Pedagogy today mainly refers to the kind of theoretical and empirical research which is based on a concept of objectivity or oriented at the principle of consensus deriving from reading social reality as if it were a text (cp. "linguistic turn") - it is to say: as if social reality is ruled by completeness, closeness, unambiguity and linearity (Oser 1997, Wulf 2007). The praxeology of pedagogical thinking and practice is then more or less reduced to certain norms, definite interventions in well-defined pedagogical situations. Today in the frame of school, to impart available knowledge and abilities oriented at certain objectives is regarded as the main aim. In general, pedagogical as well as pedagogically intended knowledge and abilities are broadly interpreted as psychometric competencies.

In this view, the more tacit side of pedagogical sceneries as the implicit meanings of spoken and written statements, modes of body-communication and -interaction, inexplicable knowledge, iconic representations, didactical operations and commodities as well as architectural environments is more or less neglected. These tacit dimensions of pedagogy constitute a sort of incidental scenery. This scenery might open, grant or might also close the significant ways of teaching and learning; it might empower learners and teachers in understanding, transcending and creating the world or constrain them in doing this.

Diverse phenomenological, constructivist and post-structural perspectives even regard reflection itself as a "secondary experience", ciphered out from a basic pre-reflexive multiplicity, e.g. of experiences. Thus, finding ourselves in a concrete situation, we tend to complete our actual experiences by interpreting the explicit, i.e. by reconstructing the invisible sides of the situation, realizing the unsaid as it is revealed, and by focusing on issues read between the lines. In doing so we often recur to a corporally conveyed experiential knowledge, and we come back to it whenever we want to decide whether or how something makes sense to us. Thus, there seems to be a tacit side of getting insights and scientific examination.

By taking over an empirical-praxeological perspective our group mainly attends to the question how social practices constitute a (binding) reality. Of special interest is the question to what extent tacit dimensions are part of this process.

As a methodology, praxeology refers to approaches in the field of "Sociology of Culture" (Bourdieu, Reckwitz), "Sociology of Knowledge" (Mannheim, Bohnsack) and the "Chicago School" (Mead, Goffman et al.). It has its roots in phenomenological (Alfred Schütz et al.), in interpretative-hermeneutical approaches (Berger, Luckmann, Geertz, Goffman), in semiotic-structuralistic (Saussure, Eco, Foucault), pragmatical (Peirce et al.) und analytical approaches (Wittgenstein).

In pedagogy, the term praxeology connected to names as Josef Derbolay, Dietrich Benner et al. A praxeological theory conceptualizes sociality as an anthropological fact, generated in dynamic and relational processes. In social practices and contextual structures orders are transmitted, constituted and created/established. The focus lies on corporal, performative and on the emergent aspects of the practices by which "substantiality" (Wirklichkeit) is generated. "Substantiality" is, beside others, faceted as the logic of practice (Bourdieu), as the meaningful other (Mead), as the social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann) and as the spaces of common experience (Mannheim). A praxeological approach reconstructs social practices in order to reveal their underlying levels of meaning. This entails the transition of the question from what (happens) to how (realities is constituted) which implicates to leave aside objectivistic claims of truth and presumptions of subjective motives.

**Indicative areas of research:**

- What does it mean to take over a praxeological perspective in the field of empirical social research?
- Methodologies and methods in the qualitative empirical reconstruction of "Tacit Dimensions of Pedagogy", as questions like:
  - How can praxeological aspects in pedagogy be grasped?
  - What kind of data can be regarded as fitting to an explorative approach, i.e. participant observation (e.g. audio-/videography)?
  - How can the relation between explicit and implicit phenomena be investigated and empirically captured?
  - How can implicit processes of practices be documented?
  - How can implicit processes of practices be analyzed? How can e.g. body-language, body-communication and body-interaction be deciphered?
  - How can implicit relations between several persons be explored?
- How do iconic representations, architectural and ecological environments, didactic settings, time structures and other tacit aspects of everyday life influences pedagogical practices?
Praxeology and Phenomenology – a Difficult Relationship

