build or construct, and it is a relatively new term. See the stimulating article by Heryanto 1988: 8ff.

5. There was one exception to this: in Brassika several ‘mess’ had been built over the
years. These were simple lodgings for public servants or teachers who had been assigned to work in Brassika but lived far away. Several of these mess had been unoccupied for years and looked most unsightly with their vandalized, broken windows and green inflorescences on the walls, signifying rising damp. They contrasted with the neat and well-kept appearance of private dwellings and other public buildings.

6. In Balinese villages, unlike Javanese villages, those in public office did not directly benefit from their position: wages were low, there was no land in lieu of wages, and the demands and expectations of the populace were high. It was only the pembangunan funds which were manipulable.

7. The programme was established in 1969 as a single ‘one-off’ grant of Rp. 100,000 to each village to stimulate self-reliance (Fox 1988: 1). To obtain the grant, each desa had to provide the kecamatan with an account of village finances, a plan and budget which included self-help (swadaya) contributions that matched the grant. Suitable projects included marketing, transportation and communications facilities, as well as ‘social projects’ such as balé desa and temples. By 1980 the grant had become a regular, annual component of village finances:

Table 6-1: ‘Bantuan Desa’ funds, 1979–1982

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<td>1979–80</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>1980–81</td>
<td>750,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981–82</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1982–83</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
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Source: Fox 1988, and village sources

In 1979–80 each village received Rp. 450,000; in 1980 it was expected that Rp. 100,000 of the Rp. 750,000 would be spent by the women’s organization, the PKK, with Rp. 20,000 of the Rp. 100,000 to be spent on a PKK library in each village. By 1982–83 the allowance for each village had increased by nearly 300 per cent, but this figure was not increased again until 1990–91. In 1990–91 the grant was raised to Rp. 1,350,000, of which Rp. 700,000 was supposed to be spent on the PKK.

8. Apart from the former perbekel’s interjection at the meeting of the Pamong-Pamong in November 1980, I did not hear any demur or opposition to the Tjokorda’s proposals. See Chapter 5, supra.

9. This contrasts with the use to which Bandes funds were sometimes put in other villages. In ‘Tarian’ and Sanur, for instance, both in the tourist areas of Bali, more truly ‘developmental’ projects were devised, which created sustainable income-earning opportunities for the inhabitants. Warren 1993: 167–207 and Appendices 309–327. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that wealth breeds wealth.

10. For instance, in the late 1970s the Tjokorda made a new village regulation whereby temple priests in the whole of Brassika were to be paid a food and clothing allowance out of banjar funds as a guarantee of life (jaminan hidup).

11. See Thomas (1991), esp. Chapter 3, for instructive parallels with the insertion of European objects into colonized Pacific communities during the era of European colonization.

12. See the excellent article by Bowen (1986) on the invention and appropriation of gotong-royong as a state-making device.


14. This was the same meeting described later in the chapter.

15. In subak G., members were divided into ‘active’ and ‘passive’, depending upon their loyalties before Gestapu: a PKI man was murdered in the temple, the temple was rebuilt by PNI loyalists and the ‘other’ members were nominated ‘passive’. In fact, passive members usually said that they were not members: they did not attend meetings or work days, and paid exemption (‘ngoot’) of Rp. 25 per 0.01 ha sawah worked for each meeting or work occasion. The mean size of holdings of active
members was 0.62 has, compared with 0.34 has for all landowners/workers. In subak K., owners and workers of holdings smaller than 0.25 ha were explicitly discouraged from participation in subak work and only active members were allowed to attend meetings. There were about 50 active workers (pekaseh) out of 158 landowners/workers in this subak. In subak GK, the workers were called a seka, and membership was voluntary, but less than a quarter of potential members participated. The mean size of holdings of active workers (seka participants) was 0.49 has compared with 0.30 has for all landowners/workers. See Parker 1989: 150–177 for more details on subak membership, workings and leadership.

16. Compare, for instance, the remarks by Hobart for subak in the Gianyar region, where the numerical domination of the subak by small landholders ‘directly affects decisions taken by the group on capital investment. As the majority of members have little, if any, surplus, or very occasionally are large farmers with dispersed holdings, their stake is too small in a particular area to be worth large financial outlay, they tend to vote against expenditure where possible …’ (Hobart 1979: 179).

17. More details can be found in Parker 1989: 236–244; 271–275.

18. Taken as a group, seka members were below average in areas of sawah owned and sharecropped. Those active at the time of the survey numbered 169. Some seka were only active around adalaw times, a period when cash was in short supply and great demand – for compulsory subscriptions and offerings as well as new clothes. The majority were highly seasonal; a few were planting as well as harvesting seka and there were also a couple of small hoeing seka. Most seka were formed by descent groups in order to support their descent group temple and most seka contained fewer than ten members. Many of the descent group seka contributed half of the proceeds from harvesting to the descent group and divided the other half among the workers.

19. In 1989, if a farmer could hold on to a successful crop until after harvest and he could sell the gabah kering for Rp. 225 per kg, he could make substantially more than with a pre-harvest sale. The klian subak reported that yields of 8 tonnes gabah per ha were common in 1989 and really good farmers could get 11 tonnes. While these figures are almost certainly optimistic, and are definitely wildly optimistic as an average to cover those with substantial pest or lodging losses, these were the bases upon which farmers’ calculations were often made.

20. Formerly, this work was done by women within the confines of the houseyard. Usually the women of a household hulled the rice every day using a mortar and pestle. Alternatively, wealthier or patron households such as the Puri paid poor or parekan women in cash or rice for their services. The rhythmic tattoo of this hand-pounding was one of the everyday sounds of Bali, but it is rarely heard today. The hand-pounding of rice was hot, hard work, and its demise has generally been welcomed. Details of the introduction of rice milling can be found in Parker 1989: 271–275.

21. The whole complexion of Brassika’s elitist subak changed in the mid-1980s as a response to the government’s subak contest (lomba subak). Until this time, none of the three subak had written rules (awig-awig). They followed an oral tradition which was obviously open to change. A feature, though, was the extremely detailed tradition of regulations and fines for all manner of infractions and contingencies. Matters such as fines for stealing, absences, infringing on neighbour’s land and disputes over responsibilities were dealt with in discussions at meetings. Sitting above these separate oral traditions was an awig-awig for the whole watershed or pasedahan agung, a copy of which was in the possession of each klian subak. The decision to enter the lomba subak meant that each subak had to commission the kl ian desa adat, Tjokorda Gede Kaka, to write their official awig-awig. These were duly approved and ratified by the bupati in the mid-1980s. To a considerable degree this exercise was designed to produce conformity across subak. One interesting effect was the democratization of subak membership in the Brassika area. By the new rules in all the subak, if a man has sawah in only one subak he must be active. If a man has
sawah in more than one subak, he may choose whether or not to be active.

It is actually (naturally!, being Bali) far more complex than this. In subak G.,
there are still 2 major lines dividing those who own less than 0.25 ha and those who
own more, and between those who are active and those who are passive. Those who
own less than 0.25 ha are exempted from odalan contributions for the subak temple.
Those who own more than 0.25 ha and are active are given an exemption equal to
the contribution that would be given if the farmer owned 0.25 ha. Passive farmers
owning more than 0.25 ha get no exemption and their payment of the penggot is said
to be a substitute for responsibility (pengganti kewajiban). In subak K., the cut-off for
active membership was reduced from 0.25 ha to 0.10 ha, i.e. a man owning more than
0.10 ha must be active and a man working less could choose. The reason for
the change, said the klian subak, was that holdings were getting so small that there
were insufficient numbers of workers to keep abreast of maintenance work in the
subak. In subak GK, the number of members went from 86 to 201 simply on account
of the implementation of the new rule that if a man works land in only one subak he
must be active.

22. The practical application of this contradiction was often explained to me by my
hostess, 'Gung Biyang: patients arriving at her thriving private clinic, which she
officially operated in the evenings, would arrive at any time, night or day, and she
was supposed to be working at her official post at the government clinic from about
7.30 am to lunchtime. She was always criss-crossing the street to keep a presence in
the official clinic while tending patients at her home clinic. Other village leaders
gave the example of divided loyalties: if the kulkul sounded, they were supposed to
attend the banjar, but this frequently conflicted with simultaneous desa meetings. It
was finally written into the awig-awig that desa meetings had priority in such cases.

23. In the textbook for first grade of junior high school, this type of Pancasila
democracy, in which citizens sacrifice their own interests for the national good, is
contrasted with liberal democracy. The book states that when liberal democracy was
implemented in Indonesia, people neglected the national interest, competing to
get their own way through a plethora of political parties. The result was confusion,
instability and conflict (Sumiwi et al 1991: 63–67). It would be interesting to know
how these messages are being received today.


25. The Hitler reference is interesting, especially as it contains no hint of
approbation or horror of Hitlerian dictatorship. Anderson has discussed a similar
reference to Hitler by Sukarno in his 1963 speech as an example of an important
aspect of the Javanese notion of power: i.e. that it is not informed by a sense of
morality (Anderson 1990: 31). See also the following essay in the 1990 collection,
pp. 78–93, in which Anderson suggests, among other things, that Sukarno identified
with Hitler in his charismatic oratorical skills. I suspect this is a relevant point for the
Tjokorda. Later (1992), the Tjokorda knew some of Sukarno’s speeches pretty well
verbatim, but I cannot say that in 1981 there was any connection.

26. They had been nominated by the perbekel; the Department sponsored their ten-
day training trip to Denpasar; and on their return they were formally offered the
positions. They were paid a pitiful ‘honorarium’ of Rp. 7,500 per month.

27. In Brassika, the Puskesmas Pembantu (sub-clinic) had the following activities
listed on its wall chart:

- KIA (Kesejahteraan Ibu dan Anak, Mother and Child Welfare)
- PKM (Pendidikan Kesehatan Masyarakat, Social Health Education)
- P3M (Pemberantasan Penanggulangan Penularan, Fight To Overcome Infectious
  Disease)
- HS (Hygiene Sanitasiun, Hygiene and Sanitation)
- UKS (Usaha Kesehatan Sekolah, School Health Effort)
- UKM (Usaha Kesehatan Masyarakat, Social Health Effort)
- UKK (Usaha Kesehatan Keluarga, Family Health Effort)
- UGK (Usaha Gizi Keluarga, Family Nutrition Effort)
28. A TKS was a quasi-public service job for which incumbents were paid a minimal wage. Young people (presumably mainly men) who were keen to get into the public service, could offer their services and be sent anywhere in the archipelago. The position was usually a white-collar job and was seen as training for the incumbent and as 'a foot in the door' of the public service. The TKS in Brassika was a young Central Javanese man from a family of low socio-economic status. He made himself useful in a clerical and advisory role in village local government and the implementation of development. He too lived in the Puri. There were five TKS in the kecamatan in 1980.

29. More information on this organization can be found in Sullivan 1994: 58–82.

30. The Desa Tertinggal (translated in government publications as 'Poor Village') scheme was instituted by the national government in 1993 as a poverty identification and alleviation scheme. Villages were identified on the basis of their scores on a range of socio-economic variables. The variables included public facilities such as transport, educational and health facilities, private wealth of villagers, quality of life criteria such as birth and death rates and school enrolment ratios. Villages identified as 'poor' were allocated Rp. 20 million in 1994/95, regardless of the size of village and degree of poverty. The identification and distribution system was fine-tuned during 1994 (BPS 1994, 1995).
SECTION IV

Women As Subject Citizens
Chapter 7

Sexuality, Fertility and Family Planning

The melodic subjects of the counterpoint of nation-state formation are political independence, territorial integrity and constitutions to guarantee human rights; the romantic evocations are of folk traditions that reach back to golden idylls and memories of past glories; the grand themes are those of emancipation, progress and modernity. The piece need not by definition be a masculine one, but it has a masculine timbre. The players are largely men, the action is conducted by men, their instruments are physical weapons and powerful oratory and the rendition is strident, outward bound and aggressive. The diplomats and soldiers who play out the politics of negotiation and the heroism of national struggle and revolution are men of action. And after the battle, all the new president’s men draft the constitutions and sit in parliaments, cradle their machine-guns and build aircraft factories. The stuff of which nation-states are made – war, statecraft, diplomacy and trade – are male pursuits.

Where are the women in this process of making the nation-state? The conjugation of nation and state, already troubled and awkward, is further disturbed by the appearance of ‘women’. Most scholars of the new nation-states have managed to ignore women,1 perhaps neither seeing a distinctive contribution by women in the composition of this master-narrative nor identifying particular projects and interests as female. Women do not, apparently, have a formative, participatory or even appropriate place in the making of the nation-state.2

Yet women have a presence, often invisible, often formative, usually unacknowledged, in the new nation-states. In some struggles for national liberation, particularly in guerrilla warfare, such as the struggle of the Viet Cong, women have been militarily active. There have been women who have led newly independent nations, and of course in protracted wars, secessionist movements, acts of terrorism and many expressions of commitment to political liberation by oppressed civilians, women have been active, not infrequently as leaders (for instance, in the Philippines’ people’s revolution and in the movement initiated by the Chilean ‘mothers of the disappeared’).3
Women make decorative and powerful icons or ‘signs’ – of nationalism, emancipation, tradition and modernization. Islamic veiling in Turkey, Iran, Algeria and France has at times expressed anti-Western, anti-secular and anti-modernist positions of religious and ethnic difference. Women’s unveiling in many North African, Middle Eastern and South and Southeast Asian countries has at times expressed emancipation and modernity (Kandiyoti 1991). In contemporary Malaysia and Indonesia, women’s choice to adopt the veil often expresses a resurgent Islamic modernity (Brenner 1996; Nagata 1995; Ong 1995; Stivens 1998: 52). In Malaysia, veiling is often the choice of upwardly mobile, educated Muslim women. In New Order Indonesia, President Suharto embodied modernity in his safari suit while Ibu (Mother, Mrs) Suharto in her kain and kebaya embodied national tradition. Currently, President Megawati dresses with and usually without the veil, depending upon the audience and place.

But for the most part, women and the nation-state seem disparate and unconnected. Within the nation-state, women appear as the least integrated section of the population, nestled as they are shown to be in the bosom of the family. Women seem at the farthest remove from both national political centres and the new, global culture of McDonalds, world music and World Cup football.

In this and the following chapter I want to examine some new aspects of Balinese women’s lives with a view to exploring the gendered process of nation-state construction.4

I am deliberately selecting a uniquely female ability – reproduction – and thereby I bare myself to criticism on the grounds that I am essentializing womanhood. It could also be argued that my selection reveals that I have been seduced by the government propaganda which assigns a restricted role to women as wives and mothers (Sullivan 1994; Suryakusuma 1996). The reasons for my choice are both emic and etic. In Bali, women have long valued and been valued for their fecundity, as reproducers (Belo 1949; Lovric 1987; Parker 2001, 2002b and In press a). In Balinese perception, fertility is central to cosmology, ritual practice, married life, farming, participation in local politics, the naming system – indeed, central to life. Yet recently women have been persuaded by the nation-state to limit their family size in such numbers that it is thought that now Balinese parents are not even replacing themselves.5

Such an apparently drastic revaluation of fertility, and of women’s role, requires explanation.

My other reason to focus on ‘“The Most Essentially Female Function of All”: Giving Birth,’ (Callaway 1978) is the opportunity it provides to discuss ‘traditional’ Balinese beliefs in the context of the nation-state. This is a chance to redress a range of imbalances in the literature. There has been a reluctance to discuss ‘the modern’ in the anthropological literature on Bali, a neglect of the nation-state and a bias against the mundane problems
of how the Balinese feed their families, and against the political economy of Balinese life. The anthropological literature on Bali has, until very recently, been preoccupied with ritual, religion and art, such that it seems that the Balinese reproduce by way of cremation rather than by sex and birth. Yet when there is discussion about contemporary practice, such as the fertility decline in Bali, we find a curious reversal: the discussion is dominated by male demographers who have usually assigned responsibility for the successful introduction of family planning to the government apparatus. They have generally neglected the cultural context, failed to examine the motivations of the female adopters of contraceptive technology and ignored the implications for Balinese religion, ritual, cosmology and art.6

The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Bali dropped from 5.96 in the period 1967–70 to 2.14 in 1994 (BPS 2000). Indonesia experienced a nationwide fertility decline of nearly 50 per cent in the period 1960 to 1987 (that is, the TFR declined from 5.61 to 2.85). Bali stands as the model province in this movement, followed by North Sulawesi (Hull and Jones 1994: 135–136).

Table 7-1: Total fertility rates in Bali and Indonesia 1971–1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (Period)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>TFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>5.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1967–70)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1976–79)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>2.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1986–89)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IDHS)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The New Order contraceptive volte-face is seen by the Indonesian and Balinese authorities as a sign of the success of the national development project. Although the family planning revolution in Indonesia has not been discussed within Indonesia in terms of women rather than men, it raises questions about the place and work of women within the nation-state: the motivation of women, the agency of women, the power of the kekeluargaan ideology and decision-making processes at levels ranging from national offices, wherein fertility targets are set, to marital beds. It suggests that women are not outside the intimate melodies of the nation-state counterpoint. It suggests either that the state is so coercive that women are being forced to have IUDs inserted or that the supposed opposition between state and society is unreal and that more complex forces are at work.
In the parlance of Indonesian family planning or ‘KB’ (Keluarga Berencana), in 1989, 80 per cent of 501 Eligible Couples (ECOs) in Brassika were fitted with IUDs (Village Statistics, 1992). Other forms of contraception barely rate a mention: one woman took the pill, one man used condoms and seven vasectomies and 26 tubectomies were performed. As early as the 1970s some of the banjar in Brassika were winning prizes for their number of Eligible Couples adopting contraception – one banjar head, the Tjokorda’s brother-in-law, won a trip to Jakarta for his efforts in motivating women in Pekandelan to adopt IUDs.

The main question I want to answer in this chapter is: why did Brassika women adopt contraception so enthusiastically in the last 25 years? In the following chapter I will examine changes in birth practices. I begin by examining fertility and sexuality, marriage and kinship to set the socio-cultural scene, then describe the new economic incentives for women to adopt contraception. Finally, the government family planning programme is brought into focus.

FECUNDITY AND SEXUALITY

The artistic, anthropological and archaeological literature on Bali is saturated with images of fertility (and infertility). There are swollen male and female genitalia, and outrageously engorged penises; there are breasts of amazing generosity, women swarming with children; there are female stomachs bulging with pregnancy; there are painted scenes of excruciating punishments for infertile women. These appear in paintings, wooden statues, stone sculptures, straw dolls, rice-cake figures, Chinese-coin dolls, characters in dance-dramas, drawings on palm-leaf and woven figures in palm-leaf banners (Bernet Kempers 1991: 42ff and 58ff; Brinkgreve 1987; Forge 1978; H. Geertz 1994; Hobart 1978a and 1978b; Hunter 1988; Kam 1993; Pucci 1992). Male–female pairs, which metaphorically associate the fertility of humans and rice crops, and offerings to ensure fertility, are particularly common. Women are considered responsible for successful reproduction. Given this overwhelming preoccupation with fertility, especially as a raison d’etre for Balinese women, one should ponder how it is that Balinese women have come to be persuaded to limit their fertility.

The Balinese have traditionally been preoccupied with fecundity rather than with sexuality: women value and are valued for their reproductive capacity, which is seen as a source of unique power (Belo 1949, Lovric 1987, Parker In press a). The ideal woman was primarily a mother, and secondarily a faithful wife and hard worker at home, in the fields and in the performance of ritual offerings (Covarrubias 1972 [1937]: 120–159). ‘A Balinese [man] [sic] feels that his most important duty is to marry as soon as he comes of age and to raise a family to perpetuate his line’ (Covarrubias 1972 [1937]: 122).
It is difficult to communicate the ideals of love and sexuality in Bali from field notes. Here, instead, I rely on precolonial literary traditions, albeit elite traditions of legendary love and family history. The tradition of epic kakawin poetry from Java–Bali melds ideals of nature, love and human struggle, seeking to express in words a mystical union of humankind, the natural world and the divine. The language of Kawi or Old Javanese lent itself to this ‘cult of beauty’ (Zoetmulder 1974), and though many technical and thematic aspects of the versification derive from the kavya model of India, the local world of the courts and priestly houses of Java and Bali dominates the poems.

The Parthayana is a kakawin which describes the journey of the divine hero of the Mahabharata, Arjuna. He is a handsome, promiscuous hero travelling through the human world on a pilgrimage, re-establishing social order, dharma. One excerpt describes the wedding night love-making to his first wife:

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The prince had already been enthroned on the couch, And had taken the girl on his lap, where she lay deprived of strength, all atremble. When they were left alone there, he was just like a bee caressing a budding flower. He became more and more like an intoxicated tadaharsa bird paying homage to the moon, overwhelmed by longing. Bewildered and wan, the beautiful girl grew ever more afraid, and sighed, Bending gracefully aside when he tried to seize her waist, moving away, warding him off. Overwhelming sadness totally crushed her heart into little pieces, And tears of honey suddenly welled up in her eyes, as she arched her brows threateningly. (Creese 1998: 217, Canto 17: 3–4)

The object of his love-struck worship, weary of resisting, sank down, weeping; Helplessly striking at him with her hands as if she would blunt her nails. As he seized her waist-band, it suddenly came loose from her fragrant, slender waist. And it seemed she would die as he threatened her thus, he ignored her fear and took possession of her.

