3. The Nordic Threat:  
Soviet Ethnic Cleansing on the Kola Peninsula

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It’s the hidden enemy, whom we don’t know, who is dangerous. 
We know all the people [in this report] and have files on them. 
The day will come when we’ll settle accounts with them. 
Stalin (cited in Bazhanov 1990: 93)

Access to previously unavailable sources from Soviet archives has brought 
to light a little-known history, namely ‘national operations’ of the Soviet 
secret police (NKVD) and the deportation of minorities, one of the central 
features of Stalinist repression (Samuelson and Sorokin 2007: 739–56). 
Local studies have already provided a deeper understanding of the nature 
and mechanism of this repression (Vatlin 2004; Kotljarchuk 2012a). However, most previous studies have been concerned with large minority groups (Iwanow 1991; Mann 2005; Dönninghaus 2009) or with the deportation of minorities during the Second World War (Nekrich 1978; Sword 1994; Poljan 2004). This chapter focuses on the inter-related phases and dimensions of state-run violence in a short-term and long-term perspective and on a case uncharted by previous research. Investigating local material in the broader context, it examines Soviet large-scale violence towards Nordic minorities of the Polar area as a gradual process of ethnic cleansing. It also reconsiders the ways in which the Soviet state dramatically changed the population structure of the Kola Peninsula and fully integrated this region into the ‘pure’ Russian context.

Historians have put forward many explanations for the mass repression 
of various ethnic groups committed by the Soviet Union; two approaches 
are particularly relevant. Most scholars focus on the security dilemma in the 
border area, suggesting the need to secure the ethnic integrity of Soviet
space vis-à-vis neighbouring capitalistic enemy states. They stress the role of international relations and believe that representatives of ‘western minorities’ were killed not because of their ethnicity, but rather because of their connection to countries hostile to the USSR and the fear of disloyalty in case of an invasion (Werth 2003: 215–39; Mann 2005: 318–28; Kuromiya 2007: 141–3). Other scholars argue that the Soviet terror against minorities was actually genocide based on ethnic criteria (Nekrich 1978; Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 79–80; Kostiainen 1996: 332–41; Naimark 2010; Snyder 2010: 92–108). However, previous historiography usually analyses the Great Terror, deportations during the Second World War, administrative and cultural discrimination, and the cleansing of cultural landscapes separately.

The main idea in the present study is the use of the theoretical framework of Holocaust and genocide studies for analysing Soviet state-run repression on the Kola Peninsula and examining this as a continuing process, with a particular concern for ethnic violence. As Norman Naimark (2010: 11) has pointed out, “implicit in any evaluation of Stalin’s mass killing of the 1930s is our knowledge and understanding of the horrors of the Holocaust”. The theoretical model developed by the author for this study is based on the ethnic violence approach – the investigation of different phases and dimensions of genocidal strategy (Chapman 1994; Martin 1998; Dulić 2005; Naimark 2001; Jones 2011). This model sees ethnic violence as a gradual political process that is divided into the following phases and dimensions:

**Diagram 1: Phases of ethnic violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: Preparation and conceptualisation of mass violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registration of members and mapping of minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda of hatred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 2: Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organised massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroying of economic, cultural, and religious life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of normal family life and reproduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase 3: Cleansing of cultural traces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intentional destruction of native heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning of cultural landscape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory politics of forgetting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The first phase concerns the preparation and conceptualisation of state-run mass violence. The crucial question is how an ideology of hatred is formulated by the political leadership and then mediated to the local authorities and the broader public through official documentation and mass media. The second phase relates to the technology and short-term effects of mass killing and deportation. The last phase bears on the long-term results of the destruction, the cleansing of cultural landscapes, the official politics of forgetting and its consequence for the affected ethnic community. The present article covers phases one and two.

**Historical background**

The Kola Peninsula has long had strategic importance for the Nordic countries and is historically considered a part of Norden (Skogan 1992). The natural resources and the demographic and socio-economic structures of the western part of the Kola Peninsula were similar to the Norwegian Finnmark and Swedish Norrland in the beginning of the twentieth century. Here Sami reindeer herders coexisted with Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish farmers, fishermen, and hunters of Barents Sea animals. A relatively mild northern climate created possibilities for agriculture and milk production.

The Peninsula’s indigenous Sami population has roots that date back to medieval times. In 1868, the imperial government in St. Petersburg decided to invite to Russian Lapland new settlers from neighbouring Sweden-Norway and the Grand Duchy of Finland. This decision led to a rapid Scandinavian colonisation of the Peninsula (Shrader 2005). In the late nineteenth century, there were more than 1000 settlers from Sweden-Norway, making up 8 per cent of the population of the Kola Peninsula (Thorsen and Thorsen 1991:14). Colonists founded a dozen Finnish settlements, Norwegian (Tsipnavolok, Kildin, and Terebirkka) and Swedish (Murmasjö, Kovda, and Kosoi vorot) colonies, and several settlements of Northern Sami. The Nordic newcomers chose an isolated lifestyle and usually preferred not to mix with the local Russian population (Volens 1926: 11–13; Saeter 1992; Carlbäck 2000: 75–6; Leinonen 2008; Orekhova 2009).

Unlike many European countries where ethnic minorities faced discrimination, the Soviet Union proclaimed a policy of support of cultural and linguistic rights for all ethnic minorities. In the 1920s, the Bolsheviks systematically promoted the national consciousness of minorities (Martin
2001). In the Russian North, the historical experiment of multinationalism included the establishment of dozens of autonomous territories, the training of native cadres and the introduction of a native system of education (Slezkine 1994).