Anja Kraus

Tacit dimensions of pedagogy are meant to challenge its explicit side. The explicit side of pedagogy covers e.g. univocal pedagogical rules and tasks, well-defined operations and interventions as well as distinct pedagogical situations. Tacit accentuations, implicit meanings, forms of nonverbal communication and interaction as e.g. a hidden curriculum, inexplicable knowledge, iconic or spatial/architectural representations etc. are supposed to undermine, modify as well as challenge the explicit aspects of pedagogy. The terms “tacit”, “hidden”, “implicit”, “nonverbal”, “inexplicable” etc. - I will introduce the term “absent” - already give a general hint to the variety of the tacit aspects of a pedagogical situation constituting a sort of incidental scenery. In educational practice, this scenery might open and even grant, or it might also close significant ways of educating and learning; tacit factors might empower learners and pedagogues in understanding and creating the world or they might constrain them in doing this. In order to work out the tacit scenery scientifically not only diverse tacit phenomena, but also practical-operative aspects linked with them as well as epistemological-methodological questions are to be considered. These are the already well-known basics of our common work plan.

When I looked for the topic of my presentation, I primarily thought of Pierre Bourdieu’s critique on Husserls and Schütz’ phenomenology as a transcendental epistemology. In contrast to that, newer German phenomenologists as Bernhard Waldenfels and Käte Meyer-Drawe, who fundamentally put the autonomy of the subject and the free will into brackets and in question, made a great effort to work out the limitations of knowing and insight. During my further examinations, I realised that later German positions in praxeology namely that of Dietrich Benner are rather near to the position of bodily phenomenology. The common ground of praxeology and phenomenology turned out to be much broader than I originally thought. It is based on the argument that the everyday orientation and here a kind of practical sense is the thing to start with in anthropology, pedagogy and epistemology.

Thus, the question I will focus on in my presentation is: how is orientation in learning processes modelled in the phenomenological concept of Meyer-Drawe and in the praxeological concept Benner? In order to get in sight the diversity of tacit phenomena in general as well as to grasp some qualifying notions of these phenomena and some important epistemological-methodological questions, I at fist will unfold a metatheoretical viewpoint developed by Patrick Fuery (1995). In his concept the multi-layered multiplicity of the incidental tacit scenery mentioned above is displayed.

Fuery (1995) introduces the term “absence” as an operative tool to analyse recent philosophical, in the first instance existentialist, psychoanalyst and post-structuralist theories. Beyond that, the term is supposed to allow for the reflection of “[...] the various systemic and interpretative models [...] in general,] including the ideological, hermeneutic, ontological, and political”1 views.

Fuery states that on one hand a relation of absence and presence is formed by theory. On the other hand this relation in a way founds a methodology and an epistemological approach. However, read as an operative distinction the way how absent factors effect things at hand and the other way round and hereby diverse structures, variations, discrepancies and other disparate contexts can be conceptualized. Fuery calls his system “heterology of absence”. He writes: “Presence is valued, held up, invested with power, and so can be said to have a pervasive quality”2, whereas and while “absence” functions differently. Though presence is supposed to be simply at hand, absence is evidently dependent on its status or spe-

1 Fuery 1995, p.8
2 Fuery 1995, p.1
cial shaping. That is to say, an absent thing can be absent in the sense of being isolated, being lost, passed, displaced, suppressed, something can be absent in the sense of being indefinite, incomprehensible or uncatchable etc. Anyway, Fuery works out that not only presences, but also absences generate, organize, disclose or modify issues by influencing the qualities of a thing.³ In our context we regard the shaping or the qualifying notions of absence as equivalent to the practical-operative aspects linked with tacit dimensions.

Thus, Fuery unfolds the following qualifying notions of absence (one could prolong the list):
- Firstly, “negation” and “repression” (as Freud or Kristeva put it);
- secondly, the signifying order of “négatités” (see Sartre);
- thirdly, the absence as “Aufhebung” or “cancellation” (Derrida) or as the “order of desire” (Lacan);
- fourthly, absences may indicate something that is not said, expressed, present etc.

Modeling the approach of P. Fuery

On one hand it is possible that “absence”, e.g. qualified by negation or by repression, is derived from a state of presence. Then it is figured either as potentially present, respectively as held-in-readiness, or it is something denied providing, sheltering or validating something that in contrast is not rejected, but present, valid, available.