Intent on his purpose, unable to restrain his mounting excitement, The prince abandoned himself to the overwhelming force of his boundless desire, quite without mercy.
```
For it so assailed him that, in the end, he ravished the beautiful princess,
Pressing down upon her trembling breasts, now laid bare, filling her with fear and aversion. (ibid: 217, Canto 17: 10–11)

After being thus deflowered, the weary maiden was completely devastated,
Like a pale leaf that has just withered away.
Gasping for breath, deprived of all strength, she rose and stumbling to the foot of the couch, sank down there,

Her embroidered, fragrant robe stained with blood, glistening wet.
Aghast she rearranged her clothing
For fear of again being forced to make love.
She went dejectedly from the fragrant boudoir,
A sudden frown on her face at seeing the blood trickling to her feet (ibid: 219, Canto 18: 1–2).

The ardour of the hero and the shy unwillingness and resistance of the bride are almost formulaic in Javanese and Balinese kakawin. It must be said that the obvious reluctance of the young bride is usually overcome in the first night of the hero’s passion and thereafter “they shared together in the raptures of love” (ibid: 399, Canto 55: 3).

Secondly, I turn to the traditions of precolonial history writing. The following excerpt from the Babad Dalem, a core text of Balinese history, the chronicle of the royal house of Klungkung, conveys the ideal fusion of masculinity, fecundity and sexual prowess in the person of the king.

The king was the epitome of darma, and all of Bali’s enemies were still and quiet. No one could resist his kasaktian. He conquered not only Blambangan but also Sumbawa and Pasuruan. He instructed his subjects to hide their beautiful wives and daughters, as it was difficult for him to control his sexual desires. Watu Renggong was master of all knowledge important to a king: the rules of governing, the proper conduct of war, the four means of destroying enemies, horse training, and the arts of sexual love. (33b–35a in Wiener 1995: 126)

Arjuna and the Balinese kings of Klungkung and Brassika were supposed to be sexually potent and promiscuous. Power, sex and fecundity were and are intertwined for men, sex contributing to the patriline and the strengthening of the realm. Dalem Segening is famous among villagers today for his fecundity. His many wives, on the other hand, were properly neither lustful nor ardent, the ideal wife being faithful, beautiful, chaste and fecund.

It is probably impossible to show how these images of the lusty king and the demure queen shape contemporary relationships. Nevertheless, just as
four-year-old girls in the West (even the daughters of despairing feminist mothers!) are inspired to draw princess after princess in pretty long pink dresses with puffed sleeves and love hearts (Davies 1989), so too do these old poetic images inspire and inform today’s courting couples.

Epic heroes remain relevant as models of exemplary behaviour in an ordered social world from an idealized, romantic and glorious past. In 1992 the village primary schools and offices were empty by noon: the TV station was televising the Indian Mahabharata and Ramayana in dramatic serialized form, daily at noon. These stories of high-caste heroes and ideal types were still enormously popular, and they formed the basis of most of the performing arts in Bali, particularly wayang. Although some of these traditional forms are now declining in popularity, the popularity of the new televised form was undeniable. Also, villagers still see people in terms of the epics: a handsome, elegant young man from the Puri is an Arjuna, he’ll have no trouble getting girls. Although the Indonesian state discourages polygyny, in Brassika, as we have seen, both high-caste and nouveau-riche low-caste men aspire to have more than one wife.

The narrative of the romantic and marital liaisons of the Tjokorda of Brassika parallels the tale of Arjuna in the Parthayana. Arjuna’s first sexual experience was with the seductive, beautiful Snake-Princess, who appeared as a vision while he was meditating upon the beauty of nature. She persuaded him to follow her to the underworld and there he was absorbed in a Tantric sexual union with the Absolute. Similarly, in Bali it is women who are blamed for sexual indiscretions, because it is women who tempt men. It is the opposite for proper wives. Arjuna’s second sexual partner and first wife (whose wedding night was described above) was the beautiful daughter of a king who was without a male heir. The king arranged his daughter’s marriage with Arjuna on condition that Arjuna provide a male heir for his kingdom. Arjuna abducted his third sexual partner and second wife, Subhadra, after he had raised the possibility of marriage with her brother, Krsna. Arjuna’s marriages are caste-endogamous and pre-arranged by Arjuna and the brides’ father and brother. The satria men cooperate to choose the woman’s husband without her knowledge or consent. The use of force is presented as appropriate for a satria; the groom initiates and controls the sexual act against the will of the bride until she is deflowered or raped. Sexuality is saturated with violation and violence.

The Tjokorda’s first two marriages from his wandering, ‘wild young man’ days were temporary, to pretty young low-caste women, soon divorced. His next marriage was to a satria woman of great beauty. This marriage was arranged and permanent and, in typical high-caste style, extended his kinship links to the north of Bali and within the neighbouring kingdom of Gianyar. The fourth marriage linked his house more locally – with a wealthy and ascendant but low-caste house in the next village. The last and ‘best’ (=highest status) marriage was to Gung Biyang, his highest-
status *satria* wife. She is the beautiful daughter of a high-caste Klungkung civil servant, and the most highly educated woman in the village. It is her son who will inherit the Tjokorda’s position. As to whether or not this was an arranged marriage, it is now hard to say. It appears not to have been arranged by the parents, but she claims to have been enticed away from another, happier relationship. It has been a desperately unhappy marriage for her and she says she was the victim of sorcery, love-magic, initiated by the Tjokorda. In addition, the Tjokorda is widely known as a ‘playboy’ (the English term is used), known to have affairs and suspected by his wives and other villagers of using prostitutes.

I have heard no one criticize the Tjokorda for fathering 14 children by his current three wives, despite the official Family Planning Board teaching that ‘Two is Enough’. Several men told me that they had assumed I was part of the Tjokorda’s ‘harem’ and one cheeky young man asked if we were ‘*intim*’ (intimate). The sexual promiscuity of men, and particularly of one such as the Tjokorda, may be bemoaned by wives but is expected and accepted by all. Sexual desire (*kama*) is felt by men and women to be far stronger in men than in women. Some women say they can go for long periods without wanting sex. Women also say that because they are always busy and work hard, they are always tired and therefore do not think about sex as much as men. It is generally thought that it is in women’s nature to have more *emosi* and more feeling than men, but not sexual feeling.

It is common for some men to boast to one another of their sexual conquests, illicit sexual activity in the *kebun* (gardens), to make ribald comments to one another as girls go past and to make unlikely sexual propositions to attractive young women who properly pass by feigning deafness and impregnability. In my experience, women’s conversation is not sexually explicit: young women gossip about attractive young men but not in terms of sex. Both sexes flirt outrageously at times: one of the Tjokorda’s daughters we had to nickname Marilyn (after Monroe) for her luscious pout, batting of luxuriant lashes and marvellous air of promise.

**KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE**

The basic social unit is the father-mother united in marriage, a subset of the patrilineal descent or ancestor group (Geertz and Geertz 1975). Marriage unites two disparate entities, male and female, perceived as opposite in all things yet interdependent. An unmarried man cannot sit in the *banjar* and an unmarried woman is a threat to social and natural order. For every public office held by a man, whether it be as priest, as member of the *banjar* or even as a public servant, there is a ‘woman’s job’ for his wife, as assistant, maker of offerings or as member of a government women’s organization. However, the main purpose of marriage is not the creation of this unit but the creation of children. Any sexuality which threatens this reproductive
unit is troublesome, whether it be extra-marital liaisons, transvestism or homosexuality, and we saw an instance of this create havoc in village political life.

Traditionally, marriages were arranged by families or conducted by elopement. The latter method allowed young people to skirt parental and/or community disapproval, and also allowed persistent young men to prevail over unwilling brides-to-be. Nowadays, probably most marriages are not arranged, but the conjugal alliance is still very much a partnership of families as well as a working partnership of individuals. Parental approval is still essential. Elopement remains fairly common and fits well with contemporary Western and Indonesian notions of cinta (love).

The principle of marrying within a group is approved. Endogamy is preferred, within a variety of groups, including patrilineages, caste/status groups and banjar. In Brassika, two banjar, Anjingan and Kidikan, shared a distinctive adat (customary law) based on a scavenging lifestyle. This set them apart from mainstream Balinese society. The two banjar were dominated by the Dalem Suladri and Pasek Dangka descent groups respectively, and their levels of endogamous marriage were the highest in Brassika: 65 per cent and 57 per cent of marriages occurring within the respective descent groups were endogamous. These are very high rates of endogamy for Bali (compare Geertz and Geertz 1975: 100), but it is not surprising given the unique adat which the endogamy is designed to reproduce and maintain.

Among high castes, hypogamy was forbidden and direly punished earlier this century; it remains an issue of great heat and significance. When it occurs, the woman is traditionally ‘thrown away’ by her family, she loses her caste identity and she cannot pray at her family’s temples. ‘Gung Biyang’s younger sister married a sudra man. It was an unusually close-knit family and the newly married sister returned to her natal houseyard on the occasion of her family’s temple anniversary (odalan). I have a poignant memory of the warm welcome and gift of food (rice) extended to her, but also of her desperate efforts to control her face and tears as the rest of the family departed in their finery for their descent group temple, leaving her to mind the house. Such mis-caste marriages seem to be on the increase now that high-caste daughters are allowed mobility for schooling and employment. The marriages of the Tjokorda’s daughters already include two men of less-than-satria rank, and even though these daughters, and their babies, are welcomed warmly by their loving families, they cannot pray at the Puri’s family temple.

Women’s endogamy maintains a group’s identity by defining its borders and advertising its character as strong, vital and pure. When powerful men seek marriage partners of another group it is usually a sign of expansion of a patrilineage or realm, and when those targeted women are released (by arrangement or by theft), it signals a disparity in status and power. Perceptions of status disparities (perhaps underpinned by notions of purity and pollution) help to regulate choice of marriage partner.
Cosmological principles of women’s purity and danger structure many other aspects of women’s sexual/reproductive life such as menstruation and childbirth. Although much of the anthropological literature describes the special condition of women when menstruating or after childbirth as ‘polluting’, ‘dirty’ or ‘impure’, as a translation of ‘sebel’ (e.g. Miller and Branson 1989), I am uneasy with this translation. In my experience ‘sebel’ implies more than ‘stained’ or ‘impure’ – it has more of the character of ‘dangerous’, as discussed by Mary Douglas (1966). Similarly, the caste hierarchy in Bali may be said to be underpinned by notions of the relative purity/impurity of those of different caste status (as in Dumont 1970), but a more diffuse sense of disparities of status (pangkat) and power (sakti) animates everyday life.

In Bali, women’s average age at marriage was advanced by Indonesian standards in the 1960s and has probably risen past 22 years (Hull and Jones 1994: 137; Streatfield 1986: 21). Virginity for women at marriage is desired, though premarital sex is often considered unavoidable. Most weddings probably occur prior to sexual intercourse. It seems to me that, for the Balinese, the problem with premarital sex is potentially that a pregnant woman may not have a marriage partner rather than the premarital violation of female virginity. This situation, described in Chapter 5, is described as a ‘theft’ by the man. Upon pregnancy, girls should be quickly married to the father of the unborn child. Even suspicion of premarital sex is enough to push families to force conjugation, particularly if the coupling is auspicious. One evening several years ago, one of the Puri daughters had gone next door for help with her homework from one of the Geria sons. She was not seen to come home that night; the young man’s father said his son’s bedroom lamp had been extinguished about 11 pm; the royal daughter was pulled out of high school and married to the priestly son.

According to the small number of women with whom I could talk on such topics, sex is ideally initiated and controlled by men. The ideal wife is neither seductive nor lustful. In the early stages of a relationship or marriage, desire for sex and the creation of children are not separated. Young unmarried women characteristically work to earn money and are expected to help with domestic and ritual work. Nevertheless, their load is light compared with that of older married women. Newly married women move into their husband’s house-compound, co-residing with parents- and brothers-in-law and their families. Until they produce a baby, especially a son, brides are in a weak and comparatively powerless position. The new wife is often expected by her mother-in-law to take over the great part of the housework, cooking, shopping and laundry, and women have primary responsibility for childcare. Mothers-in-law often perform much of the ritual work, especially the making of offerings, of the house-compound. (On women’s work see Branson and Miller 1988, Connor 1983 and especially Nakatani 1995.)
Divorce is traumatic and difficult for women, mainly because they must surrender their children to their husband’s patrilineage, and also because they have no rights of access to the family wealth and property. (See Chapter 5, the case of Cokorda N–P–.) Women bitterly contrast their position with that of men, for whom divorce is easy, and usually explain that it is best ‘to accept, to receive’ (menerima) and to stay in unhappy marriages in order to remain with their children.

Extramarital affairs are fairly common, though apparently more common for men than for women. Married women do not admit to conducting affairs, whereas men’s affairs are made more public. In Brassika, wronged wives would withhold rice from their husbands and use the potent weapons of witchcraft and sorcery to punish wrongdoers.\(^{10}\) I have reports of men organizing ‘elopements’ with and without the knowledge and consent of the woman involved.

Polygyny is officially discouraged by the national government (through legislation and civil service penalties for promotion), but is particularly practised by high-caste men. Since many village government positions are held by high-caste men, this can be an issue. (The Brahman teacher Ida Bagus Putu, who took a young student as his second wife, caused his family great distress and consternation.) A sexual double standard operates by which sexual promiscuity is valorized for men, making them appear strong, potent and attractive in the eyes of both men and women, but not condoned for women. However, it seems to me that men’s fear and control of female sexuality is partly based on their fear of being cuckolded – of appearing ridiculous, of being cheated, of losing face and of being bested, in the eyes of other men.\(^{11}\)

In everyday life women are primarily important as mothers – as organized, organizing and caring nurturers. It is the mothers who have primary responsibility for the physical, moral and ritual care of children: cooking and feeding, cleaning, laundry, housework, dressing, teaching of everyday life skills, responsibility for the child’s ritual purity and safety, teaching of manners and guidance on children’s social problems and moral training. This nurturing aspect of womanhood is neglected in the literature on Bali but is pervasive in the lived reality of Bali. However, this is not to say that the mother is solely responsible for childcare. In Brassika, childcare occurs in the context of a co-resident extended family. The services of other children and cousins, patrilineally-related women and men, especially grandparents, are usually available. There is not such a spotlight on the mother as there is in the suburban middle-class family.

While there is often antagonism between men and women in Bali, women do not ultimately threaten the higher power of men, nor do they attempt to compete against men as equals. ‘The women accept ... the role of an inferior. It is simply that they have their being on a different plane from the men’ (Belo 1970 [1936]: 106).
However, Balinese women often appear strong and assertive, especially in the marketplace and the household, where they often control the household purse for everyday expenses. This has led several observers to comment on the ‘strong feeling of equality’ in marital relationships (Covarrubias 1972 [1937]: 155), and Geertz and Geertz even claim, ‘The relationship between husband and wife is one of equality’ (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 56).

I find these claims extraordinary in the light of various kinship mores and practices: that the bride ‘follows her husband’ (ikut suami) to his natal houseyard after marriage; that men ideally control sexual practice; that women are held responsible for fecundity; that men can divorce women for adultery, but not vice versa; that only men inherit sawah and can claim the family home and property; that only men sit and can speak in the banjar. Above all, the injustice that strikes most hurtfully at the hearts of Balinese women is that on divorce or separation women lose their children. This injunction has one of two tragic consequences for everyday life: either women are trapped in an unhappy marriage or they lose their children. When talking about new ways of living and the lot of women generally, it is this sword which cannot be avoided and cannot be exchanged. Women invariably conclude that this injunction is immutable because to change it means to change the entire social structure. It has the effect of keeping women in their place.

This is the social and cultural environment in which women’s sexuality and fecundity are expressed. Women’s fecund powers are valued and feared, and men seek to control women’s reproductivity and sexuality. However, traditional notions of women as rampant reproducers have been transformed. Why and how has this come about?

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS; AN OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN?

When I began fieldwork in 1980, Brassika villagers were already acutely aware that the area of agricultural land was finite, that the population was growing and that access to a plot of rice land that would support a family was increasingly unlikely. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was an efflorescence of wage-labour opportunities within and especially without Brassika, and a rapid expansion in parental investment in children’s education. There was a shift in women’s labour away from family work (both reciprocal and unpaid) to wage labour, a great increase in the economic cost of children and a decline in the economic contribution of children to the family farm. Consequently, since the mid-late 1970s there have been powerful economic incentives for married women to drastically limit family size.

Brassika women often explained that these economic factors were the main reasons for them to adopt contraception. They often combined such explanations with statements about their perception that babies born these
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In the past, they said, it was a sensible strategy to bear more children than necessary because of the likelihood that some would die. Their perceptions are borne out by the macro-level statistics which show a dramatic decline in infant mortality rates in Bali, from 130 deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in the late 1960s to 40 in the mid-1990s (BPS 2001).

Women’s work and control of household finances have usually been hailed by observers as signifying that Balinese women have an extraordinary degree of economic autonomy. My argument is the opposite: that traditionally most women traded and kept pigs for sale, and, more recently, laboured on the open market and performed other marginal and lowly work because they had financial responsibilities within the family, were expected to work hard and could not inherit the main traditional means of production, sawah (irrigated rice fields). Even high-caste women, who were sequestered behind high walls, had a tradition of earning money by weaving, keeping pigs or setting up stalls suspended from the walls of the house compounds.

Agriculture was still the main source of income for village men. Sawah was owned by men, not by women. Land was inherited through the patriline and could also be bought and sold, pawned and sharecropped. In the Klungkung area, the few women who controlled sawah were widows and the only women to head households were widows. In 1981 in Brassika only 15 out of 439 sawah-owners were women, all widows. Women frequently expressed outrage to me that they could not inherit land. This sense of injustice was probably fired by recently acquired knowledge about national laws which require equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters. The clash of local and national laws on this topic is not (yet) a subject for public discourse as an issue or problem, but in a seminar paper, Desak Putu Parmitii stated that,

> It can be said that the Hindu religion views women and men as having the same position in matters of faith and deed, as well as in occupation, except in the division of inheritance which follows the patrilineal kinship system, recognizing only the purusa (male) line of descent. (Parmitii 1992: 103; my translation)

She then went on to outline the ways in which the patrilineal system elevated the position of men over women. The seminar did not debate the issue. However, at another seminar in 1994, the subordinate position of women in Bali, the strength of the patriarchy, the weak position of women in decision-making and patrilineal inheritance practices were discussed (Bali Post, 20.4.94–24.4.94). A couple of women in Brassika who read the newspaper reports commented that it had taken an outsider labour rights campaigner, Dr Muchtar Pakpahan, to raise this last issue, and snorted in
derision at comments made by some Balinese academics that there were ‘no problems’ for Balinese women, aside from their heavy work loads.

In pre-Green Revolution times, women were active as unpaid family workers in the sawah, particularly in rice harvesting and pounding, and in dry annual crop production. As recently as 1981, women in Brassika were very active in voluntary harvest groups and exchanged their labour directly for rice. By 1989, virtually all harvesting was done on a commercial basis by small, efficient harvest teams. Diesel-powered rice hulling machines had made hand-pounding obsolete.12

The labour inputs from wives (and children) for each rice crop were much reduced. With labour inputs much reduced, both men and women were searching for new sources of income. The diversification of villagers’ occupations and sources of income is a striking feature of the transformation of the village from peasant subsistence economy to wage-labour market economy. While this type of transformation was not uncommon in Suharto’s Indonesia, the pace and magnitude of the shift away from the agricultural sector and the expansion of the workforce in the industrial and service sectors in Bali has been extraordinary (Bendesa and Sukarsa 1980: 52; Oey-Gardiner 1993: 211; Team Pengembangan 1984). Likewise, the level of participation of women in the workforce, always high in Bali compared with other areas of Indonesia, has grown rapidly (Abdurrochim 1986: 49–50; Hugo et al. 1987: 244–249; Oey-Gardiner 1993: 211; Team Pengembangan 1984: 19). The fast pace of industrialization and internationalization of the economy was mainly a result of the tourism industry in Bali. The burgeoning industrial and service sectors, which were largely financed by national (Jakarta) and international capital, piggybacked on the international marketing networks, advertising linkages and political power of the tourism industry (Aditjondro 1995: 19–20).

Balinese women now commonly work alongside men as labourers on building sites and on public works projects, especially roads. Labouring is a lowly occupation. Positions are usually offered for a particular construction job or project, not as a permanent attachment to an employer, be it government department or private company. There is usually no job security and no protection against time off for injury, pregnancy and sickness. People who have no land, no skills, no money and no contacts are forced into labouring. The work is hard and hot, and the hours are long. Labourers bundle themselves against the burning sun. High-caste people will not labour, at least not in Bali.

Labourers are usually paid daily wages; labouring women receive two-thirds to three-fourths of the male rate. Some women, usually the younger unmarried women, attach themselves to a large company, live in Denpasar or other town and follow the company to the site of a contract. The women work in gangs, sometimes with men, carrying headloads of sand or gravel or rocks, shovelling materials onto or out of trucks, breaking rocks, tending
the fires to heat drums of tar, spreading blue-metal, sometimes supplying male bricklayers with mortar and bricks.\textsuperscript{13}

By 1981, poorly educated young women from Brassika were frequently leaving home at the age of 15 to 18 to go to Denpasar, Sanur, Kuta and other towns and tourist centres in search of work. Many had no jobs lined up and some had no accommodation organized. Parents were usually aware of the open-ended nature of these trips. Sometimes daughters came back home after a couple of days; some trips ended more profitably, with employment in textile factories or jewellery sweatshops; some ended with the daughter back home and pregnant some months later; and some didn’t ‘end’ – a few daughters disappeared.

In the 1990s, the expanding industrial sector, especially the textile, garment and handicraft industries, especially attracted female workers. In these industries, there was great variation in work arrangements but the most common for married women in Brassika was the labour-intensive, at-home manufacture of clothes and accessories.\textsuperscript{14}

While the development literature enthusiastically promotes the contribution that the education of girls makes to bringing about reductions in fertility,\textsuperscript{15} there is no evidence of a causal link in the case of Bali. In 1981, in Brassika’s most go-ahead banjar, Tirtawangi, those young women who left home and village to find work in the towns and tourist areas were usually those who had had some schooling (see Chapter 9). However, the fertility revolution in banjar such as Tirtawangi occurred in the 1970s, with the widespread adoption of contraception by the unschooled older sisters and mothers of these adventurous young women.

For these reasons, it appears that Bali is a special case: the burgeoning non-agricultural economy offered income-earning opportunities to largely unschooled women; these employment opportunities outside the home encouraged them to use contraception. Hence, the fertility rate was already declining by the time schooling for girls became common.

The extremely rapid adoption of Green Revolution technology and work practices coupled with the extraordinary growth of tourism in the 1970s caused women to view favourably the opportunity to use contraception to limit family size. Income-earning opportunities at this time were to be found outside the home and village, at a time when children were becoming expensive rather than economically productive.

CONTRACEPTION

After the Suharto government came to power in 1966–67 it lost no time in instituting a national family planning programme as part of its economic development programme. By 1970 the National Family Planning Board (BKKBN) was operational and concentrated its contraceptives campaigns in Java and Bali. By 1974 two features of the Indonesian family planning
programme that were unique to Bali and important in explaining its success were being implemented: the *sistem banjar* and the advocacy and use of the intra-uterine device (IUD) as the method of contraception.

The IUD has often been used as the preferred pioneer contraceptive in family planning programmes in the Third World. The IUD is an invasive but once-only device – unlike the pill, once accepted its use is out of the woman’s control until such time as it is extracted. It is effective without the user understanding how it is effective; its use requires no knowledge of anatomy, no memory of menstrual cycles and no memory or foresight (unlike the pill and diaphragm) on the part of the user.

The IUD was adopted as the preferred contraceptive by the provincial branch of BKKBN from the beginning: 50 per cent of new contraceptive acceptors adopted IUDs in 1975–76 and by February 1990 the figure had risen to 70 per cent (Kantor Statistik 1988 [?]: 24; Kantor Statistik 1990 [?]: 23). In August 2000, 61 per cent of active KB participants in Bali used the IUD; in Indonesia, the percentage was 28 per cent (BKKBN 2001). Fortunately, the general trend is towards a diversification of contraceptive methods, with injections, Norplant arm implants and sterilizations becoming more common (BKKBN 1992: 3; Hull and Jones 1994: 142; BKKBN 2001).

Although convenient and effective as a contraceptive, the IUD often causes significant health problems such as bleeding, pain and infections, which are not adequately attended to by village medical staff. In other societies, the IUD has been seen as potentially unpopular because of the embarrassment or shame of women at the time of insertion. In Bali, this was not seen by health professionals as a problem, partly because women were often attended by female clinic staff and partly because Bali was unusual in having a tradition of male birth attendants. (Nevertheless, women – including well-educated health professionals – not infrequently expressed this embarrassment to me.) The Indonesian family planning programme targeted women who already had one or more children. The few village women who knew that there were other methods of contraception usually stated that they preferred the IUD because they did not have to remember to take it, unlike the pill. (The pills in the packets for the government-provided oral contraceptives were not labelled with the days of the week – this would have been a simple, cheap partial remedy for this problem.) Real knowledge and experience of oral or other contraceptives were abysmally absent: in 1994, for instance, the local ‘experts’, the clinic staff, asked me for information about how to take the pill. The Head of BKKBN in Bali noted this selective knowledge, and stated:

Field workers are trained to devote special attention to the IUD in providing information about the program. Clinic personnel are instructed to recommend the IUD above other methods, to encourage
continuation among IUD users who are considering having the IUD removed or changing methods, and to encourage users of other methods to shift to the IUD. (Astawa 1975: 95)

The IUD-dominated information campaign was so successful that the term ‘IUD’ was used in village Bali to mean ‘contraception’, and most women did not have a word to signify ‘contraception’.

The frequency of the adoption of the IUD in Bali was mainly the result of the government’s totalitarian methods of disseminating information about contraception and of delivering contraceptive services and supplies. Knowledge about female anatomy, reproductive processes and contraceptive choice was inadequate even among those medical and paramedical staff who had been ‘trained’. Further, the IUD was the ‘easiest’ (second to sterilization) method of contraception in terms of cost and distribution of supplies, education, motivation and permanency of ‘contraceptive status’ (that is, adopting women cannot easily renege on their decisions). On this last point, Astawa, the Head of BKKBN in Bali, stated that the ‘high continuation rates’ of IUD acceptors were the principal reason that his organization promoted the use of the IUD (Astawa 1975: 95). In a conversation with me about the prevalence of the IUD, a BKKBN official stated that it was suitable (cocok) because it did not require much desire or will (keinginan) on the part of the woman (19.6.94). Within the context of Balinese male control of women’s sexuality and fertility, it is not surprising that a form of contraception which, once inserted, is largely beyond the control of its female users, was virtually the only type made available.

The second aspect of the family planning programme unique to Bali was the so-called sistim banjar. Increasingly, through the 1970s and 1980s, the banjar became a channel through which government policy on development matters such as health and hygiene, school attendance and family planning was implemented (Warren 1993: esp. 217–224 on family planning). Its status as an autonomous, democratic local government was seriously corrupted.

Under the sistim banjar of the national family planning programme, elected banjar heads were made responsible for reaching targets of contraceptive acceptors. In 1980, one target was 90 per cent of eligible couples (ElCos or married couples of child-bearing age) were to become acceptors of contraceptives. Heads of banjar were paid a small salary; candidates for the position were vetted by government officials; and most spent considerable amounts of time compiling paperwork, implementing government development programmes and attending government meetings and training courses. Although they were not civil servants, they can be seen as administrators in the service of the government bureaucracy.

The banjar head had to make a household map and register of all eligible couples (ElCos) in his hamlet; the register for each ElCo included
name and age of woman, husband’s name, date on which she accepted family planning, numbers of dead and alive children, as well as current details of contraceptive status. The banjar heads worked in bureaucratic tandem with village clinic staff and BKKBN fieldworkers, who were public servants. Clinic staff and fieldworkers had some medical training, though villagers were often unaware of their differing levels of training and professional status. They distributed supplies of contraceptives such as pills, but only the more senior clinic staff were allowed to fit IUDs.

The ‘contraceptive status’ of any married woman and ‘ElCo’ – usually whether a woman of child-bearing age was using an IUD – was part of the personal knowledge of banjar heads. It was also common knowledge in any banjar and, if unacceptable, was acted upon by the banjar. Normally, if an ‘eligible couple’ was procrastinating about using contraception after the birth of a child, the matter was casually raised by friends and neighbours, as well as by clinic staff in post-natal checks and immunization visits. Truly recalcitrant couples may have found themselves the topic for discussion at the monthly banjar meetings, and/or visited by banjar heads as well as by government medical and administrative staff.