The Soviet administrative rebuilding of Russia was prepared by the collection of data on nationalities. The first all-Soviet census of 1926 counted 1919 Finns, 1708 Sami, 715 Komi, 168 Norwegians, 108 Nenets, and 12 Swedes living in the Murmansk region. 148 residents were foreign citizens, most probably immigrants from Sweden and Norway. The total population on the peninsula at that time was 22,858 persons. Therefore Nordic minorities (without foreign citizens, Finno-Ugric Komi, and Uralic Nenets) made up approximately 16.7 per cent of the entire population and about 29 per cent of the rural population of the Murmansk region.

A number of national units were created on the Kola Peninsula with native-language media and schools. In 1930, a Finnish national district with Polarnyi as the centre was founded, including the Norwegian national council of Tспинвалок. The same year Sami autonomy with its centre in Jokanga and a Lappish national district with its centre in Kola were established (Routsala 2005). About 44.6 per cent of the population of the Polarnyi district at that time were Finns. Together with Sami, Norwegians, and Swedes, they made up the majority – 57 per cent of the population (Orekhova 2009: 208).


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1 The statistical data of the present chapter is based on the official results of the 1926 and 1939 Soviet censuses and on published or digital databases on the victims of Soviet terror, where ethnicity and place of residence are mandatory criteria. Among them are the Kniga pamiati (Memory Book: List of the Names of Persecuted People on the Kola Peninsula, 1997), the database of Memorial with over 2.6 million names of victims of the Stalinist terror, the regional database of North-Western Russia “Recovered Names” and the database “Repressed Russia” with over 1.4 million names.

2 The real number of Swedish immigrants was probably higher. Many settlers from the northern part of Sweden declared their Finnish ethnicity in the 1926 census. In 1938, the Swedish colony of Kovda (previously in Karelia) was included in the Murmansk region. The number of Swedish citizens increased in the 1930s as a result of the emigration of Swedish leftists and workers (the so called Kirunavsenskar) to the Soviet Union.
Fifteen years after the start of Nordic colonisation, the government of imperial Russia raised the alarm. In 1881, the Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared a secret report “Materials for the Solutions Related to the North of Russia, Murmansk, and the White Sea Ports”. The government recognised that emigrants from Sweden-Norway and the Grand Duchy of Finland had built within a short period of time a prosperous economic zone in the tundra. However, the 100-page document regarded the Finnish-Swedish-Norwegian colonisation of the Murmansk coast a huge political mistake, resulting in “the peaceful conquest of our West coast” (Materialy dla razrabotki voprosov 1881: 43). A number of countermeasures were proposed: administrative reform (elimination of the special colonist district), development of infrastructure in order to reorient the colonists from Sweden-Norway to Russia, attracting native Russians to settle at the Barents Sea coast, and finally Russification of the colonists (ibid. 41–53). As Jens Petter Nielsen points out “this process was motivated less by a desire to Russify than by the wish to preserve the unity and integrity of the Russian state” (Nielsen 2005: 22).

Imperial authorities noted that the second generation of Nordic colonists and Sami did not study the Russian language. In order “to Russianise the younger generation of colonists and Lapps” a special boarding school was established in Aleksandrovsk/Polarnyi where all subjects including the Lutheran religion were taught in Russian (Obshchezhitie dla detei kolonistov 1902).

The Soviet regime on the Kola Peninsula was established in 1920 after three years of civil war. The remote Northern periphery was terra incognita to the Soviet leadership, whose personal experience was urban and linked to the industrial milieu (Toulouze 2005: 140–1). The Soviet nationalities policy was based on the contradistinction between the past Empire of the Romanovs and modern Soviet Russia (Kotljarchuk 2012a: 24–30). Lenin and his party stressed that imperial Russia had been a “prison of nations” where an “exhaustive suppression of national minorities” prevailed (Drabkina 1930; Natsionalnye menshinstva 1929: 35–61; Lenin 1962: 69). Therefore, with the help of a favourable policy of ‘indigenisation’, the Bolsheviks aimed to attract people like the Nordic colonists and Sami to take their side (Kotljarchuk 2012b).

The concepts of the nationalities policies of the Russian empire and Soviet Russia were entirely different. Tsarist Russia decided on cultural
Russification; the Soviet state declared full support for minority rights and administrative autonomy. The Bolsheviks anticipated, in line with the Marxist doctrine, that Nordic colonists belonging to the poorer farmers and fishermen would be loyal to the new nationalities and socio-economic policy (Bogatstva Murmanskogo kraya 1934: 99). The government regarded reindeer herders of the North in a positive way as “primitive communistic groups” (Slezkine 1994: 220–1; Leete 2004: 28–30; Kotljarchuk 2012b). The main aim of the nationalities policy towards the Sami was “the elimination of the age-old backwardness”, that is, to help them catch up with other, “more advanced” minorities, but at the same time to reinforce their ethnic identity (Natsionalnye menshinstva Leningradskoi oblasti 1929: 35–6). The positive class evaluation of the Kola-Nordic communities gave an additional confidence to the authorities in the attainability of the goals of the new nationalities policy. However, not all local Bolsheviks believed in the progress of indigenisation. In 1929, the planning commission of Murmansk district discussing the future demographic development of the region made the following analysis:

> Murman was largely colonised not by Russians, but by Finns and Norwegians, something that certainly has a negative effect, in particular it was one of the reasons for the ceding to Finland in 1920 a part of our territory of the Western Murman.³

Therefore, the Murmansk planning commission proposed to move 2000 households of ethnic Russian fishermen to the Barents coast. Local Soviet authorities perceived Nordic settlements as a security problem.