On the other hand absence can even be the sine qua non of a certain state of presence, to think of négatités understood as the outlines of an existent entity (Sartre) as e.g. the outlines of what a phenomenon or somebody is not. Absence can be figured also as the condition of a certain state of presence, when it covers statū like “unforeseeable”, “spontaneous”, “genuine”, “occurrent” (see Derrida), or when it denotes the lack of something causing the desire to be remedied (Lacan).

Furthermore, absences may explicitly indicate something that is not yet here, something that is excluded, extinguished, omitted etc.

In short, according to Fuerys hypothesis the fundamental parameters of each concept can principally be traced back to the relation of absence and presence, to tacit and explicit dimensions presupposed in a theory.

Here, the system of Fuery serves me as a conceptual ground to unfold the tacit and the explicit dimensions in pedagogy. My special aim is to trace the tacit phenomena and their practical-operative aspects in the phenomenological theory of Käte Meyer-Drawe and in the praxeological approach of Dietrich Benner.

³ Fuery 1995, p.7
Here I will focus on their understanding of the experience of learning and sketch some epistemological and methodological figures in their approaches. Then I will delineate a critique of their approaches.

Meyer-Drawe (2008) regards the experience of learning as a tacit phenomenon. According to her, learning can only roughly be shaped as a so-to-say “négatité” by referring to its circumstances or to its results. Learning arises spontaneously. It is an occurrence, while its beginning is never obvious. It is not possible to gather or gain acknowledgements, insights and understandings. “Human learning starts with a rejection.”

Like every human experience learning involves multiple disruptions, chiasms, fissures, distances. Meyer-Drawe points out that these diverse gaps in an experience lead to the character of being befallen, meeting a happening, to which we’re committed without being able to help it. The perturbations, irritations and imbalances that are connected to each of our experiences cause a fundamental alienation within ourselves. Maurice Merleau-Ponty to whom Meyer-Drawe refers gets it to the point: “One perceives, not I perceive”.

There is something perceived and the origin of a perception is not clear. Meyer-Drawe writes: “Experience is a silver-tongued silence, a reliable and unquestionable belief in the world. Reflection does not start before this belief is shaken and things lose their sense here by regaining significance. Thinking has to face the genesis of its own sense making.”

This model of experience accentuates the moment of caring for oneself as a part of our conduct of life understood as an effort, not least the effort to catch up reflectively with the events of sense-making. Learning is thus situated immediately at a fissure line inside the learning subject, which is at the same time an inevitable fault line. According to the phenomenological concept of learning it is a blind spot or better contour in our experiential field. This in the end leads Meyer-Drawe to her interpretation of the situation of learning is a likewise narcotic including a painful encountering with oneself, as we do not know what we have to learn, unless we already have learnt it and at the same time we have to realise that we know more than we’re able to express.

In a learning process former knowledge has to be rejected, alien features invade into familiar contexts.

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4 Meyer-Drawe 2005, p.31
5 Merleau-Ponty 1966, S.253
7 Meyer-Drawe 2005, p.190 cites Polanyi 1985
Then, for a sudden, things are making sense in a kind of archaic and persistent way, as if this sense had been there forever. In this process, diverse conflicts arise inside a person. Nevertheless, learning has to be aspired and even resolutely wanted - otherwise the awareness as an integral factor of learning would not emerge. - This special effort and this need has only one moment to stick on: the inchoative character of an event.\footnote{Meyer-Drawe 2005, p.155} It is to say: We´re not the starting point and not the center of our own learning. „To begin without a beginning is possible as a response: [writes Andreas Dörrpinghaus] a responding human being is moving something by being moved.”\footnote{„Ein Anfang ohne Anfang ist möglich als Antwort; der Mensch als Antwortender ist ein Beweger, der bewegt wird.” (Dörrpinghaus 2003, S.456)} Learning has a responsive character, responding to former knowledge, to new influences etc. The willingness and abilities to respond are here regarded as the only possible reference in the context of learning. The experiental rupture described above passes through this responsivity, even making it possible. In consequence, the willingness to learn which we normally refer to reflection and understanding is not only modeled as an intention, but also as a disposition and at the same time it is a happening. From the phenomenological view, reflection is regarded as a “secondary experience”, ciphered out from the basic pre-reflexive multiplicity of our experiences. Thus, finding ourselves in a concrete situation, our effort is to complete it by qualifying it, reconstructing the invisible sides of the situation, realizing the unsaid as it is revealed, focusing on issues read between the lines etc. In doing so we recur to a corporally conveyed experiental knowledge and we come back to it, whenever we want to decide, whether or how something makes sense to us. The phenomenological method, the epoché, is the mode how tacit aspects work as indices. In other words, the epoché reveals insights as tacit processes.