Balinese women were excluded from the major local decision-making organization, the banjar, but they were bound by its decisions and expected to implement them. Coupled with this political exclusion was the expectation that women would accept (menerima) orders and act on them.

Another aspect of the programme was the ‘Balineseness’ of the campaign (Streatfield 1986: 55). At the outset of the KB programme, the Parisada Hindu Dharma, the quasi-government Hindu umbrella organization, published assurances in book form that ‘The Hindu Religion Does Not Forbid Family Planning’. In television advertisements, women in traditional dress extolled the economic advantages of having small families; some posters employed the local, rather than the national, language. The whole campaign had a local flavour because of the banjar implementation system.

Further, the target-driven nature of the campaign, which has probably also contributed to the promotion of the IUD as the contraceptive par excellence, exploited a distinctive characteristic of Balinese institutions: their competitiveness. Clinic staff, fieldworkers, banjar heads and the institutions they represented were assigned performance credit points according to the number of acceptors they could muster; winners won prizes, including trips to Jakarta, losers may have found their villages designated ‘desa tertinggal’, left-behind villages. This competitiveness operated at all levels of BKKBN Bali and health services administration such that even village-level personnel often told me proudly that Bali was the first province for family planning success in Indonesia.

The family planning programme was accompanied by a comprehensive public health programme aimed principally at women of child-bearing age in order that they took part of the responsibility for the modern health care
of the next generation. The programme included vaccinations, weighings and nutritional supplements for children under five, ante-natal and post-natal checks for women – including checks on their ‘contraceptive status’ – and a childbirth programme which moved parturient women from homes to clinics and hospitals. As mentioned above, infant mortality rates in Bali dropped substantially. Female informants perceived that nowadays babies were more likely to live to adulthood than when they were young and frequently mentioned this as one reason they could restrict the number of births.

This bombardment of state policy and programmes was present in most of Indonesia and was not unique to Bali. Balinese ‘enthusiasm’ for contraception cannot, therefore, be solely attributed to government health programmes and propaganda. As BKKBN realized in the early 1970s, Bali is a densely settled island, with a socially cohesive and relatively homogeneous society. It was well supplied with roads and could quickly and cheaply be supplied with clinics and medical and paramedical staff easily articulated with its indigenous banjar. In Bali, the net of government health and contraceptive services was densely interwoven with the decision-making of local government forums (banjar meetings and leaders) and the moral force and identity of local communities (banjar).

The incorporation of Balinese women into the Indonesian state not only occurred within the health care and local government systems. Formal teaching about the desirability of family planning began in the first year of primary school and continued in all subjects and grades of school.16

Messages about gender roles within a nuclear family – with father as the head of the family, mother as his loyal support and two children as the industrious students – dominated many lessons. Television advertisements reinforced the message that women as mothers, wives and daughters had a caring role in society and were responsible for their family’s hygiene and health. Women were targeted to buy the family soap, toothpaste and contraception. At all levels of society, the government had set up PKK (Family Welfare Organizations) to mobilize women’s participation in development. The PKK signs posted in villages throughout Indonesia proclaimed the duties of a woman as:

1. producer of the nation’s future generations
2. wife and faithful companion to her husband
3. mother and educator of her children
4. manager of the household
5. citizen (Hull 1996: 95; Sullivan 1994, esp. Chapter 3, pp. 50-82, also 128ff.)

This government emphasis on women as carers, supporters and nurturers overlooked the important contribution that they made as producers, providers and workers in the labour force. Village women,
having moved away from unpaid family labour, no longer fit the state rhetoric about good female citizens. The New Order state had no place for women as breadwinners, community leaders or engineers. The message was that the men of power, the men of action, produced, managed, decided and controlled, while the women served, accepted (menerima), maintained and reproduced – the latter in moderation!

The ideal woman of the Indonesian state was a diminution of the real-life Balinese woman. According to the state stereotype, women were merely home-bound, dependent wives and mothers. In the daily experience of Balinese women, however, extra-domestic practices and social relations often became sources of personal satisfaction, social and self worth, freedom and enablement. But they often involved women in personal moral conflicts such as the risk of incurring gossip if a young woman left home to try for work in a town, or the anguish over whether or not to work away from home for wages but leave children in the care of others. Working women felt considerable satisfaction but they also experienced overwork. Many felt many stresses as a result of what was commonly known as ‘peranan ganda’, their double/multiple roles. Many women saw their work in terms of a tripartite division: home, work and ritual, the latter being an extraordinarily heavy obligation in Bali. These multiple roles, and the overload of work and pressure of time that they connote, became the usual topics of discussion whenever women’s issues were raised in public. The peranan ganda of Balinese women became an accepted topic of public discourse in a way that inheritance rights or custody rights are not (yet).17

Balinese women were publicly applauded for their ‘high work ethos’ and their reputation as labourers (Bali Post 20.4.94) – one wonders if their contribution to society through roadworking labour has to a large extent replaced their childbearing labours. For Balinese women, family planning was a means by which they could help to reconcile the often conflicting roles of mother and worker. Contraception allowed Balinese women to be free (bebas) to work.

CONCLUSION

Behind the statistics on fertility decline in Bali are the IUDs that became standard medical procedure for married women who had one, two or three children. IUDs were not fitted to government officials, or to the men sitting in banjar meetings. They were adopted by married women who did not attend meetings but who had to have been sufficiently well motivated to turn up at clinics to be fitted. Some women were aware of the current debates in their banjar; some contributed to a general public discourse on issues discussed at meetings, particularly those that affected their household economic management; some women even had behind-the-scenes real power, being able to swing opinion. Several women claimed to
me that they did not want to go to meetings because they already had too much work to do.

Nevertheless, within everyday life in the banjar of Bali, women were publicly voiceless, were discriminated against with regard to liberty, equality and fraternity and enjoyed a very limited citizenship. The constitutional right of political equality in Indonesia was not exercised in Balinese local political life.

Not unexpectedly, most women with whom I discussed such matters said that they decided to become family planning acceptors after discussing the matter with their husbands. Nevertheless, scholars have documented significant differences in contraceptive acceptance rates according to banjar in Klungkung, Karangasem and Gianyar (Poffenberger 1983: 54–55; Streatfield 1986: 147–152; Warren 1993: 219–224). These differences reflected the decisions made or not made by the councils, variations in the moral cohesiveness and homogeneity of communities and also the enthusiasm and industry of banjar leaders. The women’s comments and the statistically significant differences between banjar acceptance rates point to two crucial aspects of social, religious and government life in Bali: the importance of the structural inequality between the sexes in Bali, such that men are thought to have the right to control the sexual and reproductive life of their wives and female fellow-citizens (sic), and the public nature of decisions about fertility control.

However, women informants did not generally perceive that their acceptance of contraception had been forced upon them: one well-educated, high-caste woman removed her own IUD and had a tubal ligation without her husband’s knowledge and another high-caste woman, a mother of eight, refused to comply with her husband’s and banjar’s demands that she use contraception because she had not yet produced a son.

Most women saw the adoption of contraception after the birth of two or three children as a means of liberation. Contraception enabled women to seek employment and income which would enable them to provide a more healthy and comfortable living for their small families.

However, my personal view is that this recent contraceptive ‘freedom’ occurred in a context of un-freedom, that deep, historical and cultural forces structured new strategies and decisions. The mother of eight girls acted ‘freely’ in order to comply with a societal norm that made sons more desirable than daughters. The woman who secretly went off to have her tubes tied did so after her husband had told her that he had had a vasectomy and then made her pregnant. (His other wife was caught in the same trap.)

The success of family planning in Bali was only partly due to the nature of the programme. The acceptance of contraception and the desire to reduce fertility occurred in a complex cultural context of male domination and control of female sexuality and reproductivity combined with
economic and political transformations that had considerable potency in persuading women to use contraception.

NOTES
1. See Dobbin 1980 for this phenomenon in Indonesian history writing.
2. See Gelman Taylor 1997 for a recent attempt to correct this for twentieth-century Indonesian history.
3. See Davies 1983, a compendium of women’s organized participation in national liberation struggles.
4. Most of the material in this chapter has appeared in Parker 2001 and In press a. Here the emphasis is on the ways in which women in Brassika, and particularly their fertility, have been made part of the process of nation-state construction.
7. In esoteric contexts, maleness is associated with the spiritual dimension, with the sky and with essence (purusa), in contrast to femaleness, the chthonian dimension, which is associated with the earth and the goddess of the earth, Ibu Pertiwi, and with substance (perdana) (Filloux 1991: 25, 89). The rua-bhinneda principle – that the two different life-forces must come together – animates all life.
9. This feature of Brassika is not dealt with in any detail in this book, because of space restrictions. See Parker 1991.
10. Ottino (pers. comm.) also reports from the Batukau region that men sometimes cooperate to facilitate affairs, inviting husbands away from home in order to allow illicit sex, and, in one memorable incident, remained to guard the adulterous couple and witness the copulation.
11. I do not agree with Mead, who posited that male sexual concerns centred on problems of wavering male potency, triggered by men’s fear of their teasing mothers (e.g. Mead 1950: 200).
12. See Parker 1989: 236–244 for a description of this transformation.
13. Usually the more skilled and better paid jobs in construction – such as setting up formwork (shuttering) or string lines off plans, are male jobs, as are foremen positions. Tradespeople – stonemasons, electricians, mechanics – are men.
14. They made finished items (such as cut-work clothes (bordir), carved and painted wooden statues and trinkets), or completed one stage in the production of handicraft-type goods (such as sewing sequins on brassieres or embroidering clothes and shoes). It was rare for women sewing at home to work steadily for several months, but they sometimes worked frantically for a couple of weeks to fill an order. Wages were usually not steady and were paid on completion of an order and according to productivity: the speed and skill, and thus output, of the worker helped to determine income. Some Brassika people worked in small, backyard factories equipped, for instance, with sewing machines or soldering irons and forge. These small factories employed a small number of male and/or female workers, who frequently lived on site or in rented rooms. The pace of much of this work was driven by the timing of orders received from middle-men, or, uncommonly, from middle-women. Large-scale weaving, garment or jewellery making factories employed hundreds of workers. The last two types of factories are mostly in urban or peri-urban areas and many of the workers are non-local, including many from outside of Bali.
15. Conventional wisdom, most clearly expressed in World Bank documents, causally links rising levels of educational attainment for women with lower fertility. International agencies and poorer countries with a concern for the deleterious effects of rapid population growth have vested female education with tremendous potency as ‘a policy instrument for countervailing high levels of fertility’ (Smock 1981: 153) and for producing a wide range of important social changes. For instance, Cochrane and others, in widely quoted World Bank studies, concluded that there is an inverse relationship between level of education and fertility and population control, and that the relationship is stronger for women than for men (Cochrane 1979; Cochrane, O’Hara and Leslie 1982).

16. Examples of school lessons which focus on family planning can be found in Parker 1992a: 108–110; Parker 1992b: 63–65; and Chapter 10 below.

17. For instance, since the late 1980s various ‘Research Reports’ (Laporan Penelitian) produced by students at the provincial university, Universitas Udayana, focussed attention on women in the labour force who had a peranan ganda, e.g. Astika et al. 1990; Ginarsa et al. 1988; Kebayantini 1990; Tim Peneliti 1989; Wiasti 1990.
In 1980, when I began fieldwork in Brassika, most births were home births. A typical birth took place in the marital quarters of a husband’s natal house-compound. Some labouring women were unattended by traditional village midwives (balian manak), by choice or circumstance; others made some effort to be attended by these traditional specialists; a few were starting to present themselves to the new government-employed midwife trained in Western-style bio-medicine, ‘Gung Biyang.

By 1992, the year of my next long stint of fieldwork, childbirth practices had changed dramatically. Although ‘Gung Biyang still practised in the government sub-clinic, the majority of births occurred in her private clinic. Emergency births were sometimes transferred mid-course to the district hospital, 12 km away. A few women planned to have their babies delivered in hospitals in Denpasar, about 40 km distant.

In this chapter, I examine the radical changes associated with giving birth – not merely the site at which births occurred, but also the personnel attending the parturient woman and her baby, the ritual and practical care which mother and baby received and the treatment of birth as a significant event in the lives of individual women, their families and communities. The involvement of the Indonesian state in this shift was part of its interventionist strategy of ‘developing’ all aspects of family and village life. As part of its umbrella Primary Health Care policy, the government had attempted to integrate traditional birth attendants into the modern health care system (Ministry of Health 1990: 6). The state provided a two-tier system of obstetric care in village clinics and town hospitals, but in Brassika the service that was preferred by village women was the private clinic run by ‘Gung Biyang, government-employed nurse and midwife and principal wife of the local Dewa Agung and village head. I examine first the cosmological context in which childbirth occurs, including the important link between sorcery and women’s reproductive capacities; then I trace the changing obstetric practices within Brassika and the role of the state; and I briefly explore some of the problems women experience with hospital births.
THE ‘DOMESTIC NIGHTMARE’

In the preceding chapter, I noted the preoccupation of the Balinese, as probably of most peasant peoples, with fertility. The fecundity of women is associated with the fertility of soil and with agricultural fertility generally. It is linked with devotion to Ibu Pertiwi, the Earth Goddess, provider of food and symbol of fertility. Women are associated with earthiness, substance (perdana or pradana) and chthonian powers. Men, in contrast, are associated with the sky and with essence (purusa), the god Akasa, provider of water and symbol of the fertilizing element. It is the fusion of the two complementary sexual principles (rua-bhinneda, the two that are different: the purusa and the pradana) which ultimately creates and maintains the cosmos.

The reproductive potential of women is a double-edged kris for women. Women have primary responsibility for fertility and reproduction and fecundity is the primary source of positive public value for women. However, infertility is an offence against the moral order and a major source of community suspicion, as it provides a motive for sorcery. Women’s reproductive capabilities are a source of ambiguous power. Not only is female sexuality/fecundity different from that of men, but women are also more vulnerable than men because they are responsible for a lot more. Failed fecundity is highly suspicious.

The two principle sorcerers in Balinese mythology are Rangda and Basur. Rangda is the famous widow-witch of Balinese theatre. She is the complex embodiment of evil. She is a fear-inspiring figure: she has long pendulous, sometimes hairy, breasts; her long, loose, white hair reaches often to the ground; she has fangs and long claw-like fingernails, bulging eyes and a tongue that lolls to her waist; sometimes entrails are draped around her neck; and her body is covered in horizontal black and white stripes of fur. Rangda cannot be killed: she is always there, destructive, vindictive, insanely malicious, angry, cavorting and shrieking – and female.

Rangda is also the principal source of power/knowledge for those wishing to learn the arts of black magic (pangiwa, the ‘left’ knowledge). While both men and women can practise magic and sorcery and wield sakti (magical power), the Balinese think that women are particularly well suited to it. One becomes a witch/evil spirit (léak) by consuming one of the Kanda Mpat, the ‘four siblings’ that accompany each human baby at birth, i.e. the amniotic fluid, the blood of childbirth, the umbilical cord and the placenta. At night the novices gather at the graveyard, having left their bodies at home in bed. Under the tutelage of Rangda, they transform themselves into old hags, dine on the rotting corpses and decorate themselves with intestines, then go out to do a night’s work, appearing as fearful visions, wreaking havoc in dreams and generally causing illness and
death. Rangda and witches in general are reputed to cause miscarriages and to feed on newborn babies.6

‘The Great Sorcerer Basur’ is Rangda’s lesser, male counterpart.7 Like the story of Rangda, the story of Basur is that of a widower; as in the story of Rangda, arrangements for his child’s marriage turn sour and precipitate his transformation into a sorcerer. Like Rangda, Basur is able to transform himself into non-human forms, and he has the ability to fly. He initiates his transformation by going to the graveyard, practising yoga, standing on one leg and reciting mantra. However, Basur is a rascal or mischief-maker rather than an embodiment of pure evil.8 Unlike Rangda, he is not particularly associated with problems of fertility and reproduction.9

The identification of witches with widows, with old women in general and with infertile women is tied up with complex notions of power (sakti). The sexual power of single women and widows cannot be controlled by regular sexual intercourse (regular ‘ploughing’). The bodies of women who are past child-bearing age, widowed or infertile are also not controlled by the regular occupation of their bodies by foetuses and the demands of hungry babies.

There are three aspects of the body of the married woman of child-bearing age which men are thought to control, and which men cannot control when a woman is single, widowed or childless. Lust or sexual desire (kama) is potentially rampant when there is no husband to regularly ‘pay attention’ to her. A woman’s sexual and reproductive organs are occupied when there is a husband and/or babies to service. Vital fluids flow and are lost, depleting the woman of sexual power when she is menstruating or nursing.

Another aspect of the Janus face of women’s reproductivity is that menstruation and childbirth are highly dangerous and polluting.10 Women may not go to market, make offerings or attend temples for at least three days each menstrual period. Most women stated that they cheat on the first proscription, for who would know, but obey the prohibition on entry to temples, offering prayers and offerings. The blood of menstruation and childbirth is very dangerous to men, even though it is considered life-producing. Many informants cited menstruation as the reason that women did not become priests, did not wear sacred masks and so on, though of course priests’ wives, who operate as priests, menstruate and give birth.

At these times a woman is sebel: she is vulnerable to attack from and attractive to evil spirits (buta-kala). A woman is, by nature, potentially in contact with chthonian forces of evil. Further, the deities or spiritual protectors may stay away because of her hot (panes, tenget) state. Thus, when sebel, a woman is both potentially vulnerable to danger and an agent of ambiguous power. As noted above, women are associated with the practice of pangawa (left-handed magic), both because of their reproductivity and frequent condition of sebel, and because of their easy access to the sorcerer’s means.
Balinese explanations of conception are typically context-contingent. Most commonly in Brassika the male line (*purusa*) was invoked to explain conception, but sometimes also informants acknowledged that both blood (*getih*) and semen (*yeh*) form the seed (*manik*). The womb is the place where the *manik* grows into a baby. It is the seat of the Panca Maha Bhuta, or Five Great Elementals: *pretiwi* (earth, human flesh, skin and bones), *apah* (water, blood and bodily fluids), *teja* (fire, metabolic heat), *bayu* (wind, breath) and *akasa* (ether, soul). *Akasa* is the essence of the other four from which they emerge and to which they return at the end of life, the soul returning to the sun (*Surya*), the source and repository of all life (Filloux 1991: 25, 275–280). Students of *pangiwa*, left-handed magic, learn to control the movement of these elementals and to draw them into and out of the body through the nine bodily orifices and extremities such as the tip of the nose and the elbows. The orifices of the body are important as openings in the boundary between the body and the world outside. Through these orifices, foreign material enters and is assimilated and transformed, and bodily fluids and excrement are externalized. The containment and closure of the body is a way of keeping the body strong and pure. An important male concern is the control and keeping closed of the opening to the womb.

The womb is also the womb for the Kanda Mpat, the ‘Four Siblings’, i.e. the amniotic fluid (*yeh anom*), the blood of childbirth (*rah* or *getih*), the vernix caseosa or umbilical cord (*banah* or *lamas*) and the placenta (*ari-ari* or *luhu*). After birth the Kanda Mpat are normally buried in the house-yard near the entrance to the new parents’ *meten* (sleeping quarters): the precious remnants of birth are placed in a hollowed-out coconut shell wrapped in white cloth along with various symbolic foods and spices and maybe some magical letters written upon a scrap of white cloth or a piece of palm-leaf (*pipil*). A cutting of *pandan* (pandanus) or large pebble marks the burial spot. At the time of burial the subtle aspects of the Kanda Mpat return to the four points of the compass, where they may be identified with the Panca Maha Bhuta. When the baby is 105 days old, the principal ceremony attached to birth is held (the *nelubulanin*, the three-month ceremony): this is a large social celebration of a successful birth and contrasts with the actual birth which is barely ritualized. After this, the Kanda Mpat return to the baby, and from then they normally live in the vital organs of the body until death. The Balinese have considerable feelings of affection for their elder sibling guardians and routinely make offerings to them at life-cycle ceremonies.

However, the Kanda Mpat are not just friendly, personal spirits. The texts make clear – texts with titles such as ‘The Beginning of the World’ – that the Kanda Mpat articulate the *buwana alit* (the microcosm of humankind, or the human body) and the *buwana agung* (the cosmos).
The salient in the many local treatises on the Kanda Mpat in Balinese literature is the extensive co-associations with which the Balinese love to play. The four elder siblings have deific names – Angapati, Mrajapati, Banaspati and Banaspati Raja – who are invoked when help or guardianship is required; they are equated with the four directions and gods – East (Isvara), South (Brahma), West (Mahadewa) and North (Visnu) –, with the colours, with parts of the human body (skin, sinews, flesh, bones) as well as with the organs which are their bodily abode (heart, liver, kidneys and bile), with sites of bodily entry and egress and so on. The four can easily become five when Ego is added, and so they correspond to the Five Great Elementals, the four directions plus centre, the Five Gods (Panca Dewata, the four above plus Siwa in the centre), the five syllables, the five senses and so on.

The principle power of the Kanda Mpat is their capacity to transform into one of these associated identities. If duly attended, fed and consulted, they become powerful protectors and benefactors, e.g. blood becomes the daughter of Rangda who becomes a tiger and who guards from the south; the umbilical cord becomes Banaspati Raja, a Barong who guards from the southeast, etc. However, if neglected, their jealousy or retribution can be terrible. They can then leave the body and live in the Pura Dalem or other adat temple, the household shrine or other ancestor temple. The power of sorcerers lies in their ability to see and manipulate their own Kanda Mpat, into and out of the fontanelle or other bodily aperture. The procedure for bringing them into existence (nadi or dadi) requires that the initiator is spiritually strong and ‘brave’, for one’s own spiritual siblings are terrifying beings. The procedure involves the selection of an auspicious day and several days of asceticism and abstinence. A strong sorcerer can wreak havoc with her/his own siblings under control, manipulating their ambivalent force in defence and attack.

It would be hard to overestimate the frequency of accusations and occurrences of suspected black magic and sorcery in Bali. In Brassika, almost everybody could be suspected of practising witchcraft: this meant that a high level of mutual suspicion pervaded many social interactions. The high level of suspicion worked against an easy, friendly social environment, and casual visiting, spontaneous gift-giving and presents of food were rare. Levels of suspicion varied: in some ways, strangers were less threatening than neighbours and family, but co-wives, at the other end of the scale, were extremely suspect and in my experience never visited one another.

Lovric has emphasized that witchcraft imagery and experiences in Bali are to be understood as expressing the symptomatology of disease, morbidity and fear of death. The content and epistemology of witchcraft encodes natural disorder and ‘the abnormal state of affairs to which the human condition is relentlessly subjected’ (Lovric 1987: 230).
Changing Birth Practices

The Balinese witch-sorcery complex clusters around such events as infertility, impotence, miscarriage, still-birth, sickness and death. Many of the hazards to life inherent in pregnancy and childbirth, and the realities of neo-natal and maternal deaths and high infant morbidity and mortality, are cast in the idiom of witchcraft. The witch is an envisagement of the dire possibilities which mitigate against normal birth, growing up, reproducing and growing old. (Lovric 1987: 246)

Sorcery often has a sexual and erotic form of expression in Bali: a not unusual vision reported by men is the seductive and beautiful young woman with long, flowing hair, who, on the reverse side, is a frightful ogre of organs and innards. This vision can appear as a succubus during sleep and even when walking along a road at night.

Lovric’s and my case studies also reveal considerable support for the argument, familiar from studies of witchcraft in Europe, that witches are often economically successful individuals or the misfits in society. Lovric provides the example of the unmarried, childless, middle-aged woman who was known as a witch (ibid: 240). In Brassika, accusations of sorcery were common and not always connected with women or with reproduction. The following incident, however, is typical with regard to the actors involved, the action and the suspected intent.

In 1992, Ibu Ayu, a primary school teacher, was understandably worried about her new son’s survival. She had borne a girl, then two babies had died, and now this boy was vulnerable. She had had an unusual post-partum period, with diarrhoea and now incessant weeping, and she didn’t seem to have any milk. Ibu Ayu had just found a black hair and a black eyelash in the top of a newly opened can of powdered milk formula for her baby, and suspected her sister-in-law, Ni Ketut Rasmi, of ‘left-handed’ magic (pangiwa).

Ketut Rasmi was arguably the most economically successful woman in the village: she ran the only real shop (at which the milk formula had been bought), and as PSM had been very active in implementing development projects in the village – a lucrative activity. Ketut’s husband was the older brother, I Wayan Semadi, and he headed the houseyard. Ketut had three children, a boy and two girls. She married into her husband’s descent group from an ambitious but poor family. She was often suspected of witchcraft.

Ibu Ayu, the troubled new mother, had married the younger brother, her first cousin, endogamously, two years previously. The older brother was a primary school teacher; the younger brother was better educated, had a Master’s degree and was a secondary school teacher. Ibu Ayu was the daughter of the respected first teacher (now headmaster) in the village. This family was one that was tragically divided and massacred after Gestapu and implicated in the Kalki affair (supra).
This accusation of witchcraft was partly a battle between low-caste women with contrasting claims to high status and family rights: conflict between in-marrying and endogamous wives, differences in values between educated and poorly educated families and between professional and labouring families, fraternal strife over inheritance rights and the problem of the continuity and purity of the patriline. In Bali, the anthropological literature maintains that in low-caste families the youngest son inherits, and that in high-caste families the oldest son inherits. However, in real-life Brassika, many oldest sons of low caste inherit.18 In this case, the father of the two brothers was killed as a Communist supporter in 1965, so the oldest son took over the family as soon as he was old enough, even though not yet married, and worked the 0.3 ha *sawah* belonging to his dead father. He supported his younger brother through university. As things stood before this birth, Ketut’s son would probably have inherited. Now, given Ibu Ayu’s purity of kin line and the brothers’ conflict, the matter of inheritance was a hot issue.

The incident also involved ‘Gung Biyang, the high-caste midwife. ‘Gung Biyang had officiated at the birth, as she did in 1992 for most births in the village. She was, of course, a prime suspect for witchcraft because she had access to the means (amniotic fluid, blood, etc.) and the opportunity (alone with the birthing mother, entrance to the home in post-natal bathing and checks). In the case of Ibu Ayu, she had been ideally placed to practise witchcraft: Ibu Ayu’s milk supply had been low so ‘Gung Biyang had bought a bottle, teats and two tins of formula, wrapped them up and sent her daughter with them to Ibu Ayu. Like Ketut, ‘Gung Biyang was often accused of witchcraft, and villagers often warned me of her skills.

This was a contest over successful reproduction between three of the most highly placed women in the village, couched in terms of the fearsome potential power of women as witches. Lovric has emphasized that witchcraft in Bali is a ‘domestic nightmare’ related to

rivalries, jealousy and envy within families and among designated ‘inequals’. These, together with inheritance disputes and indebtedness, are perhaps the negative aspects of an extended family pattern of living, overcrowdedness and a lack of privacy. (Lovric 1987: 242)

**CHILDBIRTH PRACTICES IN BRASSIKA**

When I began fieldwork in Brassika, three registered traditional village midwives had just attended a short training course in the use of clean instruments and hands for the delivery of babies.19 The utilization of traditional birth attendants (TBAs) was an important element in the government’s primary health care system. The Ministry of Health boasted that
Indonesia is one of the first countries to integrate traditional birth attendants into the modern health care system and to train them as family planning motivators.

At present there are about 97,362 TBAs in this country who attend 80–90 percent of all births... They not only deliver babies but also assist women during prenatal periods, give advice on child care, infertility and play important ritual and religious role[s]. (Ministry of Health 1990: 6)

It is an integration which has not been without its problems (Grace 1992; Sciortino 1996; Slamet-Velsink 1996), and indeed some have questioned if there has been any integration (Sciortino 1995: 233; Hull 1990: 6). Maternal mortality rates in Indonesia remain high by Asian standards, and extremely high by Southeast Asian standards. The rates for Bali are well above the Indonesian average. In Brassika, as in the rest of Indonesia, the use of TBAs has continued but is unmeasurable. Because TBAs generally do not keep written records, the statistics on patronage of TBAs, as well as on infant and maternal mortality associated with their utilization, are unknown.

The strong presence of men in the traditional practice of midwifery in Bali is noteworthy. Connor suggested that ‘a large minority, perhaps even half of the traditional midwives in Bali are male’ (1983: 68), though statistics are inadequate. Worldwide there are few societies which tolerate intervention by male midwives, except, of course, Western bio-medicine with its highly trained, highly paid, male obstetricians. The reasons for this partial male occupation of what is usually the domain of older, experienced mothers are complex. They include the male domination of healing generally and the association of women with sorcery.

In 1980, most births in Brassika occurred in the woman’s marital quarters in her husband’s natal house-compound. During labour, the woman typically sat on a low stool or mat and was supported by her husband or other attendants such as a female neighbour, children or female affines. There was considerable ambivalence among mothers towards TBAs. Traditional midwives, by all accounts, usually adopted a ‘hands off’ approach, often remaining outside the building, perhaps bringing herbal or bark drinks (loloh), or oil to make the passage more slippery and hasten birth. Several times women reported that traditional male midwives were ‘takut’ or afraid. Many women reported that they felt uncomfortable being physically exposed to view, particularly to male TBAs, in their in-laws’ compound. Some, especially those who were reporting first births as young newlyweds, felt isolated and helpless among their affines: they were dependent upon their in-laws’ goodwill and generosity in seeking help if problems arose. One woman felt totally alone: she had married into her husband’s Brassika family from north Bali and was quite