Registration

The all-Soviet census of 1926 – the first complete census in Soviet history – included 188 ethnic categories classified around numerous linguistic groups. Alongside this census, the government initiated a special Polar census in which a highly detailed survey of indigenous groups and minorities of the Barents Sea area was collected (Thorvaldsen 2011). One of the

³ Докладная записка Мурманской окружной плановой комиссии "О переселении в 1930-1931 гг. 2000 семей рыбаков колонистов на мурманское побережье Баренцева моря". State Archives of Murmansk oblast (GAMO), fond R-132, opis‘ 1, delo 322, pp. 28–9. According to the 1920 Treaty of Tartu, Soviet Russia ceded the Petsamo area to Finland. In the years 1584–1919, this territory had been a part of the Arkhangelsk region of Russia.
official aims was “solving the national question” by mapping compact minority areas and producing scientific grounds for establishing national autonomy (Blum and Mespoulet 2003: 204–11). While part of the authorities used the collected data for the support of minority rights and facilitating social-economic transformation, the secret police analysed the same data for surveillance of different social groups that were considered suspicious (Holquist 2001).

The Soviet secret police was involved in the activity of the Central Statistical Office (TsUNKhU). The chief staff at the central and regional level were approved by the secret police and each branch of TsUNKhU had at least one police officer posted for duty. On the request of the secret police, the Central Statistical Office reported statistical data (Zhiromskaya 1999: 148–52). The NKVD had a special eighth department of statistics with detachments in every region that counted members of various suspicious social groups from foreign citizens to former White army soldiers (Tinchenko 2011–12). In 1934, the Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) was integrated into the Soviet secret police.

In 1925, by the initiative of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the Research Institute of the North (Institut Izucheniya Severa) was founded and already by the following year scholars from this institute published a socio-demographic investigation of colonists of Western Murman (Volens 1926). In 1927, an ethnographic map of the Murmansk region was prepared at the Soviet Academy of Sciences with description of the settlements of Sami, Finns, and Norwegians.

The role of Soviet scholars in the mapping of the Russian North and in collecting ethnic data has been discussed in previous studies (Eidlitz Kuoljok 1985; Kuropiatnik 1999). In his book on ethnographic knowledge and the making of the Soviet Union, Francine Hirsch drew attention to the role of statistical and anthropological mapping of minorities in the Soviet terror (Hirsch 2005: 273–308). Holocaust studies show the significance of anthropology and eugenics in the mapping of potential victims (Müller-Hill 1998; Gretchen 2004). Nevertheless, the link between Soviet anthropologic and demographic research and preparation of national operations of the NKVD is largely understudied.

In 1929, the Murmansk branch of the Central Statistical Office prepared a statistical report of the region, based on the all-Soviet and Polar census. It contained details on the ethnicity of the population of the Kola Peninsula, with data for all settlements. The survey included information on the “dominant ethnicity” of inhabitants, the number of their families, and
certain ethnic groups’ share of the village population (Murmanskii okrug 1929).

During the ‘national operations’ and deportations, the collected ethnic data was supposed to help identify suspicious nationalities (Blum and Mespoulet 2003: 219). The 1940 NKVD secret order on the “Resettlement of foreign nationalities from Murmansk and the Murmansk region” was based on the precise knowledge of citizens to be deported, their place of residence, gender, professional, and age profile (Kisilev 2008: 118–22). As Peter Holquist (2001: 133) noted, “with macabre precision the Soviet state indicated region-by-region target victims”. Unfortunately, the limited access to internal documents of the NKVD in Russian archives is an obstacle to gaining more thorough knowledge on the role of registration in the preparation of the Great Terror and Soviet deportations.

Isolation as instrument of covert policing actions

Studies of the Holocaust have shown that segregation and the international isolation of the German-Jewish population played a crucial role in the first steps towards genocide (Longerich 2007: 29–129). The question is, therefore, whether socio-geographic and international isolation facilitated the mass operations of the NKVD on the Kola Peninsula. On the eve of the Great Terror, all leaks abroad were unwanted. Reactions of the Scandinavian and Finnish press and diplomatic intervention would have significantly complicated the NKVD practice of mass repression. The illegal escape of potential victims was also an issue in the sparsely populated Soviet–Finnish–Norwegian borderland. One of the first steps of the government in isolating Nordic colonists and citizens was to limit their access to diplomatic missions. By 1937–38, Scandinavian diplomats worked under tremendous pressure. For example, the Soviet side denied visas to newly appointed Swedish diplomats, violated the principle of inviolability of the diplomatic bag, and arrested Soviet citizens belonging to the technical staff of Scandinavian missions. The NKVD also secretly installed listening devices in diplomatic apartments. These actions paralysed the consular service (Ken, Rupasov, and Samuelsson 2005: 114 note 87).

The next step was the liquidation of all diplomatic representation outside Moscow. The vice-consulate of Sweden in Arkhangelsk was closed in 1935, with the interests of Sweden in the Barents Sea region being represented by Norway after that. However, in 1937, the NKVD conducted the mass arrests of “persons affiliated and associated with the Norwegian consulate” in
Arkhangelsk, the latter being accused of being “a nest of espionage”. During the special operation, 63 individuals were arrested (including a Kola Norwegian merchant venture, Martin Ulsen), the consulate was closed, and Norwegian consul Albert Viklund who had grown up in Russia was forced to leave the Soviet Union (Ovsiannikov 1994). The Norwegian consulate in Arkhangelsk had been a traditional place for asking for help among Kola Norwegians and Swedes (Jentoft 2001: 110). In autumn 1937, the Soviet government demanded the closure of the Swedish consulate in Leningrad. At that time, the Murmansk district was a part of the Leningrad region. After the preparatory work and the evacuation of the property in January 1938, the consulate ceased to exist. In December 1937, at the request of the Soviet government, the consulate of Finland in Leningrad was likewise closed. Therefore, by January 1938, not a single representative of the Nordic states was based in north-western Russia.