Also Dietrich Benner (2005) points out the productivity of negative experiences in pedagogical situations. In the tradition of the rather positivistic praxeological movement he does not place this negativity inside our experiental field and in the process of experiencing as such. He speaks of positive and negative experiences, whereas he connotes negative experiences in the context of “Bildung” positively. Here, he regards knowing and non-knowing, being-competent and not-being-competent, being-familiar-with and being-bewildered or being-irritated as elements of one and the same process, thus, learning is characterised as a quest or search. A learning process according to Benner starts in a kind of no man´s land, in the disappointment of a certain previous knowledge.\footnote{Benner 2005, p.12}
By restructuring the knowledge, accompanied by irritations, by neediness and other negative experiences a learning process takes place. Then, all by the sudden and everlasting, the negative experiences and the left-behind-knowledge in a learning process are forgotten. In a kind of cancellation the crisis inside a learning process is suddenly and blindly transformed into ability.

In order to educate or to teach somebody one has to know about the negative experiences in a learning process and also about this kind of cancellation.

I come to my critical reflections on the approach of Meyer-Drawe and that of Dietrich Benner: Meyer-Drawes hypothesis of a fundamental alienation within ourselves more or less levers out the possibility to regard real existing power structures and their reproduction as the common ground for our practical sense (cp. Pierre Bourdieu and other praxeologists). Furthermore, repression and denial do not play a role in a learning process unless they are figured as oblivion. Thus, there is no dimension of resistance on one hand. On the other hand, the possibility of a common knowledge or a common sense is more or less omitted.

Benner points out that the confrontation with negativity is the case in processes of learning and Bildung, while he uses these terms equivalently. Other experiences than learning and Bildung are supposed to be much more present, objective and distinct, ruled by knowledge.

Here we can stick to Georg Breidenstein (2008) who writes about praxeology as a specific empirical approach: „The social dimensions in praxeological approaches are not any more, as classical theories of action, assumed as and located in normative orientations or, as in rational choice-approaches, in decisions of the acteurs, but in everyday-practices that are ruled by practical knowledge and practical abilities. That is to say a practice is the smallest element of the social world; she is a routinised ‘nexus of doings and sayings’ (Schatzki 1996, S.89) by which implicit practical understanding (stressed by the author) is supported and drawn up. By accentuating practices the viewpoint is disentangled from the acteurs. The question is not who carries out which kind of practice, but in contrary who or what is involved in a specific practice. Human bodies as well as artifacts are thematised as participants of practices (Hirschauer 2004). Thus, the praxeological perspective insists on the materiality of happenings: ‘A practice consists of certain routinised movements and activities of the body’ (Reckwitz 2003, S.290).“

Furthermore he points out that the praxeological perpective includes the hypothesis, „[...] that social practices do not arise solely, moreover the social world builds up loosely linked complexes of practices“12. Thus, activities are always imbedded in a social context and balanced out intersubjectively. Thus, practices are connected to socially mediated personal inclinations. Each practice has its conditions in a specific social context. Sociality is conceptualized as an anthropological fact, generated in dynamic and relational processes. In social practices and contextual structures, orders are transmitted, constituted and created as well as established. The focus here lies on corporal, performative and emergent aspects of the practices by which substantiality or reality is generated. A praxeological approach reconstructs social practices and their effects. This entails the

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12 RECKWITZ 2003, S.295
transition of the question from what (happens) to how (reality is constituted), which implicates to leave aside as well objectivistic claims of truth as well as presumptions about subjective motives. While in the praxeological approaches of Benner and Breidenstein more forcedly than by Meyer-Drawes viewpoint societal living conditions and the common knowledge are taken into account, there is, correspondingly, no obvious Anhaltspunkt to describe processes of inner repression or such of resistance. While Meyer-Drawe looks at responsivity as a general phenomenon the social embeddedness of our being presupposed in the praxeological approach described above more or less leaves aside its material, spatial, emotional aspects.

Acknowledgements