supported by family or close friends. However, there was a strong feeling that women should not return to their natal home to give birth.

By 1992, childbirth practices had changed dramatically. Even though the medicalization of birth that had occurred in Brassika over the past 12 years was part of a worldwide trend, birth remained a mysterious and charged event that was managed and interpreted in culturally distinct ways.

By 1992, most births in Brassika occurred in the private clinic owned and run by 'Gung Biyang. It was possible for her to accept labouring women at the government sub-clinic across the road from her private clinic and the Puri. The government sub-clinic was equipped with a delivery bed, complete with stirrups, in a separate obstetrics room, but it was rarely, if ever, used. As with her normal nursing practice, villagers preferred to see her in her non-official capacity and in a non-government site, and it was easier for her to receive and nurse patients 24 hours a day at her home-based clinic. The women I asked about their choice of site and care during childbirth considered that it was more modern dan bersih (modern and clean), patut (appropriate) and maju (progressive) to have their babies delivered in the clinic than at home. Although to me the clinic was neither clean, light nor cheery, they preferred it to home – they said they could rest and be well looked after, it was private and clean, and they felt that 'Gung Biyang was more knowledgeable and expert than the balian. A couple of women whom I asked about 'Gung Biyang’s reputation for sorcery fended off the insinuation by saying that she wouldn’t dare to practise black magic in a proper modern practice – it would be very obvious in the clinic documentation if all the patients died! As for why ’Gung Biyang’s private practice attracted many times more patients than her official government practice, the usual response was that her private clinic was open at times when the patients could come (i.e. particularly in the afternoons and evenings); although not cheaper, it was not expensive and payment was flexible; and she had a greater range of medicines than the government clinic.24

The tension between new wives and their mothers-in-law was partly avoided when women chose the clinic as the site for birth. After the birth of a first child, the status of the new parents changed dramatically, from dependent, albeit grown-up, children they became adults with full citizenship rights in the village: they were treated as mature adults whereas before they were ‘not yet Balinese’ or ‘uncivilized’ (dereng wong Bali /durung manusa); they entered the desa adat as a new independent unit, and had voting rights in the banjar; and if the husband were the oldest son, he became the head of the house-compound. The daughter-in-law’s position in the family changed instantly with the birth of her first child: from virtual domestic slave to her mother-in-law she became a respected mother, the marriage was virtually set in stone and she was partner to a village citizen. The older couple could now retire gracefully from public life.
'Gung Biyang worked in the government sub-clinic (Puskesmas Pembantu) at the base of the kecamatan government health hierarchy. At the apex of the hierarchy was a young male doctor, a non-local Balinese who lived in the nearby town. He made monthly visits to each banjar in a shiny, new white van with a red cross, accompanied by a retinue of uniformed female nurses. Usually these visits were coordinated with the routine monthly weighings and vaccinations for young children. I attended several of these monthly visits, and once timed the doctor’s sessions with patients, unbeknownst to him. Almost all interactions lasted less than 30 seconds, usually 6–10 seconds, long enough only to establish that a patient was 'hot' or had diarrhoea.

In addition to these monthly visits, 'Gung Biyang had regular days at the village sub-clinic set aside for family planning (Mondays and Thursdays), and conducted pregnancy checks and administered tetanus toxoid injections for pregnant women. She kept tabs on the reproductive status of all women in the village and had an intimate knowledge of village women’s health. She avoided making house calls – they were inconvenient, transport was a problem, and she was well aware that she was suspected of sorcery – but she was quite flexible with payment when poor people consulted her in her private practice. Villagers from banjar Kidikan and Anjingan were under-represented among her clientele: she disapproved of their scavenging adat and regarded them as undesirable and (magically) dangerous.

The sections of the population most often covered by the health care net were children and married women of child-bearing age. Men and older people were comparatively neglected by the system – it was a system oriented towards producing a healthy future population. While the system worked well for some aspects of women’s and children’s health – for instance, mass immunization – the production-line techniques were not suitable for other aspects such as contraception, birth and gynaecological problems.

The pyramid of health services was typical of many state instrumentalities in Indonesia, with a male, non-local head and lower functionaries of both sexes, often non-locals. Although some feminists have argued that the state is a male institution (e.g. MacKinnon 1982 and 1983), it is pertinent to note that Balinese villagers, especially women, often interacted with a female representative of the state in the person of nurses and midwives, though it is obvious that their bosses were men. In modern Bali, women, especially women of higher caste and class status, dominated the ranks of nurses and midwives, partly because service occupations were thought to be suitable for women and partly because it was the high-caste women who had had access to the comparatively long years of training (12–15 years of education). Their physical contact with polluting bodily wastes did not preclude them from following nursing occupations; in fact, this pollution was never mentioned.
Women in labour arrived at 'Gung Biyang’s private clinic at any time of night or day. The clinic was housed in a three-room extension of the Puri, one in a line of shop booths on the main bitumen road, across the road from the government sub-clinic. One room was a waiting room, another the dispensary and the third room was the delivery room, through which there was access to a tap and cistern. Village women gave birth on a simple, metal-framed bed in this dark and rather dank delivery room. Commonly, a new mother stayed here for one night after the birth. For this accommodation and the delivery 'Gung Biyang usually charged Rp. 15,000 (at that time, AUD$10.00). For the actual delivery, the birthing woman, her husband and 'Gung Biyang herself were the only people that 'Gung Biyang allowed to be present – often only the two women were there. It was often said, by 'Gung Biyang, fathers and mothers alike, that husbands did not dare (sing bani, tidak berani) to attend.

'Gung Biyang’s routine preparation consisted of fetching a couple of buckets of water, pocketing a tube for sucking out the baby’s airways, placing a stainless steel basin under the bed (for the afterbirth), setting out a towel, blanket, long gauze bandage with strings at the corners (for tying around the baby’s waist), a swab of gauze on the bottle of Betadine (antiseptic), clamps, a bottle of oil, scissors, foetoscope, baby bath and rubber gloves.

Usually the woman laboured and delivered the baby lying on her back, wearing a bra and with her kain (skirt cloth) lying loosely around her. The loosening of clothing was always a precursor to the birth, both in hospitals and in the village clinic. This practice probably derived from a Balinese medical theory of the body which aimed to facilitate the flow of vital life forces and fluids through the channels of the body – hence the importance of massage and the concern with orifices.

At 'Gung Biyang’s clinic, the husband often sat by his wife on the bed as they awaited the birth. First-time parents were sometimes embarrassed; one woman resisted 'Gung Biyang’s attempts to examine her internally. ’Gung Biyang tried not to leave the labouring woman alone and she was very encouraging to labouring women, saying ’Sakit?’ (does it hurt?) as she monitored the contractions and, in the second stage of labour, she was gentle, encouraging and matter-of-fact, saying mostly, ’Terus, terus’ (keep going, keep going) or ’Duweg’ (clever girl). She did not usually administer oxytocic drugs to precipitate the birth or the delivery of the placenta, because, she said, the baby might come too quickly and tear the woman. She routinely oiled and massaged the genital area and eased the baby’s head and shoulders through the passage. Throughout the birth, women were usually quiet and docile, grimacing with the contractions, sometimes asking how much longer or requesting drinking water or to change positions. Some women cried, most pulled on the bedposts with raised arms. Some women were vocal with the pain – one woman was sheepish and malu (embarrassed) because of it.
Changing Birth Practices

After the birth, ‘Gung Biyang oiled and wiped the baby. She clamped, cut and tied the umbilical cord. She weighed and bathed the baby, wrapped the umbilical stub in the disinfected gauze bandage, then she dressed the baby and wrapped it in a blanket. Sometimes she handed the baby to another woman — often the new mother’s mother- or sister-in-law. She swabbed the mother, swaddled and dressed her. The father took the bloodied kain and towel, and carried home the basin containing the placenta and umbilicus, blood and amniotic waters which ‘Gung Biyang had swished off the vinyl-covered bed.

The mother and father did not usually have the chance to look at or hold their new baby for some time. The time after birth was generally relaxed, quiet and happy. If the baby were a boy, there was often more obvious joy than if it were a girl: during the father’s homecoming there was more joking and celebration both in the street, where passers-by in the know asked the outcome, and in the houseyard. The woman who had resisted internal examination was apologetic and expressed disappointment because her first child was a daughter. She was the second wife of an older man whose first wife had had no children. After the birth, ‘Gung Biyang advised her not to use family planning, commenting to me ironically that she was supposed to be the village adviser (pembimbing) on family planning!

STATE HOSPITAL BIRTHS

Some women with probable problem births that had been identified early, and some well-educated women, planned to give birth in hospital, even as far away as Denpasar, about 40 km distant. Emergency births were sometimes transferred to the nearest hospital, 12 km away. Hospital births were unusual for village women, but it seems likely that they will become more common. Here I am discussing women’s experience of birth in a government district hospital.

When hospital and higher-echelon health workers talked about, and even to, village people, one of the themes was dirtiness. For instance, when the kecamatan doctor visited a banjar he told me, in the hearing of patients, who had, after all, presented themselves to him for treatment, ‘These people are dirty. They don’t know (tidak tahu), they are not yet aware (belum sadar) of progress and cleanliness.’

One woman who arrived at hospital to give birth, in extremis, was roundly criticized by nurses and midwives for not having cleaned herself after her waters had broken the previous day, and yet none of the staff cleaned her or showed her or her husband where they could get water. The woman was shunned because, the nurses said, she stank. This theme of dirt, poor personal hygiene and bad smell was not evident in ‘Gung Biyang’s treatment of village women.
The more glaring aspects of hospital treatment of birthing women were the physical roughness, apparent lack of compassion and inattention to the women’s pain, discomfort and desires. Staff ordered women to lie down and put their legs up in stirrups. Women had to give birth in this position, even if they protested. Staff made all decisions about treatment, interventions, timing and dosages, for example, of antibiotics, vitamins and oxytocin. Episiotomies were routine for first births. No one other than staff and birthing women was allowed in the labour ward ‘in order to keep everything sterile and so as not to disturb the functionaries’. Of course, the birthing environment was a long way from sterile: the flies could be rather thick, and dropped instruments were reused. Some nurses would loosen a woman’s clothing, help her manage her hair or assist with sitting up to eat or drink, but generally, women in labour were left alone, were not engaged in conversation and were not consulted about action that might help them during sometimes long periods of labour. I have listened to nurses shouting at labouring women, castigating them for taking so long, for not lying down, for putting their legs up and for not trying. I have witnessed nurses twisting hands and legs into the required position, slapping, poking, scraping, parting and roughly swabbing women.

Ex-hospital village patients complained about their harsh (keras) treatment at the hands of hospital staff and vowed not to return. In contrast, one hospital patient who had had two children by planned Caesarean section expressed satisfaction with the treatment. One reason for this difference was, no doubt, this woman’s known high social status. Another educated, high-satria woman who had lost a baby when about 30 weeks pregnant blamed the hospital staff for incompetence and procrastination – charges that ill-educated village women would not be in a position to make.

After a hospital birth, and after the baby had been dressed and the mother swabbed and dressed, the mother moved to a normal bed, the husband came in and the staff placed the baby next to the mother on the bed. Most couples spent a gentle, quiet half-hour or more alone with the new baby before the father took the plastic bag containing the afterbirth – the contents of the bucket under the bed – home for burial.

The staffing pyramid at the hospital resembled the kecamatan health hierarchy, revealing the privileging of certain groups within the state and the complex operation of power, access to education and jobs. Privileges of gender, ethnicity and caste status intersected: a Javanese male doctor was the kabupaten doctor (the previous incumbent was a local Cokorda); the matron was a brahmana woman; and many of the nurses and midwives were of satria caste.

One reason for the hospital staff’s perception of the dirtiness and ignorance of village women is that the majority were sent to hospital because their condition was such that local midwives such as ‘Gung Biyang were afraid to treat them. They were the emergency cases, such as the
woman whose amniotic sac had broken the previous day. One distraught couple came to 'Gung Biyang’s private clinic one day with a terribly ill baby, more than 35 days old. The mother said a child had given the baby a banana – standard food for a baby that cries a lot, and a common cause of gut obstruction and death in infants. 'Gung Biyang told them to go to the doctor at the clinic. The doctor told them to go to hospital. Afterwards, 'Gung Biyang said that she was very worried, that she was not willing to take responsibility for giving it an injection or taking any action because it was their only boy – they already had two girls – and that was why she had offered no information or opinion, just told them to go straight to the doctor. Later she went to the hospital. She was worried that she would be blamed for the death and thought that if she went to hospital it would mean that the couple would be 'big-hearted' towards her. Similarly with problem births – the hospital staff may have been rough or impatient with parturient women because they were left with the high-risk cases; they knew they would bear responsibility and so shifted their own fear of blame onto the cause as they saw it: the labouring woman. Sometimes they also blamed the village midwife for delays in referrals and arrival at hospital, for not having cleaned the parturient woman or for her critical condition.

When I undertook content analysis of school textbooks some years ago, I was puzzled by the frequency of the appearance of the word ‘bersih’ (clean) (Parker 1992b: 58). In the set of Moral Pancasila Education textbooks that I studied, ‘bersih’ was one of the most frequently occurring key words, surpassing in frequency important words such as negara (state), bangsa (nation) and rajin (industrious). In primary school texts, citizens were forever cleaning – not only as individuals cleaning rooms, houses and streets but also as communities collectively cleaning villages. There were even movements (gerakan) and competitions (lomba) for cleaning the village to celebrate Proclamation Day. Similarly, everywhere in Bali – in schoolyards, hospital grounds and in the streets – one of the many government slogans was the acronym ‘BALI’:

B – bersih (clean)
A – aman (safe)
L – lestari (eternal)
I – indah (beautiful)

This was an advertisement exhorting the Balinese to live up to an image of Bali that was thought to appeal to tourists.

After studying childbirth and some other aspects of health services, I no longer find these exhortations for cleanliness puzzling. Just as high priests separate purity and impurity, the contemporary nation-state appropriates the language of hygiene to separate progressive from backward, those who know from those who do not, the good citizen from the errant. The govern-
ment’s construction of its self-image in textbooks is also the setting of goals for students: in the future, they will want to live in clean, modern homes with rubbish bins and garbage disposal services; the streets should be clean like those in Singapore; old people will no longer stain the ground with their red betel gobs; and women will no longer give birth in their father-in-law’s houseyard.

It is not stretching the point to link the ideal of a clean and modern Indonesia with the ideal of a clean and ideologically pure Indonesia. Retrospective explanations for the 1965–66 massacres, upon which the New Order was founded, were imbued with the idea of cleansing (membersihkan) the village and indeed the nation of the moral pollution of Communism (supra). These were not unique to Brassika, or to Bali – they pervade the short stories of the period and the government discourse about the ‘latent danger’ of Communism, which of course legitimated the mobilization of laws against subversion, arrests of undesirable elements without trial and so on. ‘Cleanliness’ was thus conflated with modernity, loyalty to the Suharto regime and Indonesian-ness.

Unexpectedly, the key Balinese ritual of childbirth survived the move away from home towards hospital and hygienic rationality. The contents of the bucket under the bed – the embodied Kanda Mpat – were still carefully wrapped and tended, taken home and buried with due ceremony. It might seem a small point, but given the dogged fight of the Balinese to keep their religion and to have it registered as one of the five acknowledged religions (agama) in Indonesia, the respect allowed the Kanda Mpat is significant. The hospital staff in Balinese hospitals – even the Javanese Moslem doctors – did not attempt to rid the Balinese of their ‘backward’ beliefs. Perhaps the ‘special place’ occupied by Balinese culture within Indonesia combined with a continuing, if unofficial, pan-Indonesian belief in a host of spirits and jinns.25

Perhaps also, the religiosity of Indonesian ‘national culture’ – enshrined in the first principle of Pancasila, essentialized in New Order propaganda against Communism and indoctrinated through endless lessons in religious tolerance – disallowed the dismantling of this particular local tradition.

Obstetric practices in Bali changed substantially between 1980 and 1992. It was as mothers that women were drawn into the net of government health care and its accompanying ideology. According to this ideology, women as wives, housekeepers, mothers, child-bearers and, finally, as citizens, were responsible for family health and welfare. Government rhetoric stated that the improvement in family welfare was dependent upon a process of moving the mass of ordinary people from ‘traditional and static to a rational and dynamic way of thinking’ (Republic of Indonesia, 1977 quoted in Sullivan 1983: 168). In real life, such rhetoric was transformed into the speeches of the powerful, when hospital staff castigated and
blamed labouring village women for endangering themselves and their families for feeding their children the wrong food or for being late, slow or dirty in the labour of childbirth.

In moving towards a ‘rational and dynamic way of thinking’, and to so-called modern and progressive sites for giving birth, particularly hospitals, Balinese village women were subjecting themselves to sometimes considerable vilification as dirty, old-fashioned and ignorant. Hospital staff only acknowledged as modern and enlightened those higher-class women who submitted docilely and in good time to a planned birth by Caesarean section. In village clinics, where midwives and clients were mutually dependent for service, were often known to each other in other contexts and had to operate within a moral community, village women were more likely to be encouraged than rebuked during childbirth. Like hospital staff, village midwives did not want to be blamed when things went wrong, but they were also concerned to appear supportive and ‘big-hearted’ to their patients.

The delivery of a baby in hospital was often the first moment at which Balinese women were drawn into the ambit of the state and its health care system. The experience of birth in hospital was for village women often the most radically modern action they had taken: they had physically removed themselves from their known world; they were isolated from all known people; they did not know where to get food and water or how to relieve themselves; and all this at a time of physical distress and emotional turmoil. It came as a rude shock to be rendered the object of scorn and abuse, when at other times and places the modern mother was the object of veneration.

Ironically, it was at this moment, when women came into their own and surrendered themselves and their most valuable capability, ‘The Most Female Function of All: Giving Birth’, that they were devalued and denigrated by the state. It was no wonder that village women, for the time being at least, voted with their feet and patronized the local, modern alternative: the village midwife.

NOTES

2. As Kristeva wrote:

   If it is not possible to say of a woman what she is (without running the risk of abolishing her difference), would it perhaps be different concerning the mother, since that is the only function of the other sex to which we can definitely attribute existence? (Kristeva 1986: 161).

3. Balinese paintings of hell invariably include pictures of infertile women suckling caterpillars or enormous insects (e.g. Hinzler 1986 and 1987; Hunter 1988; Pucci 1992). The Balinese paintings of the late 1930s collected by Mead and Bateson and reproduced in Geertz 1994 show the preoccupation of the Balinese with magical power (sakti) and sorcery. The dominance of the female figure in scenes of sorcery, infant mortality, abnormal reproduction and threats of witchcraft to children is
striking. There are pictorial narratives of female leak (witches, witch deities, evil spirits, sorcerers) eating stillborn babies, the transformation of both women and men into Rangda, a meeting of leak witnessed by a village headman who recognized his own wife as the head of the coven, and leak fighting over the corpse of a baby in a grave. (See plates, stories and captions on pp. 10, 20, 64, 69, 71, 72–73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 87, 88 and 96.)

4. The most memorable appearances of Rangda are in the dramatic Calonarang dance-play, an exorcism of leak, witches. The play climaxes when massed men, and formerly women, attack her with kris and she reverses the power so that they turn their kris on themselves. Then the Barong, a male, dragon-like figure, counters her magic with his own, hardening the skin of the chests of her entranced attackers so that despite their frenzied efforts, the kris points do not penetrate. Rangda collapses, her power contained but never destroyed, and the Barong departs.

The dramatization is supposed to be based upon an historical figure, a widow-queen. Belo reported that she is Queen Mahendradatta, mother of King Airlangga, the Balinese prince who became King of Java in 1019 (1949: 18). Others report her as the widow Calon Arang of Girah (also known as Jirah or Dirah). The following summary is based upon that in Hooykaas (1978: 16–18).

The widow had a beautiful daughter who was of marriageable age, but because of the widow’s reputation for her knowledge of sorcery, there were no suitors for her daughter’s hand. Furious, the widow took her pustaka, a book of magic invocations, and, dancing with her entourage of half a dozen young women (trainee witches) in a graveyard, asked the goddess Durga for permission and power to ruin the country and its people. Durga agreed but requested moderation. Calon Arang and her entourage danced at the crossroads at midnight and shortly afterwards people everywhere fell victim to a contagious illness. Many died. The king sent soldiers to kill her, but she spewed forth fire from her eyes, nostrils, ears and mouth, killing the soldiers. The widow was incensed, and, with her pustaka and followers, she went to the graveyard again. Foreswearing moderation, she danced upon and desecrated the interred bodies, thus pleasing Durga. Widespread destruction followed.

The king called upon the assistance of Mpu Bharada, who devised a stratagem. His pupil, Mpu Bahula, asked for the widow’s daughter in marriage. After some time, this son-in-law managed to get his wife to give him Calon Arang’s pustaka. He gave the book to his guru, Mpu Bharada, who then had the power to control life and death. He managed to resurrect the victims of the widow who had not yet decomposed, and he conquered the widow and then revived her, exorcizing and liberating her soul.

5. A continuing puzzle is the fact that some scholarly sources, such as Mershon (1971) and Weck (1976 [1937]), and some of my informants, state that the umbilical cord is one of the siblings; some of my informants state that the vernix caseosa is intended. Hooykaas also notes this conflict (1974: 8n).

6. The link between witches and failed reproduction is vividly portrayed in Mead and Bateson’s 1951 film, ‘Trance and Dance in Bali’, which uses material shot in 1937–1939. Beautiful young maidens appearing at the beginning of the Calonarang performance are transformed into little novice witches. They steal a newborn baby (contributed by Mead in the form of a doll) from a labouring mother (the part is played by a man) and take delight in tossing it from one to another.

7. The title is H. Geertz’s (1994: 59). Hooykaas notes that,

She [Rangda] surpasses Basur by far as to the number of her victims, the seriousness of their afflictions and the duration of her tyranny, which lasted for weeks if not months. (1978: 16)

8. He is the subject of a dance-drama, one of the Arja genre, but the story line differs from the one given here (see de Zoete and Spies 1973). The story of Basur, as compiled by Hooykaas from Balinese poems, is as follows.

A widower, Nyoman Karang, had two marriageable daughters, Sokasti (often Sukanti) and Rijasa. The father was full of wisdom about the institution of marriage
and the properties of a good wife, and told his daughters how their mother had died at the hands of a sorcerer. Mid-stream, an ugly and bragging villager, Basur, came to request the hand of Sokasti in marriage for his unattractive and uncouth elder son, Tigaron. The father said that the daughter must be consulted. Their conversation was interrupted by the arrival of an uncle, proposing marriage between his son, the handsome Tirtha, and Sokasti. Sokasti made it plain that she preferred the latter proposal (cousin marriage). Basur was miffed and after dark went to the graveyard where he made offerings to Durga, practised yoga and recited mantra. He was transformed into a léak and flew to the tree outside Sokasti’s bedroom. Sokasti became mortally ill. Her father recited mantra and neighbours helped in vain. Their aging, faithful balian was asked to help and, by reciting mantra, he restored Sokasti to consciousness. Another bragging balian arrived uninvited and asked for exorbitant fees to cure the girl. Even Basur considered him a charlatan and, from his vantage spot in the tree, caused the imposter to be struck down with an incapacitating bout of diarrhoea. He was discredited and ridiculed by the villagers. Sokasti, very weak, but recovering, thanked the old balian who stated that Basur was to blame. He instructed Basur that in future he should only punish evil-doers.

Another version appears in the series of six pictures by Ida Bagus Putu Blatjok, with the story told by the painter, in Geertz 1994: 59–61.

9. H. Geertz makes the comment that ‘femininity is not central to the idea [i.e. of Rangda], since a male sorcerer on a violent rampage may take the shape of a rangda’ (1994: 16). To me, the transformation from male sex to female sex is exactly the point; Rangda is always depicted with pendulous breasts. The figure of Rangda makes a wonderfully rich symbol: she expresses the complexity and interconnectedness of female sexuality and fertility, the power of women, male respect for and fear of women, as well as the potent possibilities of failed fertility.

10. The pollution attendant upon childbirth is principally carried by the parturient woman. The midwife, husband and other attendants seem not to have their mobility restricted after birth – a sign that they are not considered polluted. In women’s birth stories to me, as in the account by Mershon (1971), the discourse was mainly one of ritual danger rather than spiritual pollution but the restrictions on mobility for the new mother and child suggest that the two were intertwined and perhaps should not be artificially delineated by scholars.

11. In conversations about descent groups, ancestors, inheritance claims or the custody of children after a divorce, for instance, informants cited the purusa (penis, patriline or male principle). Caste differences between people were often expressed in terms of yeh (water or semen, which flows only downwards); men should only marry endogamously or with women who are ‘lower’ by virtue of genealogical position, caste and age. However, in situations in which babies, pregnancy or birth were imminent, informants usually stated that the foetus grows from the union of two fecund fluids, getih (blood) and yeh (semen), or, more specifically, from the manik (seed, germ, life-giving essence) of both man and woman. Some informants acknowledged the contradiction in the idea of an ancestral line and essence traced through males and the notion that the woman contributes manik from her womb too. In other contexts, informants declared that the female blood was irrelevant. In genealogies of people in Brassika, the women were not written in, but in fact the identity and caste status of mothers in polygynous marriages was of critical importance.

12. For instance, Balinese women have to keep their knees jammed together when wearing traditional dress; they must sit decorously with their legs to one side; they must sit side-saddle when riding pillion on motorbikes; women must never climb trees. There is also the concern to keep the genitals lower than the head: one must never walk underneath washing lines containing underpants; one must not rest one’s head on a pillow on which one has been sitting, etc. (though these latter apply equally to male genitalia as to female genitalia).

13. Hooykaas notes that ‘the concept of Kanda Mpat appears to be confined to jagat Bali, the world of Bali’ (1974: 98), but there is some evidence that belief in spiritual,
birth-siblings is pan-Indonesian (e.g. Barraud 1990: 229, n. 10).

There is a small body of work on the Kanda Mpat in Bali. In English see Eiseman 1990 and Hooykaas 1974 for a narrative compilation and various lists of the co-associations gleaned from local manuscripts, priestly litanies and the findings of Weck, the Chief Medical Officer in Bali in the 1930s. Mershon notes the importance of the Kanda Mpat continually in her work on life-cycle rituals (1971).

14. Before eating, many people put aside a small portion of rice for their siblings; before she begins breast-feeding, a new mother expresses a few drops of breast milk onto the ground to feed the new baby’s Kanda Mpat; before embarking upon a difficult feat, or even before jumping into a river to bathe, children may address their elder siblings, sometimes just attending to them and sometimes asking for help or protection.

15. They are equated with the first sons of the Primordial Being – Kusika, Garga, Metri and Kurusa – who were ordered to create the world but failed to. A fifth son, Pratanjala, learnt some mantras and created the world. The four asked forgiveness and became Isvara, Brahma, Mahadewa and Visnu.


17. Most common are stories of Balinese sightings of floating lights and flying disembodied limbs. I have heard of riderless motorbikes and even a helicopter vision. Witches are reputed to gather at graveyards to test each other’s power in competitions (Lovric 1987: 292) and I witnessed a trance healing session when the invisible power of one healer (balian) sent another healer crashing across the room as though struck by a bolt of electricity. When I first arrived, my abrupt introduction to this phenomenon was a photograph of a recently murdered man prone amongst some bushes. His body had been slashed in four-pronged stripes, as though by a small weeding fork. I was told that he had been attacked by a budi, and that no other murderer had been found by the police. Whenever people experienced misfortune such as illness or falling off a motorbike, they immediately jumped to the conclusion that someone ‘had it in for them’. They cast around for the perpetrator in two directions: they tried to imagine who might have felt jealous (iri hati), envious or hurt, and they tried to reconstruct recent events to work out who had had access to them or their houseyard and thus been able to plant the potent object which had triggered the misfortune. This may have been an amulet, a scrap of paper containing a magic drawing or magic letters (aksara), or a personal remnant such as hair or nail clippings planted in the entranceway of the houseyard or indeed anywhere around the house.


19. One of them, I Nyoman from banjar Siangan, was commonly called a balian (healer) or tukang urut (masseur); his practice consisted of bone-setting, massage, midwifery and a variety of other interventions including the manipulation of a foetus to turn it head-down. Other traditional village midwives that I came upon in Brassika during the course of my intermittent fieldwork included two lower satria-caste women (Sang– and Desak–, both of whom underwent a short course at the Puskesmas or subdistrict clinic), and three jaba men (who were unregistered and completely untrained in biomedical midwifery).

20. In Indonesia the accepted rate (accepted, but with all sorts of caveats regarding the reliability of the statistics) is 450 deaths per 100,000 live births. For example, Smyth (1996: 132) accepts 450 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births and USAID (1998) quotes this figure. However, WHO/UNICEF (1990) reports maternal mortality rates of 650/100,000 live births for Indonesia in 1990. The average for Asia is 420, for Singapore 45, Malaysia 69, Thailand 100 and the Philippines 162 (various sources quoted in Smyth 1996: 132). The figure for Bali is 780, but this is probably too high. See Parker In press b, n. 5.