On 28 October 1937, at the height of the ‘national operations’, the NKVD issued order 00698 “On combating counter-revolutionary espionage, terrorist, subversive activities of the staff of embassies and consulates of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Poland”. The order created a new concept in the Soviet repressive dictionary, namely, ‘consular ties’, which meant the criminalisation of any contact between Soviet residents and diplomatic missions. The order did not define the punishment, thereby opening the opportunity for mass violence. A new NKVD directive from 1 February 1938 equated ‘consular ties’ to other crimes of espionage, something that in practice implied the death penalty. The 00698 order also covered the embassies of Nordic countries. Paragraph 7 provided for the intensification of “surveillance of the other missions, through which the Japanese, German, Italian, and Polish intelligence services conduct counter-revolutionary work in the Soviet Union, namely Finnish, Austrian, Balkan and Scandinavian” (Bilokin 2000: 27). The diplomatic corps in Moscow discussed the shocking arrests of embassy visitors provided by the Soviet government. The Swedish Ambassador William Winter informed Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler of the impotence of diplomatic missions of the Nordic countries to help their compatriots.4

Strengthening of border control

The demarcation made as result of the 1920 Tartu Treaty between Finland and Soviet Russia divided Scandinavia and the Kola Peninsula with a 300-kilometres straight-line boundary under Finnish and Soviet control. For the first time in history, a well-guarded border between two hostile states isolated Russian subjects in the High North from their western kinsmen.

The new border broke family ties. In tsarist Russia, Kola Norwegians and Finns had free contact with residents of nearby Norway and the Grand Duchy of Finland (which was still under Russian control). The port of Aleksandrovsk and the Norwegian town of Vardø were connected by a regular ferry. In Vardø, Kola Norwegians, Finns, and Swedes usually baptised and confirmed their children and bought necessary goods, including fishing equipment, boats, and coffee (Volens 1926: 20). The Sami people moved freely in the tundra between Finnish and Russian Lapland. However, in the mid-1920s Soviet authorities imposed a ban on the output of the Kola colonists to the port of Vardø and tightened their control over meetings between Russian and Finnish Sami.

Starting in the 1920s, a special ‘border zone’ was erected (Martin 1998: 830), dividing the Nordic colonists and Sami of the Kola Peninsula from Finland and Norway with a 22-kilometre wide border strip. Every Soviet citizen, including locals, were required to have a special NKVD-border guard permission in order to enter the border zone. Entering the territory of the zone without identification documents was forbidden.

In 1934, fortified border areas were introduced and starting in 1935 a special programme to create a politically reliable squad within the population of the border area was realised. NKVD officers were ordered to deport to the inland all unreliable individuals and every village council in the border area was to have a police officer. The local party organisations were instructed to increase the number of communists and Komsomol members (Ramanava 2007). As a result, by 1937, the local party branch in the Norwegian colony Tsipnavolok included 12 members (Jentoft and Goncharova 2008: 94), among them no Norwegians.

Increasing economic restrictions made smuggling a survival strategy of the colonists and Sami. The centre of smuggling was the Rybachy Peninsula (Fiskarhalvøya/Kalastajasaaarento). Before the Second World War, this peninsula was divided between Soviet Russia and Finland. On the eastern shore of the peninsula were Tsipnavolok, as well as some Finnish farms and settlements of Norwegian Sami. On the west coast of the peninsula close to
the Soviet border, the Finnish village of Vaidaguba was situated. As a result of strict border control, colonists had to meet their compatriots illegally during fishing and hunting sea animals in the Barents Sea. However, the establishment in 1933 of the Soviet Northern Navy and of the base of the maritime border guard in Polarnyi led to a significant limitation of the meetings on the sea and in the tundra.

*Propaganda of hatred*

Unprecedented in Soviet history, state-run terror demanded mass propaganda of hatred. Genocide Studies show that the Holocaust was prepared through a governmental campaign that was filtered to society through mass media (Glass 1997: 129–45; Herf 2006: 17–49; Jones 2011: 487–98). As Leo Kuper has shown, it is not the social conditions within a society that cause genocide, but rather a situation where the powerful make the decision to exterminate a group of people (Kuper 1982: 40–56).

The ideological orchestration of ‘national operations’ included two main aspects. First was the concept of the new round of mass repressions directed this time against suspicious nationalities, then the conceptualisation of terror and its implementation in society. At the end of March 1937, the newspaper *Pravda* published a speech Stalin gave at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 3 March 1937, titled “On the errors of party work and further steps to eliminate the Trotskyite and other hypocrites”. The full text appeared as a separate edition and was reprinted by the local press. In this speech, Stalin formulated the “essential facts” that laid the ideological foundation of the Great Terror. If in the beginning of the 1930s repressions were directed against certain social groups (i.e., kulaks and priests), now the dictator warned about the total cleansing of Soviet Union. According to Stalin “sabotage and subversive spy work of agents of foreign states hit the Soviet state and our organisations from top to bottom” (Stalin 1997: 151). Nevertheless, Stalin announced a thesis of the permanent nature of class struggle in the USSR. In 1937, the media dictionary of Soviet newspeak was enriched by a number of new terms (Pöppel 2007). The formula of ‘capitalist encirclement’ meant a dramatic turn of Soviet domestic and foreign politics. For the first time, Stalin did not make any exception and all the neighbouring countries entered the list of enemies (Stalin 1997: 151–73). The idea of international solidarity with the working class and Western communism was abandoned in favour of the isolation and distrust of foreigners. In the orders to the
NKVD, Stalin and the party leadership emphasised that the mass operations against Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Chinese, and Romanians applied to both foreign and Soviet citizens.⁵

In the summer of 1937, publications on the activities of foreign intelligence agents were one of the hot topics in Soviet press. On 11 July 1937, the chief of the fourth secret political department of the NKVD for the Leningrad and Murmansk areas, Petr Korkin, published in *Leningradskaya Pravda* an article titled “On the subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in the rural area”. The author claimed that even the remote areas of northern Russia had become “an active field of intelligence services of capitalist encirclement” (Kotljarchuk 2012a: 122–34). A number of prints published in hundreds of thousands copies were talking about the destructive espionage of capitalistic states against the Soviet Union and their internal agents. The publications were addressed to all groups of society: from the NKVD officers and party officials to kolkhoz propagandists, librarians, and pioneer leaders (see Zakovskii 1937; Shpionam i izmennikam 1937; Shpionazh i razvedka 1937; Zilver 1938). As Oleg Khlevnyuk (1992: 170) has pointed out, Soviet writers and journalists produced easily recognisable stories during the Great Terror suggesting that mass purges were justified and that the country was full of spies.