22. Connor suggested some reasons (1983: 68). Men dominate all healing in Bali (balian in general); the practice of Sang Nyoman suggests that a balian may include midwifery as one aspect in conjunction with a range of other healing practices. Attendance at home births requires travelling outside at night, a practice which transgresses protocols of propriety for women. Men are thought to be stronger than women in warding off attacks by evil spirits (leak), both en route to and during the birth, an event which is thought to attract leak. As noted above, midwives are very vulnerable to accusations of sorcery, principally because of their access to the means of sorcery and the food of leak – i.e. the Four Siblings (Kanda Mpat) that accompany the newborn as the afterbirth. The Four Siblings are ambivalent: as the Guardian Spirits, if nourished and tended they protect the newborn, but they can also attract evil-doers and if neglected or abused may even mutate into predators of the baby. It seems likely that men dominate traditional midwifery practice in Bali because of the belief that women are more strongly associated with sorcery than men, and because the principal tools of the trade become available at births. In some accounts (such as Mershon 1971) it is implied that the expertise of the midwife is to take upon him/herself the management of the wastes of childbirth.

23. I did not witness any of these home births.

24. It seemed to me that ‘Gung Biyang purposely arranged things so that this was so.

25. This claim is difficult to substantiate. Spirit belief is, of course, well documented for particular societies in Indonesia and documented as co-existing with the Great Tradition of Islam in many societies and groups in society, e.g. among the abangan and priyayi in Java (Geertz 1960), but I am thinking here in particular of the ubiquitous spirits and jinns creating havoc and enabling heroes to perform supernatural feats in Indonesian action movies.
SECTION V

Schooling the Child Citizen
CHAPTER 9

The Introduction of Schooling

The last generation of anthropology has been characterized by the study of culture. Beginning in the 1960s, anthropologists explored culture as a ‘system of shared meanings’ (Geertz 1973: 3–30) and ‘a forest of symbols’ (Turner 1967), in particular examining the symbolic and ritual structures of societies and their functional coherence. However, attention to the problems of access to the structures of power and questions about social agency and resistance, combined with the anarchic effects of post-structural theory, increasingly caused researchers to regard culture as the outcome of social practice which could not be read as coherent ‘constructions’. The production and reproduction of shared meanings – the work of making culture – has come to be regarded as a problematic and contested process, or historically specific processes, rather than a single, automatic or hegemonic imposition. This shift has initiated the consideration of nation-states as cultural products and of nationalism as a cultural process of collective identity formation. Social scientists, particularly since Foucault, now scrutinize the ideologies and practice of the makers and implementers of national power, those who create and maintain national-cultural identities. We have come to realize that powerful nationalists have a vested interest in culture – in finding commonalities among populations, in classifying and delimiting communities, in documenting the authenticity of culture and in identifying uniqueness.

More recently still, anthropologists have addressed the issue of globalization – the process by which cultures are increasingly brought into the world economic system and the new international division of labour, and thus transformed. Arguments turn on the fulcrum of homogenization: the balance between the creation of one, increasingly same (American-looking) world, and the production of a reaction towards heterogenization and increased possibilities for ‘indigenization’.

The creation and maintenance of national culture entails certain imperatives: ways of dealing with the tensions between the prior demands of and primordial attachments to local communities (Geertz 1973: 255–
310) and the suction of globalization. Above all, the nation-state has to become a natural-seeming community of citizens. Citizens must perceive that they have common characteristics that unite them in some unique way.

The nation-state has to be created and continually recreated. A national essence or identity has to be devised and naturalized. The citizen of the nation-state must grow with a particular sense of self, entailing attachment to and self-identification with the nation-state; with a willingness to accede to the demands and sovereign authority of the state; and with a particular cognition, consciousness and imagination of the history, geography and cultural shape of the homeland. This subject-citizen shares collective memory, knowledge, practices, benefits, oppressions and constrictions, and a sense of ‘us’ (fellow-citizens) versus ‘them’ (non-citizens). In many ways, the key element in identity formation (i.e. ethnic identity, racial identity and so on) is self-identification with a group.1

The nation-state must also have territorial boundaries which enable citizens to identify the roughly circular line at which their reception of global flows of images, objects, capital and people is different from that of others, and which enables them to clearly identify the ‘us’ and ‘them’. The arbitrariness of the nation-state as a bounded entity can clearly be seen in the case of Indonesia – most obviously, the island of New Guinea has a straight line running through it which is an international border. The tragedies that remain, for instance, in Aceh and West Papua, are testament to the messiness of the project of nation-state definition.

All nation-states devise means for dealing with the tensions engendered by internal and external forces and for rendering the nation-state ‘an implicit, taken-for-granted, shared national habitus’ (Foster 1991: 237). One universally adopted means is the national education system.

The subject of education in the service of the nation-state has been comparatively neglected by students of the nation-state (and by education specialists), and yet compulsory mass schooling is ubiquitous. Perhaps the ‘fit’ of schooling and the nation-state is so precise, so ‘natural’, that it remains invisible. There is a literature on civics education and a literature on the evolution of mass schooling in Western industrialized nations, but we lack a systematic corpus of analysis about education as a means of making and recreating the nation-state.

Schools are overwhelmingly powerful institutions of national culture and state power. Of all state institutions, schools are the most ubiquitous. Schools have tremendous coercive power over all child citizens. Of all state functionaries, teachers have the longest period of contact with citizens. In Indonesia, children begin their school life at about six years of age as not-yet citizens and come out, three to twelve years later, as citizens. For six hours in each of six days each week, the tentacles of the state have children in their grip. After months of sitting in classrooms listening and observing,
and before I had had a chance to examine curricula, I concluded that the main purpose of the education system as it was practised in Bali was to produce good Indonesian citizens. Indeed, Indonesia has been precise and honest in describing its goals for its national education system: The 1975 Curriculum states that:

The purpose of National Education is to form a Pancasila- and Development-minded humanity... The aims of Primary School General Education are that the graduates
a. Have good basic qualities as citizens;

b. Are healthy in body and mind;

c. Have knowledge, skills and basic attitudes that are needed for:
   1. Continuing studies;
   2. Working in society;
   3. Developing themselves for life in accordance with the principles of education. (Departemen Pendidikan 1975: x)

Thus, the conflation of being a good person, being an educated person and being a good citizen was not only an express purpose of national education but also was successfully inculcated in schools to the extent that an outsider could discern this purpose.

The New Order state did not assume that a child would be a good citizen simply by dint of birth within the borders of its territory. Children had to be taught the ‘nature’ of the good citizen, become imbued with the values of the state, have considerable knowledge of its version of the history, geography and government of the nation-state and eventually come to accept, know and identify with the Indonesian nation-state. Citizenship in Indonesia was neither automatic nor equal. The means by which schools created citizens in Brassika is the subject of the second chapter (Chapter 10) in this section on education.

During fieldwork in Brassika I was struck by the importance of schooling in the village. Even in 1980 most children attended school, advertising the nation-state as they paraded through the grubby lanes in their smart uniforms of red and white, the colours of the national flag. Those children who did not attend – usually because of poverty – were pitied for their lack of opportunity or scorned as backward. People could increasingly read newspapers, advertisements and history books. Teachers, although living in genteel poverty, were active and respected village leaders. The Tjokorda, like his father, saw education as one of the principal means by which Brassika would *maju* (progress). There was a general expectation that education was useful and indeed necessary for a more prosperous future which would be quite different from the past and the present. Thus, education was seen as an agent of change, by which life could be improved.
Education was also the cause of a radically different way of thinking: individual lives became open-ended and subject to manipulation, with the possibility that individuals could experience an unexpected life-course, an altered social condition and status.

The frequency of schooling and the ordinariness of schooling by the 1970s and 1980s belie the revolution that mass schooling had largely wrought. In one generation Brassika had become a literate village. It also became a village in which villagers were becoming aware (sadur) of their roles as citizens of the nation-state. Children became aware of their national duty to be industrious (rajin). Married women became aware of their national duty to bear only two children in the moderen site for bearing children, the clinic. Mothers became aware of their national duty to raise their two children as educated, clean young citizens. It was their national duty to immunize their children, feed them, see that their teeth were brushed, their feet shod in school shoes and their hair shampooed and nit-free. Married men had their duties as banjar members broadened – now they had to police the family planning system and compulsory attendance at school – while real political decision-making was withdrawn to more distant, more controllable echelons. Farmers were made aware that their primary duty was to grow their higher-yield crops. Schoolteachers were responsible for shepherding their charges through the multiple-choice national examinations and into the next stratum of education, and for their own attendance at endless village meetings during which the progress of the village was to be charted.

Very little has been written about the impact of the national education system in Indonesia.3 In this chapter, I want firstly to explore the question of how the villagers came to accept and indeed embrace the idea of mass schooling. Schooling was not the imposition of coercive colonial and later independent governments, but rather an innovation introduced by invitation (Parker 2000). It became accepted, in most but not all quarters, as ‘a good thing’ and entrenched as part of the collectively held disposition of Brassika villagers.

Secondly, it is important to document the reach of schooling in Brassika in order to determine which groups or categories of people gained access to schooling and which groups were able to utilize their schooling and gain employment in the modern sector – in short, the extent to which the social structure reproduced itself through education.

HISTORY OF SCHOOLING IN BRASSIKA

The introduction of mass schooling in Brassika had the radically transformative effect of creating citizens of the Indonesian nation-state out of Balinese villagers. The introduction of schooling was not the coercive, incorporative action of an external polity on a victimized ‘little people’, but
rather a process initiated by the local Dewa Agung, probably for reasons of paternalistic responsibility and pride.

The first primary or ‘people’s school’ (volkschool) in Brassika was built in 1929 on the initiative and material sponsorship of Brassika’s Dewa Agung, the father of the present Tjokorda. He donated a block of land in the heart of the village, diagonally opposite its central crossroads from the palace. He mobilized the population of Brassika and surrounding villages to donate money, materials and labour to build a classroom block. Teachers’ salaries were (sometimes) paid by the colonial government. He also had another volkschool built at Jalananyar, a village 6 km distant, and this was later upgraded into a Tweede Klasse Inlandsche School (a three-year vernacular school). This became the school of eastern Bali before the Japanese interregnum (1942–45).

In the pre-War period, the language of instruction in these schools was Balinese. Those who attended described how their teachers taught them Balinese stories such as the tales of Tantri – e.g. ‘Ni Diah Tantri’ – and some simple mathematics, but most admit that their teachers were hardly more than babysitters, at least at the local volkschool. The three grades were attended by teachers, most of whom had never been to school. During the Japanese period, Malay (later called Bahasa Indonesia) increasingly took over as the language of instruction at high school level, but it was slow to permeate through to Brassika as the principal language of instruction.

These two schools were the first primary schools in the Klungkung region, and remained the only schools in the area around Brassika until the 1970s. Until 1952, the school in Brassika catered for pupils in grades one to four. Since then, it has provided classes in all six grades, and until late in 1981 was the only school in Brassika to do so. Brassika is now served by five primary schools, all built on the initiative and land of the local Dewa Agung.

Why was this first school in the region of East Bali built in Brassika, when in 1929 there were only about 100 of these vernacular primary schools in all of Bali (Caron 1929: 94–97)? Brassika is not and never has been a town. It is about 12 km from any towns, and it is clear that the Dutch had no particular interest in it: there was no road to Brassika until the 1960s, no local industry to service and a native bureaucracy of one (the local Dewa Agung) to provision. It is only because of the Dewa Agung’s sponsorship that the schools were built, not because of Dutch imperatives to train a native bureaucracy or to satisfy external demand for educated labour.

His reasons for founding the schools can only be surmised – he died in 1971, before I arrived in Brassika. As far as I know, he left no diaries or other personal memoirs. Some literature, including Indonesian literature, expresses concern that education breaks down the social fabric and destroys all that is best in local cultures. It is then, perhaps, puzzling to hear that a powerful traditional ruler, with everything to lose, would voluntarily establish a modern school for a conservative village population. The intelligentsia of the day, centred in
Singaraja and Denpasar, were inspired with the ideology of ‘paham kemadjoean’ (the understanding of progress): ‘a strong will to develop Balinese society through education and religion and to change customs and traditions that did not conform to the spirit of the age’ (Agung 1986: 3). I conjecture that the Dewa Agung had these schools built because, in the intellectual climate of the day, he felt it his moral duty as a responsible ‘king’, a benevolent patron and moral exemplar for his people. He probably had qualms about his family rubbing shoulders with commoners at school, about the seating arrangements in classrooms (all children sat on the floor, an arrangement which contravened caste protocols of head heights), about the possible neglect of status titles and egalitarian use of language and about possible infringements to the code of physical separation that regulated the caste hierarchy.

Nevertheless, we must assume that the Dewa Agung perceived that his own position was strong and unchallenged, that the social hierarchy was not vulnerable and that a modern ruler should display his benevolent paternalism by providing schools. Potentially, the introduction of schooling was simultaneously revolutionary and conservative: it was to modernize an impoverished and illiterate backwoods population, and conserve the position of traditional authority and power of the elite. In Brassika, schooling began because of the strength and outward-looking and modern disposition of the local ruler. It was his responsibility to recreate an exemplary realm marked by strong leadership, conspicuous expenditure and generosity. The new Bali- and Indies-wide ideology – that Western-style education was the attribute of a civilized person – suggested the particular form that the largesse of a traditional ruler should take. The ruler of Brassika, now as then, is concerned not only to appear modern but also to produce modernity. This is a new slant on kingship in Bali, usually regarded as a force for conservatism and the recreation of the past in the present.

Why did parents send their children to school in the colonial period? Most people nowadays say that they send their children to school in order for them to get a good job. Villagers are aware of the need for sources of income outside agriculture. It is hard to know if this was the principal motivation for parents sending their children to school in the period from 1930 to the mid 1970s, given that the transport system was non-existent between Brassika and anywhere else until the 1960s and that the bureaucracy was rudimentary. Teaching was probably regarded as the most desirable likely profession.

Clean, white-collar jobs in offices in the city were, no doubt, valued. However, it has only been since the mid-1980s that white-collar jobs have been widely available. As far as I know, in 1980 there were only two men from Brassika, both brahmana, who had permanently left the village to work ‘successfully’ outside the district – one was a university lecturer and the other worked for the army. In 1980, at most 34 men and four women had
jobs that required schooling: 15 teachers, 11 public servants and about ten officials of local organizations.

In the New Order period, four new primary schools were built in Brassika, all on land donated by the Tjokorda and all using government money. Primary school (Sekolah Dasar – SD) No. 2 was built in 1971 with four classrooms accommodating classes three to six. In 1981, three additional classrooms were built and were opened officially by the governor of Bali. This school is situated on the main bitumen road, just north of Geria Suci and about 100 m to the north of SD1. SD3, or ‘SD Inpres’ as it is locally called, was built in 1973–74 with special funds allocated under the Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction) scheme. As any schoolchild in Brassika will tell you, in identical words, the Inpres scheme is one in which money is dropped (‘uang didropkan’) straight from the president (‘langsung dari presiden’) for special development projects. In Brassika, the Dewa Agung organized some voluntary labour, and the money was spent on materials and some labour costs. SD Inpres teaches children in grades one to five. It is situated on the very edge of the central living area of the village, on the border of Siangan, almost 1 km southwest of the crossroads and 1.5 km from Tirtawangi. SD 4 was built in 1983 and SD 5 in 1986. SD 4 was built in the back-blocks of banjar Kidikan, in a particular effort to attract the children of Anjingan, who stayed away from school in droves. It was said that it would be impossible to staff a school actually located in Anjingan, so this location was the best compromise. SD 5 was built to accommodate both a public primary school, in the morning shift, and a private junior high school (SMP-PGRI, Indonesian Teachers’ Union Junior High School) in the afternoons. By 1994, fewer than eight years after its construction, the building was a ruin: the building contractor had used green timbers as structural members of the roof, and termites had gnawed their way through, causing the dramatic collapse of the roof. Lessons were held in afternoon shifts in the other nearby schools, with rooms being rented.

The initiative and benefaction of the two local Dewa Agung were central to the establishment of schooling in Brassika. Private patronage rather than state sponsorship of mass schooling was not unusual in the colonial era: the 1920 census indicated that ‘other’, mainly private and community, schools were taking more than one-half of all pupils in Bali (Nederlandsch-Indie 1922: Table B, 309). Royal sponsorship of education has almost completely disappeared during the last ten years, partly because of the impoverishment and increasing powerlessness of the Puri but also as a result of the appropriation of the arena of schooling by government. The refurbishment of SD 5, for instance, was virtually out of village control: the headmaster proposed the repairs, the village head agreed, then the Department of Education and Culture sent the money to the school.

For parents, choice of primary school in Brassika is now mainly a matter of proximity to home. The situation is more complex for high school:
there is a general fanning out of the school-age population, not only in terms of place of schooling but also with regard to public and private schooling, intellectual streaming of the students and academic subject specializations.

In 1981, there was no high school in Brassika. The junior high school (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, SMP) in Jalananyar was one of three in the kecamatan and one of ten in kabupaten Klungkung. This school was formerly the volkschool built in Dutch times on land provided by the Dewa Agung, later extended. Lessons were held in morning and afternoon sessions. However, between the 1930s and 1980s, those who attended high school from Brassika did so at the high schools in Klungkung. One important school in Klungkung was the private, Dutch-language HIS (Hollandsch-Inlandsche Scholen, Dutch-Native School), established as early as 1924. Brassika’s elite from the Puri and Geria joined other elite children from all over eastern Bali at this school, and here learned Dutch and later Japanese and Indonesian. Most of the teachers and public servants I came to know as village leaders in 1981 had been educated here.

By 1994 there were two high schools in Brassika, the SMP-PGRI and a brand new public school. The latter began life almost as a virtual-reality school: in 1992, students were enrolled but there were rarely any classes; teachers gave their time but received no pay; there were no buildings and not yet any land. The only real transaction was the payment of Rp.1,500 per month per student for school fees, double the standard fee (called SPP) in order to help finance the establishment of the new school. Classes were ostensibly held in SD 1 in the afternoons until such time as the land deals could be finalized. The land required for a new junior high school is a minimum of 1 ha. I was told by Department of Education officials in Klungkung that government regulations explicitly required that this land be bought, not donated, and in Brassika this land, unlike all the land donated by the Puri for primary schools, has been purchased mainly from privately owned sawah. By 1994 this new school was fully operational. It became a hub of community activity for Brassika and surrounding villages, hosting meetings and cultural events. Its facilities were superior to those in the primary schools, its buildings more solid and its furniture and equipment more sophisticated.

The SMP-PGRI was a private high school run by the Indonesian Teachers’ Union (PGRI). It was inexpensive by the standards of private schools, and general opinion in the village had it that the education the students received there was sub-standard. Requisite entry scores were low, classes were often not held and absenteeism among staff and students was common. It was a small building that felt more like a temporary hut for shelter from the rain than a high school.

In 1981, there were five senior high schools (Sekolah Menengah Atas, SMA) in Klungkung, including one teachers’ training school and two vocation-
al schools. By 1994, students from Brassika attended a large range of SMA schools, mainly in Bangli, Klungkung, Gianyar and Denpasar.

ACCESS TO SCHOOLING
Statistical analyses of village surveys and of school rolls, supported by everyday observations in classrooms, reveal that in 1980, children in Brassika were under-educated by comparison with children in Bali generally and Indonesia as a whole. In 1981, the percentage of eligible children (i.e. aged 7–12 years) enrolled at school was well below the government target of 85 per cent: 69 per cent of children were currently enrolled, at least another 4 per cent had dropped out and about 27 per cent had never attended school (calculated from village survey, 1981).9

In Brassika, gender, social status and banjar membership have been the major determinants of access to schooling.

Gender
The following two tables clearly show the impact of the gender variable on school enrolments:

**Table 9-1: Gender ratios in Brassika primary schools, 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Boys (n)</th>
<th>Girls (n)</th>
<th>Gender Ratios (male as % of female pupils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: School rolls, 1981.*

This table shows that the numerical domination of classes by boys increased in the higher classes. This suggests either a higher dropout rate for girls than for boys or a recent increase in enrolments of girls, or both. Teachers seemed not to have questioned this gender difference – and perhaps not even to have noticed it. When pressed for an explanation, most teachers cited the high level of value attached to girls’ labour at home.
This situation was clearly the outcome of entrenched attitudes towards the schooling of girls, as Table 9-2 shows. In 1981, about 84 per cent of women had had no schooling, while about 47 per cent of men had missed out.10

Reminiscences by some of the middle-aged men who had attended the local *volkschool* included the observation that in the pre-War period only the Puri girls had attended school – no other village girls had attended. The difference between primary school and high school achievement levels, for both men and women, is striking.

**Table 9-2: Gender ratios and educational level of adults in Brassika, 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Men (n)</th>
<th>Women (n)</th>
<th>Gender Ratio (male as % of female pupils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no schooling</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some schooling</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Details of those with 'some schooling':*

- lower primary: 184, 61, 302
- upper primary: 159, 45, 353
- junior high: 19, 8, 238
- senior high/other: 21, 5, 420
- Total*: 383, 119, 322

*Note: Information on the educational level achieved by four adults with 'some' education is missing


By 1992 the situation in primary schools had greatly improved, with enrolments roughly equally divided between the genders. (Indeed, there were greater numbers of girls than boys in the higher classes. Teachers told me this time that this was due to a temporary demographic inequality.)

This was in line with a Bali-wide and indeed Indonesia-wide trend towards greater gender equality in school enrolments (Oey-Gardiner 1991).11 Nevertheless, Balinese girls were decidedly uneducated compared with other Indonesian girls, especially at the upper levels of schooling.
The trend towards gender equality was also occurring in secondary schools in and around Brassika, though there was a significant lag, perhaps indicating continuing unwillingness to improve the education of girls at this level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Boys (n)</th>
<th>Girls (n)</th>
<th>Gender Ratios (male as % of female pupils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: School rolls, 1992.*

The trend towards gender equality was also occurring in secondary schools in and around Brassika, though there was a significant lag, perhaps indicating continuing unwillingness to improve the education of girls at this level.

Table 9-4: Gender ratios in local* junior secondary schools, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Boys (n)</th>
<th>Girls (n)</th>
<th>Gender Ratios (male as % of female pupils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: These were the three SMP most attended by Brassika students: the private SMP-PGRI in Brassika, the new SMP in Brassika and the SMP in Jalananyar. Of course, many students travelled further afield than this.

*Source: School rolls, 1992.*

Social Status

Under this heading I include social status, in particular caste status, and wealth. Both operated through the education system as one would expect: generally speaking, high status and wealthy groups reproduced their privileged position in society partly through education. For instance, the
The vast majority of men positioned at the top end of both indices had had some education: all adult respondents in my village survey of 1981 who had the title of Cokorda had had some schooling, and two-thirds of men who owned more than 0.5 ha land had had some schooling.

The following table illustrates the commitment of high-caste people to education and, further, some of the ways caste and gender interacted. About two-thirds of all triwangsa men had had some schooling, notably 89 per cent of brahmana men and all men of Cokorda title.

Table 9-5: Education achieved, gender and caste status, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No education</th>
<th>Some education</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of row</td>
<td>% of row</td>
<td>% of col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>triwangsa men</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jaba men</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all men</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>triwangsa women</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jero*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jaba women</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all women</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Adults</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Women with the title ‘Jero’ were jaba-born but had married into a triwangsa family, or had another claim to higher-than-jaba status.

Source: Village survey, 1981

The family of the late Ida Bagus Weda was probably the best educated in Brassika when I began fieldwork. He had the rank of Assistant Lieutenant in ABRI when he died. He had two wives. His daughter by his first wife received no schooling and married an Ida Bagus from Dlodmelanting. His other nine children by Jero S– had been educated in towns and cities, including Jakarta, and all but one had found employment in the modern sector. In 1981, the oldest son worked in Denpasar in the tourist industry.
The second son was a freelance tourist guide based in Denpasar and spoke three European languages. The third son was educated in Jakarta and worked in Klungkung in the Department of Health. He lived in Brassika and married a teacher from Puri Agung. The fourth child, a daughter, remained at home and eventually married locally. The next son graduated from senior high school in Denpasar and worked as a waiter in a Kintamani restaurant. Another son was a member of the armed forces and was stationed in East Timor.

A stark contrast was the family of Nang Masir. Nang Masir had one wife and eight children. He sharecropped 0.25 ha tegal and worked on occasion as a day labourer. His first five children were girls, none of whom went to school. They all married local men and work at home and in the fields. The sixth child was a son, and he and the remaining two sons had a primary school education.

The lower triwangsa men were statistically more similar to jaba men than to higher triwangsa men: only about one-half of all jaba men had had some schooling.

As with men, triwangsa women enjoyed far better access to schooling than jaba women. Twenty-nine per cent of triwangsa women had had some education compared with 12 per cent of jaba women. Again, the brahmana and high satria groups scored highly: 50 per cent of brahmana women and 88 per cent of Cokorda and Anak Agung Isteri women had had some education. Thirty-two per cent of women titled Jero had had some education, indicating perhaps that education helped women make a ‘good’ marriage, or perhaps that it was the daughters of better-off commoner households who were targeted by high-caste men. The lower triwangsa women tended not to be educated.

Caste title was also a factor in the level of schooling achieved: of the 21 men in Brassika who had reached senior high school level, nine were triwangsa; six of the 19 men who had reached junior high school level were triwangsa. When examining the schooling figures for young people aged 7–25 years, the bias in favour of triwangsa boys is most obvious among those who reached senior high school level: 48 per cent of Brassika’s senior high school elite consisted of triwangsa boys; jaba boys made up 31 per cent; triwangsa girls made up 10 per cent and jaba girls constituted 12 per cent of those reaching senior high school level. In 1981 there were not many students called ‘Ni’ sitting at high school desks.

The correlation between wealth and educational achievement is not as clear-cut as that between caste title and education. It is not clear from statistics whether wealth preceded education or whether wealth followed from education. At the traditional bottom end of the wealth scale, among the landless, the educational picture is very mixed. About 47 per cent of the landless had had no education, and these were generally poor sharecroppers and day-labourers with few chances in life. However, among the landless there was also a small significant group who had enjoyed good educational
access: of those 21 men who achieved senior high school level of schooling, 13 were landless. They tended to receive comparatively high salaries. One of the senior health administrators in the kecamatan was in this group: one of eight sons in a family in which only one son inherited the family sawah, he was educated to this level with nursing training. He rose steadily in local clinic administration. He was one of the small number of adults whose life history clearly showed that a concomitant of a decent education could be comparative financial security.

At the other end of the landed wealth spectrum, two-thirds of large landowners (owning more than 1 ha) had had some education, and large landowners tended to be educated to a higher level than smaller landowners. Statistics collected on daily income and monthly wages indicate that educated men generally had higher salaries and earned more as day-labourers than uneducated men (Parker 1989: 375, Table 8-6). There was a particular leap in salaries for men with a post-junior high school level of education.

In Brassika there was a strong tradition of economic and political domination by triwangsa people, particularly by the high triwangsa – those of brahmana status and Cokorda title. As in the statistics on land ownership, it was not the possession of triwangsa station that entitled one to educational privilege – men of Dewa, Ngakan, Sang or Gusti title were not well educated, and women of those title-groups even less so. It was only those girls as well as boys in the most inner (jero) houses, the true Puri and Geria, who were automatically steered into high school and, these days, beyond. Those high-caste people whose status coincided with wealth were best able to utilize educational facilities, drawing not only on their wealth to finance long years of schooling but also on extended family ties in towns and cities for contacts and accommodation. In 1981, the sons of low-caste, farming families had rarely been educated beyond primary school and only very few had made good financially.

Banjar Membership

Not unexpectedly, the various banjar of Brassika exhibited considerable variation in schooling rates. While official village statistics by 1989 showed almost no variation at primary school level, in 1981 the differences in formal schooling between the least educated banjar (Anjingan and, to a lesser extent, Kidikan and Dalem) and the best educated banjar (Pekandelan, Dlodmelanting and Tirtawangi) were striking.

Children from Tirtawangi made up a disproportionate one-quarter of all those achieving junior high school and senior high school levels in 1981. An explanation for the higher levels of education in Pekandelan, Dlodmelanting and Tirtawangi and, conversely, for the low levels of school attendance in Anjingan is found not in distance from schools but in the socioeconomic makeup and attitudes which distinguish Brassika’s distinctive banjar.
The Introduction of Schooling

Table 9-6: Education of all people aged 7-25 by banjar, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banjar</th>
<th>No schooling (% of row)</th>
<th>Some schooling (% of row)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pekandelan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuaba</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dlodmelanting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalem</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidikan</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siangan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirtawangi</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjingan</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Village survey, 1981*

School attendance was affected by, and effected, a mentality best described by the Indonesian word *maju*, progressive. This mentality was fostered both in schools and at the *banjar* level. Tirtawangi was the most go-ahead and development-minded *banjar* in Brassika and combined this with a commitment to communal development rather than individual self-interest. Its *klian dinas* had the highest education (junior high school) of all *klian* in Brassika. He was efficient and capable in his administration; he demonstrated considerable initiative in instigating development projects within his *banjar*, and he had achieved the highest family planning acceptance rates in the village. He suggested the adventurous idea of transmigration to his constituents and groups of Tirtawangi residents signed up for transmigration to Central Sulawesi and South Kalimantan in 1980 and 1993. This had the effect of relieving the pressures of overpopulation at home and, combined with the ‘good citizen’ mentality, produced the model *banjar*: houseyards were continually being extended, melded and ‘beautified’; the prosperous and committed remaining citizenry kept their street drains trimmed, their paths and streets clean, their impressive *balé banjar* in good nick and, most unusually, there were even public toilets. In 1981, Tirtawangi was unique in its programme of communal work to fund the *banjar*: unlike other *banjar*, whose main source of funds were monthly subscriptions paid by each head of household at the meeting, Tirtawangi’s main source of funds was the
proceeds from the seka manyi or harvest group. Tirtawangi members were required to harvest the crops of Tirtawangi landowners and two-thirds of the earnings were contributed to banjar funds.

In recent years, this civic pride came under some pressure. The comfortable socio-economic status of Tirtawangi people was due not to sawah ownership but to their outward orientation and welcoming of change and ‘progress’, their high levels of education and the large numbers of Tirtawangi residents who had found work outside the village.14

The occupations and places of work of Tirtawangi people were most varied and interesting and included many jobs embedded in the tourism industry: working at a Kuta rent-a-car counter, a tailor in Denpasar, a woodcarver for a large tourist outlet in Gianyar. This last factor was partly accounted for in the early years by the predilection of its brahmana contingent for formal education leading to high-status, white-collar occupations which could only be practised away from Brassika in towns.15

By 1981, Tirtawangi was remarkable for its large number of absent young people. Half of the young people (aged 16–25 years) from Tirtawangi, not counting those still at school, had left Brassika: most worked as labourers in towns, but many were still unemployed. Half of those who had left lived and worked in Denpasar; the other half were scattered in the other major towns of Bali and in other islands. Education was clearly important in giving young people the confidence and incentive to leave home: 55 young people in Tirtawangi had not been to school and of these, 40 were still at home. One concomitant of this was that those left at home tended to be those with the least initiative and knowledge.

All this movement left Tirtawangi empty and sepi (quiet, lonely), a keyword in Tirtawangi vocabulary about its contemporary identity: its well-maintained streets were bereft of people; there were insufficient numbers of people to work the seka manyi, which was defunct; and the banjar was mainly financed by the payment of pengampil by its absent members. By 1994, the volleyball court was still mown, but rarely used. By 1997 it was quite overgrown.

There is an apparent circularity in the above argument, i.e. that high levels of educational achievement were the result of a maju attitude, high levels of education and the ability and willingness to work outside the village in the modern sector. However, when we come to look at other banjar, the Tirtawangi circumstance becomes acceptable as explanation. Pekandelan was another comparatively well-educated banjar. Pekandelan was the banjar of Brassika’s major houses: the various branches of the Puri and two important Geria. It was the wealthiest banjar in more senses than one: there were more large landowners (people owning 1 ha or more of sawah) in Pekandelan than in any other banjar, 70 per cent of its population were triwangsa. Pekandelan also had the highest rate of landlessness of all banjar in Brassika, with 58 per cent of its households landless. This latter
factor – Pekandelan contained both the lord’s and the lord’s servants’ quarters – pulled down Pekandelan’s otherwise high educational achievement level.

Unsurprisingly, we see in Pekandelan that recent achievements in education were due to a complex intertwining of caste ideal types and the power entrenched in this traditional status: the combination of landed wealth and economic security, high social status and considerable local political power, high educational levels, the recognition of education as the key to future careers, a high-caste constitutional fondness for bookishness and white-collar occupations, the willingness to sponsor young people through long years of schooling and sometimes volunteer work ‘service’ (mengabdi) to obtain permanent attachment to government employment. The Tirtawangi circumstance now appears singular: it was essentially a banjar of low caste, low status farmers who used education to pull themselves into a modern urban world.

Anjingan is the instructive opposite to Tirtawangi and Pekandelan. Anjingan was Brassika’s strongly kolot (conservative) banjar of dog-eaters and scavengers. Their recalcitrant commitment to their distinctive way of life implicated them in a cluster of anti-modern attitudes largely defined or devised by mainstream, respectable outsiders: they were said to be unaware (tak sadar), un-maju, anti-hygiene, anti-contraception and anti-education. This was said by respectable villagers to show that disposable wealth alone was not sufficient to bring about desirable changes in attitude towards development and ‘joining in’ (ngiring). Although they did not admit it publicly, Anjingan people told me they knew they would never get electricity (something they wanted – they were not that un-maju!) while they continued to scavenge for dogs to eat.

In 1981 there was only one Anjingan child at senior high school and seven at junior high school. By 1992, Anjingan school participation rates were still at the bottom of the village, though considerably higher than when I began fieldwork. In 1981 the few Anjingan children in school had a tough time: teachers and pupils alike cast them as dirty, smelly and stupid. The newest primary school (built in 1983 not in Anjingan but in Kidikan, in the central living space of the village) was said by the Tjokorda to have been expressly built to address the problem of the neglect of education by wong Anjingan. However, as the headmaster told me, it was only really to provide a separate space for them. He said it could not have been built in Anjingan because no teachers would go there. Also, he confirmed my suspicions that, contrary to mainstream Brassika stereotyping, the economic plight of wong Anjingan was a sorry one. Participation in the good life of national citizenship can be understood as a two-way contract: the rewards of national development were only distributed to obedient citizens.

The example of I Wayan Jauh illustrates the changing nature of the relationship between wong Anjingan and the village elite, and the potential
force of education. Wayan was the first son of a poor Anjingan farming family who in 1980 expressed their intention to surrender their by-line of trading in *kepeng*, the Chinese coins collected by *wong Anjingan* from exhumed graves. The Puri family needed a servant and offered an ‘opportunity’ to Wayan: they would put him through school and he would work as a servant and live at the Puri. This arrangement lasted for many years: through primary school, junior and senior high school, Wayan bumbled his way through the chores, washing up, chopping up chickens, washing and so on, often so tired he could barely stay awake, and often verbally abused and cuffed for his laziness or shoddy work. Wayan went off to Denpasar and found employment, eventually white-collar work, married and lives now in Denpasar. He returned to the Puri to pay his respects when I was there in 1992. He wore modern, Western-style clothes and had added a towel tied around his waist as a traditional sign of respect for the Puri. The Tjokorda took in his transformation to a modern young man-about-town in one glance, motioned him to sit in a chair at the same height as himself and proceeded to chat with him in Indonesian. The Tjokorda acknowledged a new relationship of apparently modern, quasi-equal status through the use of the status-neutral, national language and the accommodation of the humble servant-boy from Anjingan in a chair. This dramatic shift in Wayan’s status, acknowledged by the Tjokorda, was mainly, I would suggest, achieved through Wayan’s education.

Generally speaking, the great social differentiations of gender, caste, wealth and *banjar* identity structured access to education in Brassika. What we see in Wayan, and in Tirtawangi, is not just that education reproduces the great social cleavages, but that education can also be radically transformative.

NOTES

1. In many cases, the claimed shared characteristics of a single identity may be subject to change, quite arbitrary, ethnocentric, etc., such that a group’s identity is often contingent upon external forces. See, for instance, Comaroff 1995; Hall 1989; Handler 1994.

2. In order to enjoy particular rights and privileges, such as the right to apply for a job as a public servant or teacher, or to be accepted as a Brahman priest, certain documents and identifications, which attest to a candidate’s citizenship, loyalty to the current regime and good behaviour, are necessary.


4. For instance, Armijn Pane, in his important novel *Shackles*, had a character say, ‘A little Western education and they completely forget about their own culture’ (Pane 1985: 68).

John Coast warned:

If modern education, which is an urban product, ever tends to make the modern Balinese generation discontent with working in the ricefields, then the whole basis of Bali’s economic as well as social fabric will be destroyed.
The Introduction of Schooling

Similarly, Ailsa Zainu’ddin wrote of Indonesia:
In so far as Western education was accepted, it undermined the traditional society and created divisions between the older and younger generations (Zainu’ddin 1970: 55).

5. The Raja of Karangasem believed, for instance, that it was only through education that the condition of his people – their health, literacy and agriculture – could be improved (interview with his grandson, the historian Anak Äágung Putra Agung, 15.6.94).

6. Up until the present, the children of the palace were usually the class and school captains. They were not allowed to participate in school excursions if they were to be transported by trucks into which the pupils were herded ‘like cattle’. Status titles are still used within the school system for both students and teachers.

7. In the early days of mass education under the New Order it was hypothesized that distance from school was an important factor in restricting school enrolments. This has never been the case for primary school enrolments in Brassika.

8. It was held in what is now the Kabupaten Museum, adjacent to Puri Klungkung and the site of the _puputan_. This was a school established by the conservative Klungkung Hindu organization, the Sila Dharma (Pillars of Dharma, the sacred order).

One of its most famous pupils was the late Ibu Gedong Bagoes Oka, the first Balinese girl to receive an education in Holland. She became one of Bali’s foremost intellectuals, founding an internationally renowned ashram. She has been one of the sharpest commentators on government policy and Balinese public life.

9. It is important to note that enrolment rates do not always equate with attendance, and that in 1981 the number of children attending school was often below the figures indicated.

10. This pattern is corroborated by official village statistics compiled in 1991 to enumerate the educational status of the young people in the village; among those aged 19 and over (no upper age limit was supplied – presumably it only listed those not yet married), totalling 2,485 young people (1202 men and 1283 women), 177 men (14.7 per cent of men) had had no education and 367 women (28.6 per cent of women) had had no education.

11. Between 1980 and 1985, Bali went from being equal fourth from the bottom in a list of sex ratios for primary school attendance in Indonesia’s 27 provinces to equal ninth from the bottom. However, in both 1980 and 1985, Bali was second from the bottom for the listing of sex ratios for senior high school attendance (Oey-Gardiner 1991: 61, table 3). Her figures for Bali and Indonesia are tabulated below. Note that she uses the female per 100 males scale, whereas I use the male per 100 females scale.

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<td>13–15 Bali</td>
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<td>86</td>
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12. Social status was not simply a function of caste or of wealth, nor did these two indicators always go hand-in-hand. However, high caste status, especially the _brahmana_ title of Ida Bagus and the _satria_ title of Gokorda, was a guarantee of high
status. Both wealth and education could be a source of enhanced status. The one figure in Brassika who stood out in 1980–81 was the jaba man, I Sugih: he had the highest income of anyone in the village, but had enjoyed only a primary school education.

13. Nineteen per cent of large landowners had post-primary education and many had graduated from junior high school; 3 per cent of those owning 0.5–0.99 ha had post-primary education; 4 per cent of those owning 0.01–0.49 ha had post-primary education; and 7 per cent of the landless had post-primary education.

14. In 1981, its members owned an average of 0.22 ha which coincided with the mean amount of sawah for each household in Brassika. (Most people who transmigrated owned no sawah and were perceived by those remaining at home to have been the have-nots of the banjar.)

15. The Geria in Tirtawangi was also committed to traditional forms of knowledge: its core members include a pedanda and a dalang wayang.
Making Citizens in School

In 1983 Ben Anderson wrote that ‘the consistent leit-motiv of the New Order governance has been the strengthening of the state qua state’ (Anderson 1990: 111). I would argue that that strengthening came about most effectively through the implementation of mass schooling. In this chapter I aim to explore the messages about the nation-state purveyed and internalized at school and the means by which this dissemination occurred. However, I also want to suggest that the process of creating national citizens in schools was, despite the homogeneous and authoritarian nature of the school system, an open-ended and potentially transforming one.

It has been suggested that in Indonesia the world of school is notionally in opposition to the world of home (Shiraishi 1997: 129). In Bali it appears from a host of indicators that the world of school is disjunct from the world of home. There is a different language spoken in school (Bahasa Indonesia, the national language, rather than Basa Bali, the first language). Schools occupy obviously extra-local space, literally flagged with the symbol of nationhood, Sang Merah Putih (‘The Red and White’) in each schoolyard, and fenced against the incursions of parents, sellers or other unauthorized persons. Children wear a special set of clothes – uniforms – when they go to school, donning, literally, the colours of the nation-state in their Merah Putih school uniforms. There is also a new calendar of national holidays, events and ceremonies which are imposed on villagers via schools. Some are public holidays that commemorate important events in national history; some are irrelevant religious holidays such as the Muslim Idul Fitri. Schooling now defines childhood in Bali – as when mothers describe their children: ‘This one doesn’t go to school yet’ (‘Ini belum masuk’) or ‘So-and-so is already in senior high’ (‘Si Anu, yang sudah masuk SMA’).

However, as the previous chapter showed, this apparent separation of the worlds of school and society has not always been the case and, I would argue, is not the case now. In New Order Indonesia the architecture and fenced territory of schools were not the only physical representatives of the state in villages: there were health clinics and family planning posts, village
offices, patriotic statues, agricultural co-operatives and kiosks, markets, rice warehouses, tanks and taps for piped water and ‘mess’ (government housing) for government employees in most villages in Bali. School uniforms had to be paid for by the sacrifice of parents, who complained loudly and often, particularly about the quality of shoddily made shoes. The celebration of the nationally important days involved the families of schoolchildren in considerable expenditure of time and money, for instance, for Independence Day costume parades, sporting events and so on. Thus participation in a school forced the community not only to acknowledge and adopt a new nationally regulated calendar but also to collectively participate in the rituals of state-making. In other words, schools were a physical construct at the outer reaches of a long, hierarchical and extensive education bureaucracy, but they were also an integral part of people’s lives.

A focus on the children who flow through that apparently sequestered schoolyard allows us to see that the schoolyard or schoolroom, as an extension of the nation-state, is not a discrete, bounded world in oppositional stance to home or village society.

The main subject of this second chapter on education is the means by which schools created Indonesian citizens in Brassika. In New Order Indonesia, the content of textbooks was a faithful representation of state messages about a wide range of ‘facts’ and values, and it is important to understand the extent to which Indonesian school culture was a ‘textbook culture’. Generally, primary school teachers in Brassika stuck to textbooks with leech-like enthusiasm, devoting the greater part of teaching time to reading the textbook: usually reading out loud rather than silent reading, reading en masse, reading by turn around the class or individuals reading as appointed by the teacher, either standing in front of the class or sitting at their desks. Teachers in high schools seemed to be better trained and more confident of leaving the textbook to one side while they talked or asked questions.

The bulk of a typical lesson consisted of this reading, though often, more recently, the repetition of the passage was interspersed with simple comprehension questions, usually provided at the end of the passage in the textbook or devised by the more active, generally younger, teachers. These questions, and indeed all the multiple choice questions which constituted all exams other than maths, ostensibly tested factual knowledge. Some, like this question from a 1992 ‘summative test’ in geography and demography, seemed to miss the point in favour of a pedantic focus on bureaucratic jargon:

4. To give service in the field of health, in each kecamatan the government has built

a. a polyclinic (poliklinik)
b. a people’s health centre (puskesmas)
c. a maternal and child health clinic
d. a medical post

There was supposed to be only one right answer to these questions. I had considerable difficulty answering many of them. For example, the sixth question in a 'summative test' for 5th grade in the subject called moral Pancasila education in 1991/92 was:

Our state is friendly with other states which
a. are large and rich
b. are close to our state
c. love peace
d. are modern and progressive

In fact, most of these questions were not difficult for students because they only required the students to have rote-learned sentences in textbooks which told them these ‘facts’. This was, after all, what students had been doing for the great part of five hours a day, six days a week, all year.

However, I would argue that the process of educating children in Indonesia was not the automatic transmission of ‘facts’ and national values but a much more open-ended process. This implies that the end-product of schooling cannot be predicted: each child differently interprets school messages according to their own social position and life experience. My purpose here is not only to examine government messages purveyed by school textbooks but also to examine how these messages were variously internalized and interpreted by schoolchildren. A focus on the children who receive and interpret school teachings provides a different picture. For this reason the chapter incorporates much information from children’s writing, observations of classroom activities, and extraneous material from beyond the classroom.

The chapter is structured around four ‘key words’: family, village, Bali and Indonesia. ‘Key words’ have most famously been studied by Raymond Williams (1983) in the book of that name. He analyzed public discourse, selecting key words and presenting both their etymological origins and subsequent historical shifts in shared meanings in order to record the ‘practices and institutions which we group as culture and society’ (1983: 13).

FAMILY

The ideological foundation of the Indonesian nation-state is the ‘family foundation’ (azas kekeluargaan). The ‘family foundation’ ideology presumed an automatic and in-built harmony of affective ties between family members; it presumed ‘goodness’ over selfishness, a willingness to sacrifice, to co-operate and pull together for the common good; it assigned to each
family member a ‘natural’ place and a role to play; and it was infused with hierarchical principles, particularly respect for age and maleness.

In the textbooks for the school subject moral Pancasila education, the righteous refrain was the model life of a model student and citizen, Budi. Budi lived with his family and friends in a model village, Desa Sukamaju, the Village of Like-To-Progress – rather like Enid Blyton’s fictional Toytown in the Noddy series.

Here I reproduce field notes of a Grade 5 Bahasa Indonesia lesson in 1992. The lesson was based on the textbook reading (Slamet et al. 1990: 35–37). The twin messages of this language lesson were the desirability of using family planning (K.B., Keluarga Berencana) and, the subterranean message, the nature of the ideal family. The hegemonic utilization of the euphemistic term ‘family planning’ kept sex, and the control of fertility, in the family (ideologically, but not, of course, in fact). Furthermore, as you can see in the lesson, it made contraception the responsibility of mothers.

8.00 am...Children are reading out aloud, one at a time from textbook... the passage entitled (literally) ‘My Younger Sister is One’ [which means I Have Only One Younger Sister]...

8.07 Boy finishes. Teacher gives a little explanation: the government has a programme for married couples so that they will have small families.

“Now we will compare small families with large families.”
He writes on the blackboard, “A Small Family, means two children, that is, it consists of father, mother and two children”, then describes the family planning insignia, with two children flanked by their father and mother. The teacher talks about this symbol of “humankind” (manusia), with the small family in the centre, mother on the left, father on the right, 2 children in the middle. Repetition ad nauseum...

“In the middle there are two...?”

“Children!” yell the kids. Then he writes on the board, “The purpose of Family Planning: to achieve families that are happy and prosperous.” Then he says, “Boys and girls are the same, tell your mothers. Are there any who have mothers who don’t follow [KB, Family Planning]?”

Subdued murmurs of assent, “There are.” “Tell your mothers. Formerly, there were families that had up to 8 or even 12! Then there was not yet K (family)...?” “B (planning)!“ yell the kids.
... Teacher asks,
“Who has two siblings?”…
Then the teacher talks about love, kasih sayang, and writes,
“the larger the number of children, the less there is of parental love
the smaller the number of children, the more there is of parental love”
[This is one of the main points in the reading passage.]
8.23 (The teacher is indulging in an unusual deal of ad libbing,
though not adding points not already raised in the passage.) He says,
“It’s not just a matter of love, but also, the more children there are
the more often parents are angry and fight with their children…”
Children are half-listening, no interaction.
“Also, it’s a matter of economics. If you have 1 kg. of rice divided
among 4 people, it’s enough, but divided among 7, it’s not enough,
so you have to look for more money…”
This is a long speech by the teacher and there is no contribution
from the children. By 8.27 the kids are talking away softly amongst
themselves…
“The acronym to learn is NKKBS: Norma Keluarga Kecil Bahagia
Sejahtera, the Small Family Norm is Happy and Prosperous…”
He writes on the board,
“The nuclear family (keluarga inti) is father and mother and two
children.”
and says,
“I Wayan and I Made [low-caste names for first-born and second-
born son in Bali] are in this family, but I Nyoman [third-born son] is
outside the nuclear family.”
“Who is the head of the family?”
“Father!” the children answer. The teacher talks at length about
fungsi (function) and tugas (duty) in the family:
“Is mother the head of the family?”
“No!”
and writes on the board,
“Difference between father and mother”
“the duty of the father is to be responsible for the costs (biaya) which
are needed (diperlukan) by the family.”
The teacher talks for a while about the jobs of fathers: ploughing and
hoeing, farmers as well as labourers, civil servants.
“Do parents ask their children for money?”

“No.”

“In general, it is the father who is responsible, but it’s possible, for a while, for example, for the mother to become a civil servant and for the father not to be, and then it’s clear that it is the mother who is responsible for the family. Or maybe the mother becomes a big-time trader and she becomes responsible and the father stays at home to look after the children. In general though it is the tugas of the mother to look after the household – sweeping, cooking, getting water, making drinks to take to father in the rice fields. It is mother who is tired, especially in the villages...And what is the tugas of children?”

“To go to school!” the kids yell.

The teacher writes,

“One, to study
Two, to help parents at home.”

Pupils copy it down while teacher talks,

“Other jobs you can help with are sweeping, cutting grass, washing the dishes – but don’t just help your parents. Remember, your first duty is to stud...?”

“Y!” yell the children. (10.2.92)

The lesson is typical in its content and messages but unusual in the degree of teacher lecturing and embroidering upon the main points. (Incidentally, the use of the Balinese birth-order names was one of the slogans of Bali’s Provincial Family Planning Board.) Although the teacher was unusually independent of the textbook in this lesson, the passivity of the students and the superficiality of the teacher’s comprehension questions remain. A quick glance around his classroom would have revealed to this local teacher the economic centrality of the mothers of some of his most illustrious and high-status students, including the sons and daughters of the Tjokorda and pedanda. These mothers included the most highly educated women in the village, working as nurses and teachers, and in some cases they entirely supported their families or their children, especially in households headed by polygynous men.

Although this was a language lesson, the government’s ideological model of a nuclear family of father, mother and three (later two) children was strong. Budi’s mother and sister worked in the house, sweeping, working in the kitchen and washing. It was almost mother’s duty to be tired. Budi’s father
has even heavier responsibilities. He must do his work at the office. He has the responsibility of providing money for his family. He works...for country and state. Because he works for the state, he gets a wage from the state (Permadi 1979–80 Kelas 4: 34).

Thus there was a strict division of household labour and routines along gender lines, a division which, if followed, would have constrained Balinese people in a way that traditional divisions of labour do not. Budi and his brother went to the mosque to pray but his sister did not. Budi’s father, the family’s authority figure, served his village (and state) as head of the neighbourhood; when there was a voluntary neighbourhood work-day he organized it while Budi’s mother worked in the kitchen making layer cakes to serve to the workers. (Layer cake was a particular favourite of Budi’s father.) Men served the state, but women served the men. The middle-class, gendered nuclear family captured in Figures 10-1, 10-2 and 10-3 was the social heart of the ideal Indonesia – with mother in traditional garb at home with baby and children.\(^7\)

In fact, in textbooks it was rare to find any work or role for women outside the home, and even jobs for men were stereotyped into farming or office work. More recently, a textbook stated, 'Formerly, most types of work could only be done by males. But now, nearly all work can be done by females. These occupations include driver, army, police and business' (Ananta 1989 Kelas 2: 30). The principal ambi-gendered occupation in the textbooks was teaching, but in Brassika schools this was an occupation dominated by men.

It was clearly stated by textbooks that the ideal family is harmonious (happy and prosperous) because of the affective ties within the family. What was emphasized more than emotional ties, however, and this is
obvious in the above lesson, were the proper responsibilities, behaviour and duties associated with each person’s station within family, school and society. There was a rather brutal message in the above lesson for those in large families: less parental love was available in large families than in small families. However, I never heard this sentiment expressed outside the classroom in Bali. Indeed, if there was a single characteristic which distinguished Balinese adult attitudes towards children it was an unconditional giving towards children, especially small children, and delight in their essential being rather than their abilities, achievements or individual characteristics.

In contrast to good little Budi were all the real-life Balinese kids who came from families and households which varied enormously in composition, even within Brassika. There was the teenage delinquent, Cokorda Wow, a cheeky
and likeable son of Puri Ambengan. Cok. Wow was popular with the girls and always absent from school, home and anywhere else he was supposed to be. He and the oldest son of my Puri family were great friends and had cooked up a plan to move down to Nusa Dua to complete their schooling there, arguing that it would be likely to lead to a job in the tourist industry. His parents had business interests in the up-market tourist enclave of Nusa Dua, and had agreed to the plan, but my Puri parents were holding off, being less than pleased with the influence Cok. Wow was having on their son. He virtually moved into the Puri and slept on a mattress in his own little ‘den of iniquity’, complete with stereo system and pornographic magazines. Of course it became a popular hole in the wall for all the resident Puri teenagers, especially his girlfriend, daughter of the Tjokorda – that is, until the magazines were discovered! Public dressing-downs in school, being made to pick up rubbish at school, being ‘dried out’ in the schoolyard and even several home visits by teachers had little effect.8

His parents, who were often away from the village, made several formal visits to the Puri to request help in bringing their wayward youth to heel. It was easy for Brassika parents to identify the wicked tourist zone (the city, kotakota) as the source of the ‘dirty’ (kotor) magazines and to associate the boy’s naughtiness with a father too taken up with his business to ‘look after’ (menghiraukan) the son.

Another cause célèbre was Ida Bagus Putu, a high school teacher from Geria Sakti, who ‘married’ one of his SMP students. I first heard of this elopement when I awoke one morning to the noise of a motorbike being revved up and down the main street for half an hour. After a short respite, it began again and continued for most of the morning. It seemed to express terrible anger or frustration. A 16-year-old daughter of a local Gusti family had run to the geria the previous night, apparently keeping a tryst with Ida Bagus Putu. Putu had long been married, though he hadn’t ‘paid attention
to’ (menghiraukan) his wife for two or three years. They had two children, both in advanced teenagehood. The geria family were terribly upset, and the motorbike rider was one of Putu’s younger brothers, much exercised over this family disgrace. Community opprobrium centred on the ethic that a teacher, who is also civil servant, must be a model (teladan) or moral example (contoh) to his students, and this bigamous marriage was beyond acceptable models of respectable marriage for civil servants.

Outside of school, teenage girls from the village spent most time around home. Girls are expected to help their mothers – they often do the washing and ironing, fetch water, make offerings, shop, help with cooking, cleaning and other housework – and they can spend an inordinate amount of time on self-beautification. Both girls and boys nowadays spend a lot of time watching television, usually in groups with friends and family, with American sit-coms, music video shows and quiz shows all very popular. Magazines and books for teenagers were too expensive for most in Brassika. Boys spent most of their free time with their male friends and young men, hanging out at the corner guard-post and at warung, tinkering with bikes, playing table-tennis or other sports. Boys at high school in Klungkung or other towns were more likely than girls to truant from school, and usually gravitated to the minor attractions of the town (a department store, arcade games). Lack of funds was a major problem for them.

VILLAGE (GLOSSING BOTH ‘BANJAR’ AND ‘DESA’)
I conducted an experiment in creative writing in 1981 in grades four, five and six of primary school. I informed the teachers the day before the compositions were to be written, impressing upon them that the children were to be free (bebas) to write whatever they wanted. I was interested to see what intellectual content might be produced, as well as to check competence in Bahasa Indonesia. I originally intended not to restrict the kreativitas of the children with titles for the compositions, but was dissuaded by all teachers.9 In 1981, teachers were convinced that the children would not write anything at all if they were not given some guidance (bimbingan). In the end, the titles decided upon were ‘Banjarku’ (My Banjar) for fourth grade, ‘Desaku’ (My Village) for fifth grade and ‘Pulau Bali’ (The Island Of Bali) for sixth grade.10