The Soviet Union had stable diplomatic, economic, and political relations with Sweden and Norway. Unlike Finland, these neutral countries were not on the list of primary Soviet enemies. The Kremlin evaluated the relationship with these Scandinavian countries as always correct (Chubar’ian and Riste 1997: no. 191, Ken, Rupasov, and Samuelsson 2005: 33–4). For the Kremlin leadership, it was significant that unlike in Finland the Communist parties in Sweden and Norway acted legally. The fact that these countries did not have a common borderline at that time with the Soviet Union also played a role. However, the spiral of the Great Terror changed this positive image and from 1937 numerous articles were published depicting Norway and Sweden as the main bases of espionage against the Soviet Union (see Hôtes inopportuns 1937; Tarle 1937; Norvezhskaya diplomaticheskaya 1937; Gribov 1938). Soviet publications

⁵ Постановление ЦК ВКП (б) от 31 января 1938 года "О продлении до 15 апреля 1938 года операций по разгрому шпионско-диверсионных контингентов из поляков, латышей, немцев, эстоцев, финов, греков, иранцев, итальянцев, китайцев и румын, как иностранных граждан, так и советских подданных, согласно существующих приказов НКВД СССР." Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (RGASPI), fond 17, opis’ 166, delo 585, p. 27.
became a matter of great concern for Swedish diplomats in Moscow who realised that the Kremlin consciously built a negative image of Sweden.\(^6\)

The thesis of active espionage suggested a wide network of domestic agents, and according to the Soviet press, the agents were members of numerous minorities. In 1937, the readers of *Polarnaya Pravda*, the leading official newspaper of the Murmansk region, learned that local Soviet cadres of the Polar district were “Finnish nationalists who despise the Russian language, incite enmity between Finns and Russians, and undermine the Soviet kolkhoz system” (Razgromit’ burzhuaznykh 1937). The newspaper of the national Polar district “Polarnoin kollektivist / Polarnyi kollektivist”, which appeared both in Finnish and Russian published a series of articles against “Finnish bourgeois nationalists who usurped the political power in the district” (Paikallisesta nationalismista 1937; see also Mitä tekee 1937; Natsionalisticheskie nastroeniya 1937; Otkazalas’ razgvarivat’ 1937; and Bystree likvidirovat’ 1937).

Many publications were about meetings at which the workers of the country unanimously supported the elimination of ordinary spies and saboteurs (Edinstvenno spravedlivyi 1937). The judgment of the state was presented as a verdict on behalf of the entire society. The largest children’s daily newspaper *Pionerskaya Pravda* published a number of articles about foreign countries’ espionage and children helping the police to catch the spies. The article “Exposing the conspiracy” was about the arrest of a spy at the door to a Norwegian consulate (*Pionerskaya Pravda* 1937: 20).

Through propaganda, the population and local authorities were prepared for the mass cleansing of certain minorities. This was important for two reasons. First, the national operations and the deportation of minorities were secret; their progress was not reported by the Soviet media (unlike the Moscow trials). Second, to hide mass arrests in rural areas was not possible, and the exact number of captured people became known next day. The state-organised propaganda campaign reached its goals. NKVD documents of 1937–38 show that the simple reference to the ‘foreign origin’ of an arrested individual convinced witnesses of the guilt of the accused person. For provincial policemen, the official newspapers served also as information sources that helped to elaborate the design of ‘national operations’ (Vatlin 2004: 49).

Organised massacre

In July 1933, Stalin visited the Kola Peninsula together with the head of the Leningrad region Sergei Kirov and defence minister (people’s commissar for military and navy affairs) Kliment Voroshilov. Stalin was the first leader of Russia and the USSR to visit this region. By a Politburo decision, the Northern Navy with 12,000 military personnel was established in the centre of the Finnish national district of Polarnyi.7 Industrial development was promoted in conjunction with further militarisation of the peninsula. Geological exploration, which started in the 1920s, led to the development of a number of mines. According to the second five-year plan for the Soviet economy, a number of large strategically important factories and facilities were built on the peninsula. Thus, over a short period of time the Kola Peninsula transformed from a nature reserve into an area of high military significance (Shashkov 2000; Mikoliuk 2003; Kotljarchuk 2012b).

The new strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula for the totalitarian regime turned the Nordic minorities into a perceived threat. In 1937, the NKVD started top-secret mass operations in order to execute members of several ethnic minorities (Werth 2003; Savin 2012). At a meeting of the Politburo on 20 July 1937, Stalin initiated the first operation by writing “a proposal” that “all Germans working in our military, semi-military, and chemical plants, and in electrical power stations and building sites, in every region, are to be arrested” (Repressii protiv sovetskikh nemtsev 1999: 35). In all, 56,787 Germans were arrested, 41,898 of whom were shot. Only 820 of them were citizens of the Reich (Okhotin and Roginskii 1999: 70–4). The second operation was “Polish”, leading to the arrest of 139,815 Soviet Poles and the execution of 111,071 of them (Repressii protiv polakov 1997). A number of other operations were organised after these models, concerning, for example, people of Greek, Latvian, Iranian, Afghan, Bulgarian, and Finnish nationality. According to official statistics, altogether 335,513 people were arrested in these ‘national operations’, 247,157 of whom were shot (Werth 2003: 232; Savin 2012: 43).