The ‘composition’ as a literary product is a cornerstone of Western school language teaching. It has high status as a measure of pupils’ control and creative use of language, and for many years was the only vehicle for students to express their own dreams, reactions and imaginative creations. Brassika children were not accustomed to written stories. They were not used to gaining entrance to a world of magic or fantasy via text; they did not have the positive, emotional experience attached to the written word enjoyed by many Western children; and they did not understand the
written word as an expression of spirit, emotion or creativity. My point is not that my setting of the task of writing compositions was a foreign or strange Westerner’s imposition. Indeed, schoolchildren in Bali were taught to write compositions, throughout primary and high school. Rather, I would stress that the expectations of Balinese teachers and students of the content of these products were not those of Western educators.\footnote{11}

Most stark to me was the impersonal nature of the writing. There was barely an ‘I’ in the several hundred compositions I finally collected from all levels of schooling. In Bali, compositions were not about experience or the individual. The ubiquitous use of the passive voice depersonalized and decentred the writing, and responsibility for actions was devolved away from the author or other actor. Teachers overwhelmingly provided ‘guidance’ about structure and content and both teachers and textbooks supplied the students with detailed information about particular topics. There was the expectation that a piece of writing must be a formal, factual account, correct and proper (\textit{baik dan benar}).\footnote{12} Balinese schoolchildren produced writing which was without a skerrick of emotion, fantasy or fun.

My experiment in composition-writing was hardly scientific. The fourth grade teacher was very intrusive, insisting, before the lesson began, that my first suggested title, ‘The Island of Bali’, was impossible because the children had not yet studied that in social science.\footnote{13}
I changed the title to ‘Banjarku’ to keep her on side and wrote the title on the board. There was a long silence, and nobody wrote anything. The teacher told the children to write their names, date, title and margins. Then she said to me that they needed *bimbingan*, so she proceeded to rattle off suggestions such as banjar meetings, klian banjar, repair of roads, temples and balé banjar. She walked around the room, muttering these subjects all the while and exhorting the children to write neatly, not make mistakes, etc. There went my plan to see what the children knew, or what they thought they should write. They did not have to think – they were not given the chance to do so. The resulting compositions lacked coherence and were very jumbled. However, the children wrote about a wide range of topics and included a great many interesting details about their *banjar*.

The assumption that children, and indeed all citizens, needed guidance underpinned the education system, and the whole paternalistic authority system. In Suharto’s Indonesia, citizens were not born – they had to be made, and schools existed for this purpose (Parker 1992b: 42–43). Whenever there was discussion with or among teachers about pedagogical techniques, the technique known as ‘guidance from behind’ (*bimbingan dari belakang*) was described. Typically the teacher used a spatial metaphor: he or she would direct classroom operations from the back of the room selecting students to write on the board to complete sums or sentences, not telling them the answer, but letting them find the answer under the teacher’s guidance. One mathematics teacher told me that children thought that mathematics was the hardest subject, that they got bored and fed up if they didn’t know the answer, but that if they ‘found the answer’ they were happy. The word ‘find’ was the key: the textbook was the repository for a body of already formulated knowledge which the teacher, gradually and systematically, passed on intact to the students, who would, eventually, become the possessors.

In Bali, higher knowledge is generally acquired through learning, i.e. memorizing and copying (Duff-Cooper 1993: 209). Most Balinese words for learning (*muruk*), studying (*malajah*), teaching (*nguruk, ngajah*) and knowing (*uning*, *nawang*) imply drilling, memorizing and copying rather than understanding or exegesis. (Similarly, the Indonesian word ‘*menghafal*’ is most accurately translated as ‘to learn/memorize’, for the former is not possible without the latter.) Knowledge is claimed when the pupil can replicate the teacher’s knowledge (called *tutur* in traditional higher learning), and the student is then *ipso facto* capable and clever. The knowledge itself is not questioned or analysed: it is accepted without proof other than that it is being taught. Underlying this directional and hierarchical system of knowledge transmission is the assumption that ‘those who know’, and therefore control the flow of knowledge, have the necessary qualifications to cope with this knowledge, which is a kind of authoritative power.
This attitude towards knowledge and learning is not unique to Bali, and is manifest in many aspects of educational practice throughout Indonesia. (See H. Hill 1991: passim; Rodgers 1995; Siegel 1986: esp. 138ff; Sweeney 1987: esp. 267ff.)

I repeated the creative writing experiment in a fourth grade class in another school where the teacher was not overbearing and peace and quiet reigned in the classroom. The teacher could not let the children write without some bimbingan and so wrote on the board:

Suggestions
- agriculture
- development
- family planning
- study group activities
- weaving activities

The children worked largely on their own. The result was a collection of comparatively simple, short, clear essays. The compositions from the second school were much less interesting and more homogeneous than those of the first group, indicating that the blackboard suggestions were rather rigorously followed. The second group’s compositions were more formal, correct and stiff than those of the first group. Many had the feel of a report to a superior, and included sentences such as: ‘My banjar is already reasonably modern’ (‘Banjarku sudah cukup maju’). Nearly all concluded with the formal sentence, ‘Thus is my composition about my banjar’.

When we move on to the Indonesian, rather than Balinese, version of ‘village’, desa, we find that school textbooks taught a great deal about villages (desa), particularly at primary school level. In textbooks, ‘the village’ was often used to denote what city dwellers might dub ‘the countryside’. The beauty of the desa was a constant: the air was always fresh and clean; the views were green (except when the rice crop was yellowing) and extensive (implying that there was lots of empty space); and it was always quiet and peaceful in the village. Textbook writers obviously lived in cities, for the chief feature of a real-life Balinese village was that it was a densely packed settlement, which contrasted, in Balinese eyes, first with the beauty, fertility and openness of the ricefields and secondly with the darkness of the threatening, magically dangerous river gorges.

Nature – the bounty of God – was said to be for humankind, the most perfect and loved creation of all. Commonly this waxing lyrical about rural Indonesia was the lead-in to an appreciation of the Greatness Of God, the first principle of Pancasila. Sometimes it was followed by a passage about the ‘Rights and Responsibilities of Village Citizens’, which were the guarding of the prosperity and progress of the village.
The inhabitants want the village to *maju* (progress) and be prosperous. The cleanliness, health and security of the village are always attended to. Thus derives the peace and prosperity of the inhabitants. (Permadi 1979 Kelas 4: 26)

As in the children’s compositions, the textbooks bombarded the reader with details of the hierarchy of village administration and office-holding positions, including the subdivisions of the village, the wards, neighbourhood, etc., though we never read of the Balinese version of these, the *banjar*.

A chapter about a village was often followed by a chapter on the city. The busyness of city streets was frequently mentioned and was a way of introducing the need for rules. Children were introduced to traffic lights, for instance, and their function of ordering chaotic streets. The textbooks did not tell the students what the different coloured lights actually mean, i.e. that red means ‘stop’. I can testify, having experienced a drive to the airport by a high school graduate unused to city driving, that this is an unfortunate omission!

Direct comparisons between village and city were made:

Villagers are not too busy. They have only one desire. How to make their land really fertile and multiply the yields from their crops. That is the reason village inhabitants are not as busy as city people. (Permadi 1979 Kelas 4: 37)

The textbook was expressing the government’s wish (in both senses of the word) that villagers be apolitical and concentrate on their main function and duty: the production of food. Textbook writers could be patronizing: ‘Ahmad is the son of a farmer. However, Ahmad is a clever and industrious pupil’ (Permadi 1979 Kelas 3: 52). The ideology of the ‘floating mass’ permeated these passages on ‘the village’, though the term was not used, to my knowledge.

In one class there was some copying from the Grade 5 social science textbook:

> My village is the source of life for the state  
> It is my responsibility to build it in a new way  
> This determines the future  
> For the archipelago and nation…

The Village must become the base for the state and because of that we must build our Village. The Village must progress. Village society must be prosperous. The progress of the Village means the progress of the state. The prosperity of Village society means the prosperity of the state. We feel that the Village has great usefulness for the state.
There were also several attempts at collusion. Two girls wrote the following paragraph, revealing a pastoral and romantic vision of the village which derives, at least in part, from textbook teaching:

Early in the morning the sun has already risen. The air is cool and we can breathe in the fresh air. Each morning we play sport to inhale the fresh air so that our bodies will be healthy. (Compositions of 3.2.1981, my translation)

Expressions of emotional attachment to ‘the village’ were not infrequent, and also derive from the textbook:

My village is my place of living for all time. As well [it’s the place where I’ve] been looked after and made by Mother and also father. My village, which is very noble and fertile, I will worship always. My village is a loved village.

There were a few clones and a few would-be clones with weird mixtures: lists of banjar and their handcraft cottage industries, rhapsodies about getting up early in the morning in the fresh country air interlaced with doses of ‘The village must advance’, ‘We must build the village’ and ‘Progress in the village means progress in the state’.16

In their essays on ‘My Village’, most children wrote that they lived in Brassika, and that there were eight banjar in Brassika. A few children showed an impressive knowledge of the names of all eight klian dinas and their banjar. Most wrote that their village was already maju (progressing, or modern), and mentioned in this regard the number of schools in the village, the successful family planning programme, and the appearance of Brassika’s famous topeng dancer on television.

My village is extensive and beautiful. My village now is flourishing in all fields and development – mainly in the banjar.

In the field of agriculture my Village is already rather maju. In the field of education my Village is also already maju. In my Village one hundred heads of household have already entered Family Planning. (Composition of 3.2.1981)

BALI, ‘ISLAND OF THE GODS’

The subject of Bali was hardly mentioned in school textbooks. I did not know this when I set it as a topic for the compositions, but it became
apparent that students knew almost nothing of the formal history of Bali and little of its geography and economy. They knew quite a deal from their religion lessons (allocated an average of two lessons out of 40 per week) of the formal features of Balinese religion, but these bore little resemblance to their everyday religious practice of offerings and temple ceremonies.

This opening sentence and paragraph of a sixth grade student’s composition about ‘The Island of Bali’ is typical:

The island of Bali is the island of the gods, what is the reason it is called the island of the gods, because of the many tourists from overseas as well as from within the country. (Composition of 4.2.1981)

This excerpt shows a lack of understanding of causation and of the use of words of causation, ‘apa sebab’ (why, what is the reason) and ‘karena’ (because). Sweeney, in his book on orality and literacy in the Malay world, noted the strength of an oral narrative tradition which was characterized by an adding-on mode of communication in which information was continually added in the ‘and-then’ style to compile a narrative (1987, chapters 7 and 8). When asked to analyse information, his university students attempted to use words of causation such as ‘oleh sebab’ (because of), ‘jadi’ (so) and ‘karena’ (because) and subordinators such as ‘bagi’ (for) and ‘kepada’ (to), but they produced fractured sentences which did not subordinate or link logically one clause to another, e.g. ‘Bagi orang kampung itu, mereka suka…’ (For the people of that village, they liked…). If the causative subordinators were removed, the narrative pattern made sense. Students in Bali exhibited many of the same characteristics as Sweeney’s students in this respect. The ‘and-then’ mode is not suited to an analytical approach: the student wants to memorize intact chunks and string them along in the correct order, not to analyse the meaning prior to construction and subordinate one sentence to another or compare or juxtapose sentences or clauses. As Sweeney said,

The aim of a pupil in an oral milieu is to acquire the sum total of his (sic) teacher’s knowledge and to preserve it intact in his mind. His task is not to confront or argue with his teacher, for such activities are incompatible with the oral transmission of knowledge. (Sweeney 1987: 269)

All the children who used the phrase ‘island of the gods’ had trouble explaining it, yet 21 of the 24 pupils in the class used it. They knew the formulation and knew they could safely use it in their compositions. The pupils did not understand its meaning (i.e. the pervasive influence of religion in all aspects of life in Bali) nor the nature of its connection with the tourist trade. Also, they either did not realize that they did not
understand it or they considered that it did not matter. As I expected, I found the phrase in the social science textbook, albeit the textbook for fourth grade:

Children, the island of Bali is also called the island of (the) Gods. As a tourist place because the views of nature are beautiful. (It is) famous throughout the world. (Mugiyana et al 1975? vol. 4A: 11; my translation)

It is no wonder the children found the meaning unclear.

The content of the sixth grade compositions was homogeneous across the 24 in the class. The teacher who looked after the class when I was not there said she suggested the children include in their essays the government structure of 8 kabupaten, etc. The following statements were the most frequent:

Bali is famous for its culture/arts. (24)
Many tourists come to Bali. (24)
There are eight kabupaten. (24)
The name of the governor is Prof. Dr. Ida Bagus Mantra. (21)
Bali is the ‘island of the gods’. (21)
Bali is headed by a governor. (19)
Bali is famous for the art of dancing. (18)
Kabupaten are headed by bupati. (16)
Denpasar is the capital/busiest/most beautiful city. (16)

Bali was described from an outsider’s perspective, perhaps because of students’ expectation that a composition should not be a subjective account. It was as though ‘Bali’ only existed for the tourist, or as though the Balinese pupils thought that only a non-Balinese need be taught about Bali. Thus the schoolchildren of Bali came to believe that Bali was indeed paradise – why else would so many tourists come?

The following composition was probably the best in the class from a language point of view, and typical in its content.

This island of Bali of ours is much visited by tourists, domestic as well as foreign.

This island of Bali of ours is much admired by foreigners because it is famous for the arts, the arts of dancing, painting, seni tabuh, and there are others, so that this island of Bali of ours is called the island of the gods.
The Province of Bali is headed by a governor. The name of the governor is Prof. Dr. Ida Bagus Mantra.

The Province of Bali is divided into eight kabupaten which are headed by a bupati. [Kabupaten correctly named.]

Whereas the Province (sic) of Bali is divided again into kecamatan headed by camat. [Kecamatan correctly named.] The busiest city is Denpasar.

Thus is my composition about the Island of Bali. (Composition of 4.2.1981)

The compositions revealed most strikingly a thorough knowledge of government structure and its importance. There was an almost complete disregard of or ignorance about history and geography, but a well-developed awareness of the presence and importance of the tourist industry in Bali (perhaps emphasized by the presence of a white woman in the classroom). For instance, only three children mentioned that the Balinese follow the Hindu religion, but six mentioned that tourists visit Pura Besakih.

There was much overlapping and repetition of topics treated in the various subjects. One was almost as likely to find questions on the constitution in the subject called physical education as in the subjects called moral Pancasila education, social science or education in the history of the national struggle. As far as I could see, the constitution appeared in all examinable subjects except mathematics. The effects of this ‘weak classification’ were, no doubt, many, but included the wrapping of students in an inescapable net of ideology which was not easily penetrated, tested or resisted.¹⁷ A passage from a moral Pancasila education textbook gives the idea:

Now farmers in our nation already use mechanized tools. Ploughing is mechanized, harvesting is mechanized and pumps irrigate the sawah... as time goes on, we progress more and more. Inhabitants can enjoy the gifts of God who is Great. If the way of life of the inhabitants is increasingly modern, our state will increase in prosperity and strength. That is the reason we must now begin to work enthusiastically and study industriously at school. (Permadi 1980 Kelas 4: 18)

Bound together in this passage were the desirability of mechanized technology, God’s bounty (implying the first principle of Pancasila), the desirability and equivalence of national prosperity, strength and a modern way of life and the need for conscientious work at school. There was not really any question about what happened if one element were missing or awry, but rather the emphasis was on the seamless whole: religiosity, cooperation, industry, modernity, prosperity and the state.
A similar creative writing experiment was conducted at senior high school level, notably at the most academically selective public SMA in Klungkung. Here students really were allowed to write on a subject of their choice. Most picked a topic that they had recently had as a class piece; one of the local tourist destinations such as Goa Lawah or the harbour of Padangbai. These were competent if unimaginative and impersonal essays. The following composition stands out, not only for its extensive vocabulary and variety of constructions but also for its unusual subject matter: ‘My Island of Bali, My God, Sang Hyang Widi Wasa, and My Motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’. It is the composition of probably the most intellectually gifted student I came upon in the schools of Klungkung, a female, subaltern student elsewhere described as ‘brave’ (Parker 1997: 509).

What is imagined in your thoughts when you hear a word which is no longer foreign, that is ‘the Island of Bali’? In the world of tourism, certainly it is Bali’s panoramic beauty which flashes through the mind. But it is different if observed from a geographical perspective. This island is squeezed by the other islands in the hand of the Indonesian archipelago. Although small, Bali stores millions of meanings pregnant with potent charisma. It is supported also by a civilization and culture which hides a great deal of religious meaning. Together with all that, the Hindu community in Bali also has a great storehouse of belief in God. So don’t be surprised if the slogan “Island of the Gods” is directed at the island of Bali. Ida Sang Hyang Widi Wasa is the God; Brahma, Wisnu, and Siwa are the rays of his purity. Although there are many gods, Bali is neither polytheistic, animistic nor dinamistic. But Bali is monotheistic. You do not believe me? Do you not know the motto of the state of Indonesia? Yes, correct, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” or, its complete form, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, tan hana dharma mangrwa”. Good, this is a golden opportunity for me to talk a little about this slogan.

The literal meaning of this motto is “different but still one”, there is no second morality. If we just read it, it seems very simple. But let’s explore its meaning further. In a religious manner, the Hindu community in Bali worships God with many names which are differentiated according to their function. Although it is thus, from among those thousands of names, there is only One Great God. There is only one truth (dharma) which is eternal and everlasting. So, that motto is indeed correct. After knowing its meaning, certainly we must also know who was the spark? He was Empu Tantular, a person from one of the many famous lontar. This motto was plucked from the book of Sutasoma which was written in Sanskrit. Thus is a little history of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”, which is still with us today and has neither been made mouldy by rain, nor damaged by the heat, nor destroyed by anything at all.
How is this applied in society? In a very equal, balanced and harmonious manner. This ancient sloka, furthermore, has the capacity to unite the nation of Indonesia which consists of a thousand and one ethnic groups. How extraordinary! An enormous task which, appropriately, arouses pride, does it not?

From this description I hope you now know how the island of Bali enchants and simultaneously contains mystery. And one thing more, how the people of the island of the gods worship their God who is Unity in Diversity.

This student showcased a striking aspect of the Indonesian education system: its distinct lack of disciplinary boundaries and integrity. In this student’s composition, the slogan of the tourist industry, the ‘Island of the Gods’, the national motto, Unity in Diversity, and the totalizing name of the Balinese Godhead, Ida Sang Hyang Widi Wasa, were made to be equivalent and isomorphic through the use of Pancasila logic. The intellectual gymnastics through which she achieved the deification of the national motto can largely be attributed to her education. The effects of ‘weak classification’ of school subject matter and the all-embracing nature of Pancasila ideology involve a metaphoric violence done to the etymology, integrity and purity of some concepts, such as the existence of and belief in many gods in Bali. The Balinese have had no option but to ‘prove’ that their religion is neither polytheistic nor animistic in order to fit with the first principle of Pancasila, Belief in the One and Only Supreme God.

Under this first principle, the Suharto government permitted its citizens to follow any of five ‘religions’ (agama): Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christian Protestantism and Christian Catholicism. (See Figures 10-4 and 10-5.) A senior high school moral Pancasila education lesson explained that the tenet, ‘We believe in devotion towards The One Supreme God’, coexisted with three other principles: freedom to embrace religion; the responsibility to develop an attitude of respect towards those who embrace another religion; the recognition of the connection between a community (umat) and God. The accommodation of these four principles was called tolerance (toleransi) in school textbooks, in teachers’ oral teaching and in general social conversation. Almost invariably, tolerance was associated with religious tolerance. The teacher explained that having five religions, Indonesian citizens had to have respect for all for the sake of stability (stabilitas) and security (aman). There had to be this tolerance between religious communities (umat), and there was no excuse for religious conflict (mempertengkarakan agama). The teacher, unusually, then introduced a problematic, oppositional situation in her lesson: what happened in Klungkung town when it was Nyepi (the day of silence and stillness preceding New Year in Hindu Bali)? One girl answered rather sourly that, ‘The Muslims have to stay at home.’ Then the teacher asked what happened in
Klungkung town if Nyepi coincided with Idul Fitri (when Muslims went to the mosque) or with Sunday for Christians? The teacher said that there was already harmony in Indonesia (rukun sudah di Indonesia), and there were no religious problems in Indonesia (ada masalah agama sudah tiada). The government had already brought in a rule that if Nyepi coincided with Sunday or Idul Fitri, people of other faiths had to either pray at home or walk (not use a motorbike) to the nearest church or mosque. In fact, this tolerance was not left to chance: the government regulated every major religious observance to the nth degree. In Bali, the government, via the Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indonesia, attempted to pre-empt any disorder resulting from lack of tolerance: before any major religious observance such as Nyepi it circulated typed instructions to each administrative subdivision, listing the articulated timetabled celebrations from kecamatan level to banjar and even household level, with instructions as to the types of offerings to be made, the regulations as to the activities proscribed (e.g. no guests or visiting, no lights or fires, no entertainments, etc.) and the regulations for public order, implemented by civilian officials, Hansip and the police and army.

Figure 10-4: Children praying according to the custom of the five authorized religions (Saptaningtyas and Fais vol. 1b 1997: 28)
Tolerance in New Order Indonesia was a matter of obeying rules about legislated ‘religions’, for recognized social station and recognized cultural difference. The emphasis was not on exploring or understanding that difference, but on maintaining order – *stabilitas* and *aman*. As Trinh Minh-ha observed, ‘I am tolerated in my difference as long as I conform with the established rules’ (1989: 87).

Balinese culture was presented to school pupils on two fronts: one was the formal teaching of Balinese language and religion (each allocated an average of two lessons out of 40 per week) and the other was the non-academic aspects of general school life, such as the officially sanctioned morning prayers (the Tri Sandhya), the making and presentation of offerings and the respectful commemoration of and homage to Saraswati, Goddess of Learning.

Saraswati Day was enthusiastically celebrated in Brassika schools every Balinese year and illustrated nicely the Balinization of the school system, albeit at its strongest. It showed the strength of local religious practice, regulated, as usual, by the PHDI, and the strength of traditional authority in Brassika. Teachers and pupils of SD2 transformed the schoolyard with their wearing of gorgeous traditional clothes (*pakaian adat*) and bearing of offerings, placed on the school *padmasana* (shrine to Sang Hyang Widi Wasa). The priest attached to Pura Pucak Sari, the fertility/agricultural temple on the summit of a nearby hill, attended the ceremony here and at other local schools because of a connection between this temple and schoolchildren: Saraswati is another manifestation of the god Vishnu, god of water, and of Dewi Sri, goddess of rice and of fertility, and many

![Figure 10-5: The religious buildings of the five authorized religions in Indonesia (Permadi Kelas 5 1980: 15)](image-url)
schoolchildren go to Pura Pucak Sari to ask for clear minds before exams, poetry competitions and kakawin recitations. The priest’s wife, Jero Mangku Isteri, the Religion teacher, Pak R., and the son and daughter of the local Dewa Agung (the school captains) went up to the *padmasana* for prayers and the making of *tirta*. The rest of the school settled themselves, sitting lower down in the schoolyard, in the mud, the teachers on mats in a block. The headmaster took no particular role, and the Religion teacher gave directions to the children, in Bahasa Indonesia, to ready themselves with incense and prepare the offerings in the correct order. The girls in particular fussed over the placement of their incense and offerings, while the boys were more inclined to horse around with the matches. However, the overall impression was that in their *pakaian adat*, which many of them did not own and had borrowed from older relatives, they were small adults. After the chanting of the Tri Sandhya, not normally an element in temple ceremonies, and the performance of conventional prayers accompanied with the usual offerings (with cocoons of palm leaf *banten*, then with flowers, then with money), and with the charming accompaniment of *mabasan* (chanting) begun spontaneously by a group of little girls up front, the *tirta* was sprinkled by the Dewa Agung’s son and rice was sprinkled by the Dewa Agung’s daughter. These two were helped by the Religion teacher and Ida Bagus Putu, afore-mentioned polygynous assistant at the school and the son of the candidate for *pedanda*-hood, and they toured the school, sprinkling *tirta* and offering prayers in all the rooms and significant places (field notes, 28.11.92).

There was a very strong commitment among Balinese officials in the Department of Education and Culture and the PHDI, and among teachers, to maintain such teachings, yet the Balinese subjects were accorded little formal recognition at examination time. Students, teachers and parents (the latter a barely considered group of consumers in the Indonesian context) all considered achievement in the Balinese subjects unimportant for success in future life. The subjects included in the nationwide exams, Ebtanas, held at the end of primary school, junior high and senior high school, were Bahasa Indonesia, English, mathematics, natural science, social science and moral Pancasila education. Individual schools set exams in religion and regional language, and also in arts, crafts, sport and health and education in the history of national struggle (field notes, 9.11.92). The curriculum and teaching materials for regional language – in this case, Balinese – were set by the Department of Education and Culture in Bali; the curriculum for the Hindu religion was a national curriculum, with guidelines set in Jakarta, with input from PHDI, but the teaching materials were compiled in Denpasar by a team of officials from the Department of Education and Culture, the Department of Religion, the governor’s office and local religious experts (Interview, Department of Education and Culture, Kanwil, 10.8.92).
The weight and immutability of the Indonesian state was one of the principal messages encountered in schools. By third grade, schoolchildren could understand Bahasa Indonesia; they knew all the symbols, mottoes, songs, pledges and photos associated with the state; they knew the hierarchy of state apparatus, the meaning of citizenship and the identity of their state bapak. By the end of primary school, they knew all 27 provinces and their capitals; they knew the pyramidal structure of the bureaucracy, the details of the constitution, a version of their national struggle for independence and the duties of the model citizen. The education system was extraordinarily successful in extending national consciousness and knowledge to the farthest reaches of the archipelago.

However, the messages were not received undiluted and unmodified. Apathy and cynicism marked Brassika’s ‘celebration’ of nation-marking days such as Heroes’ Day and Independence Day in 1992. That year, the irrelevance of the nation-state to ordinary villagers screamed at me. One public servant commented upon the poor turn-out, ‘We are very temporary citizens.’ (Warga negara sebentar saja.) When even the village head and the heads of banjar did not bother to attend, it was the schoolchildren who carried the burden of citizenship.

‘INDONESIA, OUR STATE’

The weight and immutability of the Indonesian state was one of the principal messages encountered in schools. By third grade, schoolchildren could understand Bahasa Indonesia; they knew all the symbols, mottoes, songs, pledges and photos associated with the state; they knew the hierarchy of state apparatus, the meaning of citizenship and the identity of their state bapak. By the end of primary school, they knew all 27 provinces and their capitals; they knew the pyramidal structure of the bureaucracy, the details of the constitution, a version of their national struggle for independence and the duties of the model citizen. The education system was extraordinarily successful in extending national consciousness and knowledge to the farthest reaches of the archipelago.

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The children were also capable of quiet revolt. Always late for classes, high school students occasionally truanted, wrote graffiti or were otherwise naughty. Boredom was a major problem in classrooms: in 1992 most exercise books were liberally decorated with the scribbles of bored kids and...
it seemed that ‘Guns ‘n’ Roses’ slogans (and the odd ‘F– on you!’ (sic))
ornamented most of the exam papers that year. Sometimes students
interrupted the order of ceremonies: strategically placed knots in the long
grass on the assembly field tripped up the flag-raisers on one occasion, and
once a raucous fart at assembly triggered uncontrollable giggling. These
were not cries of political revolution or secession, but they indicated that
school students variously tested, modified and rejected some aspects,
particularly the regimentation, of school life.

The New Order regime had a Hindu-Javanese vision of an Indonesian
culture which was a single, ‘normal’, relatively homogeneous culture in
which particularist (ethnic) cultural expressions were presented as a
pastiche (e.g. Acciaioli 1985; Lindsey 1993: esp. 172–179; Parker 1992b:
59ff). Schools were probably the single most effective advertising medium
for this national culture. There were several means by which schools
advertised this national culture: by an overbearing emphasis on this rather
banal and featureless culture, by marginalizing and ignoring the regional
cultures and by pastiching the regional cultures, denying their strength and
integrity and thereby making cultural difference a matter of only superficial
importance. The techniques can be seen in the accompanying pictures
taken from school textbooks. Figures 10-6 and 10-7 show a guard house and
a balai desa being constructed by gotong-royong or mutual community help.
These buildings do not belong to any regional style of architecture. The
banality and repeatability of the ubiquitous, national, suburban domestic
architecture are obvious in Figure 10-8. In Figure 10-9, cultural pluralism
involves only a ‘fashion parade’: the presentation of exotic and distinctive
costumes, supposedly unique to various ethnic groups, is usually unaccom-
panied by textual explanation or elaboration. Cultural features – religious buildings, dances, musical instruments and national heroes – were displayed as objek pariwisata, tourist objects – isolated, culturally disembedded and meaningless, but valuable as money-earners from tourists and as symbols of the achievement of national unity.22

School education also involved the teaching of cosmopolitan (especially Western) knowledge, which was usually conflated with Indonesian-ness and modernity. (In this project, school was aided especially by television.) Schoolchildren learned not only certain school habits such as the wearing of uniforms and the practice of military-style drilling, but also modern lifestyle habits such as eating a balanced diet, using toilets instead of irrigation ditches and using contraception to produce only two children. This seductive conflation of modernity and national culture was the dominant cultural paradigm taught in schools. Figure 10-10 is the cover of the textbooks for Bahasa Bali (Balinese Regional Language). It foregrounds the modern boy and girl in school uniform to a receding background of a Balinese temple.