Sami, Norwegians, and Swedes were not officially covered by these campaigns and therefore not included into the official data. However, the state-run violence against them was designed in accordance with the principles of other ‘national operations’ (Kotljarchuk 2012b). In 1937–38, the NKVD fabricated a number of ‘underground organisations’ on the Kola

7 Протокол Политбюро ВКП (б) № 139 от 15 июня 1933 года. RGASPI, fond 17, opis’ 3, delo 924, p. 18.
Peninsula. Kola Norwegians were accused of spying for Norway and Germany as members of a fictitious espionage organisation, the “Blue Cross or the Order of Rosicrucians”. Finns were supposed to be agents of Finland’s General Staff and the Petsamo bureau of the Finnish secret police Valpo (Mikaliuk 2003: 101–2; Savilova 2008). Dozens of Sami were accused of being members of an underground rebel organisation, the alleged aim of which was to establish an independent Sami state (Kotljarchuk 2012b).

The Sami underground rebel organisation was a falsification of the NKVD and already in 1940 a number of policemen were arrested and sentenced to prison for “violations of socialist legality during the investigation of the Sami case” (Kiselev 1999). Einar Laidinen and Sergey Verigin (2004: 168–9) found the names of 179 actual agents of Finland, of whom 89 were natives of the Karelian and Kola borderlands, but among whom were no Sami. Among those arrested in the course of the Nordic operations were also ethnic Russians. For example, Vasily Alymov, the director of the Murmansk museum and a leading researcher of Sami culture, was accused of being the designated president of a future Sami state. His wife and adult son were also arrested and shot. The NKVD used the correspondence of Alymov with Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish scholars regarding the Sami as “evidence of the international network of a Sami underground organization” (Kotljarchuk 2012b).

Altogether, 694 Finns, 68 Sami, 23 Norwegians, and 6 Swedes were arrested in the Murmansk area in 1937–38, approximately one fifth of the adult population belonging to these nationalities (Mikaliuk 2003: 62–3; Kotljarchuk 2012b). Most of the victims were shot. The executions were decided by a so-called troika – a three-man meeting of the local police chief, the local prosecutor, and the party secretary. The death rate of the arrested during the Great Terror among Kola Norwegians was 77 per cent, a higher figure than the 73.8 per cent average for all victim groups of the NKVD’s ‘national operations’. The death rate of the arrested Sami was 64.7 per cent (Kotljarchuk 2012b: 69). Many of those who had been sentenced during the Great Terror by a troika to “ten years incommunicado” were also murdered. Thus, the final number of Nordic victims might be even higher.

The Great Terror and mass arrests caused a deep economic crisis of previously prosperous Finnish, Norwegian, and Sami kolkhozes. In January 1939 the local government of the Polar district stated that the production

8 Дело контрреволюционной шпионско-повстанческой организации ”Голубые крестья или Орден Розенкрейцеров”, 1938 год. GAMO, fond P-140, opis’ 3, delo 3153.
plan of 1938 was fulfilled by only 20 per cent and that most of the fishing boats were not staffed (Klovu 1939).

A number of features distinguish the ‘national operations’ from other parts of the Great Terror, making them similar to genocide. The murders were conducted secretly on a mass scale. The suspicious ethnicity was one of the determining criterions for most of the arrests. The victims were killed under cover of night and buried en masse in unmarked places. Large-scale places, for example in Levashovo, were guarded by the secret police until the time of perestroika. In many other smaller places, the NKVD sought to conceal all traces of mass murder. The arrested people disappeared and relatives did not get to know what really happened to them until the fall of the Soviet Union. Among the victims – supposed members of Nordic and Sami ‘nationalistic’ organisations – were also people of other ethnic backgrounds (Russians, Komi, Latvians, etc.). This is one of the differences between the Soviet mass murder and the Holocaust. However, all those arrested by the Murmansk police were connected in some way to Scandinavia and Finland, or had close personal relations with Nordic families. Another difference as compared to the Holocaust is that the direct victims of the Great Terror were adults only.

Deportation

An argument for the Soviet regime to use mass violence against Nordic minorities in order to secure the Murmansk region was the Winter War. In January 1940, the Soviet Foreign Office accused Sweden and Norway of supporting Finland and planning a large-scale war against the Soviet Union (Vneshniya politika SSSR 1946: no. 395). In his speech at the Supreme Soviet on 29 March 1940, the head of government and Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov explained for the Soviet elite the reasons for the Winter War and blamed Great Britain, France, and Sweden for supporting Finland against the USSR. According to Molotov, the Great Powers intended to use Finland, Sweden, and Norway as a springboard for a future war. Therefore, he claimed, the Soviet occupation of the Petsamo area aimed to protect the Murmansk region and railroad (Shestaya sessia Verkhovnogo 1940: 26–37).

9 The Levashovo forest in the neighborhood of St. Petersburg is the largest mass grave of the victims of the Great Terror in Russia. Here many of Kola Finns, Sami, Norwegians, and Swedens were murdered in 1937–38. In 1989, the mass graves of Levashovo were opened to the public. Since that time, dozens of memorials have been erected to the memory of different ethnic groups, among them Finns, Norwegians, Estonians, Poles, Germans, Italians, Lithuanians, and Assyrians.
As a result of the Winter War, the Soviet Union occupied Finland’s Petsamo area, which until 1920 had been a part of Russia. Finland lost its access to the Arctic Ocean and a new state border between the USSR and Norway emerged. In addition to this, large border territories in middle and southern Finland were incorporated into the USSR.