Branson and Miller showed that Balinese secondary school students aspired to the modern jobs publicized by school and government and did not wish to follow traditional village-based occupations such as stone masons, farmers and even priests (Branson and Miller 1984: 277). I conducted a similar survey of 152 junior and senior high school students, asking them in questionnaire format what they would like to do (work at, kerja) after they leave school. Overwhelmingly, young people saw their future in modern occupations requiring education and skills: jobs in the tourist industry were the most popular (21), followed by the health sector (13 doctors, 9 nurses, etc.) and teaching (15), jobs in business/entrepreneurial activities (12) and the public service (12), and a wide variety of modern sector jobs such as...
working for the army or police (11), working in a bank (10), with computers (3), with Telkom (3), as a driver and so on.

Below I reproduce an unusual 1992 fifth grade primary school lesson, unusual because, being a rainy day, it was a sports lesson taken inside, in the classroom, and there were no textbooks for teacher or pupils.

“[You] need food for energy to play sport…” He writes up makanan (food) and the numbers one to five. The children can supply these five foods easily and he writes them on the board.

1 cooked rice (nasi)
2 side dishes (lauk pauk)
3 vegetables (sayur-sayuran)
4 fruits (buah-buahan)
5 milk (susu)

He continues,

“When we move, we use many calories. We need good food, or nutrition. Good food means?”

“Nutrition!” the children answer. He writes “+ vit” on the board...

“Who has already eaten nasi?” he asks.

Most students haven’t.

“Have you bought porridge?”

“Not yet.”

“Do you have sick stomachs?”

“Yes!” everyone yells.

“What is the function of nasi?”

He writes up,

1. growth of the body
2. increase energy or calories
3.?

“What is the third?” he asks.

No one ventures an answer.

“To replace damaged cells.”

Hardly any children are writing anything down, but they are very interested.

“For example, when we have a wound, if we have eaten lots of vitamins it will heal quickly. What vitamins are there in nasi?”

“Vitamin B.” The children know.
“If we have a shortage of Vitamin B, what is the consequence?” He answers himself,
“Beri-beri. Red rice has much Vitamin B. To be complete, we must eat lauk-pauk. What is that?”

The children know meat and fish...

“Do you understand now? Don’t go to sleep! Now, don’t buy sweet ices in the morning, that’s red vomit! That stuff spreads cholera and can cause you to die in fifteen minutes. Water is the seed of cholera, water must be heated.”

“Number three, vegetables. Vitamin C. Green vegetables such as bayam…”

“Number four is fruits. After eating, don’t drink to clean – eat fruit. If you eat bananas, the smell of meat and cabbage disappears. You must then brush your teeth, at least twice daily.”

He gives quite a long lecture on this, demonstrating a vigorous teeth-brushing. All the children act it out, and the teacher picks on one boy who brushes vigorously across his teeth. He makes fun of the boy in a good-humoured way,

“Already in fifth class and he still brushes his teeth like that!”

He explains the purpose of brushing in a rotary fashion, to free the remains of food from between the teeth and to get rid of the foul smell.

“Tomatoes have Vitamin A; pawpaws have Vit C; bananas have Vitamin A; mangga – don’t too much of these or it will cause the big M: Menceret (Diarrhoea),” and he writes a capital M with a circle around it on the board.

“If we have a shortage of Vitamin C what is the consequence?”

No one knows apparently.

“What disease? Don’t be afraid. If you have an opinion, try, it doesn’t matter if you’re wrong. Bleeding gums.”

A boy has wandered out of the classroom without asking permission, as is usual in this class. Actually he is a well-behaved boy. The Sports teacher makes an example of him, beginning while the boy is out of the room. When the boy returns he is understandably confused and blushes. The teacher has been saying that one should say, “Excuse me for a minute, I’m going out back,” rather than going into details about having diarrhoea or something.

“This is enough. It’s not polite (sopan) if you just walk out.”

Then the teacher writes Panca Tertib on the board and asks what that is.
All the children know it is the Five Rules. The teacher says *tertib* is discipline and that if we want to be good pupils this must be memorized. He writes up,

1. *diri-murid teladan* (self-model pupil)
2. *wicara* (talk)
3. *busana* (clothing)
4. *waktu* (time)
5

The children copy this down – they don’t know it and don’t know the meaning of all the words...

“*Diri*: if a teacher says good morning to you on the street, don’t just stand there on one leg with the other leg cocked – answer good morning. Respect is reciprocated.”

The children are trying to work out what the last of the Five Rules is, but to the end the teacher doesn’t tell!

“*Wicara* is ... being polite (*sopan*). If we respect others we get respect and respect ourselves. What is the proof? If we say good afternoon, and the greeting is returned, then *sukses*. *Busana* is *pakaian*, clothing. You must tuck in your shirts! You should oil your hair and comb it, tuck in your shirts, carry your schoolbag, wear shoes – that is *ganteng* (appropriate, smart) in the street.”

He talks about the importance of wearing shoes, not just because of slipperiness, but also because of worms in the mud, especially out the back, i.e. around the Wé-Sé (W.C., toilets). They can enter the pores of the skin and cause thinness of the body, yellowing of the skin and a fat tummy. The teacher draws a rough human figure on the board, it is thin but with a fat tummy, has a mouth but no anus.

“Worms come up and get fat in the tummy.”...

“Now, *waktu*, time. What time do you come to school?”

Some pupils say 7.30, some say 8.00, but the teacher says,

“You should say 7 o’clock, to allow time for cleaning the toilets, sweeping – don’t come at 7.30! The earlier the better! You can always study by yourself in the library.”

Then he talks about the W.C., saying that it’s always smelly. It belongs to everyone, he says, and must be cleaned. There is *kreolin* to dissipate the smell, there in the teacher’s room.

“Don’t piss on the walls!”

The teacher stands side-on to the class and demonstrates how boys should aim carefully, pretending to hold his penis and spray the
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walls! (Many of the children are giggling, the girls covering their mouths and lowering their gazes, many boys are looking at me to see how I’m taking this.) Then the teacher draws a toilet in section and shows them how to aim for the hole so that the toilet doesn’t smell.

“The walls usually smell of piss! Any questions?”

“No,” the children answer.

“You’re just saying that so you can go to morning tea!”

He fills in a bit of time talking about hair – that boys should have short hair. He picks out a couple of boys with short hair and one or two that need to have a hair cut. Girls don’t need to have their hair cut, he says, but it should be tied up.

“Plaits are especially good. Have you ever had nits?” The bell rings, it’s 9.25 a.m.

“Yes,” answer the children.

“Do you all understand?” checks the teacher.

“Yes.”

“Any questions?”

“No!”

“So if we have a test and you get any wrong, watch out!”

The children laugh self-consciously. This teacher is fun. (15.2.92)

I have quoted at length from my field notes of this lesson because the teacher’s monologue enmeshed the fields of health, civility, self- and social respect, hygiene, diet and civic responsibility. It was clear that proper, modern, educated Indonesian citizens had a responsibility to exercise, to eat well, to have only two children, to dress circumspectly, wear shoes, say good morning and piss in the toilet.

CONCLUSION

In Brassika, school, family, community and nation-state were not discrete worlds – the considerable degree of fit and identification that students experienced between these institutions was a measure of the distance travelled away from a society based on family and the local towards a more outward-looking, impersonal and open-ended society.

School education involved not only the learning of factual knowledge but also ways of learning and regimes of obedience and silence, acceptance and questioning. In school, Brassika students absorbed ‘hidden curricula’: they learned that different types of knowledge were categorized as modern and worthwhile while others were old-hat and worthless; they learned how the state groups and streams different genders, classes and ethnic groups;
they learned that the individual could be rewarded for particular types of achievements. In school, students learned modern lifestyle habits such as eating a balanced diet and using toilets and contraception.

Student essays and school life reveal both the strength of school teachings about the state and citizenship and ‘deviant’ student understandings and practices. Cok. Wow did not seem too restrained by the model of docility presented by Budi, but, generally, children and teenagers were extraordinarily polite, obedient and orderly. The model of family life presented in school teachings was considerably at variance from real-life domestic arrangements in Brassika, but one could see the changes as children brought home new ideas and introduced them into their own households.

When undirected and without textbook information, young students produced interesting essays describing the richness of everyday life in the hamlet (banjar). However, when ‘guided’ by textbooks and teachers, their essays on ‘the village’ (desa) became self-conscious and somewhat anxious reports to a superior, preoccupied with the weight and hierarchy of government and authority, and concerned to convey the progressiveness of
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their local version of the Village of Like-to-Progress. They faithfully reproduced government ambivalence towards ‘the village’. On the one hand, they represented the village as the wellspring of Indonesian-ness: close to nature and the bounty of God, villages were the rice-bowl of the nation. Village people were simple folk and the repository of traditional moral values. They had only one aim, the production of food for their nation. They cooperated in good times and bad, through reciprocal labour and consensual decision-making, in this national effort. On the other hand, villages must progress: village people must adopt new technologies and practise family planning; children must study hard to advance to the next class; villagers must learn new habits of sanitation, personal hygiene and diet in order for the nation to become clean, prosperous and healthy.

Student essays on ‘Bali, Island of the Gods’ presented a Bali that simultaneously reeked of totalitarian regimentation under a strict bureaucratic hierarchy and appealed to foreign tourists because of its tropical natural beauty and cultural and artistic wealth. One essay sought to synthesize the image of ‘Bali, the island of many gods’ and Pancasila monotheism through the ideology of unifying nationalism. This essay apparently revealed the success of school teachings about the integralist state and authorized tolerance. However, the strength of Balinese culture was obvious in the students’ religious practice. The hallmark of school religious life was the daily offerings brought by schoolgirls, organized, characteristically, by rosters on classroom walls. The apotheosis of this practice was Saraswati Day, when local dress drove out school uniforms, and local political and religious hierarchies prevailed.

It is not surprising, given the content of textbooks and lessons, that student knowledge of the symbols, structures and form of the Indonesian state was considerable. It is also no surprise that students have absorbed, in the classroom and schoolyard, a respect for authority and school-derived knowledge, and acceptance of state hierarchy and imposed discipline, that are only rarely challenged. Students have internalized the modernizing messages of school and TV. Children can wax lyrical about the beauty of the fresh morning air in the village, but they understand that villages are dirty, backward places. They have no desire for village-based jobs. They seek higher education, employment and experience elsewhere. School orients them away from family, home and village and towards the prosperity and comfort of a modern Indonesia of city life, neat suburban bungalows, toilets in tiled bathrooms and tourist dollars. Children are hurried on from family or banjar concerns towards larger, more modern and exterior goals. School messages of model citizenship and the desirability of modernity are inextricably interwoven, and probably inescapably seductive. The Balinese of the future will neither defecate in ditches nor spray in the ‘Wé-Sé’: they will want to aim true in toilets.
NOTES

1. Kumar described the features of India’s ‘textbook culture’:
   1. Teaching in all subjects is based on the textbook prescribed by state authorities;
   2. The teacher has no freedom to choose what to teach …;
   3. Resources other than the textbook are not available in the majority of schools, and where they are available they are seldom used …;
   4. Assessments … are based on the textbook (Kumar 1988: 453).

2. This process is expanded upon in Parker 1997 and 2002a. The latter is a modified version of this chapter.

3. Key words – words that are significant, indicative and binding, and that are inextricably bound up with the problems they are used to discuss – were discussed as an entrance to and exploration of a particular culture. Key words are not definitive in the sense that they encapsulate a fixed meaning. They have a double valency: they have both available and definable meanings and, simultaneously, difficult and developing meanings. There is a range of opinions on this point. Key words, particularly in modern societies, take on a semblance of common sense and shared reality, not least because of mass schooling and the power of mass media, but the extent to which their meaning is fixed and homogeneous is arguable. Illich argues that ‘The set of key words in all modern industrialized languages is homologous. The reality that they interpret is everywhere fundamentally the same’ (Illich 1982: 6). He gives as examples of key words ‘family’, ‘work’ and ‘development’. However, he qualifies this: ‘each modern language has its own set that provides that society’s unique perspective on the social and ideological reality of the contemporary world’ (ibid.)

   For Indonesia the technique of key word analysis has been usefully employed by van Langenberg (1986) in his analysis of Indonesian political culture, by Heryanto (1988) in a discussion of the meaning of ‘development’ and by myself (1992b) in an examination of school textbooks.

4. Supra, Chapter 1. The ideology of an integrated, organic body politic, built upon the ‘family foundation’, was promulgated by nationalist thinkers such as Professor Raden Supomo, an adat legal expert, and Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the educationalist, from the 1920s to the 1940s. Bourchier (1996) traced the idea back to the Leiden Law School and to the German Romantic Movement, debunking the idea that this was a uniquely indigenous set of values. See also Reeve 1990: 157ff.

5. ‘Budi’ resonates well in Bali: as well as a name, it is a common noun meaning good character, virtue and moral thinking. In discussions of caste, for instance, low caste or reformist Balinese arguing in favour of status determined by individual virtue, effort and right action use the term ‘budi’ to contrast these with status based on birth and supposed purity.

6. In textbooks produced since the major curriculum change in 1994 the central character of Budi and the ideal Desa Sukamaju have largely disappeared.

7. See also Leigh 1994; Logsdon 1985; Mulder 2000: 31–100 passim; Parker 1997; and Shiraishi 1997 on family ideology in schools.

8. Asked by a teacher if he wanted to be ‘black-listed’ (the English term was used, meaning that no public school would then accept him as a student), he obligingly answered ‘Yes’. Then, asked if he knew what the ‘black list’ was, replied, ‘No!’ (This little story was recounted to me with much amusement by his friend, the oldest son in our Puri.)

9. Kreativitas was a word much in vogue among younger teachers by 1992, but not in 1981. By 1992, probably the most common questions I was asked by thinking teachers were: what is kreativitas? and how could they teach it?
10. ‘Desa’ was the lowest administrative unit under the Indonesian administration, but in daily life the *banjar* was the key unit of social life. The term ‘*banjar*’ did not, to the best of my knowledge, appear in school textbooks, nor, therefore, in school teaching. In the textbooks there is a sub-village unit, variously called RT (Rukun Tetangga) and *dusun*, and Budi’s father was, of course, the head of his RT. In Brassika, the term ‘*banjar*’ was gradually giving way to ‘*dusun*’ as the government increasingly penetrated daily life.

11. I would like to thank Paul Tickell for pushing me to reflect upon the school composition, and the style of writing therein, as a cultural production.

12. See Hooker 1993: 272–293 for an incisive description of the dangers of New Order language policy. The overly prescriptive ‘*baik dan benar*’ language development policy was ‘successful’ to the point where the use of Indonesian as a medium for personal and emotional communication was threatened.

13. At that time, Bali was first mentioned by name in social science (IPS) lessons in grade 4 in Mugiyan et al. n.d. vol. 4A: 10–11.

14. All 13 children mentioned *sawah* and study groups; 12 mentioned *pembangunan* (usually understood as *bangunan*, buildings, such as *balé banjar*, temples and houses) and 11 mentioned craftwork such as basket-making (an activity in that area).

15. The textbook original includes a song entitled ‘My Village’, which the children were enjoined to sing together:

    My Village
    My beloved Village
    Object of my heart’s adoration
    The place of my father and mother
    And of my friends

    It’s not easy to forget
    Not easy to be separated
    Always I long for you
    My beautiful Village

    (ibid.: 72)

16. The children who copied from friends or from the textbook were not considered to be cheating – a concept I never heard discussed in a Balinese classroom. Rather, it was considered normal for children to work in groups, in class and at night when doing homework, and to share equipment, textbooks and knowledge. Students congregated with their classmates and worked cooperatively to find the answers to their sums, learn their tables or anatomy or answer their comprehension questions. A ‘*Strongking*’, a kerosene-powered pressure lamp, in any household, *banjar* or even *warung*, was likely to be the centre of a ring of intertwined kids still in uniform, sprawled on floors, steps and stools, scribbling earnestly, reading out loud in groups or reciting tables en masse. Ties among classmates were often very strong and longlasting, and students of all ages liked to do their ‘homework’ with friends, often not at home. Middle-aged adults had no hesitation in re-activating a friendship with a classmate for some business or family matter.

17. See Leigh 1991 for more on ‘weak classification’ and ‘strong framing’.

18. Only five ethnic groups in Indonesia taught their own regional language: the Javanese, the Sundanese, the Madurese, the Balinese and the Bugis in South Sulawesi.

19. I included the phrase ‘Our State’ (Negara Kita) because it was so often used in textbooks as a tag to ‘Indonesia’, no doubt to instill a sense of common ownership. See Parker (1992b: 59).

20. As early as 1980, Brassika village schools were equipped with new maps incorporating East Timor as an Indonesian province.


23. There are several reports of Balinese distaste for manual labour, especially paid manual labour (Duff-Cooper 1991 and 1993: 206; Gerdin 1982: 206ff; Hobart 1980: 88), but these must be balanced against Balinese valorization of rice-farming and the traditional ‘measure of man’: the amount of sawah owned and the ability of a man to farm. In Brassika, to work one’s own sawah was a respectable occupation, but a white-collar worker might have looked down upon it because it was physically difficult and dirty work.

24. The question was open-ended: there were no occupational categories provided. Only six boys answered that they would like to work as farmers, and only one girl said unequivocally that she wanted to work in dance or crafts; there were no would-be priests, dalang (wayang puppeteers) or stone masons. There were a small number of both girls and boys (5 and 6) who would engage in trade.
SECTION VI

Conclusion
CHAPTER 11

Conclusion

In the beginning of this book, I posed the question: How is the integration of an isolated, traditional Balinese village into the Indonesian nation-state to be explained, if not by the action of a hegemonic, omnipotent state? Thinking of the need of nation-states to continually re-create themselves through their member parts, I asked: How can the view from Brassika help us to understand the longevity of the New Order? In the body of the book, multiple answers have been implied and supplied.

I have argued that, despite the dark totalitarian forces of military intelligence and surveillance, the threat of violence and the intrusions of government, villagers’ experience of the Indonesian state has not been one of menace and coercion. The creation of the postcolonial nation-state of Indonesia has not been simply the automatic response by society to stimulus by a strong state. The success of the New Order in incorporating this Balinese village has been very much due to the all-encompassing nature of the regime. It has reached into all aspects of village life – agriculture, education, health, transport, housing, food, clothing, cultural and religious life, health and reproduction, employment – and transformed them all.

In some arenas, such as in the provision of educational, health and contraceptive services, the enlightened civilization of the nation-state was much in demand. In the realm of schooling, villagers’ desire for literacy, numeracy and modernity overlapped with the local Dewa Agung’s understanding of his modernizing responsibilities and urge to patronage. It was his royal duty to have those early schools built and attended. Villagers increasingly saw schooling as the way to acquire modern competencies and occupational fitness for a future, post-agricultural economy. The state-building impetus of independent Indonesia created its own slipstreaming effect, sucking in first the elite sons and daughters, then gradually peasants’ sons and even daughters, such that now all children are subject to the processes of citizen-construction in school.
The government project of creating an educated 'human resource base' while crafting good Indonesian citizens through schooling coincided in some degree with villagers' desires for literacy and vocational fitness. Particular versions of modernity and national consciousness were taught to schoolchildren. 'Tolerance' is one example: children were taught that tolerance of religious, ethnic and cultural diversity was 'a good thing', but that without the intervention of government to regulate and control diversity, anarchy would ensue. The amount of cultural diversity allowed was slight and tended towards the cosmetic; the depth of understanding of cultural differences was shallow indeed; and the extent to which religious difference was tolerated was limited. Though there is considerable evidence of a successful programme of instilling national values and understandings in children, these messages were variously received. Attention to Balinese identity in the broadly homogeneous national school curriculum was scant, but when given the opportunity, local people innovated enthusiastically in *kakawin*-reciting competitions and richly symbolic Saraswati Day rituals.

Similarly, the people’s desire for healthy children overlapped with the government’s interest in developing a healthy human resource base and eventually effected a programme of primary health care, most notably of immunizations against childhood diseases. There was not a perfect fit between the government’s goal of population reduction and women’s contraceptive needs but their coincidence has usually been fortuitous. Of course large hiatuses exist in the provision of contraceptive services, largely because of this disparity in motives. In particular, women need more personalized treatment and improved access to information about a wide range of contraceptive choices and their consequences.

The national project of development was ostensibly devised to effect a drastic improvement in people’s material well-being. It was also devised to achieve certain ideological effects: the uniting of an impoverished and conflicted populace, and the distracting and depoliticizing of an overheated and radicalized community. Until recently, most social scientists judged the government’s project a significant success, on all these fronts. A not inconsequential effect was the identification of the interests of large, newly-wealthy sections of the population, the middle classes, with the interests of the nation-state.

Because of these and other confluences, villagers in Brassika usually accommodated themselves to the dense net of bureaucratic intrusion and surveillance which was woven into village life. Indeed, for the most part, it was local people who knotted the net: they intruded and monitored, trading upon pre-existing social networks, activating ‘feodal’ ties of masterdom and serfdom, and transforming bureaucratic processes into personalized, asymmetric services. Not infrequently, the sons of the royal and priestly houses benefited from their inherited positions of privilege and power, reproducing premodern hierarchies within the modern state. It was the local
Dewa Agung in his position as well-oiled universal joint articulating state and village who best exemplified this.

The question of modernity arises at this point. How could villagers describe themselves as 'moderen' and 'maju' when development was, for the most part, implemented along the lines described by the feodal, kaula–gusti relationship? What constituted 'the modern' in Brassika? What was moderen and maju about Brassika?

The people of Brassika employed Janus-faced cultural resources which were both obedient to the strong state of Indonesia and irrelevant and anachronistic. Brassika was simultaneously an embodiment of an anterior premodern epoch and an exemplar of contemporary Indonesia. Modernity originated outside the village, in the capitalist and bureaucratic relations of the modern state and international community. From within Brassika, it seemed that much of the success of the Indonesian nation-state in penetrating and incorporating village society was due to the conflation of modernity and nation-state in the perception of villagers. The institutions of modernity – mass education, taxation systems based on control of land not labour, impersonalized, individual-based ‘democratic’ forms of government, public health systems – had been introduced by the Dutch colonial regime and Indonesianized after Independence. It was the strength of the local cultural domain that allowed it to appropriate the terms moderen and maju and use them to embrace and manipulate those aspects of modernity – fertilizers, motorbikes, schooling, contraception, immunizations against disease – that it desired. It could even naturalize aspects of development to its local forms. The limits on the satisfaction of these desires were, of course, many, but so too were the limits of the unsuccessfully hegemonic nation-state. The role of the local elite in capturing and manipulating the emblems of modernity was vital.

There is no doubt also that the role of the local elite in establishing the 'New Order' in Brassika in 1965–66 was crucial. The post-Gestapu massacres created terrible memories and traumas, unseen now in the harmonious daily life of this poised people. There were so many killings – and so brutal was their manner and so bitter the backlash against radical popular politics – that for the bereaved families and friends of the slain, a 'New Order' may have seemed a comparative safe harbour. For those complicit in the murders, the valorization of their deeds by their patron state has laundered the stains but not disinfected the wounds. One fears that these are malignant.

In Brassika the significance of the massacres is not simply that they caused trauma and anger and loss. Ordinary people felt such emosi – such anger and injustice and passion – that they were emboldened to commit murders of their own people. Today, the explanations of the murderers and the complicit are not just of emosi – they are primarily statements about the restitution of Balineseness. At the time, the heated discourse was of
archaic rights to land and of opposition to feudal privilege. But now, the statements emphasize the social rupture and division that prevailed, the improper conflicts within families and hamlets, the abandonment of religious devotion.  

They are statements of religiosity, purity and cleanliness, of the rightness of stratified society, of proper loyalties and of social and religious duties and obligations.

The modernizing and yet-to-be-modernized subjects of my research had created their own complex domain. While they were happy for now to participate in nation-building, I had the sense that if the grand narrative of the nation-state should be found wanting, these ‘temporary citizens’ would have their own alternative resources – their religion, histories, language, communal ties and economic base – to draw upon. Some citizens had other, more sinister resources to mobilize: some had Madame Defarge-like diaries in which they had recorded the real votes in national elections or their version of village meetings; some had kept scrap-books into which they had glued newspaper clippings; some government officials had ‘the real statistics’ kept locked in the bottom drawer of the desk. Similarly, the power of the Kanda Mpat, the Four Siblings that accompany each baby from birth, and the anti-modernist and anti-rationalist beliefs in sorcery and witchcraft maintain a premodern domain to which modern Western biomedicine has no access.

Indonesia today, especially when viewed from afar via the medium of television, is a much less solid polity than it was in 1992 or 1980. The gravitational forces are far weaker now than at any time since 1966. A couple of its constituent parts, though not Bali, appear increasingly likely to spin off; others have already gained a much more independent status vis-à-vis the Jakarta centre. As Chatterjee wrote, the problem is to find, against the grand narrative of history itself, the cultural resources to negotiate the terms through which people, living in different, contextually defined, communities, can coexist peacefully, productively, and creatively within large political units. (Chatterjee 1993: 237–238)

Events within Indonesia since late 1997 have signalled the rupture of state and government and demonstrated the fragility of the nation-state. Hopes for a thorough-going clean-up of corruption in the government, judiciary and bureaucracy are more or less dead, and the ideals of participatory democracy which swept away Suharto have been prudently downgraded as a result of the constant upheavals of the last few years. Some commentators believe that the question now is the continued existence of the nation-state of Indonesia, although I am not among them. School lessons are remarkably effective! Some believe that the idea of ‘the
Indonesian nation’ has lost its integrity. A host of alternative futures for Indonesia is now possible. The question directs attention to the tragic borderlands of Aceh and West Papua, and the conflagration of resource politics, religious intolerance and ethnic/migrant tensions in Maluku and elsewhere, fanned by a desperate military.

But is there also a question mark over the loyalty of even the heartlands of Java and Bali with their ‘floating masses’? That question mark implies a critique of the twin bases of New Order longevity: developmentalism and stability. Both have been discredited, but from different sources. Local exegesis of the failure of the globalized economy as it developed within Indonesia blames not only the corruption of the First Family but also the international capitalists who could casually dip their ladles into and out of poorly protected economies. It was a critique of irresponsible, free market capitalism. The failure of development brings about the failure of the second base, stability, for many Indonesians invested heavily – their careers, fortunes, futures, children – in the alliance of the domestic state with international capitalism. The event that ultimately brought down Suharto was not the discovery of mass civilian graves in Aceh, or the murder of independence fighters in the mountains of New Guinea, or even the attempted genocide of two-hundred-thousand East Timorese over 20 years of dislocation and famine, but the shooting of six university students in Jakarta. The New Order government stupidly (or by design) shot six children of its own middle class and thereby lost the loyalty and faith of a nation.

As I write, at the end of 2002, faith in development appears not to have abated in Bali. In Bali at least, it appears there is development life after Krismon, September 11 and the Bali bombings. The hideous state-of-the-art ‘tourism object’, Garuda Wisnu Kencana, a US$150 million ‘integrated cultural park’, has been refinanced (by local as well as Chinese interests), and part is already operational. An agreement with China allows 300,000 Chinese tourists to visit Bali from 2002 – a welcome substitute for the American tourists who cancelled after September 11. Recent press reports express concern that the Balinese language is dying out, with parents rushing to educate their children in foreign languages (and Indonesian). It’s business as usual in Bali.

The acceptance speech of Megawati Sukarnoputri on becoming Vice-President on 21 October 1999 included the following:

To my children throughout the Homeland, I ask that you return wholeheartedly to your work. Do not act emotionally, for at this podium, you can see your mother standing here… (Ziv 2001: 73 [my translation])

The comforting language of the family and the plea to avoid emosi – the sign of disorder – are familiar to us from the New Order. One can imagine their
appeal in village Bali. While the populist rise of Megawati, and her succession to the presidency, might appear a nationally integrative factor for the Mega-mad Balinese, there is evidence that her popularity is now waning. The dubious influence of her husband and other elements of the PDI-P, the continuing violence and instability of other parts of the country (which is bad for business), the overweening violence and ambition of the army and continuing corruption and economic pressures work against her even in her Balinese stronghold. The decentralization of administration and budgets should work in Bali’s favour, but it is not hard also to see fertile ground for corruption and nepotism. The demand for rapid economic returns rather than environmental sustainability or respect for local culture may prove irresistible. In fact, many of the patterns of development which prevailed in Brassika in the New Order can be expected to prevail Bali-wide.

What apparently remains intact in Bali is the idea of Indonesia as an integral, sovereign nation-state. In both Brassika and Jakarta, Indonesia is still an idea that commands loyalty and pride among its subject citizens. The story told within this book suggests that the story of Indonesia requires retelling and re-fashioning. The story is an open-ended one.

NOTE

1. One of the questions in the village survey asked respondents what, in their opinion, were the most important changes in the village since he/she was a child. Almost all respondents answered along developmentalist lines: greater prosperity, electricity, improved schooling, water, transport, etc. A member of the lower gentry, taking some time, responded thoughtfully, 'The attitude of respect (hormat) towards the triwangsa has increasingly declined.'
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