In the course of preparation for the Winter War, on 16 September 1939, Murmansk was given a special status as a closed city. As part of this decision, the Politburo ordered the NKVD to deport from the city “500–700 suspicious people, especially Finns and Estonians”.¹⁰ To protect the new state border, 10 NKVD border guard regiments were sent to the Karelian and Murmansk sector, totalling 7000 soldiers. Like in eastern Poland, the NKVD began to ‘cleanse’ the new territory of former citizens. However, 312 Finnish citizens of the Petsamo area were repatriated to Finland, and not deported and interned like the Poles (Savilova 2008: 142–3). That this was not seen as a solution to the security dilemma is evident from the order of NKVD’s chief Lavrentiy Beria in July 1940 that all Finns, Norwegians, Northern Sami, and Swedes of the Murmansk region be deported. The deportation included 6973 Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes living on the Kola Peninsula as well as a small number of Balts who were forcibly relocated from the Kola Peninsula to the inland of north-western Russia.¹¹ Russian Sami were not included in this list. Those of them who lived in the borderland had already been forcibly resettled by decision of the local government in February 1940 to the inland of the Peninsula (Stepanenko 2002).

Unlike, for example, the deportation of Soviet Koreans from the Far East, which was justified with reference to Japanese espionage (Gelb 1995), the regulations and instructions of the Murmansk deportation do not contain any reasons for the resettlement. The threat of the Nazi German advance to the Russian Arctic after the occupation of Norway in May of 1940 was not reflected in official documents because the USSR and Nazi Germany had to act as allies after the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.

¹⁰ Постановление политбюро ЦК ВКП (б) "О переводе города Мурманска на режимное положение", 16 September 1939. RGASPI, fond 17, opis’ 162, delo 26, p. 5.
Another reason was the new dimension of violence during the Second World War that resulted in the transition from terror to large-scale deportations of certain minorities. Starting in January 1940, the NKVD carried out extensive deportations of Poles from western Belarus and Ukraine. On 5 March 1940, the Politburo under the chairmanship of Stalin adopted a secret resolution on the execution of all Polish soldiers and officials captured in 1939. As a result, at least 21,736 Polish nationals were killed in the Katyn forest and other places of the Soviet Union.

**Destruction of economic, cultural, religious and family life**

The radical change of nationalities policy resulted also in the abolition of all Nordic autonomous territories on the Kola Peninsula and the abolition of the native (Finnish, Norwegian, and Sami) school system in 1938. This was justified by the Kremlin and local authorities in terms of the threat, for example, that national territories “were established by bourgeois nationalists” and had become “a base for numerous spies” (Gatagova 2005: no. 132). Minority schools on the Kola Peninsula were said to have “become an arena of anti-Soviet bourgeois influence on children” where the “Russian language was ignored and discriminated against” (Gatagova 2005: no. 136). Moreover, native newspapers and libraries on the Kola Peninsula were closed, and textbooks in native languages were confiscated and destroyed or moved to the so-called ‘special deposit’ (spetskhran). On 17 January 1938 the last issue of Polarnoin kollektivisti appeared in Finnish language. The liquidation of the native system of education and press, and the linguistic Russification policy was explained by the local authorities as serving the colonists and their children’s future (Ivanov 1938). The 1940 deportation led to the economic collapse of the western area of the Kola Peninsula. On 5 August 1940, the local government of Murmansk reported to the central government in Moscow that because of the “relocation of foreign nationalities, many territories of our region, especially the Kola and Polar districts, remained entirely without labour”. The deportation was followed by the expropriation of property and destruction of material objects. The Lutheran churches that had existed on the Peninsula since the end of the nineteenth

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12 Докладная записка исполнительного комитета Мурманского областного совета в Совнарком Союза ССР “О переселении в Мурманскую область 286 хозяйств из других областей Союза ССР.” 5 Aug. 1940. Russian State Archives of Economics (RGAE), fond 5675, opis’ 1, delo 330, pp. 46–7.
century and dozens of Sami Orthodox churches were destroyed (Berdieva 2000: 85).

After the Second World War, the Kola Peninsula as a Soviet borderland to the NATO alliance became the most militarised and high-security area of the country. Deported Nordic groups never returned. A number of deported nations were rehabilitated on a collective base and their national autonomies were re-established after Stalin’s death. The case of Kola Nordic groups is similar to Volga-Germans, Soviet Koreans, and Poles, who did not receive permission after the war to return home and did not regain autonomy. The punishment of these groups was collective, no matter what the post-Stalinist rehabilitation offered on the individual level.

The Sami case is unique in Soviet history. Not only was Sami national autonomy, which existed on the Kola Peninsula in the 1930s, never restored, the forcible deportation of the Sami population continued until the 1960s. By 1965, almost all reindeer herders had been concentrated in the four kolkhozes of Lovozero (Gutsol 2007). As a result, the Sami people lost their indigenous rights to their nomadic lifestyle, along with most of grazing lands and water resources in Russian Lapland. The balance between use of natural resources and suitable development was destroyed (Kozlov 2008: 21–3). Population pressure led to the depletion of grazing lands and the ecological destruction of the tundra. The population of reindeer declined from 40,000 animals in 1964 to 25,000 animals in 2001. Unemployment and alcoholism became spread among the Russian Sami and many of them left their homes for major cities in north-western Russia (Kozlov 2008: 23–4).

The Nordic colonies and Sami settlements on the Kola Peninsula were small with a fragile cultural heritage that could easily be destroyed. Today most of the former Nordic villages have no indication of previous human habitation, though on some of them military installations have been built. The cultural landscape created during a century of Nordic colonisation has been eradicated.

In 1995, the Norwegian government introduced a special repatriation programme for Kola-Norwegians and their descents who had immigrated to Russia and could not return after 1917. Through this programme, approximately 150 people came back to their historic homeland. Finland has a special individual programme of repatriation for Russian citizens of Finnish and Ingrian descent.

The Great Terror on the Kola Peninsula had a disproportional impact on men. The brunt of repression was directed against men of the age of sexual reproduction (20–45 years old), something that contributed to the vulner-
ability of the population. The terror also had a great impact on men in the age group of 46–72 years. This cohort reached adulthood before the October revolution and was, as it was regarded as belonging to *l’ancien régime*, seen as populated by potential enemies of the Soviet government. The age profile of these victims also reflects the fact that elders who traditionally occupied the leading position in the local communities suffered most from the terror (Kotljarchuk 2012b).

The forced deportation of Nordic minorities in 1940 also contributed to the prevention of a normal reproductive and family life. Deported people were placed in special settlements under the direct control of the NKVD. The food supply and economic situation in special settlements were often worse than in the Gulag. Unlike the Gulag camps, the contingent of special settlements (*spetsial’nye poseleniya*) was based on the family structure. This contributed to the high mortality rate of children (Kotljarchuk 2011). The special settlers (*spetsposelentsy*) were interned until 1954 and did not get permission to return home afterwards. After the Second World War, the Murmansk area remained a special regime area where former ‘criminals’ were not allowed to reside. As a result of this, the Nordic colonists were spread over the entire Soviet Union and lost their connectedness.

**Conclusion**

There are several interacting links between the different phases of this ethnic violence. Mass arrests and the disappearance of people in 1937/38 created an atmosphere of fear that helped the authorities in 1938/39 to destroy without protest the administrative and cultural autonomy of minorities and the native system of education. The Great Terror contributed to the lack of collective resistance in the course of the forced deportation of 1940. The deportation of Nordic minorities led to the economic collapse of the western part of the Kola Peninsula and provides evidence for Michel Foucault’s claim that it is meaningless to look for logically structured economic purposes in the activities of political regimes that prefer violence over dialogue and do not care about economic consequences (Nilsson 2008: 83–91).

The present study confirms Alain Blum’s and Martine Mespoulet’s (2003: 204–25) observation that, in the course of censuses and statistical investigations, the Soviet government constructed different ethnic categories that were not only used for the support of minorities, but also for cruel mass violence towards certain groups. The secret police collected
ethnic data for the domestic surveillance of citizens in many interwar states. The U.S. military intelligence service (MID) used the New York City registration data in order to keep track of immigrant groups (foreign-born Jews) who, according to the MID, created a counter-intelligence problem (Bendersky 2000: 158–282, 337–93). However, while such policies led to unlawful surveillance and discrimination of minorities in democratic states, it was a starting point for mass killing and ethnic cleansing under totalitarian regimes.

After having isolated the Kola-Nordic population from Scandinavia, the Soviet authorities executed their repressive mass operations in silence and avoided international protests. The changed nature of Soviet nationalities policy remained unknown in Norden and for many Scandinavians, the Soviet Union continued to be an inspiring example of a positive nationalities policy and a functional planned economy (Wråkberg 2013).

The main contributions of propaganda in the course of the Soviet terror were the following: (1) creating a negative image of the at-risk groups, (2) claiming that the members of certain national groups did not belong to the loyal part of society, (3) creation of an atmosphere of uncertainty, fear, and suspicion in the national districts, (4) creation of general fear of certain ethnic minorities, (5) explanation of mass arrests, (6) glorification of informers and their collaboration with the secret police, and (7) neutralisation of bystanders in order to change their behaviour to active or passive cooperation with the NKVD and non-resistance to on-going mass violence.

Like in Nazi Germany (Friedlander 1980), the Soviet bureaucracy manipulated formal language in order to make its communication incomprehensible to bystanders. The NKVD orders, for example, used the following definitions: ‘contingent’ (kontingent) for arrested jailed and deported people, ‘first category’ (pervaia kategoriya) for those who were to be murdered and ‘second category’ (vtoraia kategoriya) for those to be sent to the Gulag. Instead of deportation (deportatsiya) or forcible relocation (vyselenie), the party and NKVD edicts preferred to speak about ‘resettlement’ (pereselenie). Such a use of language contributed to the dehumanisation of the victims.

The founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin, had believed that instead of the capitalist state that he defined as “an apparatus of suppression” the Bolsheviks would build a classless global community (Lenin 1969: 90–1). This utopia turned to the nightmare of mass killings and the destruction of dozens of Soviet minorities.
Dividing the analysis of Soviet mass violence into different but inter-related phases and dimensions makes it possible to investigate state-run violence against minorities as a continuous political process. Future research should investigate additional similarities and differences between Soviet crimes against humanity and other genocides.
Top: Map of Russian Lapland, St. Petersburg, 1745 (Photographer: Andrej Kotljarchuk)

Bottom: Ethnographic map of the Murmansk region. Blue – Sami; deep blue – Finns; striped red – Norwegians; red – Russians (Photographer: Andrej Kotljarchuk)
Polarnoin kollektivisti

Moskovon kaupungin Stalinkin vaalitulosten vaaliendelissä kokouksessa Suuressa Teatterissa joulukuun 11 päivänä v. 1937

Toveri I. V. Stalinin puhe

Koko Sowietvaltion hallinto on hallinto, joka on rakennettu Stalinin ajasta.

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Mourning ribbon in the Sami language over Petr G. Chaporov (executed in 1937 by the NKVD in Leningrad), Levashovo Memorial Cemetery, St. Petersburg 2000 (Photographer: Aleksandr Stepanenko)
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PART 1. NATIONAL IDENTITIES

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